Attempts for Peace between Ukraine and Russia: Ukraine’s Pursuit for its Rights, Russia’s Insistence on its Demands

Since the early years of his tenure, Russian President Vladimir Putin hoped to influence Ukrainian politics and make the country more aligned with Russia. However, after Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych failed to retain power in February 2014, the new government appeared to distance itself from Russia. In response, President Putin escalated his demands to the point of denying Ukraine’s territorial integrity. He resorted to the use of force to unilaterally “annex” the Crimean Peninsula and to instigate and promote a separatist conflict in the eastern Donbas region. For its part, Ukraine established its firm stance to resist influence from Russia and rapidly developed its defense capabilities. In 2021, President Putin apparently became determined to change this trend and escalated again his demands to the point of subjugating Ukraine. To achieve this goal, in February 2022, he launched a military operation to control Ukraine’s capital. This operation failed, and Russian troops withdrew from the area around Kyiv; however, the goal of subjugating Ukraine remained.

In response to Ukraine’s call for ceasefire talks, Russia presented a draft treaty aimed at making Ukraine a neutral country. Both sides negotiated over the draft, but on April 15, 2022, President Putin added a phrase to the draft that would effectively eliminate the possibility of implementing security assistance guarantees for Ukraine. He then continued to pursue aggression rather than the possibility of an early ceasefire. However, in September, Russia suffered a crushing defeat, losing much of its occupied territory. In response, Russia took steps to extend the nominal border lines in its constitution up to the lands controlled by Ukraine in the four oblasts (regions). This increase in Russia’s demands made it even more difficult to settle the conflict. Ukraine made further progress in regaining the occupied territories but was unable to advance in 2023 due to the strengthening of the Russian defensive line. In June 2024, President Putin declared that he would negotiate in pursuit of a “final resolution” to the conflict only after Ukraine’s decision to withdraw its troops from the four regions. Although the Russian army advanced that year, it fell far short of the inflated Russian aspirations of attaining the whole of the four regions and subjugating the state of Ukraine.

If Ukraine manages to stop the advance of the Russian army by increasing its military capabilities with the supports from its partners, the conditions for a “Mutually Hurting Stalemate” (MHS) will be reached, and the probability of a peace agreement will become higher (Peace Plan A in this paper). In contrast, United States President Donald Trump, who took office in 2025, believed that Ukraine’s concessions would satisfy Russia and lead to a ceasefire agreement (Peace Plan B). However, Russia hoped to make further progress on the battlefield and continued its attacks on Ukraine, never giving up its demand for the elimination of security guarantees for Ukraine and showing little interest in other concessions. Facing this reality, President Trump began to express his frustration with Russia and put pressure on the country. However, as the implementation of Peace Plan A would require a long-term commitment of resources, he remains hopeful for a short-term settlement through Peace Plan B.

Neither of these peace plans can be accepted by Ukraine as long as Russia continues to reject security guarantees for Ukraine. Even if Russia were to shift to a ceasefire agreement, it could revert to the use of force whenever such a move appeared to offer the possibility of further gains. For Russia to believe that it can benefit from reducing its demands and engaging in negotiations rather than relying on force, Ukraine must be strong enough to stop Russia—a difficult and lengthy path ahead.

Full report (Japanese)