

## 国際会議参加報告

### 第 50 回 国際軍事史学会大会の概要

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国際軍事史学会（ICMH）の第 50 回大会が、8 月 31 日から 9 月 5 日までの間、セネガル共和国ダカール市にある Hotel Azalai Dakar を会場に開催された。共通テーマは「反乱と主権」であった。参加国は、ヨーロッパとアフリカを中心に約 30 カ国におよび、大会参加者約 150 名の内、50 名以上が報告を行った。大会の運営は、セネガル軍の全面的支援の下に行われた。

31 日に黒人文明博物館およびアフリカルネッサンス記念碑における研修に続いてセネガル国防大臣主催の歓迎レセプションが行われ、大会は始まった。研究会は 9 月 1 日から実施され、14 のセッションに分けて進められた。各セッションにおいて 3～4 名が各々 20 分の発表を行った。発表は英語、フランス語のいずれかで行われ、英語の発表はフランス語に、フランス語の発表は英語にそれぞれ同時通訳された。

日本からの発表者は、1 日に出張者（進藤）が「厚木航空隊事件」について発表し、4 日に立命館大学・宮脇昇教授が日露戦争における鉄道輸送について発表し、いずれも好評を得た。

大会期間中に行われた個々の発表は学術的水準が高いものがほとんどであった。植民地支配に対する反乱の具体例を取り上げた発表の他、複数の反乱を対象とした比較研究、事象としての反乱の類型化とそれぞれの特徴を分析した発表も行われた。開催地がセネガルであったことから、アフリカにおける植民地支配と反乱の諸問題に関する発表が多かった。

表敬行事と各種研修もほぼ毎日行われ、憲兵隊司令部、セネガル軍史料・歴史遺産局、国軍博物館、平和維持活動博物館、国軍設立 50 周年博物館等を訪問した。4 日には奴隷貿易の拠点の 1 つであり、世界遺産に登録されているゴレ島に渡り、同島歴史博物館を研修した。その前日（3 日）にバンディア自然保護区を見学し、西アフリカに生息する動植物を自然状態で観察できた。最終日の 5 日は総会が開催された後、陸海空各軍の参謀総長が協同で主催した夕食会が行われ、大会は終了した。

第 51 回大会は、「境界線（国境等）：統合と協調 対 分離と紛争」を共通テーマとして 2026 年 8 月、ブラジル連邦共和国のフォス・ド・イグアス市で開催される予定である。

例年同様、今回の学会において軍事史に関する様々な研究発表を聞くことができた他、各国の研究者と意見交換もでき、世界各地の研究動向と関心事項を把握することもできたので、防衛研究所による情報発信と国際交流の促進に役立った。また、各国の研究者とのネットワーク作りの場としての意義も大きかったと思われる。

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# “A Divine Nation Does Not Surrender!”: The Atsugi Rebellion, August 16-23, 1945

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## 要約

1945年8月15日に玉音放送により日本政府が降伏を決定したことが発表され、陸軍と海軍は全体としてその事実を受け入れたが、一部の部隊は抵抗した。中でも第302海軍航空隊（302空）による厚木航空隊事件は最大級の反乱事件となった。

302空は1944年3月に新設され、厚木飛行場を根拠地に関東の防空に従事していた。開隊以来の司令官であり、歴戦の指揮官であり隊員の信望も厚かった小園安名大佐は8月11日、天皇がポツダム宣言を受け入れる意向であるという情報を得ると、降伏が天皇の本心でないと確信し、徹底抗戦を決意した。15日の玉音放送を受けて、小園は「皇国に降伏はない」として、302空の海軍からの独立と抗戦継続を隊員に宣言した。16日から全国各地に伝単を空中散布するなどの方法により、他の陸海軍部隊にも蹶起を呼びかけたが、同意する部隊はなかった。

降伏に向けたアメリカとの交渉への悪影響を懸念した海軍は説得による鎮静化を試みた。ところが、17日ごろから小園は南方で罹患したマラリアによる熱が再発し、行動不能に陥り、21日に強制的に海軍病院に入院させられ、反乱は原動力を失った。海軍大佐であった高松宮宜仁王の説得も功を奏して、302空副長・菅原英雄中佐は反乱の収束を決意し、21日、小園大佐が移送された直後に302空の武装解除を命じた。それでも抵抗を続ける意志を有した隊員約80名は、武装解除される直前の戦闘機30数機に分乗して、無断で陸軍の狭山および児玉の飛行場に脱出したが、やがて説得その他の方法により恭順させられ、反乱事件は収束した。

