英文要旨 (Summaries in English)

Compellence as a Counter to Fait Accompli: Past Record and the Causes of Failure

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Compellence can be an option for a country which suffers a loss due to another's fait accompli. In such a case, the former demands, with military threats for noncompliance, that the latter undo what it has done and recover the status quo ante. In order to advance our understanding on how to counter fait accompli, this study addresses two questions. The first is: how successful has compellence been in countering fait accompli? In the Militarized Compellent Threats dataset, there are ten such cases between 1946 and 2001. Only one of them was successful, and all others ended in failure. Given this record, the second question is: why does compellence tend to fail in this context? The analysis of the nine failed cases reveals three causes of failure. The overall finding is that the context matters. The target of compellence had resorted to fait accompli based on a perception that the opponent would not respond militarily or the ensuing conflict would be winnable. Once established, such optimism is hard to change and makes the target insusceptible to compellent threats, rendering the strategy tend to fail in this context.

Involvement of Australian Forces in Third Country Contingencies under the U.S.-Australia Alliance:

Past Cases and Implications for Today

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After World War II, Australia fought side-by-side with the United States and the United Kingdom, sending troops to wars in which the United States participated, such as the Korean War, Vietnam War, Gulf War, Afghanistan conflict, and Iraq War. Although Australia's contributions were small in each case, its prompt and

timely deployments have made Australia a strong ally of the United States. In those battles, Australian forces were often integrated with U.S. and British forces and were subordinated to U.S. command at the operational level. In any future conflict situation that may arise in Indo-Pacific, it is highly likely that Australia will contribute to the alliance and coalition missions, so long as the United States is involved there. At present, Australia's possible contributions include intelligence gathering, surveillance activities in areas surrounding the conflict, aerial refueling, maritime and air attacks, participation in ground combat, minesweeping and maritime blockades in the surrounding waters, and logistical activities. Japan could be considered as a potential strategic location for such activities in the event of a situation in Northeast Asia, such as a contingency on the Korean Peninsula.

Efforts to Eradicate LTTE in Sri Lanka: A Study of Efforts before the Rajapaksa Administration ADACHI Yoshimasa Japan Ground Self Defense Force

The Sri Lankan government successfully eradicated the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between the efforts of the government and the military before the Rajapaksa administration and those of the Rajapaksa administration, and to clarify the significance of how they contributed to the eradication of the LTTE. In conducting the analysis, taking into consideration the characteristics of the armed conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE, three indicators of counterinsurgency principles that are considered to be particularly important are used. The analysis reveals that government and military efforts before the Rajapaksa administration generally provided the basis for the ability to eradicate the LTTE in Eelam War IV during the Rajapaksa administration. In addition, this paper suggests the implication that since strengthening the military requires long-term efforts, when analyzing the success or failure of counterinsurgency operations, it is necessary to analyze not only the recent administration's efforts but also those efforts from a long-term perspective.

Japanese Siberian Intervention and its Effect on Imperial Japanese Army's Modernization:

Building Full-Fledged Air Arm

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The purpose of this thesis is to illuminate hitherto underappreciated side of Japanese Siberian Intervention; its effect on the Imperial Japanese Army's modernization program, especially on creating the state-of-the-art air force. The existing literature mainly stresses the importance of "Ugaki Drawdown" in 1925 and its impact on the army air arm's modernization, but the Siberian Intervention starting in 1918 equally played a significant role in it. As a preparation for the Intervention, Japanese Army purchased a massive amount of aircraft from European countries and the U.S. to update its air fleet, while France, having been trying to push Japan's military action in Siberia, succeeded in gaining dominance as aircraft supplier to Japan. Accordingly, Japanese Army could strongly promote its air arm's modernization through the education given by the French Aviation Mission which used as teaching materials the purchased cutting-edge French aircrafts. Also, the Intervention, coupled with French influence, fostered the rudimentary Japanese aircraft industry. While the Imperial Japanese Army strongly recognized the necessity of modernizing its air force through its own WWI studies, the Siberian Intervention gave the direction for it.

