Post-Cold War International Society and U.S.-China Relationship

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One crucial variable that determines the future trend of the East Asia surrounding Japan is the relationship between the United States and China. There is no doubt that the future U.S. - China relations will be significantly influenced by whether the engagement policy of the United States proves to be successful or not. Japan, therefore, should take great interest in the engagement policy. This paper is the result of the joint study written by the authors with common concern in the issue.

1. The Structure and the Characteristics of the post-Cold War International Society

(1) What is "international society"?

(a) Definition

The term "international society" is often used as a synonym to the "international relations" or the "world" in general. Academically speaking, however, it is a concept that was developed by the "Grotian School" as one of the traditional theories of international relations in Britain. Hugo Grotius, a Dutch scholar of international law, suffered a strong impact by the event where religious disputes led to a cruel war called the "Thirty Years' War," and advocated an international law and order to be observed at war time and peace time based on the natural law oriented rationalism.[1] He applied the social nature of human beings, appetitus societatis, to the state, and theorized a detailed concept of just wars and unjust wars by balancing the tense relationship between the continuation of a sovereign state and the legal/moral framework that binds the actions by the state. This theory for the international relations by Grotius has been pursued further in Britain and in the U.S. with different interpretations. While the Americans have been inclined to consider the Grotian tradition as a liberal or idealistic paradigm that counter the one of the realists who focus on the conflicts of interests among states, which are rational and

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[1] Hugo Grotius, trans. F. W. Kelsey, Japanese translation *The Law of War and Peace* (3 volumes) trans. Masao Ichimata (Sakai Shoten, 1972).

unitary actors of international relations,[2] the British have considered it as a version of realist international relations theory that focuses more on the cooperative rules and institutions among states than power politics does.

When we take the Grotian School faithfully to what Grotius mentioned in his famous *De Jure Belli ac Paci* (*The Law of War and Peace*), its essence lies in the balance and compromise between the value of independence and continuation of a state, a value that was absolute in the times of Grotius, and the necessity for an international order. For Grotius, the solution was the distinction between just wars and unjust wars; for contemporary scholars of Grotian School, the solution were the "rules" and "institutions" of international relations. Among the major scholars in the Grotian School are Herbert Butterfield, Martin Wight, C.A.W. Manning, Hedley Bull, Gerrit Gong, Adam Watson and John Vincent.[3] Since the 1980s, an international relations theory called the "Grotian School" that had inherited the tradition of the British international relations theories started to attract attention in North America. Clair Cutler, Robert Jackson and others developed the Grotian arguments in the style that reflected the regime theory and the characteristics of the international relations in the post-World War II period.[4] In recent years, Barry Buzan theorized the relationship between the neo-realist theory of international system, which had been creating heated arguments in the international relations theory in the United States since 1980, and the British theory of international society. It is worth noting that they are trying to integrate the theory and history, and moreover, the American international relations theory and the British international relations theory.[5]

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[2] For example, Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," *International Organization*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring, 1982), pp.192-4; Arend Lijiphart, "The Structure of the Theoretical Revolution in International Relations," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (March, 1974) , pp.50-51.

[3] Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds., *Diplomatic Investigations: The Essays on the Theory of International Relations* (London : Allen & Unwin, 1966) ; Martin Wight, *Power Politics* (London : Royal Institute of International Affairs 1946) ; Wight, *Systems of States* (London :Leicester University Press, 1977); C.A.W.Manning, *The Nature of International Society* (London:LSE,1962): Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (London:Macmillan,1977); Gerrit W.Gong, *The Standard of "Civilization" in International Society* (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1984) ; Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society* (London: Routledge, 1992) ; Watson, "Hedley Bull, State Systems, and international Studies, Review of International Studies," Vol. 13 (April 1987), pp. 147-53; John R. Vincent, *Nonintervention and International Order* (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1974). Another recent publication that broadly covers the international relation theory of Grotius: Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, & Adam Roberts, eds., *Hugo Grotius and International Relations* (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1992).

[4] Clair Cutler "The Grotian Tradition in International Relations," *Review of International Studies*, Vol.17 (1991); Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1990); Jackson"Quasi-states, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory: International Jurisprudence and the Third World," *International Organization*, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Autumn 1987); Robert H. Jackson & Carl Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist : The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood," *World Politics*, Vol.35, No.1 (October 1982).

[5] For example, refer to the following: Barry Buzan, "From International System to International Society : Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School," *International Organization*, Vol. 47, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 327-350; Barry Buzan and Richard Little, "The Idea of International System : Theory meets History," *International Political Science Review*,Vol. 15, No. 3 (1994), pp.231-255;Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, *The Logic of Anarchy : Neorealism to Structural Realism* (New York : Columbia University Press, 1993).

The term "international society" is a concept with a broad range of implications as discussed in the second half of this Paper and the definitions and emphases vary among the theorists listed above. Generally speaking, the meaning and content may be identified through comparison with the term "international system." Hedley Bull, who is one of the leading scholars in the Grotian School and one of the few scholars who tried to understand the international relations theoretically as a scholar of political science among the British scholars of the international relations, who have strong tendency to take historical orientation, studied the significance and maintenance of the international order in his book *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, and defined the system of states (or international system) and the society of states (or international society) as follows. First, an international system arises "when two or more states have sufficient contacts between them and have sufficient impact on one another's decision, to cause them to behave as parts of a whole."[6] In other words, mere existence of more than two states as independent political bodies does not create an international system. The system arises when the states make periodical contacts and "where there is interaction between them sufficient to make the behavior of each a necessary element in the calculations of the other." Interactions among countries take various forms. There are direct and indirect interactions. Some interactions may be peaceful and cooperative while others may be conflicting. There are political interactions, strategic ones, economical ones, or social ones. Interactions among countries include vertical ones as seen in the old Asian tribute system centered around China and horizontal ones among equal sovereigns.[7]

It is estimated that the concept of an international system was formulated in Europe in the 18th century. It is said that the first time the concept appeared in writing was in the *Handbook for the European State System and Their Colonies* (*Handbuch der Geschichte des Europäischen Staatensystems und seiner Kolonien*) by Heeren published in 1809.[8] While it was feared that the growth of the state power in France might destroy the "European State System" and bring about a world empire, Russeau, Genz, Heeren and other philosophers analyzed the situation using the term "international system" and at the same time advocated the necessity of the continuation of the state system.[9]

On the other hand, an international society arises "when a group of states conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another and share in

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[6] Bull, *Anarchical Society*, pp.9-10.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

[8] Bull asserted, however, that Heeren is using the term "The State System (Staatensystems)" in the meaning of the "international society" discussed later in this paper. Ibid.,pp.12-13.

[9] Ibid.,pp.12-13. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "L'état de guerre"; "Extrait de la Paix perpétuelle" ; "Jugement sur la Paix perpétuelle," C. E. Vaughan, *The Political Writings of Rousseau*, Vol. 1 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,1915); "Fragments on War," S. Hoffmann and D.P. Fidler, eds., *Rousseau on International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1991); Friedrich von Gentz, "Fragments upon the Present State of the Political Balance of Europe," M. G. Forsyth, et al., *The Theory of International Relations* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970). See also E.Luard, *Basic Texts in International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1992).

the working of common institutions."[10] When states form an international society, the prerequisite is that those states have found common interests or values and are conscious that they are regulated by certain rules against one another, and these states would cooperate in the international laws, diplomacy, international organizations, practices of war, etc. Existence of an international system is a necessary condition for the international society, but it is not the sufficient condition. Even if, for example, there is communication among nations and agreements have been reached on trades, wars and alliance, it is an international system but not an international society if they are not conducted with common interests and value at the base, or if there is no recognition of the rules or recognition of the continuity of the rules among the states.[11]

In reality, however, there is no clear distinction as to whether an existing international system can be regarded as an international society, or when an international system becomes an international society. The definitions of an international society vary even among the scholars in the Grotian School as to what the main actors of an international society are or what type of rules or systems among the countries are supposed. Grotius, for example, stated that although states are the main actors in the international relations, individuals are the ultimate unit of the international laws, the international laws have direct connection with the development, prosperity and dignity of the individuals, and the individuals possess the same rights and responsibilities as the states under the international laws.[12] While the moral standard that binds the individuals and the moral standard that binds the states are the same for Grotius, Bull distinguished the rules among states from rules among individuals. In Bull's theory of international society, the main members of an international society are limited to states, and he distinguished the achievement of justice by individuals from maintenance of the international order. He highly estimated the value of maintenance of order among states and the role the states are to play for that objective even if it may conflict with justice. Bull denied the Grotian concept of the natural law, where it is believed that the objective collective interest and long term social interest exist in the world, attached greater importance on history and called himself a "neo-Grotian" scholar distinguishing his theory from those of Grotius and Wight. Grotius thought it was necessary for the welfare of the human being to make the rules that govern the interrelations among states comprehensive and systematic, and believed that the natural law which was the "order of right reason" could provide moral standard among states. On the other hand, Bull thought common rules, values and norms among states should be formed naturally through the course of history, not from abstract theories. Therefore, he believed that the "international society" is established by accidental concurrence on the expediency and interests among states rather than by conscious creation by politicians based on the natural law and long term interests for the states.[13]

