

Presentations

The Strategic Significance of a New Japan and the Establishment of a Western Alliance Network in the Far East in 1951 from the Perspective of the Western Powers

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Introduction

The entire Western alliance network has been revitalized since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine on February 24, 2022, but concerns about the Taiwan contingency and incessant missile tests in the Far East have made the closeness of the Western alliance network more important than ever in the context of the Far East. The roots of today's Western Powers can be traced to September 1946, when U.S. President Harry S. Truman agreed with Lord Montgomery, CIGS, British Chief of the Imperial General Staff, during a meeting at the White House to realign the Anglo-American alliance against the Axis during World War II to become an alliance against the Soviet Union (or more precisely, an Anglo-American-Canadian alliance, since Canada would also be involved). The subsequent establishment of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Western Union from 1947 to 1948 marked the creation of separate spheres of influence for the United States and the United Kingdom. This was followed by the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949, which led to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), greatly extending the Western alliance network. From this period, the U.S. government and military in Washington, D.C., in particular began to seriously explore the possibility of making Japan an ally, and after the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 and full-scale intervention by China in November of the same year, the British and U.S. governments and militaries, which headed the Western alliance network, began to establish and extend the Western alliance network in the Far East, which could be considered Phase 1 of the establishment of the Western alliance network in the Far East. Phase 1 consisted of three alliance treaties signed in succession over a ten-day period from August 30 to September 8, 1951, namely the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines, signed in D.C. on August 30; the ANZUS Treaty between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, signed in San Francisco on September 1; and the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America, signed on September 8. Phase 2 of the establishment of the alliance consisted of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America, signed on October 1, 1953, following the armistice agreement at the end of the Korean War; the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty between the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and Pakistan, signed in Manila on September 8, 1954; and the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China, signed on December 2, 1954. (At the same time, the Middle East Treaty Organization (METO) was established by the United Kingdom, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, and the Kingdom of Iraq in 1955.) This paper seeks to present an evidence-based account and analysis of the

strategic and military disagreements that occurred between the British and U.S. governments and militaries that were behind Phase 1 of the establishment of the Western alliance network in the Far East amid the extension of the Western alliance network (setting aside a detailed discussion of the diplomatic processes behind the conclusion of the three alliance treaties for another time).¹

It is well-known that the Western alliance network in the Far East takes the form of a so-called hub-and-spokes alliance system, and this paper seeks to explore the reasons for this. From the perspective of international relations, it is often claimed that the form taken by a military alliance is based on reasons specific to that particular military alliance or, at best, its relationship with military alliances in the vicinity. However, this paper draws attention to the fact that the United Kingdom and the United States, which were the leaders of the West as a whole, clashed with each other over their respective global strategic concepts and war planning in 1951, and that a hub-and-spokes alliance system was established as a mutually acceptable form of alliance amid the clash of their different concepts. Furthermore, the United States established a new alliance setup by incorporating Japan as a “Japan of the West” with the intention of setting up Japan as a country capable of engaging in total war in the hypothetical scenario of World War III alongside the United Kingdom and the United States against the Soviet Union. This paper argues that the Far East Western alliance network was formed in order for the U.S. to, as its top priority, establish Japan as a country capable of engaging in total war and as a “Western success model” in the Far East during the Cold War as envisioned by the U.S., while respecting the British Commonwealth’s interests and concerns in the world at large and in the Far East, as well as to distinguish Japan from its other allies in the Far East and accord it special treatment, which resulted in the establishment of the hub-and-spokes alliance system. The British, however, also made use of U.S. naval power to establish a military system in the Far East to help prevent its Middle Eastern front, which was a focus of the United Kingdom, from possible collapse.²

¹ For more on the White House meeting on September 11, 1946, and its historical significance, see my article, “Jiyu shugi kokusai chitsujo” ha 1946 nen no eibei gunji domei no tai soren yo saihen ni yori seiritsu shita! — howaitohausu deno 1946 nen 9 gatsu 11 nichi toruman - montogomeri kaidan to sono kanren tenkai [“The Liberal International Order Was Established by the 1946 Reorganization of Anglo-American Military Alliance to Anti-Soviet Mission!—The Truman-Montgomery White House Meeting on September 11, 1946 and Its Related Developments”], Sogo seisaku kenkyu [*Journal of Policy Studies*] (Kwansei Gakuin University), No. 63 (September 2021), pp. 21-68.

² Victor D. Cha’s well-known study of the Western alliance network in the Far East has several serious flaws. First, and the most significant flaw, is his lack of understanding of the nature and system of the worldwide Western alliance network. This issue is not limited to him but is shared by many American scholars, and especially international political scientists. They do not seem to be even aware that the origin of the Western alliance network can be decisively traced to the realignment of the Anglo-American military alliance to become an alliance against the Soviet Union in September 1946. Regardless, the Western alliance network in the Far East is bound by the worldwide Western alliance network, and it is impossible to discuss it unless one grasps the full picture. The second flaw is that many American scholars discuss the alliances without even directly reviewing materials from the U.S. military archives. Key to understanding the worldwide Western alliance network is the looming shadow of World War III during the period from the beginning of the Cold War to the armistice agreement at the end of the Korean War. It is presumptuous to assume that one can discuss the Western alliance network by focusing solely on political relations without understanding the network’s military mechanism. The shared, cooperative relationship fostered through war planning on a global scale, the creation of a global command system,

More than that, this paper suggests that the Western Powers' worldwide alliance network had a hub-and-spokes framework in terms of its actual direction, at least during the period from 1946 to 1954. However, this framework was not obvious because the three countries that made up the informal alliance of the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada, which were the leaders of the Western Powers, concealed their leadership and did not share with other Western alliances and allied countries the war plans, global command structure, and deployment of troops that were vital to the maintenance and development of the whole alliance system. In particular, many have been misled by NATO's political operational status into believing that NATO is the primary entity spearheading the Western alliance network. In reality, as far as NATO's actual situation from 1946 to 1954 is concerned, it was extremely useful in addressing political conflict but was little more than a mere facade in military terms. Accordingly, this paper argues that during the period in question, the Anglo-American-Canadian alliance, an informal but still top-tier alliance of the Western Powers, was exclusively responsible for the formulation and direction of the war plans, global command structure, and deployment of troops that were vital to the Western Powers. With the Anglo-American-Canadian alliance as the "hub," the above-mentioned alliances were incorporated as "spokes" in the form of subordinate alliances. However, even though the three countries were equals in principle, the United Kingdom and the United States had no choice but to play a central role due to Canada's clearly inferior national strength, and it became the norm for the United Kingdom and the United States to deliberate and direct the Western alliance network in the world on equal terms. Phase 1 of the establishment of the alliance network in the Far East led by the United Kingdom and the United States set the pattern for Phase 2. It is impossible to understand the

and the training and deployment of troops led by the Americans, British, and Canadians was exclusive to the "ABC." Third, many American scholars, including Cha, ignore the fact that the United Kingdom and the United States had operated as equals and adopted an integrated approach to directing alliances in the Western alliance network, at least from the beginning of the Cold War until the armistice agreement at the end of the Korean War. The United Kingdom exerted a major influence on even the Western alliance network in the Far East. Whether intentionally or not, Cha's study does not consider the ANZUS Treaty as a Far East alliance in any substantial sense. Needless to say, he does not appear to have referenced any materials from the British military or diplomatic archives either. The result is a potentially skewed view of the alliance network in the Far East. Furthermore, as far as the fourth flaw is concerned, Cha lumps together the U.S.-Japan alliance of September 1951, the U.S.-ROK alliance of late 1953, and the U.S.-China alliance of 1954, but is it not a bit of a leap to equate alliance building in September 1951, when the United Kingdom and the United States were discussing the conditions for entering the world war, let alone the possibility of a great war in the Far East, with alliance building following Joseph Stalin's death and the armistice agreement at the end of the Korean War in the latter half of 1953 and after? Moreover, he does so in a manner that effectively ignores not only the ANZUS Treaty but also the U.S.-Philippines alliance. Also, and this is yet another weakness among American academics, how much of the actual situation can be explained by the "informal empire theory," which is focused on engaging with neorealist and even liberal arguments? Research conducted in a style that is suddenly driven by theory without any evidence-based study of the reality of the alliances is self-limiting in scope. Victor D. Cha, *Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia* (Princeton, Princeton U.P., 2016). The following study, while similarly flawed, approaches Western alliances in the Far East from a liberal perspective, as opposed to Cha's "power-oriented" neorealist perspective. Iain D. Henry, *Reliability and Alliance Interdependence: The United States and Its Allies in Asia, 1949-1969* (Ithaca, Cornell U.P., 2022). I believe that these studies have tried too hard to align their own research orientation with the position of political science. As someone who has been wrestling with materials from the British and U.S. military and diplomatic archives for over 40 years, I am concerned that studies on alliances cannot even arrive at a proper starting point without having performed routine evidence-based work.

nature and operation of the network of subordinate alliances in the Far East without following up on the engagements between the United Kingdom and the United States. Of course, there is no doubt that parties other than the United Kingdom and the United States had their own say in related matters as well.

The Emergence of the Threat of a World War after the Start of the Anti-Marshall Plan Campaign and the Accompanying Changes to Japan's Strategic Status

For slightly over a year from the end of Turkish straits crisis in the summer of 1946 to the start of the Soviets' Anti-Marshall Plan Campaign in September 1947, neither the British nor U.S. governments and militaries leading the Western alliance network believed that a world war against the Soviet Union would be possible and real in the near future. As is widely known, in May 1947, the British government and military had adopted a policy of combining the development of the atomic bomb and the establishment of a high-speed jet-powered medium bomber force to be deployed for world wars in 10 years' time in its key defense policy paper DO (47) 44, which was based upon the premise that no world war would be fought in the next decade. The U.S. government, and even the U.S. military, had also believed in August 1947 that there would be no war against the Soviet Union in the immediate future. However, as is widely known, once the Anti-Marshall Plan Campaign began, discussions took place between the British and U.S. governments and militaries regarding the possibility of an imminent world war against the Soviet Union, which led to the formulation and sharing of emergency war plans within the two militaries and even discussions about the idea of a worldwide Anglo-American command network. At the end of 1948, an emergency war plan against the Soviet Union known as ABC-101 was prepared jointly by the general staffs of the British, U.S., and Canadian militaries. At least on the basis of current historical records that are publicly available, no evidence suggests that there was ever any major or substantive war plan against the Soviet Union based on the premise that U.S. forces would fight Soviet forces alone. The war plans against the Soviet Union were formulated based on the premise of a war against the Soviet Union led by the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada, which would fight a world war against the Soviet Union from beginning to end in the form of an allied total war. The plans also served as the basis on which a global command system was created, troops were deployed, and budget measures for training troops were adopted. Therefore, in reality, there was no strategic or military framework that supports a neorealist analysis of international relations, which is based on the model of great powers acting independently.³

³ For more on the Turkish straits crisis in the summer of 1946, see my article, "Jiyu shugi kokusai chitsujo" ha 1946 nen no eibei gunji domei no tai soren yo saihen ni yori seiritsu shita! ["The Liberal International Order Was Established by the 1946 Reorganization of Anglo-American Military Alliance to Anti-Soviet Mission!"], pp. 26-33. DO (47) 44 (May 22, 1947), in Julian Lewis, *Changing Direction: British Military Planning for Post-war Strategic Defence, 1942-1947* (Second Edition) (London, 2003), pp. 370-387. For more on the emergency war planning involving the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada in 1948, as well as the disagreement over continental strategy versus air strategy between the British and U.S. militaries that occurred behind the scenes, see my article, NSC-68 no gunjiteki kigen — sorengun kara kindai seiyo bunmei o rain gawa boeisen de mamoru gunji senryaku o motomete (1) ["The Military Origins of NSC-68: In Search of A Military Strategy to Defend Western Civilization from Soviet Forces on the Defense Line of the Rhine (1)"], Aichi gakuin daigaku joho shakai seisaku kenkyu [*The Journal of*

The series of Anglo-American-Canadian emergency war plans of 1948 were based upon a strategic concept in which the United States and the British Commonwealth would immediately conduct devastating strategic bombing campaigns against the Soviet Union before launching land campaigns for an invasion of the Soviet Union from the Middle East to force its surrender around two years after the outbreak of the war. In 1948, the U.S. military had an arsenal of only 50 atomic bombs (preserved in a pre-assembly state), which were positioned as a supplementary means of warfare. Furthermore, it was unclear whether the U.S. president would ultimately resort to using atomic bombs, which could not be said to be absolutely essential in the context of a Cold War that was dominated by political conflict. (Truman was extremely cautious of the use of the atomic bomb after the bombing of Nagasaki.) I will set aside a detailed account and analysis of the disagreement between the United Kingdom and the United States over the emergency war plans against the Soviet Union in 1948 for other papers, but it must be pointed out here that there was one major weakness in the series of Anglo-American-Canadian emergency war plans of this period. Of course, those in charge of the British and U.S. militaries were well aware of this. The weakness in question is the prospect that in the event of an imminent world war, the ground forces of continental Western Europe in 1948 were not adequately trained to repel an invasion by Soviet ground forces along the Rhine, and that the massive Soviet army would overwhelm the three Benelux countries and even France, a former superpower of ground warfare. In other words, as of 1948, the Western alliance network did not have a global war plan for defending the Western Union, a Western alliance that was established on March 17 of the same year and which consisted of the United Kingdom, France, and the three Benelux countries. It also did not possess adequate ground forces that could serve as the basis for the defense of continental Western Europe.

This weakness persisted through 1949, when the United Kingdom and the United States agonized behind the scenes of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on April 4, 1949, over the fact that there was neither a war plan to defend continental Western Europe nor adequate ground forces to do so, at least for the immediate future. Even at this point, if a world war were to break out, the United Kingdom and the United States could no doubt survive and launch a massive ground invasion of the Soviet Union from the Middle East two years later by taking advantage of strategic bombing campaigns and naval campaigns. Moreover, the United States had been relentlessly growing its arsenal of atomic bombs, even if they had not been assembled. In other words, even though the United Kingdom and the United States would likely emerge victorious in a total war where the United States and the British Commonwealth were pitted against the Soviet Union, they could not militarily defend continental Western Europe, which should be considered a “border region” directly connected to the ongoing political warfare, and needed to create the illusion that the countries of continental Western Europe could be defended so that they could incorporate these countries into the Western alliance network politically. NATO, despite being a military alliance, was incapable of defending continental Western Europe in the moment, even if it might have been able to do so over the medium to long term. Of course, the United Kingdom and the United States did not expect to be able to rely on the military

forces of France, Italy, and the three Benelux countries in continental Western Europe, except for limited operations at the start of the war.

From a macro perspective, continental Western Europe was not the only vulnerable border region for the British and U.S. during the first half of 1949 in the event of a world war against the Soviet Union. The British and U.S. border region in the Far East had started to collapse, and the U.S. government and military were also struggling with defending the Far East region. In China, which had been in the midst of a violent civil war in 1947, the Kuomintang (KMT) forces, which the United Kingdom and the United States did not recognize as a member of the West but to whom they had nevertheless provided limited aid, gradually became outnumbered by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) forces. By late 1948, the KMT forces had collapsed, and the KMT government and a section of its troops started fleeing to Taiwan. It was inevitable that this turn of events would also impact the United States' attitude toward Japan. As early as 1948, U.S. Department of State strategist George F. Kennan and Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) Douglas MacArthur had almost reached full agreement on the vision of a future neutral and independent Japan and the military policy of entrusting the defense of the island chain to U.S. strategic bombing capabilities from Okinawa (which included the veiled premise of the use of the atomic bomb), but these various premises started to crumble in a fundamental way.

In the first place, the Japanese archipelago at the time was a border region that could be defended to any extent the British and U.S. wanted to, given the overwhelming U.S. naval and air superiority and the poor state of the Soviet Navy. Unlike France, Italy, and western Germany, which are contiguous with the Soviet Union, the U.S. Navy and Air Force could almost certainly defend the Japanese archipelago against the Soviet threat, and if the U.S. Navy could protect the maritime trade routes to the Japanese archipelago, Japan could very likely have become a country equipped with total war capabilities that the United Kingdom and the United States could rely on. In short, in terms of military production capabilities, this would alter the grand scheme of things by ensuring Japan line up on the side of the United Kingdom and the United States in a war against the Soviet Union. Needless to say, the British and U.S. militaries did not plan to engage in a world war where they would have to rely on the military production capabilities of France, Italy, and Germany.

However, as of 1948, the U.S. military in Washington did not consider Japan as a partner in total war. At the time, the United States could not easily dispatch reinforcements to the Far East in the event of a global total war against the Soviet Union, so the United States had only hoped to train a security force (constabulary) and a limited Japanese military force based locally in Japan.⁴

Shortly after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, the U.S. Department of War began considering Japan as a partner in total war, in addition to the limited rearmament of Japan. On May 24, 1949, at the request of Army representative of the Far East Command Colonel C. Stanton Babcock, the U.S. Army Plans and Operations Division in Washington, D.C., began

⁴ See my book, *Nihon saigunbi he no michi 1945-1954 nen* [*The Road to Japan's Rearmament, 1945-1954*] (Minerva Shobo, 2009), pp. 51-59.

preliminary discussions on peace talks with Japan. On the sidelines, Babcock emphasized that the Department of State had requested the National Military Establishment (NME; the unified department overseeing the three services of the U.S. Armed Forces before the formation of the Department of Defense) to calculate U.S. security requirements in Japan and indicated that the Soviet Union had proposed a discussion of the issue of peace talks with Japan at the Council of Foreign Ministers' meeting in Paris. In other words, the U.S. Army in Washington was forced to present a desired strategic vision for Japan following the peace treaty. At this meeting, they reaffirmed the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the body comprising the most senior U.S. military leaders in Washington D.C., and presented a set of circumstances that the United States should achieve in Japan as an interim measure. This was the future vision of Japan as a member of the Western Powers that can contribute to anti-Soviet and anti-communist causes.

- A. Japanese security forces, including the police establishment, should exist capable to assure stability of the Japanese Government against foreign-inspired internal uprisings.
- B. Limited Japanese armed forces should exist sufficient to assist the Western powers in the defense of Japan in case of hostilities.
- C. The Government of Japan should be oriented toward the Western powers.
- D. An economic level should be achieved sufficient to permit the Japanese a standard of living which will foster Democracy and discourage Communism.
- E. Confidence in the Japanese should be established that the United States will continue to support Japan if the Japanese continue to resist totalitarianism.
- F. The Japanese should be enlisted as an ally in the cold war.
- G. An economic recovery must be achieved for Japan which will permit that country to regain a position of favorable influence [leadership] in the Far East.
- H. The United States must maintain an effective leadership in Japan.
- I. The political and territorial integrity of Japan must be guaranteed either by the United States or by an international agreement.

Based on the above, the Plans and Operations Division drafted the "Position of the National Military Establishment with Report (sic) to the Conclusion of a Japanese Peace Treaty" (dated May 28, 1949), which was circulated within the Army General Staff. This document introduced "a U.S. concept for waging the cold war" in Asia and considered the establishment of Japan "as the keystone to the protective area of resistance," which included India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Siam, Indochina, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Formosa, and the Ryukyus, against Soviet-influenced "military communism." In this context, the Division was particularly focused on the establishment of a form of democracy that boasted "a democratic way of life as exemplified by the United States and other Western powers but adapted to Japanese traditions and culture." The Plans and Operations Division also hoped that Japan's advanced industrial production capabilities would help to undermine Soviet influence in Asia. Unlike Kennan's approach, the Division suggested that Japan's political and economic power could be used not only for "defense" against Soviet influence but also

for launching political and economic “offensives” throughout Asia following the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War. To support these political and economic measures, the long-term U.S. objectives for Japan were defined as follows: “The long range military objective of the U.S. towards Japan would (sic) be to permit the Japanese to develop and maintain sufficient military power, of a strictly defensive nature, to deter external aggression and in the event of aggression, to enable them to take their place in the defense of the non-Communist Far Eastern area.” Thus, the document stated that the United States would promptly draw on and provide “sufficient military leadership and military assistance” for the rearmament of Japan after the signing of the peace treaty. It was assumed in the document that the United States would withdraw its forces following the peace treaty and would not require any military bases on mainland Japan. At the same time, however, the document stated that the peace treaty should not contain any provisions that would interfere with bilateral negotiations to establish U.S. military bases in Japan. The Army General Staff had thus presented a position that built on the position of the JCS.⁵

In addition, a document on how to comprehensively utilize Japan’s military potential was submitted by the JCS in response to a request by the Department of State. On June 15, 1949, the JCS submitted a document entitled “Strategic Evaluation of United States Security Needs in Japan” to the National Security Council (NSC), which became NSC-49 and was circulated within the U.S. government and military as information. In relation to Europe, this document may be thought to have been directly relevant for the further development of conventional armaments, defense of continental Western Europe, and introduction of a new NATO command system, as exemplified by the so-called Eisenhower Initiative. (The Eisenhower Initiative was a document addressed to the JCS on February 25, 1949, by Dwight D. Eisenhower, the newly appointed unofficial chairman of the JCS, in which he requested the strengthening of conventional forces, primarily ground forces and tactical air forces, throughout the West in order to defend continental Western Europe along the Rhine and with a view to the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty and its institutionalization.) In other words, a more efficient utilization of Japan’s military potential could bring about a strategic situation that would allow the United States to deploy and amass greater power in Europe. More directly, the document was also related to the concern that a CCP victory would spark chaos within the U.S. military and that a CCP occupation of Taiwan would greatly affect the military balance in the Far East.⁶

The JCS drew attention to three Japanese military assets in this respect. The first was

⁵ Memo for Record (May 24, 1949), P&O 091 Japan TS Sec. I, Case 1-13, RG 319, National Archives II, College Park, MD, USA. For more on the position of the NME on the peace treaty with Japan, see Memorandum from Lt. Col. John P. Daley (May 31, 1949), P&O 091 Japan TS Sec. I, Case 1-13, RG 319. This memo hoped that Japan’s growing industrial power would undermine Soviet influence in Asia.

⁶ NSC-49 (June 15, 1949), in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Vol. VII, Part 2* (Washington D.C., USGPO, 1976), pp. 773-777. (Hereinafter, this series will be abbreviated as *FRUS*.) This document was created on June 9, 1949. See my article, NSC-68 no gunjiteki kigen — sorengun kara kindai seiyo bunmei o rain gawa boeisen de mamoru gunji senryaku o motomete (2) [“The Military Origins of NSC-68: In Search of A Military Strategy to Defend Western Civilization from Soviet Forces on the Defense Line of the Rhine (2)”], *Aichi gakuin daigaku joho shakai seisaku kenkyu [The Journal of Information and Policy Studies, Aichi Gakuin University]*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (December 2000), pp. 1-2.

Japan's military base network, which, at minimum, the Soviet Union should be prevented from using. If the Soviet Union were to acquire Japan's bases, trade routes in the North Pacific and U.S. military bases in the West Pacific would come under threat, and Soviet forces could invade Southeast Asia or eastward across the Pacific. Even more important, the JCS pointed out, was the need to maintain U.S. military bases in Japan. These U.S. military bases were to assist with strategic defensive operations undertaken by U.S. forces in the Far East and serve as "staging areas from which to project our (U.S.) military power to the Asiatic mainland and to USSR islands adjacent thereto." This was inconsistent with MacArthur's original vision of a demilitarized and neutral Japan. With regard to specific bases, NSC-49 focused on the demands of the U.S. Navy and considered Yokosuka to be an essential base, while bases in the Ryukyu Islands were deemed to be plagued by undesirable weather conditions and hydrographic problems. In other words, the JCS positioned the Japanese archipelago as the core base for U.S. military advances on the Far Eastern front in an all-out war against the Soviet Union.⁷

The second potential military asset was Japan's war-fighting capabilities, especially its human resources and industrial production capabilities. The JCS determined that Japan's war-fighting capabilities would "have great influence either for or against the interests of the United States in the event of global war." In short, the question was whether Japan would line up on the side of the United Kingdom and the United States against the Soviet Union or vice versa when weighing up each side's total war capabilities. In fact, there was some pressure at the time on the British and U.S. in terms of military planning to make sure Japan line up on the side of the United Kingdom and the United States. The United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada had envisioned that in a future world war, France, Italy, and western Germany would likely be under Soviet control, and when making calculations for total war, they assumed that these three countries would contribute nothing to the United Kingdom and the United States, or at worst, be a positive for the Soviet Union. The third potential military asset was Japan's combat capabilities: "If United States influence predominates, Japan can be expected, with planned initial United States assistance, at least to protect herself and, provided logistic necessities can be made available to her, to contribute importantly to military operations against the Soviets in Asia, thus forcing the USSR to fight on the Asiatic front as well as elsewhere." In other words, Japan's military power could be said to have been incorporated into the framework of the global Western Powers versus the Soviets. In this light, it was suggested that the conclusion of a peace treaty should be postponed until Japan's Western orientation was first established.⁸ Clearly, U.S. military leaders in Washington had come to expect Japan to be their partner in an allied total war against the Soviet Union.

