

第 48 回 国際軍事史学会大会の概要

清水 亮太郎

2023（令和 5）年度の第 48 回国際軍事史学会大会は、9 月 3 日から 9 月 8 日までの 6 日間にわたり、トルコ共和国イスタンブール市にて開催され、共通テーマは「戦争と都市：軍事紛争の都市空間・住民への影響」であった。

合計 24 カ国から約 120 名が参加して、日本からは日本軍事史学会理事・稲葉千晴氏（名城大学教授）、大井昌靖氏（元防衛大学校准教授）、防衛研究所戦史研究センターの清水（筆者）及び伊藤頌文研究員が参加した。

上記の共通テーマの下、13 のワーキングセッションと 1 つの Ph.D. ワークショップにおいて、合計 53 の発表が行われた。開会式では、エルハン・アフヨンジュ トルコ国防大学長、マッシモ・レオナルディ国際軍事史学会会長による歓迎と開会の辞に続いて、ギュルテン・イユルディス トルコ国防大学教授が「都市戦争における変化と持続」と題する基調講演を行った。

本大会は、トルコ軍事史学会及びトルコ国防省の支援のもとに開催され、史跡研修ではアヤソフィア大聖堂、トプカプ宮殿、ハルビエ軍事博物館などを見学することができた。最終日の総会では、理事会及び各委員会による報告が行われ、承認された。それによれば、今後の開催地として、2024 年度はポルトガル共和国（リスボン）、2025 年度はセネガル共和国（ダカール）が予定されている。共通テーマは、それぞれ、「政治的移行期における軍隊の役割：18 世紀から現代へ」（リスボン大会）、「1800 年以降の反乱、離脱、そして主権」（ダカール大会）とのことである。

（防衛研究所戦史研究センター戦史研究室主任研究官）

The Japanese Empire and the Holy See in World War II:  
The Undercover Warfare after the Yalta Conference

清水 亮太郎

【要約】

第二次世界大戦において、中立国は、連合国、枢軸国双方にとって、戦略的な情報を取得し、交換するチャンネルであった。昭和天皇は、日米開戦前から終戦時の和平仲介のチャンネルとしてローマ教皇庁を重視していたほか、カトリック教徒が住民の圧倒的多数を占めるフィリピン統治の必要などから、開戦後東條英機首相に命じて 42 年 4 月、公使館を開設し、フランス・ヴィシー政権の大使館で参事官を務めていた原田健が初代公使として教皇に信任状を捧呈した。米国もまた、CIA の前身である OSS は早くからヴァチカンを諜報活動の拠点としており、その情報にヴェッセル (Vessel) という符牒を用いていたことが知られている。

この研究報告では、1944 年後半から 1945 年 5 月頃までの期間に、日本、米国、そしてローマ教皇庁との間で、ヤルタ会談に関してどのような情報のやり取りが行われたのかについて、日米の外交史料、旧 OSS 史料などを用いて分析、検討した。それらを通じた結論として、大戦末期のヤルタ会談における極東密約に関する情報が、中立国ヴァチカン市国における情報戦の焦点となったとの指摘を行った。

Introduction

In the very final stages of World War II, Japan asked the Soviet Union to mediate a peace with the Allies. There was still effective Neutrality Pact between Japan and the Soviet Union since April 1941. However, the Soviet Union had promised the United States and Britain at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 that it would enter the war against Japan two or three months after the German surrender.<sup>1</sup> After the war,

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<sup>1</sup> In the Yalta conference, it was agreed that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan under the following conditions: 1) The status quo in Outer-Mongolia (The Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved; 2) The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored; 3) The Chishima Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

this diplomacy toward the Soviet Union has been severely criticized as “illusionary diplomacy.”<sup>2</sup>

It is believed that the "secret agreement at Yalta" was promptly conveyed to Japan by the military attaché Onodera Makoto from Stockholm, Sweden, a neutral country. However, according to recent studies, the report was not a definite report on the Soviet Union's participation in the war.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, recent studies have revealed that more accurate intelligence on Soviet entry into the war was conveyed to the General Staff headquarters in Tokyo from Bern, Switzerland, and Lisbon, Portugal.<sup>4</sup> In this presentation, I would like to examine what kind of battles were being fought in the neutral Vatican over the intelligence concerning the Yalta secret agreement.