In other words, the neo-Grotians define an international society more broadly and assume

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[10] Bull, *Anarchical Society*, p. 13.
[11] *Ibid.*, pp.13-16.
[12] Sir Hirsch Lauterpacht, "The Grotian Tradition in International Law," *British Yearbook of International Law*, Vol. 23 (1946), pp.26-30.
[13] Hedley Bull, "The Grotian Conception of International Soiety," Butterfield and Wight *Diplomatic Investigations*, ch.3; Cutler, "Grotian Tradition in International Relations," pp.53-59.

an international society that is closer in definition to an international system. The distinction between the traditional Grotian School and the neo-Grotian School is also defined as "solidarists" and "pluralists."[14] While the former insists on the existence of a high degree of consensus in the relations among countries, the latter approves it only in the minimum sense. The minimum common interests concern independence of countries, mutual respect for territories, observation of treaties and a certain restriction standard for use of violence, and the systems that realizes them are the international law, diplomacy, balance of power, control of the international order by major powers, wars, etc.[15] While Grotius distinguished just wars and unjust wars, Bull takes the stance that there exists no consensus among countries as to what is justice and what is injustice, and makes no distinction in wars, either.

Buzan makes a similar distinction. He separates the international societies by *Gemeinschaft* (blood relationship or family oriented community) and *Gesellschaft* (functional group or profit oriented group), which is a classic method of classifying societies in sociology. If an international society is a *Gemeinschaft*, it is a society with common sentiments, historical experiences, identity and other organic, traditional linkage. This concept concurs with the concept of the traditional Grotian School or the solidarists, as seen in Wight's international relations theory[16] which believes that an international society can be formed only when there exist a certain cultural (especially religious and linguistic) identity. On the other hand, if an international society is a *Gesellschaft*, it is a society tied together rationally and functionally with contracts, and agrees with the concept of the neo-Grotian School or the pluralists. In this viewpoint, necessity for recognition and coordination arises among the members of the international society as a matter of course through increase in the systematic interactions, and through these functional evolution in the international society, the minimum goals or rules will be formed concerning restriction in the use of military power, observance of contracts, coordination of possession rights, etc. that will replace the anarchic logic.[17] Whether we regard the international society as defined by the solidarists or by the pluralists, or whether we regard it as a *Gemeinschaft* or as a *Gesellschaft* presents us an important suggestion in studying the conditions of the U.S. - China relations in the future. In other words, as a general rule, communication would be easier and rules and systems based on common value judgment would be promoted in a *Gemeinschaft* like international society, where the actors share a common culture or civilization and long term interests are recognized among the actors, but the global community today has lost such common base. Understanding the international society as the pluralists theorize or as a *Gesellschaft*, however, might help us discover the possibility of the ideal situation where the two major powers like the United States and China which do not share any cultural values and historical experiences take allotment of responsibilities as the major members of the international society and contribute to the structuring of rules for the international order.

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14 Bull, "Grotian Conception of International Society," ch.3.
15 Bull, *Anarchical Society*, passim.
16 Wight, *Systems of States*, p.33.
17 Buzan "From International System to International Society" ; Buzan, Jones and Little, *The Logic of Anarchy*.

(b) Changes in the international society

Bull stated that the Grotian element of the international society as discussed above has always existed ever since the establishment of the modern international system.[18] Then, how has the actual international society developed and changed? The following is an attempt to study the international society historically and position the contemporary international society in the history with the focuses on (1) what are the actors or the major members of the international society, and (2) what is the foundation of the interrelations among the actors (this includes the culture/civilization foundation and the legal/institutional foundation). The international society can be said to have experienced three phases since the birth of the modern international system, namely (A) the 15th to 17th centuries, (B) the 18th and 19th centuries and (C) the 20th century.[19] This classification of course cannot be clearly identified. Also, a different classification may be possible when other factors of the international relations are considered.

(A) International society in the 15th to 17th centuries

In the 15th to 17th centuries, the universal political organization of the Western Christendom collapsed, and while the emerging modern states began to be recognized as the new major actors in the international relations, new norm and rules were sought to fill the social and moral vacuum that arose after the decline of the Christendom. In this period, at the early stage, in particular, it was not clear what the major actors of the international society were. Although modern states had begun to assume greater prominence to replace the Pope and local emperors, the diplomatic relations existed among actors other than the states. The terms for the states varied, such as "civitates," "principes," "regni," "gentes" and "respublicae," and so did the actual conditions of them.[20] There are a "state" concept which emphasizes the territory and the governing structure and a "nation" concept which focuses on the history, tradition, religion, language and other social standards. In this viewpoint, the 15th to 17th century was the period where the "state" predominated. The states that emerged as the strong actors in the international relations began to establish themselves by the existence of a common sovereignty with absolute power while combining the heterogeneous groups with different languages, religions and practices. As expressed typically in Bodin's sovereign theory, the absolute supremacy of the sovereign was thought to ensure political integrity as a state that is beyond the cultural, social differences among ethnic groups and regions.[21]

In the viewpoint of the relations among actors of the international society, the relations among states in this period were first founded upon the Christian civilization. The theory that a certain kind of order should exist in the non-religious level in the relations among modern states

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[18] Ibid., pp.24-27.
[19] Bull, *Anarchical Society*, pp.27-40.
[20] *Ibid.*, p.29.
[21] Jean Bodin, *Six Books of the Republic*, trans. M. J. Tooley Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1955).

was first conceived by Grotius who secularized the natural law,[22] and succeeded by Pufendorf, but during most of this period, in the 15th and 16th centuries, in particular, there existed no concept of laws or order that were separated from the divine law either among individuals or among nations. The religious unity in the Christendom in the Western Europe was further strengthened by the existence of an external threat, namely the Ottoman Turkish Empire during that period. In the latter half of this period, however, while the insistence on continuation of the universal authority of the Pope and the empire was still inveterate as the replacement to fill the social, moral vacuum that arose in the process of the gradual collapse of the Christendom, some internationalists began to advocate a natural law which had originated from the Stoics in the ancient Greece and Rome. Since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, in particular, a new school called the natural law theory began to play the roles of leading the principles of new international relations and to identify the domestic political relations. In those days, however, only implicit rules concerning the definitions of the states, wars and conventions among the states were beginning to be established, and no explicit rules existed yet. The international system, such as diplomacy and balance of power based on the cooperation among equal states had not been established yet.[23]

(B) International society in the 18th and 19th centuries

The 18th and the 19th centuries were the period when a political frameworks called states established a solid position as the actors in the international relations. In the discussion of the terms "state" and the "nation," this period, especially the 19th century, was the era of the "nation." The recognition that a state must coincide with a cultural, ethnic, linguistic community that could clearly be distinguished from others spread throughout Europe, and the trend of the times shifted from the inter-dynastic relations to nation-states. In the concept of a state in the 15th to 17th centuries founded upon the natural law, the state equalled the sovereign, and the state was created artificially, functionally and consensually, but in this new period, historicist concept of a nation was established which theorized that a nation would develop through the history and actual experiences and would be bound by the times, customs and culture.

The universalism of the Christendom that had been the foundation of the international relations disappeared from the international politics both in theory and in reality, and the Eurocentricism replaced it.[24] In the international society of the Christendom in the 15th to the 17th centuries, there had been a tendency to mitigate the exclusivism against other regions or states in accordance with the principles of the natural law that advocated common rights and

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[22] For secularization of the natural law, Kanichi Fukuda, *History of Political Science* (Tokyo University Press, 1985), p. 295.

[23] It is well-known that a long lasting organization in charge of diplomatic relations was established in city-states in Italy in the 15th century, but it was not the phenomena that spread through the Western Christendom. And since the diplomatic relations at that time were not linked with the principles of morals and ethics, the actions that betrayed other actors through such organizations occurred frequently. Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (New York : Dover Publications,1955).

