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## 英文要旨 (Summaries in English)

### **PLA's Perception about the Impact of AI on Military Affairs**

**IIDA Masafumi**

**National Institute for Defense Studies**

Rapid progress in developing the Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies ignites discussions of the “intelligentized warfare” as a future form of warfare among the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Scholars in the PLA commonly understand that the transformation from the “informatized warfare” to the “intelligentized warfare” would be a revolutionary change if the AI technologies make a significant progress. They also contend that “human-machine joint decision making,” in which a human commander and the AI jointly conduct command and control missions in a complimentary manner, would be the mainstream. Unmanned weapons are expected to play a major combat role in the front while humans carrying out command and control duties in the rear. It is argued that the “intelligentized warfare” may invite the “human-machine joint operations,” in which manned platforms and unmanned platforms jointly conduct war fighting, and the expansion of contested domains into the “virtual space” such as the “recognition domain” including perceptions of adversary’s political leaders and commanders. It is observed from the discussion about the AI among the PLA that they have expectation to take a favorable position in the future wars by well preparing for the “intelligentized warfare.”

### **PLA's Intelligentized Warfare:**

#### **Discussion on China's New Military Strategy**

**YATSUZUKA Masaaki**

**National Institute for Defense Studies**

The Xi Jinping administration adopted the “Military Strategic Guideline for a New Era” in 2019 with the perception of intelligentized warfare, as a future warfare spread in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) through observation of the US Third Offset Strategy. The PLA under Xi Jinping administration aims to overtake the U.S. military

by seizing this important moment and pre-empting the trend of a new revolution in military affairs, as intelligentization in military will be the key to winning the future warfare. The preparation of the PLA for the intelligentized warfare will change the military's unit formation, doctrine and training, and it is backed with a government-wide and long-term effort, including the military-civilian fusion strategy. On the other hand, the change in military strategy toward the intelligentized warfare, in the short term, may disrupt the process of Xi Jinping's military reform and, in the long term, pose difficult challenges to the PLA in a wide variety of ways, including contradictions with the nature of the party's military, personnel training and lack of experience in actual warfare.

### **Dismantling and Disposal of Nuclear Warheads and “Verification Approach by a Coalition of Willing”: A Study on the Development of the Verification System for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)**

**ICHIMASA Sukeyuki**

**National Institute for Defense Studies**

The verification system in the arms control treaties is important to maintain the treaty's credibility and act as a deterrent to the agreement's violations. Since the Cold War, there have been many negotiations on arms control treaties. As a result, effective verification systems developed, and later treaties inherited many of these systems. On the other hand, since the 1990s, Western nuclear-weapon states have been focusing on efforts to develop technologies to verify the dismantling and disposal of nuclear warheads, which do not plan to negotiate specific treaties. Concerning such efforts, which this paper calls a “Verification Approach by a Coalition of Willing (VACW),” some previous studies have discussed positive expectations, such as the development of verification technologies becoming the basis for establishing a nuclear disarmament treaty in the future. Under these conditions, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), adopted in 2017, has decided not to inherit verification knowledge and establish only simple verification-related provisions. In recent years, while discussing what the future TPNW should be as a verifiable treaty, this paper focuses on the formation process of the VACW. It considers measures for the future

development of the treaty's verification system, starting with observers' participation in the treaty by VACW member countries.

**Geopolitics Revisited:  
A Geopolitical Model and the U.S. Security Commitment to Taiwan**

**MAEDA Yuji**

**National Institute for Defense Studies**

Even as great power politics is coming back in the 21st century, the study of geopolitics still has a number of problems in producing substantive knowledge of our world. Whereas Classical Geopolitics stands on a shaky scientific foundation to make deterministic predictions, Critical Geopolitics is not very empirically productive, either, because of its fundamentally discourse-centric worldview. This paper relies on positivist epistemology and a hybrid ontology that recognizes both material and ideational factors to propose a model of geopolitics. The model is designed to explain foreign policy outcomes from physical geography as an independent variable, coupled with discourse and technology as intervening variables. Based on that model, this paper also discusses the concepts of “buffer zones” and “pivot zones” to analyze the U.S. security commitment to Taiwan in the contemporary East Asian strategic environment. The U.S. Taiwan policy, designed to deter armed conflict and to preserve the status quo, can be explained with a combination of geopolitical incentives, namely: 1) the Taiwan Strait as a buffer zone that favors the defense over the offense; 2) Taiwan as a pivot zone, which, if lost, would destabilize the entire regional security architecture; 3) the Pacific Ocean as a larger buffer that moderates the U.S. commitment against the potential Chinese threat; and 4) military technologies that make denial strategies and geographical buffers more effective.

**Between “Freedom of Navigation” and Coastal States’ Security:  
India and UNCLOS**

**IZUYAMA Marie**

**National Institute for Defense Studies**

It is puzzling that although India is enhancing maritime cooperation with the United States, it is still designated as “excessive claimant” and challenged under the US Freedom of Navigation Program. What is “excessive” with respect to India’s interpretation of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)? With growing maritime capability, is India inclined to upholding more liberal maritime order? This article examines India’s position in UNCLOS negotiation. India spoke for overlapping coastal states’ interests and developing states’ interests. There was outstanding consistency in India’s position against military use of the sea. India’s restrictive interpretation towards “freedom of navigation” is at the core of potential dispute with the US. Since the 2010s, India has been upholding “freedom of navigation” in bilateral and multilateral diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific region. However, this author argues that it is the change of India’s regional diplomacy rather than its change in principled stance to prioritize coastal states’ sovereignty over freedom of military use of the sea.

