
英文要旨 (Summaries in English)

Factors Fixing the U.S. Naval Base at Guantánamo : What Is Cuba's "Uniqueness"?

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This paper examines the U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo Bay (NSGB) within the framework of base politics theory, which analyzes base dynamics from perspectives of security, domestic politics, and international relations. This approach aims to investigate why the base remains operational in Cuba despite the host nation's refusal, in an era where the host nation should not be able to compel the establishment or maintenance of a base. It identifies the factors behind the Guantánamo U.S. Naval Base's entrenched status—a phenomenon unexplained by existing base politics theory—specifically examining Cuba's "special characteristics."

This study reveals that the "uniqueness" of the base in Cuba lies in the fact that the two adversaries are attempting to build confidence through their existence. This finding demonstrates that even when a host nation ostensibly rejects a base, the base can potentially be maintained if it functions as a channel linking the two nations. This insight holds the potential to revise existing base politics theory.

The Formation Process of the Ground Self-Defense Force's "Authorized Strength":

Its Significance from the Perspective of Defense Buildup

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This paper analyzes, from the perspective of the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), the formation process and institutional significance of the term "authorized strength of 180,000 personnel" introduced by the Defense Agency in the Third Defense Buildup Plan of the late 1960s. Before its introduction, discrepancies between authorized strength and actual personnel, as well as the unclear relationship between personnel

figures and buildup targets, were frequently criticized in the National Diet. Therefore, achieving the GSDF's goal of establishing a force of 180,000 personnel was difficult at that time. In this context, the term was conceptualized not merely as a numerical target but as an indicator institutionally and structurally linked to the GSDF's 5 armies and 13 divisions. It functioned as a more theoretical and institutional basis for force expansion than the previous buildup requirements, yet in the long term also constrained the GSDF's growth and influenced subsequent organizational development concept.

**U.S. Military LIC Research in the 1980s:
Focusing on Army and Air Force LIC Joint Research**

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The U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force jointly established the Army-Air Force Center for Low-Intensity Conflict (CLIC) in March 1986 to deepen their examination of Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC). This paper analyzes the differences in how the Army and Air Force utilized CLIC to clarify the role CLIC played in LIC research and dissemination within both services during the late 1980s.

The research revealed that the Air Force led the establishment of CLIC and much of CLIC's research focused on counterinsurgency and insurgency support within the LIC framework. The Air Force utilized the CLIC to examine the nature of air power and its role in LIC, drawing lessons from counterinsurgency operations during the Vietnam War. In contrast, the Army viewed counterinsurgency and insurgency support as merely one aspect of LIC, resulting in limited utilization of CLIC. This divergence in the Army and Air Force's approaches to CLIC is thus linked to their differing perspectives on the Vietnam War.

**The Search for “Better” Concessions:
A Theoretical Perspective on Credibility-Preserving Concessions**

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When a status quo state facing an undeterrable challenger in an international crisis strongly seeks to avoid war, concessions can become a viable option. However, due to the negative legacy of appeasement at Munich, concessions carry a strongly unfavorable image in policy circles and some parts of academia, resulting in limited policy-oriented research. This paper explores how to design “better” concessions — those that overcome the central problem that present concessions invite future demands — through a theoretical examination aimed at identifying feasible approaches to concession — making. In particular, it focuses on how concessions risk damaging reputation and prompting another challenge, and explores methods for preserving reputation when making concessions. Recent studies on reputation highlight not only resolve but also capability as critical dimensions. Building on this insight, the paper argues that conducting a limited attack — one that demonstrates both strong restraint in intent and sophistication in capability — prior to making concessions may constitute a feasible method for preserving reputation. To illustrate this argument, the paper examines the large-scale Iranian attack on Israel in April 2024.

**Probability of a Taiwan Conflict:
A Military Explanation**

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This paper examines the probability of a Taiwan conflict from a military perspective. It draws on the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ wargaming report *The First Battle of Next War* as battle data for the hypothetical war and offense-defense theory in international politics as a tool to analyze them. I argue that the military condition of the Taiwan Strait is characterized as defense advantage, which stabilizes the region at least in military terms. In doing so, two concepts of stability are highlighted. The first is arms race stability. The mid-to-long-term arms race will be absent or moderate in the environment of defense advantage since offensive military

buildup can be effectively offset by the defensive side. The second is crisis stability. Preemptive attacks are likely to be less attractive because defensive forces, particularly asymmetric forces deployed on the ground, are highly survivable to the offensive's first strikes. These two types of stability contribute to lowering the likelihood of armed conflict over Taiwan.

The Anti-Soviet Armed Resistance in the Baltic States: The Memory of the “Forest Brothers”

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This paper examines the anti-Soviet armed struggle in the Baltic region from a military perspective. Following the Soviet re-annexation in 1944, a partisan movement known as the “Forest Brothers” began an armed resistance against the Soviet Union. The main subject of this paper is to investigate why this struggle was protracted despite the lack of external support.