[24] Paul W.Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848* (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1994).

obligations for the entire human race, but in this new period, the exclusive tendency grew stronger with the belief that the international society was unique to Europe, and non-European nations could be allowed to participate in the international society only when the level of their civilizations matches the standard of Europe. Therefore, although there had been many occasions where the European states entered into agreements or endeavored to build peaceful relations with the states in other regions of the world in the earlier period, the European nations established the "standard of civilization" to the membership in the international society and started to expand direct control in the world as the relative powers of the European states increased and the gap between non-European nations spread wider.[25]

The rules for coexistence of states developed as the states began to be explicitly recognized as the major actors in the international society. The origin of the rules that bound the states was no longer the natural law but the positive law which is a law on the practices and treaties among states based on the actual historical and national behaviors. In this period, a great number of writing concerning the history of the international system and the rise and fall of great powers became the new source for the generalization of politics and presentation of empirical rules, and the international rules were formulated with the past cases as the basis instead of the universal philosophy that stipulates what is right and what is not. As a result, the concept of the "international law" was recognized to replace the "law of nations" which had existed in the Christian international society.[26] As the rules for coexistence of states, the principle of non-intervention, the principle of equality of the fundamental rights of the states, domestic control rights and other rights were recognized, and several systems were formed that reflected the international cooperation including the international law, balance of power and the diplomatic system. In the rules that restricted wars, the just war theory based on the early natural law philosophy gradually disappeared, and as a result of the recognition that the states monopolize the right to exercise just violence in the international politics, the states became able to alter the partners for conventions and the contents of the treaties.[27] The European international society in the 18th and 19th centuries was closer to the "ideal type" of the international society in the Grotian school in the sense that the rules were established to reflect common interests and values among the countries that are the explicit actors of the international society. Such an ideal type of the international society, however, is rather an exception in the long history of the international relations.

(C) International society today

Bull posits that the international society in the 20th century has more common aspects with the international society in the 15th to 17th centuries than with that in the 18th and 19th centuries.[28]

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[25] Hedley Bull, "The Emergence of a Universal International Society," Hedley Bull and Adm Watson, eds., *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1984), chapter 8.

[26] Bull, *Anarchical Society*, pp.33-38.It was Bentham's Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation in 1789 that the term international law was first used.

[27] *Ibid.*, pp.33, ff.

[28] *Ibid.*, p.38.

In the present international society, the concept that the major members of the international society are the states is gradually becoming obscure, and many have started to argue that the members of the international society should also include the individuals, international organizations, non-governmental groups that conduct various activities beyond the borders. This aspect is similar to the obscurity in the major actors of the international society in the Grotian times. In regard to the concept of the "state" vs "nation," it is the age of the "state" supremacy today. After the decolonization, in particular, a state became a political framework that connotes the present international society with diversified domestic conditions among the members. The "standard of civilization" is no longer a standard for the membership in the international society, and the states are now allowed the participation in the international society based on the territories and the governing organization regardless of the domestic conditions. Furthermore, in the 20th century, there emerged a tendency to divert from the historical positivism which defined that the existing customs were the source of the rules of the international actions as seen in the 18th and 19th centuries, and return to the natural law principles. In other words, the League Covenant, the Kellog-Briand Pact, the Charter of the United Nations and other normative principles were formulated, and the rules of coexistence of the states have more universalistic tendencies through the international organizations, laws of wars, and international arbitration and coordination procedure that developed from the mid-19th century to the mid-20th century. These standards and universal rules are regarded in connection with the international moral and international improvement unlike those in the 18th and 19th centuries where the maintenance of the international order was the top priority goal through the minimum rules including maintenance of existence, compliance with contracts and stabilization of possessions.[29]

While the present international society has a similar aspect to that in the 15th to 17th centuries, however, there also exist the aspects where the international society in the 18th and 19th centuries has extended and developed, the aspects which are totally different from the international societies in the past. Since the 1960s, for instance, it has often been emphasized that actors other than the states have begun to exert influence in the international relations. It is also true, however, that while the conventional states had only concerned the diplomatic and strategic issues, the present states have begun to be involved in the economic and social issues as well which had been the concern of the civilians in the past, extending their roles and functions. While many advocates exit from the state-oriented paradigm as the economic interdependence deepens and the human community awareness spreads around the environmental and other contemporary issues, nothing exists yet to replace the existing state system. It is new states that are born as a result of the movement of the international integration and separation, and there seems to be no signs of denial of a state as a dominant form of political institution. It could be said instead that the sovereigns have become the first common political form for all human race in the world and the state system has been strengthened by the global spread of the European international society

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[29] *Ibid.*, pp.38-40.

after the World War II.[30]

The international society has expanded globally, first by the participation of the United States and Japan as major powers, followed by that of the other member of the international society outside Europe after decolonization. The new characteristics today are that non-European states occupy the majority of the international society, and the members of the international society no longer share the culture, language, religion, ethical rules and artistic tradition which had been shared among the Europeans in the European Christendom. On the other hand, however, the rules which the Asian and African states learned from Europe through their elites during the period of expansion by Europe are still alive in the diplomacy, international organizations and international laws of war. National self-determination, sovereign equality and other new rules were actually contained in the European liberal philosophy. The loss of the cultural foundation of the past due to the changes in the members of the international society significantly characterizes the international society in this century, but it is also an important aspect that the new comers to the international society have accepted the basic rules and systems of the European international society in the past and socialized themselves.[31] The international society that was gradually formed as the modern national system was born and that had been recognized explicitly in an ideal form in the 19th century has now acquired new adaptability and durability in the 20th century and is now more "institutionalized". In this sense, perhaps the international society today can be said to be developing even further rather than have recurred to that of the 15th to 17th centuries.

(2) Trends of theories of international relations in the post-Cold War era

Although the end of the Cold War is often regarded as the dividing ridge in the international relations, it is not necessarily so in the theories of international relations. Theories are not formulated by directly reflecting the actual changes in the world in the first place. Regarding the end of the Cold War as the watershed of IR theories seems to be more apparent a phenomenon in the United States than in any other country.

As an overview the neo-realism and the neo-liberal institutionalism are the dominant two system-level paradigms in today's IR theories in the U.S. These at least partially succeed to the tradition of the classical realism and liberalism in the past. The realism and liberalism have differ by; how to define the actors of the international relations, what issue to consider as important in the international relations, whether to regard the international relations as conflicting or cooperative, and whether to emphasize the changes in the international relations or the continuity. Generally speaking, the realists consider that the state is the major unitary, rational, actor of international relations and focus on the aspect of the conflicts of interests

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[30] For example, Hedley Bull, "The State's Positive Role in World Affairs," *Daedalus* (Fall 1979), pp. 111-23; Jackson and Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist" ; Jackson, *Quasi-states, Dual Regimes,and Neoclassical Theory*.
[31] For example, Yongjin Zhang, "China's Entry into International Society : Beyond the Standard of 'Civilization'," *Review of International Studies*, Vol.17 (1991), pp. 3-16 ; Gong, *Standard of "Civilization" in International Society* ; Gong, "China's Entry into International Society"; Bull and Watson, *Expansion of International Society*.

among the states in the zero-sum international relations. They also regard the security issue as the most important. Realism is the theory that emphasizes the recurring patterns in the international relations. On the other hand, the liberalism considers that the international organizations, multi-national enterprises and other non-state agents as other important actors in the international relations, and consider that a state is not an abstract entity but consists of individuals, bureaucrats, interest groups and other entities, and those various domestic groups exert influence in the diplomatic policies. The liberals also consider that the important issues in the international relations include economic and social problems, focus on the cooperative aspects of international relations and pay attention to the progressive changes in the international relations.

In the second half of the 1980s, the realism and liberalism adopted the elements of the structuralism[32] and developed into the neo-realism and neo-liberalism respectively, where they converged more in content. The neo-realism is a realism that considers the structure of the international system as the independent variable and does not necessarily conceive the image of conflicting international relations based on the attributes of the actors, such as "the human nature is evil" or "the consistent pursuit of power by the nation" as seen in the classical realism. The liberalism accepted the premises that the fundamental structure of the international relations is anarchy and that the actors in the international relations were the states emphasizing the changing nature of international relations. Thus, a new diagram debate was born in the second half of the 1980s that is different from the conflicting confrontation between the classical realism based on the power politics and the liberalism that succeed to the integration theory and the functionalism.[33]

If any changes were made in the international relations theories at the end of the Cold War, one of them must be the increased arguments concerning the appropriateness of realism as a theory. A new hope was born for peace by cooperation among major powers through the development of the institutionalism, the "democratic peace" theory and Francis Fukuyama's "the End of History" argument, which pushed the elements that the liberalism had possessed forward, and the tendency has occurred where the neo-liberalism recurred somewhat to the mutual dependency theory and international integration theory.