No longer able to resist Washington's calls for the rearmament of Japan, MacArthur gradually backtracked from his position. He dropped the premise of the tactical use of the atomic bomb, which had played such a major role in his concept of Japan's defense. He also agreed to the establishment of a constabulary (armed police) for responding to mass uprisings, which

⁷ *FRUS, 1949, Vol. VII, Part 2, pp. 774-775.*

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 774; p. 776.

could be considered a half-step back, despite not wavering on his opposition to rearmament. In the Far East Command war plan “GUNPOWDER (2nd Edition)” dated April 12, 1949, the Far East Command abruptly deleted its recommendation on the tactical use of the atomic bomb on four seaports along the Sino-Soviet coast that had existed in the first edition. This implied that atomic bombs would not be used for the defense of Japan, which could be said to be a clear change in the position of the Far East Command. (However, the second edition of the plan retained the part on the Strategic Air Command’s strategic nuclear bombing of Soviet war-fighting capabilities in the Far East.) Perhaps as a result of this, Washington was anxious to find out what alternative plans MacArthur had in mind. Surprisingly, MacArthur’s “backtracking” was evident in a November 10 briefing to the JSSC conducted by his subordinate Babcock. After reprising superficial arguments against rearmament, Babcock suggested the introduction of a large constabulary (security force) comprising 100,000 to 150,000 men. The JSSC could not hide their astonishment at this and remarked, “That is a pretty good-sized force.” Babcock explained to the surprised JSSC that the United States’ mission in training the constabulary was to ensure that it would “not become the nucleus for a force oriented in the ways of the old Imperial Japanese Army.” Ironically, this statement revealed just how easily the constabulary could be converted to an army based on common knowledge within the U.S. military. However, MacArthur’s full surrender was still some time away (although Kennan, on the other hand, had lost the political influence to oppose the rearmament of Japan by the end of 1949).⁹

At the end of December 1949, President Truman determined that the United States’ position in Northeast Asia was politically and strategically inferior, and that there was no room for possible cooperation or compromise with the CCP, prompting him to call for Japan’s rapid independence and recovery as well as its incorporation as a member of the Western Powers. On December 30, Truman and the NSC stipulated in NSC-48/2, a new strategy document with respect to Asia, that “policies with respect to Japan [would] be re-evaluated after the decision regarding a peace treaty [had] been made.” However, at an NSC meeting on the previous day (December 29), President Truman had expressed that Soviet involvement in the peace treaty was not essential. He recalled that the United States, the United Kingdom, and China offered terms of surrender to Japan at the Potsdam Conference, and that the Soviet Union was not part of this process. He added that Russia declared war on Japan a few days after the first atomic bomb was dropped on Japan, when Russia had already agreed to the terms of surrender issued to Japan. The President then said that the U.S. position with respect to Japan was that the United States had a partnership only with the United Kingdom and [the Republic of] China, and that the three parties could negotiate a peace treaty with Japan regardless of whether the Soviet Union was involved. Should it be said that Truman’s decision led to early peace talks without the involvement of China and the Soviet Union as well as the incorporation of Japan as a member of the Western Powers? This was completely at odds with

⁹ General Headquarters of the Far East Command, “Staff Study ‘GUNPOWDER,’ 2nd Edition” (April 12, 1949): “Annex G, Part 1 to Staff Study ‘GUNPOWDER,’ 2nd Edition: Operations with SAC” (April 12, 1949), RG 6, Series III, Box 101, the MacArthur Memorial Archives. JSSC, “Transcript of Meeting, Held in the JSSC Conference Room, The Pentagon on Thursday, 10 November 1949, at 1300,” CCS 388.1 Japan (9-1-47) Sec. 1, RG 218. See *FRUS, 1949, Vol. VII, Part 2*, p. 811; p. 833.

the JSSC's recommendation of postponing treaty negotiations and MacArthur's insistence that any peace proposal with Japan must involve both China and the Soviet Union. The problem was how the Department of State's position of pushing for early peace talks without regard to the involvement of China and the Soviet Union could be reconciled with the Department of Defense's wish for Japan to contribute militarily to the Western Powers following the peace treaty, namely, through the three pillars of Japan's base provisioning, industrial power, and rearmament as outlined in NSC-49. The ideal scenario in Truman's mind would have been to first prioritize the Department of State's position until an early peace treaty was concluded, before satisfying the military requirements desired by the JCS and the Plans and Operations Division. However, while that decision may have immediately satisfied the Department of State, it did not fully convince the Department of Defense for some time. Nevertheless, when the Korean War eventually broke out, the U.S. Department of Defense had no choice but to focus its attention on responding to the war at hand instead of the Department of State. Furthermore, once the U.S. military started to rely heavily on Japan's base-provisioning capabilities, industrial power, and logistics capabilities as part of the UN forces, the vision outlined in NSC-49 could only become the dominant reality.¹⁰

Collapse of the British Middle Eastern Front and the Significance of the Far East in the United Kingdom's Search for Recovery

In the 1940s and early 1950s, the superpower of the British Empire and British Commonwealth consisted of the United Kingdom itself, the major Dominions of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, as well as a network of autonomous regions and colonies around the world, the central artery of which was the Cairo-Suez region, which includes the Suez Canal. In addition to this global network, it had established military and naval bases and facilities and set up a basic system that was capable of engaging in global war. Even before the Cold War began in 1946, when the Anglo-American alliance was realigned to become an alliance against the Soviet Union, which then began to resist it, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were already engaged in a struggle for influence over the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. By 1945, the United Kingdom had a network of strategic bomber bases in the Cairo-Suez region where Lancaster bombers that had been modified for long-range attacks were deployed, ready to bomb major Soviet-occupied cities in Eastern Europe at any time to gain an advantage in this struggle for influence. Of course, in the event of a world war, these bombers could also be directed to industrial areas in the southwestern part of the Soviet Union. In 1946, the U.S. military had naturally assumed that in the event of a world war against the Soviet Union, it would dispatch a large force of B-29s to the Cairo-Suez region based on the realigned Anglo-American alliance.

However, when the U.S. military's new strategic bomber B-50 was deployed in 1948,

¹⁰ For more on the stipulation on Japan in NSC-48/2, see *FRUS, 1949, Vol. VII, Part 2*, p. 1218. For the President's remarks at the NSC meeting, see "Memo for the President" (December 30, 1949), President Secretary File, NSC Meeting, Box 220, the Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri, USA. For more on discussions within the U.S. government and military surrounding the President's remarks, see Chapter 5 of my book, *Nihon saigunbi he no michi [The Road to Japan's Rearmament]*.

its operating range was considerably improved, which prompted the U.S. military to remove the Cairo-Suez region from its list of air base groups that were necessary for strategic bombing against the Soviet Union. The B-50 was modified from the B-29 and powered by a much-improved engine. The United States thus acquired strategic bombing capabilities that, in combination with the British mainland or Iceland, and with Okinawa or the Japanese archipelago, could cover almost all of Soviet territory. Accordingly, the U.S. military no longer needed the British air base group in the Cairo-Suez region and even started to neglect the strategic importance of the entire Middle East in the context of a world war.

In the latter half of 1948, President Truman took the first steps toward removing budgetary support for the emergency war plan “HALFMOON” (British code name: Double Quick) that was being pursued by the British, U.S., and Canadian military staff. This prompted the British, U.S., and Canadian military staff to collectively study the plan in greater depth, with the planning officers of the three countries holding a “short-term emergency planning” meeting from October 18 to 26, 1948, to review the basic approach of “HALFMOON” before it was adopted as ABC-101. However, ABC-101 would be effectively invalidated. This was because on January 10, 1949, the U.S. President abandoned the budget proposal to support “HALFMOON” and submitted to the U.S. Congress a \$15 billion bill that would not allow the United States to provide aid to the British Empire and British Commonwealth, let alone support the maintenance of continental Europe. On the surface, the U.S. government’s failure to support the budget rendered ABC-101 ineffective for the foreseeable future. It was believed that at the time, Truman was more concerned that a collapse in the finances of the United States would cause it to lose the Cold War in no time than with a possible world war. He may also have made the calculation that it would not be impossible to have ABC-101 go into force following the outbreak of a world war by pushing through an emergency budget.¹¹

At the same time, when the Joint Logistics Plans Committee (JLPC), a subordinate body of the JCS, started studying the feasibility of ABC-101, they found some surprising flaws. According to the plan, the Cairo-Suez region was deemed to be the most important strategic bomber base, but the JLPC was not satisfied with the prewar state of airfields and facilities in that region and anticipated a severe lack of skilled engineering units to carry out the necessary airfield restructuring. The JLPC also warned that the United Kingdom could not be expected to definitely carry out this restructuring. According to the JLPC’s calculations, only the Farouk (Payne) Airfield was immediately available, from which only one medium bomber group could operate. Reinforcing and rebuilding the Abu Sueir Airfield was thus imperative. The JLPC calculated that if the British began reinforcement work right away, the U.S. Air Force could operate two medium bomber groups there by the “spring of 1949.” By the time the JLPC completed this report, the Joint Strategic Plans Group (JSPG), a subordinate body of the Joint

¹¹ JLPC-416/32 (November 12, 1948), CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) Sec. 24, RG 218. The British began to suspect that the United States was not seriously committed to the defense of the Middle East. In particular, British military reports stated that the U.S. Army was concerned about the vulnerability of the Mediterranean connecting line and the commitment of too large a force there. JP (48) 130 (Final) (November 4, 1948), DEFE 4/17, (UK) National Archives, Kew, London. For more on President Truman’s decision, see Kenneth W. Condit, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Vol. II, 1947-1949* (Wilmington, 1979), pp. 252-253.

Strategic Plans Committee (JSPC), had advised the JCS to recommend that the JCS should develop a different emergency war plan that did not rely on the long-term protection of the Cairo-Suez region, in view of the weaknesses of ABC-101. Subsequently, the JSPC ordered the JSPG to prepare an outline of a new joint emergency war plan.¹²

Despite this turn of events, the JCS still stood by their Anglo-American allied war plan that was premised on the defense of British Commonwealth interests in the Cairo-Suez region and the Mediterranean. In response to the JCS's stance, the JSPC prepared a different war plan based on realistic calculations of available forces during the period from January 1949 to July 1950. On January 28, 1949, the JCS adopted the new war plan, "TROJAN," whose content was almost identical to that of "HALFMOON".¹³

As a counterpoint to this, however, there were growing voices within the U.S. military that an emergency war plan focused on continental Western Europe instead of the Middle East should be adopted as the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty drew closer. On February 25, 1949, Eisenhower requested the JCS to adopt a new strategic concept for the defense of continental Western Europe. In response to the Eisenhower Initiative and the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, the JCS ordered the JSPC to create a new emergency war plan on April 26. According to the guidelines of the order, the JCS argued that NATO member countries should develop capabilities for defending the Rhine, despite not completely precluding the early strategic nuclear bombing of Soviet industrial capabilities: "The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the security of the United States requires, with respect to continental Europe, the pursuance of a continuing policy to develop, at the earliest possible moment, with the nations of Western Europe, the capability of holding a line covering the Western Europe complex preferably no farther to the west than the Rhine." However, the JCS realized that "the accomplishment of this purpose cannot be counted upon at this time" due to the financial and military limitations of the member countries and, as a compromise, ordered that "pending the attainment of such objective, plans must be so drawn that, if possible, a substantial bridgehead be held in Western Europe." If this was not possible, the JCS considered "a return to Western Europe at the earliest practical time, in order to prevent the exploitation and communization of that area with long-term disastrous effects on U.S. national interests."¹⁴

In response to this stance, the JSPC sought the introduction of a new strategic concept as articulated in the outline of "OFFTACKLE," a new emergency war plan formulated for the (British-U.S.) Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) meeting in the summer of 1949. According to this plan, in addition to the destruction of Soviet industrial power, another new objective of strategic bombing was to "delay the Soviet invasion of Western Eurasia." However, even the JSPC did not believe that this new approach to strategic bombing and the last-ditch effort to defend the Rhine with a patchwork coalition of ground forces by the Western Powers would miraculously hold off the Soviet forces, so they settled on the next best option, which was to invade southern France from Morocco with the goal of liberating continental Western Europe at

¹² JLPC-416/32 (November 12, 1948); JSPC-877/30 (November 11, 1948), CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) Sec. 24, RG 218. JSPC-877/36/D (December 21, 1948), CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) Sec. 26, RG 218.

¹³ JSPC-877/44 (February 16, 1949), CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) Sec. 29, RG 218. Condit, *op. cit.*, p. 293.

¹⁴ JSPC-877/56 (April 21, 1949); JCS-1844/37 (April 27, 1949), CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) Sec. 31, RG 218.

the earliest possible date. Such a military operation could be said to be harmless but pointless. In any case, at this stage, the U.S. military had abandoned the idea of strategic bombing by the U.S. Air Force from the Middle East and was considering undertaking a “political” operation in Northwest Africa whose strategic contribution was unclear.¹⁵

At a CCS meeting between the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COS; the body comprising British military leaders) on August 3, 1949, the main topic of discussion was initially how the British and U.S. militaries, which had inadequate ground forces, could defend continental Western Europe under the North Atlantic Treaty, but the JCS suddenly surprised the COS by stating that they did not want to dispatch U.S. troops for military operations in the Middle East. The JCS argued that since the United States had signed the North Atlantic Treaty, it was politically impossible for it to dispatch key U.S. forces to the Middle East. Outraged by this, the COS countered that dispatching additional British and U.S. troops to continental Western Europe would be an unnecessary waste of military resources given the overwhelming Soviet forces. The JCS agreed with the calculations of the COS but remained adamant that the content of the war plan for defending Western Europe should, at the very least, not doom the North Atlantic Treaty. Although the JCS raised the possibility of moving U.S. troops from the Moroccan front, where U.S. forces would be initially dispatched, to the Middle East, the COS saw through this North African operation as a preparatory operation for a re-landing in southern France: “U.S.: Yes, the North African base could give us the Cairo-Suez as an alternative operation. BRITISH: Maybe it would be better to go to Marseilles or to Bordeaux.” The JCS calmly responded, “We might do.” Unable to contain their shock and anger, the COS protested that the United States was about to sacrifice a vital region of the United Kingdom, and asked, “Do you think the British give up Cairo-Suez?” The JCS’s response was diplomatic but cold. “No, not if it can be held, but we can’t help.”¹⁶

As a last resort, the COS emphasized the weaknesses of the U.S. military deployment plan and questioned when the U.S. military would be able to dispatch the “first division” to Europe. The JCS’s response was hilarious. “One airborne division can be available in about two or three weeks and one infantry division and about one-third airborne division in about 30 days. That is challengeable . . . In two years our National Guard will be trained and available.” Yet, the JCS and the COS believed at the time that France would not last more than 30 days. Upon hearing this, the COS asked sarcastically, “What shall we tell the French? Do we say we cannot put anything in the bank [of the Rhine] now, but can in two years?” The JCS, which was scheduled to meet with the French General Staff two days later, answered the COS nonchalantly, “We don’t propose to tell them (the French) anything. You have been the only ones with whom we have been planning. We shall discuss only North Atlantic planning with them.” The COS accused the JCS’s attitude of being detrimental to the morale of continental Western Europe without any regard for the coherence of their argument.

“We must consider the psychological effect on France. If you do not agree to support

¹⁵ JSPC-877/66 (August 2, 1949), CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) Sec. 36, RG 218.

¹⁶ “Confidential Annex” to COS (49) 113th Mtg. (August 3, 1949), DEFE 4/23. “Conference with the British Chiefs of Staff, Held in Offices of the British Cabinet, London, England, on Wednesday, 3 August 1949 at 1530,” pp. 4-5, P&O 092 Europe TS, Sec. III, Case 47 Only, Book 1, RG 319.

France and do not go into Western European planning, the French may throw up their hands in despair. They are sitting on the spot. We have 22 miles [of straits] and you have several thousands of miles of water. They have no barrier. At present there is more cooperation and hope and things being done with Western Union than we had dreamed possible. There is a strong increase in French determination; but they are a bit brittle.”

These remarks should be understood as bewilderment on the part of the COS and a sign of their disbelief at the “naive” U.S. approach.¹⁷

The British military was puzzled by the sudden abandonment of the defense of Cairo-Suez by the U.S. military. As the JCS suggested during the meeting, the U.S. ground forces attached to Northwest Africa had certainly almost no chance of heading for the Cairo-Suez region. The British military’s concept for the defense of the Cairo-Suez region at the time was to take advantage of the narrow topography of the Lebanon-Palestine region with British and U.S. ground forces (especially the British Army) playing the role of a “shield” to intercept southward-advancing Soviet forces and protect the area, while having the Royal Air Force and the strategic bombers of the U.S. Air Force serve as the “spear” to destroy Soviet industrial power and make a decisive impact on the total war. The U.S. forces would then be completely freed up, and from the British point of view, there was a possibility that not only continental Western Europe, which was the air interception front for the British mainland, but also the Middle East, the heart of the British Empire and British Commonwealth, falling to Soviet invasion. For the British military, and indeed the British government and military as a whole, it was imperative that the Western Powers’ strategic framework for defending the British Empire and British Commonwealth was reconfigured.

In reality, from June to July 1950, the British government had been discussing with the Australian government the issue of dispatching Australian forces to the Middle East, and the Australian government had promised to explore the possibility of dispatching ground and air forces that could be deployed in time of war to “the Middle East or Malaya.” The plan was to have Australian forces take the place of U.S. forces. However, at that point in time, deployment to the Middle East was only a subject of study and not something to which the Australian government had committed. Moreover, when comparing the Middle East and Malaya, Malaya was geographically closer to Australia and perceived as more vital to Australia’s national defense than military operations in the Middle East. The Japanese occupation of Malaya during the Pacific War and the subsequent attack on mainland Australia were fresh in the mind of the Australians. According to an Australian Defence Committee document, in the event of an imminent threat to Malaya, the COS should entrust the ANZAM Chiefs of Staff (comprising British, Australian, and New Zealand military representatives but with Australian forces at their core) with the responsibility of defending Malaya, which could then deploy the Australian forces. (Unlike the British Cabinet’s Defence Committee, the Australian Defence Committee was not composed of key cabinet ministers and military leaders but senior diplomatic and military officials.) While military operations in Malaya already had defense

¹⁷ “Conference with the British Chiefs of Staff, Held in Offices of the British Cabinet, London, England, on Wednesday, 3 August 1949 at 1530,” pp. 8-9, P&O 092 Europe TS, Sec. III, Case 47 Only, Book 1, RG 319.

and command systems in place, those in the Middle East did not. Although the defense of Malaya was important to the British military, it was deemed to be on a different level than the Middle East, which could dictate the fortunes of the British Empire. The question was how to create a strategic environment in which the Australian government could be persuaded to dispatch a large force to the Middle East. This meant reconfiguring the existing framework for the defense of Southeast Asia and the Australia/New Zealand region, and that it was necessary to link this to the defense of the Middle East. Under the British Commonwealth defense framework at the time, Australia and New Zealand were the countries primarily responsible for the defense of the ANZAM region, which consisted of Malaya, mainland Australia, New Zealand, and their surrounding waters. In late 1948, the Australian government informed the British government that it was prepared to assume responsibility for the defense of the region, which also included Indonesia, Malaya, and Borneo. In November of the same year, the British government allowed Australia to engage in peacetime defense planning studies, and in early 1949, the ANZAM defense treaty was signed between the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. The Royal New Zealand Air Force began stationing their troops in Singapore in September 1949, and the Royal Australian Air Force did the same in Malaya in June 1950. Before China intervened in the Korean War, the British military had already recognized that the British Commonwealth's global strategic framework would be severely disrupted if Chinese troops invaded Southeast Asia.¹⁸

Nevertheless, it is important to reiterate here that what the Australians were really concerned about was the military threat posed by Malaya to mainland Australia, not the defense of Malaya's natural resources. There were virtually no strategic or military calculations connected to imperial interests made by the Australians. If the U.S. Navy at the time could take advantage of its naval supremacy to completely eliminate the military threat from the Southeast Asian region connected to the Eurasian continent, there would be no need to defend mainland Australia with a large ground force, which would then allow forces to be deployed around the world to save the day for the Western Powers led by the United Kingdom and the United States. Should this be seen as a situation in which Australian and New Zealand forces could become the "odd-job men" that support the Western alliances? An opportunity was needed to deploy the Australian and New Zealand forces to vulnerable areas of the Western Powers. Such an opportunity would arise with China's full-scale intervention in the Korean War and the U.S. concept of a Pacific Pact, regardless of whether the U.S. should ultimately be considered a remote cause for allowing Australian and New Zealand forces to be dispatched to defend the Middle East.

¹⁸ Tilman Remme, *Britain and Regional Cooperation In South-East Asia, 1945-49* (London, 1995), pp. 184-185; Annex I to JP (50) 97 (Final) (September 21, 1950); "Australian Defence Committee Minute No. 87/1950: Strategic Planning in Relation to Co-operation in British Commonwealth Defence: High Command in War in the ANZAM Region," Appendix "B" to Annex III to JP (50) 97 (September 21, 1950), DEFE 4/36.

Discussions Within the U.S. Government and Military over Initial Proposals of a Semi-peace Treaty with Japan and a Pacific Pact

In U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson's famous defensive perimeter speech on January 12, 1950, Japan and the Philippines were included within the U.S. defense perimeter, but Australia and New Zealand were not. (Of course, this could also be seen as a prototype system behind the three defense treaties signed during the period from August to September 1951, with an emphasis on Japan.) It should be noted that the defensive perimeter only covered the northern half of the Western Pacific island chain, from the Aleutians to Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines. As is well known, Taiwan and Korea were not included. It could also be said that only Japan and Okinawa were incorporated into the U.S. defense perimeter in consideration of the longstanding friendship and protective relationship between the United States and the Philippines. This alone was a major shift from MacArthur and Kennan's vision of Japan as a neutral party that would not provide direct support in the Cold War through its military power. In this sense, it should be said that the U.S. Department of State was clearly increasingly on board with the new stance that had been taking root within the Department of Defense and the U.S. military throughout 1949, namely, to restore the global military balance, which was on the verge of crumbling, to that of Anglo-American supremacy by making Japan an ally of the West. (The Department of State, however, had prioritized victory in the Cold War over fighting a world war and aimed to eliminate the penetration of communist forces through the rise of new political forces that would fulfill anti-poverty and anti-colonialist aspirations in Asia, including by providing political and economic support for these forces. Behind this was likely its calculation that the vast area and cultural depth of Asia was something neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could assimilate, and that the goal should be to coexist with the region.)¹⁹

On the other hand, the speech also sought to separate China from the Soviet Union, a position that was popular within the U.S. Department of State at the time. This could be said to be an offensive in the Cold War, but it was also likely just a means of waiting for the Soviet Union to self-destruct. The speech suggested the main reason for such a separation was that the Soviet Union was not a revolutionary state but merely one that "added new methods, new skills, and new concepts" to "the thrust of Russian imperialism." This drew on Kennan's basic understanding of the Soviet Union. Acheson then cited the fact that the Soviet Union had already trampled on the will of the Chinese people and was gradually detaching areas originally under Chinese control and incorporating them into its own sphere of influence. Specifically, he pointed out that the Soviet Union had already taken over Mongolia and was beginning to take control of Manchuria.²⁰

On the other hand, even though the U.S. Department of State was in favor of Japan's incorporation into the Northwest Pacific offshore defense line around the period from January to February 1950, it did not envision Japan as a partner in total war as proposed by the U.S. military in NSC-49. Instead, it toyed with the idea of a Japan that was within the U.S. defense

¹⁹ Dean Acheson, "Speech on the Far East" (January 12, 1950), <http://cia.gov/readingroom/docs/1950-01-12.pdf>.

²⁰ Ibid.

perimeter but was incapable of self-defense, which was only a half-step away from MacArthur and Kennan's vision of a neutral Japan. Could it be said that the U.S. Department of State had expected to be able to promote the peaceful coexistence of the United States and the Soviet Union by taking advantage of Japan's inability to defend itself, which was not very different from Kennan's vision? The Department of State and civilian officials in the Department of War searched for a compromise between a peace treaty and U.S. security requirements. Special Assistant to the Secretary John B. Howard had presented a new proposal within the Department of State, which was then submitted to Acheson by W. Walton Butterworth, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, on January 18, 1950. This proposal was the re-proposal of a "semi-peace treaty," or the partial restoration of Japan's sovereignty, so to speak, by "[restoring] to Japan the full exercise of its sovereign powers in the political and economic fields," while shelving security and territorial issues. The greatest advantage of this proposal was the retention of SCAP's authority and the maintenance of U.S. military bases as they were. This was an attempt at satisfying the Japanese people's desire for the restoration of sovereignty while avoiding the risk of diplomatic negotiations with China and the Soviet Union.²¹

To supplement this, Howard proposed a "Pacific collective security arrangement" to address Japan's security problems. The proposed arrangement was essentially a strategy of double containment against both the Soviet Union and Japan, but at the same time, it was hoped that the arrangement could also be used to advance a peace treaty. Howard explained this as follows in "Position of the Department of State on United States Policy Toward a Japanese Peace and Security Settlement": "The security problem relating to Japan has two aspects. The first aspect flows from Japan's [past] aggression which led to the war and from the fear of the victims of Japanese aggression concerning [Japan's] possible resurgence in the future. The second aspect flows from the postwar threat of aggression from Soviet-Communist expansion in Asia. The first aspect of the problem would normally be taken care of in a treaty of peace. The second aspect would not normally be part of a peace treaty. However, the two aspects overlap and it may be possible that a satisfactory security arrangement for one would materially assist in taking care of the other." The proposal had in mind the United States, Canada, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan as official members of the collective security arrangement. Unlike the North Atlantic Treaty, however, this arrangement did not provide for automatic military action in response to aggression against a member, but rather, "each would take such action as it deemed necessary, individually or in concert with other members, to assist the member attacked." In other words, it was closer in form to the Rio Treaty (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance). If the arrangement guaranteed U.S. military bases in Japan and prohibited the rearmament of Japan, it would be compatible with the global war plan as long as the U.S. could deploy adequate troops in Japan for the war against the Soviet Union. However, securing adequate U.S. troops was the dilemma. Moreover, the introduction of this arrangement implied that Japan would also be incorporated into a system beyond the Far East Command's military system against the Soviet Union, specifically, a military system

²¹ *FRUS, 1950, Vol. VI, p. 1120.*

against the Soviet Union and Japan based on multilateral arrangements in the Pacific. This meant that the details of the defense of Japan would be worked out on a multilateral basis, in which case Japan would clearly possess the lowest status in the region.²²

The Department of Defense and the U.S. military did not welcome this proposal. On the contrary, when a similar proposal was subsequently put forward, they criticized it as militarily unnecessary and reckless. They feared that the United Kingdom and France would use this framework to draw the United States into the defense of British and French colonies in Southeast Asia. The United States had no intention of being the “watchdog” of British and French imperialism.

At the same time, Acheson gave a speech in Berkeley, California, on March 16, 1950. The speech made clear his commitment to seeking the peaceful coexistence of the United States and the Soviet Union and could be read as a sign of his belief that a world war would not break out in the foreseeable future and should be avoided in any case. He then urged the Soviet Union to move forward with the various World War II peace talks that had stalled and find a path to coexistence through U.S.-Soviet negotiations. With regard to Japan, Acheson stated that the Soviet Union should consider the interests of countries other than the members of the Council of Foreign Ministers (the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union, and France) and stop obstructing peace talks with Japan, as well as repatriate Japanese prisoners of war who were forced to work on Soviet territory. He could be said to have been seeking a solution to the Cold War that addressed both the needs of Japan and U.S.-Soviet negotiations. Of course, he touched on not only peace talks with Japan but also settlements in Germany, Austria, and on the Korean peninsula, as well as the necessary inspections prior to that. It should be said that he had not anticipated the outbreak of the Korean War.²³

Around this time, Under Secretary of Defense Tracy S. Voorhees submitted on his own initiative a “semi-peace treaty” similar to Howard’s proposal to the Department of State and the JCS. On March 23, he was invited to meet with Acheson, Butterworth, Howard, Philip C. Jessup, and Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, to explain his proposal. Acheson criticized Voorhees’ proposal for being unduly focused on legal aspects and said that it did not understand the severity of the political conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Voorhees told Acheson that he had already discussed this proposal with the JCS and expressed his hope that Acheson would give it serious consideration, but Acheson coldly replied that he would like to discuss it directly with the JCS.²⁴

On April 20, the JCS rejected Voorhees’ proposal. Besides the cost of occupation, the JCS cited the following two important reasons for their opposition. First, a “semi-peace treaty” would undermine “both the status and authority of the U.S. forces in Japan at a time when a high degree of stability in that country (Japan) and throughout the non-Soviet world is, to all intents and purposes, mandatory.” Second, maintaining a so-called “regime of control,”

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 1140-1141; p. 1143. For a more detailed discussion and the military background to this, see Chapter 5 of my book, *Nihon saigunbi he no michi [The Road to Japan’s Rearmament]*.

²³ Dean Acheson, “Speech at Berkeley, California” (March 16, 1950), Teaching American History, <http://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/speech-at-berkeley-california/>.