Supplying Operation to Guadalcanal: From a Japanese perspective

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Why did Japanese soldiers call the island of Guadalcanal " 餓島 [Ga-Tou]," which means the island of starvation? This paper aims to clarify the conditions of the Battle of Guadalcanal Island from the perspective of the supplying operation conducted by the Japanese Imperial Army and Navy. It was one of the characteristics of this battle that Japan competed against the U.S for force projection. In the early stage of the battle, when the forces of both sides were almost equal, the Japanese Army and Navy

made three major attempt to transport combat troops and munitions by convoyed transporting fleets after building a supply route from Rabaul to Guadalcanal. However, all of these attempts failed. At the same time, the Japanese Army and Navy lost both air and sea control over Guadalcanal. Around November 1942, the Japanese changed their means of transportation and began using high-speed destroyers and submarines. But the Japanese were unable to transport heavy equipment because the destroyers and submarines did not have sufficient transport capacity. In addition, soldiers on the island had to unload munitions and transport them to frontline by hand. The Japanese were only able to supply the soldiers fighting on Guadalcanal with a small amount of food which they carried by their own hands.

Officer Development and Military Professionalism: How the Educational Philosophy of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Was Transformed in the 1970s?

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The experience of the Vietnam War provided the U.S. Army with the momentum to reform itself. Revising the way of officer development was a part of this efforts. In the mid-1970s, when army began to remake itself into a professional force, the educational policy of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), which had been recognized as the most important educational and training institution for officers, was revised. Subjects such as political science and sociology, which were not directly related to warfighting, became to be recognized as less important. At the same time, more emphasis was placed on imparting the knowledge and skills that would be useful in post-graduation duties; less emphasis on providing opportunities for academic contemplation on war. In short, CGSC was transformed into a vocational training school. However, in the process of these college reforms there was a fierce dispute over the educational policy. This paper aims to explain how the educational philosophy of the CGSC was transformed in the 1970s through examining the ideological aspects of this dispute, especially the differences in the ideas about what types of competencies a field grade officer must have in order to be a military professional.

[Research Note]

The People's Liberation Army's "Disarmament" in the 1980s: A Reexamination of the One Million Personnel Cut in 1985 MOMIJI Natsuki Ministry of Defense

The 1980s was a period of great political and economic change for China, and the same was true for the Chinese People Liberation Army (PLA). Throughout the 1980s, PLA underwent military reform, large-scale personnel reductions, and unit reorganization. Today's PLA can be seen as a result of series of transformations in the 1980s.

This paper focuses on the decision to cut one million personnel in 1985, and examine the specific targets of the personnel reductions, their implementation, and the policy decision-making processes. It then attempts to provide a new perspective on the factors that led to the decision, which differs from the mainstream interpretation in China. There were two separate but parallel processes at that time: one is downsizing of its organization, which had been overstretched by the Cultural Revolution, and the other is preparation of an armed forces suitable for future wars. During those processes, one of the ongoing goals was the integration of the various functions to form the synthetic units, and this would be believed to have influenced the timing and direction of personnel reductions.

[Research Note]

Complementarity of the Japan-U.S. Alliance:
A Quantitative Analysis Based on the Economics of Alliances
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The purpose of this paper is to examine the characteristics of the Japan-U.S. alliance from 1979 to 2020. Specifically, this paper aimed to answer the following two questions. First, did Japan's defense power and U.S. military power complement or substitute for each other? Second, was there a trade-off between Japan's strengthening defense power and its contributing to the alliance? To analyze these questions, this

paper used two models: the public goods model and the arms-and-allies trade-off model. The hypotheses corresponding to these two models were tested by economic and quantitative methods. Based on the results of the tests, this paper concluded that Japan's defense power and U.S. military power complemented each other, and that there was no trade-off between Japan's strengthening defense power and its contributing to the alliance. The conclusion implies that the Japan-U.S. Alliance functioned as a system to efficiently enhance its ability to deter and counter threats by generating synergies between Japan's defense power and U.S. military power.