

国際会議参加報告

第41回国際軍事史学会大会の概要

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2015（平成 27）年度の第 41 回国際軍事史会議は 2015 年 8 月 30 日（日）から 9 月 4 日（金）までの間、中華人民共和国北京市において開催された。

今回の会議には 35 ヶ国から 187 名が参加した。日本からは稲葉千晴・名城大学教授（日本軍事史学会理事）、岩谷・防衛研究所主任研究官の 2 名が参加した。また、開催国である中国を除くアジアからは韓国（2 名）、インドネシア（2 名）が参加した。

本会議の共通テーマは「第二次世界大戦と 20 世紀における戦争の発展」であり、16 のワーキングセッション、4 つの Ph.D. ワークショップ、3 つの中国語セッションにおいて合計 84 の報告が行われた。

開会式典で中国人民解放軍副総参謀長孫建国海軍上将、陳剛北京市副市長、軍事科学院院長高津中将、国際軍事史学会カンフィス会長から祝辞が述べられた。最終日に開かれた総会においては、新たな会長としてイタリアのマッシモ・レオナルディ博士が選出され、理事として日本から名城大学の稲葉千晴教授が選出された。また、アジアからは中国軍事科学院軍事歴史および百科研究部外軍歴史研究室主任・研究員である柯春橋上級大佐も理事に選出された。なお、来年（2016 年）はトルコ（イスタンブール）、再来年（2017 年）はカメルーン（ヤウンデ）で開かれることが決定された（2018 年以降は未定）。

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# From Marco Polo Bridge to Shanghai: Initial Phase of the Sino-Japanese War Revisited

岩谷 將

## 【要約】

本稿は盧溝橋事件から第二次上海事変にいたる日中戦争の拡大過程を、その要因に着意しつつ、日中双方の一次史料にもとづいて概述する。

## Introduction

The small skirmish between troops of Japan and China, which occurred at the Marco Polo Bridge near Peiping in 1937, led to a total war that lasted for eight long years. Neither the Chinese high command nor the Japanese high command initially wanted the incident to become a full scale war, but failed to contain the fighting. The Japanese high command had problems with their control within organizations, whereas the Chinese high command had communication problems with local garrisons that were not fully under their control. Due to mutual mistrust, both sides misunderstood and miscalculated actions taken by the other side. The accumulation of misunderstandings and miscalculations lead to the enhancement of aggressive postures on both sides. Finally it led to full scale war.

This paper will explore the reasons for the escalation of the Sino-Japanese war in its initial phase, using both Japanese and Chinese primary sources.

## Marco Polo Bridge

Peiping had been under nighttime martial law since June 26. The China Garrison Army of Japan (CGA) was going to be reviewed by the regimental commander from July 9 to 16, and repeated military maneuvers from the end of July near the Marco Polo Bridge. At dusk, July 7, 1937, Captain Shimizu, company commander of the CGA, led his nighttime field maneuver exercises at wastelands near the Marco Polo Bridge. At 22:40, shots were heard twice from the Chinese position near the river bank. Captain Shimizu ordered the maneuvers to stop, and found one private missing

at roll call. After having received the report, regimental commander Colonel Mutaguchi ordered the battalion commander, Major Ichiki, to negotiate with the Chinese side at the neighboring town of Wanping for tortious firing.<sup>1</sup> Although the missing private was found after a while and that fact had been reported to the Chinese side at 2:00, the disappearance case made a mere shooting incident more complicated.<sup>2</sup>

Around 3:00, having heard gunshots again, the battalion commander ordered his unit to move forward and to prepare to fire by authority of regimental commander Colonel Mutaguchi.<sup>3</sup> After that, the Chinese 29<sup>th</sup> Army called for Japanese troops to stop advancing, and opened fire as Japanese troops did not stop advancing to the Chinese position. On July 8, at 5:30, both sides went into action which led to an eight year long war.<sup>4</sup>