²⁴ *FRUS, 1950, Vol. VI*, p. 1150.

especially if the U.S. occupation forces were left intact, would imply that the United States would provide “for an indefinite period a military commitment to support the diplomatic and other international commitments which the Government of Japan would have authority to make.” The JCS wanted to avoid a situation of over-commitment to Japan given that they were already struggling with over-commitment in the context of Western Europe.²⁵

Beyond these reasons, dramatic developments on the Asian continent had increased the significance of U.S. military bases in Japan. In February 1950, U.S. military assumptions were shaken by reports that a Sino-Soviet alliance treaty had been signed and that Soviet forces had begun to be stationed in China. In other words, Okinawa’s strategic vulnerability was rapidly increasing. In the war plan “OFFTACKLE,” the JCS assumed that Communist China would not provide any facilities or resources to the Soviet Union and would pursue an “opportunities-based policy” for its own expansion. This assumption was now badly shaken. On May 1, Forrest Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), issued the following warning to the JCS: “China is now under the domination of the USSR. The USSR is reported to be providing military aid and advice to all branches of the Chinese military establishment. Soviet naval elements are reported in Chinese ports. Air elements, possibly Soviet controlled, are appearing in China. Formosa may soon be in hands unfriendly to us.” The prospect of a Soviet-controlled China taking over Taiwan was a major problem for the Far Eastern part of “OFFTACKLE.” This was because “OFFTACKLE” relied heavily on “denial to the Soviets of the use of Formosa as a base for offensive operations” for the defense of Okinawa and Japan. According to the plan, Okinawa was one of three major strategic nuclear bomber bases in the world (the others being the British mainland and the continental United States) and the only one in the Far East. (Moreover, strategic nuclear bomber bases could not be expected in the Middle East due to the weak British ground forces and poor state of airfields in the region.) The plan was for a single medium bomber group to conduct nuclear bombing against the Soviet Union from Okinawa. JCS-1380/87 (dated April 19, 1950), which shot down Voorhees’ proposal, reported that “evidences of intensified military activity by the Chinese Communists, particularly in preparations for invasions of Formosa and Hainan.” Taiwan’s geographical proximity to Okinawa worried the U.S. military and made it vital for U.S. military bases to be maintained in Japan. Sherman had remarked, “If we leave Japan, we may or may not be able to stay in Okinawa.” In other words, it was essential to maintain large U.S. military bases on mainland Japan to allow strategic nuclear bombing campaigns to be launched against the Soviet Union from Okinawa. This also meant that MacArthur’s strategic concept of maintaining only small U.S. military bases in Japan going forward became unrealistic.²⁶

In a telegram to the JCS dated May 29, MacArthur warned, “Current emergency [war] plans [against the Soviet Union] are no longer realistic.” He emphasized the deployment of

²⁵ “Decision on J.C.S. 1380/87” and JCS-1380/87 (April 20, 1950), G-3 091 Japan TS (Section I-A) (Case 4 Only) (Book I) RG 319.

²⁶ JCS-1844/46 (November 8, 1949), Paul Kasaris ed., *Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part II, 1946-1953: the Soviet Union*, A Microfilm Project of University Publications of America (Washington D.C., 1979). Forrest Sherman to the JCS (May 1, 1950), CJCS 091 Japan 1950 RG 218. JCS-1380/87 (April 19, 1950).

Soviet-manufactured jets by the Chinese Air Force in Shanghai and Peking and stated that an offensive by the CCP against Taiwan was imminent. He also warned that if the CCP successfully occupied Taiwan, the Soviet Union might eventually use bases in Taiwan in a world war, which would pose a serious threat to U.S. military bases in Okinawa and the Philippines. In particular, if Soviet fighter jets attacked U.S. military bases in Okinawa from Taiwan, they would have 50% more combat time in the airspace of Okinawa and could carry 500 pounds more bombs than if they attacked from Shanghai. Consequently, he warned that unless the U.S. forces in Okinawa were considerably reinforced, Okinawa may be severely weakened and rendered unsuitable for use as a base of operations for B-29 strategic bombing due to its vulnerability to Soviet air offensives. This was a situation that could rock the very foundations of U.S. military war planning against the Soviet Union, which MacArthur himself acknowledged by suggesting that Communist acquisition of Taiwan would dramatically increase the Soviet threat to the military position of the United States in the West Pacific and force them to reconsider both the Far East Command and JCS emergency war plans. To counter this military threat, MacArthur suggested providing military aid to the KMT forces in Taiwan on the one hand, and considered a buildup of U.S. forces in Okinawa and the Philippines on the other. However, MacArthur's proposed solution was diplomatically irreconcilable with the U.S. government's continued position of non-intervention in Chinese affairs and militarily required the dispatch of more troops, which would be extremely difficult to achieve.²⁷

At this point, even though MacArthur had yet to acknowledge it, an alternative way to militarily support the U.S. military bases in Okinawa was to secure U.S. military bases in Japan following a peace treaty and engage in war against the Soviet Union through the network of bases in Okinawa and mainland Japan instead of those in Okinawa and the Philippines. This strategy would not necessarily require the buildup of U.S. forces that MacArthur demanded. Pursuing this strategy would also increase the possibility that strategic nuclear bombing campaigns would be launched against the Soviet Union from mainland Japan instead of Okinawa.

The Collapse of the Pacific Pact Proposals

The intervention of the Chinese military in the Korean War that started in November 1950, as well as its great victory in the war, led to much debate in the West, and especially between the United Kingdom and the United States, over its defense system in the entire Far East. One particularly heated point of debate between the United States and the British Commonwealth was the defense system surrounding the proposed Pacific Pact and ANZUS Treaty. In hindsight, the disagreement could be seen as a strategic tug-of-war between the

²⁷ CINCFE to DA (for JCS), C56410 (May 29, 1950), in Supporting Documents for Annex D to G-3 Section Command Report (1 January to 31 October 1950), Records of GHQ, FEC, SCAP & UNC, Military History Section, Command & Section Reports, 1949-52, TS, 1950, RG 554, Box 340, Folder #1731. MacArthur had also proposed providing aid to the KMT from a similar perspective in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense dated June 14, 1950. MacArthur to Johnson, "Memorandum on Formosa" (June 14, 1950), in Supporting Documents for Annex D to G-3 Section Command Report (1 January to 31 October 1950), Records of GHQ, FEC, SCAP & UNC, Military History Section, Command & Section Reports, 1949-52, TS, 1950, RG 554, Box 340, File #1731.

United Kingdom and the United States, the leaders of the Western Powers, over how to involve the other party in the area they were tasked with defending without becoming involved in the area that party was responsible for defending. Through 1951, it was known that in the event of all-out war against the Soviet Union (i.e., outbreak of World War III), the following division of regional responsibilities would take place between the United Kingdom and the United States. Both the United Kingdom and the United States would be responsible for the defense of Western Europe, with the Middle East the responsibility of the United Kingdom and the Far East that of the United States. However, the United States was practically responsible for only East Asia and the West Pacific in the Far East, and there was no formal division of responsibilities between the United Kingdom and the United States for Southeast Asia. Under such circumstances, it was important for the U.S. government and military to determine how to incorporate the military forces of members of the British Commonwealth into the defense of East Asia and the West Pacific, for which the United States was responsible, while simultaneously preventing U.S. forces from being drawn into the Middle East, for which the United Kingdom was responsible, and Southeast Asia, for which the United States was not officially responsible. Specifically, even though British Commonwealth forces were already fighting in Korea as part of the UN forces, further coordination was ideal in a situation where a quick solution to the problem of defending Japan was required. The U.S. military wanted a defense system in which both Australian and New Zealand forces could be deployed to defend mainland Japan, if possible.

However, the Pacific Pact, the equivalent of NATO for the Pacific, as initially envisioned by the U.S. government and military, was opposed by the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and even Japan, which eventually gave rise to the current hub-and-spokes alliance system of disparate military alliances. What is crucial is that the United Kingdom was adamant about creating a defense system that was compatible with the rebuilding of its Middle Eastern front, rather than creating a defense system for the Far East alone. Specifically, the United Kingdom continued to pursue a defense system that would allow both the Australian and New Zealand militaries to adopt a strategic posture in which their forces (primarily their ground forces) could be dispatched to the Middle Eastern front. Furthermore, unlike the U.S. government and military, Australia and New Zealand were not at all interested in fostering Japan as a major Western power; in fact, they were concerned that Japan might emerge as a new military threat alongside Communist China if it were to be rebuilt. In addition, while the Japanese government was comfortable with the idea of having U.S. forces stationed on mainland Japan as part of a collective security framework, it opposed the idea of allowing Australian and New Zealand forces to carry out military operations on mainland Japan. This was a far cry from the attitudes of Western European countries toward the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty in early 1949, and the circumstances were not conducive at all to creating a similar type of security framework.

Nevertheless, on January 12, 1951, before leaving for Tokyo, John F. Dulles, ambassador in charge of the peace treaty with Japan, submitted to Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador to Washington, a proposal to incorporate Japan's police reserve into a newly created Pacific collective security organization that would function as an army without having to amend the

Japanese Constitution, along with a characterization of peace negotiations with the Japanese government scheduled for the end of January. Dulles then argued that the United Kingdom should be a consultant of this Pacific collective security organization, instead of an official member. This was a statement that could have led to the elimination of the British sphere of influence and British influence in general in the Far East. Furthermore, he emphasized that this proposed framework would satisfy the restrictions on Japan's military power demanded by Australia and New Zealand. In other words, Dulles attempted to combine the rearmament of Japan with Pacific defense arrangements to achieve double containment, i.e., against both the Soviet Union and Japan, and through this, promote a peace treaty with Japan and preserve the Japanese constitution. This was in line with defense arrangements that were underway in Europe, namely the incorporation of West German ground forces into the framework of NATO, thereby depriving them of their character as the military forces of an independent nation. More importantly, under Dulles' Pacific Pact concept, both Australia and New Zealand would be incorporated into the United States' Pacific islands group defense strategy. The payoff of this arrangement for Australia and New Zealand was unclear, and Franks reported to his home country that Dulles did not mention what specific military guarantees Australia and New Zealand would receive in return.²⁸

In hindsight, Dulles' approach to the Pacific Pact was effectively a misguided policy that sought to "mercenaryize" the Japanese military force that was about to be rebuilt, which would not only jeopardize Japan's position amid political conflict during the Cold War but also hinder the development of a "security community" between Japan and the United States in the worst possible way. Moreover, although a sense of trust had been fostered between Japan and the United States at both the governmental and private-sector levels through occupation, Japan was still regarded as a former enemy by the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, and it was impossible for these countries to immediately regard Japan as an ally. As Dulles and U.S. Department of State officials began to negotiate the Pacific Pact, they were confronted with this wall of public opinion in the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. International politics is thus a curious thing, given that it was not direct opposition to this misguided policy but rather other political considerations and the wall of public opinion that gradually destroyed it. This eventually led to the formation of the three alliances and, ironically, an even greater reliance on the development of a "security community" between Japan and the United States.

The British feared that a U.S.-led Pacific Pact would completely sideline the United Kingdom in the Pacific. Thus, the British Foreign Office swiftly responded to the Dulles proposal, and in a letter to the COS dated January 24, requested that the proposal be studied and reviewed immediately. The Foreign Office believed that the proposal was still in the draft stage, and if the British moved quickly, it could be modified to become more aligned with British interests. In response to this request, the Joint Staff Planners (JP; a subordinate body of the COS and a key body responsible for the planning and execution of military operations) completed a report that objected to the Dulles proposal on January 26 and presented it at a COS meeting on January 29. The report expressed concern that the Dulles proposal would

²⁸ Washington to Foreign Office, No. 129 (January 12, 1951), PREM 8/1404.

draw Australia and New Zealand into the defense of East Asia and preclude the contribution of Australian and New Zealand forces to the defense of the Middle East, which was of paramount importance to the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the report outlined other reasons for its opposition, including a statement of pride that the United Kingdom should remain a Pacific power and an emphasis on colonies and countries in Southeast Asia. Specifically, first, if the United Kingdom were to take up the role of a consultant under the Dulles proposal, it could give the world the impression that the United Kingdom would cease its participation in and withdraw from the Pacific, which may jeopardize its position as a world power politically, as well as create the impression that the United Kingdom and the United States were decoupling and cause political unrest in Hong Kong and Malaya. Second, the exclusion of countries on the Asian continent could lead to invasion of Malaya, Indochina, Burma, and Thailand by the communists (i.e., China). Third, Australian and New Zealand forces could be deployed to other fronts (i.e., Japan and others) that were not of vital importance (i.e., the Middle East) under the Dulles proposal. Fourth, it would be premature to involve as many countries as in the Dulles proposal, given the current situation in which the Asian countries could not agree on a regional defense treaty. Still, the JP recognized the strengths of the Dulles proposal, including the fact that it would ensure the security of Australia and New Zealand through the power of the U.S. Navy, that it would serve as the first step toward a future regional defense treaty, that it would counter international criticism of U.S. imperialism, and that it would facilitate inspections of Japan without requiring an amendment of the Japanese constitution. However, in addition to the four reasons for opposition outlined above, the Dulles proposal also unduly neglected the impact on Southeast Asian countries on the Asian continent amid concerns of a possible Chinese invasion of Southeast Asia. In other words, while the United States had much to gain under the Dulles proposal, the United Kingdom could face not only a setback in their defense of the Middle East but also greater risks in Southeast Asia. The report further stated that under the Dulles proposal, the defense treaty could become a framework that was imposed on Japan, and from the viewpoint of ensuring healthy relations between Japan and the Western Powers going forward, it would be desirable to separate the bilateral defense treaty between Japan and the United States from the peace treaty with Japan. The United Kingdom, in its own way, viewed the creation of a “security community” with Japan with great importance. At the COS meeting on January 29, R.H. Scott, a representative of the British Foreign Office who was allowed to attend the meeting, thanked the COS for its prompt response and expressed strong support for the proposal to separate the U.S.-Japan bilateral defense treaty from the peace treaty with Japan as well as for the first reason for opposition (that efforts should be made to prevent the United Kingdom from being sidelined in the Pacific). On the other hand, J.J. Paskin, a representative of the Colonial Office, criticized the report for its inconsistent position on a future regional defense treaty. As a result, even though attendees at the meeting acknowledged the significance of the Dulles proposal as a first step toward fostering a long-term regional defense treaty system, opposition was dominant. It was also agreed upon at the meeting that a summary of the report would be handed to Dulles, who was already visiting Japan at the time, through Sir Alvary Gascoigne, head of the British liaison mission in Tokyo. Gascoigne handed the summary to Dulles on February 2. The summary stated that, among other things,

the exclusion of the United Kingdom from the Pacific under the Dulles proposal would create the impression that the United Kingdom would withdraw from the region and cause unrest and upheaval in Hong Kong, Malaya, and other parts of Southeast Asia. Dulles' proposed Pacific Pact ultimately only served as the catalyst for the creation of the first Western alliance network in the Far East, with the British and U.S. governments and militaries subsequently taking the lead in adopting an alliance system and establishing Western alliances in the Far East that took into account the strategic and military situation in the world at large.²⁹

In creating the first Western alliance network in the Far East, Japan also indicated its opposition as a party despite having a smaller voice. The U.S.-Japan talks led by Dulles and Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida that were already underway in Tokyo also seemed to have had a certain impact. At a meeting on February 1, 1951, John M. Allison, U.S. envoy to Tokyo, suggested to the Japanese that the U.S. was considering the idea of collective security in the Pacific similar in form to the North Atlantic Treaty. Major General Carter B. Magruder, Special Assistant for Occupied Areas in the Office of the Secretary of the Army, who was also present, asked whether the Japanese would accept the stationing of the military forces of other countries alongside U.S. forces, with both Australian and New Zealand forces in mind. The Japanese, however, were not interested in the idea of collective security in the Pacific and wanted a security relationship only between Japan and the United States, and responded that the Japanese people strongly desired the presence of U.S. forces only. However, after Gascoigne handed over the summary of the views of the British, the U.S. no longer attempted to actively encourage the Japanese to enter the Pacific collective security framework. It is impossible to determine the exact time Gascoigne handed over this summary on February 2, but at the U.S.-Japan talks on the same day, the U.S. only presented the proposal for a U.S.-Japan bilateral defense treaty to the Japanese. In any case, Dulles' concept of collective security in the Pacific was no doubt met with resistance from both Japan and the United Kingdom.³⁰

At the time, the Japanese government had been pursuing participation in the West and the full restoration of sovereignty with regard to a general security framework beyond rearmament, but it perceived the Dulles proposal as a proposal for Japanese control by the Western Powers (see my book for details of the Japanese response). The preliminary draft used by the Japanese government in its negotiations with the Dulles Mission (the so-called "Plan D" (revised version)) essentially stated that Japan's basic policy with regard to security was to join the Western Powers to oppose the Soviets and that its basic policy with regard to the peace treaty was the full restoration of sovereignty. This preliminary draft stated that Japan did not desire formal rearmament for the time being, citing as reasons Japan's anti-war sentiment, priority on economic recovery, and fear of re-invasion by neighboring countries (although the draft mentioned a security force). In connection with this, on January 23, 1951, Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials and former ambassador to Italy Masayoshi Hotta studied recent

²⁹ "Pacific Defence Pact: Copy of a Letter dated 24th January, 1951 from the Foreign Office to the Secretary Chiefs of Staff Committee," COS (51) 40 (January 25, 1951), DEFE 5/27; JP (51) 14 (Final) (January 26, 1951), DEFE 4/39; "Item 2: Pacific Defence Council," Confidential Annex to COS (51) 21st Mtg. (January 29, 1951), DEFE 4/39; *FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, Part 1*, pp. 143-144.

³⁰ See my book, *Nihon saigunbi he no michi [The Road to Japan's Rearmament]*, pp. 411-412.

world reports related to Japan's security and reaffirmed the policy of not allowing any form of surveillance force against Japan following the peace treaty in order for Japan to achieve the full restoration of sovereignty. Specifically, one example was the vague timing referenced by the clause "until Japan is able to defend itself" which the United States wanted to insert into the U.S.-Japan bilateral defense treaty, which could lead to the "permanent stationing of troops." The second was a proposal among British Commonwealth countries to allow Japan to possess a certain level of military capability but to stipulate in the peace treaty a "surveillance" mechanism for verifying its limits and compliance status, which was unacceptable for an "autonomous and independent" country. Third, the Japanese were opposed to a collective security framework such as the "Pacific Alliance" as this could be directed not only against the Soviet Union but also against Japan as a "surveillance force" through the introduction of arrangements aimed at preventing the re-invasion of Japan. Japan had thus been opposed to a Pacific Pact even before Dulles presented it.³¹

As the British COS and Foreign Office continued to voice their opposition to the Dulles proposal, the COS invited Permanent Secretary of the Australian Defence Department Sir Frederick Shedden to their meeting on January 31, 1951, where First Sea Lord (FSL) Lord Fraser himself asserted that the Chinese threat in Southeast Asia was not a problem because the ocean protected the Australian continent geographically, and if a world war or other crisis were to break out, Australia could dispatch its ground and air forces to the Middle East in accordance with the U.S.-British Commonwealth war plan with peace of mind. The British military was desperately trying to establish a defense on its Middle Eastern front amid a possible world war. It was prepared to sacrifice part of the Far Eastern front in order to save the Middle Eastern front, and it was also determined to make sure that the key Dominions of Australia and New Zealand were aware of this. Just prior to these remarks, Shedden had complained to the Australian public about his concern that the threat to Southeast Asia could eventually spill over to Australia, and that without more formal military planning cooperation with the United States, he was unsure if Australia should commit its forces to defending the Middle East at the risk of its own defense. Objectively speaking, the Australians had two diplomatic bargaining chips at the time to push for a military treaty with the United States: the rearmament of Japan and China's invasion of Southeast Asia. In this sense, from the perspective of the British, the defense of the Middle East, one of the key elements for the defense of the British Empire in a world war, would be insecure if they could neither counter the Dulles proposal nor handle the Chinese military threat. The British was struggling to defend its empire in the face of a limited war against China and the possible outbreak of a world war in the event of a Soviet invasion of Japan. In fact, British and Australian military leaders had held secret discussions earlier (probably around the end of 1950) without the permission of the Australian government regarding the issue of dispatching Australian forces to the Middle East, and in January 1951, British government ministers were given a confidential orientation at the Commonwealth

³¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Nihon gaiko bunsho — heiwa joyaku no teiketsu ni kansuru chosho dai 1 satsu (I-III)* [*Japan's diplomatic documents: Records related to the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, Vol. 1 (I-III)*] (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2002), pp. 632-634. See my book, *Nihon saigunbi he no michi* [*The Road to Japan's Rearmament*], pp. 374-387.

Prime Ministers' Conference in Colombo so that the discussions would not be exposed.³²

On the other hand, the war situation in Korea started taking a turn for the better for the British and U.S. forces in late January 1951. The Chinese supply lines that were exposed to British and U.S. air offensives were no longer functioning properly, and the speed of the Chinese southward advance was visibly slowing down, with a large number of Chinese officers and soldiers having been lost to frostbite and disease. The morale of the UN forces, especially the U.S. forces, improved with this. As a result, the Pandora's box of a Chinese invasion of Southeast Asia was no longer in immediate danger of being opened. In order to stabilize the situation in Korea and avoid escalation into a Chinese-led war in the Far East, the British government and military began studying ways to resolve the military issues on the Korean Peninsula. In a letter dated January 31, the British Foreign Office requested the COS to study what kind of military situation would be desirable on the Korean Peninsula in the event that the Chinese did not agree to a ceasefire, including the possibility of an invasion north of the 38th parallel. The COS and the JP completed the new study on February 6. In the study, the COS responded to the Foreign Office that after eliminating the options of securing a bridgehead in Manchuria and invading from the Sino-Korean border, they were left with two fronts that could be secured in two bottleneck regions of the Korean Peninsula, namely the area around Pyongyang and the area around Seoul and Incheon, the latter of which being the more desirable front from the standpoint of defense due to the advantages it offered for air operations against China. The COS was also opposed to crossing the 38th parallel again, as doing so would make negotiations with China even more difficult. On the other hand, in its February 8 study, the JP feared that the imposition of economic sanctions against China would lead to the withdrawal of British Commonwealth countries in Asia from their cooperation in anti-communist policies. The JP was also concerned that a "worst-case scenario" could see Chinese forces invade Hong Kong, Indochina, Burma, Thailand, and Malaya, and that the need for a buildup of military forces for the sanctions could result in a situation that would require further mobilization of UN forces, which would destabilize the global Anglo-American strategic framework. Furthermore, the JP stated in the study that a direct attack on Hong Kong by Chinese forces would lead to all-out war against China, and as long as there were inadequate troops to defend Hong Kong, a decision would have to be made whether to withdraw or fight to the last man. This situation was akin to walking a tightrope as far as the British military was concerned. On the other hand, with regard to the defense of Malaya, the COS decided at the February 2 meeting that in the event of a Chinese military threat to Malaya from the north, it would be assumed that the British would occupy Thailand at the invitation of the Thai government or at their sole discretion to secure the Songkhla position in Thai territory. Representative Scott of the British Foreign Office also suggested dispatching a small force of British troops to Bangkok in the event of a French defeat in Indochina or an internal or external communist threat to Burma so that it would be easier for Thailand to accept its *de facto* occupation by British forces. It was clear that in the event of either a war against China

³² "Item 1: Meeting with Sir Frederick Shedden," Confidential Annex to COS (51) 22nd Mtg. (January 31, 1951), DEFE 4/39; SAC (50) 1st Mtg. (January 2, 1950), CAB 134/670. See Chapter 6 of my book, *Nihon saigunbi he no michi [The Road to Japan's Rearmament]*.

or a world war, the successful defense of Malaya by British forces alone would effectively make it easier for Australia and New Zealand, especially Australia, to take on commitments to defend the Middle East.³³

While the British government and military wanted the cooperation of both Australia and New Zealand in the defense of the Middle East and Southeast Asia, they also wanted the U.S. defense guarantees for Australia and New Zealand to be as limited as possible, both in terms of member countries and the scope of the guarantees. This was because the more limited the guarantees were, the less likely Australia and New Zealand would be drawn into the United States' defense of the Pacific. A VCOS-level COS meeting (led by the Vice Chiefs of Staff of the various services) held on February 16 was attended by representatives from the Foreign Office, Colonial Office, and Commonwealth Relations Office to discuss the proposal advanced by the U.S. Department of State. Following the meeting, the attendees approved a letter to the High Commissioners to Australia and New Zealand requesting that, if possible, the agreement be limited to simple defense guarantees of Australia and New Zealand by the United States in time of war, instead of a treaty. It further ordered that if that was not possible, the second-best option would be a tripartite pact between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, but if that was also impossible and the proposal had to include Japan and the Philippines as suggested by U.S. envoy Allison, the United Kingdom's participation should be sought. The second-best option of a U.S.-Australia-NZ tripartite pact was subsequently discussed at a VCOS-level COS meeting on February 26, where Sir Nevil Brownjohn, Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff, stated that the proposed treaty would not undermine Australia and New Zealand's commitments in the Middle East but instead encourage Australia and New Zealand to contribute their forces to the defense of the Middle East because their defense would be guaranteed by the United States. However, he also argued that the proposed treaty should not contain any provision for the advance defensive deployment of Australian and New Zealand forces in the Pacific region. Brownjohn feared that the United States would use Australian and New Zealand forces to defend the Pacific, including Japan, thereby making hollow the commitments between the United Kingdom and Australia/New Zealand regarding the defense of the Middle East, which were not governed by a treaty. Representative Scott of the British Foreign Office supported Brownjohn's stance, pointing out that the proposed treaty was so loose that there was no danger of the Pacific siphoning off the two countries' troops that would be dispatched to the Middle East, and that the treaty would instead be useful for both the Australian and New Zealand governments in overcoming the political challenge of dispatching troops to the Middle East at a time when the Pacific was under threat. In addition, in order to

³³ "Copy of a Letter dated 31st January, 1951 from the Foreign Office to the Secretary Chiefs of Staff committee," COS (51) 51 (February 1, 1951); COS (51) 57 (February 6, 1951), DEFE 5/27. At the February 5 meeting, the COS ordered the JP to consider the following four issues: (1) the possibility of a significant expansion of North Korean forces and the withdrawal of Chinese forces from Korea; (2) responding to the United States' suggestion of possibly mobilizing KMT forces; (3) studying the contributions of countries that had not yet deployed troops to Korea; and (4) the possibility of fully entrusting the defense of South Korea to the Korean military in the event that Chinese forces withdraw from North Korea. COS (51) 24th Mtg. (February 5, 1951), DEFE 4/40; JP (51) 25 (Final) (February 8, 1951), DEFE 4/40; "Item 4: Preparations for the Defence of Malaya," Confidential Annex to COS (51) 23rd Mtg. (February 2, 1951), DEFE 4/39.

strengthen commitments in the Middle East, Scott proposed that during negotiations with the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, the British government should put on record its hope that the proposed treaty would never transcend the global strategy currently accepted by all the four countries. Scott's proposal was supported not only by the COS but also by the representatives from the Commonwealth Relations Office who were present at the meeting. The attendees were also unanimous in their opposition to the participation of the Philippines and other countries. The COS's position at the meeting was reported to the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office on February 27, with the added warning that the COS recognized the danger in this U.S.-Australia-NZ treaty that the attention of Australia and New Zealand could be shifted from the defense of the Middle East to the defense of the Pacific.³⁴

At the same time that the British government and military were attempting to somehow utilize the defense arrangements between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand for the defense of the British Empire, they also decided to inform the U.S. that the peace treaty with Japan should not contain any restrictive clauses regarding the rearmament of Japan. For the British, it was more important to first initiate the rearmament of Japan than to iron out the actual details. This was because the rearmament of Japan would reduce pressure on the United States to incorporate Australian and New Zealand military power into the defense of the Pacific. At the COS meeting on February 26, 1951, Representative Scott of the British Foreign Office suggested a settlement in this direction, while hoping that the U.S. would suggest restrictions on Japan's rearmament that the British wanted to impose (a defensive ground force and small, defensive naval and air forces) in the U.S.-Japan defense treaty and that Japan would voluntarily observe these restrictions. A memorandum regarding the restrictions on the rearmament of Japan approved by the COS in December 1950 was submitted to the JCS through Lord Tedder, Chief of Joint Staff Mission (JSM) in Washington D.C., and it was agreed that the matter would be discussed between the United Kingdom and the United States as soon as possible. These restrictions were no longer terms imposed on the former enemy state of Japan but rather provisions that the United Kingdom and the United States were requesting Japan to observe as an ally in order to address the concerns of British Commonwealth countries in Asia, especially Australia and New Zealand. It should be said that the United Kingdom, a leader of the global West alongside the United States, was in favor of Japan becoming an ally and rearming Japan, and it adopted the stance of leveraging Japan's overall total war capabilities in a possible war against the Soviet Union.³⁵

At the same time, the British attempted to convince Australia and New Zealand that the rearmament of Japan did not pose any serious threat and there was no need for a U.S.-Australia-NZ treaty that gave too many concessions to the U.S. in return. At a meeting with Percy C. Spender, Australian Minister for External Affairs and for External Territories, on February 14 and 15, 1951, Sir Maberly Esler Denning, Chief of Far Eastern Division, said that

³⁴ COS (51) 32nd Mtg. (February 16, 1951); "Annex II: Copy of agreed draft telegram from C.R.O. to U.K. High Commissioner, Canberra repeated U.K. High Commissioner, Wellington, Singapore and Saving to Washington, Tokyo and Manila"; COS (51) 37th Mtg. (February 26, 1951), DEFE 4/40; COS, "Untitled" (February 27, 1951), FO 371/92071.

