

**U.S. Military Intelligence Services and the Pacific War:
Focusing upon the OSS and its Dragon Project 1941-42**

SHIMIZU Ryotaro

Abstract

Although the COI, the United States' first concentrated intelligence agency, was established in response to the Second World War, it was soon split into two new agencies: the OWI, which was responsible for wartime worldwide public relations, and the OSS, a strategic intelligence agency led by William J. Donovan. In contrast with the army's and OWI's emphasis on propaganda aimed at mainland Japan, Donovan proposed the Dragon project, an undercover intelligence program whose purpose was to provide direct support for military operations in the China theater and the Far East under Japanese control.

The Dragon project was a comprehensive warfare program derived from the basic research carried out by the Research and Analysis branch of the OSS, and it would make use of subordinated ethnic groups in Japanese-controlled territory as local agents as a means of conducting military intelligence activities in the China theater. From its inception, the OSS was oriented toward promoting the dismantlement of the Japanese empire — the decolonization of East Asia, in other words. The military intelligence-related knowledge, organizations, and activities developed by the OSS in the China theater could be regarded as an emergence of modern strategic intelligence.

Defense System of the Imperial Japanese Navy: From the Viewpoint of Anti-Submarine and Mine Warfare

ISHIMARU Yasuzo

Abstract

The Imperial Japanese Navy's operation plan included a section called "Defenses." The term "defenses" encompasses all aspects of defending major coastal ports, waterways, straits, and important cities within Japanese territory from enemy attacks. The purpose of defenses is to maintain port function as a rear supply source for fleets and to secure transportation routes in the surrounding seas. They are divided into sea defenses, air defenses, and land defenses, with designated dedicated naval units and jurisdictional zones.

The Imperial Japanese Navy's efforts at anti-submarine warfare and mine warfare, which had been categorized as defense-related areas, received harsh evaluations after the war. Why did defense-related military operations perform badly? Looking back at the reality of anti-submarine warfare and mine warfare, what was the relationship between the defense plan and the operation plan, and how was the defense plan positioned? In order to investigate the factors behind the lack of success in these areas, the author has studied the defense systems of the Imperial Japanese Navy by taking a retrospective look at organization-building related to the construction of defense systems, the committing of human resources, education and training, research and development of related weapons, and the status of deployed naval vessels, among other things.

An examination of the reality of anti-submarine warfare shows that the U.S. Navy possessed 317 submarines during the Pacific War, while the Japanese Navy had 179. The U.S. Navy lost 52 submarines, and the Japanese Navy lost 127. The number of submarines lost as a percentage of the total in their possession was 16% for the U.S. Navy and 71% for the Japanese Navy. Indeed, the difference in these figures indicates that the Japanese Navy was poor at anti-submarine warfare.

An examination of the reality of mine warfare shows that confirming the military achievements of mine warfare was a difficult matter. Since laid mines could not be

constantly monitored and the moment of detonation could not be confirmed, it was extremely difficult for both sides to ascertain the existence and degree of military success gained through mine warfare. However, it is a fact that marine traffic was cut off by defensive mines laid by the Japanese Navy and by offensive mines laid by the U.S. Navy in the vicinity of the Japanese mainland toward the end of the Pacific War (Operation Starvation), and that minesweeping operations after the war required a great deal of effort and sacrifice.

The operations of the Imperial Japanese Navy essentially consisted of two prongs: open sea operations by front-line fleets (external warfare units) centered on the Combined Fleet and defensive operations by defensive units (internal warfare units) centered on major naval stations and the Critical Naval Department corps. Initially, the Imperial Japanese Navy's annual operation plans included both open sea operations and defensive operations. However, for a period of time before the war, plans for major naval stations and the Critical Naval Department corps were prepared separately from the annual operational plans; therefore, a sense of differentiation between external and internal warfare units developed, which resulted in defensive units being more antiquated and smaller in size than external warfare units. In order to clarify the reasons for this, the author has examined the defense-related departments with regard to their organizational development, the status of training implementation, the status of weapons research and development (mines, bombs, anti-submarine nets, hydrophones, and minesweeping weapons), and the deployment of naval vessels equipped with these weapons.

The Imperial Japanese Navy committed a large budget and skilled human resources to the operations conducted by its Combined Fleet and other external warfare units. However, operations conducted by major naval stations, the Critical Naval Department corps, and other internal warfare units (defensive units) were treated as secondary, without the commitment of skilled human resources, and were reliant on outdated equipment. As a result, anti-submarine warfare and mine warfare, which had been categorized as defense-related departments, failed to produce adequate results as pointed out by both Japanese and international observers.

Airplane Assignments of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force in the Early Days

NISHIDA Hiroshi

Abstract

In Japan, the Air Service, which served as an auxiliary force subordinate to both the Imperial Army and Imperial Navy before and during the war, was reorganized as the independent Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) after the war. The first issue the JASDF faced was that of aircraft deployment. Simply stated, this was the question of whether the JASDF should consolidate and take possession of all Self-Defense Force aircraft, or whether the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) should also possess aircraft. The “common knowledge” regarding this issue is based on the recollections of Osamu Kaihara, who served as the National Security Board’s head of security and as First Section Defense Bureau Chief of the Japan Defense Agency during the period of transition from National Security Board to the Japan Defense Agency. In light of the current situation in which Kaihara’s remarks are being spread without sufficient verification, this paper aims to reexamine the actual policy-making process concerning this issue in a more multifaceted way, mainly by reading the materials held by the National Archives of Japan and by exploring the plans of the people who were involved at the time as extensively as possible.

The main point derived from Kaihara’s recollections is that the aircraft deployment issue was mainly settled by a plan orchestrated by the JMSDF in which a letter was presented by the U.S. Far East Command through the U.S. Navy to the Japanese prime minister. A number of books that touch on the time of the JASDF’s founding have come out since the publication of Kaihara’s recollections, but most of them are based on Kaihara’s recollections. In other words, whenever the issue of aircraft deployment is discussed, the discussion is greatly influenced by Kaihara’s recollections.

All JASDF-related personnel recall that, although both the JGSDF and the JMSDF, especially the JMSDF, strongly disagreed with the JASDF regarding the issue of aircraft deployment, the Director General of the Japan Defense Agency ordered the consolidation of aircraft operations and training under the newly established JASDF, with some exceptions; and while the JASDF enjoyed an ideal start, it gradually became a shadow of its original self.

論文英文要旨 (Abstract)

Yoshimori Terai (54th graduating class of the Imperial Japanese Naval Academy and former vice admiral), who played a central role in the rebuilding of Japan's maritime self-defense capabilities, left behind more recollections on the issue of aircraft deployment from the JMSDF's perspective than all JASDF-related personnel combined. Although Kaihara claimed that the Hull letter presented to Prime Minister Yoshida was the deciding factor, Terai wrote that the JMSDF did not orchestrate a plan to have the letter be presented through the U.S. Navy, and that the JMSDF was not even made aware of the existence of the letter itself.

The author concludes that the issue regarding aircraft deployment, which was one of the biggest issues faced by the newly established JASDF, was not determined by the JMSDF in accordance with its own policy and with the backing of the U.S. Navy, despite this being "common knowledge"; rather, the parties from the Japan Defense Agency and Self-Defense Force service branches, which all held different opinions, discussed the issue at length and finally came to the decision on behalf of the Japan Defense Agency and Self-Defense Forces that the aircraft would be deployed to all three service branches.