Special Address

The Korean Peninsula and Japan's National Security: A Historical Perspective

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Introduction

In September 1969, as negotiations for the reversion of Okinawa were gaining momentum, a diplomatic policy planning committee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan compiled a policy document titled Outline of Japan's Diplomatic Policies. In this document, which was the result of extensive discussions involving the foreign minister, it is argued as follows, that peace on the Korean Peninsula is essential for Japan's security.

"For Japan, the greatest matter of concern is that the entire Korean Peninsula does not fall under the control of powers unfriendly to our country, and that the balance between the major powers on the peninsula remains stable, thereby preventing contingencies. Significant relaxation of tensions on the peninsula is not expected in the near future nor is peaceful reunification. It is in our interests for the time being, therefore, to maintain diplomatic relations with our neighbor South Korea, promote stability and prosperity in the country, and foster good neighborly relations."

The document is indicative of the traditional Japanese perspective on security dating back to the 19th century, in which emphasis is placed on the importance to Japan's security of the Korean Peninsula not falling under the control of unfriendly powers. Due to its geopolitical position, the Korean Peninsula was a place where powerful nations vied for influence. There have long been forces in the peninsula allied with external powers that Japan considered "unfriendly powers", to varying degrees, posing a threat to the peace and stability of the entire peninsula.

This document from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also states that maintaining the balance between major powers on the peninsula is a necessary condition for preventing "contingencies". History shows, however, just how difficult it can be in East Asia to maintain a balance of power among major nations. It could be argued that Japan's decision to annex Korea was, as I discuss below, made in part precisely because a balance of power had not been established in the peninsula.

In this paper I explore what Japan has perceived as security threats amid the internal and external destabilizing factors on the Korean Peninsula. I also examine the ways Japan has sought to maintain its own security, tracing the history of these endeavors and examining security conditions on the peninsula today.

Imperial Japan and the Korean Peninsula: From Neutrality to Annexation

Until around the time of the Russo-Japanese War, there were two opposing positions on Japan's defense policies relating to the front lines of national defense and the direction of national

development. One advocated for envisioning Japan as a "maritime nation" with a national defense policy focused on self-defense, as was championed by the navy. However, the Russo-Japanese War established a foothold for continental expansion, and this led to the opposing position becoming dominant as a central pillar of national policy. This position advocated looking to the continent for the direction of national development and viewing Japan as a "continental nation" with an "offensive defense" policy of establishing Japan's main defensive frontlines on the continent.[1]

The Imperial National Defense Policy, enacted in 1907 following the Russo-Japanese War, was based on the overarching imperial strategy of protecting and expanding the interests that Japan had established in Manchuria and Korea as a result of the war. The fundamental emphasis of national defense was shifted to offense, and the standard for the necessary military capacity to achieve this was defined as the "capacity to go on the offensive in East Asia". Meanwhile, southward expansion into Asia and the Pacific was positioned as signifying the "development of civilian capabilities", or in other words, a civilian-led expansion towards the south.

Opting to become a "continental nation" inevitably heightened Japan's interest in the Korean Peninsula as a pathway to the continent. Yamagata Aritomo, the proponent of the Imperial National Defense Policy, had stated in his speech as prime minister to the first session of the Imperial Diet in 1890, that to maintain national independence, it was necessary to not only defend the "line of sovereignty" (around the Japanese archipelago) but also to actively protect Japan's "line of interest" (around the Korean Peninsula). Protecting this line of interest meant maintaining Korea's independence.

Yamagata's speech was aimed at gaining parliamentary approval for the enhancement of army and navy armaments, and the building up of military capacity necessary for the protection of the line of interest was yet to commence. Yamagata argued therefore that while Japan ought to pursue enhancement and expansion of its military capabilities, since occupation of Korea would provide an excuse for other powers to interfere, a more appropriate way to maintain Japan's security would be to use diplomatic means to make the powers involved secure Korea's neutrality and independence. This idea of ensuring Korea's neutrality was largely shared among the Japanese leaders who had emerged victorious in the "*Seikanron*" (conquest of Korea) debate, and not a few within Korea supported the idea.[2]

Nevertheless, competition among the great powers for their respective interests was relentless on the Korean Peninsula as well as in Qing China after it suffered defeat in the First

1 Hatano Sumio, "Kokubo Koso to Nanshinron" [National Defense Concepts and Argument for Southward Expansion] (*Koza: Tonan Ajia Gaku 10: Tonan Ajia to Nihon* [Monographs on Southeast Asia Studies 10: Southeast Asia and Japan], Koubundou Publishers, 1991); Kitaoka Shinichi, "Kaiyo Kokka Nihon no Senryaku - Fukuzawa Yukichi kara Yoshida Shigeru made" [The Strategy of Japan as a Maritime Nation: From Fukuzawa Yukichi to Yoshida Shigeru] (Ishizu Tomoyuki and Williamson Murray (eds.), *Nichibei Senryaku Shisoshi* [History of Japanese-American Strategic Thought], Sairyusha Publishing, 2003).

2 Osawa Hiroaki, "Chosen Eisei Churitsuka Koso to Nihon Gaiko" [The Permanent Neutralization of Korea Concept and Japanese Diplomacy] (Inoue Toshikazu (ed.), *Nihon no Gaiko: Gaikoshi Senzenhen* [History of Japanese Diplomacy: Pre-war Edition], Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, 2013); Ohsawa Hiroaki, *Kindai Nihon no Higashi Ajia Seisaku to Gunji* [Modern Japan's East Asia Policy and Military Affairs] (Seibundo Publishing, 2001), pp.48-65.

Sino-Japanese War. The scope for establishing Korean neutrality was becoming increasingly limited. Japan's initiation of war against Qing China was not targeted at establishing exclusive domination over Korea but rather a response to the setbacks to the idea of establishing Korean neutrality.[3]

If one simplifies the common cause behind the First Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, it was that Japanese leaders were in agreement that to ensure Japan's national security, the Korean Peninsula should be prevented from falling under the control of hostile major powers. Protection or annexation (colonization) of Korea was a last resort to prevent the peninsula from coming under the control of the major powers.[4]

The annexation of Korea followed a different process to the colonization process of Western imperialist powers. Japan pursued the establishment of a protectorate in accordance with international law while cautiously working to secure international recognition, as can be seen in the Taft-Katsura Agreement. This approach involved granting Korea nominal independence while promoting internal political reforms with Japanese involvement in order to exclude interference from other powers. The annexation not only strengthened Japan's control over Korea but also pre-emptively excluded intervention from third countries.