³⁵ COS (51) 37th Mtg. (February 26, 1951), DEFE 4/40.

although he understood the desire of Australia and New Zealand for some kind of security assurance from the U.S., they should reconsider whether a pact to which Japan might be a party in the future was a good idea. According to Denning, Japan was more vulnerable to attack by China and the Soviet Union than Australia and New Zealand, and if Japan became involved in such a treaty, Australia and New Zealand would be unable to fulfill their other responsibilities (in the Middle East). Furthermore, with regard to the Japanese threat, Denning indicated that the threat posed by the People's Republic of China was more serious and that even Japan itself could no longer ignore China's threat as he attempted to allay the fears of Australia and New Zealand over the Japanese threat. With regard to the defense of the Middle East, Spender said that he understood Australia's responsibilities in the Middle East, which the United States had also acknowledged. Denning responded by saying he did not think so. The British was thus attempting to use Australia and New Zealand directly, and even Japan indirectly, to achieve their goal of bolstering the defense of the Middle East.³⁶

On the other hand, in order to prevent a world war from being sparked by U.S. recklessness in the Korean War, the British military prepared the document COS (51) 106 (dated February 27, 1951), in which it did not include a direct Soviet attack on Japan in the list of "circumstances which at present seem to justify the launching of full-scale atomic war," i.e., *casus belli* for starting a war. The British military refused to regard a Soviet invasion of Japan as grounds for starting World War III at the time. Moreover, the COS even intended to make the U.S. adopt this policy. The British military considered a Soviet attack on the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, other NATO countries, West Germany, Austria (excluding Vienna), and Turkey as circumstances that would unconditionally justify starting a war, as well as an attack on Greece if no other means were available, and "possibly" an attack on Berlin. Thus, the British military did not initially have a "stop line," which combined grounds for starting a war with geographical lines, in the Far East.³⁷

From the perspective of the COS, all-out war against the Soviet Union meant Soviet nuclear attacks that would pose an immediate threat to the survival of the United Kingdom and the large-scale devastation of Western Europe. They had grown frustrated at the idea of achieving major victory through the mass use of nuclear weapons without deploying major ground forces in Western Europe, a strategy much touted by U.S. public opinion. At the same time, the COS had determined in February 1951 that Soviet forces did not have the capability to invade Japan in view of U.S. naval and air power. Rather, they believed it was vital to persuade the United States not to use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union as the United States viewed China and the Soviet Union as a monolithic entity and was seeking to thwart China's military incursions. The British military was convinced that China was not a satellite state of the Soviet Union.³⁸

At the Staff Conference (typically a consultation between the Cabinet's Defence Committee members and COS members) on March 6, 1951, British Prime Minister Clement

³⁶ U.K. High Commissioner in Australia to U.K. High Commissioners in New Zealand and South Africa, Commissioner General Singapore, and Washington, No. 96 (February 15, 1951), FO 371/92071.

³⁷ COS (51) 106 (February 27, 1951), DEFE 20/2.

³⁸ Ibid.

R. Attlee agreed with the COS and stated that the United States should not have a monopoly on decisions to use nuclear weapons or on the right to give ultimatums. (For Attlee, however, these decisions belonged exclusively to the United Kingdom and the United States and should not be shared with other NATO countries.) British Ambassador to Washington Sir Oliver Franks promptly submitted COS (51) 106 to the U.S. two weeks later and suggested that Secretary of State Acheson, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall, and if possible, Director of the Mutual Security Agency W. Averell Harriman be involved in the discussion. The Staff Conference approved the proposal, and Attlee ordered the Ambassador to the United States to work on gaining U.S. acceptance of the approach outlined in the document. According to U.S. records, the document was discussed on May 4 by Air Marshal Sir John Slessor, Chief of Staff of the Royal Air Force; Paul Nitze, Chief of Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State; and H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Under-Secretary of State. Nitze was quick to point out that Japan was not included in the grounds for starting a war. Slessor dodged the issue by saying that he would give further consideration to this problem. A little later, Franks and Sir Roger Makins of the British Foreign Office submitted a request to Nitze and Matthews on May 12 for the U.S. to start studying COS (51) 106. Franks subsequently showed the document to Acheson, while Air Vice-Marshal Sir William Elliot, Chairman of the British Joint Services Mission, discussed the document over lunch with Slessor, Nitze, and Minister of Embassy Sir Christopher Steel. Elliot also presented Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff and General of the Army Omar N. Bradley with a short summary of the history of this document and expressed hope that the JCS would study it accordingly and submit the results to the British.³⁹

In fact, a study on the issue of grounds for starting a war was already underway within the U.S. government. Carlton Savage of the Policy Planning Staff had prepared a study paper (dated April 12, 1951) on the circumstances under which nuclear weapons should be used in a war against the Soviet Union. Unlike the British, he adopted the position that the issue was not whether to use nuclear weapons, but whether the Soviet Union was taking military action with the intention of all-out war. Therefore, he argued that if the Soviet Union attacked a U.S. territory, a NATO member country, Berlin, Vienna, Greece, or Japan with the express intention of starting an all-out war, the United States should start an all-out war. However, there was a strong suggestion that the United States should keep conflict as localized as possible with regard to the invasion of Japan and large-scale intervention in the Korean War, and only if this was impossible should the United States engage in all-out war. The possibility of conflict localization depended on the balance of military power between the Soviets and the West in the Far East, which included Japan's military power: "In case of a Soviet attack on Japan or an overt Soviet attack upon U.S. forces in Korea, the United States undoubtedly would react by taking military action against the Soviet Union. Whether we would attack Soviet forces and territory in the Far East alone, in order to keep the conflict localized, or [attack them] in Europe as well, would depend on the circumstances of the time. If we should feel there was a

³⁹ COS (51) 42nd Mtg. (March 6, 1951); COS (51) 50th Mtg. (March 20, 1951), DEFE 20/1. For U.S. records, see *FRUS, 1951, Vol. I*, p. 826. "Record of Conversation" attached to "Copy of a letter dated 18th May, 1951 from Sir Oliver Franks to Sir Roger Makins" in COS (51) 311 (May 28, 1951); Elliot to Lt. Gen. Sir Kenneth McLean (May 22, 1951), DEFE 20/1.

possibility of keeping the conflict localized we would probably not use the atomic weapons; [if no such possibility exists], we almost certainly would [use the atomic weapons].” Savage maintained that the United States should not initiate all-out war against the Soviet Union as a result of other problems in the Far East, nor should it aggressively pursue the use of nuclear weapons. For example, he argued that the U.S. policy should be conflict localization even if China attacked the U.S. forces deployed around Taiwan or if China launched large-scale tactical bombing campaigns against the U.S. forces in Korea. The only case that would lead to all-out war in relation to China was if the limited military action taken by the United States in response to Chinese military action triggered the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty and led to large-scale Soviet intervention, and even then, the United States should attempt to localize conflict.⁴⁰

Savage adopted the position that the United States and the United Kingdom did not necessarily need to be aligned on the issues of grounds for starting a war and the use of nuclear weapons: “In discussions with the British we must make no commitments restricting the freedom of the United States to use atomic weapons whenever we consider their use necessary. In turn, we can expect no British commitment, beyond [the commitments] contained in the Atlantic Treaty, to [definitely] go to war with us against the Soviet Union in future contingencies.” In other words, the United States and the United Kingdom were free to act as they saw fit beyond the scope of the provisions of the Atlantic Treaty, and they would jointly engage in war only if they could find common ground. One could go as far as to say that a split between the United States and the United Kingdom was inevitable outside of the question of Europe.⁴¹

It might be useful to analyze the situation from a macro perspective. The United Kingdom’s concern was that the United States, which had suffered a historic defeat following a major Chinese military intervention in the Korean War from November 1950 to the first half of January 1951, would casually resort to nuclear war or start responding immaturely to the threat of a world war against the Soviet Union from around April 1951 out of sheer inexperience, thereby sparking a world war. Moreover, Ernest Bevin, the competent and influential British Foreign Secretary, died suddenly on April 14, 1951, resulting in a weakening of the Labour Party government’s foundation. Could it therefore be said that the United Kingdom, as an equal partner of the United States in the worldwide Western alliance network, was desperate to restrain U.S. recklessness? In terms of preventing the outbreak of nuclear war and world war, the United Kingdom did not yet possess atomic bombs during the period from the end of 1950 to 1951 (the United Kingdom only became nuclear-armed in 1952), which was only five years away from the arrival of strategic bomber forces comprising medium-sized jets, its decisive card in a nuclear war against the Soviet Union. Indeed, the United Kingdom had the world’s most powerful interception system at the time, so the Tu-4, a Soviet-manufactured strategic bomber that was a copy of the B-29, could not easily drop an atomic bomb on London, but the possibility of such a strike was not zero. Due to its limited range of operation, the Tu-4 was incapable of shuttle bombing between the continental United States and continental Europe. The United Kingdom also feared that the United States, confused by the successes of

⁴⁰ *FRUS, 1951, Vol. I*, pp. 814-820. Cited passage on p. 819.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 820.

Communist China, would shelve the Western Powers' existing policy of focusing on Europe and the Middle East and simply turn its attention to the Far East. The United Kingdom's emphasis was on striking a balance. Indeed, while China's successes must be acknowledged, the United Kingdom also recognized that China had certain limitations both militarily and politically, and it believed that the West should not overreact and hand the Chinese and Soviets a further advantage. Another fear was that the United States might easily respond in a misguided way to the immediate threat of China by turning Japan into a powerful nation in a short period of time and creating a new threat in Japan. It must be pointed out, however, that the British had no solution that amounted to a trump card in the Far East. The same was true in the world at large.

Opposition to the United States' Concept of a Pacific Pact from the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, and the United Kingdom's Approach to Undermining the Concept

The Pacific Pact as conceptualized and advanced by the United States, especially Dulles, was met with general disapproval from the Pacific countries that were supposed to be involved from the start. This opposition was not limited to the United Kingdom alone. However, while the opposition of the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, which had been expected to be involved from the start, seemed more muted than that of the United Kingdom, these countries' opposition drew from a deep distrust of Japan. At the same time, they were attempting to achieve some form of reciprocity and mutual respect, if not equality, in their relations with the United States.

On February 12, 1951, an energetic Dulles met with Philippine President Elpidio Quirino in Manila to explain his concept of a Pacific Pact. President Quirino, however, was unmoved by the idea. At the meeting, Dulles explained the Pacific islands defense line from the Aleutians to Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Australia/New Zealand, and mentioned the possibility of incorporating Indonesia into this line, asking Quirino if he thought it would be possible to achieve this under a security arrangement with Indonesia. This was because Indonesian President Soekarno had visited Manila just prior to this meeting. In response, Quirino said, "Indonesia will be slow to make a definite commitment to the cause of the anti-Communist world." In short, he suggested that Indonesia would not be on board. Furthermore, at this point, Quirino mentioned the Baguio Conference that took place in May 1950 before the outbreak of the Korean War and pointed out that priority should be given to activities in the economic and cultural fields in order to gain the understanding of Southeast Asia and the Pacific countries, even going as far as to say that "it might not be necessary to take military steps at present." The Philippines, in reality, appeared to be suggesting that it was opposed to the concept of a Pacific Pact. However, the record of this meeting mentioned that Quirino indicated a "definite interest" in "some form of Pacific security pact" without specifying when such a pact would be concluded.⁴²

According to W. David McIntyre, a historian with expertise in Australia and New

⁴² *FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, Part 1*, pp. 152-154.

Zealand, Dulles was dealt a further blow when Australian Minister for External Affairs Spender and New Zealand Minister of External Affairs Frederick Doidge argued against a Pacific Pact and for prioritizing a U.S.-Australia-NZ defense treaty at the U.S.-Australia-NZ negotiations held in Canberra from February 15 to 18, 1951. At the February 15 meeting, Spender said at the outset that Australia's concern was the lack of restrictions on the rearmament of Japan under the peace treaty with Japan, and that Australia could not make any military contributions outside of Malaya and the Pacific (mainly a reference to the Middle East) unless the future threat posed by Japan was eliminated. Doidge, slightly confusingly, mentioned a NATO-style treaty before indicating that his preferred outcome was a U.S.-Australia-NZ tripartite pact while opposing a treaty that combined Australia/New Zealand with Japan and the Philippines. Dulles presented his understanding of international perceptions and reiterated that Japan no longer posed a threat, and that China and the Soviet Union would not resort to a world war unless they could incorporate Germany and Japan. He then noted that Japan did not currently possess any local defense capabilities because of the Korean War but pointed out that the United States intended to incorporate Japan as a major Western power. He also said that the United States was trying to create a "screen of force" in which the U.S. troops stationed in Japan and the Philippines could serve as a screen between Australia/New Zealand and China/Soviet Union. The conversation went on a little further, with Doidge using the metaphor of guarding the front door and unlocking the back door to describe the issue of New Zealand's military commitment to the Middle Eastern front and the United Kingdom's concerns about a Pacific Pact. Spender also mentioned the responsibility of the Australian military to dispatch its forces to the Middle East. Dulles stated again that he feared a backlash from the Philippines if a U.S.-Australia-NZ treaty that excluded the Philippines was introduced, made remarks that could be interpreted as opposition to a U.S.-Australia-NZ treaty, and even said that he preferred an informal security arrangement to a regional security treaty. At this point, Doidge indicated that New Zealand would accept a U.S. presidential proclamation, but Spender stated that Australia strongly insisted on a formal treaty. In any case, the day's developments unfolded in a manner that was threatening to bring about a breakdown of negotiations between Dulles, Spender, and Doidge. Given this situation, Spender briefed the Australian Cabinet on the problem that evening and sought their wisdom and views on the matter. At the briefing, Spender said that he wanted to pursue U.S. commitment to the defense of Australia and safeguard Australia's voice in the West as a whole, and that a U.S.-Australia-NZ tripartite pact was therefore his ultimate objective. However, Australian Prime Minister Robert G. Menzies asked Spender to put on the brakes and proceed with negotiations with the understanding that the defense of Australia should take precedence over other objectives. Other members of the Cabinet also seemed somewhat hesitant, and the overall mood in the Cabinet was that there should be a U.S. presidential proclamation at the very least, and anything else beyond that would be up to Spender.⁴³

Thus, at the February 16 meeting, a resolute Spender mentioned the Australian Cabinet's

⁴³ W. David McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact: Policy-Making, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1945-55* (NY, St. Martin, 1995), pp. 316-318.

discussion and decision on the evening of the previous day (February 15) and pressed Dulles on providing clear security guarantees to Australia by the United States as an alternative, given that the forthcoming peace treaty with Japan would not contain a no-rearmament clause based on the memorandum submitted by the U.S. He then continued by saying the Cabinet noted that “[Australia’s defense] obligations in the Middle East” were a precondition for proceeding with the conclusion of a U.S.-Australia treaty, as if to demand that Australia be given due respect for its contribution to the West as a whole. The Australian Minister for External Affairs then reported that at the previous evening’s Cabinet meeting, Australian Prime Minister Menzies said that “he could not believe that the United States would leave Australia without adequate security guarantees while imposing no restrictions on Japanese rearmament.” Spender went on to say, “A tri-partite arrangement of the United States, Australia and New Zealand seemed best to Australia, but if a stalemate developed [in negotiations] over the feasibility of this [arrangement] or alternative arrangements the [Australian] Government could not approve a [peace treaty with Japan] permitting unrestricted Japanese rearmament.” Spender was pushing for a U.S.-Australia-NZ treaty by holding hostage the peace treaty with Japan, not the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. It could also be said that Spender was attempting to make the U.S.-Australia-NZ treaty a reality by holding hostage the fostering of Japan as a major Western power, a goal of the United States. Spender’s move served as a powerful threat.⁴⁴

Spender did not stop there. He went on to criticize the lack of respect given to Australia, a reference to the operation of the entire organization of the Western Powers. His goal was to strengthen Australia’s position in the West as a whole.

“No one could challenge the fact that when [the previous world] war broke out, Australia was immediate in it with all its forces, but Australians [now] feel that they have no say in discussions affecting their country’s security. Australia has no say in the North Atlantic Treaty organization. [Australia] is not a party to any continuous consultative security arrangements, and accordingly has no capacity to influence events which greatly affect Australia. If [Australia] is to discharge its obligations [during a world war] there must be some continuous mode of consultation [in which Australia has a voice],” he said.

It was unclear to what extent Spender had understood the direction of the Western Powers under the leadership of the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada, but he at least understood that Australia’s position in the West had not reached the level of NATO, and he wanted to leverage the U.S.-Australia-NZ treaty to strengthen its position. This was a maverick move that was removed from the stance of the Australian Cabinet as whole.⁴⁵

With regard to his opposition, Spender explained in detail why Australia could not ignore the Japanese rearmament restrictions clause and asserted that the current Australian administration would not survive parliamentary and public opinion in the absence of defense guarantees for Australia by the United States. He highlighted the following three possible dangers that might arise from not introducing any restrictions on rearmament in the peace treaty with Japan, which were divorced from the political reality in Japan.

⁴⁴ *FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, Part 1*, pp. 156-157.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 157.

1. *The possibility of the Communists gaining control of Japan*—Australia saw the need to attract Japan to the side of the free world. But doing this has dangers against which we must be prepared.
2. *Economic factors*—Various of these had been cited by Ambassador Dulles the previous day, arising essentially from the problem of how Japan is to be kept economically on our side.
3. *The danger that Japan and China might find it easier to get together than Japan and the western world.*” (italics in original)

In reality, the Japanese Communist Party was virtually split and in decline in Japan at the time, and there was almost a *de facto* cutting of diplomatic relations between Japan and China. Should it then be said that Australian politicians and public opinion could not undergo a “change of heart” quickly enough to accept Japan, a former enemy, as an ally in its own security only five or six years after the Pacific War? Indeed, it would have been surprising if they could.⁴⁶

Nevertheless, the Australian government had to explain to the Australian parliament and public that the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was premised on Japan becoming a military power, which was something they had to accept. This was a British-style democratic government. Spender, who was also a politician, explained that the government could lose power if it failed to present a policy behind the treaties that would satisfy the parliament and the public: “In short, Mr. Spender stated, we (the Australian administration) have felt that if we were to go to the people and the Parliament, and say that we must approve a Japanese treaty of the type desired by the United States, without a corollary security arrangement for Australia, it would mean political oblivion for our party. So we are seeking a formal arrangement.” The U.S. government and military became aware of the constraints imposed by Australia’s democracy. Japan was no longer deemed a former enemy for the United States, but the same could not be said for the Australian parliament and public. New Zealand Minister of External Affairs Doidge stated that New Zealand also shared Australia’s opinion. From the perspective of the U.S., this could be seen as the moment when it realized that a credible treaty for the defense of Australia and New Zealand was necessary to foster and incorporate Japan as a major Western power.⁴⁷

If Australia and New Zealand were focused on rationalizing on the basis of international and domestic politics, the Philippines had coupled the two elements of liberating itself from its inferior position with respect to the United States and demanding reparations from Japan with the two elements of dealing with the future threats of Japan and of communism. Perhaps, the U.S. was aware of this. In a telegram to the Secretary of State on March 15, 1951, Myron M. Cowen, U.S. ambassador to Manila, warned that the Philippines was preoccupied with obtaining reparations from Japan in connection with the peace treaty with Japan. He also warned that if Japan and the Philippines were included in the same Pacific Security Pact,

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 157-158.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 158.

there was a fear that Japanese commanders could be assigned to command the Philippine forces: “If Japan were also to be [a] member [of the Pacific security pact], Philippine reaction might be negative from fear that [the] Philippines would become [a] junior partner possibly with Philippine troops expected under certain circumstances [to] serve [and contribute] under Japanese commanders.” He pointed out that there would be numerous political challenges in mobilizing Philippine forces alongside rearmed Japanese forces under the same security pact. In addition to this fear, the Philippines was also focused on obtaining reparations from Japan, according to Cowen. In any case, it was difficult under these circumstances to get the Philippines to accept a peace treaty with Japan without restrictions on rearmament in the absence of substantial reparations from Japan or a substantial political gift. The diplomatic negotiations were such that a Pacific Pact was out of the question.⁴⁸

On April 5, 1951, U.S. Secretary of Defense Marshall sent to the Secretary of State a “draft memorandum for the President” on the creation of Western alliances in the Far East. The Department of Defense’s strategy was to avoid a unified Pacific Pact and instead link the countries involved in the Pacific islands defense line to the United States through three separate treaties. The leaders of the U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. military were mindful of the President’s two original objectives of fostering Japan as an anti-communist power and preventing Japan from becoming an aggressor, as well as the results of Dulles’ visit to Japan and the Philippines and his discussions with Australia and New Zealand. The memorandum described this as follows: “Consideration of this matter, particularly during the course of Ambassador Dulles’ visit to Japan, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, made apparent that the desired results can be better achieved by a series of [security] arrangements rather than by a single [security] arrangement.” The Department of Defense and the U.S. military knew that there was no need to compel unity in the creation of Western alliances in the Far East, and their policy was to satisfy the minimum military requirements while respecting local sentiments toward Japan, a former enemy, and local domestic political needs as much as possible. The Department of Defense and the U.S. military believed that if Western alliances in the Far East as a whole could constitute a system that fostered Japan as a major partner of the West, these alliances did not have to be unified and that a network of alliances of various forms centered on the U.S.-Japan alliance would be adequate. Thus, the Department of Defense and the U.S. military proposed three security arrangements, specifically in the form of U.S.-Japan, U.S.-Philippines, and U.S.-Australia-NZ treaties, with Indonesia to be included under the U.S.-Australia-NZ framework depending on the situation. The general policy within the U.S. government and military was thus decided through this draft memorandum for the President by the Secretary of Defense, with only the political coordination with Japan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and other countries to be sorted out. Perhaps in support of this proposal by the U.S. government and military, the British Ambassador to Washington indicated at a meeting on the same day (April 5) with Dulles, Rusk, and Allison, U.S. envoy to Tokyo, that the British government had expressed concern about the inclusion of the

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 179-180.

Philippines in the U.S.-Australia-NZ treaty.⁴⁹

The British government understood that the United States' insistence on pushing for the participation of the Philippines in the U.S.-Australia-NZ defense treaty was a means of including Australia and New Zealand in the U.S.-led effort to establish a Pacific sphere of influence. To counter this, the United Kingdom positioned the U.S.-Australia-NZ tripartite pact as the first step toward the establishment of a future defense system encompassing the Middle East through South Asia to Southeast Asia and the Pacific preferred by the United Kingdom, and sought to dissociate Australia and New Zealand from the Pacific islands group defense strategy preferred by the United States. At the meeting between Franks and Dulles in Washington on February 28, 1951, Dulles suggested that President Truman wanted the Philippines to join the U.S.-Australia-NZ treaty. Scott of the British Foreign Office was so shocked that he wrote in a private memorandum dated March 7 that the United Kingdom should not intervene in the defense agreement between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, for the following reasons: the United Kingdom was not able to protect Australia and New Zealand, but the United States could; and the United Kingdom could inform them of its interests and opinions on affairs in the Pacific with the hope that the three countries' defense agreement could develop into a dominant defense arrangement in the Far East, which would be compatible with British interests. Meanwhile, in a personal letter dated March 13, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations Patrick C. Gordon Walker informed Australian Prime Minister Robert G. Menzies of the British government's position on the U.S.-Australia-NZ treaty and the issue of the Philippines' participation. This personal letter was sent with the approval of British Prime Minister Attlee, with the same information also conveyed to the New Zealand government. The letter, after major revisions, contained a radical change: namely, that the British Commonwealth would never allow the United States to take British interests in the Pacific, especially Australia and New Zealand, away from the United Kingdom. With regard to the issue of the Philippines' participation, Gordon Walker pointed out that he did not believe it arose out of strategic necessity. With this, he was suggesting a symbolic reason for opposition: that Australia and New Zealand would be regarded as being on the same tier as the Philippines as part of the U.S. sphere of influence in the Pacific, into which Australia and New Zealand could be deemed to have been incorporated. More importantly, he wanted to position the U.S.-Australia-NZ treaty as the first step toward a full Pacific Pact equivalent to the North Atlantic Treaty that the British government hoped to establish in the future and which would include India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and even Southeast Asian countries. In other words, Walker put forward the new notion that the British Commonwealth, not the United States, should take over the Far East by establishing a strong link with South Asia and Southeast Asia. The British government was positive that the treaty would be easier to explain to India, Pakistan, and Ceylon if that were the case. Its plan was to approach the treaty as the first step toward a future full Pacific Pact for the defense of the British Commonwealth. However, the actual telegram that was sent after the revision contained the following changes. First, the treaty's scope expanded slightly from a full Pacific Pact to explicitly include the Middle East and even

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 183-186.

hinted at a possible coupling with the North Atlantic Treaty. What was pursued as a long-term goal was not a U.S.-led but a British Commonwealth-led “world-wide defence chain” that would stretch from the Pacific to Southeast Asia and South Asia, and then to the Middle East, and further through coupling with NATO: “First a regional defence system extending from the Pacific through Southeast Asia and South Asia to the Middle East is a most desirable long-term objective as completing the world-wide defence chain of which the North Atlantic Treaty was the first link.” The British government “welcomed” the U.S.-Australia-NZ treaty from this perspective. However, the United Kingdom opposed the Philippines’ participation on the grounds that it would upset other Southeast Asian countries by not allowing them to join. Furthermore, instead of stating that the United States would replace the United Kingdom in the Pacific, the wording was changed to say that British public opinion would understand the United Kingdom as having become subservient to the United States. However, unlike its response to the Australian government, the British government went out of its way to send a separate telegram to the New Zealand government thanking it for expressing willingness to honor its commitments in the Middle East.⁵⁰

In response to this, New Zealand Minister of External Affairs Doidge emphasized in a telegram sent on March 23 (arrived March 22) that U.S. forces would defend Australia and New Zealand under the U.S.-Australia-NZ treaty, with Australian and New Zealand forces being dispatched to the Middle East, which was compatible with the British government’s concept of a global defense treaty. However, on the issue of the Philippines’ participation, Doidge countered that he did not think its participation meant what the United Kingdom thought it did, and that as long as U.S. troops were stationed in the Philippines’ territory, it could be said that its participation served sufficient strategic purposes. Nevertheless, the New Zealand government had no intention of aggressively insisting on the Philippines’ participation. The British government thus recognized that it was possible to exclude the Philippines from the treaty.⁵¹

On the other hand, the Australian government’s response was much colder than that of the New Zealand government. On March 22, Resident Minister for Australia in London Eric Harrison submitted the Australian government’s dissenting opinion to Gordon Walker. In it, the Australian government did not position the U.S.-Australia-NZ treaty as part of a global defense treaty, which was most important for the British government; instead, it criticized the fact that waiting for the realization of such a concept before proceeding with a Pacific Pact would render it impossible in the foreseeable future, stating, “In truth, such a regional defence system [as proposed by the United Kingdom] is not, in our judgment, a practical possibility

⁵⁰ Washington (Franks) to Foreign Office, No. 606 (February 28, 1951); R.H. Scott, “Untitled” (March 7, 1951); P.C. Gordon Walker to Robert Menzies (March 13, 1951); E.G. Cass to E.J. Emery (CRO) (March 13, 1951), FO 371/92072. Cabinet approval was also received on March 12. “Pacific Pact” (March 12, 1951); P.C. Gordon Walker to Robert Menzies (March 13, 1951); CRO (Gordon Walker) to U.K. High Commissioners in Australia and New Zealand, No. 238 and No. 144 (March 13, 1951); CRO (Gordon Walker) to U.K. High Commissioners in Australia and New Zealand, No. 237 and No. 143 (March 13, 1951), FO 371/92072.