## Negotiations in Peiping

Japanese Army Agencies stationed in Peiping and the Hebei-Chahar Political Council started negotiation to prevent a recurrence of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident at midnight, July 8. Around 3:00, Major Sakurai, adviser to the Hebei-Chahar Political Council and the Chinese 29<sup>th</sup> Army, had a conversation with Qin Dejun, mayor of Peiping and vice commander of the 29<sup>th</sup> Army. They agreed to: 1. Not to redeploy other troops. 2. Not to deploy troops to the outside of the area of the bridge. 3. Prevent the expansion of conflict from spreading to other areas. In addition, Qin told Sakurai that Feng Zhian, Commander of 37<sup>th</sup> Division, 29<sup>th</sup> Army, never deployed his troops outside the area of the bridge. If there were any soldiers outside, that would not be those of Chinese troops. The Chinese side had no objection to the Japanese taking the offensive against soldiers outside the area of the bridge.<sup>5</sup> That answer became the basis for an

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<sup>1</sup> “Shina Chutongun Hohei Daiichi Rentai Daisan Daitai Sento Shoho (detailed battle report of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, 1<sup>st</sup> regiment, China Garrison Army),” National Institute for Defense Studies Military Archives (NIDSMA).

<sup>2</sup> Wang Lengzhai, “Lugouqiao Sshibian Huiyilu (Reminiscence on the Marco Polo Incident),” in QiqiShudian, *Kangzhan Jianguo Diyinian (The First Year of War of Resistance and Founding of Nation)*, 1938, p. 4.

<sup>3</sup> “Shina Chutongun Hohei Daiichi Rentai Daisan Daitai Sento Shoho” *ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Noji Ichiki, “Jihen Hottan no Omoide (Reminiscence on the Initial Phase Marco Polo Incident),” in *Kaikosha Kiji Tokuhō (Kaikosha Articles Special Issue)*, 1938 July.

<sup>5</sup> “Hokuhei Rikugun Kikan Gyomu Nisshi (Daily Report of the Peiping Army Agency),” NIDSMA.

attack on the troops stationed outside the area of the bridge.

July 9, Zhang Zizhong, mayor of Tianjin and also commander of the 38<sup>th</sup> Division, 29<sup>th</sup> Army, agreed to an unconditional mutual cease-fire at 5:00 and told the Japanese side that the Chinese troops would retreat to the west bank of the Yongding River.<sup>6</sup> On July 10, whereas both parts still continued negotiations on a truce after a local retreat, the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff (AGS) sent a message to the CGA in Tianjin, and ordered it to get Chinese approval of the following conditions in a short time without reference to political problems. 1. Stop stationing troops on the west bank of the Yongding River. 2. Guarantees for future abidance to the agreement. 3. Punishment of the responsible personnel. 4. Apology. Next day, the Japanese suggested that if both sides would reach a truce, the Japanese would retreat voluntary on the condition of a simultaneous retreat by both sides in exchange.<sup>7</sup> Finally, on July 11, at 17:50, both Chinese and Japanese local commands signed a formal cease-fire agreement.<sup>8</sup>

## Japanese response

There were two different opinions regarding the Marco Polo Bridge Incident within the Ministry of War and the AGS.<sup>9</sup> One was a “non-expansionist” view represented by Major General Ishiwara Kanji, Chief of G1 of the General Staff, who planned to concentrate national resources on armaments for a war with the Soviet Union.<sup>10</sup> The other was an “expansionist” view which wanted to use the incident to strike a military blow at China to break the deadlock in North China. Although the “non-expansionists” held a minority position, they held authority over the supreme command. The AGS had no plan for an overall war against China, as they estimated that there was no possibility of a full scale war with China at that time.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> “Rokokyo Jiken Kaiketsu no tame Taishi Sessho Hoshin ni Kansuru Ken (Policy for Negotiation with China in order to Resolve Marco Polo Bridge Incident),” in “Shina Jihen Senso Shido Kankei Tsuduri (Documents on War Guidance of China Incident)” Vol. 1, NIDSMA.

<sup>8</sup> “Hokuhei Rikugun Kikan Gyomu Nisshi,” NIDSMA.

<sup>9</sup> “Kawabe Torashiro Shosho Kaiso Otoroku (Oral History of Major General Kawabe Torashiro),” NIDSMA.

<sup>10</sup> “Nishimura Shigeo Kaisoroku (Reminiscence of Col. Nishimura Shigeo),” NIDSMA.

<sup>11</sup> “Ishiwara Kanji Chujo Kaiso Otoroku” (Oral History of Major General Ishiwara Kanji),” NIDSMA.