The Korean Peninsula Under the National Mobilization Regime

Although it was proclaimed in the preamble to the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty of 1910 that the purpose of annexation was to "to ensure eternal peace in the Orient", this "peace in the Orient" was nothing other than the absorption of the Korean Peninsula (the Korean Empire) by Japan. One could say that it was Japan's insatiable appetite for security that led to this particular form of colonial governance, in which the peninsula was absorbed and its external relations were severed, bringing it under Japan's rule as an integral part of its imperial territory.

Japanese colonial rule, unlike that of Western countries, involved a type of colonialism in which neighboring regions were absorbed and integrated under one central authority with the promotion of economic, political, and societal integration. In particular, Korea, Taiwan, and Manchuria, which were incorporated into Imperial Japan, formed a kind of pseudo national economic zone with deeply intertwined economies. Integrated economic management

3 Diplomacy commentator Kiyosawa Kiyoshi argued that during the twenty years leading up to the First Sino-Japanese War there was focus on the issue of how to preserve Korea as a buffer zone between Japan, China, and Russia to establish a relatively stable East Asian order. He argued that the war was fought not for the annexation of Korea but for its independence, and commented: "Had Korea been internally consolidated and not been exploited by foreign powers and thus not posed a threat to Japan's sense of security regarding its national defense, the First Sino-Japanese War would likely have been at least delayed considerably." (Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, *Nihon Gaikoshi Vol. II* [History of Japanese Diplomacy, Vol. II], Toyo Keizai, 1942, pp.251-252).

4 In the spring of 1909, under the direction of Foreign Minister Komura, Kurachi Tetsukichi, head of the Political Affairs Bureau, drafted a Grand Policy towards Korea in which he argued that Japan had not sufficiently bolstered its influence in Korea and stated that, "Annexing Korea to make it part of Japan's imperial territory is the most certain method for us to establish our power... Placing the peninsula under our governance in both name and substance and terminating its treaty relations with other countries is a long-term strategy with an eye to the empire's next 100 years" (Kurachi Tetsukichi, "Kankoku Heigo no Keii" [Background to the Annexation of Korea], Document Division, Secretariat for Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1950). This policy was reflected in the Cabinet decision of July 1909 on the Korean Annexation Issue.

was conducted under homogenized socio-economic systems, and the development of market economies and industrialization progressed. The Korean Peninsula in particular held a central position in this economic zone under the wartime regime during World War II.[5]

In 1938, following the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Japan's National Mobilization Law was enacted to help with the establishment of a national defense system amid prolongation of the conflict. Korea subsequently became a key player in the general mobilization system for human and material resources. It served as a "military supply base" supporting the empire-wide mobilization system through the supply of rice, cooperation in supplementing Japanese labor and military forces (labor mobilization), development and supply of mineral resources, development of electrical power resources, and so on.

After the Mukden Incident and Japan's subsequent occupation of Manchuria, Korea was expected to serve as a resource supply base supporting Japan's continental expansion and as an advance base for defense against the Soviet Union. With the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Korea went from being a market for Japanese goods and investments to becoming a core "military supply base" for the overall imperial mobilization system, experiencing significant growth in its mining and heavy industries in addition to its light industries. The development of heavy-chemical industries in the northern half of the peninsula, later inherited by North Korea, contributed to North Korea's initial economic advantage over South Korea, which lasted for some time after World War II.

An American researcher argued that if Japan had not embarked on military adventurism in the 1930s, there would have been no need to mobilize the resources and energy of local populations to such an extreme extent.[6] The deployment of a general mobilization system in Korea and Taiwan from the second half of the 1930s transformed Japan's rule over Korea, which had until then been relatively moderate albeit authoritarian, into a general mobilization-based imperial rule, which weighed heavily on the local population with the imposition of harsh labor mobilization demands. This consequently became the root cause behind still unresolved issues such as the "comfort women" and requisitioned labor issues.[7] If one views these issues as factors fueling disputes, one could say that they continue to impact, in a broad sense, the post-war security relationship between Japan and South Korea.

Divergence of Perspectives on Security

The liberation of the Korean Peninsula in August 1945 was not the result of the activities of the internal independence movement but the result of Japan's sudden defeat by the Allied Powers, making it a "granted liberation". This significantly influenced later views on security in the Koreas. Kim Ku, who had led the Korean Liberation Army and devoted himself to the independence movement, later wrote in his memoirs that he had been "worried that because

5 Hori Kazuo and Hagiwara Mitsuru (eds.), "*Sekai no Kojo" e no Michi: 20 Seiki Higashi Ajia no Keizai Hatten* [The Road to Becoming the "World's Factory" - East Asian Economic Development in the 20th Century] (Kyoto University Press, 2019), Chapter 1.

6 Mark Peattie (translated by Asano Toyomi), *Shokuminchi* [Colonies] (Jigakusha Publishing, 2012).

7 Hatano Sumio, *Choyoko Mondai to wa Nani ka* [What is the 'Requisitioned Labor' Issue?] (Chuko Shinsho, 2020), Chapter 1 and Conclusion.

Korea played no role in the war, our influence in future international relations would likely be diminished".[8]

As Kim Ku had feared, an independent state led by the Korean people did not emerge after liberation. Following the end of military rule by the United States and the Soviet Union, the two governments of the North and South were finally established in 1948, creating a "divided nation".

The two divided regimes came to rely on the balance between the surrounding major powers. South Korea formed a military alliance with the United States in 1953 for its very survival as a state, rather than just its own security. South Korea sought economic growth under U.S. military protection and its basic stance of striving to outcompete the North Korean regime continued into the 1980s. The authoritarian regime that lasted until 1987 can also be appraised in terms of the level of its effectiveness in maintaining superiority in the competition with North Korea.

On the other hand, Japan, which had instantly lost its colonies upon its defeat in World War II and relinquished control over the Korean Peninsula, came under Allied occupation. Japan's security became limited to the "line of sovereignty", and the concepts of "offensive defense" and protecting the "line of interests" disappeared. The geopolitical position of the Korean Peninsula remained unchanged, however, and security on the peninsula continued to be an important factor in Japan's security after the San Francisco Peace Treaty.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which had begun working on preparations for the Treaty of Peace with Japan from immediately after the end of World War II, prepared "A Proposal to Enhance Peace and Security in the North Pacific Region" in the autumn of 1950, ahead of negotiations with the United States (the Dulles-Yoshida Talks) that were scheduled to commence in 1951. Work on the proposal was conducted at the direction of the Prime Minister Yoshida.