⁵¹ U.K. High Commissioner in New Zealand (Doidge) to Commonwealth Relations Office, No. 196 (D. March 23, 1951, R. March 22, 1951); Foreign Office to Washington, No. 1194 (March 29, 1951), FO 371/92072.

in any foreseeable future.” The Australian government also criticized the participation of the Philippines, arguing that the United Kingdom’s concerns were “unfounded.” Moreover, the Australian government disrupted the United Kingdom’s strategy. It demanded that the restrictions on the rearmament of Japan be written into the peace treaty and that a surveillance body be established to enforce these restrictions. In addition, the Australian government cited as justification for its view that a rearmed Japan would actively cooperate with the Soviet Union and China and pose a major threat in the Pacific. The British government found the Australian government to be a much more difficult party to negotiate with than the United States.⁵²

Thus, the British government attempted to exclude the Philippines from the U.S.-Australia-NZ treaty by negotiating with the United States. In a telegram dated March 30, Ambassador Franks notified London that after negotiations with Dulles, there was a high possibility of excluding the Philippine government as long as they could come up with a good reason. The British government informed the Australian government of its policy of avoiding negotiations with the Australian government regarding the issue of the Philippines as it would be settled unilaterally through negotiations between the United Kingdom and the United States. In a telegram to Franks dated April 3, the British Foreign Office raised concerns to the U.S. that the Philippines’ participation would have a negative impact on other Southeast Asian countries and that the U.S.-Australia-NZ treaty should function as a treaty for the Pacific. However, the telegram also contained the real reason that should not have been communicated to the U.S. The inclusion of the Philippines, then often regarded as a U.S. satellite state, in the treaty would underline the exclusion of the United Kingdom and could give credence to the view that Australia and New Zealand had been incorporated into an “American Commonwealth system.” On April 5, Franks met with Dulles and Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and reiterated the British government’s strong opposition to the participation of the Philippines. Franks then suggested that the United States enter into a separate treaty with the Philippines identical in content to the treaty with Australia and New Zealand. Dulles and Rusk asked whether entering into separate treaties would lighten the “defence obligations” of Australia and New Zealand, which would not extend to the defense of the Philippines. Although this was a natural question to ask, Franks replied that he did not know. According to Franks, the Americans began talking among themselves and started to argue that Australia and New Zealand would incur “defence obligations” while U.S. forces were stationed in the Philippines. The U.S. rationale was that an attack on U.S. forces was equivalent to an attack on the United States itself, and therefore Australia and New Zealand would incur defense obligations in that regard. The U.S. then stated that it would consult with the JCS, the Secretary of Defense, and other leaders of the Department of State before giving a final answer to the British. This could be said to be a path to a settlement that would be amenable to various interpretations. A settlement of this form would allow the U.S. to say that it had incorporated Australia and New Zealand into its Pacific defense line while allowing the

⁵² “Record of Conversation between the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Resident Minister for Australia-Thursdays, 22nd March, 1951” (F 1072/36); “Message from the Australian Minister for External Affairs to Mr. Gordon Walker” (March 22, 1951), FO 371/92073.

British to claim otherwise. On April 14, Rusk informed Franks that the U.S. government had decided to conclude the U.S.-Australia-NZ treaty in a form that did not include the Philippines. At this meeting, Rusk highlighted the importance of aligning the defense commitments of the U.S.-Australia-NZ treaty, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and the U.S.-Philippines treaty so that they were all on the same level, an indirect gesture to the fact that the U.S.-Australia-NZ treaty was part of the United States' Pacific defense line. Nevertheless, as a result of British diplomacy, the British Commonwealth's defense commitments to the Philippines could only have been described as ambiguous.⁵³

Discussions and Considerations Surrounding Dulles' Proposed Pacific Pact Within the U.S. Government and Military

On December 13, 1950, almost a month before the January 12, 1951, meeting in which Dulles presented his proposal for a Pacific Pact to Franks, the predecessor to the Dulles proposal had already been presented by the U.S. Department of State to the U.S. Department of Defense for study by the latter. On January 3, 1951, the JCS agreed to explore the possibility of this Pacific Pact. However, it was well aware that the treaty would not make much sense with respect to the Soviet Union and feared that the treaty would be expanded to include more countries during the course of negotiations, thus increasing defense obligations. Moreover, the military situation in the Far East at the time was too pressing for the U.S. military to make the Pacific Pact a reality. The U.S. Army had suffered a series of historic defeats since China's intervention in the Korean War, and although the U.S. military had stopped short of escalating the war into one against China, it was concerned that a direct invasion of Japan by Soviet forces could spark all-out war. Containment of Japan was already out of the question, and there were fears within the U.S. military that a Soviet invasion of Japan would pose a threat to U.S.-NATO relations or even the Anglo-American military alliance. The concept of a Pacific Pact had become strategically impossible and dangerous, at least from the perspective of the U.S. military. In view of this, the JCS insisted to the Department of State that participation in the defense arrangement should be limited to Pacific island countries only, and under no circumstances should there be a commitment to dispatch troops for the "defense of Hong Kong." This starting point already encapsulated the strategic intentions of the JCS, which did not want the United States to become militarily involved, but if politically necessary, would only go as far as to build a Pacific defense line without getting involved on the Asian continent, and especially not in Southeast Asia. The JCS was careful to stay out of the defense of the colonies of Western European colonial empires, including the British empire. Setting aside the defense of Japan, the overwhelming power of the U.S. Navy was also the most effective and cheapest means of fulfilling defense obligations with respect to the defense of Australia, New

⁵³ Washington (Franks) to Foreign Office, No. 934 (March 30, 1951) (F 1072/37); CRO (Gordon Walker) to U.K. High Commissioners in Australia and New Zealand, No. 298 and No. 178 (April 2, 1951); Foreign Office to Washington, No. 1277 (April 3, 1951); Washington (Franks) to Foreign Office, No. 1029 (D. April 6, 1951, R. April 7, 1951) (F 1072/40); Washington (Franks) to Foreign Office, No. 1137 (April 14, 1951) (F 1072/42), F 371/92073.

Zealand, the Philippines, and Indonesia from a military perspective.⁵⁴

However, an important thing about this JCS agreement was that a reason for their reluctance to go along with the Pacific Pact was the same strategic reason as what the United Kingdom was hoping to achieve, namely, that Australia could provide “more assistance” to defense contributions “in the Middle East” if it could be reassured of its defense in the Pacific. For the JCS, it was essential to prevail by mobilizing the full capabilities of the Western Powers in the event of all-out war against the Soviet Union. From their point of view, as far as Australia and New Zealand were concerned, the disagreement over the division of regional responsibilities under the Anglo-American strategic framework should only be focused on the “trap” of the United Kingdom attempting to make use of Australia, New Zealand, and other Southeast Asian countries to draw the United States into the defense of British interests in Southeast Asia and elsewhere.⁵⁵

It is important to note, however, that from the outset, the JCS did not intend for Australia to be part of the Anglo-American-Canadian high-level war planning group, a key element of the Western military alliance network. (Australia and New Zealand at least did not have a full picture of how the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada were preparing for a global war against the Soviet Union at the time.) Although the JCS viewed Australia’s military contribution in the Middle East as a vital operation in a war against the Soviet Union, they were still unwilling to grant Australia, at least at that point in time, equal status in the Western military alliance network as a whole. In fact, on January 15, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs George Perkins of the Department of State informed Dulles that Australia wished to be involved in global military planning and had asked to send its mission to the Pentagon, but the JCS later declined this request.⁵⁶

Dulles, too, was more interested in having greater latitude in peace talks with Japan and pushing for the rearmament of Japan through a Pacific Pact than in the concept of a Pacific Pact itself. For him, therefore, the Pacific Pact was a means rather than an end in itself. In a memorandum dated January 3, 1951, to Philip C. Jessup, a Department of State senior official, Dulles stated, “the United States should not become committed to the [Pacific] Pact unless it is assured that the other Parties will agree to the kind of [...] Japanese peace [treaty] that the United States feels is necessary.” He further believed that the Pacific Pact should provide “an *international* framework within which Japan could create military force as part of an international security organization rather than merely as a *national* force.” President Truman had therefore symbolically authorized Dulles to negotiate not only a peace treaty with Japan and the rearmament of Japan but also a “mutual assistance arrangement among the Pacific island countries.” However, as outlined above, Dulles was confronted on February 2 with the United Kingdom’s opposition to the Pacific Pact through Gascoigne. A shocked Dulles then approached the Department of State on the same day regarding the possibility of a security declaration for the Pacific countries, including the United Kingdom, that emphasized

⁵⁴ *FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, Parts 1 & 2*, pp. 132-133; p. 1366.

⁵⁵ *FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, Part 1*, p. 133.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 141. W. David McIntyre, *op. cit.*, p. 296.

the “Commonwealth ties” between the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. Dulles might have determined that a mere declaration would not result in the United States being drawn into the defense of the British Empire. However, in a February 8 memorandum from Washington, Rusk criticized the proposed declaration and pointed out that if it paved the way for the United Kingdom’s participation, France, the Netherlands, and even Portugal would want to be part of it, which would alter the purpose of the Pacific Pact into the defense of colonial empires. This could have resulted in the peace treaty with Japan and the Pacific Pact, which was a means to push for the rearmament of Japan, deviating from their original intentions. Rusk presented alternative options such as a “U.S. unilateral declaration,” a “series of bilateral agreements,” or a “tripartite agreement” that did not involve a system with many participating countries such as a Pacific Pact. He suggested that Dulles discuss these options with Australia and New Zealand.⁵⁷

Rusk met with Prime Minister of New Zealand Sidney G. Holland and his delegation in Washington on February 8. When Rusk explained the background to the Pacific Pact negotiations between the United Kingdom and the United States, Holland exploded with anger at the attitude of the United Kingdom that he just heard about and complained that New Zealand had also received inadequate defense guarantees despite having committed to dispatching one of its key divisions to the Middle East in the event of a world war. The New Zealand delegation then sought defense guarantees from the United States and proposed the inclusion of the United Kingdom in the pact. In response, Rusk attempted to convince New Zealand that the security of Australia and New Zealand could be adequately guaranteed “without the imposition of an arms limitation on Japan.” At this point, however, New Zealand was still concerned about the future threat posed by Japan. On the other hand, it was noteworthy that New Zealand indicated its readiness to reconsider the strategic concept centered on its commitments in the Middle East in the event of a “local war” in the Pacific. To the U.S., these remarks must have sounded like New Zealand could also participate in the defense of East Asia under certain conditions. Rusk then proposed a tripartite pact between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, to which New Zealand promptly agreed. However, New Zealand then, somewhat contradictorily, admitted that it was still committed to the Middle East and Europe and hinted at its ambiguous position as a member of the British Commonwealth.⁵⁸

Fearing that both Australia and New Zealand might retract their defense commitments in the Middle East, the British submitted on February 14 the British government’s objection to the U.S. government’s proposed Pacific Pact and the proposed declaration regarding collective

⁵⁷ *FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, Part 1*, p. 135; p. 137; p. 145; p. 150.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 148-149. Around this time, New Zealand had already begun recruiting troops for deployment to the Middle East and was preparing to dispatch 33,000 to 35,000 soldiers. Furthermore, the NZ Chiefs of Staff Committee was considering four options on January 30, before Holland visited the United States: first, a treaty under which the United States would formally defend Australia and New Zealand; second, a comprehensive treaty that would include the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and other non-communist Asian countries; third, a Pacific Pact, as suggested by Dulles; and finally, a presidential proclamation under which the United States would informally defend Australia and New Zealand. The Committee had believed on February 6 that the last option was the most acceptable but switched to the first option following the negotiations that took place between Rusk and the Prime Minister of New Zealand. McIntyre, *op. cit.*, pp. 305-307.

security in the Pacific. The British criticized the way in which the declaration equated an attack on Japan with an attack on Australia and New Zealand, accusing it of paving the way for the deployment of Australian and New Zealand forces to defend Japan. They concluded that this would result in the two countries neglecting their commitments in the Middle East. This was the most overt instance of the British expressing concern about potentially losing both Australia and New Zealand from the British Commonwealth defense to the United States' Pacific defense line. The British also warned that unrest would spread to various Southeast Asian countries and affect South Asian countries as well, depending on which countries were participating in the two proposals. The British government then suggested that a tripartite pact between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand would be acceptable.⁵⁹

At the previously mentioned U.S.-Australia-NZ negotiations held in Canberra from February 15 to 18, the focus had shifted from a Pacific Pact to a tripartite pact. Since agreement on the pact was almost certain, it seemed to the United States that the pact would establish an international environment for concluding a peace treaty with Japan, eliminate the opposition of Australia and New Zealand to the rearmament of Japan, and, as a bonus, offer the possibility of Australia and New Zealand contributing to the defense of the Pacific. From the perspective of the United States, Australian Minister for External Affairs Spender's remarks at the Canberra negotiations that, despite his opposition to the unrestricted rearmament of Japan, he would not insist on introducing a mechanism to inspect the rearmament process, could be deemed a major step forward. However, New Zealand Minister of External Affairs Doidge cited the example of German rearmament during the interwar period and expressed concern that there might be trouble again if Japan was given a chance. In response, Dulles argued that the failure of the Treaty of Versailles showed that imposing excessively harsh restrictions could be counterproductive. Furthermore, Dulles stated that there was no need to worry about the rearmament of Japan because it would be neither large-scale nor symmetric (Japan would not be allowed to develop military capabilities that involved the possession of strategic air forces, aircraft carriers, or other overseas offensive capabilities), drawing attention at the end of his speech to the longing for peace among the Japanese people in recent times. Dulles tried to get a free hand from Australia and New Zealand as far as the rearmament of Japan was concerned, which he effectively got. This was a major success in the building of a Pacific defense line by the United States. At this meeting, Australia and New Zealand adopted the position that the Soviet threat was still pronounced in Europe and the Middle East, but Dulles surprised both the Australian and New Zealand governments by saying that "he (Dulles) considered that there [was] a real danger of attack on the Far East and the South Pacific, and he did not know whether the danger was greater here or in Europe." (At the time, the United States seriously feared that a world war could be sparked by a Soviet invasion of Japan.) By alerting Australia and New Zealand to this danger, Dulles was attempting to probe if the Australian and New Zealand militaries would be willing to participate in and contribute to the Pacific defense line. Furthermore, Dulles reiterated the importance of the defense of Japan to the security of Australia and New Zealand, stating, "From the point of view of the military defence of this

⁵⁹ *FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, Part 1*, pp. 154-155.

area (Australia and New Zealand), Japan is in a critical position. The attack may come from the south through Indonesia but is more likely in the north through Japan.” Perhaps moved by this, Doidge reaffirmed his support for the tripartite pact and said that he needed more time to get the New Zealand public to accept the “bigger concept.” At this point, it must have seemed to the U.S. that an agreement had been reached to push for a tripartite pact between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand.⁶⁰

In order to avoid criticism that the pact was a “white men’s treaty,” the U.S. then requested Indonesia’s participation with the hope that it would turn down the request. The same request was also made by the President with respect to the Philippines. The British government was staunchly opposed to both, which the U.S. government respected. When Dulles returned to Washington in early April, the Pacific Pact had vanished without a trace within the Department of State, leaving behind only the idea of a defense line built around the U.S.-Australia-NZ tripartite pact, the U.S.-Japan defense treaty, and the U.S.-Philippines treaty. However, could Dulles and other leaders of the Department of State be seen as having achieved some measure of success in strengthening the U.S. strategic framework in the Pacific through their efforts in pushing for the rearmament of Japan and in making the Australian and New Zealand governments aware of the importance of the defense of the Pacific? Perhaps it should be said that they managed to successfully integrate Japan into the international political arena as a major partner of the West without causing any negative impact on the overall structure of the West as a whole.

For the U.S. military, however, this method of linking together small defense arrangements was seen as an obstacle to the concentration of defense capabilities and the consolidation of fronts, despite being a means of avoiding the “trap” of the British. In its April 7 report, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC; a subordinate body of the JCS) criticized the multiple treaties as a result of bowing to British pressure and complained that a single regional treaty would have better concentrated the resources of the participating countries and made it easier to engage in “combined action to resist aggression.” The JSSC feared that concluding a growing number of such small treaties would pave the way for bipartite pacts between the United States and “Burma, India, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel.” They further criticized that, from a strategic perspective, continuing to conclude small treaties and defense arrangements would increase the United States’ military burden due to its inability to take combined military action. According to the JSSC, the U.S. military was already fully committed to three important missions that could deplete its military resources, namely, to fighting the war in Korea, defending Japan as a base of operations for that war, and

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 157-159; pp. 161-163. For more on the threat perceived by the U.S. military that a Soviet invasion of Japan would spark a world war, see Chapter 6 of my book cited above. However, in a memorandum on the Pacific Defence Pact negotiations submitted by Australian Minister for External Affairs Spender to the Australian Cabinet on February 15 in anticipation of Dulles’ visit to Australia, he wrote, “For us, it is clearly unrealistic to consider getting involved in a commitment to possibly dispatch Australian military units to defend Japan in the event of an attack on the country.” The memorandum also stated that a North Atlantic Treaty-style treaty system was impossible from the perspective of avoiding this defense commitment to Japan. Roger Holdich, Vivianne Johnson, and Pamela Andre eds., *Documents on Australian Foreign Policy: The ANZUS Treaty 1951* (Canberra, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2001), p. 72. Hereinafter, this book will be abbreviated as *The ANZUS Treaty, 1951*.

improving the unsatisfactory military posture on the European front. In view of this, the JSSC recommended that the two treaties other than the U.S.-Japan defense treaty not be concluded.⁶¹

In an effort to bridge the gap between the JSSC and the Department of State, a meeting between Dulles and the JCS was held on April 11. At the meeting, JCS Chairman Bradley stated that the JCS had yet to decide on their final position and discussed the advantages and disadvantages of having multiple separate defense arrangements. The only advantage was that the United States could maintain its special relationship with the Philippines, while the disadvantages included the fact that having separate arrangements would not exert the same level of deterrence that a collective security system such as NATO would, that the United States would be forced by Indochina and Burma to conclude similar treaties, and finally, that key personnel would have to be dispatched for each treaty, giving rise to much redundancy and wasted resources. U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Sherman also reiterated the disadvantages and expressed concern about the possibility of countries making disparate requests for assistance, especially with regard to joint military planning. The JCS was thus initially reluctant to establish a hub-and-spokes alliance network to cater specifically to political and diplomatic needs.⁶²

Given their inability to operate effectively from a strategic standpoint, the JCS attempted to downgrade the status of these defense arrangements from treaties to agreements and further to unilateral U.S. declarations. In response, Dulles explained the background to the negotiations between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand to date and said that any further negotiations could be perceived as U.S. opposition to a tripartite pact. As a compromise in this respect, the JCS suggested that a clause be introduced into the defense arrangements stating that war plans, war planning, and military organizations would not be shared. U.S. Army Chief of Staff Joseph Lawton Collins even said, "The disclosure of our plans for the defense of Japan would not be relevant since the other nations were not competent to go to the defense of Japan." In response, Dulles countered, "Under the separate pacts all the nations concerned equally would be pledged to help defend Japan if it were attacked unless we failed to go to the assistance of Japan ourselves." He then argued that Australia and New Zealand had a right to know the United States' war plans because of their defense commitments in the Middle East. Bradley then asked Dulles the most important question of all, namely, "the certainty that the other nations would go to the defense of Japan in event of an attack on Japan." If the answer to this question was that it was fairly certain, the United States could consider Australia and New Zealand as active allies in its Pacific defense line. However, Dulles replied that public opinion in Australia and New Zealand would rebel against the idea of regarding Japan as an ally.⁶³

The JCS's hopes were instantly dashed. Bradley and Sherman then indicated their preference for something more flexible and less rigid than clearly written defense arrangements. Sherman explained that war planning would work better if done in "the back room." Though somewhat reluctant, the JCS decided against pushing for more from the U.S.-Australia-NZ

⁶¹ JCS-2180/10 (April 7, 1951), CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) Sec. 2, RG 218.

⁶² *FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, Part 1*, pp. 193-194.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 197-199.

tripartite pact. On the same day, the JCS decided to support the Department of State's proposal of concluding multiple separate defense arrangements but suggested that defense coordination with both Australia and New Zealand be kept to a minimum and not include war plans, war planning, or military organizations. The JCS also requested that measures be adopted to prevent the Pacific Council, which comprised the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, from participating in war planning by NATO and the Organization of American States, as well as from gaining access to the content of plans finalized by these organizations. The JCS had no intention of having Australia and New Zealand involved in high-level military planning as long as they could not be active allies in the United States' Pacific defense line, especially if they could not rush to the defense of Japan. On April 13, Secretary of Defense Marshall submitted this decision to Secretary of State Acheson. From the perspective of the U.S. military, the ANZUS Treaty was an insubstantial treaty with a strong political overtone, a defense agreement that could not be expected to do much but would also not lose much. Furthermore, according to a memorandum dated April 17 sent from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State on April 19, the JCS requested the Department of State to ensure that Article VII and Article VIII of the proposed ANZUS Treaty stipulated that there would be no military plans, planning, or organizations for that purpose, and that the United States would not establish a military planning organization with Australia and New Zealand or any formal military planning organization among the Pacific island countries. The JCS not only did not want Australia and New Zealand to join organizations led by the trio of Western powers of the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada, but it also had no intention for them to establish formal consultative relationships with the existing organizations of NATO and the Rio Treaty, nor for them to be involved in the creation of a formal military planning organization under a possible future treaty among the Pacific island countries. From the perspective of the United States, the ANZUS Treaty was a "means" of international diplomacy to bring Japan into the fold as a major Western power, and it could be said that the United States wanted to ensure that this "means" would not interfere with the organizational direction of the West as a whole.⁶⁴

However, according to the historian McIntyre, the U.S. encountered great difficulty in getting Australia and New Zealand to accept this policy advanced by the U.S. government and military, i.e., the policy of excluding Australia and New Zealand from participating in the Anglo-American-Canadian global command and military planning organizations under the Western alliance network, preventing them from coupling with NATO and the Rio Treaty, and neutralizing the power of the council that would be established under the ANZUS Treaty. On June 1, 1951, Dulles met with Australian Ambassador Spender and New Zealand Ambassador to Washington Sir Carl August Berendsen but failed to get them to accept this policy. The three discussed the matter again at a meeting on June 25, but Dulles was still unable to eliminate the clause on coupling and consultation with other higher-level organizations and other Western alliances from the proposed ANZUS Treaty. (Australian Minister for External Affairs Spender

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 200; p. 221; Decision on JCS-2180/12 (April 11, 1951), CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) Sec. 2, RG 218.

had been appointed Australian Ambassador to Washington in April 1951.) At this point, Dulles was forced into tough talks with the JCS, and following the talks held on July 10, Dulles came to terms with a new policy on coupling the Pacific Council with other Western organizations. Dulles then met with the Australian and New Zealand ambassadors on the same day to obtain their agreement to these amendments. The Council would be composed of members ranked foreign ministers and vice ministers without any semblance of a military organization, and consultative relationships would be established with other allied military organizations in the Pacific only. This would, at the very least, ensure that Australia and New Zealand would no longer be linked to organizations around the world led by the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada, or to NATO, through the ANZUS Treaty. This was a decisive step in making the ANZUS Treaty organization a subordinate and regional organization within the worldwide Western alliance network. It could thus be said that the United States did not view Australia and New Zealand as major partners in the West as a whole, at least not at this juncture.⁶⁵

Finding Common Ground between the U.S. Government and Military's View of Japan as a Partner in Total War and the British Government and Military's Focus on Rebuilding the Middle Eastern Front

The United States was convinced that the passive measures demanded by the United Kingdom would not mitigate various threats such as the threat of a world war sparked by China and the Soviet Union, or the threat of limited war, civil war, or domestic political conflict in the Far East. On the surface, the nature of the United States' establishment of a Far East Western alliance network in 1951 appeared to be about the creation of a U.S. sphere of influence in the Far East, but the United States was in fact concerned that besides China's success in Asia, the Korean War would escalate into a world war against the Soviet Union. Thus, the dominant view within the U.S. government and military was that a sphere of influence capable of only passive resistance to the various threats posed by China and the Soviet Union could not possibly handle the challenges associated with these threats, and that there was no other way out of the conundrum other than to accept and foster Japan as a new major partner of the Western alliances. In other words, it could be said that the United States' interest was in transforming Japan into a country that would make significant contributions in a war against the Soviet Union (i.e., World War III) as well as in any Cold War-style conflict involving China across the entire Far East even during peacetime. This was a search for a new Western alliance that could be said to be the creation of a new major partner, which went beyond the passive notion envisioned by the British of combining the establishment of a U.S. sphere of influence in the Far East and double containment against the Soviet Union and Japan as envisioned by the British Commonwealth.