The institutionalism became prominent as the significance of the regimes among the states were highlighted again by the intensification and expansion of the EC integration, regional integrations for liberalization as seen in the NAFTA, emergence of the environmental and natural resources issue, human rights issue, international involvement in regional conflicts and other incidents as global problems to replace the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The institutionalism proposes contributions to peaceful transition in the

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[32] This structurism is distinguished from the one concerning the behaviorism in the international relation theories that was popular in the 1950s to 60s. The origin of the structurism in the international relations after 1980 was the structurism as the methodology which emphasizes science and objectivity that was employed in the fields of cultural anthropology, psychoanalysis, economics, literature, etc., and it was Kenneth Waltz who was called "second Durkheim" that introduced it in the international relation arguments.

[33] Joseph S.Nye,Jr., "Neorealism and Neoliberalism," *World Politics*,Vol. 40 (January 1988), pp.235-251.

international relations where the institutions provide information, reduce the transaction cost, furnish various coordination opportunities and promote reciprocity among states.[34] Most of the institutionalists consider that the watershed in the international relations was the point of time when the United States became the supreme major power in the West instead of the end of the Cold War, and link to the hegemonic theory that argued the generation of the regimes in the Western countries under the American hegemony and the development of interdependence. In the present post-Cold War world, it has been emphasized that the hegemony of the United States is different from that of Portugal, Holland, the Great Britain and other powers in that it has been liberal and democratic, which has contributed to the diffusion of liberal democratic order to the entire world.[35]

The "democratic peace" theory advocated by Bruce Russet and others is an argument that the more democratic each country becomes, the more peaceful the international relations become. This was based on the joint studies with his colleagues which concluded that democratic countries do not engage in wars with one another.[36] Heated arguments on whether the thesis that democratic countries do not engage in wars with one another is correct or not has been exchanged and a number of anti-theses exist.[37] The end of the Cold War might have given opportunities for the democratic peace theorists to assert their stance more strongly. Samuel P. Huntington indicated in his thesis *The Third Wave* that the wave of democratization that had been in progress in the past has irreversibly spread throughout the world after 1989. He also considers that global spread of democracy is synonymous to expansion of peace in the world, and speculates that the world freed from violence will be realized by the spread of democracy.[38] In Fukuyama's *The End of History*, he states that the end of the Cold War means the victory of the Western liberal democracy and at the same time it means that the human race has reached the final point of the ideological evolution. He insists that liberal democracy will be universalized and it will be the last governing style by the human race,[39] although his argument provokes much criticism.

A new tendency has thus emerged where the liberal democratic order, which has been nurtured

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[34] For example, Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony : Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1984).

[35] John Ikenberry, "The Myth of Post-Cold War Chaos," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.75,No. 3 (May/June 1996); Ikenberry "The Future of American Leadership,"*Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 111 (November 1996).

[36] Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993);Robert L.Rothstein, "Democracy, Conflict, and Development in the Third World," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol.14 (1991); Zeev Maoz & Nasrin Abdolali, "Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816-1976," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol.33 (1989).

[37] For example, Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of Democratic Peace,"*International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994), pp.5-49; David Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace,"*International Security*, pp.50-86 ; Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa, "Polities and Peace," *International Security*, Vol.20, No. 2 (Fall 1995), pp.123-146 ; Raymond Cohen, "Pacific Unions : A Reappraisal of the Theory that 'Democracies Do Not Go to War with Each Other,'" *Review of International Studies*, Vol.20 (1994), pp.207-223.

[38] Samuel O. Huntington, *The Third Wave :Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman University of Oklahoma Press,1991).

[39] Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest* (Summer 1989).

under the hegemony of the United States during the Cold War and which has proven to be victorious by the end of the Cold War, is considered as the standard with stronger, more intensified binding force. The current debate on the system-level international relations theories in the United States, therefore, has been between the neo-liberal institutionalism in the superior position against the neo-realism.[40]

(3) Post-Cold War international society: Implication to the U.S. - China relations

What are the characteristics of the post-Cold War international society? (1) Major members of the international society and (2) relations among the major members as well as the nature of the accrued agreements and rules are important elements in the determination of the character of the international system. Several researchers have drawn evaluation and review on the images for the post-Cold War international society.

(a) Major members of the international society and the size

Different arguments exist among the scholars on the definition of the major members of the international society in the next twenty to thirty years to come. Many assume China, Japan and Germany (or the Western Europe) as the new major members. Most speculate multi-polar world. C. Layne, for instance, listed the examples of the collapse of the French hegemony that lasted from 1660 to 1714 caused by the rise of Britain and Austria, and the fall of the British hegemony caused by the rise of Germany and Japan, and pointed out that the uni-polar system had not lasted for more than fifty years and the hegemony of the United States is under the similar conditions. The United States is currently exerting worldwide leadership with outstanding national strength, but the structural constraints in the international system always makes the uni-polar system shift to bi-polar or multi-polar system. Layne stated the neo-realist thesis that if a state with a potential to become a major power opts not to become one, it would mean structural anomality, and asserted that the United States should prepare itself for the multi-polar system which is certain to come by listing Germany and Japan as the rising major powers.[41] Kenneth N. Waltz speculates that although the bi-polar system with the United States and Russia in the military aspect will continue for some time, structural change will occur in ten to twenty years and there will be a quadruple- or quintuple-polar system where Germany (or the Western Europe), Japan and China will play the major roles.[42] Henry Kissinger, who is a traditional realist, also speculates multi-polar system in the post-Cold War world, and asserts that the diplomatic stance which the United States should adopt should be "neither to dominate the world nor withdraw

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[40] M.E.Brown, S.M. Lynn-Jones & S.E. Miller, *The Perils of Anarchy* (Cambridge :MIT Press, 1995); David, A. Baldwin, *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York : Columbia University Press, 1993).
[41] Christpher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion," *International Security*, Vol.17,No.4 (Spring1993).
[42] K.N.Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993).

from it, but to learn balance of power"[43] with the premise that the United States, China, Japan, Russia and India will at least be the major poles.

The stability of the multi-polar international system has been discussed by making comparison with the uni-polar (hegemony) system and bi-polar system. The theorists of multi-polar stability often present their arguments using the examples of relatively stable Europe between 1648 and 1792, where no significant territorial changes were made except for the first division of Poland as well as the cooperative relations in Europe in the early 19th century. These historical international systems are examples of the international order that had been maintained by cross-restraint usually among five to six major powers with virtually equal national strength and that possessed several generation and maintenance conditions. They include the system where diplomacy was entrusted to the professional politicians and diplomats who had the capabilities to successfully conduct careful diplomatic maneuvers and alliance operations, the endeavors for maintaining the cooperative system intentionally by the diplomats especially in the Vienna system, flexibility of the alliance, and according to several scholars, the existence of common language and standard for diplomatic activities. Those conditions are said to have led to a consensus in maintaining continuity of independent states and limitation of wars.[44] The future world is speculated to experience the multi-polar system where heterogeneous poles intermingle for the first time. How will the rules and systems of the international society with such characteristics be, and what will be desirable?

(b) Rules in international relations

When considering the rules of international society, two viewpoints exist on the understanding of the international society, namely Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, or solidarism and pluralism, depending on whether civilization and culture are regarded as important foundation as discussed in the Section 1. The city state system of Ancient Greece, the Warring State system of China, the state system of ancient India, and the international system that originated in modern Europe had foundation on the common culture or civilization. The concept that the common culture/civilization are important elements of the international order and stability are still deep-rooted. Samuel Huntington, for instance, takes the stance that it is not politics, economy or ideology but cultural identity that forms the pattern of the post-Cold War world, and it is inevitable that the states with different culture and civilization will "clash". He speculates that the world was divided into the Capitalists', Socialists' and the Third World during the Cold War, but the system will be replaced with multi-polar international relations with seven to eight different civilizations participating, and in this first multi-polar and multi-cultural future world, the clash will break out particularly by the Islam world and China against the universalism in the

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[43] Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Touchstone, 1994).
[44] E.V.Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power* (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1955) ; Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored : The Politics of Conservatism in a Revolutionary Age* (New York : Grosset & Dunlap, 1964) ; R. Elrod, "The Concert of Europe," *World Politics*, Vol. 28. (January 1976) ; R.Jervis, "From Balance of Power to Concert : A study of International Security Cooperation," *World Politics*,Vol. 38 (October 1985).

