

Compellence in Peace Operations: United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)*

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Abstract

Contemporary peace operations are activities that could involve the proactive use of force to restore security and protect civilians in areas where peacekeepers are deployed. However, these peacekeepers are not necessarily on course to accomplish their missions. Thus, this paper examines under what conditions the proactive use of force in peace operations tend to succeed by analyzing the case of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) from the perspective of compellence. MONUC can be deemed as a case of successful compellence as it succeeded in inducing a large portion of armed groups in Ituri to accept disarmament by repeatedly carrying out proactive military operations from 2003 through 2007. In order to find out the reasons behind the success, this paper considers whether factors related to the success of compellence discussed in previous studies have been satisfied in the case of Ituri, especially focusing on the three pertaining to the fundamental constituent elements of compellence.

Introduction

Unlike traditional peacekeeping operations that follow the principle of non-use of force except for self-defense, contemporary peace operations, deployed to where a civil war is going on, are activities that may involve the proactive use of force for the purpose of restoring security and protecting civilians. However, such proactive use of force does not always go smoothly. Even in missions which are authorized to use force proactively beyond self-defense, peace operations are faced with a variety of problems, including the inability to restore the security of their operational areas or to prevent a massacre of civilians, and peacekeepers themselves suffering casualties from attacks against them. Thus, how to use force in peace operations remains as a major challenge.

There are views critical of the proactive use of force in peace operations. However, if one expects peace operations to be deployed to where a civil war is going on and to change the unfavorable local conditions, traditional peacekeeping that evolved for the purpose of keeping the status quo by maintaining a ceasefire already in place is not appropriate. Instead, as an effort to enhance the possibility of successful peace operations, it is necessary to consider how to induce

* Originally published in Japanese in *Boei Kenkyusho Kiyo* [*NIDS Journal of Defense and Security*], vol. 22, no. 1 (November 2019). Some parts have been updated.

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local armed groups to accept the renunciation of violence and disarmament through the proactive use and threat of force by peacekeepers.

In considering the above, the theory of compellence is useful. Compellence is a strategy to induce others to take a specific action by demanding they do it with threats of harm for non-compliance. Compellence is similar to deterrence in that it employs the threat of force. The biggest difference between them lies in that while deterrence is a strategy for maintaining the status quo by demanding the opponent refrain from taking a specific action, compellence is a strategy for changing the status quo by demanding the opponent take a specific action. Furthermore, in deterrence, when the threat of force is put into action, it means a failure. In compellence, however, the pressure may be kept on the opponent until it complies with the demand. Thus, not only the threat of force but also the actual use of force are within the concept of compellence. Nonetheless, since the purpose of compellence is to make the opponent comply with the demand, compellence is deemed a failure if the goal had to be achieved by brute force. Hitherto, the conditions of success of compellence have been mainly examined for such cases as crisis management and limited war between states. By applying this theory to contemporary peace operations, it is possible to explore the conditions to make the proactive use or threatened use of force more successful in peace operations.¹

Hence, this paper considers under what conditions the proactive use of force in peace operations tends to be successful by analyzing the case of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) from the perspective of compellence. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been in the state of conflict since 1996, and the United Nations (UN) has been engaged in peace operations there since 1999. As a peace operation in the DRC, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), in which a peace enforcement unit was created under the UN command for the first time since a peace operation in Somalia, is well-known.² MONUC, the predecessor of MONUSCO, was also a robust peace operation which repeatedly and proactively used force against armed groups. In particular, MONUC deployed a brigade-size unit in the Ituri region in the northeastern part of the DRC and succeeded in inducing the large part of armed groups there to accept disarmament through the repeated military operations. It is possible to regard this development as a successful example of compellence, and the examination of whether the conditions of success discussed in the existing studies of compellence were satisfied in this example will provide a clue about the applicability of the conditions in the context of peace operations.

The previous studies on compellence cite a host of factors that can affect the success or failure of compellence, but this paper cannot consider each and every factor. Hence, of the factors examined by multiple previous studies, this paper focuses on three: the contents of demands and

¹ For the concepts and characteristics of compellence, see OHNISHI Ken, "Compellence and Coercive Diplomacy: Concepts and Characteristics," *Briefing Memo* (March 2019). For the application of compellence to peace operations, see OHNISHI Ken, "Coercive Diplomacy and Peace Operations: Intervention in East Timor," *NIDS Journal of Defense and Security*, no. 13 (December 2012), and OHNISHI Ken, "Heiwa-sakusen ni okeru gunjiryoku no kinou ni kansuru ichikousatsu: Shierareone eno kainyuu wo jirei toshite" [Functions of Military Force in Peace Operations: The Case of Intervention in Sierra Leone], *Boei Kenkyusho Kiyo* [NIDS Security Studies], vol. 15, no. 1 (October 2012).

² For MONUSCO's Force Intervention Brigade, see, for example, YAMASHITA Hikaru, "MONUSCO kainyu-ryodan to gendai no heiwaijikatsudou" [MONUSCO Force Intervention Brigade and Contemporary Peacekeeping], *Boei Kenkyusho Kiyo* [NIDS Security Studies], vol. 18, no. 1 (November 2015).

the asymmetry of motivation, strategies, and the use of positive inducements. The three points of what to demand, how to apply pressures, and whether the positive inducements are employed on top of pressures are the fundamental constituent elements that must be determined in practicing compellence,³ and are worth attentive examination.

This paper first traces developments in the conflict in the Ituri region of the DRC, and then sums up the activities of MONUC with a particular focus on the use of force. Based on these, this paper analyzes the case from the perspective of the theory of compellence and considers whether the aforementioned three factors actually affected the success of MONUC.

1. The Background and Developments of the Conflict in Ituri

(1) Two Wars in the DRC and the Deployment of MONUC

The immediate trigger for the establishment of MONUC was the Second Congo War that started in 1998. The country experienced the First Congo War two years ago (the name of the country then was Zaire). The first war was brought to an end in May 1997 when the government, headed by Mobutu Sese Seko that had placed Zaire under dictatorial rule for over 30 years, collapsed under attacks by neighboring Rwanda and the rebel group backed by it, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL). Then, Laurent-Désiré Kabila, one of the AFDL leaders, replaced Mobutu as president and changed the name of the country from Zaire to the DRC.⁴ Rwanda was deeply involved in the war, including the direct invasion. Behind its military actions lied its intention to mop up Hutu former government army soldiers and militias who fled into Zaire and launched attacks against Rwanda and the Tutsi people in Zaire.⁵

After the end of the first war, however, the relations between new President Kabila and Rwanda changed for the worse, and the invasion of the DRC by Rwanda and Uganda, and the rebellion by the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) backed by these two countries in August 1998 plunged the DRC into the second war. Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia intervened in the war on the side of Kabila, with the security of border zones and natural resources of the DRC providing the motives for the successive interventions by the surrounding countries.⁶ In the course of the war, Rwanda and Uganda broke away, and Uganda came to support the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) as another rebel group separate from the RCD, which also split up into a pro-Rwanda group and a pro-Uganda group, turning the war into a complicated conflict involving a large number of interested parties.⁷

In July 1999, a ceasefire agreement was concluded in Lusaka, the capital of Zambia, and the parties agreed on the withdrawal of foreign military forces and requested the deployment of a UN

³ Alexander L. George, "Theory and Practice," in *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 2nd ed., eds. Alexander L. George and William E. Simons (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 16-17.

⁴ Thomas Turner, *The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth and Reality* (London: Zed Books, 2007), pp. 1, 4-5; Gérard Prunier, *Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 134-136.

⁵ Turner, *The Congo Wars*, pp. 3-4; Prunier, *Africa's World War*, p. 73.