## 1 OSS and ‘Unconditional Surrender’

The U.S. wartime intelligence agency, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), was the point of contact for peace negotiations in Switzerland. As is well known, the OSS and the Japanese side had various discussions regarding the conditions for surrender.

Allen Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) after the war, worked primarily on peace negotiations with anti-Nazi forces in Germany. By the end of January 1945, Dulles, based at the OSS Bern branch, made contacts in Switzerland with anti-Nazi resistance groups and with German military personnel who were critical of Hitler.<sup>5</sup> In a report explaining about the military personnel who took part in the failed assassination attempt against Hitler on July 20, 1944, Dulles concluded that he was convinced an affirmative program along the following lines would make the German military submit to the Americans and British before the Soviet Union created chaos in East Germany.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Hosoya Chihiro, *Ryoutaisenkan no nihon gaikou* [Japanese diplomacy in the interwar period] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1988), p. 331.

<sup>3</sup> Bert Edström, *Master Spy on a Mission: The Untold Story of Onodera Makoto and Swedish Intelligence 1941-1945* (London: amazon.uk, 2021).

<sup>4</sup> Yoshimi Masato, *Shusenron: naze ketsudan dekinakatta no ka* [War termination: Why couldn't a decision be made?] (Tokyo: NHK Publishing, 2012).

<sup>5</sup> As for Dulles' search for a separate peace with German forces, see, Allen Dulles, *The Secret Surrender* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966).

<sup>6</sup> Office of Strategic Services, “Memorandum of Information for the Joint Chief of Staff (1945/1/27),” National Archives and Record Service (NARA), M1642, Roll 22.

- 1) Unconditional surrender remains an unaltered policy, but German military leaders are seriously concerned about the future of its country.
- 2) All cities in Germany are on the verge of being able to spare unnecessary destruction and achieve a resumption of economic life through proper distribution of food and supplies.
- 3) Officers of Wehrmacht who contribute to constructive policy should facilitate the liquidation of the Nazi regime.

This report was submitted by the OSS deputy director to the JCS.

By at least the end of 1944, there was a clear understanding, both at the OSS headquarters in Washington and in the European theater, that the goal should be to achieve an early end to the war, without strictly adhering to the literal interpretation of “unconditional surrender” vis-à-vis preventing the expansion of Soviet influence and minimizing the sacrifices of U.S. military personnel.

## 2 Yalta Conference and the Secret Warfare in Vatican

Emperor Showa had a sense of affinity with the Vatican ever since he visited it as a crown prince. When Emperor Showa (then Crown Prince) visited Europe in 1921, Pope Benedict XV reportedly mentioned in a conversation with the Emperor, “The Catholic Church is the most powerful organization striving to combat radical ideologies to maintain peace and uphold order in the world. The Japanese Empire and the Catholic Church may be working together frequently in the future.”<sup>7</sup>

Even before the Japan-U.S. war, the Emperor valued the Holy See as a channel for peace negotiations to bring the war to an end. After its outbreak, due to the convenience of intelligence gathering and the immense spiritual influence it wielded worldwide, as well as the necessity of governing the predominantly Catholic population in the Philippines, the Emperor ordered Prime Minister Tojo Hideki to establish a

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<sup>7</sup> Imperial Household Agency, *Showa tenno jitsuroku* [Records of Emperor Showa], vol. 3 (Tokyo: Tokyo Shoseki, 2015), p. 402.

legation in Vatican City in April 1942. Harada Ken presented his credentials to the Pope as the first Japanese Minister extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the Holy See.<sup>8</sup>

Similarly, in December 1939, the United States, although it did not have official diplomatic relations with the Vatican due to concerns about public anti-Catholic sentiments, sent Myron Taylor, a wealthy magnate in the steel industry, as a personal envoy of President Roosevelt. Furthermore, the OSS had used the Vatican as a base for intelligence activities from early on, and it is known that “Vessel” was the codename for the information.

On January 26, 1945, OSS Assistant Director Charles Cheston noted that Minister Harada conveyed the following to the Pope, as reported by Vessel.<sup>9</sup>

The Japanese government is positive Stalin will unconditionally refuse to abolish the non-aggression treaty with Japan. [...] The Soviet government has definitely told the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow that Soviet Union will request the British and Americans to seek the basis for a negotiated peace in the Far East, on condition that the Japanese government accedes to the Russian suggestion that the Far East peace conference be compromised of France, the United States, Japan, China, Russia and Great Britain.