West.[45] Huntington takes the view that if China continues to make economic growth while maintaining the unified State without any breakup, it is inevitable that China will expand its influence externally and continue to confront the United States with the human rights, nuclear diffusion, intellectual property and many other issues, which will certainly bring about a "cold war" between the United States and China.[46] There remain a number of obscure points in Huntington's concept of the "civilization" and inevitability of the "clash of civilizations," but it is at least true that many countries in the world do not share the Western Culture in Huntington's definition of the term, and a number of scholars have pointed out the possibilities of international conflicts which may be caused by the cultural differences among states that link to their nationalism. It requires, however, further studies as to whether homogeneity of the culture, ideology or the national regime is the requirement for maintenance of order among states as Huntington and several other theorists in the multi-polar stability point out.

The rules, standards, regimes and principles that exist in the international politics range from those that are highly explicit to implicit ones and further to those that are formed by accidental convergence of the short-term interests of the actors. Raymond Cohen, who categorized the "rules" in the international politics and expressed them with one scale that match the degree of explicity, listed "non-binding written understandings" as the most explicit rule and placed "restraints, voluntarily undertaken by the parties concerned, which happen to converge to create a symmetrical area of prohibited behavior" as the most implicit in his thesis in 1980. He categorized the rules of the international society that there exist, in the order of higher degree of explicity, "non-binding written understandings," "gentlemen's agreement," "the spirit of an agreement written between the lines" and "tacit understanding," and explained each of them citing specific examples.[47]

According to Cohen, what rule is appropriate at what conditions vary by the relations among actors and the characteristics of the issue. He described three situations where tacit understanding is preferable to implicit agreement. They are, (1) where no direct contact exists among concerned actors, (2) where explicit rules would hurt the pride of one or both parties, and (3) where the actors consider that explicit rules would damage the credibility of the actor or the nature of the agreement leave no room for vindication.[48] A large number of agreements were entered under these circumstances between the United States and the Soviet Union in the post-World War period. (1) mutual respect for the territory of the other, (2) avoidance of direct military confrontation, (3) use of the nuclear weapons only as the ultimate resort, (4) intention to maintain stability in the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union even if it means sacrifice of small and medium sized states, and (5) no obstruction to the leadership of the other;

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[45] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster,1996).

[46] *Asahi Shimbun*, April 8, 1997.

[47] R.Cohen, "Rules of The Game in International Politics,"*International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 24 (March1980) ; Cohen, *International Politics : The Rules of the Game* (New York: Longman, 1981).

[48] Cohen "Rules of the Game in International Politics," p.142.

these rules[49] are positioned as the "tacit understanding" in the Cohen's scale. These relate to the nature of the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union in the confrontation during the Cold War. On the other hand, more explicit rules are more likely to be formed in the economic, social issues when the actors share the common interests in their efficiency and cost reduction as a general rule. The same tendency is found in the resources and environmental issues. The South Pole Agreement, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Partial Test Ban Treaty, SALT , SALT and other specific agreements have higher explicity even as the rules between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and placed on the "high" side of the Cohen's scale. Those did not threaten to damage the pride and credibility of both the United States and the Soviet Union even if they are agreed explicitly.

<Cohen's scale>

		Low	Low
—	Accidental convergence of self restraint	↑	↑
—	Tacit understanding		
—	The spirit of an agreement written between the lines	Degree of explicitness of the rules	Degree of convergence in the expectation of actors
—	Gentlemen's agreement		
—	Non-binding written understandings	↓	↓
—	Binding written understandings	High	High

It is difficult to set rules explicitly and officially by the actors' intentions when the actors who are politically competing are to be accommodated. Rules are more likely to be created implicitly by mutual deterrence and inertia instead, and such rules are often more effective. Actors who do not share the cultural foundation may prefer to avoid creating agreements other than those concerning respect for the territorial rights, maintenance of independence and other extremely implicit agreements rather than building the relationship with explicit treaties and rules so that the pride or credibility would not be damaged. It is necessary to make close examinations on the standing of the rules for cooperation between the United States and China for each of the various issues if the United States and China who share no cultural foundation are to exist as the major candidates for the big powers of the international society and if the relationship between the two are to exert significant affects on the international relations. This leads to the argument as to how much and to which issues the United States should allow China

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[49] John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace* (Cambridge,MA: Oxford University Press, 1987).

to be "engaged" in the rules of the international society. The United States, for instance, has increasing tendency to consider that the United States won the ideological victory by the end of the Cold War and to assert the liberal democracy as the universal value in the international society, but there exist many states in the world which call it the American imperialism or criticize it as intervention to domestic affairs. The human rights issue between the United States and China has such a nature. While mutual economic dependence grow in both countries, they have the inter-independence relations concerning the political, cultural values. In this sense, the international society today might be regarded as a *Gesellschaft*, rather than a *Gemeinschaft* with the viewpoint of the neo-Grotian school, not the solidarism. The international society in the image of the neo-Grotian school is to be formed by sharing the minimum goals, such as respect for the sovereignty and territory, equality among sovereigns and maintenance of order in the international system and the society that had been the fundamental elements of the European state system, although the premises do not include common culture in an active sense of the term, and long-term rules and system with high degree of convergence in the expectation of actors.

The world has experienced the "homogeneous, multi-polar international society" (Europe in the 17th to 19th centuries) and "heterogeneous bi-polar international society" (the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War). It was indicated by Gaddis and Bull that one of the factors of the stability of the bi-polar system during the Cold War was not the interdependence but the inter-independence relations unlike the balance of power system that had existed in history in the past.[50] The relationship between the Unite States and the Soviet Union had the lowest degree of interdependence compared to the relations among other major powers that contributed to stability of the international order in the past, by the fact that the two states did not pay excessive attention to the value judgment or viewpoints of the other, and the fact that they had been self-sustaining, self-sufficient conditions economically when they entered the international society. A lesson may be learned from this in the relations between the United States and China because the actors are major powers with different regimes and different ideologies.

Metternich, who exercised his capability in structuring the Vienna System, said, "we must confirm independence of sovereignty based on the reciprocity because there are no isolated nations in Europe and there is a tendency that the nations are approaching one another to tie a kind of social union."[51] It is interesting to note that the goal of the cooperation among major actors by balance of power was continuation of independence and avoidance of excessive mutual dependence that might make the sovereigns unstable even in those days when the international society was formed based on common cultural background. It is the major problems to be solved in the relationship between the United States and China to determine how much they

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[50] Gaddis, ch. 8 ; Bull, "Arms Control and World Order," *International Security*, Vol.1 (Summer 1976), cited in R.O.Matthew & J. Stein,eds., *International Conflict and Conflict Management* (Toronto:University of Toronto Press,1984), pp. 388-389.
[51] Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power*, p.30.

respect the inter-independence while managing interdependence which is unavoidable in the world today, and how to fulfill the role of major powers, namely maintenance of order in the international society through mutual cooperation.

2. American Policy on China: "Containment" and "Engagement"

One of the focal issues in the Asia-Pacific region in the post-Cold War world is how to recognize the rise of China. The policy makers and international political scientists in the United States have been exchanging heated arguments on whether to "contain" the hegemony of China or to "engage" China in the international society. Generally speaking, the supporters of containment argue that the rise of China is a potential threat to the vital interests of the United States, and advocate measures based on traditional balance-of-power concept by strengthening relations with the allied countries. On the other hand, the supporters of engagement tend to seek restraint on China's unilateralism by the basic principles of the international society, namely democracy, market-oriented economy and the rules of law although they too agree on the tendency of expansion of China.[52] Such disputes may be interpreted as the complexity of the future images, whether the international society that has experienced heated ideological conflicts in the Cold War will repeat the history and continue the struggling for supremacy among major powers or expand the periphery of the order controlled by the international norms.

It appears that this dichotomy of containment and engagement is taking roots as the coordinate axes in the arguments on policies concerning China in the United States. It needs to be recognized, however, that there exist the following pitfalls in that categorization method as a tool to consider the American policies on China.

The first is that although simplification is inevitable in active arguments, such simplification is only directed to the "containment" side. There is a tendency to label the arguments for containment as "defensive and anachronistic" perhaps due to the political needs to justify the current policy of engagement, but this labeling is not appropriate when viewed against the history of the relations between the United States and China. On the contrary, the containment policy at the early stage of the Cold War had a dynamic nature aimed at reformation of the domestic system of the Soviet Union, and had much in common with the current engagement policy.

The second is that the arguments on containment and engagement tend to attach more importance on the general principles to control the international society in the post-Cold War world than on the specific analyses on the China's behavior and other Asian conditions. It should be noted that as a result of this, the arguments bear the tendency to inductively draw the images of future China from the general principles that have been assumed to apply mainly to the European region.