The proposal suggested the creation of an international security system based on the principle of abandoning war, and was separate from the draft U.S.-Japan treaty on security (the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty), which assumed the stationing of U.S. military forces in Japan. This would involve disarmament in Japan and the Korean Peninsula and limitations on the military capabilities of concerned countries (the U.S., the U.K., China, and the Soviet Union), and an international security system based on surveillance by the United Nations. The intention was to submit this proposal as material for negotiations at the Dulles-Yoshida Talks in January 1951, but it was ultimately withdrawn.[9]

This Northeast Asian disarmament vision was proposed as an ideal means of ensuring security, separate from the vision for the U.S.-Japan security treaty that was being shared at the time between Japan and the United States. At this point, in the context of the deepening

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8 Nishino Junya, "Kankoku ni totte no Anzen Hosho" [Security from South Korea's Perspective] (Kimiya Tadashi (ed.), *Chosen Hanto to Higashi Ajia* [The Korean Peninsula and East Asia], Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, 2015); Kim Ku (translated by Kajimura Hideki), *Hakubon Isshi: Kim Ku Jijoden* [Hidden Stories of Kim Ku: Kim Ku's Autobiography] (original title "*Baekbeomilji*") (Toyo Bunko, 1973).

9 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ed.), "Nihon Gaiko Bunsho: Sanfuranshisuko Heiwa Joyaku - Taibei Kosho" Document 13 [Japanese Diplomatic Documents: San Francisco Peace Treaty - Negotiations with the United States] ("Kita Taiheiyo Rokkoku Joyakuan" [North Pacific Six-Nation Treaty Proposal]).

of the Cold War in East Asia with the division of North and South Korea, the establishment of communist China, and the Korean War and China's participation in it, the vision bordered on being a pipe dream. Despite this, it was probably thought that, as a non-militarized country, a rarity in the world, Japan ought to spearhead such a security system. It can also be interpreted as having been created in order to reject the idea of rearmament.

In any case, Japan and South Korea, which entered negotiations on normalization of diplomatic relations with entirely different perspectives on security, did not, during the long round of negotiations from 1952 to 1965, discuss security issues. The normalization of diplomatic relations was the result of the two governments' judgment that opting for economic cooperation would be mutually beneficial for Japan and South Korea, and it was also a response to urging from the United States for the strengthening of cohesion within the liberal anti-communist camp. Due to its historical experience of colonial rule, however, South Korea's deep-rooted wariness of increasing its dependence on Japan remained a constraint on the deepening of security relations even after the normalization of diplomatic relations.[10]

Under the divided regimes, the relationship between Japan and South Korea, which were both allied with the United States and both faced the common threat of North Korea, has been described as a quasi-alliance.[11] In some ways, on the security front, the two countries performed functions in a manner similar to allied nations through a mutually complementary cooperative security relationship. Historical issues and territorial disputes arising from colonial rule and wartime mobilization continued to exist between Japan and South Korea, however, meaning that although the relationship was a cooperative one, it fell far short of being an official alliance. This duality cast a shadow over the nature of security cooperation between the two countries.[12]

Changing Security Perspectives

Japan's contribution to the Korean War lay in providing rear support to the United Nations

[10] In South Korea, there is a discussion emphasizing that it was Japan's expansion of power amid the struggle between the great powers during the process of colonizing the Korean Empire that led to Japan's colonization of the peninsula. This is referred to as the "late Korean Empire syndrome", and indicates the view that the crisis resulted from the growing instability of the international situation on the peninsula and that Japan's increasing influence was endangering South Korea's security. This has two implications. One is that, as happened during the time of the Korean Empire, Korea was being outmaneuvered and peninsula issues were being decided by others, and the other is that there was a fear that Japan's military buildup directly threatened South Korea's security (Lee Sun-hwan and Ito Yukio, "Shokuminchi no Kioku to Nikkan Kankei" [Japan-Korea Relations and Memories of Colonization] (Ito Yukio and Lee Sun-hwan (eds.), *Ito Hirobumi to Kankoku Tochi* [Ito Hirobumi and the Governance of Korea] (Minerva Shobo, 2009)).

[11] Victor D. Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism: The U.S.-Korea-Japan Security Triangle* (Stanford University Press, 1999) (Translated by Kurata Hideya, *Beinichikan: Hannichi wo Koeta Teikei* [The United States, Japan, and South Korea: An Alliance that Overcame Anti-Japan Sentiment], Yuhikaku Publishing, 2003). According to this book, one characteristic of the Japan and South Korea "quasi-alliance" is that, although the U.S. commitments to South Korea and Japan are a decisive factor in the Japan-Korea security relationship and although the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-South Korea alliances are in fact interlinked, the two countries lack a shared recognition of the threat from North Korea.

[12] Kimiya Tadashi, "Nihon no Chosen Hanto Gaiko no Tenkai" [The Development of Japan's Korean Peninsula Diplomacy] (Hatano Sumio (ed.), *Nihon no Gaiko 2: Gaikoshi Sengohen* [Japanese Diplomacy 2: History of Diplomacy - Postwar Edition], Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, 2013).

forces (U.S. forces) and remained so regardless of developments on the battlefield, and the Japanese archipelago became a major supply base for the United Nations forces. In its August 1950 announcement "*Chosen no Doran to Warera no Tachiba*" (The Turmoil in Korea and Our Position), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained the significance of this full support to the United Nations forces as follows:

"The fight for democracy in South Korea is synonymous with the fight to protect democracy in Japan. How can we protect Japan's security without cooperating, to the fullest extent permissible, with the United Nations forces fighting to protect South Korea's autonomy and independence?" The Korean War was a battle between democracy and communism, and the only paths open to Japan were to either become a peaceful democratic nation under the security of the United Nations or succumb to the communist world.

The above quote is indicative of the perception that protecting the "autonomy and independence" of South Korea from the communist threat through cooperation with the United Nations forces would help ensure Japan's security.

