

Paper Abstracts in English

The End of the Pacific War as A Prehistory of Postwar Japan-U.S. Relations

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This paper presents an overview regarding the dilemma between “a fundamental solution to the cause of the conflict” and “a compromise peace,” based on the perspective that the postwar period is contiguous with the termination of the war in question. It sets forth the idea that an equilibrium point for solving the dilemma between “a fundamental solution to the cause of the conflict” and “a compromise peace” can be determined based on the relative importance of “future risks” and “current sacrifices” for the side that is the dominant force, as independent variables. Then, from the viewpoint of this theory regarding war termination, this paper provides an overall picture of the Pacific War.

Furthermore, this paper looks in detail at the latter stages of the end of the Pacific War, and, in regard to factors related to Potsdam Declaration acceptance, it focuses on the possibility that a meeting of the Supreme War Council had been scheduled for August 9, 1945 more for discussing a response from the Soviet Union than for discussing the Hiroshima nuclear attack. It thus points out the possibility that between the Hiroshima nuclear attack and an entry into the war by the Soviet Union, the latter was of greater influence. Moreover, this paper considers the actual format of war termination in further detail by taking into account domestic political factors such as negotiations between a faction in favor of surrendering with one condition and a faction in favor of surrendering with four conditions.

During the Pacific War and the postwar period that continued after this, what the United States initially sought before all else was to realize a “pro-American” Japan through “demilitarization” and democratization. Meanwhile, what the United States most wanted to avoid was the acceptance of a “militarized, anti-American” Japan. Thus, the United States focused on the future risks of such a “militarized, anti-American” Japan, and, instead of “a compromise peace” with such a Japan, chose a format of war termination close to the pole of “a fundamental solution to the cause of the conflict.” As for the establishment of the postwar Japan-U.S. Alliance, although this was accelerated by the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union,

it was founded on the abovementioned format, and in this sense was contiguous with the process of war termination.

A Study of the Introduction and Development of Flying Boats in the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force

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The first flying boats of the Maritime Self-Defense Force had been received from the United States, and thus based on these, an operational foundation for flying boats of the Maritime Self-Defense Force was rapidly established. Meanwhile, after restrictions had been lifted on the aircraft industry of postwar Japan, an aircraft manufacturer (Kawanishi Aircraft Company) developed new technologies for flying boats, and sales outlets for these were sought by the Maritime Self-Defense Force, which had been forced to start handling new types of anti-submarine warfare. Support from the United States Navy was additionally received, and the above eventually led to the development of Japan's first postwar flying boat, the PS-1.

The PS-1, which had received approval for use by forces from the Director General of the Defense Agency in October 1970, featured a hull with excellent wave resistance, and new technologies for realizing a high level of STOL (short takeoff and landing) performance on water. Nevertheless, there was a situation in which its technologies related to anti-submarine sensors were immediately becoming obsolete. The initial anti-submarine concept for the PS-1 was one in which a hanging-type sonar would be installed on the flying boat and detect submarines after the flying boat landed on water. Nonetheless, during the period of development and operation, the level of quietness of submarines had further improved, and thus sonar use following water landings had a low level of effectiveness, especially due to factors such as the flying boat's own engine sounds. Furthermore, due to improvements in the effectiveness of "sonobuoy" anti-submarine sensors that are dropped from the sky, there ended up no longer being a need for water landings in anti-submarine warfare. Also, partly in light of the fact that many accidents involving the PS-1 were occurring, operation of the PS-1 was ended in March 1989, approximately 19 years after its approval for use by forces.

The PS-1 was aimed at strengthening the main characteristic of flying boats, which is "the ability to take off from and land on oceans," and, in spite of the above, the useful technologies of the PS-1, which are compatible with the geographical characteristics of Japan, have been preserved. Thus, the technologies of the PS-1 have been inherited by the rescue flying boat the US-1, and the US-2, which is currently in operation.

Although the PS-1 had a short life as a maritime patrol aircraft, its technologies have resulted in the creation of rescue flying boats that can carry out missions on ocean waters where the waves are 3 meters high. Therefore, looking at the development background and technologies of the PS-1, the case of the PS-1 seems to suggest the need to take a multifaceted perspective when historically evaluating technological development.

**British Merchant Navy in the Falklands War: Ships Taken up from Trade (STUFT)
and Their Role Revisited**

ITO Nobuyoshi

This article focuses on the contributions of British merchant ships in the 1982 Falklands War. Britain has kept its traditional maritime registry system, Merchant Navy, which has allowed merchant ships to cooperate with the state in times of emergency. Historically, Merchant Navy has played an active role in many wars, and this system is designed for cross-sectional application today. In the Falklands War, requisition was carried out by Queen's order under the royal prerogative and ad hoc guidelines formulated by the British government ensured adequate remuneration for ship-owners and crew. Ships Taken up from Trade (STUFT) were fit out and assigned for missions centred on logistical support one after another, and their solid performance deeply depended on the cooperative relationship between the Royal Navy and shipping companies rooted in historical tradition, on good treatment provided by the British government, and on the presence of crew members who aspired to missions driven by their rising nationalism. Practically, during the operations by STUFT, they were faced with various problems such as the difficult tasks of transporting materials from Britain to distant South Atlantic, unintended attacks to merchant ships including third party within the Maritime Exclusive Zone, and internment and transfer of Argentine prisoners after the end of the conflict. In addition, reluctant sentiments toward the requisitioning one of the best luxury liners at that time, RMS *Queen Elizabeth II*, were extremely strong both politically and publicly. Furthermore, the loss of container ship, SS *Atlantic Conveyor*, causing numerous casualties, attacked by the Argentine Navy aircraft and sank conclusively, brought about the heated arguments over compensation for the affair and her reconstruction. For all these matters, STUFT greatly contributed to Britain's victory and their performance symbolised what the state should be as a maritime power.