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## 英文要旨 (Summaries in English)

### **Russia's Constitutional Reform in the Second Putin Administration: Presidential Power in the Russian Political System**

**HASEGAWA Takeyuki**  
**National Institute for Defense Studies**

The major amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation implemented in 2020 are a watershed event in contemporary Russian political and legal history. In comparative political science and comparative law studies, analyses of the general features of the amendment and various social science issues concerning the extension of the term of office of political leaders have been raised. As part of the research on the Russian semi-presidential system, this paper focused on the trend of the development of federal laws such as the “Federal Constitutional Law on the Government” and examined the transformation of presidential power through institutional changes. As an interim assessment, this paper points out that the complex nature of executive power in Russia, including the presidential-federal government relationship, has been reorganized in the Constitution and various laws and regulations by strengthening presidential power, and that it is necessary to make some reservations about the active role of the Federal Assembly in the formation process of the Federal Government.

### **Japanese Military Intelligence in the Inter-war Era: Based on the Examination of *Ten-rei-han* (Doctrinal Instructions, Regulations and Manuals) of the Army**

**KUNISHIMA Kenichi**  
**National Institute for Defense Studies**

Strongly shocked at the First World War, the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) drastically reviewed its doctrinal instructions, regulations and manuals (collectively referred to as *ten-rei-han* in Japanese) during the inter-war era. The *ten-rei-han* concerning military intelligence (MI) were also re-examined.

The process can be divided into three phases. In the first phase (1918-1928), the IJA tentatively revised the *ten-rei-han* based on the lessons learned from the Great War. In the second phase (1929-1932), the IJA mostly established the instructions especially regarding espionage with the information collected after the Great War. In the third phase (1933-1938), the IJA fixed the procedures concerning MI at the operational level with further research and developments.

The *ten-rei-han* of the IJA included some elements which could provoke disregard of intelligence: operation-biased intelligence, retard and insufficiency of research, decline in value of intelligence due to excessively offence-oriented regulations. In spite of those defects, the contents of the two *ten-rei-han* - “*Sakusen Youmurei*” (the Operations Service Regulations) and “*Bakuryou Sankousho Dai-I-kan*” (the Army Staff Manual Part I) - compiled in 1938 are regarded as appropriate from today’s perspective. It could be said that the IJA reached a conclusion of the *ten-rei-han* concerning MI at the operational level.

### **Reconsidering the “Joint Communiqué” Issued by Chiang and Dulles: The ROC Had No Intention of Abandoning the “Retaking the Mainland” by Force**

**IGARASHI Takayuki**  
**National Defense Academy**

In October 1958, as the Second Taiwan Strait crisis stalled, Secretary of State John F. Dulles visited Taiwan in an effort to bring the situation under control. After a series of meetings, Dulles and Chiang Kai-shek issued a joint communiqué. This communiqué was reported as a statement of renunciation of force to recover the mainland, to which the ROC protested that it would never abandon the use of force. The communiqué was interpreted differently by the US and ROC.

The scope of the US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty signed during the First Taiwan Strait crisis did not include offshore islands off the coast of mainland. The fact that this communiqué gave the ROC a defense commitment for Kinmen and Matsu, meant that the ROC’s inferiority in the offshore island areas had been resolved and the balance had been achieved. Then, recognizing that the US had agreed to leave room

for the use of force for the “Retaking the Mainland” if not by major means, the ROC government make a moving on a full-scale counteroffensive using Kinmen and Matsu as footholds.

### **British Imperial Defence in the Mediterranean during the Second World War: Focusing on the Battle of Crete and the Siege of Malta**

**ITO Nobuyoshi**

**National Institute for Defense Studies**

This article reconsiders the battles of the Mediterranean Theatre during the Second World War from the perspective of British imperial defence, especially focusing on such cases as the Battle of Crete and the Siege of Malta. Historically, Britain had regarded the Mediterranean as a strategic point where formal colonies and informal spheres of influence overlapped. Therefore, battles in the Mediterranean during the Second World War directly linked to its imperial defence in the region. In Crete, which was placed as a part of British “Informal Empire”, Britain was unable to establish sufficient arrangements on the island due to the balance with other campaigns and eventually lost the battle. On the other hand, as a crown colony and the most important naval base in the Mediterranean, the defence of Malta was thought to be vital to the maintenance of the British Empire so that Britain sustained its enormous efforts to survive the siege by axis powers. However, totally exhausted by the war, Britain could no longer retain its imperial presence within the post-war international order. In that sense, the Second World War triggered the dismantling of the British Empire and the battles in the Mediterranean symbolised this tendency.

### **Coercive Diplomacy for Political Objective:**

#### **North Korea Threatened the Moon Jae-in Administration of South Korea**

**WATANABE Takeshi**

**National Institute for Defense Studies**

Coercive diplomacy does not always threaten to harm national interest even if the

target is other nation. Because coercion does not assume warfare, the direct target is a civilian leadership rather than military professionals who protect national interest, and the civilians are actors in domestic politics. For the targeted civilian decision makers, losing political interests rather than national interests could be the decisive reason for conceding the coercer's demand. Indeed, the reason why North Korea was able to successfully coerce South Korea to make distance from the US in 2020 was that the advantage of the Moon Ja-in administration of the South over its conservative opponents in domestic politics depended on the stable relations with the North. South Korea accepted the demand soon after Kim Jong-un, the leader of North Korea, stressed that he had the option to destroy their relationship. The coercive diplomacy also contributed to a domestic campaign of North Korea to accuse the liberal democratic South of following an outside power, the US, at the expense of Korean self-reliance. The necessity to prove the supremacy over the liberal democracy incentivizes North Korea to continue coercive diplomacy.