On the other hand, U.S. intervention in the Korean War meant that, for the foreseeable future, the risk of the Korean Peninsula falling under the control of unfriendly powers could be avoided. The longstanding challenge of maintaining security on the Korean Peninsula was thus taken up singlehandedly by the United States. As George Kennan expressed it, the United States has "… fallen heir to the problems and responsibilities the Japanese had faced and borne in the Korean-Manchurian area for nearly half a century…".[13]

The permanent stationing of U.S. forces in Japan after the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and in South Korea after the Korean War, meant that Japan's security became entirely dependent on the United States. This caused Japan's leaders to retreat from the geopolitical strategizing and power-politics mindset that had been passed down through generations of leaders since the Meiji era.[14]

The development of nuclear weapons and their monopoly by the United States and the Soviet Union further strengthened this trend. Reliance on U.S. nuclear deterrence for security meant that national discussions on the type and extent of defense capabilities Japan should possess started to dwindle. No such discussions were held in the Diet, or even among government or ruling party members. If Japan was to reject nuclear armament, such discussions should have been all the more necessary. In fact, there was hardly any concrete discussion in the government or the Diet on what threats to anticipate in relation to the security of the Korean Peninsula or how Japan ought to act under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

Finally, in the 1970s, the Basic Defense Force Concept was formulated as a

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13 Akagi Kanji, "Chosen Senso: Nihon e no Shogeki to Yoha" [The Korean War: The Shock and Aftermath for Japan] (*NIDS Senshi Tokushu Chosen Senso to Nihon* [Special NIDS Feature on War History: 'The Korean War and Japan'], National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense, 2013). Support from Japan during the Korean War extended beyond the provision of military bases to include rear support, the provision of labor, and medical assistance. (Shoji Junichiro, "Chosen Senso to Nihon: Aidentiti, Anzen Hosho wo Meguru Jirenma" [The Korean War and Japan: Dilemmas of Identity and Security] (*Sensoshi Kenkyu Foramu Hokokusho:* "*Chosen Senso no Saikento*" [The Legacies of the Korean War: A Re-Examination], National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense, 2007)., George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, the University of Chicago Press, 1964, pp.121-122.

14 Akagi, "Chosen Senso".

comprehensive security strategy, and this served as the basis for the Cabinet Decision on the "National Defense Program Outline" in 1976.[15] Although the Basic Defense Force Concept was not a defense plan based on specific threats, it survived right through until 2010. The reason for this was that, despite not having a robust theoretical base adaptable to any threat, it was a highly political vision open to multiple interpretations, and review of its content was put off amid domestic divisions over views on Japan's defense capabilities. It thus remained in place due to an "unintentional consensus".[16] This is indicative of the state of Japan's debates on defense under a U.S.-Japan alliance that requires no autonomous strategizing on Japan's part.

Peninsula Emergencies and the Reversion of Okinawa

With the North-South division of the Korean peninsula, the possibility of a North Korean military invasion of South Korea—referred to in Japan as a "peninsula emergency"—remained the central security issue in Northeast Asia from the time of the Korean War armistice into the 1980s, during which time North Korea still held a military advantage over South Korea. Especially during the 1960s and 1970s, amid frequent provocative actions from North Korea, the possibility of "communist unification" by North Korea was seen in Japan as a realistic scenario.[17]

The primary responsibility for responding to a "peninsula emergency" lay with the United States and South Korea. Japan's expected role was to guarantee the free use of domestic military bases as tactical bases for U.S. military operations. Japan was, however, encumbered by the need for a "prior consultation" system that did not allow for immediate responses to a peninsula emergency.

During the security treaty revision negotiations that started in the autumn of 1958, the Japanese side continued to argue for the need for prior consultations in the event of the following two cases: (1) When U.S. bases in Japan were to be used for purposes other than Japan's defense, prior consultation would be required to avert the danger of Japan being drawn into a war against its will. (2) In cases involving the deployment or introduction of nuclear weapons, prior consultation was deemed necessary given the strong anti-nuclear sentiment among the Japanese public. Issues relating to these two cases were the subject of heated debate in the Diet before the security treaty revision negotiations began, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs aimed to conclude some manner of Japan-U.S. agreement on them.

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15 Tobe Ryoichi, "Soryokusen/Reisen to Nihon no Anzen Hosho Kan" [Total War, the Cold War, and Japan's Views on Security] (*The Journal of Military History*, Volume 51, Issue 4, 2016). Kosaka Masataka began pointing out issues such as these in the 1960s, including in papers such as "Jimin/Shakai Ryoto ni Uttau" [Appeal to the Liberal Democratic Party and Japan Socialist Party] (*Chuo Koron*, Aug. 1963 edition).

16 Chijiwa Yasuaki, *Anzen Hosho to Boeiryoku no Sengoshi 1971-2010: "Kibanteki Boeiryoku Koso" no Jidai* [Postwar History of Security and Defense Capabilities 1971-2010: The Era of the 'Basic Defense Force Concept'] (Chikura Publishing, 2021).

17 Kimiya Tadashi, "Nihon no Anzen Hosho to Chosen Hanto" [Japan's Security and the Korean Peninsula] (Kimiya Tadashi (ed.), *Chosen Hanto to Higashi Ajia* [The Korean Peninsula and East Asia], Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, 2015); Ishida Tomonori, "Sengo Nihon no Ajia Gaiko to Chosen Hanto" [Postwar Japanese Diplomacy in Asia and the Korean Peninsula] (*Journal of Law and Political Studies*, No. 109, 2016).

The Japanese side's proposal centered on the conducting of prior consultations in cases (1) and (2) via an exchange of notes subject to public disclosure. The U.S. side began, however, to seek secret understandings to alleviate their concerns about the potential rejection of emergency sorties from U.S. military bases in Japan or rejection of the introduction of nuclear weapons following prior consultations. The negotiations remained intense right up until the end, but ultimately, it was stipulated in the Kishi-Herter Exchange of Notes (signed January 1960) that prior consultation would take place in cases (1) and (2), and an agreement was reached to prepare two undisclosed documents (secret agreements) regarding cases that would not be subject to prior consultations, and these agreements were also signed in January 1960 by Foreign Minister Fujiyama and Ambassador MacArthur.[18]

One of these agreements, which is referred to as the "Korea Minutes", stipulated that in the event of an emergency situation on the Korean Peninsula, the U.S. military could immediately launch from Japanese bases without prior consultation.[19] The other, referred to as the "Record of Discussion", stated that the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan would be subject to prior consultation.

The issue of prior consultations in relation to the security of the Korean Peninsula became apparent during the negotiations for the reversion of Okinawa. The Okinawa Reversion negotiations brought to the fore security issues involving Japan, the United States, and South Korea. I won't go into the details here, but during the negotiations between Japan and the United States starting in 1969, South Korea expressed concerns about the removal of nuclear weapons from Okinawa after the reversion, and limitations on U.S. military actions due to the need for prior consultations. These concerns had become urgent following provocative North Korean actions (the Blue House raid and the Pueblo incident) in January of the previous year.[20]

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18 Sakamoto Kazuya, *Nichibei Domei no Kizuna* [The Bonds of the Japan-US Alliance] (Yuhikaku Publishing, 2000), Chapter 5; Hatano Sumio, *Rekishi toshite no Nichibei Ampo Joyaku* [Historical Examination of the US-Japan Security Treaty] (Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, 2011), Chapter 4.

