

English Thesis Abstracts

Chinese Nationalist Government's Strategy toward Japan
and Military Operations in Burma, 1942

Motohiro Fujii

Abstract

This paper analyzes the Chinese Nationalist government's strategy toward Japan in Burma Campaign 1942. Previous studies on China's operations in Burma has focused on the relationship between Allied Powers army and her wartime diplomacy. However, the decision making process of Chinese Nationalist government and the relationship between the operations and leadership have not been clarified. From this perspective, This paper considers Chinese Nationalist government's strategy and its military operations in Burma through clarifying the process of planning and executing the operations, using official documents and some diaries such as Chiang Kai-shek.

First, I focus on Chinese Nationalist government's decision making process for planning operations in Burma. There are two different opinions on Burma campaign in the government. The first one is about strengthening cooperation with Britain which was promoted by Chiang Kai-shek and his close adviser. From this point, It is regarded the operations was as part of Chiang Kai-shek's diplomatic strategy which attempt to promote military to military cooperation with Britain while providing Chinese army to defend the colonies. The second point is to prioritize the defense of Yunnan Province which bordering on northern Burma to protect border and control over the local powers such as Yunnan army which was promoted by the high-ranked officers and staffs of the Military Council of Chinese Nationalist Government). These officers regarded that Japan can attack Yunnan while avoiding southward advance and attempted to gain control over local powers of Yunnan through reinforcing troops stationed this area. Based on the above, it can be said that Chinese Army's operations in Burma had two parallel objectives;

論文英文要旨 (Abstract)

cooperating with Allied Power and defending Yunnan.

Then, we focused on differences on the operational command in Burma between the leadership of Nationalist Government and Chinese Expeditionary Force (CEF) Headquarters. The former, especially the high-ranked officers, were reluctant to send CFE to southern Burma due to prioritize defending Yunnan-Burma border and maintaining the Burma Road. Chiang Kai-shek and CEF executed operations in southern Burma for cooperating with Allied Power. This shows us that Chinese Nationalist Government's approach were based on two different strategy.

Through the above, The following conclusions can be drawn. First, Chinese Nationalist government's strategy toward Japan and its military operations in Burma are defined two factors: diplomatic strategy strengthening relations with Allied Powers and military action to fight against Japan's southern advance. Second, domestic politics factor such like local powers of Yunnan have a lot influence on war leadership. It shows that Chiang Kai-shek's leadership was based on the delicate balance of these factors. In the end, China's strategy converged to secure Yunnan due to Allied Army defeated in Burma.

A Study of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force in the Early Days: The Aerial Rearmament Studies

Hiroshi Nishida

Abstract

There is no doubt that the process by which the Air Self-Defense Force was created was influenced by the United States and the United States Air Force. However, even if its creation was heavily influenced by the United States and the United States Air Force, from the perspective of sourcing human resources, personnel from the former Army Air Service and Navy Air Service were the ones responsible for Japanese aerial rearmament, or the creation of the Air Self-Defense Force. Personnel from the former Army Air Service and Navy Air Service conducted research on aerial rearmament ahead of the establishment of the Air Self-Defense Force. The first purpose of this paper is to clarify what kind of research was conducted, based on historical materials from Japan. The second purpose is to explore why aerial rearmament research by former army and navy personnel, which had hitherto been conducted separately based different concepts, was submitted as a joint opinion in 1952 after only a very short period of study.

This paper is organized as follows: The first part looks at the rearmament research conducted by former army personnel, and the second part describes the situation of aerial rearmament research conducted by former navy personnel. The third part compares the results of the individual research work conducted by former Army Air Service and Navy Air Service personnel, particularly those results submitted independently by former army personnel in July of 1952, with the research results submitted jointly by the former Army Air Service and Navy Air Service personnel in November of the same year. Through this comparison, we analyze the research results in detail and look at how they were compiled into a joint opinion and outcome submission. This paper mainly relies on several kinds of historical materials belonging to the National Archives of Japan which were provided by the former Army Air Service and Navy Air Service and which have been subject to limited release in recent years, and in particular on extracts of testimonials of recollections and the audio materials upon which they are based.

From the recollections of the former Army Air Service and Navy Air Service

論文英文要旨 (Abstract)

personnel who participated in the aerial rearmament research, it can be seen that there were areas of commonality in terms of the idea of an independent air force, but it is also clear that there were different opinions as to what the basic concept should be. In other words, based on their experience in the war, former Army Air Service personnel were aiming to create an air force mainly for defending the mainland, which would be led by the former Army Air Service. Human resources for this new air force would be drawn from both the former Army Air Service and the former Navy Air Service. Meanwhile, due to the fact of Japan being an archipelago, personnel from the former Navy Air Service aimed to establish an air force capable of adapting to maritime operations for the defense of the country. From their experience in the war, former Navy Air Service personnel felt it was necessary to create something similar to the former Navy Air Service, which had superior capability on island terrain and the ocean. How was it possible for the former army and navy to overcome such ideological differences and submit a joint opinion in such a short time? Perhaps the biggest factor is that the former Army Air Service and the former Navy Air Service personnel shared a sense of urgency that aerial rearmament should not be delayed further compared to land and sea rearmament.

Did the United States Army Accept the Maneuver Warfare Theory in the AirLand Battle Doctrine?

Yuichi Shimpuku

Abstract

This paper examines whether the United States Army of the time accepted the maneuver warfare theory in drafting the AirLand Battle (doctrine of 1982 edition of FM 100-5, known hereinafter as ALB [82]). Maneuver warfare is a theory constructed by William Lind based on the opinions of retired United States Air Force colonel John Boyd. This theory was accepted in its entirety by the United States Marine Corps, but there are various contradicting opinions as to whether or not it was accepted by the army. In this paper, we compare the acceptance level of the maneuver warfare theory by the United States Army with that of the United States Marine Corps, which had accepted maneuver warfare theory in its entirety, and study three factors concerning maneuver warfare theory based on historical materials: level of interest in maneuver warfare theory in the *Military Review*; descriptions in ALB (82), which is the strategy doctrine used as the basis of military education; and the level of understanding among military commanders. In studying these factors, we emphasize the understanding of maneuver warfare theory by Huba Wass de Czege, who was a virtually in charge of ALB (82) at that time.

As a result of our research, we observed that in written discussions, maneuver warfare theory was not focused on to the extent that it was by the Marine Corps. Also, according to historical documents concerning the understanding of the people responsible for ALB (82) as well as Donn Starry, William Richardson, Donald Holder and Czege at that time, these people did not show much interest in Lind's maneuver warfare theory. On the other hand, ALB (82) did contain terms similar to those used in maneuver warfare theory. This is probably due to the existence of common intellectual assets within the army, specifically the *Principles of War*, and the educational text *Maneuver in War*. In addition to Czege, these works were also praised in a contemporary article by Wallace Franz, a retired colonel who was a tactical advisor at CGSC.

From the above it seems that maneuver warfare theory could have been the

論文英文要旨 (Abstract)

catalyst for the birth of the ALB, but it is unlikely that this theory was accepted by the United States Army in the same way as it was by the United States Marine Corps.