⁶ SAKAI Hironobu, "Kongo ni okeru kokuren-heiwaijikkatsudou (1): Kokuren kongo minsyu-kyouwakoku missyon (MONUC) no jissen to sono houteki igi" [MONUC in the Congo Conflicts since 1999 (1)], *Kokusai Kyoryoku Ronshu* [Journal of International Cooperation Studies], vol. 11, no. 2 (December 2003), pp. 29-30; Turner, *The Congo Wars*, pp. 5-6, 9-10; Prunier, *Africa's World War*, pp. 181-198.

⁷ Turner, *The Congo Wars*, p. 6; Prunier, *Africa's World War*, pp. 204-206, 220-223.

peacekeeping force.⁸ In response, the UN Security Council in August 1999 adopted Resolution 1258 and decided to dispatch military liaison personnel to the DRC.⁹ Then, under UN Security Council Resolution 1279 adopted in November 1999, MONUC was established on the basis of the liaison personnel. At this stage, however, the mission of MONUC went no further than liaison.¹⁰ Subsequently, under UN Security Council Resolution 1291 adopted in February 2000, the size of MONUC was expanded to 5,537 military personnel and a decision was made to expand its tasks to include monitoring the ceasefire implementation and the supervision and verification of the redeployment of the military forces of the parties to the conflict. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, MONUC was authorized to “take the necessary action”—that is to use force—for securing its safety and freedom of movement and protecting UN personnel, their facilities, and equipment as well as civilians, within the range of its capabilities.¹¹

However, fighting and violence continued even after the conclusion of the ceasefire agreement,¹² and the deployment of MONUC made little headway in part due to the lack of cooperation from the parties to the conflict, including the DRC government. As of the end of November 2000, only 224 persons, including 148 military observers, were deployed.¹³ Under these circumstances, President Kabila was assassinated in January 2001, and his son, Joseph Kabila succeeded him. This development and the increasing fatigue among the countries involved in the conflict led to the initiation of a peace process among them. With the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement concluded in Pretoria, South Africa in December 2002, the course toward the reconstruction and stabilization of the DRC was laid out.¹⁴ The deployment of MONUC also made headway, with some 4,400 personnel, including about 490 military observers, deployed at the end of January 2003.¹⁵

⁸ “Ceasefire Agreement,” Annex to United Nations (UN), “Letter Dated 23 July 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Zambia to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” UN Doc. S/1999/815 (July 23, 1999).

⁹ UN Security Council, Resolution 1258 (August 6, 1999).

¹⁰ UN Security Council, Resolution 1279 (November 30, 1999).

¹¹ UN Security Council, Resolution 1291 (February 24, 2000).

¹² UN, “Second Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” UN Doc. S/2000/330 (April 18, 2000), paras. 29-37; UN, “Third Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” UN Doc. S/2000/566 (June 12, 2000), paras. 13-25; UN, “Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” UN Doc. S/2000/888 (September 21, 2000), paras. 21-29; UN, “Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” UN Doc. S/2000/1156 (December 6, 2000), paras. 25-39; UN, “Sixth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” UN Doc. S/2001/128 (February 12, 2001), paras. 19-29; Prunier, *Africa’s World War*, pp. 227-235.

¹³ UN, “Fifth Report on MONUC,” UN Doc. S/2000/1156, pp. 14-15.

¹⁴ Turner, *The Congo Wars*, p. 7; Prunier, *Africa’s World War*, pp. 249-250, 257-258, 265-277; UN, “Thirteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” UN Doc. S/2003/211 (February 21, 2003), paras. 2-3; UN, “Second Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” UN Doc. S/2003/566 (May 27, 2003), para. 2.

¹⁵ UN, “Thirteenth Report on MONUC,” UN Doc. S/2003/211, pp. 18-19. Under UN Security Council Resolution 1445 adopted on December 4, 2002, the maximum size of MONUC was expanded to 8,700 military personnel. UN Security Council, Resolution 1445 (December 4, 2002).

(2) The Conflict in Ituri

As seen above, movements toward peace were progressing in the DRC as a whole, but in the eastern part of the country, violence by not only the major parties to the civil war but also other armed groups was becoming increasingly more serious. In particular, in the Ituri region in the northeastern province of Orientale bordering on Uganda, the confrontation between the two ethnic groups of Hema and Lendu, which had long been in rivalry over land ownership, became intensely violent. While Ituri was placed under Uganda's control after the breakout of the second war, Hema landowners tried to encroach on land of Lendu people in 1999 and enlisted the cooperation of Ugandan forces, which clamped down on Lendu leaders and appointed a Hema politician as governor. Frustrated with these developments, Lendu forces attacked the Hema people in June 1999, which invited counterattacks by Hema and the Ugandan forces, triggering a fierce exchange of violence.¹⁶ By September 1999, Bunia, the central city of the Ituri region, became the stronghold of the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement (RCD-ML), a pro-Uganda faction of the RCD, but the infighting continued within the faction, resulting in the violence in combination with the ethnic troubles in Ituri.¹⁷ In the course of this infighting, Hema members of the RCD-ML led by Thomas Lubanga broke away, newly forming the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC). The UPC took Bunia away from the RCD-ML in the summer of 2002 with the assistance of the Ugandan forces, further triggering the ethnic violence, including massacre.¹⁸

Under such circumstances, in September 2002, the DRC government and the Ugandan government concluded the Luanda Agreement, which spelled out an agreement on the withdrawal of the Ugandan forces from the DRC within three months and the establishment of the Ituri Pacification Commission (IPC).¹⁹ As mentioned earlier, the withdrawal of foreign military forces, including the Ugandan forces, was already agreed upon under the 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, and also demanded under UN Security Council resolutions, but the withdrawal had yet to be realized. Amid the progressing peace process for the DRC as a whole, the DRC and Rwanda agreed on the timeline for the withdrawal of the Rwandan forces in July 2002, and the similar agreement was concluded for the Ugandan forces in Luanda. However, for the UPC, the Luanda Agreement meant not only the loss of Ugandan support but also the loss of its dominant position in Ituri obtained after much effort to control Bunia if the IPC was actually established. Because of this, the UPC withheld its cooperation and opposed the holding of the IPC, and approached Rwanda as a supporter in place of Uganda.²⁰

Due to this, Ituri became the place of fighting among the DRC government, Rwanda, and Uganda through their respective proxy groups. The RCD-ML strengthened its ties with the DRC

¹⁶ Dan Fahey, "The Trouble with Ituri," *African Security Review*, vol. 20, no. 2 (June 2011), pp. 109-110; International Crisis Group (ICG), *Congo Crisis: Military Intervention in Ituri*, ICG Africa Report, no. 64 (2003), pp. 3-4; Henning Tamm, *UPC in Ituri: The External Militarization of Local Politics in North-eastern Congo* (London: Rift Valley Institute, 2013), pp. 14-16; Henning Tamm, *FNI and FRPI: Local Resistance and Regional Alliances in North-eastern Congo* (London: Rift Valley Institute, 2013), pp. 16-17.

¹⁷ ICG, *Congo Crisis*, pp. 4-5; Tamm, *UPC in Ituri*, pp. 16-19.

¹⁸ ICG, *Congo Crisis*, pp. 5-6; UN, "Twelfth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," UN Doc. S/2002/1180 (October 18, 2002), para. 15; Tamm, *UPC in Ituri*, pp. 20-26.

¹⁹ ICG, *Congo Crisis*, p. 7; UN, "Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," UN Doc. S/2002/1005 (September 10, 2002), paras. 14-17.

