
英文要旨 (Summaries in English)

The 2022 Revision of the Japan's Three Security Documents in the Context of Postwar History

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This study examines the Japan's "Three Security Documents" formulated in 2022, placing them in the context of postwar history on national security policy.

In the context of postwar Japanese history, the Three Security Documents can be summarized as clarifying a line of countering threats and emphasizing operations. The Basic Defense Force Concept, which was introduced in the 1976 National Defense Program Guidelines and continued until it was abolished in the 2010 NDPG emphasized the beyond-the-threat theory as a logic for pushing back against the downward pressure on defense capabilities that arose during the détente period and then the post-Cold War period. In addition, one of the components of the concept, "repelling limited and small-scale aggression without external assistance," was a way of thinking that emphasized defense build-up itself, rather than operations.

On the other hand, the 2022 Three Security Documents clearly state that Japan will possess counterstrike capabilities, which were not included in the previous Multi-Domain Defense Force, and will secure an ability to continue fighting that support this defense force, and they also state that these will be backed up by budgetary means. This can be said to clarify and implement the approach of emphasizing counter-threats and operations.

**Examining personnel contributions to the Persian Gulf during
the Nakasone administration:
Focusing on the issue of dispatching minesweepers**

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The overseas activities of the Self-Defense Forces began with the dispatch of minesweepers following the Gulf War in 1991. However, a similar initiative was contemplated four years earlier, in 1987, at the end of the Nakasone administration. During the Iran-Iraq War, responding to requests from the United States, the Japanese government explored the possibility of sending minesweepers to the Persian Gulf. As the conflict escalated, safety in navigation became a critical issue for countries reliant on this region for oil transport.

In response to requests for assistance from the United States, several Western European nations sent their own minesweepers to conduct minesweeping operations in the Persian Gulf. Under pressure from the US, the Japanese government also started to consider how it could contribute to ensuring safe navigation in the area. While the initial plan focused on sending minesweepers, the government ultimately abandoned this idea due to political and administrative challenges.

This paper examines the deliberations surrounding the dispatch of minesweepers, utilizing recently released materials to provide a comprehensive analysis of the process and background from the initial consideration to its eventual abandonment and evaluates its significance.

**The Political Failure of Japan's Human Contribution in the Gulf Crisis and
the Quality of the Policy Process:
Historical Lessons for policy makers and the policy functions of
administrative organizations**

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The U.S. urged Japan to show Western unity during the Gulf crisis to uphold the post-Cold

War order. Japan's response, however, was inconsistent. Despite considering deploying personnel for Human Contribution and drafting UN Peace Cooperation bill, internal divisions emerged over the deployment's compatibility with national interests and U.S. requests. This led to distrust in the government, seen as a political failure. The study attributes this to decision-making incentives and selective perceptions, reducing rationality in policy-making. Historical lessons and cognitive interactions within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shaped policymakers' judgmental incentives and perceptions, rationalizing decisions and causing political failures.

**The History and Developments of the Overseas Operational Deployment
Policy of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Forces:
Focusing on the Era from the End of the Cold War
until the UNTAC Deployment**

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In 1992, Japan and Germany dispatched their ground troops to the United Nation Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). This was the first full-scale deployment of ground forces to a United Nation peacekeeping operation for both Germany and Japan. This paper focuses on the era from the end of the Cold War until the end of UNTAC deployments as its main research subject, and clarifies the history and development of the overseas operational deployment policy of the Japan Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF), taking into account Japan's perception of the changing security environment and the controversial issues that divided national opinion about sending JGSDF overseas, including constitutional debates. The involvement of such actors as politician, diplomats, and military is precisely examined and analyzed. The implications of the Gulf War as well as disaster relief operation including international humanitarian assistance are referred from a historical perspective.

