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## 英文要旨 (Summaries in English)

### **Assessing Current Development and Future Outlook of Cybernorn Processes: Through Interpreting a Competition between Liberal Democratic Camp and Authoritarian Camp as *the Battle of the Sexes***

**HARADA Yu (National Institute for Defense Studies)**

With a recent advance of various efforts to construct cybernorms, assessing current development and future outlook of such efforts have become far more important issues. One of the reasons behind this is a competition for constructing cybernorms between liberal democracies and authoritarian states; the former advocates norms ensuring free and open cyberspace with strengthening multi-stakeholder approach, while the latter advocates cyber sovereignty with justifying states' control over its cyberspace. The point at issue is not only the contents of norms, but also the way of the norms' formation and evolution, namely cybernomrs processes. In 2019, the competition became more evident as if two camps' relationship could be framed as the zero-sum game. However, since it seems premature to conclude in that way, this paper attempts to assume that the bilateral relationship could be interpreted as the battle of sexes game and test the hypothesis through case studies on cybernoms processes observed in 2019. As a result, the study reaches a conclusion that the hypothesis is reasonable and the authoritarian camp is now setting a tone of the game. Through the analysis, a significance of non-state actors to change the tone is suggested and it yields additional issues concerning the necessity of examining two camps' and non-state actors' trilateral relationships.

### **Japan-Australia Relations after the Change of Governments: Security Cooperation under the DPJ and the Labor Era**

**SATAKE Tomohiko (NIDS)**

In December 2007, the new Labor government was born in Australia. In September 2009, the new government led by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) was also established. Because of these newly emerged progressive governments in both countries, it was expected that security relations between Japan and Australia, which

were strengthened under conservative governments, enter to a new dimension. The reality was, however, that Japan and Australia continued to strengthen their bilateral and trilateral security cooperation with the United States under new governments. This was mostly because of the rise of China and the relative decline of US power, which became prominent in the late 2000s. Given these international structural changes, both Labor and DPJ governments continued the realistic approach to expand cooperation with regional like-minded democracies, as well as strengthening US alliances. At the same time, their bilateral cooperation covered a wide range of areas from bilateral defense cooperation to cooperation that aimed at stabilizing regional security. Such a comprehensive nature of security cooperation between two countries also contributed to the enhancement of Japan-Australia security cooperation under the Labor and the DPJ leadership.

### **Liberal and Hybrid Approaches to Peacebuilding**

**YAMASHITA Hikaru (University of Shizuoka)**

This article seeks to articulate the current state of the art in peacebuilding research through an examination of liberal and hybrid approaches to peacebuilding. After describing the gist of liberal peacebuilding, it situates the recent “hybrid turn” in peacebuilding within increasingly vocal critiques levelled at liberal peacebuilding and yet argues that this alternative approach is not without problems. The article suggests in conclusion that the debate is likely to evolve further with the emergence of new theoretical perspectives and the exploration of its linkage to parallel ongoing debates on grand issues such as the nature of global order.

### **Evolving Marine Corps Concept for Littoral Operations: Naval Integration for the “Defense” of “Advanced Naval Bases”**

**KIKUCHI Shigeo (NIDS)**

In countering anti-access/area denial capabilities of China and Russia, the US military sought “convergence,” or integration of capabilities among multiple warfighting

domains. While the Marine Corps fully embraces the idea of convergence, it places far stronger emphasis on “Naval Integration,” meaning integration between the Navy and the Marine Corps. Since 2010, the Marine Corps has pushed forward their efforts to eliminate “artificial seams,” between the Naval Services, land and sea, or sea control and power projection. The Marine Corps also advanced such concepts as a Single Naval Battle, or Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment, each of which treats littorals as singular battlespace, and an Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, which is premised on persistent operations forward within the arc of hostile A2/AD capabilities. Under Gen David Berger, current commandant, these concepts are being translated into tangible changes within the Marine Corps.

### **EU-UK Relations in Crisis Management and Capability Development: European “Strategic Autonomy” after Brexit**

**TANAKA Ryosuke (NIDS)**

This paper examines the extent to which the EU can seek and achieve European “strategic autonomy” in the post-Brexit environment. This paper begins with a review the history of EU-UK cooperation on security affairs - especially crisis management and capability development - and changes to such cooperation since the Brexit referendum. Traditionally, the UK has recognized the US and NATO as primary partners of its own and European security, and has been skeptical about EU’s security policy. At the same time, there has been some progress in crisis management and capability development and at times the UK has played an important role in such progress. Nevertheless, security cooperation within the EU has stalled and European bilateral and multilateral frameworks have developed outside of the EU system. In the post-Brexit period, EU security cooperation has been gaining momentum but it will not necessarily result in substantive progress and the EU’s “strategic autonomy”. Even after Brexit, the EU and its members will need to seek cooperation with the UK on security affairs and find a way to balance between “autonomy as responsibility” and “autonomy as hedging”, depending on the state of Atlantic relations that heavily influence EU-UK relations.

