

Japan's Defense Buildup in the Last Days of the Cold War

CHIJIWA Yasuaki

Abstract

This study examines Japan's defense buildup in the last days of the Cold War by considering how the “Basic Defense Force Concept” introduced in the “National Defense Program Outline for FY1977 and Beyond” formulated on October 29, 1976 (the 1976 NDPO) was positioned at this time. Although there have been discussions about the increased criticism of the Basic Defense Force Concept in the 1980s as the Cold War was winding down, the positioning of this concept in the last days of the Cold War has not been sufficiently explained, including a critique of why the concept persisted in the face of such criticism.

In the defense debates that unfolded during the Second Cold War, the logic of opposition to the Basic Defense Force Concept was increasingly incorporated into the concept itself. The various interpretations and arguments that emerged from these debates were summarized in the “power vacuum” theory described in Defense Agency Director General Seiki Nishihira's counter argument. By invoking the power vacuum theory, it became impossible to deny that the Basic Defense Force Concept was a counter-threat theory, albeit a limiting one. During the Nishihira era, it became clear that the concept of repelling limited and small-scale aggression without external assistance was based on the concept of a defense buildup rather than that of a defense force operation, and was unrelated to the actual probabilities of the situation. With these explanations and the development of defense capabilities based on the 1981 Mid-term Planning Estimates and 1986 Medium Term Defense Program, criticism of the Basic Defense Force Concept gradually subsided. Spurred on by Japan and understanding the evolution of Japan's Self-Defense Force capabilities, the United States also allowed the 1976 NDPO to be maintained. However, it has not always been the case that Japan's defense buildup in the Second Cold War period have been governed by the concepts of possession of the assorted functions / functional and geographical balance, repelling limited and small-scale aggression without external assistance, and expansion, which are components of the Basic Defense Force Concept. Policies that were not necessarily obvious within the scope of the 1976 NDPO, such as

論文英文要旨 (Abstract)

sea-lane defense protection, have also been included within the scope of outline as necessary.

The reason the Basic Defense Force Concept was not abandoned even at the last days of the Cold War was a combination of anticipated resistance from opposition parties and others to the abandonment of the Basic Defense Force Concept which was seen to be rooted in “beyond-the-threat” theory, and the lack of political will and low motivation in bureaucratic circles to create a new defense concept.

The Japanese Army and the Philippine Guerrilla Movement in the Latter Half of the Pacific War

TACHIKAWA Kyoichi

Abstract

This paper examines the efforts made by the Japanese military deployed in the Philippines in the latter half of the Pacific War; specifically, in the period from October 1943, when the Philippines became quasi-independent (that is, when the country ceased to be administered by the Japanese military), to immediately before the U.S. military landing on the Philippines in October 1944, to maintain public order in the face of anti-Japanese guerrilla activities and other incidents that were occurring during this time, and studies the effects of these efforts and the issues arising from them.

There were 2,240 seditions in the Philippines in the eight months from October 1943 to May 1944, which is more than the 2,209 seditions that occurred in the nine and a half months from January 1943 to about mid-October 1943 when the Philippines was still under Japanese military administration. From this we can say that the security situation became worse in the post-independence Philippines compared with when the country was under Japanese military administration.

Examining the seditions by type, what is remarkable about the increase in incidents in the period from October 1943 to May 1944 is the rise in terrorism and propaganda incidents whose victims were people not in the Japanese military (from 658 to 801, and 91 to 305, respectively). The number of cases involving civilians had been increasing even when the Philippines was under Japanese military administration, but the number of propaganda incidents showed an increase of more than threefold—a significant rise. On the other hand, even taking into account the fact that the latter period is shorter, one type of incident that declined in number was destruction of property.

Looking at the perpetrators of the seditions, most incidents were carried out by defeated army bandits, mercenaries, gangs, thieves, enemy bandits, armed defeated army bandits, armed bandits, army remnants, anti-Japanese troops (anti-Japanese bandits, anti-Japanese gangs, elements hostile to the Japanese), outlaw gangs, lawless elements, communists (communist bandits, communist gangs), rebels, and guerrillas (guerrilla bands,

partisans). The perpetrators of these incidents were almost universally seen to be bandits not only in cases classified as bandit raids but also in cases that were not classified as such. To summarize, most seditions were caused by guerrillas, to use the all-too-common term.