厚木航空隊事件が発生した背景に、小園大佐と隊員との強力な信

頼関係と絆があり、軍の組織としての統制力や軍紀がそれを抑えられなかったことがある。また、小園大佐と海軍上層部が相互に不信感を抱いていたことが、事前に反乱事件を防ぐことを困難にした。さらに、終戦（停戦）当日まで激しい闘志を燃やして戦っていた部隊に降伏決定を徹底することの難しさも、反乱の原因として指摘されている。

## Introduction

On August 11, 1945, the Japanese Government decided to accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and surrender to the Allies. The decision was finalized on August 14, and the Emperor formally announced the decision to the Japanese people through a radio broadcast at noon on August 15. Most units of the Japanese Army and Navy, at home and abroad, accepted the Emperor's decision. However, a few units overtly opposed the decision to surrender. In the following, I will discuss the largest of these, which was the rebellion by the Imperial Navy's 302nd Air Group. This started on August 16 and ended on the 23rd. Better understanding the Atsugi Rebellion can improve our understanding of how World War Two ended, just over 80 years ago.

The Navy's 302nd Air Group was the principal protagonist of the Atsugi Rebellion. The 302nd was established on March 1, 1944. It was stationed on Atsugi airfield, which is about 25 miles southwest of Tokyo. While the Army Air Forces were responsible in general for the air defense of the home islands, the Navy was authorized to defend the skies over its major bases. The 302nd was one of three air groups established by the navy for that purpose and was responsible for defending the skies over the Yokosuka Naval District. In practice, it defended, alongside its Army Air Force counterparts, the skies over the entire Kanto region, which encompasses the Tokyo-Yokohama area. It was equipped with single and twin-engine fighters, and bombers converted to a fighter role. The operational strength of the 302nd fluctuated between a few dozen planes to about 100 planes of all types. For the first few months of its existence, the 302nd acted more as a training unit for other air groups, but from November 1944, began playing an increasingly active role in the air defense over the Tokyo-Yokohama area. It fought its most intense air battles in 1945, as the American strategic bombing campaign against Japan reached its climax, and in fact engaged in aerial combat through and on August 15, the last morning of hostilities.

The 302nd's first and only wartime commander was Captain Yasuna Kozono. Kozono was born in November 1902, and commissioned a naval officer in July 1923, straight out of the Naval Academy. He earned his pilot's wings in 1926, and served in China, before being appointed vice commander and executive officer of the Tainan Air Group in October 1941. He served in that position during the offensives against the Philippines

and Dutch East Indies before advancing to Rabaul in April 1942, where he took part in the campaigns against Port Moresby, and later, Guadalcanal and the Solomon Islands. The Tainan Air Group was renamed the 251st Air Group in October 1942. Kozono was named its commander in November and led the group until he was relieved and sent back to Japan in September 1943.

Kozono was a charismatic, aggressive, and innovative combat commander. He was extremely popular among the pilots under his command, and Kozono reciprocated their devotion and loyalty. On the other hand, he increasingly became disillusioned with the officers of the Naval General Staff, who he felt were “desk admirals” who had no combat experience and no knowledge of the realities of the front. Kozono felt that the Navy had brought Japan to the verge of defeat in 1945 because of the incompetence of those officers. For their part, the navy establishment recognized Kozono’s abilities as an effective combat leader but also considered him to be an eccentric maverick and headstrong troublemaker.

In addition to being a capable military commander, Kozono was a devoted student of the *Kojiki* (Record of Ancient Matters), which is an early Japanese chronicle, part history and part myth, of the creation of the Japanese archipelago, the *kami* (gods), and the Imperial line. Through this interest, Kozono came to have strong beliefs about the inviolability of the Japanese emperor and Japan as a “Divine Nation” (*Kokoku*). This would become a major factor in his decision to initiate the rebellion in August 1945.

By early August 1945, Kozono was advocating an overhaul of the Naval General Staff through lawful means. His stance changed on the night of August 11, when Kozono was informed that the Emperor had decided to accept the Potsdam Declaration and to surrender. Since Kozono firmly believed that “surrender” was a concept which did not exist for the Emperor and the Divine Nation, the decision to surrender had to be the result of duplicity or disinformation by the Emperor’s cabinet and advisors, and not the Emperor’s sincere intention.

Above all, Kozono was deeply concerned that surrender would destroy Japan’s *kokutai*. *Kokutai* is an ancient, classical concept. It has been variously translated as Japan’s polity, or national essence, or the emperor system. It essentially includes Japan’s entire political, social, cultural, economic and other systems and values, headed by the emperor. Kozono feared surrender would destroy all of these things which made Japan

what it was, and therefore would destroy Japan itself. Most of the various groups opposing surrender shared this concern, which was expressed as *kokutai no goji*, or preservation of the *kokutai*.

