Considering Defense Facility Siting: Facility Acceptance, Justice, and Trust
SUKEGAWA Yasushi
Summary
The siting of defense facilities generally unfolds in two stages: (1) the national government selects a candidate site based on operational and geographical requirements, and (2) the host community determines whether to accept the facility. This second stage is particularly fraught, often escalating into “siting conflicts.” Contestation arises because the negative externalities—such as noise and safety risks—are concentrated locally, even as the facilities provide broad national benefits. While mitigation and burden reduction remain vital policy goals, the operational nature of defense facilities often makes these externalities difficult to eliminate entirely.
Facility siting research examines how to secure community acceptance by developing “siting strategies” and “guidelines.” This paper reviews these approaches and their implications for defense facilities. Japan has historically facilitated siting through negotiated agreement and compensation-oriented consensus building; defense facility administration has expanded its compensation schemes and other “harmony-building” measures.
Under the utilitarian “standard model,” siting is justified if a facility’s societal benefits exceed its costs, with compensation provided to the host community to offset negative externalities. From a resource-allocation perspective, siting is regarded as socially “efficient” when compensation costs are minimized. However, this approach is heavily criticized for concentrating locally unwanted land-use (LULU) in specific communities—a central concern of environmental justice. Furthermore, viewing acceptance as a two-party coordination problem between the national government and the local community reveals why their negotiations may fail. Even when siting appears “efficient,” the process can stall because the candidate site is under no obligation to consent to distributional bargaining and may simply exit the negotiations.
An alternative approach stresses justice, where siting and acceptance are guided by distributive and procedural justice. Because it is crucial whether communities perceive the outcome and the procedure as fair, defense facility administration requires a perspective that balances efficiency with justice. In this regard, the paper highlights “trust” as a critical third coordination mechanism, alongside the traditionally dominant “authority” (a hierarchical approach) and “price” (an individualistic, market approach). If the government and the local community can build a partnership based on trust, they may foster a consensus rooted in solidarity—a motivation unlikely to emerge in relationships defined by control or transactions. This shift opens new avenues for addressing distributional disputes.
The literature suggests that perceptions of justice and trust are correlated. If defense facilities impose significant burdens on host communities, it is essential to adopt practices that promote distributive and procedural justice. Ultimately, demonstrating fairness builds a reputation for trustworthiness that ensures both initial siting and long-term management.