Therefore, on July 8, at 18:42, the AGS ordered the commander of the CGA not to use military forces to localize the incident by choice.<sup>12</sup> Although Gen. Sugiyama Hajime, Minister of War, proposed the mobilization of three divisions from the Japanese mainland in a cabinet meeting on July 9, it was shelved due to a cease-fire agreement in North China.<sup>13</sup>

In the initial stage, the “non-expansionists” represented by Ishiwara suppressed the “expansionists”, and took measures to prevent an enlargement of the incident. Nevertheless, having heard that China was sending troops under Chiang’s control to North China, the idea to solve political problems between Japan and China by winning a decisive victory in combat gradually came to dominate the Japanese Army leadership. However, the hardliners main position still lay in the limited exercise of force in North China, and they did not want full scale war as well.<sup>14</sup>

Although Ishiwara still tried to localize the incident, he had no choice but to mobilize troops in case of a further degeneration of the situation, as it would take two or three weeks to dispatch troops from the Japanese mainland. Chiang Kai-shek’s decision to send troops into North China affected Ishiwara’s decision to mobilize troops.<sup>15</sup>

Despite the Japanese government declared deployment of troops on July 11, the Army leadership suspended deployments from the Japanese mainland as local high commands reached a cease-fire truce accord in Tianjin.<sup>16</sup>

## Chinese response

The first report sent from Peiping seemed to give Nanjing an impression that

<sup>12</sup> “Order No.400” in “Rinmei Dairikushi Tsuduri (Orders by the Headquarters of the Imperial Japanese Army),” NIDSMA.

<sup>13</sup> “Jokyo Handan 12.7.12 (Appreciation of the Situation as of July 12, 1937,” in “Shina Jihen ni Kansuru Ikenshu (Collection of statements on China Incident),” Vol.1, *Showa Shakai Keizai Shiryo Syusei- Kaigunsho Shiryo (The collection of Social and Economic Documents in Showa Period: Archives of the Ministry of the Navy)*, Daito Bunka Daogaku Toyo Kenkyusho, 1984, Vol.8, p.599.

<sup>14</sup> “Daitoa Senso Kaigun Senki (War History of the Navy during the Greater East Asia War),” Vol.1, NIDSMA. ”Sanhon Nikacho tono Renraku 12.7.16 (Communication with Director of Strategy and Tactics Department G2),” in “Shina Jihen Shori (Conduct of China Incident),” NIDSMA.

<sup>15</sup> “Ishiwara Kanji Chujo Kaiso Otoroku”.

<sup>16</sup> “Hokushi Jihen Shori Hoshin 7.13 20:00 (Policy for North China Incident as of 20:00, July 13),” in “Shina Jihen Senso Shido Kankei Tuduri,” Vol.1.

the Marco Polo Bridge incident was prepared by the Japanese Army.<sup>17</sup> Worrying about deliberate provocation by the Japanese Army, Chiang Kai-shek cabled to General. Song Zheyuan, commander of the 29<sup>th</sup> Army, as follows: “Wanping should be held at any cost without retreat, mobilizing all local forces preparing for the worst. We will deliver reinforcements soon.”<sup>18</sup> Chiang measured the situation in North China during the night of July 8 as follows.<sup>19</sup> “Japanese challenge might aim to force China to yield before we are fully prepared and armed, or to have General. Song deal with Japanese authority, or to force North China under Japanese control.”

Chiang decided not to prevent warfare with Japan, and ordered the dispatch of centrally-controlled troops to North China on July 9.<sup>20</sup> It was because Chiang recognized that China should show its clear determination to fight against Japan; otherwise it would be impossible to end the crisis peacefully.<sup>21</sup> These proactive actions taken by Chiang provided Japanese Army high command with a sense of caution.

July 11, Chiang knew from intelligence reports that the CGA had not reluctance to resolve the issue peacefully on the condition that the dignity of the Imperial Army would be preserved.<sup>22</sup> Nevertheless, having knowledge that there would be an all-out attack by the Japanese army, which actually was not planned indeed, Chiang decided to move troops retained in Henan province toward the north.<sup>23</sup> Chiang expected that the situation in North China would expand step by step, and that war could be inevitable.<sup>24</sup>

## The 29<sup>th</sup> Army

Chiang could not trust Song, and that was the major source of concern for

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<sup>17</sup> Zhongguo Guomindang Zhongyang Weiyuanhui Dangshi Weiyuanhui, *Zhonghua Minguo Zhongyao Shiliao Chubian Kangri Zhangzhen Shiqi Dierbian Zuozhan Jingguo* (Initial Edition of Important Documents of the Republic of China: Period for War Against Japan), 1981, Vol. 2, p.31. “Kuanyan zhi Heyingqin Qinmidian (Confidential letter to He Yinqin from Kuan Yan),” *Lishi Dangan*(History Archive), 1985, No. 1, p.51.