²⁰ ICG, *Congo Crisis*, pp. 7-8.

government and received its support. The UPC, an armed group of Hema, received support by Rwanda, and also cooperated with the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Goma (RCD-G), the pro-Rwanda splinter group of the RCD, and insurgent forces of Uganda also backed by Rwanda. Some of the Hema forces that parted ways as a result of the power struggle within the UPC formed the Party for Unity and Safeguarding of the Integrity of the Congo (PUSIC) and received Uganda's backing. Another faction of the UPC also broke away from the UPC under the influence of Uganda and formed the Armed Forces of the Congolese People (FAPC). As armed groups of Lendu people, the Ituri Patriotic Resistance Force (FRPI), backed by the RCD-ML and the DRC government, and the Front of Integrationist Nationalists (FNI), supported by Uganda, were formed. Other smaller ethnic groups also had their own armed groups, and there were over 12 armed groups in Ituri by February 2003.²¹

The deterioration of relations between the UPC and Uganda led to a direct armed clash between them. As of March 2003, the Ugandan forces, though scaled down, still maintained a battalion at Bunia Airport. When the UPC attacked the Ugandan forces in March 2003, the Ugandan forces launched a large-scale counterattack and had armed groups under its influence attack the UPC, putting the UPC to rout from Bunia. On March 18, the parties to the conflict, except for the UPC, agreed on a ceasefire, and the IPC was held in the following month and the Ituri Interim Administration was established.²²

Though Uganda augmented its stationed forces subsequently, the situation in Ituri remained unstable, and Bunia experienced a serious humanitarian crisis. Following the rout of the UPC, Bunia was controlled by the FNI and the PUSIC, both backed by Uganda. In April, the massacre and persecution of the Hema people by Lendu forces spread, and the FNI, mainly composed of Lendu members, and the PUSIC, mainly composed of Hema members, came to directly exchange fire between them. Uganda tried to maintain the deployment of its forces on the pretext of maintaining security, but failed to obtain the consent of the international community. Uganda handed Bunia Airport over to MONUC on April 25, and then withdrew from Bunia on May 6.²³ Following this, the persecution of the Hema people by the ethnic Lendu armed groups intensified, unfolding the widespread looting and ethnic cleansing. On May 12, the UPC went on a counterattack and recaptured Bunia, retaliating against the Lendu people. As a consequence, during the period of about two weeks, over 400 people from both sides were killed in Bunia alone.²⁴ It was estimated that the cumulative deaths in Ituri had reached over 60,000 between June 1999, when the violence began, and May 2003, with the emergence of 500,000 to 600,000 internally displaced people (IDP).²⁵

(3) From the Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) to the Enhanced MONUC Force
MONUC deployed a Uruguayan battalion in Bunia before the withdrawal of the Ugandan forces. The Uruguayan battalion, however, believed that the mandate of MONUC was based on Chapter

²¹ Ibid., pp. 8-10; Tamm, *UPC in Ituri*, pp. 33-36; Tamm, *FNI and FRPI*, pp. 25-27.

²² ICG, *Congo Crisis*, pp. 10-11; UN, "Second Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," UN Doc. S/2003/566 (May 27, 2003), paras. 11, 13; Tamm, *UPC in Ituri*, pp. 36-37.

²³ ICG, *Congo Crisis*, pp. 10-12; UN, "Second Special Report on MONUC," UN Doc. S/2003/566, para. 15.

²⁴ Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, *Operation Artemis: The Lessons of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force* (2004), p. 7; ICG, *Congo Crisis*, p. 12.

²⁵ UN, "Second Special Report on MONUC," UN Doc. S/2003/566, para. 10.

VI of the UN Charter and was not prepared or had no capability to protect civilians amid the violence.²⁶ Therefore, in the face of the urgency of the situation in Bunia, the UN Security Council decided to send in the Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) under Resolution 1484. The tasks of the IEMF were to restore security in Bunia, protect the airport and IDP camps, and secure the safety of civilians, UN personnel, and humanitarian workers. The IEMF was authorized “to take all necessary measures” to perform its tasks under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.²⁷ The IEMF was organized as a European Union mission of some 1,400 soldiers, with the French forces forming the core, and began its deployment on June 6, 2003. The IEMF declared that brandishing weapons is prohibited in Bunia and surrounding areas, disarmed armed group members while experiencing several exchanges of fire with them, and succeeded in the restoration of security within a short period of time.²⁸

However, as the IEMF was only a temporary measure limited to Bunia, armed groups were allowed to act freely in the Ituri region other than the areas surrounding Bunia, and the violence continued unchecked.²⁹ Therefore, MONUC needed to be significantly strengthened in order to take over the operations of the IEMF and stabilize the entire Ituri region. Under UN Security Council Resolution 1493 adopted on July 28, the size of MONUC was expanded up to 10,800 military personnel. The resolution authorized MONUC to “take the necessary measures” under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to protect humanitarian assistance personnel and improve the security in areas where humanitarian assistance activities are being conducted, in addition to protecting the UN personnel, facilities, and equipment; securing the freedom of movement; and protecting the civilians included under Resolution 1291. Furthermore, Resolution 1493 also authorized MONUC to “use all necessary means to fulfill its mandate” by specifically naming Ituri as well as North and South Kivu, and made it possible to deploy brigade-size troops in Ituri. It also banned the provision of weapons and other military assistance to armed groups in Ituri.³⁰ The transfer of operations from the IEMF to MONUC took place on September 1. At that point in time, only 2,400 of the planned 4,800-strong Ituri brigade were deployed, but by the end of 2003, the deployment of four battalions and support units was largely complete.³¹

2. Activities of Enhanced MONUC

(1) Proactive Operations Inside and Outside Bunia and the Commencement of Disarmament
MONUC, with its tasks and size expanded as described above, repeatedly resorted to the proactive

²⁶ Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, *Operation Artemis*, pp. 7-9; ICG, *Congo Crisis*, pp. 11-13; Jan-Gunnar Isberg and Lotta Victor Tillberg, *By All Necessary Means: Brigadier General Jan-Gunnar Isberg's Experiences from Service in the Congo 2003-2005* (Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, 2012), p. 37.

²⁷ UN Security Council, Resolution 1484 (May 30, 2003).

²⁸ ICG, *Maintaining Momentum in the Congo: The Ituri Problem*, ICG Africa Report, no. 84 (2004), p. 3; Ståle Ulriksen, Catriona Gourlay and Catriona Mace, “Operation Artemis: The Shape of Things to Come?,” *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 11, no. 3 (Autumn 2004), pp. 518-519; Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, *Operation Artemis*, pp. 11-13.

²⁹ Ulriksen, Gourlay and Mace, “Operation Artemis: The Shape of Things to Come?,” pp. 519-520; Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, *Operation Artemis*, pp. 12, 14, 16.

³⁰ UN Security Council, Resolution 1493 (July 28, 2003).