19 Sakamoto Kazuya confirmed, through a Ministry of Foreign Affairs investigation of secret agreements, the existence of a record, titled "Minutes for inclusion in the record of the first meeting of the Security Consultative Committee": that is to say, the "Korea Minutes", prepared by the U.S. and Japanese governments at the time of the security treaty revision and dated January 6, 1960. A "Korea Minutes" document dated June 23 with the same content, was found in the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. From this discrepancy, Sakamoto deduced that the Korea Minutes were prepared as a record of prior consultations between the two governments, conducted in advance to be prepared for any exceptional emergencies on the Korean Peninsula after the security treaty revision. Sakamoto interpreted this as meaning that the "prior" in "prior consultations" meant "in advance of the actual occurrence of a contingency" (Sakamoto Kazuya, "'Jizen Kyogi no Himitsu' ni tsuite" [On the 'Secrets of Prior Consultation'] (*Nichibei Domei no Kizuna (Zohoban)* [The Bonds of the Japan-US Alliance (Expanded Edition)], Yuhikaku Publishing, 2000, p.339).

20 Hatano Sumio, "Okinawa Henkan Kosho to Taiwan/Kankoku" [Okinawa Reversion Negotiations and Taiwan and South Korea] (*Journal of the Diplomatic Archives*, No. 27, 2013); Yuh Sun-hee, "*Boku Seiki no Tainichi/Taibei Gaiko - Reisen Henyoki Kankoku no Seisaku, 1968-1973*" [Park Chung-hee's Diplomacy towards Japan and the United States: South Korean Policy During the Cold War Transformation Period, 1968-1973] (Minerva Shobo, 2012), Chapter 2; Michishita Narushige, *Kitachosen - Setogiwa Gaiko no Rekishi* [North Korea: A History of Brinkmanship Diplomacy] (Minerva Shobo, 2013). An excellent recent study in this area is Narita Chihiro, *Okinawa Henkan to Higashi Ajia Reisen Taisei - Ryukyu/Okinawa no Kizoku/Kichi Mondai no Henyo* [The Okinawa Reversion and East Asian Cold War Dynamics: The Reversion of Ryukyu/Okinawa and the Changing Military Base Issues] (Jimbun Shoin, 2020).

For South Korea, therefore, the most important conditions for the Okinawa Reversion were continuation of the free use of the bases and the continued presence of nuclear weapons, or in other words, maintenance of the status quo at bases in Okinawa. At a Japan-South Korea cooperation committee meeting held in February 1969, South Korea emphasized the need to ensure effective use of Okinawan bases. In March of the same year, the South Korean government also firmly established their opposition to the application of the prior consultation mechanism to Okinawa, which would put restrictions on the fully free use of bases in Okinawa, particularly with regard to the bringing in of nuclear weapons and the dispatch of military forces to South Korea in the event of an emergency.[21]

Although the Japanese side did not publicly abandon the principle of prior consultations in response to South Korea's strong demands, it reluctantly moved to convince South Korea with the so-called "Korea Clause" (which stated that the security of South Korea "was essential to Japan's own security") in the Sato-Nixon Communique of November 1969. While the communique did partially ease South Korea's concerns, it should be noted that the efforts of Japan's Ambassador to South Korea Kanayama Masahide, also played a significant role in dispelling South Korea's concerns. Immediately after the communique was announced, Ambassador Kanayama met with President Park to convey to the South Korean government interpretations of the communique that were not disclosed to the Japanese public, including that base functions would be maintained after the reversion of Okinawa and that the bringing in nuclear weapons would be possible in the event of an emergency.[22]

The Okinawa Reversion negotiations provided an opportunity to discuss security issues on the Korean Peninsula that had not been discussed in the Japan-South Korea normalization negotiations. The Korea Clause in particular can be seen as a turning point in the history of the Japan-U.S. security relationship, as it was a declaration that Japan's security is closely linked to security in an explicitly specified region outside Japan.[23]

The idea expressed in the Korea Clause was not, however, a novel idea newly introduced during the negotiations for the reversion of Okinawa. Following the normalization of relations with Japan, South Korea began to emphasize the close connection between its security and Japan's own security as South Korea strongly felt the threat from North Korea and hoped to garner Japan's support. The communique of the second Japan-South Korea ministerial

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21 Kobayashi Somei, "Okinawa Henkan wo Meguru Kankoku Gaiko no Tenkai to Kitachosen no Hanno" [Development of South Korean Diplomacy Concerning the Okinawa Reversion and North Korea's Reaction] (Takeuchi Toshitaka (ed.), *Nichibei Domeiron - Rekishi, Kino, Shuhen Shokoku no Shiten* [Discussions on the Japan-U.S. Alliance - History, Function, Perspectives of Neighboring Countries], Minerva Shobo, 2011).

22 *Ibid.*; Yoon Sukjung, "1980 Nendai ni okeru Nikkan Kankei" [Japan-Korea Relations in the 1980s] (*Journal of Law, Politics and Sociology*, Volume 94, Issue 2, 2021).

23 Kurata Hideya, "Boku Seiki 'Jishu Kokuboron' to Nichibei 'Kankoku Joko'" [Park Chung-hee's "Independent National Defense Theory" and the U.S.-Japan "Korea Clause"] (Okonogi Masao and Moon Chung-in (eds.), *Shijo/Kokka/Kokusai Taisei (Nikkan Kyodo Kenkyu Sosho 4)* [Markets, States, International Systems (Japan-South Korea Joint Research Series 4)], Keio University Press, 2001). Note that Victor Cha has explained that the Korea Clause was the first official declaration that the security of South Korea and Japan are directly linked, and that it resulted in Japan effectively waiving its right to prior consultation and clarifying its intention to support South Korea's defense, and also strengthened the foundation of the US-Japan-South Korea security relationship (Cha: 1999/2003, p.79).

meeting in August 1968 included the phrase, "the security and prosperity of South Korea have a significant impact on those of Japan." Additionally, in President Park's New Year's press conference in January 1969, he stated, "the Japanese government and its people need to more deeply recognize the fact that South Korea's security is directly linked to that of Japan." This was reaffirmed during the third ministerial meeting in August 1969, where it was acknowledged that "the security and prosperity of both countries are extremely closely linked." This was the shared understanding that also was reflected in the Korea Clause.[24]

Nevertheless, the Korea Clause did not clearly outline a roadmap for how Japan would become involved in the defense of other regions, and the reversion of Okinawa did not bring about any substantial changes to Japan's defense policy. Japan's options for expanded security roles or substantial contributions to regional security were limited. One of the options open to Japan was economic assistance to South Korea to support its security through economic development and political stability, which was essentially a strengthening of existing policies towards South Korea.[25]

Support for South Korea and the Search for Peaceful North-South Coexistence

As the U.S. commitment to defense in South Korea began to wane under the Nixon Doctrine from the late 1960s into the 1970s, the Park Chung-hee administration felt a growing sense of distrust and embarked on "independent defense". In 1973, the regime announced a "heavy and chemical industry drive" while pursuing the domestic production of firearms and tanks and secretly pushing forward with nuclear development. As South Korea began to move towards independent defense in this way, Japan provided support for the development of its defense industry.