After the Philippines' quasi-independence, the Japanese Army (the 14th Army) was put in charge of dealing with anti-Japanese guerrilla activities and other seditions in the country, including subjugation, forced surrender and submission, propaganda and pacification, searches and arrests, and disruption of guerrilla communication networks. These efforts sometimes took the form of supporting local Philippine law enforcement measures. Nevertheless, the Japanese military failed to establish security in the Philippines. The reasons were as follows: firstly, the Japanese military had not established guidelines for implementing security measures, particularly measures against guerrillas; secondly, the security measures that were implemented had their own limitations; thirdly, the U.S. administration governing the Philippines before the war was not so bad: the people had been benefiting from it, and they were expecting the U.S. Army to return—and to a large extent had invested faith in that outcome; fourthly, the failure of the Japanese military to cut off communication between the anti-Japanese guerrillas in the Philippines and the Americans in particular allowed the guerrilla groups to convey not only information, but also people and supplies; and fifthly, and this is the decisive reason, Japan's impending defeat in the war.

War and Religion in Europe: Reflections on the Crusade and the Thirty-years' War

ISHIZU Tomoyuki

Abstract

In most cases, religion forms the basis of people's values and behavioral patterns; it provides them with *raison d'être* and gives them a framework for understanding the values and meaning of society. It serves as the foundation of people's identity—something that is intrinsic to them and that cannot be yielded to another. Discourses in many religions (including Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Zoroastrianism, and Sikhism) mix treaties on peace with exhortations for war and violence.

While some argue that religion is a major factor in the occurrence and intensification of war—a factor that has become increasingly influential in recent years, others argue that only a fraction of wars are caused by religion, and that there is no proven causal relationship between the two. This paper examines the relationship between religion and war, using as an example the effects of the Christian view of war on the Crusades and the Thirty Years' War, two of the largest-scale religious wars in Europe.

A historical overview of the concept of war in Christianity from when Christianity was first accepted to when it was established as the “state religion” of the Roman Empire shows a shift from absolute pacifism in early Christianity to the just war theory, and then through the Crusades to the theory of holy war. While the just war and holy war theories became secularized and were dismantled through the Thirty Years' War (leading to the view of war as indiscriminate), the theories were inherited and reproduced in the concept of wars that are justified by international law (the outlawry of war theory) after the disaster of two world wars. It is understood that religious views of war and peace are not merely reflections of scriptures and doctrines, but are concepts that are reinterpreted and formed by “compromises” with the external environment.

As an example, the Crusades can be generally summarized as a war whose motives were both religious and secular (political and economic), with the weight gradually shifting from the former to the latter. In terms of religious motives, the Crusades were undertaken to bring about the liberation of Jerusalem and as a penance (forgiveness for confessed sin). Secular motives included the desire to integrate the Christian world and pursue economic interests (territory and trade areas) by fighting against pagans and heretics. As a result, in

addition to the eight Crusades to the Orient (eastern Mediterranean), there were a number of repeated crusades of differing natures to places throughout Europe, such as the Iberian Peninsula (the *Reconquista*), against the Mongol Empire, and in northern Europe (the Baltic Sea coast). These crusades had a significant cultural and economic impact in that they laid the foundations for modernization and set up Christianity as the common religion of Europe. At the same time, however, the crusades served to increase intolerance to others (pagans), and the subsequent atrocities perpetrated against non-Christians provoked resentment throughout the Islamic world.

The Thirty Years' War, on the other hand, started as a "civil war" in Germany between Protestants inspired by Lutheran reformation and Catholics. However, the politically motivated intervention by other states such as Protestant Denmark, Sweden, Holland and Catholic France led to an expanded and prolonged war. In Germany, a number of Catholic lords fearing the expanding influence of the Catholic Habsburg House, converted to Protestantism. This ultimately led to infighting between the Catholic Habsburg and Bourbon Houses for European supremacy. Although the Thirty Years' War was triggered by religious conflict, it was fundamentally an international political war over hegemony, with religious issues becoming intermingled with secular and political interests.

The above analysis elicits the following two conclusions. The first is that religions have maintained a mutability that allows them to be reinterpreted according to external environments. The second is that even with wars that are started by religious conflicts, there are always political and economic frictions in the background.

Religion is a means of alleviating the fear of death. With the rise of nationalism in the twentieth century, religion has become the backdrop to the quasi-religious rhetoric of "dying for one's country." While hidden structural issues within religions (or pseudoreligions) can create conflicts and lead to wars, it cannot be said that religions themselves are a direct catalyst of war. Religion has been used as a means of concealing conflicts of interest in the purpose of going to war and as a facile justification for war; but, at the same time, it is also true that for most of history, religious worshipers have coexisted peacefully and have not come into conflict with one another. Given that all religions are rationalized and reinterpreted through their connection to authority, religions can be perceived as passive entities that are exploited by those in power. On the other hand, there is no doubt that we will see an intensification in religious and ideological wars. It can therefore be said that religion has the ambiguity of being both passive and active in war.