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[52] For distinction between the containment and engagement, see, Robert Ross, " 'Chugoku Kyoiron' ni Madowasareruna" (Don't Be Carried Away With 'China Threat'), *Chuo Koron*, May 1997, pp. 339-350.

The third is that it is often disregarded in the arguments that containment and engagement are the "means" of policies, and not the "ends." What is essential in the American policies on Asia is incorporating the rising "heterogeneous" major power into the regional framework. It is therefore indispensable to skillfully combine the competitive means such as containment and the cooperative means such as engagement. In the arguments in the simplified dichotomy, such a sense of balance in diplomacy is often disregarded.

In studying the above points, this Chapter shall be structured as follows. First, the author shall give the outline of the basic doctrine of containment and point out the fact that the containment of the Soviet Union conceived by George F. Kennan, a specialist on the Soviet Union, and the engagement policy that describes the general policy in the post-Cold War world have virtually the same nature. Here, in the context of diplomatic doctrines, the engagement policy can be positioned as recurrence to the Kennan's containment concept. This is the very point that explains why there exist theorists who understand the containment and engagement of China are synonymous.[53]

This interpretation on doctrines shall vary as a matter of course when the doctrine of containment is employed in different political situations. Adoption of the doctrine in the Cold War into the current policies on China will invite criticism as anachronistic.[54] Therefore, the author shall also point out that the engagement policy under an adjusted makeup has different orientation from that of the containment policy.

The author shall compare and refer to the arguments on containment and engagement in the United States and point out as conclusion that they are gradually converging into the "conditional containment"[55] that has the combination of the characteristics of both arguments. Through the above study, it shall be apparent that the arguments on the policies on China in the United States are shifting to those concerning the "methods" of engagement.

(1) Containment and relations between the United States and China

Generally speaking, the concept of national security does not arise from the international relations that are the subject of study alone, but it is also bound by the domestic situations surrounding the policy makers. As John Lewis Gaddis, who is a noted Cold War historian, pointed out in his work *Strategies of Containment*, containment was the concept that became necessary due to the Russian behaviors and the world situations, and at the same time it stemmed from the various power groups in the domestic situations in the United States to a considerable

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[53] For example, Rideon Rachman, "Containing China," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No.1 (Winter 1996), pp. 129-139.

[54] See the conclusion section of the report by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) on this point. Robert G. Sutter, "China's Rising Power Alternative U.S. National Security Strategies - Findings of a Seminar" *CRS Report for Congress*, June 6, 1996.

[55] The following has the same directional orientation as in the "conditional engagement" although the terminology is different. Audrey Kurth Cronin and Patrick M.Cronin, "The Realistic Engagement of China," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Winter 1996), pp. 141-169.

degree.[56] When this argument is developed further, it would mean that the arguments on policies of containment and engagement conducted at present are influenced by both the international relations in the post-Cold War and the American political society in the post-Cold War world. In order to study the appropriateness of such interpretation, the author shall first make close examination on the specific contents of the containment policy and give fundamental review to compare it with the engagement policy.

(a) Origin of the containment concept

The American policies on the Soviet Union during the Cold War can be said to be based on containment. It was the endorsement of such historical experience that caused President George Bush to express proudly that the end of the so-called Cold War was "beyond containment." It was George F. Kennan, Director of Policy Planning Staff, US Department of States, a noted specialist on the Soviet Union, who wrote up the draft of the containment policy in the years immediately after the World War II. He interpreted that the source of the Soviet expansionism is the fragility of its domestic society. He viewed therefore that the Soviet Union's challenge to the United States was mainly psychological and political, not militaristic.

In view of the worldwide balance of power, there were only five power centers in the second half of the 1940s, namely the North America, the United Kingdom, Western Europe (France and Germany), the Soviet Union and Japan. The United States was in the position to be able to form the Western world with others except the Soviet Union. Thus, the balance of power was more advantageous to the United States objectively, and there was no need for the United States to take the policy to intentionally challenge the Soviet Union. In such a long-term view, Kennan contrived the idea of containment as a dynamic policy that could cause collapse of the Communist Bloc.

According to Gaddis, Kennan assumed three phases in the containment policy. In the first phase, he planned to restore the balance of power in both Europe and Asia that had crumbled in the World War II and establish an independent power center in both regions. Kennan believed that foundation of regional resilience in the true sense of the word in Europe and Asia would agree with the national interests in the long run.

In the second phase, he pursued to gradually reduce the Soviet exertion of influence beyond the borders. The source of the influential power of the Soviet Union in the post-war period included the communist regimes in the Eastern Europe and the international communists' movements. His keen eyes foresaw the eventual break-away of Yugoslavia led by Marshal Tito and other satellite states from the orbit of the influence of the Soviet Union and generation of serious cracks in the international communists movement. He prognosticated the future of conflicts between China and the Soviet Union as the corollary.

At the final phase of containment, he sought to reform the Soviet Union's concept on the

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[56] John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment A Critical Reappraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* Oxford, NewYork Oxford University Press,1982), p. 357.

international relations into more peaceful one through negotiations. If security is established in the regions surrounding the Soviet Union, and if the domestic political stability is enhanced, Kremlin would find interests in the detente with the United States. Thus, Kennan believed that if they continue patient "containment," the ideological diplomacy under Stalin would come to an end and the containment would complete.

As discussed above, the cardinal point of Kennan's containment policy was to reform the Soviet Union to "status-quo power" in the international society by skillful combination of "carrots" and "sticks."[57] Kennan's containment concept that combined both stalwart and forbearing aspects was politically excellent, and have much in common with the current engagement policy. As discussed later, however, the containment concept was contorted as militaristic, and Kennan's concept was eventually forgotten into the oblivion of history. This has caused containment and engagement to be positioned at opposite poles.

(b) From containment of China to rapprochement between the United States and China[58]

In view of the application of containment, there were two major turning points in the relations between the United States and China in the post-war world. The first was the point of the entrenchment of the conflicts between the United States from the end of the World War II through the foundation of the Communist China to the Korean War, and the second was the point of virtual abandonment of the containment policy against China after the "reshuffling" of alliances by the Sino-U.S. rapprochement (1971). The overall structure of cooperation between the United States and China since the 1970s has not changed although both parties experienced mutual distrust after the Tien An Men incident and loss of the common enemy (the Soviet Union) at the end of the Cold War. In order to confirm this viewpoint, the author shall give the brief description on the historical development of the American containment policy for China.

The relations between the United States and China saw a historic turnabout from cooperation to confrontation in the few years that followed the end of the World War II. Throughout the World War II, President Franklin Roosevelt and Chiang Kai-shek of the Kuomintang of China had repeatedly built up the alliances in the operations against Japan, and as a result it had been scheduled that China would be a member of the "world police force" after the War. After the end of the War, however, full-scale conflicts between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in China broke out, and the People's Republic of China was established in 1949, which baffled the American conception formulated during the War. This deprivation of a valuable partner in Asia by the "loss of China" paved the way to McCarthyism. The germination of the so-called containment of China started here.

It is remarkable, however, that the American government did not dare all-out confrontation

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[57] The authors owe much to the following on arrangement of the arguments on containment. Terry L. Deibel and John Lewis Gaddis, eds., *Containment : Concept and Policy*, 2 Vols. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1986).

[58] See the following for the historical development of the U.S. - China relations. Rosemary Foot, *The Practice of Power: U.S. Relations with China since 1949* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). Akira Iriye, *Beichu Kankei* (*The U.S. - China Relations*) (Simul Shuppankai, 1971).

with Beijing and sustained the possibility of future improvement on the relations between the United States and China as much as possible. Kennan, an advocate of the containment of the Soviet Union, for instance, argued that (1) China could not exert military power outside the Asian Continent, (2) the Asian Continent did not have strategic importance for the United States, and (3) if the Communist Party of China seizes the power, its intention to be independent from the Soviet Union would be strengthened, thus he believed that the United States should support them, and considered the deteriorated relations between the United States and China as "temporary." The Secretary of State Dean Acheson also set a moderate goal to avoid the opportunities where the Soviet Union take advantage of China strategically. Acheson judged that threatening the Communist China would drive them closer toward the Soviet Union, and he demonstrated the stance that the United States would wait until the time of the Sino-Soviet split in the future while maintaining the economic relations with China.[59]

It was the concept of the "defensive perimeter"[60] in the Asia-Pacific region that was led from the expectation of rapprochement between the United States and China as well as the limited interests of the United States in the Asian Continent. Under this concept, maintenance of the defense line that link the Aleutian Islands to Japan, to Okinawa and to the Philippines was defined as the vital interests, while the Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula and other regions that were low in the "cost effectiveness" in security were omitted from this defense line. This partition was announced in the Secretary Acheson's statement at the National Press Club in January 1950, and the containment line of the United States was set on the sea, not on the land.