³¹ UN, “Fourteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” UN Doc. S/2003/1098 (November 17, 2003), para. 7; ICG, *Maintaining Momentum in the Congo*, pp. 5-7.

use of force in Ituri. After the takeover from the IEMF, MONUC was immediately faced with security problems. Of the entire city of Bunia, MONUC established its control only in the central area, with the UPC controlling the northern area and the FNI the southern area.³² Shooting incidents occurred frequently inside and outside Bunia, including attacks on MONUC, and rioting also occurred multiple times in Bunia.³³ Responding to a large-scale rioting by the UPC on September 15-16, MONUC seized a great number of weapons in its searches of UPC bases, and also killed UPC fighters in battles to take control of roads.³⁴ MONUC declared that it would turn Bunia into a weapon-free zone from September 15, and the armed groups consented to the measures on September 16.³⁵ MONUC conducted cordon and search operations and collected weapons,³⁶ and also detained key members of the armed groups. In the search of a UPC camp on September 15, MONUC detained some 70 UPC members, including Floribert Kisembo, the chief of staff of the UPC. Subsequently, however, the detained high-ranking UPC members were released at the instruction of the MONUC headquarters in Kinshasa, the capital of the DRC.³⁷ Meanwhile, UPC leader Lubanga and FNI leader Floribert Ndjabu, who went to Kinshasa for negotiations with the DRC government in August, were placed under house arrest by the government. In October, MONUC arrested Mathieu Ngudjolo, a key member of the FNI, and moved him to Kinshasa.³⁸

Despite these efforts, however, the systematic disarmament was not realized in Bunia.³⁹ On the part of the armed groups, the UPC broke up due to an internal strife, and new movements also emerged in which the armed groups began collaborating beyond ethnic rivalry for political and economic benefits.⁴⁰ In January 2004, MONUC designated the entire Ituri region as a weapon-free zone,⁴¹ but the violence continued among ethnic groups outside Bunia as well.⁴²

In order to improve security inside and outside Bunia, MONUC carried out military operations against the armed groups. In September 2003, upon the receipt of reports that the massacre occurred at a place some 100 kilometers from Bunia, a Pakistani unit was deployed there aboard helicopters of the Indian force and detained attackers under the cover of Indian attack helicopters.⁴³ On January 17, 2004, MONUC dispatched a Bangladeshi unit to a location where a MONUC helicopter came under fire the previous day, and the unit searched an armed group under the cover of an Indian attack helicopter. This Bangladeshi unit engaged with the armed group, and

³² ICG, *Maintaining Momentum in the Congo*, p. 7.

³³ UN, "Fifteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," UN Doc. S/2004/251 (March 25, 2004), paras. 25, 28; ICG, *Maintaining Momentum in the Congo*, pp. 4, 7-8; Isberg and Tillberg, *By All Necessary Means*, pp. 41-58.

³⁴ Isberg and Tillberg, *By All Necessary Means*, pp. 49-58.

³⁵ UN, "Fourteenth Report on MONUC," para. 8; Isberg and Tillberg, *By All Necessary Means*, pp. 49-50, 58.

³⁶ UN, "Fourteenth Report on MONUC," paras. 8-9; ICG, *Maintaining Momentum in the Congo*, p. 7; Isberg and Tillberg, *By All Necessary Means*, pp. 51, 80.

³⁷ Isberg and Tillberg, *By All Necessary Means*, pp. 51, 63.

³⁸ Tamm, *UPC in Ituri*, p. 39; Tamm, *FNI and FRPI*, p. 32.

³⁹ ICG, *Maintaining Momentum in the Congo*, p. 7.

⁴⁰ UN, "Fifteenth Report on MONUC," UN Doc. S/2004/251, paras. 24, 28; Tamm, *UPC in Ituri*, pp. 39-42.

⁴¹ Isberg and Tillberg, *By All Necessary Means*, p. 78.

⁴² Tamm, *FNI and FRPI*, p. 32.

⁴³ Rajesh Isser, *Peacekeeping and Protection of Civilians: The Indian Air Force in the Congo* (New Delhi: KW Publishers, 2012), p. 129.

attacks by the helicopter drove out the group from its nearby camp.⁴⁴ On January 20, a Pakistani unit came under fire, and an attack helicopter that rushed to its rescue suppressed the attackers.⁴⁵

In mid-March 2004, a large-scale operation was mounted to neutralize UPC bases. On March 15-16, MONUC targeted three UPC camps to the north of Bunia, sending in four companies. The Pakistani and Uruguayan units that participated in the operation engaged with the UPC and destroyed the camps after inflicting casualties on UPC members. On March 16, in tandem with the search operation above, some 100 troops from the Pakistani and Nepalese units carried out heliborne attacks on a UPC camp further north and destroyed it. In the fighting that continued after the removal of the camp, mortars were used and inflicted further damage to the UPC. On March 17, a search operation was carried out in Bunia as well, collecting weapons from armed elements.⁴⁶

On March 18, the MONUC troops, consisting of one Bangladeshi company, two Uruguayan companies, and one Nepalese company as well as Indian attack helicopters, carried out an operation to remove UPC camps to the east of Bunia. Some 300 UPC fighters were believed to be operating in this area, using violence against civilians. Armored vehicles and helicopters carried the MONUC troops to attack three UPC camps simultaneously from the west and the south, and brought them under control after the fierce fighting. The number of UPC fighters whom MONUC was sure of having killed were just four, but the estimated number of UPC fighters killed rose to 20, to 62, and further to over 100, according to the subsequent information provided by humanitarian assistance groups.⁴⁷

After a MONUC helicopter came under fire in Drodo in late March, MONUC used an attack helicopter to destroy camps of armed groups there.⁴⁸ On May 7, a Bangladeshi convoy and a Nepalese unit on a reconnaissance mission were attacked by armed groups. In that event, MONUC attack helicopters destroyed an armed group's camp from which the UN troops were fired upon, and pursued armed groups that continued their attacks, inflicting casualties on them.⁴⁹

Then, in May 2004, the DRC government and armed groups in Ituri held dialogue under the sponsorship of MONUC, and agreed that the armed groups in Ituri would participate in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program and those that refuse to participate in the program would be regarded as criminal elements.⁵⁰ In the dialogue, the armed groups demanded that they be treated in the same way as the parties to the Pretoria Global and All-Inclusive Agreement and also claimed their integration into the new DRC army and police and the opening of important government positions to them.⁵¹ After this agreement, the armed groups were supposed to stay in the designated camps pending their anticipated participation in the DDR program, and they were allowed to carry weapons within their camps.⁵² As of the summer of 2004, there were many areas MONUC was still unable to bring under its control. The Union of Congolese

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 104-106.

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 106-107.

⁴⁶ Isberg and Tillberg, *By All Necessary Means*, pp. 91-92.

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 94-103; Isser, *Peacekeeping and Protection of Civilians*, pp. 107-110.

⁴⁸ Isser, *Peacekeeping and Protection of Civilians*, p. 110.

⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 110-111.

⁵⁰ UN, "Third Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," UN Doc. S/2004/650 (August 16, 2004), para. 27.

⁵¹ ICG, *Maintaining Momentum in the Congo*, pp. 9-10.

⁵² Isberg and Tillberg, *By All Necessary Means*, p. 77.

Patriots-Kisembo (UPC-K), which was a splinter group of the UPC, as well as PUSIC and some members of the FNI expressed their intentions of participating in the DDR program, but the FRPI, the FAPC, the Union of Congolese Patriots-Lubanga (UPC-L), and the majority of FNI members were not committed to the ceasefire, and continued to recruit fighters and obtain weapons, fought among themselves, and attacked civilians and MONUC.⁵³ While MONUC intended to proceed with the DDR program under the carrot and stick approach, the preparedness to accept participants in the DDR program was far from adequate at that time. President Kabila signed a decree to appoint leaders of the armed groups to high positions of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC), as promised to the armed groups by the DRC government, only in December 2004.⁵⁴ For that reason, the number of participants in the DDR program that commenced in September 2004 was limited to some 1,500 (of them, some 890 were children) by mid-December 2004.⁵⁵ Subsequently, some 3,860 more members (of them, 2,210 were children) of the armed groups were disarmed, resulting in the collection of some 1,200 items of weapons. However, as the UPC-L and the FAPC refused to participate, the DDR program remained slow to move forward.⁵⁶