Disinformation and the Law of Armed Conflict

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Though dispatching and spreading disinformation may be regarded as the bad activities from the ordinary image, disinformation was used as one of the means of ruses of war during the wartime since ancient times. In addition, there is the provision that disinformation as the means of ruses of war may be not prohibited in Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I). However, the precondition of disinformation as the means of ruses of war is that the disinformation is not violated with the law of armed conflict. On the other hand, generally, dispatching disinformation will not be able to be regarded as attack under law of engagement because disinformation may only influence human's cognition and it does not have physical force. Nevertheless, it will be found that dispatching disinformation under special circumstances may fall in illegal combat methods when we confirm the regulations of the law of engagement in depth. Therefore, countering disinformation of enemy during armed conflict, paying attention to the above point will be needed.

Loss and Restoration of Civilian Protection under International Humanitarian Law:

The Position of the 'Revolving Door' Theory in International Law

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Article 48 of Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Protocol I stipulates the principle of distinction, while Article 51, Paragraph 3, stipulates the requirements under which civilians are protected, and states that civilians are protected 'unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities'. However, the Protocol does not clarify how this phrase should be interpreted, and for this reason, in 2009 the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) produced guidelines for interpretation of this issue. The ICRC therefore proposed an interpretation of customary international law that states that the protection of civilians is lost only during direct participation in hostilities,

and that the protection of civilians is restored each time they withdraw from participation. However, this interpretation has been criticised by the United States and other countries, as well as by several experts. For this reason, this paper will analyse the manuals of the armed forces of various countries, which have not been covered in previous research, and clarify the position of this 'revolving door' of protection of civilians in international law.

**The Formation of the Organizational Foundation of
U.S. Special Operations Forces:
From the Vietnam War to the War on Terror**

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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) have evolved from World War II through the Cold War, although their development has not always followed a linear path. Within the U.S. military, special operations units were often viewed as outliers. Despite their significant contributions to counterinsurgency operations during the Vietnam War, they were largely sidelined organizationally. During the Cold War, a series of operational failures acted as a catalyst for the strengthening of SOF, largely driven by political intervention from civilian leaders. However, the U.S. military resisted these changes at the organizational level, and it was not until the establishment of the United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) in 1987 that a formal organizational foundation was solidified. This study examines the process through which this foundation was established, focusing on the tension between the military's resistance to reform and the congressional push for a stronger SOF. It also explores how, following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, U.S. SOF assumed a central role in the War on Terror and anticipates the future evolution of SOF in relation to emerging U.S. national security priorities, particularly in the context of great power competition.

**The U.S. Army's Understanding and Efforts of Low-Intensity Conflict
in the Late 1980s: Focusing on the Concept and Execution of
“Peacetime Contingency Operations”**

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The purpose of this paper is to clarify one aspect of the U.S. Army's understanding of low-intensity conflict (LIC). When examining the concept of LIC operations, the U.S. Army included peacetime contingency operations (PCO) in LIC, which are closely related to high-intensity conflict. This paper examines how PCO was included in LIC, through the U.S. Army's LIC study which began in earnest in the late 1980s, and the Army's experience of the invasion of Panama. It also discusses the reasons for the U.S. Army's inclusion of PCOs in LIC.

LIC is a term that refers primarily to counterinsurgency, counterinsurgency support, and counterterrorism military operations. However, PCO is an extension of conventional warfare unlike LIC; the inclusion of PCO in LIC has made LIC more conventional warfare oriented. Even in the Panama invasion operation, the Army appreciated the bias toward conventional warfare rather than a response in line with LIC. This was caused by the Army's acceptance of LIC based on the intensity of the war. In other words, by superimposing the intensity of war on the chronological axis of escalation of war, the Army placed LIC, which is inherently different from conventional warfare, in the early stages of high-intensity conflict.

**Genealogy of the Southern Yemen's Separatism and the Strategy
of the Southern Transitional Council:
Path to the Third Pole in the Yemeni Civil War**

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This paper summarizes the genealogy of southern Yemen's separatism and discusses the factors that led to the development of the Southern Transitional Council into the largest political force in the south. Although the southern separatists were defeated in the 1994

civil war, they continued to operate domestically and internationally on a smaller scale. In the late 2000s, Southern separatism showed grassroots spread in the South as the “Southern Movement.