<sup>18</sup> Zhongguo Guomindang Zhongyang Weiyuanhui Dangshi Weiyuanhui, *op. cit.* , p.32.

<sup>19</sup> Chiang Kai-shek Diaries, July 8 (Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University).

<sup>20</sup> Zhongguo Guomindang Zhongyang Weiyuanhui Dangshi Weiyuanhui, *op. cit.* , pp.32-33.

<sup>21</sup> Chiang Kai-shek Diaries, July 10.

<sup>22</sup> Zhongguo Guomindang Zhongyang Weiyuanhui Dangshi Weiyuanhui, *op. cit.* , p.41.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.* , pp.42-43.

<sup>24</sup> Chiang Kai-shek Diaries, July 12.

Chiang.<sup>25</sup> Chiang could not grasp the overall situation for more than a week because the 29<sup>th</sup> Army's command did not inform Chiang of the real situation. According to his diary, it was not until July 23 that Chiang received details of the truce which was made on July 11, and the contents of the negotiations held on July 19 remained unknown to Chiang at that time.<sup>26</sup>

Still more, the 29<sup>th</sup> Army split into two groups, one, like Zhang Zizhong, was positive toward compromise with the Japanese, the other, like Feng Zhian, was not.<sup>27</sup> Song seemed to be powerless to bring the two groups under control.<sup>28</sup>

There were also conflicting views on the issue of war and peace among ruling members of the Nanjing government. Having known that China was still not ready to open war with Japan, military personnel like He Yingqin (Minister of Military Administration) and Xu Yongchang (Director of Military Affairs Commission) believed that some concession should be made to buy time, if needed.<sup>29</sup> In any case, many of the ruling members thought that war would be inevitable, even if they made compromises with Japan.<sup>30</sup>

The CGA received an offer from Zhang Zizhong to accept the basic Japanese demands on July 17, and the detailed cease-fire truce was signed on July 19, followed by Song's apology to Lieutenant General Kazuki, Commander of CGA on July 18.<sup>31</sup> The situation seemed to move toward a local solution as seen above.

Contrary to the local commands in Tianjin, which forecast a thaw from that point on, Chiang confirmed his determination to fight back against Japan. Chiang noted in his diary on July 19 as follows. "Now that I had already issued the Lushan Declaration, I will leave no other option for Japan. We have no choice but to fight."<sup>32</sup> Then Nanjing informed Tokyo that the local cease-fire truce needed to be authorized by the central government, and the incident must be resolved through diplomatic channels.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>25</sup> Chiang Kai-shek Diaries, July 14, 15.

<sup>26</sup> Chiang Kai-shek Diaries, July 23.

<sup>27</sup> "Kuan yan zhi Heyingqin Qinmidian," *Lishi Dangan*, 1985, No.1, p.51.

<sup>28</sup> Xu Yongchang Diary, July 15 (Academia Sinica).

<sup>29</sup> Xu Yongchang Diary, July 19, 20. Wang Shijie Diary, July 19 (Academia Sinica).

<sup>30</sup> Wang Shijie Diary, July 19 (Academia Sinica).

<sup>31</sup> "Shi San Ni Den No.74 (China Garrison Army G2 No.74 Cable to General Staff Office)," in "Hokushi Jihen Kaiketsugo no Shochi (Treatment after North China Incident)," NIDSMA.

<sup>32</sup> Chiang Kai-shek Diaries, July 19.

<sup>33</sup> Zhongguo Guomindang Zhongyang Weiyuanhui Dangshi Weiyuanhui, *Geming Wenxian (Documents on Revolution)*, Vol. 106, pp.254-255.