The U.S. government document that set out this direction was NSC-48/5, a report issued by the National Security Council dated May 17, 1951. This report entitled "United States Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia" was adopted by the NSC (91st Meeting) on May 16, 1951, and approved by President Truman on the following day (May 17), and it

⁶⁵ McIntyre, *op. cit.*, pp. 340-343.

stated, “[the President] directs its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the United States Government under the coordination of the Secretaries of State and Defense.” The United States asserted in the report that the Cold War was a global conflict that required more extensive attention, with the most immediate threat to the United States as of May 1951 coming not from continental Europe but from Asia, in view of the fact that the communists were actually using military force in Asia: “United States objectives, policies, and courses of action in Asia should be designed to contribute toward the global objective of strengthening the free world vis-à-vis the Soviet orbit, and should be determined with due regard to the relation of United States capabilities and commitments throughout the world. However, in view of the communist resort to armed force in Asia, United States action in that area must be based on the recognition that the most immediate overt threats to United States security are currently presented in that area.” Specifically, the report stated that the Soviet Union was attempting to engineer a strategic and military situation in which it could use China to control the entire East Asia, which would allow it to focus all of its efforts on invading Western Europe from Eastern Europe: “Current Soviet tactics appear to concentrate on bringing the mainland of Eastern Asia and eventually Japan and the other principal off-shore islands in the Western Pacific under Soviet control, primarily through Soviet exploitation of the resources of communist China. The attainment of this [Soviet] objective on the mainland of Eastern Asia would substantially enhance the global position of the USSR at the expense of the United States, by securing the eastern flank of the USSR and permitting the USSR to concentrate its offensive power in other areas, particularly in Europe. [Furthermore,] Soviet control of the off-shore islands in the Western Pacific, including Japan, would present an unacceptable threat to the security of the United States.” Here, the United States seemed to be anticipating the danger in the scenario of a global war like World War III that the Soviet Union could be freed from having to adopt a two-front strategy in Europe and the Far East, which would allow it to overwhelm Western Europe, possibly even the United Kingdom, and create the possibility of a Soviet victory.⁶⁶

Given the strategic and military situation at the time, if British and U.S. air bases in the British mainland, the Middle East, and the Far East were to fall under Soviet control, the U.S. Air Force’s B-29s and B-50s would find it difficult to conduct strategic bombing campaigns against the Soviet mainland due to their range of operation. In other words, this would make it impossible to launch strategic nuclear operations that could swiftly defeat the Soviet Union using the 300-odd atomic bombs recently acquired in 1951, thereby creating the possibility of a return to total war in which the Soviets would still retain a small chance of victory. (However, whether the U.S. President opted for a nuclear world war or a war in the style of World War II would likely have been a political and moral decision at the time that went beyond a mere consideration of the strategic and military situation, and even in a world war in the form of total war, the Soviet Union’s chance of victory would likely have been minimal.) In addition, the loss of the Western Pacific island countries, including Japan, would have a greater impact in terms of the erasure of the potential threat posed by Japan and the U.S. forces in Japan to

⁶⁶ *FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, Part 1*, pp. 33-34.

the eastern half of the Soviet Union than the possibility of the Soviet fleet using these areas to advance eastward across the Pacific. In other words, it could be said that the United States' strategy was to go on the offensive instead of staying defensive, even if it could not articulate that explicitly.

However, the report stated that the United States should do its best to avoid all-out war against the Soviet Union at that point in time (in 1951). The same report also stated in a different section that in connection with how the Korean War was unfolding, the United States should avoid not only a world war against the Soviet Union but also a great war in the Far East, including across all of China. Moreover, it pointed out that the West as a whole should work together to avert both a world war and a great war in the Far East, and that the focus should be on the West making decisions and acting as a whole without having only the United States take the lead. This policy could of course be said to be centered on further increasing the potential number of atomic bombs owned by the United States, but could the United States have been aiming to achieve victory in Cold War-style conflicts on the basis of its overwhelming total war capabilities? Nevertheless, the report did not suggest that war should be avoided at the expense of the United States' overall defense interests. At the same time, the report adopted the position that unless something unexpected happened, the United States should seek "the firm establishment and effective application of the principle of collective security" with the Western Powers acting as one. At that point in time, there was no discussion of the United States fighting a war against the Soviet Union on its own, with the Western Powers collectively focused on developing superior war-fighting capabilities and seeking to achieve victory in the Cold War if possible.⁶⁷

For the United States, however, the Western Powers did not have any ally in the entire Asia that was capable of successfully fighting the Cold War or a world war as of 1951, and the challenge of fostering allies that could successfully fight the Cold War while neutralizing pressure from the Chinese and Soviets was listed among its "Long-Range Objectives." On this basis, the report stated that among the "Current Objectives" that should be pursued immediately were the detachment of China from the Soviet Union and the "[maintenance of] the security of the off-shore defense line: Japan–Ryukyus–Philippines–Australia and New Zealand." In hindsight, it could be argued that the four allies of the United States at the time of the formation of the Far East Western alliance network in 1951 were all countries along this offshore defense line, and that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, and the ANZUS Treaty were the very foundation and key elements of the Far East Western alliance network. The report stated that within this defense perimeter, the United States should place particular emphasis on fostering Japan's ability to contribute significantly to the security of the Far East as an autonomous Western power: "Assist Japan to become a self-reliant nation friendly to the United States, capable of maintaining internal security and defense against external aggression and contributing to the security and stability of the Far East." The report then highlighted the need to form a Western alliance network centered on the United States in the Far East: "Promote the development of effective security and economic

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 35-36.

relationships among the free nations of Asia and the Pacific area, including the United States” based on self-reliance, mutual aid, and even substantial assistance from the United States.⁶⁸

Furthermore, “Annex 2: NSC Staff Study on United States Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia,” which was appended to NSC-48/5, described the usefulness of Japan’s capability to engage in total war, especially its industrial power, by stating, “Japan’s potential in heavy industry is roughly equal to 50% of the Soviet Union’s present production.” This meant that, in the event of World War III, Japan’s alignment with the West would give the West as a whole the following advantages. The assumption made by the Western Powers until the end of 1950 was the calculation that, if the West were to collectively engage in total war, the industrial power of the British Commonwealth would be around the same as that of the Soviet Union, and the industrial power of the United States would be three times that of the Soviet Union. They also considered it impossible to make calculations for a divided Germany and a France that the Soviets would militarily overwhelm in no time during a world war. In other words, the Western Powers had four times the industrial capacity of the Soviets. If a Western alliance network were to be developed in the Far East with the United States as its leader, Japan’s industrial power would be aggregated with the total industrial power of the West, giving the Western Powers 4.5 times the industrial capacity of the Soviets. This would further bolster the West’s advantage in a world war. The United Kingdom and the United States would then be able to win the war with ease using conventional forces alone even if they did not resort to atomic bombs. (It was common knowledge among the British and U.S. governments and militaries that achieving victory in a world war against China and the Soviet Union using conventional forces alone without the use of nuclear weapons would make it easier to eliminate communist forces throughout the world thereafter.) More specifically, it was believed that the weapons and equipment that Japan could produce on an ongoing basis would, depending on their deployment, produce powerful Western troops in the Far East that could force the Soviet Union to engage in a two-front war with Eastern and Western fronts. Elsewhere in Annex 2, the report described the massive total war capabilities that would result from combining Japan’s industrial power with the resources of the Far East islands as follows: “Nearly one-third of the population of the Far East inhabits insular areas with resulting advantages in defense. This third, which combines the workshop [regions] of Japan with the raw materials of the great off-shore islands of the South Pacific could be built into a powerful system [of military power].” Annex 2 then stated that Japan’s population, industrial capacity, geographical position, as well as the successful U.S. occupation of Japan, had contributed significantly to the Western Powers: “Japan’s population, industrial capacity, geographical position, and relationship to the United States resulting from the Occupation, make it (Japan) an important asset to the free world.” This “relationship to the United States resulting from the Occupation” could also be understood as the basis for the creation of a “security community” going forward. (In other words, there was a view that because of the great success of the reforms carried out during the Occupation, Japan was now qualified to be part of a security community involving not only the

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 35-36.

United States but the West as a whole, and to even emerge as a major power itself.)⁶⁹

On the other hand, at that point in time, the U.S. government and military did not consider Taiwan and Korea, which could be regarded as the front line against China and the Soviet Union, to be within the West's permanent defense perimeter. In fact, Taiwan and Korea were not even considered qualified to be members of the U.S. Western alliance network. Nevertheless, the United States had no intention of allowing Taiwan to fall under the control of the Chinese and Soviets. As stated in NSC-48/5, "Deny Formosa to any Chinese regime aligned with or dominated by the USSR and expedite the strengthening of the defensive capabilities of Formosa." While it would not abandon Taiwan to the Chinese and Soviets, the United States also did not immediately welcome Taiwan as a member of the West. The Truman administration did not view the Chiang Kai-shek government as the Western democratic regime that it ought to be and could be seen at times to be more concerned with victory in the Cold War by its Western allies. Elsewhere in NSC-48/5, the report called for the U.S. military's direct involvement to be limited to a maritime blockade of China by the 7th Fleet without having the United States directly defend mainland Taiwan, and although the United States would provide economic and military material assistance, the KMT government was to promote Western-style democracy on its own. With regard to Korea, the ultimate objective as of May 1951 was a "united, independent and democratic Korea," and to seek to achieve, "as a minimum," an armistice under appropriate arrangements, the complete control by the Republic of Korea of the entire area south of the 38th parallel, the complete withdrawal of non-Korean armed forces from the Korean Peninsula, and the development of a Korean defense force capable of deterring or repelling military attacks by North Korea. The United States' aim was to first secure the conditions for Korea's national survival while considering how Korea could be compatible with the United Nations' cause, since Korea's national survival was by no means a certainty, let alone the fostering of democracy in the country. From the perspective of the United States in terms of pushing for an armistice, it could be said that the situation in Korea was such that its inclusion in the alliance network as an ally of the West was still out of the question.⁷⁰

Beyond the issues surrounding Taiwan and Korea, Annex 2 of NSC-48/5 bemoaned the "lack of unity among important friendly nations" such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and India over various issues surrounding the Far East. In particular, it acknowledged the struggle arising from differences of opinion between the United Kingdom, India, and the United States on the importance of Europe and Asia: "The national interest of the United Kingdom dictates a different attitude with respect to the relative importance of Europe and Asia. At the same time both the United Kingdom and India have acted toward China and Formosa on the basis of [their] interpretation of events in China and a strategic estimate of the situation differing from those of the United States." At this point, the U.S. NSC staff was probably still not fully aware of the United Kingdom's intentions. It could be said that the United Kingdom and the United States, which led the Western Powers on equal terms, needed to reach a consensus on

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 41; p. 48.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 35-36; p. 38.

a global policy for the formation of the Western alliance network in the Far East, including in the event of a world war.⁷¹

At the time, the situation on the Middle Eastern front was not at all optimistic for the British military. The British military's internal defense plans for the Middle East during a world war from this period showed that three different strategies had been studied: the "Outer Ring" defense strategy where they would defend almost all Middle Eastern countries, including Turkey, as well as oil in the Middle East; the "Inner Ring" defense strategy where they would give up defending Persia, Iraq, and oil in the Middle East, and concentrate on defending Turkey, Lebanon, and Egypt; and a strategy where they would concentrate on defending Lebanon and Jordan. The "Outer Ring" defense strategy was politically and economically ideal, but it required, in addition to local troops, eight divisions and 900 aircraft worth of air power 30 days after the start of war and 15 divisions and 1,350 aircraft by the sixth month of war, a troop size that was impossible for the West to deploy. In particular, since the U.S. military would not dispatch any ground forces to the Middle East, the British Commonwealth and local troops had to cover almost all of the ground between them. The "Inner Ring" strategy was one that the British Commonwealth could somehow manage, and based on calculations, the British Commonwealth would only need to deploy one division and 482 aircraft 30 days after the start of war and seven divisions and 1,062 aircraft (of which two divisions and 250 aircraft would support the Turks) by the sixth month of war, while maximizing the use of Turkish troops (which had around 40 divisions at the time). The Lebanon-Jordan defense strategy would have required more troops than the "Inner Ring" strategy as it did not make use of Turkish troops. However, Chief of the Imperial General Staff Sir William Joseph Slim (Field Marshal) pointed out that the seven British Commonwealth divisions might have inadequate equipment even for the "Inner Ring" strategy.⁷²

Around this time, the COS discussed at a meeting in London on May 30, 1951, the revised draft of the British national strategy DO (50) 45 submitted by the JP and decided to stipulate provisions for Far Eastern and Southeast Asian strategy in the event of a world war in connection with the U.S.-Australia-NZ tripartite pact (ANZUS Treaty) that would be concluded. The May 29 edition of the JP report entitled "Defence Policy and Global Strategy," which included comments on revision presented at the meeting, did not deem a world war inevitable but acknowledged the undeniable possibility of the Soviet Union starting a war before the Western Powers had completed its military buildup, while identifying the latter half of 1952 as the most dangerous period. The report also emphasized that the top priority in World War III would be the effective defense of the British mainland from air offensives, including Soviet nuclear attacks. While it was not a certainty that the United States and the Soviet Union would use nuclear weapons, the start of a world war could pose a nuclear threat to London. Furthermore, the report argued that the distinction between the Cold War and a hot war was ambiguous and meaningless, while identifying Western Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia as fronts in such a war. It also made clear that the United Kingdom's

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

⁷² JP (51) 82 (Final) (May 30, 1951); "Item 2: Defence of the Middle East-1951/1954," Confidential Annex to COS (51) 93rd Mtg. (June 6, 1951), DEFE 4/43.

security priorities were Western Europe first and the Middle East second, and that Southeast Asia in the Far East was not of vital importance in the event of all-out war. (However, “Western Europe first” was probably strongly related to the defense of the British mainland with little analysis of Northeast Asia, as the latter was considered an area for which the United States was responsible.) The British military acknowledged in the report that Southeast Asia was “critically important,” but still, it added, as the lessons of the Second World War had indicated, Southeast Asia was not vital for the survival of Great Britain.⁷³

From this point of view, the JP did not position the defense of Southeast Asia in a world war or the Cold War as the United Kingdom’s third priority but rather as something that should contribute to its first two priorities of Western Europe and the Middle East. First, the JP defined the primary objective of British foreign policy in the Far East and Southeast Asia as achieving policy unity among the United Kingdom, the United States, and France, and stipulated the goal of this unified policy as containing the expansion of communism and creating an environment in which the troops and resources utilized by the United Kingdom and France for Indochina and Malaya could be mobilized for a “truly vital purpose: the defense of Western Europe.” To create such an environment, it was considered more critical to crack down on the activities of local communist elements, such as those in Indochina and Malaya, than to neutralize the direct threat posed by China. On the other hand, the JP report backtracked from the previously espoused theory of the separability of China and the Soviet Union. More precisely, the JP now argued that, particularly after China’s intervention in the Korean War, both Chinese and Soviet Communist regimes were in an unshakable alliance relationship, and that there was almost no sign that the Chinese Communists would take a different and independent policy line from that of the Soviet Communists going forward.⁷⁴

The report then indicated that in the event of all-out war, Australia and New Zealand should minimize their defense forces in the ANZAM region and strive to contribute to the defense of the Middle East. As the ANZAM region includes only a small part of Southeast Asia, such as Malaya, the JP expected the military contributions of Australia and New Zealand to be focused on the defense of the empire, i.e., the defense of the Middle East. On the other hand, the report noted the importance of the close connection between the defense of the ANZAM region and the United States’ defense of the Pacific in relation to the ANZUS Treaty but did not include any specific details of such cooperation. In a report dated June 7, the JP also requested the Australian government to make the deployment of Australian forces (especially its ground forces) to the Middle East its “first priority,” arguing that there was no direct threat to Australia from the Far East. This report contained an explanation of the British military’s rationale written for the British Minister of Defence attending the Commonwealth Defense Ministers’ Meeting. The United Kingdom had urged Australia and New Zealand to give priority to the Middle East over the Far East in the event of a world war.⁷⁵

⁷³ “Item 4: Defence Policy and Global Strategy (Revision of DO (50) 45),” Confidential Annex to COS (51) 93rd Mtg. (June 6, 1951); JP (51) 90 (Final) (May 29, 1951); Annex to JP (51) 90 (Final) (May 29, 1951); Annex to JP (51) 90 (Final) (May 29, 1951), DEFE 4/43.

⁷⁴ Ibid.; Annex to JP (51) 90 (Final) (May 29, 1951), DEFE 4/43.

⁷⁵ Ibid. The United Kingdom and the United States had already discussed in February 1951 a line of

As noted above, according to the historian McIntyre, even at the June 25 meeting between Dulles and Australia/New Zealand, Dulles was unable to eliminate from the terms of the ANZUS Treaty the introduction of a permanent military planning organization between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand and a military consultative organization with other Western allies that Australia and New Zealand had sought. Yet, in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense dated June 27, 1951, Dulles explained to the Department of Defense and military leaders that he had eliminated these two organizations. He pointed out that the council established under the ANZUS Treaty would be responsible for consultation with other countries but that this would “normally” be conducted not through military channels but “through diplomatic channels” and in connection with NATO, the Rio Treaty, or a future “security arrangement with Japan.” Dulles then requested the Department of Defense to approve these newly drafted terms.⁷⁶

However, the JCS still had concerns. The JCS submitted a dissenting memorandum dated July 9, 1951, to the Secretary of Defense, and the staff of the Under Secretary of Defense, under the latter’s guidance, held discussions with Dulles regarding an amendment to the terms of the treaty on July 10. A confirmatory memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State dated July 20 contained amended versions of Article VII and Article VIII. The amendment sought to ensure that there would be no permanent military organization established under the framework of the ANZUS Treaty and no regular consultative organization with other Western alliance networks. In the July 9 memorandum, the JCS had expressed their fear that the “consultative relationship” with other states, regional organizations, and alliances set forth in Article VIII of the ANZUS Treaty would be greatly expanded and coupled with NATO and the Rio Treaty, which would cause military planning and military cooperation throughout the West to be federalized and upend the existing Western military planning system led by the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada. In other words, it could be said that the JCS was careful to avoid creating a new form of Western alliance network direction based on a federal system, which would interfere with the hierarchical hub-and-spokes system of alliance network direction that guaranteed leadership of the worldwide Western alliance network to the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada. Furthermore, the JCS indicated forthrightly that in the event of a world war, the United States would have “primary strategic responsibility” in the Pacific, as in the case of World War II, and would not allow Australia and New Zealand to have a large say. While the JCS’s fears could be seen as groundless, they revealed the real intention of the U.S. military leaders.⁷⁷

At the same time, the U.S.-Philippines treaty was also in disarray. In a telegram to the Secretary of State dated July 17, 1951, U.S. Ambassador to Manila Cowen described the details of his meeting with President Quirino on the same day and the state of local public opinion,

demarcation between the ANZAM region, which the British was responsible for, and the Pacific, which the U.S. was responsible for. Despite this demarcation, the U.S. had no intention of according due respect to the ANZAM region. See JP (51) 68 (Final) (May 4, 1951); COS (51) 96th Mtg. (June 11, 1951); JP (51) 86 (June 7, 1951); Annex to JP (51) 86 (June 7, 1951), DEFE 4/44.

⁷⁶ *FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, Part 1*, pp. 221-222.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 226-228.

warning that the Philippine government had an “ego” problem in its desire to be regarded as a sovereign nation. Specifically, the Philippines had complained that while the United States had an equal relationship as allies with Australia and New Zealand and was attempting to foster such a relationship even with Japan, it still did not have any relationship with the Philippines as a “sovereign nation.”⁷⁸

In response, Dulles met with JCS Chairman Bradley the following day (July 18). To Dulles’ surprise, Bradley said that the JCS was not strongly opposed to the involvement of the Philippines in the U.S.-Australia-NZ treaty and that there was room for consideration if it was politically necessary. However, perhaps because Dulles had already successfully negotiated the ANZUS Treaty and had it reviewed within the U.S. government and military, he suggested that the U.S.-Philippines relationship should not be one in which the United States unilaterally defended the Philippines but rather one that adopted a “treaty basis of mutuality” similar to that between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. Nevertheless, Bradley indicated that, as in the case of Australia and New Zealand, he did not intend to allow military planning on equal footing.⁷⁹

Soon after this, a telegram dated July 19 from Ambassador Cowen arrived in Washington. The telegram contained the warning that the Philippines feared Japan would rearm and become aggressive again and that the Filipinos’ fears would not be allayed without a “more formal defense arrangement.” It also pointed to the need to satisfy the political ego of Philippine President Quirino and for the United States to show a certain amount of “respect” given the fact that Quirino took pride in having proposed a Pacific Pact back in 1949.⁸⁰

Thereafter, the U.S. Department of State desperately lobbied the Department of Defense and U.S. military leaders to modify the existing framework for the U.S.-led defense of the Philippines and accept an alliance with the United States and the Philippines on equal footing (although there was still a huge gap in national and military power between the two countries). At a July 25 meeting held in the absence of Dulles between key Department of State officials, the JCS, and key staff officials, the Department of State and the JCS engaged in a heated debate. Rusk pointed out that the Philippine government was furious at the fact that it could not obtain reparations from Japan and suggested that the United States should appease the Philippines by offering it some kind of special security arrangement. In response, Bradley stated that even without a new U.S.-Philippines treaty, the U.S. military found the existing framework of U.S.-Philippines bilateral relations to be “perfectly satisfactory,” and that this framework had been providing the security needed by the Philippines. The U.S.-Philippines military relationship in question that the U.S. military deemed satisfactory was the agreement concerning military bases signed in Manila on March 24, 1946, which entered into force on March 26. The U.S. military leaders were thus of the opinion that a new U.S.-Philippines treaty was unnecessary from the standpoint of military need. Bradley frankly stated that “the Joint Chiefs disliked the idea of any five-power arrangements in the Pacific area and thought that a bilateral arrangement

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 223.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 223-224.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 225.

with the Philippines was the most satisfactory.” In response, Rusk attempted to find common ground with the JCS by saying that the new treaty would neither compromise existing U.S.-Philippines relations nor be structured in a way that required information exchange or joint military planning. Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force Hoyt S. Vandenberg wanted to review the Department of State’s proposed treaty to see if it conformed to the JCS’s principles, and he indicated that the JCS was more focused on Japan than on the Philippines by “[pointing] out that if there were simultaneous attacks on Japan and the Philippines, [the U.S. military] might be unable to come to the assistance of the Philippines.” Should it be said that the JCS considered Japan’s power vital to winning a world war but did not view the defense of the Philippines in the same way? It was agreed at the July 25 meeting that the details of the U.S.-Philippines alliance would not be finalized, and that further consideration would take place at a later date.⁸¹

Subsequently, in a memorandum dated August 2, Secretary of State Acheson warned Secretary of Defense Marshall that there was great confusion in the Philippines “around the two points of reparations and security,” and that the dominant view in the country was that the Philippines was looked down on by the United States in the U.S.-Philippines treaty in comparison with the U.S.-Australia-NZ treaty and the U.S.-Japan treaty. He also informed Marshall that, in the opinion of Ambassador Cowen, a “simple treaty of alliance and mutual security” should be adopted to appease the Philippine public. The JCS finally relented. In a memorandum to Secretary of Defense Marshall on the same day (August 2), the JCS stated that while they genuinely wished to oppose the new mutual defense treaty on the grounds that it would not give U.S. forces any better treatment than the agreement concerning military bases that entered into force on March 26, 1947, if they looked beyond the immediate future at the bigger picture, “such a treaty of alliance” desired by the Department of State would be to “the overall advantage of the United States.” This turn of events was expected to help, but the United States came under pressure from Australia to make the content of the ANZUS Treaty consistent with that of the U.S.-Philippines treaty (whose details I will set aside for another time).⁸²

As is well known, U.S. President Truman was present along with Philippine President Quirino at the signing of the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, but Truman was not present at the signing of either the ANZUS Treaty or the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. This could be said to be an act to satisfy the “ego” of the Philippines. Thus, from late August to early September 1951, the three alliance treaties were signed by the respective representatives of the countries concerned, during which the heated talks behind the scenes over a “stop line” between British and U.S. military leaders ceased and armistice negotiations in the Korean War began. This led to a slight easing of the intensity of the conflict (setting aside the diplomatic

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 229-230.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 233; pp. 238-240. At a meeting on August 9, Australian Ambassador Spender expressed to Rusk and others that the outcry in Australia would be “very bad” if the U.S.-Philippines treaty was more explicit about U.S. defense commitments than the U.S.-Australia-NZ treaty. He also indicated that opponents of the peace treaty with Japan in Australia had already publicly declared that U.S. defense commitments in the U.S.-Australia-NZ treaty were inadequate.

processes behind the establishment of the three treaties for another time).

The September 25 progress report on the implementation of NSC-48/5 was circulated within the U.S. government and military against this backdrop, but there was surprisingly little optimism. Instead, the strategy of “Western Europe first and the Middle East second” agreed upon between the United Kingdom and the United States had been superseded by an inclination for “Far East first” on the part of the United States for the immediate future. Annex 2 of the report stated, “U.S. action in Asia must continue to be based on the recognition that the most immediate overt threats to U.S. security are currently presented in that area.” It cited, specifically, the buildup of Chinese and North Korean military forces as well as “the increased tensions in the Far East threatening the security of Japan” even during the four months following the approval of NSC-48/5. In other words, although the West as a whole had successfully stabilized the Far East to a certain extent through the successful reduction of China’s military threat through the UN forces’ operations from April 1951, there were still lingering concerns that the Far East required prompt and effective countermeasures as compared to Western Europe and the Middle East, the failure of which could spark a world war or a great war in the Far East.⁸³

Nevertheless, the U.S. government and military were convinced that the Soviet Union was intent on controlling the Far East in the medium to long term. They told themselves that simply responding to immediate threats with immediate measures would not work, and that there was a high possibility of escalation depending on the Soviet Union’s focus on military power. However, they also suggested in their own way that the Soviet Union occupied an inferior position in the Far East.

“Meanwhile, there has been no indication of any change in current Soviet tactics to bring the mainland of eastern Asia and eventually Japan and the other principal off-shore islands in the Western Pacific under Soviet control. There is every indication that the USSR will exploit to the fullest the resources of Communist China, to attain this objective [of controlling the Far East]. To date the U.S. has succeeded in avoiding a general war with the USSR, but developments in the Far East have [already] reduced the margin of [operational] maneuverability on which the Soviet Union can [realize its policy] without resorting to greatly expanded hostilities, if the Soviet Union determines to force [its] decision in Korea primarily by military means.”