## **The Use of Force in Peace Operations: United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)**

**OHNISHI Ken (NIDS)**

As part of an effort to improve knowledge about the utility of force in peace operations, this article analyzes the tendency and feature of the use of force by United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) from the perspective of the four functions of military force that Thomas Schelling proposes. While MINUSCA employs force in all of the four functions consist of deterrence, defense, compellence, and offense, the majority of its use of force falls into the category of defense, and the objectives pursued by the proactive use of force remain limited. It is expected that MINUSCA would need to use force more proactively if it wants to change the status quo, such as inducing armed groups to disarm and cease their activities, because those groups would not have incentives to do so unless defiance leads to serious consequences for them.

## **Required Account for Use and Development of Naval Mines: Standpoints derived from International Law**

**EIFUKU Seiya (NIDS)**

Convention Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines (Hague Convention VIII), signed in 1907, is regarded as still effective. However, under the Hague Convention VIII, naval mines which are clearly prohibited to use are only automatic submarine contact mines and whether other types of mines are prohibited or not is unclear. On the other hand, because of the fact that the basic principle of law of armed conflict which is the basement of Hague Convention VIII is the doctrine that only military objectives may be attacked and the fact that weapons which give rise to indiscriminate effect are prohibited under the doctrine, the equipment for target directing or explosive control may be the indicator of permissible naval mines. In addition, special account for the maritime regime and the marine environment shall be required today. Because such maritime regime and the concept of protection of marine environment appeared after Hague Convention VIII was enacted. So it is necessary to take account of such requirements when naval mines are used or developed today.

## **The Kuomintang Army in the War Termination Process of 1945: An Internal Factor for the Stabilized Transition**

**FUJII Motohiro (NIDS)**

In light of the scale of the Sino-Japanese war, it is still astonishing that the Kuomintang (KMT) regime could smoothly restore administrative control over almost all of Mainland China, even in the turmoil of the post-war period. As the stabilizing factor in this post-war transition, the existing literature has pointed out the “cooperative relationship” between the KMT and the just-surrendered Japanese Army or stressed the importance of US support toward the KMT, while seldom shedding light on internal factors within the KMT Government. Against this backdrop, this paper examines the KMT Army’s role in the war termination process in relation to its military posture. In January 1945, backed by strong assistance from the U.S. Army, the KMT Government initiated a substantial military build-up with a view to conducting a full-scale counterattack against the Japanese Army, and as part of that effort, established a new commanding headquarters, Chinese Combat Command (CCC). As soon as Japan surrendered, the KMT Army redefined its objective to the facilitating of the process of restoring authority, and transformed its military posture in line with this purpose, letting CCC take overall command. Without this transformation of the KMT Army’s military posture, it might have been much more difficult for the KMT Government to conduct such an orderly restoration of authority in the former Japanese-occupied areas. However, as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) launched an assault in North and Central China, the conflict over post-war supremacy between the KMT and the CCP intensified. In response, the KMT Government again transformed its Army’s military posture for defeating the CCP’s military forces, even utilizing the former Wang Jing-wei Regime’s forces which had collaborated with Japan during the war to conduct local security operations. In this sense, we can see the two consequences of the transformation of the KMT Army’s military posture through the war termination process in 1945. The one is the smooth and well-ordered restoration of authority by the KMT Army and the other one is the competition with the CCP that led to the Civil War.

**[Research Note]**

**The Impact of Artificial Intelligence Technology on Nuclear Deterrence**

**ARIE Koichi (NIDS)**

In recent arguments about how artificial intelligence (AI) technology might influence nuclear deterrence, some claim that it could contribute to deterrence stability, while others point out that AI may well introduce its instability. This issue dates back to the Cold War era, when the United States and the Soviet Union proceeded with automating their nuclear weapon systems by computers. It is assumed that AI technology can be applied to nuclear command, control and communications (NC3), nuclear early warning systems, and nuclear delivery vehicles. Russia has reportedly undertaken the development of an AI-equipped underwater nuclear delivery vehicle, raising concerns about the potential impact of future autonomous nuclear weapon systems on deterrence. In this regard, a more profound discussion will be needed, particularly on how we should balance AI technology with human interaction in nuclear deterrence.

**[Research Note]**

**US Military Advisory and Assistance Organizations in Japan:  
Focusing on the Beginning of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force**

**IWASA Yuko (NIDS)**

On August 1, 1950, the General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP) set up the Civil Affairs Section Annex (CASA) as a military advice and assistance section to furnish guidance to the National Police Reserve regarding its foundation and organization, which was the forerunner of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. CASA continued to operate while changing its names, status and roles from Security Advisory Section Japan (SASJ) to Safety Advisory Group Japan (SAGJ) and Military Assistance Advisory Group Japan (MAAGJ), but there are not so many studies that describe their actual activities and roles they played. This article attempts to clarify how they worked and impacted on the establishment and development of the National Police Reserve and the National Safety Force by utilizing the US primary historical materials as well as preceding studies.

CASA, SASJ and SAGJ continued to be bothered by lack of Japanese competent officers and the equipment. In addition, political and legal situation in Japan especially after independence became an obstacle to their operations. However, they tried to explore pragmatic solutions within the authority given to them and continued to be heavily involved in forming the basis of Japanese rearmament.

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