
英文要旨 (Summaries in English)

Japanese Intelligence in Neutral Countries during World War II : Focusing upon Military and Naval Attachés in Sweden and Switzerland

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Neutral countries during World War II were bases for the Allies and Axis powers to gather and disseminate information for political and tactical strategies and operational guidance. The activities of the intelligence agencies from major countries were conducted under the surface. With the exception of a study on Swedish military attaché Makoto Onodera, all previous studies on the activities of Japanese military and naval attachés stationed in Sweden and Switzerland—representative neutral countries, have evaluated the success or failure of peace negotiations in both countries and the degree of their contribution to the home government's decision-making at the war's end. In contrast, this paper examines the outcomes of intelligence activities conducted from 1944 to 1945, focusing on the collection and analysis of information on the Soviet Union. Without focusing solely on Japanese activities, the paper utilizes U.S. records of intercepted and deciphered communications and materials from the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to show that neutral countries during World War II became the stage for an information warfare, premised on the postwar confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

The Expanding Use of Analytical Wargaming as a Methodology in International Relations:

Reviewing the Discussions over the Utilization of Experimental Wargame

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Until recently, wargaming was not regarded as a methodology for scientific analysis in Social Science. However, since around 2020, Western scholars have increasingly turned to wargaming as a methodology to study international relations, especially to

investigate issues that are scarce with empirical evidence, such as the ones related to nuclear deterrence or emerging technologies. The game used for this purpose is primarily an experimental wargame, which sees games as a tool for synthetic data generation and seeks to verify a generalizable causal relationship by quantitatively examining hundreds of game outcomes. That said, as the experimental wargame differs with traditional-style analytical wargames in many aspects, its emergence has invited criticisms from the existing wargame community, and this has led to active debates over the modality of analytical wargaming. By reviewing these debates, we can gain hints on many important issues that are valuable in considering how to design analytical wargaming in general, especially on issues like ecological validity and immersion, the nature of game participants, or repetition of game.

**Modernization of the Chinese Air Force in the Late Maoist Period:
Initiatives under the Sino-Soviet Conflict and Mao Zedong's Role**

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This article examines how modernization efforts surrounding the Chinese People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) were conducted from 1959, when the "Sino-Soviet Defense New Technology Agreement" was abrogated, to 1976, the year of Mao Zedong's death.

During the period of Sino-Soviet conflict, it is generally understood that the modernization of the PLAAF stalled due to the loss of technical assistance from the Soviet Union. However, a close examination of Mao's influence on the PLAAF under the circumstances of the abrogation of the "Sino-Soviet Defense New Technology Agreement", the Great Leap Forward, the Vietnam War, the Nuclear Tests, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and the Lin Biao incident reveals a steady effort to modernize the PLAAF in both software and hardware aspects.

Use of Civil Aviation by the Japanese Government and Military during the Second Sino-Japanese War

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During the Second Sino-Japanese War, Japan used civil aviation for military air transport and other purposes. Japan had extensive air routes in mainland China, which formed the basis for aircraft operations then. Why was Japan able to build a far-reaching air route, even though Japan was an aviation backward country in the 1920s? It was largely due to civil aviation.

During the Manchurian Incident and the Second Sino-Japanese War, civil air transport companies were established one after another in Japan's sphere of influence to provide air transportation at the request of the Japanese military. And many of the air routes required for air transportation were established by civilian airlines. But then, when military air transportation declined, civilian airlines switched to civilian air transportation and continued to maintain air routes. Thus, Japan during the Second Sino-Japanese War utilized civilian aircraft to establish and maintain the far-reaching air routes.

Vietnam's "Bamboo Diplomacy":

A Survival Strategy amid Great Power Competition

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This paper examines the characteristics of Vietnam's "bamboo diplomacy," a survival strategy in the midst of great power competition, and its developments. The bamboo diplomacy refers to a balanced external policy that maintains strategic autonomy and promotes national interests without taking sides with any particular country by adopting flexible engagements according to the external environment and domestic situation. In implementing its bamboo diplomacy, Vietnam maintains relations with the United States and Russia while making it clear that it prioritizes China over any other country at important junctures in its external relations. Due to the unstable political situation in Vietnam, the current political leadership does not have the capacity to effectively deal with any instability in its external relations, especially with

China. Therefore, Vietnam has shown deference to China. The new Secretary General To Lam has also inherited the bamboo diplomacy of the late Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong.

