
英文要旨 (Summaries in English)

The Impact of Economic Threats on Japanese Preferences for Political Regimes : A Mediation Analysis of Political Interest in Support for Democracy and Authoritarianism

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This study aims to examine how economic threats affect political regime preferences in Japan by conducting a mediation analysis using real GDP growth rates and data from the World Values Survey (WVS). Specifically, we investigate the mediating effect of political interest on support for democracy and for a strong leader, which is defined in the WVS as a political system in which a leader does not need to worry about parliament or elections, and is treated as an authoritarian model in this research. The results indicate that declining economic growth directly weakens support for democracy while simultaneously increasing political interest. Mediation analysis reveals that heightened political interest partially offsets the negative impact of economic threats on democratic support, demonstrating a partial mediation effect. This suggests that political interest can mitigate, to some extent, the adverse influence of economic threats on democratic preferences. Conversely, support for a strong leader tends to rise directly under economic threats, with no significant mediating effect of political interest. These findings highlight that democracy and authoritarianism may be sustained by distinct psychological mechanisms and underscore the importance of considering mediating variables when analyzing political attitudes under economic stress.

What is “Operational Art” ?: The Ambiguity of the Intermediary between Strategy and Tactics

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The “operational art” is a theory originating from land warfare used to conceive and

implement military actions in the realm between strategy and tactics. It is expected to contribute to the realization of strategic objectives by directing tactical actions in an appropriate manner within the overall context and synthesizing the results they produce. While this theory was first developed nearly 100 years ago and has been in common use for approximately 40 years, its meaning remains unstable, and its function and effectiveness have been criticized. This essay explores the causes of such instability and debate in the ambiguity inherent in operational art's function as a bridge between strategy and tactics. To this end, I trace its historical evolution, focusing on land warfare, and clarify its intentional and accidental transformations over time. The conclusions presented here will provide key considerations in examining the effectiveness of operational art.

Use of Civil Aviation by the Japanese Government and Military during the Pacific War

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During the Pacific War, Japan established an extensive aviation network spanning its entire operational theater and utilized civilian aircraft. What were the circumstances and actual conditions surrounding this development? The Japan-Thailand air route connecting Japan to its Southern Theater of Operations during the Pacific War was originally conceived as part of a strategy aimed at the Soviet Union. Contrary to its original purpose, during the Pacific War, the Japanese Army and Navy used the Japan-Thailand air route to transport personnel and supplies. The requisitioned civilian aircraft units carried out the air transport. These requisitioned civilian aircraft units operated as subordinate units under the Army and Navy respectively, and successfully formed an air transport network across the occupied southern regions. Later, as the war entered a phase of attrition due to the U.S. counteroffensive, each of the Army and Navy implemented measures to unify the requisitioned civilian aircraft units in order to strengthen their transport capabilities and impose efficiency. However, the requisitioned air transport units, which were asked to make a greater contribution than originally anticipated, failed to achieve sufficient results, and Japan fell into defeat.

**Japanese Intelligence in Portugal during World War II:
The Japanese Legation, Army Attachés, and the Collection of American
Intelligence**

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During the Second World War, the Iberian Peninsula functioned as a major center of intelligence activity, where diplomatic missions, military and naval attachés, and the intelligence services of leading powers—including the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany—engaged in intensive information gathering. For Japan, Portugal was positioned as a critical forward post for the acquisition of intelligence on the United States from the outbreak of the Pacific War until the final phase of hostilities.

Within the Japanese legation, intelligence sources included “MA reports,” which focused on port and shipping information from East Africa, and “Fuji intelligence,” obtained through officials of the Portuguese foreign office. The Army attaché’s office maintained additional channels, notably “FU intelligence,” derived from a Hungarian agent, and “M intelligence,” operated by “Marco” —a Portuguese agent.

The United States and the United Kingdom countered these activities by supplying disinformation to agents used by the Japanese and German sides and by converting some into double agents to disrupt adversary assessments. In cases that appear to have yielded relatively tangible results, Japanese intelligence benefited in practice from cooperation with Italian diplomatic officials, as well as from networks operated by German military intelligence.