In the meantime, MONUC was assigned expanded tasks and continued with its military operations against the armed groups. MONUC was authorized to enforce an arms embargo under UN Security Council Resolution 1533 adopted in March 2004, and a group of experts was also established to monitor the implementation of the arms embargo.⁵⁷ Security Council Resolution 1565 of October 2004 increased the size of MONUC by 5,900 personnel and assigned MONUC a wide range of tasks, authorizing it “to use all necessary means” under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to maintain its presence and deter violence at key areas, enforce the arms embargo, provide security in implementing the DDR program, and so on, on top of the existing tasks to protect UN personnel, facilities, and equipment; secure the freedom of movement; protect civilians and humanitarian workers; and improve security in areas where humanitarian assistance is undertaken.⁵⁸ A report submitted to the Security Council by the UN Secretary-General in late 2004 presented a scheme to deploy one brigade each to North Kivu and South Kivu adjacent to Ituri, form the Eastern Division by combining the two brigades with the Ituri brigade, and assign the reserve force of one South African battalion to the division.⁵⁹ The headquarters of the Eastern Division achieved full

⁵³ UN, “Third Special Report on MONUC,” UN Doc. S/2004/650, paras. 27, 30, Annex I; UN, “Sixteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” UN Doc. S/2004/1034 (December 31, 2004), paras. 11, 54; UN, “Seventeenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” UN Doc. S/2005/167 (March 15, 2005), paras. 11, 14, 50, 52; ICG, *Congo: Four Priorities for Sustainable Peace in Ituri*, Africa Report, no. 140 (2008), p. 30.

⁵⁴ Under this decree, Katanga of the FRPI, Kakwavu of the FAPC, Sukpa of the FNI, Kyaligonza Nduru of the PUSIC, Kisembo of the UPC-K, and Ntaganda of the UPC-L were all appointed as brigadier generals in FARDC, and all of them other than Ntaganda moved to Kinshasa in January 2005. UN, “Seventeenth Report on MONUC,” UN Doc. S/2005/167, para. 13; ICG, *Congo: Four Priorities*, p. 30.

⁵⁵ UN, “Sixteenth Report on MONUC,” UN Doc. S/2004/1034, para. 12.

⁵⁶ UN, “Seventeenth Report on MONUC,” UN Doc. S/2005/167, para. 13.

⁵⁷ UN Security Council, Resolution 1533 (March 12, 2004).

⁵⁸ UN Security Council, Resolution 1565 (October 1, 2004). Under the resolution, the support for the operations of FARDC to disarm foreign armed groups in the Kivu region adjacent to Ituri was also incorporated into the tasks of MONUC.

⁵⁹ UN, “Sixteenth Report on MONUC,” UN Doc. S/2004/1034, para. 39.

operational capability on February 24, 2005.⁶⁰

MONUC also carried out its proactive operations repeatedly. On September 13, 2004, four companies of MONUC, supported by attack helicopters, launched an attack on an FNI camp in Kwandroma in the northern part of the Ituri region, and captured the camp with little resistance.⁶¹ MONUC reestablished control over Ndrele and Mahagi by expelling the FAPC in early December, and this led to the participation of over 80 fighters in the disarmament process and the improvement of the local situation.⁶² On February 24, 2005, MONUC disarmed 116 fighters of the FAPC as a result of a cordon and search operation in Ariwara. On the same day, MONUC also detained and disarmed 30 fighters of the FNI in Datule.⁶³

(2) Further Pressure and the Completion of the First DDR Program

However, not all the operations of MONUC proceeded smoothly. In an attack by the UPC in Nizi on February 22, two Pakistanis were injured, and on February 25, an ambush attack by the FNI at Kafé killed nine soldiers of a Bangladeshi unit.⁶⁴ Following this attack, MONUC became even tougher and carried out offensive cordon and search operations. On March 1, 2005, the Pakistani, Nepalese, and South African units, backed up by Indian attack helicopters, destroyed the headquarters of the FNI in Loga after engagement, killing 50 to 60 fighters of the FNI. In this operation, two Pakistani soldiers were also injured.⁶⁵ On May 24, MONUC and FARDC jointly managed to remove the UPC-L from Katoto, albeit temporarily, enhancing the security of the area.⁶⁶ MONUC led the military operations in Lugo on June 2 and in Medu on June 27. In the course of these operations, the armed groups adopted new tactics, such as attacking helicopters, using human shields, and abandoning their military camps and hiding among people. As the armed groups remained able to freely move across the DRC, Uganda, and Rwanda, they appeared to have a supply of weapons from outside.⁶⁷

William Swing, MONUC Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), issued an ultimatum to the armed groups to lay down their weapons by the end of March 2005. When that deadline passed, he requested the DRC government to issue arrest warrants for top leaders of the armed groups, and a lot of their leaders were actually arrested. Among those arrested were Lubanga and Ndjabu, the leaders of the UPC and the FNI, respectively, who were already under house arrest, as well as Yves Kahwa, the PUSIC leader, Germain Katanga, the FRPI leader appointed as a brigadier general of FARDC, and Goda Sukpa and Pichou Iribi, both key members of the FNI. Bede Djokaba Lambi and John Tinanzabo, who assumed the UPC leadership after the arrest of Lubanga, were also detained temporarily.⁶⁸

⁶⁰ UN, "Seventeenth Report on MONUC," UN Doc. S/2005/167, para. 36.

⁶¹ Isberg and Tillberg, *By All Necessary Means*, pp. 150-152.

⁶² UN, "Sixteenth Report on MONUC," UN Doc. S/2004/1034, para. 11.

⁶³ UN, "Seventeenth Report on MONUC," UN Doc. S/2005/167, para. 15; ICG, *Congo: Four Priorities*, p. 31.

⁶⁴ UN, "Seventeenth Report on MONUC," UN Doc. S/2005/167, para. 16; ICG, *Congo: Four Priorities*, p. 31.

⁶⁵ UN, "Seventeenth Report on MONUC," UN Doc. S/2005/167, para. 19; ICG, *The Congo's Transition Is Failing: Crisis in the Kivus*, Africa Report, no. 91 (2005), p. 25; ICG, *Congo: Four Priorities*, p. 31.

⁶⁶ UN, "Eighteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," UN Doc. S/2005/506 (August 2, 2005), para. 22.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, paras. 26-27.

⁶⁸ ICG, *Congo: Four Priorities*, p. 31; Tamm, *UPC in Ituri*, p. 42; Tamm, *FNI and FRPI*, p. 34.

The hardline approach showed some successful results. By March, the FAPC disarmed 3,322 members and disbanded itself. In doing so, Jérôme Kakwavu, the group's leader, had the DRC government promise him the position of general in the DRC army, the amnesty for the acts of insurgency, and the guarantee of personal assets. The UPC-K, which had only less than 100 fighters, also disarmed and disbanded itself. Subsequently, 2,958 fighters of the FNI, 1,862 fighters of the PUSIC, and 1,374 fighters of the UPC-L disarmed themselves, with a total of nearly 16,000 fighters participating in the DDR program by its completion in June 2005. However, the number of weapons collected was limited to some 6,200 items, 70% of which were out of commission. Many fighters of the UPC-L and the FRPI, and some fighters of the FNI still refused to participate in the DDR program.⁶⁹

(3) The Reorganization of the Armed Groups and the Second and Third DDR Programs

In June 2005, fighters of the FNI, the FRPI, the PUSIC, and the UPC joined together to form the Congolese Revolutionary Movement (MRC), and Ngudjolo of the FNI, released in March 2005, assumed the MRC leadership.⁷⁰ The MRC demanded the integration with FARDC in the desired ranks, the establishment of the Ituri military region and the appointment of an officer originally from the MRC to the top position, the allocation of political posts, amnesty, the withdrawal of arrest warrants, and the release of detained members. Bosco Ntaganda repulsed the MRC policy of integrating itself with FARDC and chose to join an armed group in North Kivu.⁷¹ Some Hema fighters also headed toward North Kivu as did Ntaganda. However, after finding out that Ituri was not an important issue for the armed group in North Kivu, many of them returned to Ituri.⁷²