It is not surprising that the Korean War which broke out in 1950 radically shook up the reliability of this containment policy which subsumed the possibility of rapprochement between the United States and China, and caused the emphasis to shift toward direct confrontation between the two nations. The United States and China were engaged in direct battles in the theater of confrontation between the UN forces and the Chinese People's Volunteers. The three-year long war had resulted in congealment of the conflict between the United States and China, north-south division of the Korean Peninsula, and the security treaty networks between Japan and the United States, between the United States and Taiwan, and between the United States and Korea. The United States became responsible for the ground defense in the Asian Continent under such framework. Thus the containment line of the United States was extended to the military boundary on the 38th parallel. Recent studies have shown that if the cease-fire agreement of the Korean War had been violated, attacks to the Chinese coastal regions was assumed, in other words, a war between the United States and China could have broken out at the slightest provocation.[61]

The relations between the two nations had the keynote of cold war confrontation until the

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[59] Warren I. Cohen, *America's Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations*, 3rd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), chapter 6.

[60] This defense line was an illustration of the commitment at peacetime, and was not intended to abandon Korea and Taiwan at wartime. See the following for the details: John Lewis Gaddis, "Drawing Lines: The Defensive Perimeter Strategy in East Asia, 1947-1951,"in Gaddis, *The Long Peace*, pp. 72-103.

[61] For example, refer to the following thesis : Rosemary J. Foot, "Nuclear Coercion and the Ending of the Korean Conflict, "*International Security*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Winter1988/89), pp. 92-112.

rapprochement in 1971. This cold war tension had been heightened by the development after the Korean War, including the two Taiwan Strait Crises in the 1950s, the nuclear tests by China in 1965, a threat of extended attacks on the southern China and China's nuclear facilities during the height of the Vietnam War and the rise of radicalism in the Chinese diplomacy by the "cultural revolution." In other words, containment of Mao Zedong's China meant urgency in the national defense of the United States.

The containment policy for China took a complete about-face by the Sino-U.S. rapprochement by Nixon and Kissinger, and the subsequent normalization of diplomatic relations by the Carter Administration. It was due to the mixture of considerations, namely the "China Card" as the restraint against the Soviet Union and stabilization of Asia through restoration of China in the international society, but the significance of the former was reduced by the ending of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

(c) Phases of the U.S. - China relations

The implications of the containment policy and engagement policy concepts vary by the historical phases in the relations between the United States and China. Generally speaking, containment means continuous application of pressure to restrain the unilateralism of the other when adjustment of interests through negotiations is difficult. It was symbolized by the direct confrontation of the United States and China during the Korean War, in particular, and the United States' refusal to approve the Beijing government. This phase in their relations with the keynote of zero-sum conflict advanced into a new phase of rapprochement with the premise of mutual approval by the new approach resulted from the Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy in 1971 and the normalization of relations in 1978. The United States and China, led by the common interests of forcing the Soviet Union to take "two-front operations," achieved "détente (relaxation of tension)." Furthermore, the United States opted strategic partnership with China, started economic and military exchanges, though partially, and moved toward improvement of relations aimed at the "entente." The keynote of the total confrontation between the two nations formed by the Korean War and Vietnam War became passe at this point in the 1970s.

In the past twenty years since then, the United States and China have been extending the economic and political exchange network, and Washington can no longer seek for international isolation of China. Even though the interests for the human rights issue were heightened by the Tien An Men incident in 1989 and the two nations experienced military tension by the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996, any efforts for containment of China at present seems "too late."[62]

The relations between the United States and China will be determined by the rational selection between continuation of entente (equivalent to the current phase of their relations) based on limited agreements or *de facto* alliance to seek broader policy cooperation (so-called strategic partnership of the United States and China). It is theoretically possible that there is another option of retreating the relations back to the level of "reconciliation." This, however, would not

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[62] Sutter, "China's Rising Power,"pp. 10-11.

be a realistic option for the United States except for the case where the Beijing government discontinues diplomatic relations and selects international isolation. The United States has begun to be increasingly aware of not only the unreserved physical force (hard power) but the "soft power" that generates from inter-contacts with other nations as well. This concept is demonstrated in the opinion of Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs in the Clinton Administration.[63] Therefore the United States has no reason to actively reduce the contacts with China in the present circumstances where the diplomatic relations are far more stable than in the Cold War period and constant trading relationship has taken roots.

The "appeasement" option is a policy to aim for international isolation of the other party by intentionally break up the cooperative relations that had reached to a certain level, and is perhaps closer to containment in the traditional sense. It is difficult to believe that the United States is willing to select this policy to reduce the contacts with China by the same reason.

(2) "Enlargement and Engagement" in the "International Society" in the post-Cold War period

The United States and China overcame the quasi-cold-war conflict in the 1970s and have not drastically amended the fundamental line even after the end of the Cold War. It is regarded that the Tien An Men incident in 1989 triggered to heighten the doctrine of human rights and democracy in the American policy for China and the removal of the Soviet Union factor weakened the incentive for the strategic partnership between the United States and China. In order to study the influence of such movements in the cooperative relations between the two nations, the author shall give the outline of the American policies on Asia in the post-Cold War period and consider the meaning of the "engagement."

First, the East Asian Strategic Initiative (EASI) which the Bush Administration proposed for the post-Cold War period showed connotation of disengagement. In other words, the United States set out the policy of reduction in force of U. S. forces in this region in three phases in ten years before the start of the 21st century, and alter the role of the United States from instructive to supportive while maintaining the commitment on security in the East Asian region.[64] The main goal is the promotion of autonomy in security by the nations in the Asian region while avoiding excessive intervention by the United States to that region. This correction of diplomatic commitment is no other than a succession to the fundamental principle of the Guam Doctrine issued by the Nixon Administration. In other words, the Bush conception was a logical consequence, not alteration, of the American policy on Asia.[65]

The downsizing of the American presence, however, generated "power vacuum" in the

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[63] The policy documentation for Europe and for the Middle East (Nye Initiative) which was drafted by Nye and others was based on his "Soft Power" argument. Joseph Nye, Jr., *Bound to Lead* (New York : Basic Books, 1989).
[64] Junichi Abe, "America: Kiro ni tatsu Higashi Ajia Senryaku" (The United States: East Asia Strategy at Turning Point). Masao Okonogi and Tomoyuki Kojima, eds., *Higashi Ajia Kiki no Kozu* (Structure of East Asian Crisis) (Toyo Keizai Inc., 1997), pp. 55-77.
[65] Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, chapter 28.

Asian region in the post-Cold war world, and encouraged pessimistic speculation that it would intensify the security competitions. Clinton Administration that assumed power in 1993 reversed the withdrawal conception of Bush because distrust had surfaced not only in Asia but in Europe as well concerning the role of the U.S. in the Western Alliance.

Democracy, human rights, market economy and other conceptions of the West were highlighted as the principles to control the international relations when the West won the "victory" in the Cold War. It was the "enlargement and engagement" of the Clinton Administration that caught this trend. President Clinton stated at the beginning of 1994 that enlargement of democracy is one of the supporting pillars of his diplomatic policies after indicating that democracies have rarely fought each other. It was Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs who more precisely presented the policy to enlarge democracy. He stated in September 1993 that "the strategy to succeed to the containment doctrine is the enlargement of the liberalistic union that consists of democratic states who believe in market economy," and positioned the thesis of enlargement of democracy at the core of the "enlargement and engagement" strategy.

It was the Central and Eastern European regions where this enlargement and engagement policy was applied in the most explicit manner. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) continued to expand the range of the policy toward risk management in the region while seeking admission of new members in order to enlarge the "zone of peace" in the Central and Eastern European regions. In structure, this means while the core of NATO secures the joint defense oriented "hard power," the framework for cooperative security is presented in the periphery. The "Partnership for Peace (PfP)" which NATO initiated in 1994 and the peace enforcement activities in Bosnia are the examples of execution of the fundamental policy of the United States.

As this enlargement and engagement policy has surfaced, the "international society theory" which was described in detail in Chapter 1 was to be applied to the U.S. - China relations as it is, but it was accompanied by two difficulties. First, this enlargement and engagement policy tended to make less account of the regional characteristics and historical backgrounds because it frequently employs the universalism rhetorics as seen in the human rights diplomacy under the Carter Administration. In other words, democracy, market economy and other principles and norms for controlling the international security anteceded, which fanned the tendency to grasp the Asia-Pacific and other regional conditions under such universalist viewpoint.