**The U.S. Marine Corps’ Struggles with Modernizing Amphibious Operations:
The Limitations of Assault-First Doctrine**

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The U.S. Marine Corps successfully conducted numerous amphibious assault landings during World War II and the Korean War. Since then, the Marine Corps has evolved its amphibious operations in response to emerging and changing threats and advances in weapons technology. However, in the 2010s, the rapidly increasing threat of A2/

AD led the Marine Corps to seek alternatives to traditional amphibious assault forcible entry operations and to make a major shift in the concept to emphasize EABO, which conducts sea control and sea denial operations. The background to this shift is that the Marine Corps had been modernizing amphibious operations since World War II, focusing primarily on offensive amphibious assaults. However, it was unable to keep up with the rapid changes in threats, and by 2014 had reached a deadlock. At a time when the modernization of amphibious operations was unable to address the changing threats, the Marine Corps' deep-rooted admiration for amphibious assaults was causing them to turn a blind eye to reality and hesitate to make a paradigm shift in doctrine.

**New Aspects of Air Warfare in the Ukraine War:
European Air Power's Current Status and Challenges**

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This paper examines the new aspects of air warfare revealed in the Ukraine war and, based on this analysis, considers the challenges and future directions for European air power. The conflict has resulted in a state of air denial dominated by ground-based air defense systems, as both Ukrainian and Russian air forces lack the capability to achieve air superiority or deliver effective air strikes. Consequently, ground combat has become a prolonged war of attrition marked by heavy casualties and ammunition shortages, while low-cost, precision-capable drones have demonstrated high utility, driving rapid development and mass deployment. These unprecedented characteristics highlight structural weaknesses in European air power, including passive defense for survivability, independent suppression of enemy air defenses, and deficiencies in training and education—areas that cannot be easily addressed during wartime and require sustained peacetime investment. These insights offer significant implications for the current posture of Japan's Self-Defense Forces' air power, which similarly relies on Japan-U.S. bilateral operations.

The Development of EU Military Mobility: Relations with NATO and European States

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This article examines the development of EU military mobility in relation to NATO's defence posture and force movement, NATO-EU cooperation, and European multilateral cooperation. Existing studies have either emphasised the EU's expanding role in the field of defence or focused on operational challenges to NATO's force movement. However, comprehensive analyses that consider the respective perspectives of NATO, the EU, European states, and their interactions remain limited, and this article addresses that gap. This article begins by reviewing NATO's defence posture and the constraints on force movement. It then explores ongoing efforts under the EU's military mobility framework, including infrastructure upgrades and regulatory streamlining aimed at mitigating these constraints. The article subsequently highlights the development of NATO-EU cooperation and multilateral initiatives among European states in the implementation of military mobility. In conclusion, it argues that the development of EU military mobility reflects not primarily an expansion of EU authority in defence, but rather the deepening of NATO-EU cooperation and European multilateral coordination.

National Security Strategies of the Philippines: Origins and Enduring Logics across Three Administrations

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The Philippines has formulated its National Security Policy (NSP), a document of national security strategy, across the Aquino, Duterte, and Marcos administrations. NSP is the important document as it provides strategic direction of the Philippine security. However, most existing studies focus on a single administration or limit themselves to a basic content comparison. This article therefore examines the Aquino administration's motivation behind the initiation of the NSP, and the philosophies of national security persisted across the three administrations. It identifies political differentiation and the South China Sea dispute as primary drivers to begin NSP

formulation. Furthermore, it argues that domestic socio-political stability and external defense are consistently maintained throughout the three administrations. This continuity stems from a shared recognition that the Philippines cannot effectively respond to a shifting national security environment without the simultaneous pursuit of both domestic and external security.

**The Legal Approach as an Instrument in the Xi Jinping Administration's
Taiwan Policy:
its Driving Logic and Functions**

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This paper analyzes the driving logic and functions behind the “legal approach” in the Xi Jinping Administration’s Taiwan policy. The Administration’s interpretation of the Anti-Secession Law, enacted under the Hu Jintao Administration as a basic law of China’s Taiwan policy, places greater emphasis on “unification”. In practice, Xi’s Taiwan policy tends to promote unification unilaterally, reflecting his own perception of Taiwan and China’s growing national strength, and adopts a tough attitude toward forces viewed as obstacles to unification, such as “Taiwan independence forces” and the United States. In addition, the Xi Administration regards law as an instrument for translating Xi Jinping’s intentions into policy, as well as a “weapon” to counter external forces. In this sense, its approach to law is highly compatible with Taiwan policy.

The legal approach can be understood to have three main functions: institutionalizing and legitimizing policy implementation; extending Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan and imposing sanctions on foreign actors through the application of Chinese laws and regulations; and appealing to domestic audiences. At the same time, it also has the potential to generate contradictions within China’s Taiwan policy and to intensify tensions with other countries, including the United States.