Following the Nanjing's notice, there were consecutive incidents of gun fire by the 29<sup>th</sup> Army on July 19 and 20 that breached the agreement.<sup>34</sup> The Japanese Army started to take a stiffer line right from that day.<sup>35</sup> In fact, Song had stayed in close contact with Feng. However, Song neither told Feng details of the cease-fire truce nor ordered the fulfillment of the truce.<sup>36</sup>

## Escalation

Just around the same time, additional logistic units which would support the contingent units for North China from Manchuria and the Korean peninsula had arrived in the Korean Peninsula from the Japanese mainland. Chiang misidentified these corps as mechanized corps which had been secretly transferred from the Japanese mainland. Based on that information, Chiang anticipated that the Japanese would maneuver on a massive scale within a week, and ordered Song to deploy his troops aggressively.<sup>37</sup>

The Japanese local high command met Song on July 24 and found that Song had not been told the details of the truce by Zhang, and also had not ordered the troops under his command to fulfill the truce.<sup>38</sup>

After Japanese troops got shot at by the 29<sup>th</sup> Army in Langfang when they repaired cables for military use with the permission of the 29<sup>th</sup> Army on July 25, the local Japanese high command adopted a tougher stance. After hearing of the Langfang incident, the CGA high command estimated that a military clash would be inevitable. The CGA headquarters asked the AGS to approve the proactive use of force. In response, the AGS ordered the CGA as follows: in view of the situation, the commander of the CGA could repeal the order no. 400 and now might as well use any military

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<sup>34</sup> "Hokuhei Rikugun Kikan Gyomu Nisshi," Sanbo Honbu Dainika, "Hokushi Jihen Gyomu Nisshi (Daily Reports on North China Incident)," "Daitoa Senso Kaigun Senki," Vol.1, NIDSMA.

<sup>35</sup> "Sanhonnika tono Renraku 12.7.19 21:00 (Communication with Director of Strategy and Tactics Department G2 at 21:00 July 19, 1937)," in "Shina Jihen Shori".

<sup>36</sup> Radio message between Song and Feng, from July 10 to 25, Yan Xishan Archives (Historica Sinica).

<sup>37</sup> *Geming Wenxian*, Ibid, Vol. 106, pp.230.

<sup>38</sup> Imai Takeo, *Nicchu Wahei Kosaku: Kaiso to Shogen 1937~1947 (Peace Maneuver during Sino-Japanese War: Memoire and Witness)*, Misuzu Shobo, 2009, p.33.



action required.<sup>39</sup> At the Guangan Gate in Peiping, having gotten shot at again by the 29<sup>th</sup> Army the next day, the CGA issued an ultimatum to Song.<sup>40</sup>

## Toward Shanghai

After receiving the Japanese ultimatum on July 27, the Chinese high command judged that the incident would escalate into a large-scale war.<sup>41</sup> Chiang began preparations for a battle in Shanghai from the end of July. After the Japanese army had broken through the front line in North China, Chiang tried to shift the major battlefield from North China to Central China in response to a proposal from Chen Cheng, Vice Minister of War.<sup>42</sup> Then, Chiang ordered a force of elite troops called *Jiaodao Zongdui*, which had been equipped by Germany to concentrate on the south and north bank of the Wusong River by July 30.<sup>43</sup>

The Chinese high command officially decided to fight back against Japan on August 7,<sup>44</sup> and set up General Headquarters on August 11.<sup>45</sup> Chiang decided to lay siege to Shanghai on August 11, and ordered *Jiaodao Zongdui* to proceed to the scheduled encircling line, and ordered Zhang Zhizhong, commander of the Nanking-Shanghai Garrison, to prepare for the battle in Shanghai.<sup>46</sup> Next day, the Kuomintang Central Committee held a confidential meeting, and the chair Wang Jingwei, vice president of the Kuomintang, proclaimed that China had entered wartime from then.<sup>47</sup> As skirmishes started on the morning of August 13, and

<sup>39</sup> “Order No.418” in “Rinmei Dairikushi Tsuduri,” NIDSMA. Katsuki Kiyoshi, “Shina Jihen Kaiso Tekki (Abstract of Reminiscence on China Incident),” NIDSMA.

<sup>40</sup> Rikugun Daigakko “Kitashina Sakusen Shiyo (Miteiko) (Operational History in North China (draft)),” Vol. 2.

<sup>41</sup> Zhongguo Dier Lishi Danganguan, *Zhonghua minguoshi Dangan Ziliao Huibian (Collection of Archives on the History of Republic of China)*, 5-2 Military, Vol. 2, 1998, p.69.