The FRPI and the FNI cooperated with the MRC in areas beneficial to them, but were not always on friendly terms with the MRC.⁷³ As for the FNI, after the arrest of Ndjabu, former Chief of Staff Joseph Chura assumed the posts of secretary-general and interim president. Then, the group turned itself into a national political party in August 2005, and in the words of its political representative, the FNI as an armed group disappeared at this point of time, but fighters who kept up with their resistance continued to use the name.⁷⁴ These armed groups were still persecuting civilians in areas where MONUC and FARDC were not deployed.⁷⁵

MONUC continued with its operations against these armed groups jointly with FARDC, proceeding with the detention of armed group fighters and the collection and disposal of their

⁶⁹ UN, "Eighteenth Report on MONUC," UN Doc. S/2005/506, paras. 23, 25; ICG, *Congo: Four Priorities*, p. 32. The fact that some 3,000 fighters of the FNI participated in the DDR program is taken to mean that a considerable number of FNI fighters joined the program, given the combined strength of 4,000 to 5,000 fighters of the FNI and the FRPI and the continued refusal of the FRPI to participate in the program. Tamm, *FNI and FRPI*, p. 34.

⁷⁰ Tamm, *UPC in Ituri*, pp. 42-43; Tamm, *FNI and FRPI*, p. 35.

⁷¹ ICG, *Congo: Four Priorities*, p. 32; Tamm, *UPC in Ituri*, p. 43.

⁷² ICG, *Congo: Four Priorities*, p. 3.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 32; Tamm, *FNI and FRPI*, pp. 35-36.

⁷⁴ Tamm, *FNI and FRPI*, pp. 34-35.

⁷⁵ UN, "Nineteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," UN Doc. S/2005/603 (September 26, 2005), paras. 15, 17; UN, "Twentieth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," UN Doc. S/2005/832 (December 28, 2005), para. 44; UN, "Twenty-second Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," UN Doc. S/2006/759 (September 21, 2006), para. 41.

weapons. On August 28, MONUC and FARDC carried out a combined operation in Boga and drove armed group members out of there. Their operations on the southern shore of Lake Albert prevented an inflow of weapons via the lake.⁷⁶ In mid-October, FARDC deployed its troops in the gold-producing zones in Kilo and Mongwalu with MONUC support and took the sources of revenue away from armed groups. As a result of this operation, nearly 1,000 MRC members surrendered in early November, with 223 items of weapons collected. In mid-November, a combined operation of MONUC and FARDC was carried out against the MRC in Irumu, in which some 200 MRC fighters surrendered and disarmed. Some 100 fighters escaped into Uganda, but they were disarmed there.⁷⁷ In March-May 2006, similar operations were conducted against the FNI and the FRPI in Djugu and Fataki.⁷⁸ In late February, a combined operation of FARDC and MONUC was conducted in Irumu where the FNI and the FRPI reactivated their activities, but the operation was postponed as some participating FARDC soldiers revolted. The operation was relaunched in May and drove the armed groups out of Tchei.⁷⁹ Diplomatic pressures were also applied to external supporters of armed groups, and Uganda in August 2005 declared MRC leaders as *personae non gratae*.⁸⁰ As a consequence, the MRC was unable to further increase its influence, but the large-scale disarmament of the MRC did not materialize either. In March 2006, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Lubanga, and he was transferred to The Hague, the Netherlands soon afterwards.⁸¹

Under these circumstances, a Nepalese unit was attacked by FNI led by Peter Karim in Tsupu on May 28, 2006, leaving one member dead, three injured, and seven detained by the FNI.⁸² For the sake of the safety of the Nepalese hostages, the operation against the FNI was suspended, and negotiations with the FNI for the release of the hostages got under way. With the presidential election scheduled for late July, the DRC government wanted to reconcile with armed groups prior to the election. Against the backdrop of such intentions of the DRC government, the negotiations developed into the dialogue with broader objectives. On top of that, on June 29, the FRPI recaptured its base in Tchei, taken by MONUC and FARDC a month ago. These developments forced MONUC and FARDC to entirely suspend their disarmament operations, and the DRC authorities and MONUC commenced negotiations to make peace with Ituri armed groups.⁸³

Following the above negotiations, all the Nepalese hostages were released in late June and July, and the DRC government and Karim reached an agreement on the integration of the FNI into FARDC.⁸⁴ Also, in July, the DRC government agreed with Ngudjolo, in principle, on the integration of the MRC into FARDC and the amnesty of armed group members. While the FRPI

⁷⁶ UN, "Nineteenth Report on MONUC," UN Doc. S/2005/603, para. 16.

⁷⁷ UN, "Twentieth Report on MONUC," UN Doc. S/2005/832, paras. 21-22; ICG, *Congo: Four Priorities*, p. 33.

⁷⁸ UN, "Twenty-first Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," UN Doc. S/2006/390 (June 13, 2006), para. 33; UN, "Twenty-second Report on MONUC," UN Doc. S/2006/759, para. 42; ICG, *Congo: Four Priorities*, p. 33.

⁷⁹ UN, "Twenty-first Report on MONUC," UN Doc. S/2006/390, para. 33.

⁸⁰ UN, "Nineteenth Report on MONUC," UN Doc. S/2005/603, para. 10; ICG, *Congo: Four Priorities*, p. 33.

⁸¹ ICG, *Congo: Four Priorities*, p. 33.

⁸² UN, "Twenty-second Report on MONUC," UN Doc. S/2006/759, para. 42; ICG, *Congo: Four Priorities*, p. 33.

⁸³ ICG, *Congo: Four Priorities*, pp. 33-34; Tamm, *FNI and FRPI*, p. 36.

⁸⁴ UN, "Twenty-second Report on MONUC," UN Doc. S/2006/759, paras. 42-43; ICG, *Congo: Four Priorities*, p. 34; Tamm, *FNI and FRPI*, p. 36.

did not take part in the negotiations, the presidential election took place without serious incident. From June to September, the second DDR program was carried out, and it was announced that a total of 6,728 fighters were disarmed and 2,332 items of weapons were collected. However, these numbers are deemed to have been inflated and many of the disarmed fighters reportedly rejoined armed groups.⁸⁵

The armed groups waited to see whether Kabila, their negotiating partner, was reelected as DRC president. After the reelection of Kabila became definite in November, negotiations between the DRC government and armed groups proceeded with a rapid pace, and between November and December, the DRC government concluded separate agreements with the MRC, the FNI, and the FRPI, respectively, on the integration of their forces into FARDC. Ngudjolo was given the post of colonel and an agreement on the amnesty of MRC members was also concluded. Cobra Matata who was leading the FRPI was already appointed as colonel in January 2005.⁸⁶

It took some time before the actual commencement of the integration and disarmament, however. On December 24, 2006, FARDC clashed with the FNI, prompting FARDC and MONUC subsequently to carry out containment operations against the FNI. As a result of the operations, some 600 FNI fighters disarmed by March 9.⁸⁷ Karim, for his part, wanted to stay in Ituri for his own personal interests and also for fear of his arrest by the government, and tried to renegotiate the method of integrating the FNI into FARDC by turning Ituri into a new military region, but his proposal was rejected by the DRC government. The government proceeded with the retraining of the armed group fighters by transferring them to training centers outside Ituri. This spurred the disarmament of the FNI in May 2007, with over 1,000 fighters and over 1,500 children disarmed.⁸⁸ Ngudjolo of the MRC also came to a conclusion that the group's armed struggle should be suspended, realizing that he could not gain more than what he already obtained through the negotiations, and on June 1, the MRC and the FRPI agreed anew to integrate themselves into FARDC.⁸⁹

Following these developments, the third DDR program was launched on July 5. Both Karim and Ngudjolo attended a ceremony to commence the program, voiced their support for the process, and urged the government to honor its pledges for amnesty, the release of detained fighters, and the respect of their ranks. The defense minister of the DRC government sent the letters to Karim, Ngudjolo, and Matata, assuring that they would not be legally prosecuted. Matata criticized the DRC government for giving only one colonel post in FARDC for the FRPI, just for Matata himself, against 13 such posts for the FNI and seven for the MRC. So, when the actual disarmament began in August, the FRPI did not participate in the program. A large number of MRC fighters were disarmed.⁹⁰ The FNI was fragmented, and dissatisfied FNI fighters attacked FARDC in the northwestern part of Djugu between August and November 2007, while about another 300 defector FNI fighters also refused to cooperate with the DDR process in the southern part of Djugu. With respect to the FRPI, only 10% of 3,495 fighters on the list submitted by Matata

⁸⁵ ICG, *Congo: Four Priorities*, p. 34; Tamm, *FNI and FRPI*, p. 36.