### **The Replacement of the Polaris System in the UK: Conflict in the Thatcher Government over the CASD Postures**

**OGAWA Kenichi**  
**National Defense Academy**

This article investigates the debate between the political and military sides in the United Kingdom regarding the replacement of the British Polaris system, from the late 1970s to the early 1980s, and how the discussion was settled.

Thatcher's Conservative government had agreed to purchase the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) Trident from the United States. The replacement of the Polaris system was an extension of the conventional policy by which the latest SLBMs made in the United States were purchased while mounting warheads were made within the country; the missiles were loaded onto submarines that were also made in Britain. This decision was made under the Conservative government, which had pledged to update its strategic nuclear forces; for this reason, it may have been considered an ordinary matter.

However, this paper demonstrates that the government and the army had contrasting stances with regard to the issue of minimum nuclear deterrence, which led to intense debates. The two sides held different opinions about the number of submarines involved: on the one hand, the former encouraged building five Trident submarines to maintain two Continuous At-Sea Deterrence postures at all times. The debate was settled by a military concession.

**[Research Note]****France's AI Defense Strategy: Possibilities for French-Japanese Cooperation****MATSUZAKI Tomokazu****Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan/Embassy of Japan in France**

This paper analyzes the military strategy on artificial intelligence (AI), published by the French Ministry of Armed Forces in order to identify France's position on international cooperation. In this field where the U.S. and China are on the rise, France, is seeks to acquire capabilities with relative advantages through international cooperation as a "second group." Bearing this in mind, this paper focuses on the field of international cooperation in building relations with Japan which constitutes France's strategy. This study also sheds light on the seven priority items of efforts identified by the French Ministry of Armed Forces as means to achieve the main elements of its four basic policies: interoperability, human-centered ethics, robust AI systems, and the creation of niche strategy. This paper then analyzes the possibility of Japan-France collaboration on these seven items taking into account both the perspective of France as well as the current situation in Japan, and summarizes the possibilities for Japan-France collaboration.

**[Research Note]**

**Transition of the Fleet Review of the Imperial Japanese Navy**

**ISHIMARU Yasuzo**

**National Institute for Defense Studies**

The Imperial Japanese Navy had held fleet reviews nineteen times in all across three eras of Meiji, Taisho, and Showa. How did the initial fleet review come to take place?

If you try to go over the history of the Imperial Japanese Navy's fleet reviews, you will find out several documents that briefly explain the origin of its fleet review, along with a list of the date and the area of implementation, the number of participating warships, and the name of the servant warship. Although the contents of many documents are almost the same, they are not in-depth.

Based on the primary historical materials related to the fleet reviews among the piles of "*Kobun Biko*" documents formerly belonging to the Ministry of the Navy, the author traces the transition of the fleet reviews of the Imperial Japanese Navy in the course of shedding light on the background of its implementation, the relevant regulations of the Navy, and the practical problems and the countermeasures.

**[Research Note]**

**Understanding "Fait Accompli": A Proposed Definition and Process**

**UGAKI Shomei**

**Graduate School of Security Studies, National Defense Academy**

Recently many researchers and policymakers have pointed out that current revisionist states such as Russia and China are more inclined to act in a unilateral fashion without relying on historical strategies that require the use of brute force or coercion in order to change the global status quo in their favor. The increasing use of unilateral strategies to change the status quo, or *fait accompli*, has drawn the attention of recent scholars, however this issue has remained largely unexplored by International Relations literature. In this paper, I will explore existing International Relations literature on *fait accompli*, propose a revised definition for the term, and examine the underlying mechanism of this strategy. This revised definition and a examining the mechanism

of the modern use of fait accompli will be beneficial for further research, facilitate in-depth analyses, and stimulate new strategies around deterring or successfully utilizing fait accompli.

**[Research Note]**

**Military Posture of North Korea:  
Changes and Intentions of Nuclear Weapons, Missiles and Conventional  
Forces under the Kim Jong Un Regime**

**ASAMI Asaki**  
**National Institute for Defense Studies**

This article deals with the changes and intentions of North Korea's military posture especially under the Kim Jong Un regime. While comparing with the previous regime (at the end of the Kim Jong Il regime), it analyzes the current military posture comprehensively. Focusing on analysis of South Korea's Defense White Paper, it examined the development of WMD and conventional forces of North Korea from 1999 to 2018. Before the Kim Jong Un regime, the mainstream was obsolete weapons which had been imported from Communist countries such as the Soviet Union. Also, the development of nuclear weapons remained at the early stage. However, during the Kim Jong Un regime, North Korea selectively developed conventional weapons which were lower cost and higher effectiveness. Furthermore, it promoted organizational changes to adapt the development of asymmetric warfare, and it accelerated nuclear and missile tests which shows the higher performance than before. Therefore, it is important to continue to analyze the North Korea's military posture from multiple perspectives, including WMD and conventional forces.

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