<sup>42</sup> Confidential Cable to Chiang Kai-shek from Chen Cheng, No. A9138, Aug 7. Chiang Kai-shek Archive, 002-090105-00001-102-001, Academia Historica, Taipei.

<sup>43</sup> Zhongguo Guomindang Zhongyang Weiyuanhui Dangshi Weiyuanhui, *op. cit.*, p.161.

<sup>44</sup> *Minguo Dangan*, 1996 No.1, pp.27-33. “Wang Shijie Diary,” Aug 8, “Chang Kia-ngau Diary,” Aug 8, Chang Kia-ngau Papers, Box16 (Hoover Institution Archives).

<sup>45</sup> “Zhongguo Guomindang Zhongyangzhixingweiyuanhui Zhengzhiweiyuanhui Diwushiyicihuiyi Sujilu (Shorthand record of 51<sup>th</sup> meeting of KMT Central Political Committee),” KMT Archives, Taipei. “Wang Shijie Diary,” July 11.

<sup>46</sup> “Shanghai Zuozhan Riji (Daily Report of the Operation in Shanghai),” in Zhongguo Dier Lishi Danganguan, *Kangri Zhanzheng Zhengmian Zhanchang*, Fenghuang Chubanshe, Vol. 1, p. 339.

<sup>47</sup> “Zhongguo Guomindang Diwuji Zhongyangzhixingweiyuanhui Changwuweiyuanhui

developed into a continuous combat by evening, Chiang ordered Zhang to prepare an attack.<sup>48</sup> Responding to the order by Chiang, Zhang notified Chiang that H hour would be 17:00.<sup>49</sup> Then, what had been a local skirmish evolved into full-scale warfare. Zhang Fakui who was also in charge of the Battle of Shanghai recollected that, China was better prepared for the Battle of Shanghai, which was why the Japanese Army and Navy Land Forces experienced great difficulty in the Battle of Shanghai<sup>50</sup>.

## Conclusion

Based on the facts described above, we can point out several factors which affected the escalation of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. First, the 29<sup>th</sup> Army had been split into two groups and Song was powerless to bring the two groups under his control, or would dare not do so. Both Japanese and Chinese high commands could not grasp the internal circumstances of the 29<sup>th</sup> Army.

Second, there were communication gaps between Japan and China. Because the North China Buffer State Strategy promoted by the Japanese Army jeopardized relations between the two countries, both sides misunderstood or overestimated the other side's actions. This consequently escalated the situation. The same is true of relations between both central high commands and local commands.

Third, the tides of public opinion deprived both governments of options involving flexible responses, and provided a sense of crisis for the other side. Chiang regretted that he did not buy more time to plan thorough measures for the war. He reflected in his diary that he should not have been influenced by public opinion.<sup>51</sup>

Last, Japan had lacked an understanding of a fundamental shift in China's strategy against Japan after 1936. Many Japanese Army personnel thought that China would come to compromise if the Japanese Army showed a tough stance against China. Nevertheless, as the implementation of its defense plan progressed, China

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Diwushichihuiyi Sujilu (Shorthand record of 50<sup>th</sup> meeting of the 5<sup>th</sup> period of KMT Central Committee),” KMT Archives, Taipei. “Wang Shijie Diary,” July 12.

<sup>48</sup> “Zhongguo Guomindang Zhongyang Weiyuanhui Dangshi Weiyuanhui, *op. cit.*, p.169.

<sup>49</sup> Zhongguo Dier Lishi Danganguan, *Kangri Zhanzheng Zhengmian Zhanchang (War Against Japan at the Front)*, Fenghuang Chubanshe, Vol.1, p.362.

<sup>50</sup> “Eighteenth Interview with General Chang”, Interview transcript of General Chang Fa-kuei, Zhang Fa-kuei Papers Interview transcript Box1, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University.

<sup>51</sup> Chiang Kai-shek Diaries, July 31.

began to have confidence in herself. The Chinese felt that it was impossible to make any further concessions to Japan. Furthermore, the Xi'an Incident deprived Chiang of the option of making more concessions toward Japan. As a result, the tough stance of the Japanese toward China resulted not in Chinese concessions, but rather China's determination to fight back against Japan.