**Issues when Instituting the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force’s  
“13 Divisions System” and Defense Build-up: A Study about the Process  
Leading up to the Authorization of 180,000 Personnel Quota in 1973**

**HIDA Daisuke**

**National Institute for Defense Studies**

This article explores the challenges the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force’s (JGSDF) “13 Divisions System” faced in 1962 and how JGSDF had been struggling with them until the government finally authorized 180,000 personnel quota in 1973. In August 1962, JGSDF changed its formation from “6 Regional Forces and 4 Combined Brigades System” to the new “13 Divisions System.” When first considering a new blueprint for division system, JGSDF assumed almost 15. As a result, the actual number of divisions became 13 because of a quota limitation of 180,000 personnel which was

determined by the government as the optimal strength for JGSDF defense buildup at that time. JGSDF faced personnel challenges among other issues. The prerequisite of attaining the 180,000 personnel quota (personnel quota in 1962 was only 171,500) was one critical issue. When Okinawa was returned to Japan in 1973, the Japanese government authorized a quota of 180,000 and deployed JGSDF Forces to Okinawa. The modernization of JGSDF equipment continued in this process as well. However, organizational imbalance of divisions remained. Also, attaining a total strength over 180,000 was in doubt.

**China's "Japan Neutralization" Policy and its Perception of Japan's  
Circumstances: the Case of the Divide and Rule Policy toward the LDP  
in "the Age of Discontinuity" in Japan-China Relation**

**SUGIURA Yasuyuki**

**National Institute for Defense Studies**

The 1958 Nagasaki Flag Incident resulted in PRC's declaration to cut off all economic and cultural exchanges with Japan. This decision, however, did not mean that PRC abandoned its Japan policy altogether. Recognizing the intensification of inner struggles in the LDP, PRC embarked on what can be termed the divide and rule policy toward the LDP.

The main targets of this policy were the prominent LDP politicians, the leaders of their respective factions, such as Tanzan Ishibashi, Kenzo Matsumura and Takeo Miki. Beijing invited them to China and played up their visits as a manifestation of anti-U.S. and anti-Kishi movements.

This divide and rule policy toward the LDP was carried out under the direct orders from CCP top leaders, particularly Mao Zedong. In face of the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis and the progress in the revision of Japan-US Security Treaty, the CCP top leaders judged that that PRC must further advance its "Japan Neutralization" Policy. The divide and rule policy was premised on the assessment of Japanese domestic political conditions developed by an interagency team led by Liao Chengzhi. These Japan hands tended to magnify the intensity of political divisions inside the LDP and Japanese public's discomfort with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Their intelligence

products were biased to suit, not challenge, the CCP top leaders' world view and further reinforced their arbitrary understanding of Japan.

### **Anti-Islamist Thought in Faraj Fūda's *Al-Ḥaqīqa al-Ghā'iba***

**NISHINO Masami**

**National Institute for Defense Studies**

Faraj Fūda, who was assassinated by a radical Islamist organization in 1992, was a famous anti-Islamist thinker in Egypt in the latter half of the 20th century. He argued in his book *Al-Ḥaqīqa al-Ghā'iba (The Absent Truth)* published in 1986, that Islamists regarded Egypt as a jāhiliya state (an ignorant un-Islamic state), thus aimed to turn it into an Islamic state through the immediate implementation of Islamic law (sharī'a), and to reinstate the caliphate. Against this backdrop, Fūda refuted those Islamist claims as follows. First, he opposed to the reinstatement of the caliphate. Second, he objected to the idea of implementing sharī'a in the manner those Islamists argued and establishing an Islamic state in Egypt. Third, he insisted that all Muslims should neither glorify their history nor regard it as infallible including the era of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs based on their idealized perception of the past. Fourth, he advocated the separation of religion from politics because he believed that Islam is not a state but a religion. Lastly, he was against the implementation of ḥadd punishments, which is generally viewed as proof of the implementation of sharī'a.

### **The Japanese Army's Measures against Guerrilla Activities in the Philippines in the First Half of the Pacific War**

**TACHIKAWA Kyoichi**

**National Institute for Defense Studies**

This article examines the measures taken by the Japanese military deployed in the Philippine archipelago in the first half of the Pacific War, namely from the Japanese military landing on the Luzon Island in December 1941 to the Philippine quasi-independence in October 1943, to maintain public order in the face of anti-Japanese

guerrilla activities and other incidents that were occurring under the Japanese military administration and studies the effects of the measures and the issues arising from them, mainly on the basis of the documents made by the *Kempeitai* of the Japanese Army. There were 3,514 seditions (raid, act of terror, arson, groundless rumor, propaganda and so forth) in the Philippine Islands during the period mentioned above. Looking at the perpetrators of the seditions, most incidents were carried out by anti-Japanese guerrillas. To deal with guerrilla activities and other seditions, the Japanese Army undertook measures such as suppression, forced surrender, submission, propaganda, pacification, searches and arrests. They employed indoctrination as *modus operandi* along the way, which produced immediate results. Nevertheless, the Japanese military failed to establish security in the archipelago before its quasi-independence.

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