The Southern Transitional Council, established in 2017, is an extension of the Southern Movement, a domestic-based movement that upholds the separation of the South. The organization has rapidly expanded its power based on (1) the government’s declining ability to govern, (2) the dissatisfaction of southern residents with the shelving of southern issues, (3) its entry into an internationally recognized government in 2019 and (4) the UAE’s support. The expansion of the Southern Transitional Council’s power damaged the legitimacy of the internationally recognized government and reduced its ability to fight the Houthis; even after becoming part of the internationally recognized government, the organization continued to clash with the national army, as well as incorporating other powerful southern political forces, leading it to form a third pole in the civil war.

The Japanese Army’s Intelligence Activities against the Soviet Union as Information Warfare: The “Lineage of Intelligence Officers” and the War Termination Policies of the Pacific

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This paper focuses on the Japanese Army’s intelligence activities against the Soviet Union as information warfare. In particular clarifying the institution, policy, and main activities of the intelligence officers led by the General Staff, the author points out that the Japanese Army emphasized information warfare against the Red Army centering on intelligence strategy during the interbellum, and their roles of intelligence activities changed drastically from intelligence strategy to the gathering and analyzing wartime information as the transition into the WWII. As examples of Japanese Army’s intelligence activities against the Soviet Union, the author sheds light on the Japan’s war termination policies of the Pacific and the confidential telegram of Major General Onodera Makoto, a military attache to the Japanese legation in Sweden. Although the Japanese Army had formed various intelligence networks to unveil Soviet military power and its strategic intentions based in Manchukuo, it was not

fully utilized for accurate predicting the Soviet entry into the war against Japan in August 1945 (the Soviet-Japanese War) due to the difficulty of fact-finding and verification of wartime information.

**Minister of the Navy Takarabe Takeshi and the issue of treatment of
engineering officers during the Taisho period**

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Why was Minister of the Navy Takarabe Takeshi unable to control the chaos surrounding the London Disarmament within the Navy Department? In answer to this question, previous research has pointed out that anti- Takarabe sentiment existed within the department even before Takarabe first became Minister of the Navy, and that Takarabe incurred resentment from deck officers due to policies that went against the interests of deck officers during the London Disarmament. However, previous research has not been able to explain the circumstances that led Takarabe to take measures to improve the treatment of engineering officers, which went against the interests of deck officers, the year after he first became Minister of the Navy, six years before the London Disarmament. This paper considers these circumstances and attempts to add new insights to the answer above.

To overcome the decline in his own prestige within the department since the Siemens scandal, Takarabe attempted to gain the support of engineering officers by implementing policies that met the demands of them. However, Takarabe incurred further resentment from deck officers, but failed to gain their support, which made it even more difficult for him to exercise control within the department as Minister of the Navy.

**On Domains of Operational Environment:
An Analysis of Japan's Perception of Domains and Its Change**

SAITO Takumi

This article attempts to show how the concept of domain is perceived in strategic documents of Japan. The first part of this article observes the global commons and domains in the documents from the 2004 National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG) to National Defense Strategy. The second part of this article analyzes the concepts of domain based on three viewpoints, the geography of imagination, the geography of forming organization and the physical geography.

According to the observation, we can confirm that the global commons which emphasize freedom of access exist in the documents until the 2013 NDPG. However, from the 2018 NDPG, it is replaced by the concept of domain, which consists of land, sea, air, space, cyberspace and EMS and prioritizes effect on battles and advantage therein.

This Article comes to the following conclusion based on the viewpoints, comparing with the global commons and domains in strategic documents of United States: Japan perceives the domains to be operational environments which (1) consist of abstract geography, (2) emphasize advantage therein and (3) have effects on forming military organizations through their physical character. However, Japan does not require domains to form independent military services.