Through the Department of the War, information that the Soviet Union promised Japan to renew the neutrality pact and made an appeasement proposal regarding peace in the Far East reached Brigadier General Andrew McFarland who participated as staff in the Yalta Conference.

An OSS report to the JCS on January 24 contains information from the OSS branches in Bern and Rome that anti-Hitler groups in Italy and Switzerland led by Ernst von Weizsäcker, German ambassador to the Holy See (former foreign undersecretary and father of Richard von Weizsäcker, president of West Germany from 1984 to 1994), were calling on the Vatican to mediate peace. It also included a detailed report regarding the activities and statements of Kanayama Masahide, counselor at the Japanese legation in the Vatican.

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<sup>8</sup> Terasaki Hidenari and Mariko Terasaki Miller, *Showa tenno dokuhakuroku* [Monologue of Emperor Showa] (Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 1995), pp. 96-97.

<sup>9</sup> OSS, “Official Dispatch (1945/2/3),” NARA, M1642, Roll 119.

According to the report, when Counselor Kanayama held a meeting on January 17 with the two acting secretary of state of Vatican, Giovanni Montini and Domenico Tardini, Kanayama stated as follows.<sup>10</sup>

Our ambassador in Moscow has informed our government that the Far East problems will be discussed when the Big Three meet. The United States, supported by Churchill, will ask for Russian help to crush Japan completely. The Anglo-Americans will ask that Russia denounce the pact of non-aggression with Japan and that Russia passively participate in the Pacific War and permit Anglo-American use of Russian air bases. Our government also understands that, before Stalin will agree to this, he will request a wholehearted attempt on the part of the Anglo-Americans to mediate, and that he will even offer to act as mediator. Our government also understands that the Big Three will discuss European problems first, and that if they are not settled to Russia's satisfaction, especially the Polish question, then Stalin will not discuss the Far East.

Kanayama then expressed hope that the Pope would help with the peace mediation before the Far East issues were discussed at the Yalta Conference. Acting Secretary of State Montini asked whether the Japanese government can offer terms for peace that would be closer to those of the Anglo-American to enable the Holy See to begin mediation. Kanayama responded that he would communicate Montini's request to the Japanese government and reiterated that the Holy See commence mediation immediately if possible.<sup>11</sup>

If Kanayama's statements are true, he had a remarkably accurate understanding of the Yalta Conference. He was no doubt the first Japanese person to know the details of the Yalta secret agreement, before the conference was even held. This information was communicated not only from the OSS to the JCS but also to the State Department and the White House.

If Harada and Kanayama at the Japanese legation in the Vatican had made completely different statements to Holy See officials, what can we understand from

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<sup>10</sup> OSS, "Memorandum of Information for the Joint Chief of Staff," 24 January 1945, NARA, M1642, Roll 22.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

this? It is conceivable that they had received different information from different sources. The information conveyed by Kanayama was genuine information that covered actual topics to be discussed at the Yalta Conference. The inclusion of items that the United States later requested to the Soviet Union, especially the invasion of Manchuria and the establishment of air bases in the Far East Siberia, suggests that the information was sourced from the United States. Kanayama's information on the Yalta conference was far more accurate and specific than the assessment sent to Tokyo by Ambassador to the Soviet Union Sato Naotake, who was said to be the source.

In fact, Giovanni Battista Montini, who later became Pope Paul VI (1963-1978), is believed to have cooperated with the OSS through Earl Brennan, a former diplomat who had been stationed in Italy and headed the Italy desk in the Secret Intelligence (SI) division at the OSS's Washington headquarters.<sup>12</sup> If Kanayama had accurate information regarding the detailed agenda of the Yalta Conference, the intelligence may have been conveyed from the OSS, perhaps through Montini.

On the other hand, Minister Harada's pro-Japan conciliatory information was implausible and the opposite of the assessment by Ambassador Sato in Moscow, alleged Harada's source.<sup>13</sup> It thus can be assumed as disinformation. At the Yalta Conference, it served as information to raise the worth of the secret agreement vis-à-vis Roosevelt, who requested the Soviet's participation in the war against Japan.