The Park Chung-hee administration pursued not only independent defense but also dialogue with North Korea. The July 4 South-North Joint Statement was released following secret high-level talks in 1972, in which the two sides expressed agreement on three principles for reunification: independence, peace, and nation-wide unity. In 1973, Park announced the June 23 Special Statement on Foreign Policy for Peace and Reunification, abandoning the principle of not establishing diplomatic relations with countries that have diplomatic relations with North Korea. He then began exploring coexistence with the North, proposing a non-aggression treaty in January 1974.[26]

Meanwhile, Japan's diplomacy relating to the Korean Peninsula primarily focused until

24 Kurata, "Boku Seiki 'Jishu Kokuboron'".

25 The Korea Clause had significance not only in wartime U.S.-Japan defense cooperation but also in peacetime. Considering that it was announced in response to the Nixon Doctrine ("Guam Doctrine"), which included both a gradual reduction in US military commitments and a call for Asian countries to shoulder greater responsibility for their own defense, the enhancement of national defense capabilities and the development of the defense industry indicated a shouldering of greater responsibility for defense in peacetime (Kurata Hideya, "Kankoku no Kokubo Sangyo Ikusei to Nichibeikan Kankei" [The Fostering of South Korea's National Defense Industry and Japan-U.S.-South Korea Relations] (Okonogi Masao and Chang Dal-joong (eds.), *Sengo Nikkan Kankei no Tenkai (Nikkan Kyodo Kenkyu Sosho 14)* [Development of Post-War Japan-South Korea Relations (Japan-South Korea Joint Research Series: 14)], Keio University Press, 2005).

26 Nishino, "Kankoku ni totte".

the 1970s on continuing to maintain the U.S. military presence in South Korea and providing economic support to South Korea. With the growing rapprochement between the United States and China in the early 1970s, however, Japan's stance began to change. While continuing with economic support to South Korea on the condition that the U.S. military presence was maintained, Japan aimed to expand exchanges with North Korea with a view to easing tensions on the peninsula and promoting peaceful coexistence between the North and South.[27]

These moves were also reflected in U.S.-Japan relations. In an August 1975 joint statement, Prime Minister Miki and President Ford noted that they "agreed that the security of the Republic of Korea is essential to the maintenance of peace on the Korean peninsula, which in turn is necessary for peace and security in East Asia, including Japan". This part of the statement, which is referred to as the "new Korea Clause", was not a reiteration of the original Korea Clause, and was expressed with a view to establishing a peace regime through dialogue between the North and South in addition to deterrence against North Korea.[28]

Efforts by Japan and South Korea to promote coexistence between the North and South basically continued into the 1980s, but under the new Cold War conditions, Japan's diplomatic efforts targeting the peninsula increasingly tended to focus exclusively on South Korea. This was a revival of the 1960s framework, under which Japan contributed to South Korea's economic development and security under U.S. mediation. In 1983, Prime Minister Nakasone and the Chun Doo-hwan administration agreed on the provision of a U.S.-brokered loan of $4 billion. South Korea greatly appreciated this substantial economic support, referring to it as "security-economic cooperation", and viewing it as representing the culmination of Japan-South Korea security cooperation cultivated through the 1970s.[29]

When the Roh Tae-woo administration came into power in 1988, it initiated the "Nordpolitik" policy, which was aimed at preparing the international environment for the South's unification with the North, and it also established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1990 and with China in 1992. This significantly dismantled the Cold War structures in place on the Korean Peninsula. In 1991, North Korea also accepted South Korea's long-standing insistence on simultaneous admission to the United Nations, and high-level inter-Korean talks resulted in the signing of the "Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North" ("South-North Basic Agreement") that year. That same year, negotiations for the normalization of relations between Japan and North Korea began.

The achievements under the Nordpolitik policy and the agreement between the North and South were meant to form an institutional framework for coexistence on the peninsula after the Cold War, but the actual background to these developments was South's "victory"

27 Ishida, "Sengo Nihon"; Lee Byeong-cheol, "Shin Reisenki ni okeru Chosen Hanto Mondai to Nihon no Taio" [The Korean Peninsula Issue and Japan's Response in the New Cold War Era] (*International Relations*, No. 209, 2023).

28 Azuma Kiyohiko, "Nikkan Anzen Hosho Kankei no Hensen" [Changes in the Japan-South Korea Security Relationship] (*The Journal of International Security*, Vol. 33, No. 4, 2006).

29 Kimiya, "Nihon no Anzen Hosho"; Michishita Narushige and Azuma Kiyohiko, "Chosen Hanto Yuji to Nihon no Taio" [Korean Peninsula Emergencies and Japan's Responses] (Kimiya Tadashi (ed.), *Chosen Hanto to Higashi Ajia* [The Korean Peninsula and East Asia], Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, 2015).

over the North in the competition between their respective regimes.

Nuclear Crises and Japan

Having been driven to "defeat" in the competition between the North and South regimes, North Korea shifted the focus of its foreign policy strategy from pursuing unification under its own leadership to securing the survival of its regime. As a result, it embarked on full-scale development of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles to ensure its survival.

Suspicions about North Korea's nuclear development efforts surfaced in 1989. The Bush administration, which was using the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to prevent nuclear proliferation as a global issue, coordinated with South Korea on its policy towards North Korea leading to the development at the end of 1991 of the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (signed in 1992). [30]

In 1993, however, North Korea declared that it was abandoning the joint declaration and withdrawing from the NPT in response to the results of IAEA inspections and requests for additional inspections. The crisis between the United States and North Korea consequently deepened so much that the possibility of a preemptive strike by the United States on North Korea's nuclear facilities was being considered.[31] A senior official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who handled this issue, recalled that it was a time when "Japan was facing the risk of war as a directly involved party for the first time since World War II." [32] This first nuclear crisis was temporarily resolved through a visit to North Korea by former President Carter and his talks with Kim Il Sung (on remaining a signatory to the NPT and freezing nuclear development), as well as the 1994 U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework.