⁸⁶ ICG, *Congo: Four Priorities*, pp. 34-35; Tamm, *FNI and FRPI*, p. 36.

⁸⁷ UN, "Twenty-third Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," UN Doc. S/2007/156 (March 20, 2007), para. 19.

⁸⁸ ICG, *Congo: Four Priorities*, p. 3.

⁸⁹ Ibid.; UN, "Twenty-fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," UN Doc. S/2007/671 (November 14, 2007), para. 21.

⁹⁰ ICG, *Congo: Four Priorities*, p. 3.

were disarmed as of August 2007. However, Matata apparently inflated the number of fighters on the list intentionally. The UN and the DRC government extended the DDR program for a month, and the DRC government on October 6 added two more colonel posts to be given to the FRPI, while FARDC threatened to resume the military operations against the armed group. However, all these measures proved to be not enough to induce the FRPI to participate in the DDR program.⁹¹ As a result of the DDR program, some 1,850 fighters disarmed themselves during a three-month period, with some 1,600 items of weapons collected from them. All declared member fighters of the MRC were disarmed, while the rate of disarmament only came to 50% for the FNI and to 15% for the FRPI.⁹² In October, Katanga, a key member of the FRPI who was arrested after he had been integrated into FARDC, was handed over to the ICC.⁹³

Following the third DDR program, security in Ituri improved.⁹⁴ In 2004-2007, a total of around 24,500 armed group fighters participated in the disarmament program.⁹⁵ The leaders of the MRC, the FNI, and the FRPI moved to Kinshasa only as late as November.⁹⁶ Of them, Ngudjolo was arrested in February 2008 and sent to the ICC.⁹⁷ Even after these developments, there were the remnants of FNI or FRPI fighters who stubbornly continued to refuse the disarmament. Regarding the FNI, the armed group was largely neutralized through political persuasions and military pressures, with the presence of the FNI reduced to something comparable to a criminal problem, rather than a military threat.⁹⁸ On the other hand, the FRPI maintained its military capabilities, and FARDC supported by MONUC and MONUSCO continued to clash with the FRPI for more than a decade thereafter.⁹⁹ The FRPI's strength seemed to have shrunk to several hundred at one point,¹⁰⁰ but later resurged to more than 1,000 fighters.¹⁰¹ On February 28, 2020, the FRPI finally agreed to disarm after negotiations with the DRC government, but it is yet to be seen if the group's DDR proceeds as agreed.¹⁰² There are also other new armed groups that have come on stage since 2007, so the region's stability has not been fully achieved.¹⁰³ However, the extent of violence in Ituri declined significantly after 2007 compared to the previous level.¹⁰⁴ Thus, all in all, MONUC can be credited for restoring security in Ituri.

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 4.

⁹² Ibid.; UN, "Twenty-fourth Report on MONUC," UN Doc. S/2007/671, para. 21; Tamm, *FNI and FRPI*, p. 36.

⁹³ UN, "Twenty-fourth Report on MONUC," UN Doc. S/2007/671, para. 41; ICG, *Congo: Four Priorities*, pp. 20-21.

⁹⁴ UN, "Twenty-fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," UN Doc. S/2008/218 (April 2, 2008), para. 28.

⁹⁵ Tamm, *FNI and FRPI*, pp. 36-37.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 36; Tamm, *UPC in Ituri*, p. 43.

⁹⁷ UN, "Twenty-fifth Report on MONUC," UN Doc. S/2008/218, para. 54; ICG, *Congo: Four Priorities*, pp. 20-21.

⁹⁸ UN, "Twenty-fifth Report on MONUC," UN Doc. S/2008/218, para. 29.

⁹⁹ Tamm, *FNI and FRPI*, pp. 38-42. See also reports of the Secretary General on MONUSCO submitted to the UN Security Council.

¹⁰⁰ Tamm, *FNI and FRPI*, pp. 40-41.

¹⁰¹ UN, "United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Report of the Secretary-General," UN Doc. S/2020/214 (March 18, 2020), para. 21.

¹⁰² Ibid.; UN, "United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Report of the Secretary-General," UN Doc. S/2020/919 (September 21, 2020), para. 18.

¹⁰³ Tamm, *FNI and FRPI*, pp. 38-42; UN, "MONUSCO," UN Doc. S/2020/919, para. 17.

¹⁰⁴ Tamm, *FNI and FRPI*, pp. 37, 43.

3. MONUC from the Perspective of the Theory of Compellence

Given the challenges contemporary peace operations are confronted with, it is of great value to consider the factors behind the success of the proactive use of force by MONUC. As stated in the introduction, this paper considers this point from the perspective of the theory of compellence. The activities of MONUC that followed the aforementioned developments can be regarded as a successful example of compellence that has induced a majority of armed groups in Ituri to accept disarmament. Below, of the conditions of success discussed in the theory of compellence, this paper takes up the three conditions related to the fundamental constituent elements of compellence and considers whether they have been satisfied in the case of Ituri. The three are the contents of demands and the asymmetry of motivation, strategies, and the use of positive inducements.

(1) The Contents of Demands and the Asymmetry of Motivation

The factor to which multiple studies on compellence attach importance is the contents of demands to the opponent and the asymmetry of motivation determined by them. The purpose of compellence is to make the opponent accept demands, but the acceptability of such demands on the part of the opponent changes depending on to what extent the opponent regards the matter as important. Furthermore, depending on to what extent the contents of demands are of importance to the compeller, which of the compeller or the opponent has stronger motivation about the matter in dispute also changes. Since the side with the stronger motivation is deemed to have a higher tolerance of costs and risks, the credibility of its threat should increase. Therefore, compellence is expected to be more likely to succeed when the compeller demands matters from the opponent which the opponent finds acceptable but which are more important to the compeller.¹⁰⁵

In the case of Ituri, this condition was not satisfied. What MONUC demanded of armed groups in Ituri was disarmament. For armed groups, disarmament meant the elimination of their existence itself, and represented one of the heaviest demands to be imposed on armed groups in the context of peace operations.¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, MONUC acted as a third-party intervener, and in terms of motivation, armed groups, which were the direct parties to the conflict, naturally had stronger motivation. If the security of the intervener is directly linked to the stability of Ituri or the DRC as a whole—for instance, if the intervener is a neighboring country—such country may have relatively strong motivation. However, the Ituri brigade was actually composed of military units from such countries as Pakistan, Uruguay, Nepal, and Bangladesh, and it is hard to imagine that such countries had motivation stronger than that of the local parties to the conflict.