Kozono first tried to convince the command of the Yokosuka Naval District to intervene and block the surrender but was rejected. Giving up any further hope of working through the Naval District command, Kozono from the 12th through the 14th tried to convince the various commanders of the Army and Navy units in his vicinity to rise up with the 302nd and continue the fight to ultimate victory or utter defeat and destruction. Most were sympathetic but almost all were noncommittal about joining Kozono in an overt rebellion. The only “commitment” Kozono secured was a promise by Rear Admiral Hisahachi Kudo, the commander of the Security Force of the Yokosuka Kaiheidan (the personnel training and education command within the Naval District). Kudo promised to not order his security forces to subjugate any rebellious activity at Atsugi.

On August 15, following the Emperor’s noontime radio address to the nation, Kozono assembled his officers, and declared that the Emperor had been deceived by his advisors into surrendering, and that Japan, as a Divine State, and its military knew not and could not surrender. He further announced that the 302nd would continue to fight with an absolute faith in ultimate victory. Interestingly, Kozono had told the 302nd that they were free to decide whether to join him in his fight to ultimate victory or to be discharged and go home. All of the 302nd willingly stayed to continue the fight, although a few had some misgivings.

Then, in a radio message to the entire navy, Kozono declared that the Japanese Navy’s leadership had forfeited all legitimacy to command because it had agreed to surrender, and that the 302nd was therefore no longer obligated to follow the Navy’s orders and would thereafter fight on as an independent force. Unfortunately for Kozono, however, the Navy managed to suppress much of the transmission, and Kozono did not receive any supportive or favorable response from other units.

The 302nd Air Group was determined to fight on alone, if necessary, to ultimate victory or utter defeat. It had stockpiled three months’ worth of food, weapons, and ammunition, and had approximately 130 aircraft, although many were under repair and inoperable. Kozono commanded 1,000 men in the 302nd and counted on 3,500 more

from the neighboring 1st and 2nd Sagamino Air Groups.

The Navy was now fully aware of Kozono's intentions, and moved to quell the rebellion, first by attempting persuasion. The commander of the 3rd Naval Air Fleet, Rear Admiral Kinpei Teraoka, proceeded to Atsugi on the afternoon of the 16th and tried to persuade Kozono to stand down, only to be rebuffed. The Navy then relieved Kozono as commander of the 302nd and appointed Captain Sakae Yamamoto, commander of the 71st Air Flotilla, to serve concurrently as the 302nd's commander. Kozono, however, remained physically at Atsugi and thus in de facto command of the 302nd.

From the 16th through the 18th, the 302nd dropped leaflets over other Japanese Army and Navy bases as well as various cities, exhorting the Japanese to fight on with the 302nd. Various members of the 302nd also went to neighboring bases and nearby urban areas for the same purpose. Unfortunately for the 302nd, however, none of these efforts produced any results.

Even as the rebellion thus got underway, Kozono began suffering a relapse of malarial fever, which he had been infected with during his earlier deployment in the South Pacific. He began experiencing recurring bouts of severe fever and delirium late on the 14th. Over the next few days, he repeatedly suffered relapses. While he did have periods of lucidity, he was essentially confined by the 18th to his quarters by his staff, and repeatedly had to be sedated with tranquilizers. On August 20, the 302nd's chief doctor misdiagnosed Kozono with schizophrenic tendencies and arranged for him to be forcibly removed from Atsugi and transferred to a navy hospital. Early on the 21st, Kozono was heavily sedated and transferred to the Nobi naval hospital in Yokosuka.

While these events were transpiring, the Navy reaffirmed its decision to quell the rebellion through persuasion rather than force. The Navy leadership feared the use of force might escalate the rebellion, which might then derail the surrender process, especially if the Americans became aware of the fact. On August 19, staff officers of the Third Air Fleet met with the 302nd's assistant commander, Commander Hideo Sugawara, instead of Kozono, who was incapacitated by fever and delirium, and proposed that Sugawara talk directly with Prince Takamatsu, Emperor Hirohito's younger brother and a Navy captain, if Sugawara was still not convinced the Emperor himself actually wanted to surrender. Sugawara had had misgivings about the rebellion from the beginning, was all but convinced personally by this time that the Emperor truly wished to surrender, and

agreed to meet with Prince Takamatsu on the evening of the 20th, accompanied by Lieutenant Commander Minoru Yoshino, chief of the 302nd's maintenance group and one of the rebellion's hardliners. Sugawara believed that the hardliners waiting at Atsugi could be convinced to give up the rebellion if Yoshino could be persuaded about the Emperor's true intentions. Prince Takamatsu calmly told them that surrender was indeed the Emperor's true desire, and suggested that the two speak directly with the Emperor if they were still unsure. This finally convinced Yoshino that surrender was truly the Emperor's own decision and not the result of deception or coercion. The two returned to Atsugi, and told the waiting officers that surrender was the Emperor's decision and that the 302nd should surrender accordingly.