**Is Space Beginning to be Considered a *Normal* Military Domain?
A Study Based on the Announcement Status of Counterspace Activities**

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Over the past decade, the recognition that space is a domain of warfare has been expressed in official documents and statements by government and military officials. Focusing on the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, France, and Germany, four countries—the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and France—have publicly stated their intention to disrupt adversaries' use of space if necessary. In terms of counterspace capabilities, the United States has announced that it has dedicated equipment and units that operate it, and Australia and France have also revealed their specific equipment procurement plans. However, in many of the countries mentioned above, there is a gap between the actual efforts related to counterspace activities and the situation regarding public announcements. Considering that in the traditional military domains of land, sea, and air, it is common to announce the possession of equipment with offensive capabilities, except for detailed specifications, public announcements related to the space domain are notable for the discretion in disclosing information on the offensive side. Compared to land, sea, and air, space is still treated as a unique domain rather than a *normal* domain from a military perspective.

**National Security and Personal Information Protection:
Personal Information Protection in Japan Self-Defense Forces**

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In recent years, personal information has become important not only for business but also for national security purposes, and the question of how to strike a balance

between security and personal information protection has become a major issue in many countries. From a legal perspective, many developed countries have established a framework that exempts government information collection activities for security purposes from the application of personal information protection acts, while organizing legal regulations for such activities separately. However, Japan's Personal Information Protection Law has no provisions related to national security, and there is no law that clearly defines the legal basis and authority for information collection activities conducted by government agencies. As a result, the relationship between the two is extremely unclear. In particular, the relationship between the activities of the Self-Defense Forces in a contingency and the protection of personal information has not been discussed at all. The ambiguity of the relationship between the two poses a critical challenge in terms of both personal information protection and national security. This paper proposes necessary measures for the relationship between national security and personal information protection in Japan, focusing mainly on the handling of personal information by the Self-Defense Forces.

Strategic Role of Counterforce Capabilities: Considerations for Formal Modeling

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One notable feature of the ongoing military buildup in contemporary East Asia is the increasing emphasis on counterforce strategies utilizing conventional forces. This trend is grounded in the assumption that counterforce capabilities, by enabling damage limitation, enhance deterrence. However, existing studies have produced conflicting predictions, with some arguing that damage limitation strengthens deterrence, while others suggest it increases the likelihood of crises or conflicts.

This paper argues that prior research has not sufficiently considered strategic interactions and has focused narrowly on certain aspects of decision-making during crises. To fully capture the strategic role of counterforce capabilities, a formalized framework tailored to the contemporary East Asian context is essential. Through an exploration of models and analyses of various policy tools within the assumed

strategic environment, this study argues that an effective approach would involve modifying existing military threat models. Four critical elements are identified as key to such formalization: (1) damage limitation, (2) inherent costs, (3) operational effectiveness, and (4) commitment problems.

**Shaping the Future of Active Cyber Defense:
Exploring the Frontiers of International Law and Possible Measures**

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“Active Cyber Defense (ACD)” has become a topic of policy debate in Japan. The concept of ACD was originally created in response to the growing number of cybersecurity threats that could not be addressed by passive defenses such as patch management. However, the concept has remained vague that merely means “some kind of active measure that goes beyond passive defenses,” because it lacks common understanding, especially, as to whether ACD also includes measures that amount to offensive one. In addition, the effects of ACD and risks it poses remain unclear partly because the international legal framework for implementing active measures in the territory of another country has not yet been developed. Therefore, ACD cannot be deemed as a silver bullet. Nonetheless, it is considered a practical measure to deal with the growing threats. Against this backdrop, Japan is facing a need to shape the future of its own unique ACD with exploring the frontiers of international law and possible measures, while considering its domestic restrictions including its risk appetite.

**Changes and Continuities in Japan’s Defense Strategy:
The 2022 National Defense Strategy and Defense Capabilities in a New Era**

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On December 16, 2022, Japan announced so-called three strategic documents: The National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Defense Buildup

Plan. The most controversial point in the three documents was how Japan strengthens its defense capabilities. Focusing on the National Defense Strategy, this article identifies changes and continuities in Japan's defense strategy. The National Defense Program Guidelines – the predecessor of the National Defense Strategy – underwent a number of revisions, and since 2013 it was transformed into a document that describes defense capabilities designed for realistic contingency scenarios. The National Defense Strategy, formulated in response to a deteriorating security environment, calls for building a defense force that focuses on opponent capabilities and new ways of warfare. This approach follows the trend of the recent National Defense Program Guidelines which incorporated “capability assessment,” but with more emphasis on required defense capabilities to address actual contingencies. Based on this logic, the National Defense Strategy presents the way in which Japan assures deterrence by denial particularly through counterstrike capabilities and resiliency.