Therefore, in the case of Ituri, the compeller posed very heavy demands to armed groups and was at a disadvantage in terms of the asymmetry of motivation. However, this situation is not unique to Ituri; in the context of peace operations, or an international intervention in a civil war, such structure is likely to appear. Hence, it can be said that compellence in peace operations is being employed under a situation where one of the important conditions of success as pointed

¹⁰⁵ George and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*; Barry M. Blechman and Tamara Cofman Wittes, "Defining Moment: The Threat and Use of Force in American Foreign Policy," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 114, no. 1 (Spring 1999); Gregory F. Treverton, *Framing Compellent Strategies* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000); Robert J. Art, "Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know?," in *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*, eds. Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003).

¹⁰⁶ In contrast, what the IEMF demanded of armed groups was the demilitarization of Bunia. This demand covered only the specific area and can be seen as a limited demand.

out in the theory of compellence has not been satisfied. The case of Ituri demonstrates that it is possible to make compellence a success even under this situation.

(2) Strategies

Alexander George classifies approaches to apply pressure in compellence into four strategies: (i) classic ultimatum (the combination of demands, deadline, and explicit threat); (ii) tacit ultimatum (either one of the three elements of the ultimatum is missing); (iii) gradual turning of the screw (gradually increase the pressure); and (iv) try and see (see how the opponent will react by applying pressure in a limited way).¹⁰⁷ There is a study on compellence that has reached the conclusion that the ultimatum is particularly effective,¹⁰⁸ and this implies a possibility that one of the above strategies is more effective than others in compellence in peace operations. Of the above four strategies, the try and see strategy applies the lowest pressure on the opponent and therefore is not likely to be effective in the context of peace operations where the compeller has weaker motivation than the opponent. The remaining ultimatum-based strategies and the gradual turning of the screw strategy may be effective in compellence in peace operations.

In Ituri, both of the above strategies were actually employed. Since the takeover from the IEMF, MONUC repeatedly resorted to the proactive use of force against armed groups to eliminate the bases of armed groups, and it also gradually expanded its operational range out of Bunia. This can be understood to be the pressure under the gradual turning of the screw strategy. Subsequently, when MONUC suffered casualties from attacks by armed groups, SRSB Swing issued an ultimatum to armed groups and pressed them to disarm by March 2005. Some armed groups complied with disarmament by this deadline. MONUC thereafter detained leaders and key members of armed groups that did not comply with disarmament and continued to apply force, turning the screw further.

As seen above, MONUC made use of both strategies. As a whole, however, MONUC continuously built up pressure, which can be described as the gradual turning of the screw strategy. The ultimatum, consequently, became one of the steps in strengthening pressures that had already been under way. Because of this, there is a limitation in evaluating the effectiveness of the ultimatum per se from the case of Ituri. However, the effect of the ultimatum in peace operations is deemed to be limited; the ultimatum issued by Swing, even with the precedents of actual use of force, did not go any further than having made a part of armed groups accept disarmament, and it was necessary to increase the pressure on armed groups that refused to lay down their arms. Rather, the case of Ituri suggests that the gradual turning of the screw strategy is necessary in compelling armed groups.

(3) Positive Inducements

Previous studies on compellence point out that the carrot and stick approach that combines a threat and positive inducements is more effective than the reliance on threats alone.¹⁰⁹ The course of events

¹⁰⁷ George, "Theory and Practice," pp. 18-19.

¹⁰⁸ Peter Viggo Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War: A Challenge for Theory and Practice* (Hampshire: Macmillan, 1998).

¹⁰⁹ George and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*; Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy*; Blechman and Wittes, "Defining Moment"; Art, "Coercive Diplomacy."

in Ituri also demonstrates the effectiveness of positive inducements. The first agreement of May 2004 between the DRC government and armed groups in Ituri already included the carrot, such as the integration of armed groups into FARDC. Also in subsequent negotiations that resulted in the substantial progress in the DDR process, the integration into FARDC (in particular, appointment of leaders of armed groups to high-ranking posts in the army) and amnesty were offered for armed groups. The case of Ituri shows that the combination of military pressure and positive inducements is effective in compellence in peace operations.

On the other hand, the Ituri case also suggests the difficulty in using a carrot in peace operations. The acceptance of leaders and key members of armed groups as high-ranking army officers means offering benefits to those responsible for the violent persecution of civilians without punishing them. Such treatment of the leaders of armed groups invited international criticism. Perhaps partly because of international pressure, some former leaders of armed groups were arrested after their integration into FARDC or sent to the ICC. In that sense, not all the crimes have gone unchecked. In the opposite perspective, however, these have set the precedents that the safety of leaders of armed groups would not be guaranteed even if they got the promises of high-ranking army posts or amnesty, thereby significantly reducing the incentives for leaders of armed groups to accept negotiations with the government. Actually, in Ituri, as described earlier, there were some leaders of armed groups hard to be persuaded into concluding an agreement with the government for fear that they might be arrested upon acceptance of disarmament. Needless to say, it is desirable to hold armed groups accountable for persecuting civilians with violence for the realization of long-term justice and deterrence of violence in the future. However, it can be argued that pursuing such responsibility could hamper the short-term benefit of halting the currently ongoing violence as soon as possible.

This raises an extremely difficult issue in the context of peace operations. If dealing with a relatively small armed group or covering a small area, it is possible even for peace operations to compel disarmament or a suspension of activities by applying pressure to an armed group to the point of urging it to choose between a defeat or a surrender without relying on positive inducements and negotiation. However, as with many African countries, in the case of a vast territory, it seems difficult to push an armed group to the brink of defeat only by military operations using the force and capabilities provided for peace operations. It has to be said that it is difficult to eliminate the tradeoff between the realization of long-term justice and the early achievement of immediate stability.

(4) Summary

The case analysis of MONUC has shown that a condition of success cited as important in existing studies on compellence, i.e. the contents of demands are relatively acceptable to the opponent side and thus the asymmetry of motivation is advantageous to the compeller, is not a necessary condition for success of compellence in peace operations. With respect to the strategies, it has also shown that the effectiveness of the ultimatum strategy is limited and it is necessary to continue to increase the pressure under the gradual turning of the screw strategy. Lastly, it has been shown that positive inducements are effective in compellence in peace operations. The above results suggest that in compellence in peace operations, the combination of the gradual turning of the screw strategy with positive inducements enhances the possibility of success. However, it is necessary to

note that offering carrots to (the leaders of) armed groups in the context of peace operations may be regarded as problematic from the perspective of the realization of long-term justice.

Conclusion

This paper traced the proactive use of military force by MONUC and considered the reasons behind MONUC's success in inducing armed groups to accept disarmament from the perspective of the theory of compellence. MONUC demanded disarmament by armed groups in Ituri, and repeatedly carried out the proactive military operations from 2003 through 2007. Under these pressures, most armed groups in Ituri participated in the DDR programs. Hence, the activities of MONUC in Ituri can be construed as a successful case of compellence. In order to explore the reasons behind the success of the proactive use of force by MONUC, of the factors related to the success or failure of compellence discussed in existing studies on compellence, this paper examined whether those pertaining to the three fundamental constituent elements that have to be determined in conducting compellence were satisfied in this case. As a result, compellence in Ituri was successful, though the heaviness of demands to the opponent made the asymmetry of motivation, regarded as important in existing studies, unfavorable to the compeller. It seems that MONUC's pressure in the form of gradually turning the screw combined with positive inducements led to the success in Ituri.

Needless to say, this paper represents an analysis of just a single case, and there remain factors other than those examined in this paper that should be considered as potential conditions of success. So, it does not mean that compellence in peace operations should prove successful only by taking the above results into account. Given the circumstances confronting peace operations, it is desirable to accumulate more credible and reliable knowledge about under what conditions the proactive use of force in peace operations tend to prove successful. To that end, further analysis of the influences of other factors on the case of Ituri and a comparative analysis with other cases are desired.