At around this time, Vessel information was handled by Captain James Angleton, who was then with the SI division in Italy and later became a senior official at the CIA and the model for the main character of the film *The Good Shepherd* (2006). Vessel's Sub-sources included individuals connected to German, Soviet, and British intelligence services.<sup>14</sup> Although information on European matters was full of errors, that on Japan was for whatever reason highly valued and trusted by key figures in the U.S. administration including Roosevelt himself. Vessel information was a mix of both valuable and questionable intelligence.

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<sup>12</sup> Richard Harris Smith, *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 84.

<sup>13</sup> As for Ambassador Sato's assessment of the Soviet-Japan relation, see, Kurihara Ken, *Sato Naotake no menboku* [Sato Naotake's Honor] (Tokyo: Hara shobo, 1981).

<sup>14</sup> Robin W. Winks, *Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939-1961* (New York: Morrow, 1987), p. 356.

The Soviet Union had recognized and resumed diplomatic relations with the Badoglio government, which was established after the Allied invasion of Sicily and the arrest of Mussolini, in March 1944, before the United States and Britain did so.<sup>15</sup> Although the Soviet Union had no diplomatic relations with the Vatican, it may have utilized the Holy See as a channel to input information favorable to itself amid a war with Germany.

The above suggests that an international, i.e., a U.S.-Soviet, intelligence warfare was taking place over the Yalta secret agreement in the Vatican, a neutral country. Regrettably, records of the telegram exchanges between the Japanese legation in the Vatican and Foreign Ministry in Tokyo from January to June 1945 have not been preserved or made public. Therefore, it is impossible to know what information Harada or Kanayama had sent (or did not send).

Meanwhile, from late May to June 1945, after the collapse of Germany, the OSS conducted peace negotiations through a different channel. Records of these negotiations are preserved both in the United States' intercepted and decrypted records called MAGIC and in Japan's diplomatic documents. There are also memoirs of OSS operatives.<sup>16</sup> In a report to Tokyo on June 3, Minister Harada speculated as follows regarding the intentions of the United States that proposed peace negotiations to Japan:

Although the European war is expected to end, there may be further deterioration in the political situation depending on the subsequent attitude of the Soviet Union. Conversely, in the Far East, it is likely that the Soviet Union will enter into the war in the final stage and take control of Manchuria, while also inciting the Chinese Communist government to secure its foothold.<sup>17</sup>

It is noteworthy that this report, too, mentions the Yalta secret agreement to involve the Soviet Union in the war.

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<sup>15</sup> Paolo Spriano, *Storia del Partito Comunista Italiano*, vol. 5, *La resistenza*, Togliatti e il partito nuovo (Torino: Einaudi, 1975), pp. 293-294.

<sup>16</sup> Martin S. Quigley, *Peace without Hiroshima: Secret Action at the Vatican in the Spring of 1945* (Lanham: Madison Books, 1991).

<sup>17</sup> From Minister to the Vatican Harada to Foreign Minister Togo, June 3, 1945, "Bachikan shikyo yori Beikokugawa to no sesshoku ni tsuki teian ni tsuite [Vatican bishop's proposal on contact with the U.S. side]," *Nihon gaiko bunsho Taiheiyo senso 3* [Documents on Japanese foreign policy, the Pacific War 3], pp. 1701-1702.



According to Martin Quigley, who was involved in these activities, William Donovan, director of OSS, instructed Quigley to find a way to bring a peace proposal directly to Tokyo and to negotiate Japan's surrender. After Rome fell in 1944, Donovan held audiences with the Pope and with Ambassador Weizsäcker of Germany. He regarded the Vatican as an important base for peace negotiations with the Axis powers, particularly Germany.<sup>18</sup>

In line with U.S. intentions, the negotiations with the Japanese side were conducted by Egidio Vagnozzi, a Vatican diplomat (State Department official) who had spent ten years in the United States as a member of the apostolic delegation in Washington.<sup>19</sup>

As mentioned earlier, Eugenio Pacelli, later Pius XII, had extensive diplomatic experience and maintained a close relationship with the United States, including direct exchanges of letters with Roosevelt. Nevertheless, he was quick to express concerns over Roosevelt's view of the Soviet Union as a guarantor of the post-war European order. In particular, he severely criticized Roosevelt's demand for Japan and Germany's "unconditional surrender," which was announced during the Casablanca Conference in January 1943.<sup>20</sup>

Furthermore, between late 1944 and early 1945, the Pope became increasingly concerned about the dangers posed by the advancement of Soviet forces into Eastern and Central Europe. In particular, he conveyed to Taylor his concerns that the Soviet occupation of Poland and the Baltic countries, which had significant Catholic populations, went against the principles of the Atlantic Charter.<sup>21</sup> The agreement reached at the Yalta Conference among Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin to establish communist control over Poland and divide Germany must have been the worst outcome for the Pope, Montini, Tardini, and others.