The report suggested that regardless of the extent to which the United States, or rather the West, had no intention of starting a world war from its side, it had no complete control over the Soviet Union’s moves.⁸⁴

The progress report then stated that the United States had continued to effectively enforce the “principle of collective defense” in a manner that overcame the concerns of its Western allies while serving U.S. interests. In short, this could be understood as the United States having been successful in its alliance formation policy and in fostering other friendly countries in the Far East while quashing the concerns of the United Kingdom and France.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 81-82.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

On the other hand, in view of the formation of the Western alliance network in the Far East, the progress report also determined that the West as a whole had constructively strengthened itself and built itself up. It went out of its way to tout the success of the Japanese Peace Treaty Conference, stating, “On the positive side, progress can be noted toward the general unity of Asian and non-Asian countries, as exemplified at the Japanese Peace Treaty Conference.” However, it also called for an understanding that further time and effort was still required on this front.⁸⁵

The progress report then went on to highlight the success achieved by the United States with regard to Japan. Could it be said that the United States had been attempting to minimize the threat posed by China and the Soviet Union in the Far East by creating and leveraging a Far East Western alliance network centered on Japan? The report referred to the signing of the Treaty of San Francisco, drafted by the United Kingdom and the United States, by 48 countries as a “turning point in Asia” that represented a “significant potential change in the power situation in Asia.” It further assessed that, from the point of view of the Cold War, the signing of the peace treaty contributed to Japan’s self-reliance, affinity with the United States, domestic security, and defense against external threats, as well as to the security and stability of the Far East as a whole. The report then noted that the economic support provided by Japan for UN forces during the Korean War had played a significant role in strengthening the Japanese economy, especially in terms of trade expansion, pointing out that “Japan’s commercial exports [had] increased from a level of about \$70 million per month for the July–September 1950 period to a level of \$125 million per month in April–June 1951.” The report also touched on the strengthening of Japan’s national defense capabilities, noting that the U.S. President had authorized Japan to establish a force equivalent to the U.S. Coast Guard on August 29, 1951, and that the Department of State and the Department of Defense were discussing the provision of heavy equipment to Japan’s National Police Reserve.⁸⁶

Written almost a month and a half after the progress report, “National Intelligence Estimate No. 43” (NIE-43; dated November 13, 1951) issued by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assessed that the Soviet Union was enjoying great success in the Far East. In the Estimate’s conclusion, the CIA acknowledged the scale of the strategic resources already acquired by the Soviet Union in the Far East as follows: “The USSR derives numerous and substantial military and economic advantages from the areas of the Far East now under Communist control. This vast, continuous land mass provides valuable bases for launching attacks against the non-Communist Far East and for further political penetration of adjacent areas, and also provides defense in depth to the USSR. Furthermore, [the land of the Far East] contains a tremendous manpower potential and considerable, though largely undeveloped, resources of strategic raw materials.” The Estimate then invoked a rather simplistic game-like understanding of the issue and claimed that the loss of Soviet control over presently held areas such as Manchuria, North China, and northern Korea would be regarded as a “threat” to the

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 83–85. For details of Japan’s rearmament process, see Chapter 6 of my book, *Nihon saigunbi he no michi [The Road to Japan’s Rearmament]*

security of the Soviet Union.⁸⁷

The Estimate further warned that “the expansion of Communist control over all of Korea would provide the USSR with the most favorable base for operations against Japan.” This understanding foreshadowed the strategic positioning of the U.S.-ROK alliance that would be concluded in late 1953. In other words, Korea could be said to have been positioned as the front line for the defense of Japan, a key element of the Western alliance network in the Far East. At the same time, in connection with this, the Estimate also recognized Taiwan as a possible base for attacking China by positioning it as a “link in the offshore island chain” in the Pacific, thereby implicitly granting it status as part of the system for protecting the U.S.-Japan alliance that included Japan, the U.S.-Philippines alliance, and the ANZUS Treaty. This also anticipated the strategic positioning of the U.S.-China alliance of 1954.⁸⁸

NIE-43 then went on to describe the high hopes for Japan in terms of its potential to pose a long-term strategic threat to Soviet success. Japan’s success and its position as a key element of the Far East Western alliance network was now taken for granted within the U.S. government and military. In other words, Japan had become the heart of Western resistance to the Soviet threat in the Far East: “Of the Far Eastern areas not now under Communist control. Japan is of the greatest strategic importance to the USSR. Japan poses the greatest potential threat to Communist military interests in the Far East and is a key element of the US defense line in the Western Pacific.” At the same time, the Estimate warned that should Japan fall to the Chinese and Soviets, the Communists would take control of the Far East’s only center of industrial power and a large pool of experienced workers and administrators, creating a “strong, largely self-sufficient power complex” in the Far East that would oppose British and U.S. interests over the long term. In other words, while a scenario of the United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan against the Soviet Union would give the Western Powers 4.5 times the capabilities of the Soviets in the event of total war, the alternative scenario of the United Kingdom and the United States against China, the Soviet Union, and Japan would tip the scales in favor of the latter side beyond mathematically shifting Japan’s contribution from one side to the other.⁸⁹

Did the ANZUS Treaty Successfully Facilitate the Deployment of Australian and New Zealand Forces to the Middle Eastern Front?

At the end of August 1951, the Australian government was more concerned with the establishment of a treaty and military commitment that would ensure the protection of Australia by the United States than with deploying Australian and New Zealand forces to the Middle East and contributing to the defense of Southeast Asia, which was what the United Kingdom wanted. In a telegram dated August 29, 1951, just before the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty was signed, newly appointed Australian Minister for External Affairs Richard G. Casey outlined to former Australian Minister for External Affairs Spender, who had been appointed

⁸⁷ *FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, Part I*, p. 107.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

Australian Ambassador to Washington D.C. and Australia's deputy representative for the conclusion of the ANZUS Treaty and the peace treaty with Japan, the basic policy for handling U.S. media and U.S. politicians with respect to the forthcoming conclusion of the ANZUS Treaty between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. Specifically, he set out a highly cautious approach, especially in relation to the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, and warned against easily acceding to the evolution of the ANZUS Treaty into a more expansive Pacific Pact and against getting ahead of themselves regarding the establishment of a council for directing the ANZUS Treaty until the treaty was ratified. In any case, this was because the establishment of a bipartite defense system involving the United States that Australia and New Zealand had been pushing for since 1946 was about to become reality. Perhaps in response to this, when the ANZUS Treaty was signed in San Francisco on September 1, 1951, Spender's remarks at the event had a notable emphasis on unity with the United States, with no mention of any direction policy or expansion policy for the ANZUS Treaty: "This day we here and now declare to the world that our three peoples share a common destiny," as if Spender was imploring the United States to do its best to protect Australia.⁹⁰

Even in late 1951, the reason for the British military's insistence on dispatching Australian and New Zealand forces to the Middle East was the serious shortage of British Commonwealth troops on the Middle Eastern front in the event of a world war. According to the revised Plan Cinderella (dated August 24, 1951), a joint Anglo-American-Canadian emergency war plan for global use submitted by the JP to the COS, the British military had deemed the shortage of troops in the Middle East to be "serious." Even if the "Inner Ring" strategy were to be adopted, only two infantry divisions could be deployed 60 days after the start of war, despite the need for 2 2/3 infantry divisions, one armored division, and one armored brigade by that point in the war; and at the 180th-day mark, when Soviet forces were likely to start launching full-scale invasions, a total of 5 2/3 infantry divisions, one armored division, and one armored brigade would be required, and although the armored division and brigade could somehow be made available, infantry divisions were expected to fall short by 2 2/3 divisions. One further infantry division and armored division would be needed by the 270th-day mark, making the shortage of troops at that point even more dire.⁹¹

⁹⁰ *The ANZUS Treaty, 1951*, pp. 196-199. Cited passage on p. 197. I will leave the discussion of negotiations surrounding U.S.-Australia-NZ joint defense in 1946, which did not materialize, for another time. For details of the British reaction, see my article, *Anzasu joyaku taisei keisei he no igirisu no gaiko/senryakuteki apurochi, 1951 nen — nishigawa gunji domeimonai de no teikoku boei keneki ni koken suru joyaku/gunji senryaku keisei o motomete* ["British diplomatic and strategic approaches to the formation of the ANZUS treaty system, 1951: The pursuit of treaties and development of military strategies that serve imperial defense interests within the Western military alliance network"], *Sogo seisaku kenkyu [Journal of Policy Studies]* (Kwansei Gakuin University), No. 56 (March 2018), pp. 1-32.

⁹¹ JP (51) 75 (Final) (August 24, 1951); Annex I to JP (51) 75 (Final) (August 24, 1951), DEFE 4/46. There was also a serious shortage of air power on the Middle Eastern front, with a projected shortfall of 300 aircraft at the start of war and 700 aircraft by the sixth month of war. *Ibid.* The Royal Australian Air Force was supposed to commit a total of 90 aircraft by the third month of war, comprising mainly of three medium bomber squadrons (24 aircraft) and two fighter/ground attack squadrons (32 aircraft). The Royal New Zealand Air Force, on the other hand, was supposed to commit a total of 20 aircraft by the second month of war, comprising one light bomber squadron (12 aircraft) and one medium-range transport squadron (8 aircraft). The South African and Rhodesian air forces were supposed to dispatch 52 bombers and 249 fighters by the third month of war. That was significantly more than the 16 light bombers and 208

To make up for this shortage of ground forces, the United Kingdom expected the militaries of Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa to dispatch, respectively, one Australian infantry division by the ninth month of war and another division by the twelfth month; 1/3 New Zealand infantry division by the ninth month of war and another 1/3 division by the twelfth month; and one South African armored division by the ninth month of war. However, there was no explicit commitment regarding any of these troops. With respect to the viability of Plan Cinderella, the British military still could not rely on the Australian military to provide reinforcements in the Middle East, especially because the Australian government had not changed its determination that Malaya's security was inextricable from Australia's own security. Nevertheless, the Australian Defence Committee had deemed Malaya to be important, though not vital, to Australia's defense, and the question was how to change the Australian government's mind in this regard. (The Australian Defence Committee, however, also agreed that Australia would fight in Malayan territory to defend Malaya until the very end before withdrawing.)⁹²

Plan Cinderella proposed mobilizing the British troops deployed on the Korean Peninsula and in Hong Kong and Malaya and dispatching these troops to the Middle East to make up for the serious shortage of ground forces there. Specifically, one British Commonwealth infantry division fighting in Korea as well as one commando brigade and one infantry brigade in Malaya would be dispatched to the Middle East, while the troops withdrawn from Hong Kong would be dispatched to Malaya to reinforce the weakened forces there. Although this deployment of troops would not eliminate the shortage, it was expected to increase the probability that the military strategy in the Middle East could be executed successfully.⁹³

The British military had also determined that the United States would fully guarantee the security of both Australia and New Zealand based on the assumption that the ANZUS Treaty would soon be concluded, an understanding also shared by the New Zealand government. In other words, from the perspective of the United Kingdom, the ANZUS Treaty was positioned as a treaty for the defense of Australia and New Zealand against the direct threat of the Soviet Union and the expected threat of Chinese forces advancing southward through Southeast Asia. (For the United Kingdom, the ANZUS Treaty had never been so much about defending against Japan as it was about defending against China.)⁹⁴

Plan Cinderella did not consider Southeast Asia to be of vital importance in a world war but did have some reservations about the defense of Malaya. According to the plan, upon the outbreak of all-out war, British Commonwealth forces would no doubt withdraw from Korea and evacuate from Hong Kong, but as for Malaya, only one commando brigade would be dispatched from Malaya to the Middle East, with the remaining British troops stationed in Malaya to continue fighting until the defense became hopeless. Regarding the defense of

fighters that would be dispatched by the Royal Air Force. Appendix 'D' to Annex II to JP (51) 75 (Final) (August 24, 1951), DEFE 4/46. To make up for the shortage of troops, Plan Cinderella had proposed to dispatch three tactical squadrons and other units from the Far East and Southeast Asia, especially from Malaya. Annex I to JP (51) 75 (Final) (August 24, 1951), DEFE 4/46.

⁹² Appendix 'D' to Annex II to JP (51) 75 (Final) (August 24, 1951); Annex I to JP (51) 75 (Final) (August 24, 1951), DEFE 4/46.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

Indochina, the plan proposed that UN forces (excluding British Commonwealth forces) fighting in Korea should be committed to the defense of Indochina. If the Chinese forces were to struggle in Indochina, it would not only delay their arrival in Malaya but could also attenuate a significant amount of their offensive power. However, the proposal itself was not feasible, and it was calculated that a considerable number of troops would be required to defend Indochina. According to French calculations, four divisions and 13 fighter/bomber squadrons would be needed to defend Indochina, while British calculations called for an additional two divisions and six fighter/bomber squadrons.⁹⁵

The COS was even more pessimistic than the JP about the defense forces in the Middle East. The COS reviewed Plan Cinderella at a meeting on September 12 and noted that even the three British divisions that were to be dispatched to the Middle East might be mobilized to defend the British mainland, that it might not be possible to withdraw even a single commando brigade from Malaya, and that the deployment of British Commonwealth forces in Korea to the Middle East might be opposed by Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. On the other hand, another dilemma for the COS was the uncertainty surrounding the withdrawal of British troops from Hong Kong, which was a government decision. Moreover, the issue of restructuring the command system for the defense of the Middle East was raised prior to this meeting, and while the COS was leaning toward a Turkey-centric defense of the Middle East and wanted to couple the Middle East defense organization to the NATO network, the Foreign Office opposed this as it thought that it would be premature. Given these circumstances, the COS agreed to continue exploring what it perceived to be hopeless U.S. defense cooperation in the Middle East.⁹⁶

During this period, the British military was concerned about the possibility that the Soviet Union might attempt not only airborne operations but also landing operations against the British mainland by the third month of all-out war against the Soviet Union. The three British divisions that were to be dispatched to the Middle East could be used to defend the British mainland to counter this threat. Given the undeniable threat of all-out war, the vulnerability of the British mainland's defenses was making the British military extremely nervous. At a COS meeting on June 13, Sir Frederick Brundrett of the Air Defence Committee pointed out that, for the next three years, air defense capabilities of the British mainland would not be sufficiently strong to repel Soviet air offensives. He then recommended that the COS and the JCS discuss the possibility of attacking Soviet long-range bomber bases to reduce their threat. In response, Slessor indicated that he had already begun discussing this issue with the U.S. However, at a VCOS-level COS meeting five days later, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC; a subordinate body of the COS) reported that should Soviet forces overwhelm continental Western Europe, as many as 20 divisions could land on the British mainland in a relatively short period of time, which shook the COS. Although Vice Chief of the Naval Staff George Creasy (then Admiral) did not believe in the possibility of a landing operation involving as many as 20 divisions, he pointed out that a study should be conducted to determine whether

⁹⁵ Annex I to JP (51) 75 (Final) (August 24, 1951), DEFE 4/46.

⁹⁶ "Item 2: Plan Cinderella," Confidential Annex to COS (51) 143rd Mtg. (September 12, 1951); COS (51) 131st Mtg. (August 16, 1951); COS (51) 133rd Mtg. (August 20, 1951); JP (51) 114 (Final) (August 27, 1951), DEFE 4/46.

the use of nuclear weapons by the British and U.S. would be necessary to prevent an invasion of the British mainland. As a result, the COS ordered the JIC to rewrite the report but remained anxious about the surprising vulnerabilities of the British mainland that had been highlighted. The revised JIC report presented at a VCOS-level COS meeting on July 16 stated that 20 Soviet divisions could invade the British mainland within a ten-day period in the first 90 days of war. (Geographically, securing the coast of Belgium was sufficient for the Soviets to conduct such a landing operation, and it was not necessary for them to overwhelm France.) Creasy opposed the JIC's calculations, citing factors such as the Soviet Union's lack of the requisite transport capabilities, the Royal Navy's ability to prevent the Soviets from landing even if it had lost air superiority, and the difficulty of conducting landing operations between the months of October and April. Chief Staff Officer to the Minister of Defence Lt. Gen. Sir Kenneth McLean recalled how difficult the Normandy landing operations were and suggested that the JIC's assessment was too harsh. In response, Air Vice-Marshal N.C. Ogilvie-Forbes, on behalf of the JIC, insisted that the possibility of the Soviets conducting landing operations in the first 90 days of war could not be ruled out, no matter how small the chance of success or how great the damage, before suggesting that it was necessary to conduct nuclear bombing against ports and harbors where vessels for landing operations were gathered. The COS deemed the JIC's calculations of the success of landing operations to be excessively harsh and believed that even if the Soviets were to attempt such operations within 90 days, they could be sufficiently countered through conventional bombing. Nevertheless, it must have come as a shock to the COS that the JIC was so adamant about the possibility of Soviet landing operations. The JP's rewritten report was subsequently discussed at a COS meeting on August 10. This time, however, the COS themselves raised the possibility that the Soviets might launch all-out airborne operations against bomber/fighter bases on the British mainland from the outset of war, which they warned would deal a devastating blow to the Western Powers' entire campaign if successful. In any case, it was difficult to deny the tremendous pressure on the British to use their prized asset of the three divisions that were to be dispatched to the Middle East to defend the British mainland instead. As the three alliance treaties were being concluded in the Far East, the defense system of the United Kingdom, a leading power of the Western alliance network, was ironically on the brink of collapse.⁹⁷

Needless to say, the United Kingdom desperately feared the imminent outbreak of a world war sparked by the defense of the Far East and especially of Japan, as well as the possible collapse of not only the defense of the British mainland but also the British defense system worldwide. By the end of August 1951, the British military had come to believe that the Soviet air force could deliver a devastating blow to the British mainland in the event of a world war against the Soviet Union, and that it was essential to mobilize the medium bombers of the Royal Air Force to destroy the Soviets' forward air bases while receiving 50 nuclear bombs from the United States. The JP warned in Plan Cinderella that Soviet air offensives

⁹⁷ "Offensive Measures which Might Be Taken to Reduce the Scale of Air Attack on the United Kingdom During the Years 1951/1957," Confidential Annex to COS (51) 97th Mtg. (June 13, 1951), DEFE 4/44; COS (51) 99 Mtg. (June 18, 1951), DEFE 4/44; COS (51) 116th Mtg. (July 16, 1951), DEFE 4/45; COS (51) 128th Mtg. (August 10, 1951), DEFE 4/46.

would, in the worst case, render the British mainland useless as a “main base,” which was key to the British war effort. On the other hand, the plan also assumed that Japan would join the war on the side of the United Kingdom and the United States. On September 11, 1951, newly appointed British Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison told Acheson that the United States should not use nuclear weapons without prior consultation as doing so could lead to a catastrophic nuclear retaliation by the Soviet Union against the British mainland. Acheson, however, retorted that the U.S. president could not possibly accept the political constraints demanded by the United Kingdom in the case of using nuclear weapons that did not require British bases. The two parties decided to await the outcome of military talks.⁹⁸

At a COS meeting held two days after the signing of the ANZUS Treaty (September 3), the British Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) warned that while the outbreak of a world war was not imminent, the Soviet Union would never tolerate a situation where UN forces were stationed in Korea with Japan rearming in the background. In other words, the fear was that the rearmament of Japan and its transformation into a country with total war capabilities would lead to the Soviet Union joining the Korean War and spark a great war in the Far East as well as a world war. The British JIC had also determined that if the Western powers ratified the peace treaty with Japan, the Soviet Union would launch a new round of offensives in Korea. In response, at a VCOS-level COS meeting on September 7, Vice Chief of the Naval Staff Creasy stated that either the rearmament of Japan or the stationing of U.S. forces in Korea might be acceptable to the Soviet Union on its own, but that accepting both would be a “very bitter pill” for the Soviet Union to swallow. He added that if these actions were coupled with the bombing of Manchuria or “hot pursuit” by UN forces along the Sino-Korean/Soviet-Korean border, the situation might become “unforgivable” for the Soviet Union. He then reiterated the importance of prior consultation with the United States to avoid this turn of events. At the same meeting, British military sources in Korea also reported concerns over “hot pursuit” by U.S. aircraft that could advance close to the Soviet-Korean border area and cross the border unintentionally or in the absence of orders.⁹⁹

On the other hand, at the September 11 meeting, Acheson made clear to Morrison that the United States had no intention of using Japanese military units from the rearmament of Japan in the Korean War, and that the ongoing rearmament of Japan was for the purpose of domestic security as well as to deter a Soviet invasion of Japan. At the same time, Acheson, perhaps inadvertently, drew attention to the scenario that the Soviet invasion of Hokkaido would mean the start of a world war from the point of view of the U.S. According to British records of the meeting, Acheson had in mind the reinforcement and heavy armament of Japan’s National Police Reserve, stating, “The Joint Chiefs of Staff were concerned lest Japan should be left defenceless if it became necessary to transfer to Korea the two National Guard divisions

⁹⁸ COS (51) 501 also AD (51) 91 (August 31, 1951), DEFE 20/1. JP (51) 75 (Final) (August 24, 1951); Annex II to JP (51) 75 (Final) (August 24, 1951), DEFE 4/46. Foreign Secretary to Prime Minister, No. 2899 (September 11, 1951), DEFE 20/2. For U.S. records, see *FRUS, 1951, Vol. I*, pp. 880-883.

⁹⁹ “Item 2: Meeting with Directors of Intelligence and Directors of Plans,” Confidential Annex to COS (51) 140 Mtg. (September 5, 1951); COS (51) 141 Mtg. (September 7, 1951); “Item 3: Military Action In Korea In the Event of a Breakdown In the Armistice Talks,” Confidential Annex to COS (51) 141 Mtg. (September 7, 1951), DEFE 4/46.

now employed on internal security duties in Japan. In that event, the Russians might decide to try an airborne landing on Hokkaido from bases in Sakhalin or the Kurile Islands. This was a danger against which it was considered important to take every precaution.” Thus, the British was made clearly aware of the role of Japanese ground forces in defining the grounds for starting a war against the Soviet Union and the use of atomic bombs from the point of view of the U.S. In other words, there would be no need to invoke the invasion of Japan as grounds for starting World War III if Japanese ground forces could successfully deter the Soviet invasion of Hokkaido, and London would not be exposed to the threat of a Soviet nuclear attack.¹⁰⁰

The U.S. went on. The U.S. government and military wanted to designate Japan as the “stop line” for the start of a world war against the Soviet Union by the entire West. At the military talks between the United Kingdom and the United States on September 13, five days after the peace treaty with Japan and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty were signed on September 8, the U.S. declared that although it would consult with the British regarding nuclear attacks that required the use of bases on the British mainland, it would not promise to consult with the British regarding the use of nuclear weapons in the event that Japan was directly attacked by the Soviet Union or if the Soviet Union intervened in a major way in the Korean War. In an exchange related to Japan, Bradley stated, “Take the situation in Japan. Your paper does not discuss that. If the Soviet Union should jump on Japan[,] we would be in a general war and we probably would recommend use of the A-bomb. Japan is as important to us strategically as the Soviet central position is to them. Korea is another situation. There you are in with us.” Despite the fact that this was not written in the British military document COS (51) 106, British military representative Elliot acknowledged that the defense of Japan would be grounds for starting all-out war and that the use of nuclear weapons would be unavoidable. This was a bold concession. At the same time, Elliot demanded that even in such a situation, the U.S. should first consult with the British. The British was attempting to control the U.S. use of nuclear weapons in the Far East as much as it could. In response, Collins coldly remarked, “But if the Soviets attack Japan[,] we would go to war even alone and we would use the A-bomb. No U.K. bases would be involved.”¹⁰¹

The United States stubbornly refused to agree to prior consultation with the British on the use of nuclear weapons in the Far East. The U.S. did not equate the use of nuclear weapons with the start of all-out war. Accordingly, it intended to keep the United Kingdom from wielding any influence over the U.S. use of nuclear weapons in the Far East (even though the U.S. also believed that an attack on U.S. forces in Japan would quite likely result in all-out war between the United States and the Soviet Union). Military-political talks between the United Kingdom and the United States were also held on the same day, but they proceeded along the same lines as the military talks. At the talks, Nitze took up the issue surrounding

¹⁰⁰ “United States-United Kingdom Talks at Washington: Far East: China and Korea: Draft record of the meeting which took place at 10.30 a.m. on Tuesday, 11th September, 1951,” FO 371/92064.

¹⁰¹ “Summary of Note Recorded by the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff at United States-United Kingdom Military Conference, Held in Room 2C-923, the Pentagon on Thursday, 13 September, 1951, at 1000,” DEFE 20/1. Bradley also suggested that a formal and large-scale attack by Soviet forces against British and U.S. forces on the Korean peninsula would be grounds for starting World War III: “Korea is another situation. There you are in with us.” Ibid.

Japan and noted that there was “serious disagreement” with the British in this regard. Elliot insisted that the only issue at hand was whether the U.S. would agree to prior consultation since he had already offered a concession on this front during the military talks. To this, Nitze coldly replied, “We could not make a commitment, even if it were only on the problem of consultation.” Bradley then informed Elliot that U.S. Army General Matthew B. Ridgway, the newly appointed Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in the Far East, feared the possibility of a Soviet invasion of Japan even more than the JCS, stressing that “if the USSR attacked [U.S.] forces in Japan [the United States] would be at war with the USSR and that it would not be a local situation.” For the United Kingdom, this meant all-out war (i.e., nuclear war) against the Soviet Union in defense of Japan as well as major Soviet air offensives on the British mainland. There was little doubt that they were probably in considerable shock. A U.S. memorandum dated September 27 calculated that the Soviet Union had 50 atomic bombs as well as 600 to 700 T-4s, which were copies of the B-29. Given the range of operation of the T-4s, they could only launch one-way attacks from Soviet territory against major U.S. targets but could easily hit major British targets before returning.¹⁰²

Thus, the entire British imperial defense system at the time appeared to be on the brink of total collapse. Confidence in the defense of the British mainland was suddenly rocked, and in the Far East, the United States was adamant about designating Japan as the “stop line,” creating the possibility that a world war might be sparked by the Far East issue. Moreover, the British Commonwealth defense system in the Middle East was already in disarray even before that, and the West’s defense posture in Southeast Asia was in an even worse state as it had not even organized an approach to defense. In short, the areas of the West’s defense system for which the United Kingdom was responsible were in danger of collapse. The British government and military believed that the best way to resolve the problem was to incorporate U.S. forces into the various fronts. In addition, tact was necessary to successfully build healthy relations with local allies.

From the point of view of the British government and military, the strengthening of the defense of Southeast Asia required, among other things, tact. One prerequisite for the defense of the Middle East was an expedient and reliable Southeast Asia defense. In other words, although Southeast Asia would not be a decisive front in a world war, British economic interests in Southeast Asia were essential for maintaining the British empire, and there was a need to ensure expedient Western control of the region. It was also imperative for the British to avoid getting involved in the difficult and awkward French colonial war as much as possible, while simultaneously taking various actions to help France avoid defeat. A JP report dated August 27, 1951, on the defense of Southeast Asia noted that France was seeking talks of the “highest possible military level” with the United Kingdom and the United States to seek the commitment of the British and U.S. militaries to the defense of Indochina, but both the United Kingdom and the United States attempted to avoid such a commitment by holding only

¹⁰² *FRUS, 1951, Vol. I*, pp. 886-887; p. 889. Elliot to COS, ELL 195 (October 29, 1951), DEFE 20/2. “To All Holders of SE-13: Revised Paragraph 2b of SE-13 Approved by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on 27 September 1951,” PSF, NSC Meeting, Box 215, the Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri, USA.

low-level military talks with France. With regard to the defense of Indochina, not only were the United Kingdom, the United States, and France unable to mobilize the necessary troops to counter an invasion by China alone (limited war), but in the event of a world war, the defense of Indochina itself had no strategic significance for the United Kingdom and the United States. Under these circumstances, it was unsurprising that the British military had deemed it “premature” to conclude a NATO-style defense treaty in Southeast Asia. However, even the British believed that “some form of regional association may be found in due course to be of value.” That could be said to be the British military’s first step in establishing a Southeast Asia defense system. The most significant reason for this inclination was its judgment that although Southeast Asia could not be defended in a war against China or in a world war, the United Kingdom, France, and the respective governments of Southeast Asian countries would somehow be able to suppress the military action of communists in the region. The August 27 report remained optimistic in its assessment of the communist threat in the region as it recognized that the French was in control in Indochina and that the British was in “control” in Malaya. Thailand, too, did not face any urgent threat from communists in the region, and it was only necessary to strengthen its military organization and equipment. Burma, however, was experiencing uprisings staged by communists in the region, with the communists reportedly holding the “initiative,” thus requiring support from external parties and a response by the government. Moreover, it was clear that in the event of a limited war against China, maximizing the extent of French resistance in Indochina would buy good time for the defense of Malaya. Based on calculations, the British needed around four months to take up its defensive position in the Songkhla area in Thai territory for the defense of Malaya, and with more time, it was not impossible that the United Kingdom could scramble British Commonwealth troops from other parts of the world to defend Malaya based on the world situation. In view of this, the British military believed that the low-level military talks between the United Kingdom, the United States, and France were meaningful. However, at these military talks, the British did not discuss the defense of Southeast Asia in the event of a world war with the French at all, and even when the French raised the topic, the British would simply reply that they were occupied with Hong Kong and Malaya and were not in a position to assist the French “in advance.” On the other hand, the British military was hoping that the ANZUS Treaty, which would soon be concluded, would foster closer relations between the United States and Australia/New Zealand and push the United States to participate in defense planning studies for Southeast Asia. In this sense, the British military was starting to consider how it could make use of the ANZUS Treaty to incorporate the United States into the complex defense of Southeast Asia. In other words, it could be said that its plan was to first establish a link between the ANZUS Treaty and the ANZAM region before incorporating France and other countries concerned.¹⁰³

At this point, as if to spur on the British, the Australian Defence Committee submitted to the British the “Strategic Concept for the Defence of the Anzam Area,” whose content was the same as that of the British strategic concept for all-out war. This concept did not consider

¹⁰³ JP (51) 151 (Final) (August 27, 1951); “(A) Defence Planning-South East Asia,” Confidential Annex to COS (51) 139th Mtg. (September 3, 1951), DEFE 4/46.