Faced with this first nuclear crisis, Japan and South Korea, which shared a common understanding of the threat posed by the North's nuclear development efforts, moved from the stage of economic support being provided by Japan to full-scale defense cooperation and security dialogues. In 1998, Japan and South Korea agreed to issue the Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Declaration during President Kim Dae-jung's visit to Japan, and announced a joint action plan that included cooperation on defense and security. That same year, Japan and South Korea held their first security policy council meeting, which was attended by diplomats and defense officials from both countries, and it was agreed to hold such meetings on a regular basis.[33] Such an expansion of cooperation on security can also been interpreted as a way for South Korea to restrain Japan's approaches to North Korea.

Meanwhile, Japan began to revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, which were formulated in 1978. After North Korea declared its withdrawal from the NPT in

30 Cha Aruem, "Kitachosen Hikakuka Seisaku wo Meguru Beikan Kyoryoku" [The Policy for Denuclearization of North Korea and U.S.-ROK Cooperation] (*Journal of Law and Political Studies*, No. 127, 2020).

31 Michishita Narushige, "Kitachosen no Kaku Kaihatsu wo Meguru Kosho 1993-1994-nen" [Bargaining and Negotiation over North Korea's Nuclear Development, 1993-1994] (*The Journal of International Security*, Vol. 33, No. 1, 2005), etc.

32 Tanaka Hitoshi, "Kanryo to Gaiko no Keizoku to Kakushin" [Continuity and Innovation in Bureaucracy and Diplomacy] (Inoue Toshikazu et al. (eds.), *Nihon no Gaiko 6: Nihon Gaiko no Saikochiku* [Japanese Diplomacy 6: Reconstructing Japan's Foreign Policy], Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, 2013), p.180.

33 Azuma, "Nikkan Anzen Hosho".

1993, joint U.S.-Japan studies on emergencies in the Far East intensified. It was judged that the likelihood of an emergency on the peninsula was higher than an emergency directly impacting Japan. The new national defense program outline determined with a Cabinet Decision in 1995, included measures prepared based on the assumption of a peninsula emergency.[34]

To establish more concrete countermeasures, a second set of guidelines was established through revision of the first set of guidelines in response to the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security in 1996. The new guidelines allowed for intelligence gathering, surveillance, and communications in support of the U.S. military in situations arising in areas surrounding Japan, and the corresponding domestic legislation, the Act on Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Perilous Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, was enacted in 1999. These measures were actually predicated on a potential peninsula emergency.[35]

In the National Defense Program Outline of 2010, the long-surviving Basic Defense Force Concept was finally scrapped, and a new approach was adopted based on assuming specific threats and addressing them. One of the driving factors behind this was the North Korean nuclear crises. The Self-Defense Forces subsequently developed overseas deployment capabilities including converting destroyers into aircraft carriers. In 2014, a third set of guidelines was formulated, allowing for limited exercise of collective self-defense. Japan-South Korea defense cooperation became more bidirectional. It also became legally possible for Japan to engage in closer sharing of ballistic missile defense (BMD) information with the United States and South Korea.

Uncertainty in the Six-Party Talks

In 1998, North Korea launched a Taepodong missile, a potential nuclear warhead delivery vehicle, and it landed in the Pacific Ocean after passing over the Japanese archipelago. In response, the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group was established in 1999. Japan, the United States, and South Korea opted to deal with North Korea's development of nuclear capabilities and missiles through increased engagement aimed at keeping such development work under control rather than through pursuing forceful containment. Under the reconciliation and cooperation policy promoted by the Kim Dae-jung administration, the Clinton administration and Japan joined South Korea in forming a comprehensive resolution framework for nuclear and missile issues and for improving relations with North Korea. Kim Dae-jung visited North Korea in 2000 to hold an inter-Korean summit, and Prime Minister Koizumi's visit to Pyongyang in 2002 was followed by the release of the Pyongyang Declaration. Japan and North Korea agreed to establish a roadmap for resolving outstanding issues and normalizing diplomatic relations in accordance with this Pyongyang Declaration.

In 2002, however, North Korea admitted to having a highly enriched uranium program, reigniting the nuclear issue. With the advent of the Bush administration, the United States reviewed its engagement policy, and the comprehensive resolution framework of Japan, the United States, and South Korea started to become dysfunctional.

34 Tanaka Akihiko, "*Anzen Hosho*" [Security] (Yomiuri Shinbunsha, 1997), pp.337-344.

35 Michishita and Azuma, "Chosen Hanto Yuji".

The United States then, in 2003, aimed for a resolution through talks held in a six-party framework involving China and Russia.[36] During this period, the Japanese government was urging the United States to conduct direct negotiations with North Korea. In September 2005, the Six-Party Talks reached an agreement on a comprehensive resolution framework that included verifiable denuclearization by North Korea in return for light-water reactors and energy assistance, confirmation that the United States had no intention of attacking or invading North Korea using conventional or nuclear weapons, improvement of relations between North Korea and the United States and Japan, and the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, and a joint statement was issued. Despite this, North Korea conducted a nuclear test in 2006 (the second nuclear crisis), followed by a second nuclear test in 2009, leading to strengthened sanctions. The Six-Party Talks were suspended in December 2008.[37]

The Kim Jong-un regime, which took power in 2011, further advanced nuclear development under the *Byungjin* (parallel development) policy on parallel development of both nuclear weapons and the economy, conducting four further nuclear tests by 2017. In response, the Obama administration adopted a "strategic patience" policy of not responding to North Korea at all.

The Trump administration, which took office in 2017, declared a strategy of "maximum pressure and engagement" and did not rule out the option of using military force. In November of the same year, North Korea successfully launched the new ICBM Hwasong-15, which is capable of reaching the U.S. mainland, heightening tensions between the United States and North Korea.

In 2018, however, the Pyeongchang Olympics was used as an opportunity to hold inter-Korean summits in April at Panmunjom and in September in Pyongyang, and between these, in June, a U.S.-North Korea summit was held in Singapore. Through these summits, the United States and South Korea explored the possibility of guaranteeing the security of the Kim dynasty's regime and building a sustainable peace regime in exchange for compelling North Korea to denuclearize. At this stage, while people remained skeptical, some saw it as an experiment in gradually transitioning to a loose "2+2 system" involving denuclearized coexistence between the North and South and a balance of power between the United States and China.[38]

In 2019, however, the situation took a dark turn. In February of that year, the U.S.-North Korea summit in Hanoi ended in failure, causing U.S.-North Korea negotiations to stall, and simultaneously halting movement in inter-Korean relations as well. The background to this failure was deep mutual distrust. The United States doubted North Korea's commitment to denuclearization, while North Korea was less concerned that compensation for denuclearization

36 For more details on the Six-Party Talks up until early 2007, see Hiraiwa Shunji, "Kitachosen Kaku Mondai to 6-sha Kyogi" [The North Korean Nuclear Issue and the Six-Party Talks] (*Asian Studies*, Volume 53, Issue 3, 2007).