**North Korea's Coercive Strategy:
Its Cumulative Effects on the Target State's Domestic Politics**

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North Korea's ability to generate threats is not diminished by South Korea's overwhelming material superiority. This is because North Korea relies on coercion rather than warfighting, which requires far greater material resources. In times of crisis, North Korea's strategy is not to compel the target directly, but to accumulate political concerns within the target state by portraying the ROK military or the U.S.–ROK combined forces as creating dangerous situations. During subsequent negotiations, North Korea exploits the cumulative effects of its crisis-inducing behavior to pressure South Korea into accepting demands that weaken its military posture or the combined defense framework. This constitutes North Korea's strategy of cumulative coercion.

**Elucidating the Conduct of Navy Ministry Section Chiefs in Wartime Showa:
A Study of the Newly Discovered Diary of Oishi Tamotsu**

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This study examines a fundamental contradiction in the behavior of Navy Ministry section-level officers (field-grade officers serving as section chiefs) during the Pacific War: Why did these officers criticize Navy Minister Shimada Shigetaro's concurrent appointment as Chief of the Naval General Staff as an infringement on the independence of the supreme command (following Prime Minister and Army Minister Tojo Hideki's similar dual appointment), while simultaneously attempting to intervene in command matters by advocating for an operation to recapture Saipan?

Previous scholarship has largely assumed that these section-level officers were consciously involved in the movement to oust Shimada, interpreting their intervention in command as a strategic means to achieve his dismissal. However, these interpretations have lacked a rigorous analysis based on extensive primary sources.

By utilizing the recently released diary of Oishi Tamotsu (Chief of the First Section

of the Naval Affairs Bureau), held by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this paper re-examines the thoughts and actions of these officers. The analysis reveals that not all section-level officers were intentionally participating in the anti-Shimada movement. Instead, faced with the crisis of Saipan's fall, they harbored deep resentment toward the Naval General Staff for failing to share critical information with the Navy Ministry. Due to this information gap, they lacked an accurate understanding of the actual war situation. Consequently, they advocated for the recapture of Saipan and the integration of the Ministry and the General Staff as a necessary measure for effective operational leadership.

**Contested Criteria for Assessing Violations of the Principle of Sovereignty in
Cyber Operations:
Policy Considerations and the Recalibration of “Pure” and “Relative”
Sovereigntist Approaches**

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This article examines the contested application of the principle of sovereignty to cyber operations, with particular attention to policies advanced by so-called “relative sovereigntist” positions. In recent years, a growing number of states have relied on sovereignty as a legal basis for asserting the unlawfulness of low-intensity, state-sponsored cyber operations in their official positions, although disagreement persists over the criteria by which cross-border cyber operations constitute a violation of sovereignty. State practice and academic commentary broadly fall into two camps: one considers unauthorized access to another state's ICT infrastructure to constitute a breach of sovereignty, while the other maintains that operations producing only negligible or de minimis effects do not amount to a violation. This divergence has direct implications for the legal assessment of policies such as cyber espionage, cross-border access to electronic evidence, and so-called “active cyber defense” measures. While these disagreements are unlikely to be resolved in the short term, this article argues that policy-specific discussions of permissible conduct offer a pragmatic avenue for navigating the contested application of the principle of sovereignty in cyberspace.

The Difference between the “Use of Force” as Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) and the “Use of (Armed) Force” under International Law: Conditions under Which the “Use of Force” by Maritime Police (Law Enforcement) Agencies Violates the Principle of Prohibition on the Use of (Armed) Force

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Confirming recent international cases and awards, such as Award of the Arbitration between Guyana and Suriname, the distinction between the “use of force” as maritime law enforcement and the “use of (armed) force” which is prohibited under international law seems to stem from the status and nature of the entity taking the action. However, if the “use of force” by maritime police (law enforcement) agencies does not constitute the “use of (armed) force” under any circumstances, it could enable circumvention of the principle of prohibition on the use of (armed) force by disguising such “use of (armed) force” as maritime law enforcement activities, thereby creating a loophole in the principle. Therefore, this article examines the criteria for distinguishing between the “use of force” as maritime law enforcement and the “use of (armed) force” under international law through the analysis of the significance and characteristics on the two. Based on this analysis, it derives the conditions under which the “use of (armed) force” by maritime police (law enforcement) agencies is assessed as violating the principle of prohibition on the use of (armed) force under international law.