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<sup>18</sup> Quigley, *Peace without Hiroshima*, p. 80, 84.

<sup>19</sup> Kanayama Masahide, *Dare mo kakanakatta Bachikan: katorikku gaikokan no kaiso* [The Vatican no one has written about: A Catholic diplomat's recollections] (Tokyo: Sankei Shuppan, 1980), p. 45, 55.

<sup>20</sup> John Pollard, *The Papacy in the Age of Totalitarianism 1914-1958* (London: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 360-361.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 362.

An estimated six million Catholics lived in Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic countries, and Poland, including the Uniates who followed the Roman Catholic and Greek Orthodox liturgies. Following the Russian Revolution, Pacelli, as papal nuncio in Berlin, held negotiations with the Soviet ambassador in Berlin to guarantee the activities of Catholic bishops in the Soviet Union. Subsequently, the negotiations continued with the aim of granting the Holy See's approval of the Soviet Union in exchange for the Pope's right to appoint bishops. However, the Soviet government imposed a complete ban on activities of the Catholic Church, and illegally operating priests were sent to concentration camps.<sup>22</sup> These negotiations with the Soviet Union during the interwar period decisively influenced Pius XII's perception of the Soviet Union.

### Epilogue

As has been examined, information about the Yalta secret agreement may have been communicated to the Japanese side in the Vatican in mid-January 1945, shortly before the Yalta Conference. There is no definitive evidence confirming whether this information was transmitted to the Japanese side during this period or if it reached Tokyo. However, there is no mistake that such attempts were motivated by the Holy See and U.S. intelligence services' clear intention to contain the expansion of Soviet influence in the post-war world and promote peace negotiations between Japan and the United States.

In addition, this presentation elucidate that an intelligence warfare was underway over the Yalta secret agreement before the Yalta Conference was held in the neutral Vatican. Intelligence about the Yalta secret agreement was utilized as a lever to promote peace negotiations between Japan and the United States. Furthermore, amid this undercover warfare, the OSS began to function as a somewhat independent actor from U.S. politics and the military, i.e., to operate as an intelligence agency.

To briefly review the subsequent events, on June 22, the Japanese government, through the Imperial Conference, formally decided to seek peace mediation with the Soviet government. This was the result of domestic political considerations, rather than

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<sup>22</sup> Bernard Lecomte, *Bachikan no himitsu: Kyoukoutyou no himerareta nijyuseiki shi*, trans. Yoshida Harumi, (Tokyo: Kawade shobo shinsha, 2010) [ *Les Secrets du Vatican*, Paris: Perrin, 2009], p. 11, 20, 27.

an objective analysis of the international relation, and the belief that the Army, which did not approve of peace negotiations, would agree to them if it was the Soviet Union to request the mediation.

This was due to the fact that there were not a few people in the middle ranks of the bureaucracy and military who preferred a Soviet style political and economic system to Anglo-American style liberalism, as well as the expectation that the Soviet Union would take a favorable attitude towards Japan in anticipation of a post-war conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union.

On July 10, the Supreme War Guidance Council decided to send former Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoye, carrying a personal letter from the Emperor, to the Soviet Union as a special envoy to request peace mediation. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Sato Naotake negotiated with the Soviet Foreign Ministry on the acceptance of Konoye, but the Soviets rejected it because Japan's proposal was not specific enough. On July 26, the Potsdam Declaration of the United States, Britain, and China, demanding Japan's unconditional surrender, was announced.

At the Potsdam Conference, Stalin was informed by President Truman of plans to use the atomic bomb against Japan, which accelerated the schedule.<sup>23</sup> On August 8, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan, and on the following day, August 9, Soviet forces began their invasion of Manchuria. Coincidentally, this was exactly three months after the German surrender.

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<sup>23</sup> Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Racing the enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the surrender of Japan* (Cambridge: Belknap, 2005).