37 Kimiya, "Nihon no Anzen Hosho".

38 Okonogi Masao, "Chosen Hanto Josei no Fukakujitsusei to Nihon no Gaiko" [Uncertainty in the Korean Peninsula Situation and Japan's Diplomacy] ("'*Fukakujitusei no Jidai' no Chosen Hanto to Nihon no Gaiko/ Anzen Hosho*" [The Korean Peninsula and Japan's Diplomacy and Security in an Age of Uncertainty], (The Japan Institute of International Affairs, 2020).

would be inadequate than they were about the fact that giving up nuclear weapons did nothing to guarantee the survival of the Kim dynasty's regime.

Conclusion

Tanaka Hitoshi, as director-general of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, played a significant role, with the approval of Prime Minister Koizumi, in conducting secret negotiations with North Korea that led to Koizumi's visit to Pyongyang in 2002 and the Pyongyang Declaration. According to Tanaka, the path to normalization of diplomatic relations based on the Pyongyang Declaration was to conduct comprehensive negotiations on "abductions, nuclear weapons, and missiles", premised on economic cooperation following normalization.

This comprehensive negotiation framework was unable to prevent North Korea's 2006 nuclear test, but fundamentally, the Korean Peninsula issue was centered on U.S.-North Korea negotiations over nuclear issues, and without organically linking inter-Korean and Japan-North Korea relations to these negotiations, progress was unlikely.[39] From the time of Koizumi's visit, North Korea's perspective has been that solving the nuclear issue is ultimately only possible through discussions with the United States. [40]

Tanaka noted therefore that while Japan-North Korea relations are bilateral, progress can only be made within a larger framework that includes China, and Japan should first focus on advancing U.S.-North Korea nuclear negotiations, and should think about progressing Japan-North Korea negotiations within the denuclearization process. The endpoint of U.S.-North Korea and Japan-North Korea negotiations over nuclear issues is the restoration of the Six-Party Talks, which could also serve as a framework for building trust. This outlook is widely shared among experts.

Okonogi Masao boldly presented a worst-case crisis scenario in a paper 26 years ago (in 1998) in which a North Korean invasion of the South or an "internal collapse" leading to an "abrupt collapse" would trigger a "chain collapse", directly impacting not only North and South Korea but also Japan, followed by a global economic depression. Okonogi argued that the first step to avoiding such a chain collapse is to get North Korea to choose the path of opening up and reforming, while integrating North Korea into the international community and encouraging a gradual regime transition, and that it is also necessary to urgently build a multilateral security system and a system for North-South coexistence.[41] The potential for the occurrence of this worst-case scenario has not passed, and Okonogi's formula thus remains compelling to this day.

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39 Tanaka Hitoshi "Niccho Kankei wo Doshite Iku no ka" (Society of Security and Diplomatic Policy Studies, Dec. 2021).

40 Okuzono Hideki, "'Kitachosen Mondai' to Nihon Gaiko - Koizumi Homon wo Megutte" [The "North Korea Issue" and Japanese Diplomacy: Concerning Koizumi's Visit] (Kan Hideki (ed.), *Chosen Hanto: Kiki kara Heiwa Kochiku e* [The Korean Peninsula: From Crisis to Peace Building], Shakai Hyoron Sha, 2004), p.214.

41 Okonogi Masao, "Chosen Hanto no Kiki Kanri - Yobo Gaiko no Teisho" [Crisis Management on the Korean Peninsula: Advocacy for Preventive Diplomacy] (Soeya Yoshihide and Akagi Kanji (eds.), *Reisen Go no Kokusai Seiji* [Post-Cold War International Politics], Keio University Press, 1998).

The extensive economic burden that a chain collapse would bring has been one reason why concerned countries like the United States, South Korea, China, and Russia have moved, in response to North Korea's repeated provocations, to contain the escalation of each crisis. Successfully preventing the escalation of successive crises and maintaining a long peace was not achieved through détente.[42]

Today, the nuclear issues faced by the international community are no longer about the management of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons as was the case during the Cold War, but those of North Korea and Iran. Dubbed the "second nuclear age", this era is characterized by more pronounced nuclear proliferation compared to what was seen in the Cold War period, and the probability of nuclear-related decisions that deviate from the will of the major nuclear powers is growing. What is more, if nuclear weapons ever are used at the conclusion of a nuclear arms race, how events would unfold and how these should be confronted remain a completely unknown quantity.[43]

Notably, North Korea's advanced missile development, which is integrated with its nuclear weapons development, has limited the effectiveness of missile defense systems. Given the difficulty of total nuclear disarmament, rather than the provision of compensation for disarmament, the necessary condition for North Korea to abandon its nuclear arsenal is the building of a relationship of trust solid enough that thorough verification of denuclearization can be conducted.[44]

When a system of peaceful North-South coexistence free from nuclear weapons and potential nuclear capabilities is established under U.S.-South Korea leadership, Japan will finally see the realization of a Korean Peninsula free from the control of "unfriendly powers". The precondition for this is to eradicate mutual distrust over nuclear development and establish a relationship of trust between the United States, North Korea, and South Korea that is strong enough for North Korea to make the decision to be abandon its nuclear capabilities, but the road ahead is a very long one.

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42 Odaira Takeshi and Michishita Narushige, "Chosen Hanto ni Okeru 'Nagai Heiwa' no Haikei" [Background to the "Long Peace" on the Korean Peninsula] (Kawakatsu Ueki Chikako and Honda Miki (eds.), *Hokuto Ajia no "Nagai Heiwa": Naze, Senso wa Kaihi Sareta no ka* ['Lasting Peace' in Northeast Asia: Why War Has Been Avoided], Keiso Shobo Publishing, 2012).

43 Ichimasa Sukeyuki, "'Daini no Kaku Jidai' Ron Saiko" [Re-Examining the "Second Nuclear Age" Theory] (*International Relations*, No. 203, 2021).

44 Tsuchiyama Jitsuo, "Kaku Haizetsu to Kaku Yokushi no Katto - Kokusai Anzen Hosho no Jirenma" [Conflict between Nuclear Abolition and Nuclear Deterrence: A Dilemma for International Security] (*Ajia Jiho*, Mar. 2022).