The resistance was primarily motivated by a reaction against Soviet policies like agricultural collectivization and forced deportations, as well as against political repression. The Soviet authorities, viewing the partisans as “rebel forces” to be eradicated, intensified the conflict. They pursued the partisans through aggressive counter-insurgency operations and intelligence gathering by agents posing as partisans. Ultimately, the struggle was ended by the large-scale forced deportation of the supporting civilian population to Siberia and the Far East.

After Stalin's death, the non-humanitarian rule was eased, removing the motivation to continue the armed fight. Nevertheless, the memory of this resistance remains a crucial historical foundation for the Baltic states today in confronting the threat posed by Russia.

**A Study on U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy:
Analysis of Targeted Killing**

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This paper analyzes how targeted killing have been positioned in the counterterrorism strategies of successive administrations within the broader framework of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy, and how they have been implemented over the past 20 years. The analysis revealed that the Bush administration did not clearly position targeted killing as a means of counterterrorism strategy, but the succeeding Obama administration placed targeted killing at the center of its counterterrorism strategy, which the Trump administration continued, and that the Biden administration in particular has shifted to a counterterrorism strategy that relies on targeted killing by drones. The study also found that the number of targeted killing was influenced not only by the positioning of targeted killing by each regime, but also by the characteristics of counterterrorism operations; that the form of targeted killing gradually shifted to one that emphasized drone airstrikes; and that efforts to avoid civilian casualties in targeted killing were able to reduce the number of civilian casualties.

**The People's Liberation Army's Perception of Japan:
An Analysis before and after the Release of Japan's Three Strategic
Documents**

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This article empirically analyzes the People's Liberation Army (PLA)'s perception of Japan through the PLA's open sources which are systemically collected. It sets two research questions: 1) has the PLA's perception of Japan changed due to the release of Japan's three strategic documents? 2) if it has, what in the documents have caused this change? This article shows that the PLA's perception of Japan has tightened since the release of the documents, and empirically verifies the validity of the literature which argue that the enhancement of the Japan-US alliance has had a significant impact on the PLA's perception of Japan. It also finds out that Japan's defense build-up,

especially in stand-off defense capabilities, integrated air and missile defense (IAMD), cyber defense, and mobile deployment/ civil defense, and the strengthened defense cooperation with Australia have tightened the PLA's perception of Japan.

**Characteristics of Cognitive Domain Operations as Envisioned by the People's Liberation Army (PLA):
A Comparative Analysis of Western Research and Chinese articles including those in PLA Daily**

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Cognitive domain operations refer to a confrontation waged at the level of consciousness and thought regardless of whether it is peacetime or wartime. Through the deliberate and selective manipulation and dissemination of information, those operations aim to influence decision makings, alter perceptions, and struggle for hearts and minds. The PLA uses cognitive domain operations to shape and influence its audience to create favorable perceptions of its actions and objectives. The end state of cognitive domain operations is emphasized as defeating opponents without war fighting or ensuring victory with minimal conflict, thus contributing to military success.

In juxtaposition with Russian information warfare, the Chinese approach is distinguished by the mobilization of multifarious entities within the Communist Party of China, the PLA, and governmental apparatuses in the construction of narratives, capitalizing on the expansive and intricate networks inherent to the Party organizations. Nonetheless, linguistic barriers have encumbered both China and Russia. Should the PLA, in the foreseeable future, surmount these constraints through deploying generative artificial intelligence, countering the PLA's cognitive domain operations will prove to be considerably difficult.

[Research Note]**The Formation of the Concept of “Protection of Sea Lines of Communication”
in the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force:
Debates Surrounding Maritime Defense Concepts in the 1950s****AKAMATSU Shinji
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The Protection of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), an important mission of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), carries two strategic meanings: SLOCs as a lifeline for Japan’s survival and prosperity, and as a basis for U.S. reinforcement in the event of armed attack. Despite its significance, the process through which this dual-layered concept was formed in the postwar period remains underexplored. In the 1950s, the JMSDF made two attempts to acquire aircraft carriers—symbols of a blue-water navy—based on operational concepts focused on protecting SLOCs. While the idea of U.S. reinforcement was absent in the early 1950s, it gradually became essential to maritime operations. By the late 1950s, the “Akagi Concept” incorporated U.S. reinforcement into its planning. Notably, anti-submarine sweep operations using carriers were likely intended to facilitate early U.S. intervention. Although the carrier acquisition was not realized, these initiatives contributed to the institutionalization of a dual-layered concept of SLOC protection—both as a national lifeline and as a strategic basis for alliance-based defense cooperation.