Malaya to be vital to the security of Australia and New Zealand, allowing both Australian and New Zealand forces to be dispatched for the defense of the Middle East. However, the concept was not approved by the Australian government. There was still concern within the Australian government that the loss of Malaya would lead to tremendous political unrest, based on past experiences during the Pacific War. In contrast, the JP reiterated that the ANZUS Treaty would allow the United States to defend Australian territory from direct threats, even if Malaya were to fall. The British military was starting to think that the ANZUS Treaty would be activated against Chinese forces during a world war, i.e., the basis on which U.S. forces would defend Australia and New Zealand against the threat of China, and thus serve as a defense treaty that would make it politically possible for Australia and New Zealand to dispatch their forces to the Middle East with peace of mind. This strategic concept was discussed at a COS meeting on September 21, with the COS not only welcoming the proposal but also supportive of the JP's opinion.¹⁰⁴

The Australian government's concern at this time was how to give actual substance to the ANZUS Treaty that had just been signed. In a telegram to the Australian Minister for External Affairs dated September 20, 1951, Australian Ambassador to Washington D.C. Spender said that, in order to achieve this, the first approach to the U.S. government and military would be the most important and that the Australians should opt for, as the first task, the establishment of a three-power consultation body and a stable start to its management. A week later, in a letter to the Ambassador dated September 27, Frederick R. W. Scherger, Air Vice Marshal & Head of Australian Joint Service Staff, Washington, proposed the creation of a military organization for the defense of the ANZAM region that drew inspiration from the British-Australian military organization. On the other hand, the generals proposed that the Council should be established in Washington, citing the advantages of having the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) available and operational at all times in the event of a world war, as well as the ease with which logistics support from the United States and Canada could be discussed. In any case, it seemed as if the Australian government and military were intent on giving actual substance to U.S. defense commitments and advancing the status of the ANZUS Treaty within the Western alliance network.¹⁰⁵

Meanwhile, the British military was careful to ensure that the various defense measures for Indochina proposed by France would not be a drag on the British Commonwealth's already complex defense posture in Southeast Asia and the ANZAM region. The French had already submitted a defense proposal for Johor. The proposal called for concentrating troops in the Tonkin area of Vietnam and defending Malaya by building a bridgehead in the Johor area

¹⁰⁴ JP (51) 118 (Final) (September 13, 1951), DEFE 4/47. Acting Australian Minister of Defence Phillip A. M. McBride had sent a letter to the British government expressing concern about the impact of the Malaya issue on Australian public opinion. JP (51) 120 (Final) (September 13, 1951), DEFE 4/47. During this period, the British military had adopted the policy of mainly defending Malaya with one British Gurkha infantry division and one infantry brigade by the 9½-month mark of a world war, when the Chinese invasion of Malaya was expected. "Appendix to Letter from Mr. Shinwell to Mr. McBride: the Threat to Malaya," Appendix to Annex to JP (51) 120 (Final) (September 13, 1951); "Item 4: Strategic Concept for the Anzam Area," Confidential Annex to COS (51) 148th Mtg. (September 21, 1951), DEFE 4/47.

¹⁰⁵ *The ANZUS Treaty, 1951*, pp. 200-202.

on the opposite shore of Singapore. The British, of course, had determined that under such a defense proposal, they could lose most of Malaya and ultimately fail to defend Johor. As for the idea of establishing a major logistics base in Singapore to support the French military effort in Vietnam, studies revealed that Singapore would not be able to fulfill the considerable stockpiling requirements. Thus, the British military began exploring the idea of mobilizing U.S. troops. In other words, the British was looking to tap on U.S. logistics bases in not only Singapore but also the Philippines to meet the needs of the French. This led to a meeting between the COS and Marshal Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, Commander-in-Chief of the French forces in Indochina, on October 4. The latter expressed optimism that fighting against Viet Minh's forces in Vietnam would cease within two years in the absence of direct intervention by Chinese forces, while stressing the danger of Chinese forces and the importance of military aid from the United Kingdom and the United States.¹⁰⁶

During the period from March to October 1951, the British government and military found themselves in a situation where the defense of the Middle East could be extremely challenging in the event of a world war. The British could not count on the deployment of Australian troops to the Middle East because of the Australian government's stance, and more than that, recent issues in the defense of the British mainland meant that it might not be possible to even dispatch the three divisions from the British mainland to the Middle East. In comparison, there was marked optimism surrounding the Southeast Asian strategy in the event of a limited war against China. Underlining this optimism was an improvement in the domestic military and security situation in various parts of Southeast Asia. Recent developments in the Korean War were favorable for the British military as well. From the point of view of the British, the fear of a personal war against China by MacArthur had been relieved by his dismissal, while a favorable military situation was unfolding in which UN forces could wear down the Chinese forces in Korea. Although there was still a non-zero possibility of a Chinese invasion of Southeast Asia, it was nothing compared to the tense period of December 1950 and January 1951. Amid the shortage of troops in the Middle East and Europe and the increasingly optimistic military situation in the Far East, the promotion of the security of Australia and New Zealand by the United States through the ANZUS Treaty had contributed to the defense of the British Commonwealth, not so much against the Soviet Union and Japan but rather against the Soviet Union and China. The ANZUS treaty system became one of the few reliable defensive pillars across the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, a fragmented region that the British Commonwealth was responsible for defending, thereby paving the way for U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. This could be said to be a ray of hope for the defense of the rapidly sinking British Empire. This was also the standpoint from which the British later approached the United States, Australia, and New Zealand regarding the participation of the United Kingdom in the ANZUS Treaty.

The Australian government, however, had neither the intention nor the time to fully support British participation in the ANZUS Treaty. The key move within the Australian

¹⁰⁶ JP (51) 152 (Final) (August 27, 1951), DEFE 4/46; PAO/P (51) 63 (September 27, 1951); JP (51) 162 (Final) (October 1, 1951); COS (51) 155th Mtg. (October 4, 1951), DEFE 4/47.

government and military in this regard was a telegram sent by Australian Prime Minister Menzies to Australian Minister for External Affairs Casey on November 8, 1951, in which he gave strict orders to prevent the conclusion of the ANZUS Treaty from developing into other extended security arrangements. Menzies explained that, first, the ANZUS Treaty had not been ratified yet, and given that Australia's efforts since 1946 had finally culminated "for the first time in [its] history an American guarantee of security," Australia must not lose this guarantee by casually extending security arrangements before the treaty was ratified.¹⁰⁷

Second, Menzies feared that Australian public opinion would be confused if Australia was easily on board with talks on extending security arrangements. According to him, in the event of such talks, the Australian government could be trapped in the face of dominant opposition against supporting Asian countries among the Australian public, while on the other hand, he pointed out that the Australian public might demand active commitments to the defense of Southeast Asia, which might prevent Australian forces from being dispatched to the Middle East, which was what the United Kingdom wanted.¹⁰⁸

Third, he noted that the United Kingdom had opposed an expanded security system in Asia unless such a system defended areas under British control. He further suggested that it was unlikely the United States would be on board in the first place if security arrangements were to be extended to Asia in the face of British opposition. He had witnessed the unwillingness of the United States to create a more expansive security regime in Asia. Menzies then reiterated that it was of paramount importance for Australia to continue to secure the United States' commitment to defend Australia, and that Australia should not assume overseas defense responsibilities that did not sufficiently cater to Australia's own interests.¹⁰⁹

From Menzies' point of view, he did not want Australia to serve as a "watchdog" for the defense of British, French, and Dutch imperialism at that point in time, and that implicitly, he perceived a cooperative stance with the United States to be more important than "loyalty" to the United Kingdom for Australia's own defense. In other words, his priorities were to secure the defense of Australia by the United States, to contribute to the defense of the Middle East in the event of all-out war against the Soviet Union, and to defend Southeast Asia against China and other limited threats. However, he did not seem to believe that, apart from their deployment to the Middle East, Australian forces should be immediately deployed to deal with the threat of China and other communist powers from continental Southeast Asia once the U.S. defense of Australia had been secured. In view of this, he pushed the United States to provide support that was limited to military and economic assistance without the direct deployment of troops instead of a military defense commitment by the United States to countries in continental Southeast Asia. Menzies had likely determined that this would drastically reduce the possibility of Australian forces being caught up in an imperialist defense. As far as Menzies was concerned, the concern of the British government and military in London that Australia's focus on the defense of continental Southeast Asia would result in it neglecting the deployment

¹⁰⁷ *The ANZUS Treaty, 1951*, p. 209.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 210.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 210.

of Australian forces to the Middle East was unfounded (though this was perhaps not so much the case with Australian military leaders). In fact, Menzies' Cabinet reached an agreement to inform the British government on December 4, 1951, that Australia planned to dispatch army troops and air power to the Middle East in the event of a world war.¹¹⁰

Acceptance of the Notion of a Fixed Western Alliance Network in the Far East Within the U.S. Government and Military

In hindsight, during the period from the signing to the ratification of the three alliance treaties, the U.S. government and military had been sounding out the likelihood that a Western alliance network in the Far East would function well in a world war. The U.S. government and military were cautious to avoid developing new security treaties and exploring the deployment of troops to continental Southeast Asia. From this perspective, rumors that the newly formed Conservative government in the United Kingdom was seeking U.S. defense commitments to continental Southeast Asia emerged as a new concern. However, this did not affect the direction of the worldwide Western alliance network under the leadership of the United Kingdom and the United States that was deeply rooted in the U.S. government and military.

The Conservative Party won the British general election on October 25, 1951, leading to the formation of a Conservative government led by Sir Winston S. Churchill. The Churchill administration started to take action to expand the Far East defense system under the three treaties concluded under the Labour Party government to have the United States involved in defending Southeast Asian countries within continental Eurasia. This was initially an extremely ambiguous move. According to a U.S. Department of State memorandum of conversation dated November 9, 1951, British Ambassador to Bangkok G.T.S.A. Wallinger informed U.S. Chargé d'Affaires William T. Turner that Lt. Gen. Harn Songgram, Chief of the Joint Staff Department, Ministry of Defense of Thailand, had indirectly approached Wallinger's staff to explore the possibility of a regional treaty or a Pacific defense pact along the lines of NATO. Furthermore, the British ambassador asked the U.S. about its intentions should Thailand move in that direction. Wallinger, however, maintained that the United Kingdom was still not looking to extend security arrangements beyond the three treaties at that point in time. In response, Turner informed Wallinger that the U.S. had no immediate plans to sign a defense treaty with Thailand. However, at the end of November, U.S. Ambassador to London Walter Gifford told Secretary of State Acheson in a telegram dated November 28 that British government organizations were reconsidering the defense of Southeast Asia and that the problem could get out of hand if escalated, warning that it was unclear how India would react if a defense treaty were to be signed with Thailand. The British then indicated that they were thinking about holding talks with the U.S. before discussing with France a review of the defense of Southeast Asia. The Department of State responded immediately. In a telegram dated December 1 to Gifford, Under Secretary of State James E. Webb stated that while the Department of State recognized that the British government was reconsidering the defense of Southeast Asia, only an agreement between the leaders of the British and U.S. governments contained any

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 210. For the Australian Cabinet's agreement on December 4, 1951, see *Ibid.*, p. 213.

possibility of extending the alliance network, and that talks should be first limited to between the United Kingdom and the United States and “discussions [of] formal defense arrangement such as extension of Pacific Pact [would be] premature.”¹¹¹

At this point, the U.S. Department of State began preparations for talks between British and U.S. leaders involving the new Churchill administration, where it planned to argue against any possible extension of the Western alliance network in the Far East. Its plan was to have the U.S. military deliver the reasons for opposition. Fortunately, even before that, the Australian government had already signaled its opposition to the extension of the defense treaty network into continental Southeast Asia. According to a memorandum of conversation dated December 10, Australian Minister for External Affairs Richard Casey, who was visiting Washington at the time, told the U.S. Department of State that while he acknowledged the importance of the interchange of ideas or persons between countries based on his travels and interactions in Southeast Asia, he warned that “bringing in [...] some of the Southeast Asian countries [into the defense alliance] would add ‘weak sisters’ who could not contribute to the mutual defense [apart from] a few ports or airbases.” Australia was concerned about the organizational and institutional development of the ANZUS Treaty that was just signed, but it had no interest in extending the alliance network. This was an encouraging sign for the U.S. government and military. In addition, in preparation for the talks between British and U.S. leaders scheduled for January 1952, the Steering Group within the Department of State completed the draft of a U.S. position paper entitled “A Pacific Security Pact” on December 20, 1951. The draft assumed that the United Kingdom and the United States would take the lead in directing the Western alliance network in the Far East, and it emphasized the importance of striving for a win-win outcome for both countries. Based on this position, the draft summarized the political objectives of the United States as follows.

U.S. Objectives

1. To maintain the security of the off-shore defense line: Japan–Ryukyus–Philippines–Australia; to deny Formosa to the Chinese Communist regime; to forestall communist aggression in South and Southeast Asia.
2. To consider the desirability of security arrangements, either on a bilateral or multilateral basis, with countries of Asia other than those already aligned with the United States, namely, Japan, Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand.

At the same time, the draft assumed that although the British was reconsidering the defense of Southeast Asia, they would not pursue expansion beyond the three alliances: “While it appears that the UK would like closer cooperation with the United States in matters and problems of mutual concern in Southeast Asia, the UK probably believes it premature to consider extending the present Pacific defense arrangements.” The concerns of Gifford and Webb were thus relieved. This was probably based on the understanding that the British would be more focused on its relations with the United States, and that the United Kingdom would be

¹¹¹ *FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, Part 1*, pp. 254-255; p. 258.

sympathetic to the United States as far as extending the alliance network in the Far East was concerned from the perspective of directing the West as a whole under their joint leadership.¹¹²

The draft was also focused on Japan and emphasized its ultimate centrality to the Western alliance network in the Far East, calling for Japan's active involvement in defense arrangements with other countries. It noted that it was "particularly important that Japan should eventually be brought into multilateral security arrangements." The U.S. Department of State, however, understood that this could not be achieved prematurely and that the "most careful consideration" was required regarding the difficulties of incorporating Indonesia and the means by which continental Southeast Asian countries could be incorporated (although these issues remain unresolved even in the 2020s). The draft also stated that the ratification process for the three treaties had not been completed yet, and that it was necessary to refrain from hastily creating the next security treaty.¹¹³

However, the draft subtly did not rule out a certain security treaty: "The assumption of further [defense] commitments in this [Far East] area must be the subject of the most careful consideration; furthermore, much will necessarily depend upon the desires and ability to contribute to defense of the countries involved." In other words, talks would be possible with "the most careful consideration," and the will and capability to defend were key to making progress in such talks. It could be said that the U.S. was aware of the pragmatic effects of such a treaty, i.e., the concrete contributions it could make to the West as a whole. Still, the draft did not call for the U.S. government to immediately start working on it. Moreover, the draft set out the position of resolving this issue within the framework of the Western Powers led by the United Kingdom and the United States, i.e., through ongoing negotiation and communication between the two countries: "We would however wish to keep constantly in touch with the British Government on this important matter." It viewed the extension of the Western alliance network as inevitable based on the assumption of cooperation between the United Kingdom and the United States on a global scale.¹¹⁴

The JCS, however, did not favor this possibility of extension. In a memorandum addressed to the Secretary of Defense dated December 28, 1951, attached to a memorandum dated January 2, 1952, sent by the new Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett to Secretary of State Acheson, the JCS interpreted the possible extension outlined in the draft as "the United States [desiring] to form a Pacific Area Pact similar in purpose and structure to the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)," to which it opposed from a "military point of view." This "military point of view" was their opposition to the over-commitment of U.S. forces worldwide.

"[The JCS was] strongly of the opinion that current United States [military] capabilities will not admit new [security] arrangements or any extension of present [security] arrangements in the Pacific area which would involve additional military commitments, particularly in view of the great extent and scope of present United States military commitments world-wide.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 260-262.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 262.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 262.

Any extension of United States commitments along the lines suggested in the [draft] should be preceded by action which would bring about a corresponding increase in United States military capabilities to support such extension.”

Taking this to the extreme, it would have been understandable if troops were deployed with a view to winning a world war and political alliances were formed in support of that goal, but there was a view that creating military alliances for political support and committing a large number of troops to these alliances might jeopardize victory in a world war. As a possible alternative, the JCS suggested that the defense of Pacific countries other than Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, which were already part of alliances, should be handled under the UN framework until they clearly demonstrated “will and determination” to develop the capability necessary to maintain internal security and defend their immediate surroundings.¹¹⁵

In response to the JCS’s sharp criticism, the Department of State made some changes to the draft dated December 20, 1951, further reducing the scope for extension. “A Pacific Security Pact,” the policy statement dated January 2, 1952, that would be used for talks between British and U.S. leaders, was revised to read, “The United States believes that until and unless [international] circumstances change no action should be taken to extend the present Pacific [security] arrangements at this time.” By adopting this stance, the United States dispensed with all military commitments to continental Southeast Asia, though this could also be understood as coming at the cost of negating Japan’s potential coupling and evolution with other security frameworks as the center of the Western alliance network in the Far East.¹¹⁶

On the other hand, while the U.S. government and military were opposed to extending the alliance network, the British government and military believed that their proposed plan of defending the Middle East with Australian and New Zealand forces was working well for the moment. On December 4, 1951, the Australian Cabinet reached a formal agreement to inform the British government that it would dispatch units from the Australian Army and the Royal Australian Air Force equipped and trained to fight in the Middle East in the event of a world war against the Soviet Union. This was a victory for British diplomacy. However, after making such a decision, the Australian government ironically became reluctant to deploy its troops to the Middle East as the situation in Southeast Asia grew increasingly tense in 1952, with the British government having to demonstrate a willingness to agree to a reduced scale of deployment in the Middle East in early 1953. Certain aspects of the military and strategic dynamics that animated the Western military alliance network remained very much unpredictable.¹¹⁷

Conclusion

This paper argues that the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, the ANZUS Treaty, and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, all of which concluded from late August to early September

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 263.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 265.

¹¹⁷ *The ANZUS Treaty, 1951*, p. 213.

1951, a period that should be considered Phase 1 of the formation of the Western alliance network in the Far East, were basically shaped by considerations and discussions on global strategic and military policies on the part of the United Kingdom and the United States, the leaders of the Western Powers. (I will set aside the full details of the direction of the worldwide Western alliance network mentioned in the introduction for another time.) Of course, it is true that the conclusion of the three treaties also involved immediate strategic and military policies and considerations in the Far East as well as the political calculations, aspirations, and efforts of Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. Nevertheless, it is hard to deny that the global strategic and military systems of the Western Powers played a dominant role in shaping the nature and determining the basic operating policy of the Western alliance network in the Far East.

The Anglo-American consensus on the nature and basic operating policy of the Western alliance network in the Far East, following their intensive debates and discussions, was an ingenious combination of the two countries' respective demands and concessions. In a nutshell, the United States sought to foster Japan as a new global partner of the West and have it contribute both in terms of total war capabilities in the event of a world war as well as in the context of political conflict surrounding the creation of Western-style societies in Asia during the Cold War. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, sought to establish a Far Eastern defense line in Japan against the Soviet Union and China without having to contend with Japan as a new military threat, and through this to protect Australia and New Zealand from the threats posed by Japan, China, and the Soviet Union, with which they were concerned. At the same time, the U.S. Navy would be responsible for the defense of Australia and New Zealand, thus establishing a strategic and military system in which the ground forces and tactical air forces of Australia and New Zealand could be freed up and deployed for the defense of the Middle East, which was on the brink of collapse. As a result, the United Kingdom and the United States reached a compromise, with the United States giving up the U.S. military's request to have Australian and New Zealand forces dispatched to defend Japan, and the United Kingdom agreeing to the wish of the United States to recognize the defense of Japan as grounds for starting a world war, despite its initial opposition. This led to the United Kingdom accepting the U.S.-led process of fostering Japan as a partner, and the United States agreeing to the deployment of Australian and New Zealand forces to the Middle East as demanded by the United Kingdom. The result could be said to be a more than acceptable win-win outcome for both the United Kingdom and the United States.

What were the nature and basic operating policy of the Western alliance network in the Far East established through talks between the United Kingdom and the United States? Was there complete agreement between the two countries? In fact, even the United Kingdom and the United States, the leaders of the West, had subtle differences in their most important world war directions. However, these differences were not sufficiently great to undermine the overall world war directions of the two countries.

First, the United Kingdom and the United States had agreed to foster and incorporate Japan as a partner in total war against the Soviet Union both in the short term and in the medium to long term. This was because of their calculations that, in the short term (i.e., a

two- to three-year period from 1951), the United Kingdom and the United States could not defend continental Western Europe against a Soviet invasion in a world war, which meant that continental Western Europe would be unable to contribute to the West in a world war in the immediate future, and such a move was in line with the high expectations of Japan in a world war and a guarantee of its special status. It could perhaps be said that the regional priorities for the Western Powers in the event of an immediate world war (i.e., an allied total war) were as follows. The United States' priorities were, first, the U.S. mainland, the United Kingdom, and Canada; second, Japan; third, continental Western Europe; fourth, the Far East outside of Japan; and fifth, the Middle East. The United Kingdom's priorities, on the other hand, were, first, the British mainland, the United States, and Canada; second, the Middle East; third, the Far East; and fourth, continental Western Europe. However, both the United Kingdom and the United States had calculated that if the West could successfully build a ground force capable of defending continental Western Europe in the medium to long term (i.e., 1954 and beyond), both countries would then be able to pivot to a policy of prioritizing, first, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada; second, continental Western Europe; third, the Middle East; and fourth, the Far East (although this ultimately did not turn out to be as straightforward as expected).

Second, both the United Kingdom and the United States hoped that Japan could help create a Western-style Asia that was capable of competing politically, socially, and ideologically with Asian communist powers in fighting the Cold War in Asia (even though the United Kingdom lacked the commitment and effort of the United States, which was indispensable for the occupation and reform of Japan). While I will set aside a detailed discussion and analysis of this for another time, the progress of the creation of what scholar Ikenberry calls a "security community" between Japan and the United States has resulted in the attenuation of Sino- and Soviet-leaning communist forces within Japan, and communist forces with a strong independent character have barely managed to survive. Furthermore, major foreign policy debates in Japan have revolved around the issue of whether Japan should be neutral or Western-leaning, with the prospect of a Sino-/Soviet-leaning Japan out of the question. Japanese democracy has also largely inherited the Anglo-American model of democratic management, and more than that, an affection for Americans and American culture has begun to take root throughout Japanese society as a whole, with anti-American sentiments starting to be perceived as the "know-it-all" attitude of a small group of intellectual elites. In Asia, Japan created a Western model of society capable of competing with the success of communism in China and Vietnam, thus becoming the exemplar of such a model for other Asian societies.

Third, the Western alliance network itself created a structure that continued to have a major impact on Japan in the Cold War. The future vision of Japan as a total war partner in the event of a world war as desired by the United States had clashed with the future vision of a non-aggressive Japan as desired by the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines, but these two visions were ultimately reconciled successfully to create a Japan that would contribute to the West in the Cold War instead of a hot war. In other words, the Western alliance network as a whole agreed amid this clash of two distinct visions that Japan would not get involved in various limited wars in Asia but instead contribute to the creation

and pursuit of the Western model in the Cold War. In the event of a world war, however, Japan would become fully active as a country capable of engaging in total war. The Western alliance network could thus be said to have defined Japan's external outlook. As a result, since no world war occurred during the Cold War period, Japan continued to enjoy peace and had no direct military involvement in limited wars; instead, it continued to serve as a successful model in the realms of political, social, and ideological conflict involving the Western Powers. While it could be said that events within Japan also had a significant impact on what Japan became, it was noteworthy that the structure of the Western alliance network offered not only the United States but also other Western countries besides the United States a level of influence over Japan that could not be ignored.

Fourth, a crucial reason why Phase 1 of alliance formation in the Far East gave rise to a hub-and-spokes system was that public opinion in the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand in 1951 was not psychologically ready at all to accept Japan, a former enemy, as an ally. From the point of view of the U.S. government and military as well as the American public, a sense of trust was fostered between Japan and the United States during the five-plus years of occupation, and in particular, the Americans who had arrived in Japan as occupiers and played the roles of educators and missionaries conveyed to American society the sense that Japanese people could be trusted. Of course, Australia was involved in the military occupation of Hiroshima, but it was an exceptional situation and insufficient to alter public opinion in Australia. The notion of a trustworthy Japan did not permeate the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. This wall of public opinion was not sufficient to interfere with the passage of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, but it could be said to be powerful enough to potentially block a Pacific Pact. Of course, more than that, the strategic calculations and efforts of the British were the primary cause of the demise of the Pacific Pact. Today, this wall of public opinion in the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand no longer exists. It could thus be said that one of the reasons a hub-and-spokes system had to be created has become irrelevant as a result of Japan's engagement with the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand over the last 70-odd years (although there are other reasons for maintaining the hub-and-spokes system right now).

The formation of the Western alliance network in the Far East in 1951 was founded on the direction of the Western alliance network under the leadership of the United Kingdom and the United States, and it is on this basis that the creation of the Western alliance network in the Far East should be understood as having been shaped by strategic constraints around the world. Any attempt to understand the disparate Western alliances in the Far East on an individual basis without a holistic understanding of the context could be accused of missing the forest for the trees. Nevertheless, it is concerning that leading international scholars who specialize in international relations theory still fail to understand the constraints and influence of the United Kingdom and the United States, the leading powers of this worldwide Western alliance network, nor do they discuss the subject based on an understanding of the details of the grand strategic and military relationships involving the two countries. It remains to be seen if discussions on alliances during the Cold War period or alliances as a whole will continue to veer off course going forward.