By early morning of the 21st, the 302nd's senior officers had resigned themselves to surrendering, and orders were given to ground and disarm all aircraft. However, this precipitated a mass exodus by the junior officers. Approximately 80 junior officer and noncommissioned pilots and crew commandeered 34 aircraft to continue the fight and flew to the Army's air bases at Sayama and Kodama, each about 30 minutes' flying time to the northwest of Atsugi. However, these efforts were ultimately futile. The Sayama group was persuaded to give up and subsequently flew back to Atsugi. Officers sent to Kodama rendered all of the renegades' planes unflyable by slashing their tires. The Kodama group was then loaded on trucks to return to Atsugi but found themselves under arrest. The Sayama group's officers were later also arrested.

At Atsugi, with Kozono and the most rebellious pilots gone by late morning of the 21st, the rebellion swiftly petered out. Fuel was drained and propellers removed from all remaining aircraft. In the afternoon of the 21st, the 302nd was disbanded, and its members were told to go home. While there was a final violent outpouring of emotion on the night of August 21, the remaining members of the 302nd began heading home from the 22nd, and the war at Atsugi was essentially over.

As mentioned above, Kozono had strong beliefs about the uniqueness and inviolability of the Japanese imperial family. These beliefs, along with his strong distrust of and contempt for the Navy's high command, were the catalysts which triggered Kozono to openly rebel against Japan's decision to surrender. Kozono felt a rebellion was justified because he sincerely believed that the Emperor did not truly desire to surrender, but rather had been deceived into deciding so.

Kozono's personality was also a major factor in the Atsugi rebellion. The feelings of loyalty and devotion he and his subordinates, in particular his junior officers and non-commissioned crew, felt towards each other resulted in his becoming somewhat of a cult figure among his pilots. The strong bond between the commander and his junior officers led to the marginalization of his senior officers. The senior officers thus found it more difficult to restrain their commander, and Kozono could more readily exert personal and direct influence over his junior officers. However, it should be remembered that most of the senior officers initially were in favor of the rebellion and continuing the fight.

Kozono's strong personality and distrust of the Navy's leadership also hampered the Navy's ability to defuse the rebellion before it began. Many in the Navy's leadership had come to regard Kozono as a loose cannon, and by 1945, there was nobody who could or was willing to talk Kozono out of resorting to extreme measures.

Finally, the sudden decision to surrender was a factor in the 302nd's decision as a whole to continue fighting. The 302nd fought hard and was highly motivated even during the morning of August 15, in the last aerial combat of the war. In retrospect, it was unrealistic to expect them to suddenly stop fighting, just because they had been ordered to do so by higher commands.

Kozono and the Sayama and Kodama groups were charged with group insubordination, instead of the more serious charge of sedition or mutiny, and court martialed in October 1945. The non-commissioned aircrew were given suspended sentences and released immediately. The officers were initially given five-year sentences, but all were fully pardoned in April 1947. Kozono was initially sentenced to life in prison, but his term was commuted to twenty years, then ten, before he was released on parole in December 1950. However, their ranks and service records were not restored, which affected their ability to qualify for pensions. Kozono passed away in November 1965, aged 58. His widow did not qualify for a survivor's pension until the Pensions Law was revised in May 1974.

The Atsugi Rebellion thus ended without any real, tangible effect on Japan's surrender and the start of the American occupation. The advance party of the American occupation force was delayed by a typhoon and did not arrive in Atsugi until August 28, which gave the Japanese time, albeit barely, to clean up the utter mess left by the riot on the night of

the 21st. Japanese concerns that the Atsugi rebellion might affect the start of the occupation therefore did not materialize.

The Atsugi Rebellion remains significant today because it is another reminder that the termination of conflicts can be messy and complicated. Participants on both sides of a conflict must keep in mind the importance of managing and controlling groups which are opposed to conflict termination because they feel it would mean the end of their nation and way of life. In the case of the Atsugi rebellion, both Japan and America were fortunate that it ended without escalating further, enabling the World War to finally and formally end on September 2, 1945.