Furthermore, the thesis that enlargement of democracy will build up a peaceful structure inevitably gives the orientation toward interventionism. In the case of containment, the domestic system is seldom the direct subject of interests of outside powers because the main concern is whether the diplomatic actions of the target nation is cooperative or not. On the other hand, in the case of engagement, it is more likely that the commitment for mission to transform the political system of the target nation into democracy is aroused because explicit interrelations are recognized between the domestic and international politics. As a result, there are stronger drives to depend on domestic intervention disregarding the regional balance, and this engagement policy exerted subtle influence on the Clinton Administration when it decided to participate in the domestic disturbance in Bosnia to which the Bush Administration had decided non-intervention. The problems that arose from the enlargement and engagement policy were serious

for the relations between the United States and China which experienced difficulties in establishment of strategic partnership due to the loss of the common enemy, the Soviet Union.

(3) Coordinates of arguments concerning American policy on China

As the author stated at the beginning of this section, one of the arguments on the international relations in the East Asia in the post-Cold War world was whether to contain China on the rise or to allow China to engage in the international society. Several tacit understandings exist in this argument.

The first is the instability in the balance of power in the East Asia and absence of the international system to peacefully manage any disputes. The focus of attention is the structural characteristics where hegemony of a major power is easily actualized due to this lack of a comprehensive security mechanism.

The second is the coincidence in the opinions that China is not very interested in the status-quo in such fluid East Asia. Even the theorists in engagement recognize that China is a revisionist power in Asia, and the concern is directed toward whether China possesses the intention and capability to threat the regional balance of power.

The third is the general coincidence in the speculation that the Chinese military will not be a direct threat to the United States in the next ten years.[66] Such speculations, however, contain a reserved condition that the probability of China becoming a super power in the next century in the long run cannot be ignored.[67]

Thus, general agreement has been formed concerning the recognition of the condition that China's unilateralism is emerging as a factor for instability in fluid Asia without a security framework. Theorists of both containment and engagement have drawn different prescriptions although they share the above recognitions. The following is the summary of the arguments.

(a) Estimation of the international system in Asia
Theorists of containment regard that the "power vacuum" generated in the post-Cold War world will not easily be filled and security competition is easy to be actualized in the form of power struggles among major powers.[68] It is also emphasized that there is a limit to strengthening the security mechanism in the Asia-Pacific region with the keynote of diversity. The most radical theorists of containment, Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro assert firmly that China's long-

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[66] See Sutter, "China's Rising Power," pp. 1-16.

[67] The evaluation of the strategic nuclear capability of China by the United States is being amended due to the suspected spy case of stealing the nuclear related technologies that surfaced in Spring 1999. See the "Cox Report" by the Special Investigation Committee of the House of Representatives for the details. http://www.washtimes.com/investiga/investigacox.html.

[68] Ross Munro, "Japan, Prepare for 'China Threat'," *This is Yomiuri*, July 1997, pp. 180-187: Paul Dibb, Toward a New Power in Asia, *Adelphi Paper*, No. 295 (London: IISS, May 1995); Richard K. Betts,"Wealth, Power and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War,"*International Security*, Vol.18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94); Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multi-polar Asia," *Ibid*.

term hegemony is permanent and the movement toward improvement of the relations with the United States is merely strategic. They argue that the international rules and standards lack strength to be the framework to restrain China and forceful measures by the traditional balance of power policy should be employed. Charles Krauthammer also set out the stance of upsetting the power base of the "relentless dictator" in the long run while restraining the expansion of China, and entrusts power politic tools as the means.[69]

A neo-isolationistic argument may be defined as a variation of the theory of containment. Christopher Layne, the major theorist of this argument advocates that the United States should reorganize and reduce the diplomatic commitment because he believes that healthy domestic politics and society are the basis of security. This policy will give rise to the sense of responsibilities in the allied nations but will induce "security competition" in Europe and Asia, and the United States should maintain a distance from the allied nations and reserve power as the "final balancer". He asserts that if, for instance, both Japan and China rise in the East Asia, the United States should let them compete with each other and be contained within themselves. Such cool-headed calculations on the national interests has generated the concept of the "offshore balancing"[70] in which the United States shall not be committed neither to China nor to Japan, which may be positioned as an indirect containment concept.

Theorists of engagement, on the other hand, assert that it is the current of the times to enlarge the principle of control by democracy, market economy and laws, and present a bird's eye view of the control of the international order in Asia. These theorists can roughly be divided into those of "unconditional engagement" and others of "conditional engagement".

It is the "Kantian peace" that forms the basis of the unconditional engagement theory.[71] Its advocate Michael W. Doyle speculates that establishment of democratic constitutional politics will create prudence in diplomatic policies and mold an international system where wars are unlikely to break out. He adds that there were only three democratic nations in the 18th century, but the number has rapidly increased to fifty after the World War II, and such trend of enlargement of democracy is a great current in history. Democracy has won victory in two world wars and a cold war fought in this historical process, but there has been no war that divided the democratic powers in two in the past two centuries. He states that in Asia, Japan has turned into a peaceful nation by experiencing democracy and it is now contributing to the regional security.[72] This argument by Doyle has become the motif for the abovementioned "enlargement and engagement" policy which Lake, Assistant to the President had presented.

Such arguments overlap partially with the theories of economic interdependence. If China participates in the international economy system, the incentive to violate the interests of important economic partners will weaken, and when modernization of the domestic society proceeds,

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[69] Shinn, "Introduction," in *Weaving the Net*, p. 4.

[70] Christopher Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing : America's Future Grand Strategy, "*International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer 1997), pp. 86-124.

[71] See Michael E. Brown, et al., eds., *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1995).

[72] Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics,"*The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986).

there is a possibility that it may function as the pressure to bring down the authoritarian system.[73] There is, however, no assurance that such changes will take place, and it is impossible to draw the condition setting as to how to provide the motivation to prevent the Chinese leaders from taking actions that do not comply with the standards of the international society. Furthermore, the method to formulate diplomatic policies from the general principle of engagement will frontally contradict the subtle sense of balance that is required at critical conditions.

It is the "conditional engagement" theory that defined the criteria of the engagement policy based on such criticisms, and it can be estimated as the most sophisticated theory so far. A typical example of this theory is the report edited mainly by the Council of Foreign Relations of the United States. Here is the outline.[74]

First, the following ten points are identified as the principles of the engagement policy for China: self-restraint of unilateral use of military actions; peaceful resolution of territorial issues; respect of sovereignty; freedom of sea lanes; appropriate military reinforcement; transparency of the military; non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons; access to the market for trade and investment; cooperative resolution of supernational problems (terrorism and drug control); respect for basic human rights.

It should be noted that the item numbers correspond to the priority order. In other words, the most important points in the engagement policy are those that possess high degree of political implication and urgency such as execution of military actions, the territorial issues and sovereignty, and it is speculated that the United States will sharply respond when any breach in those areas occurs. The focus here is to attach more importance to individual measures for each issue in the relations between the United States and China, and to restrain issue-linkage as much as possible.[75] Respect for human rights, for instance, has low priority even though it is listed here as one issue, and it will be less likely that breach in the human rights area by China will spread to other more important issues. Thus, the theory of conditional engagement aims for providing a safeguard against escalation of conflicts while aiming for the gradual formation of fundamental principles for the relations between the United States and China. As Shinn, one of the compilers of this report admits, the base line of this conditional engagement policy bears close resemblance to the Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy that promoted detente between the United States and the Soviet Union employing the combination of "carrots" and "sticks."[76]

(b) Chinese hegemony

Theorists of containment define that the Chinese hegemony is rooted in their long history, social climate and political culture, and is permanent. This analysis that their hegemony will

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[73] Sutter, "China's Rising Power."

[74] Shinn, "Conditional Engagement with China," in *Weaving the Net*, pp. 12-30. See also Robert B.Zoellick, "China: What Engagement Should Mean," *The National Interest*, No.46 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 13-21.

[75] The Cox Report agrees with this approach.

[76] Shinn, "Introduction," in *Weaving the Net.*

not change has gained support from some scholars of China. According to Alastair Johnson, it is their domestic and social factors that play important roles in forming the national identity of China, and the "strategic culture" established in the Ming Dynasty exerts the decisive influence, which led China to recognize the international relations as permanent state of war.[77]

There has been no examples where a communist regime proceeded with the political reformation process without inviting the collapse of the establishment, and the Tien An Men incident has made the political leaders thoroughly recognize the hazardous aspect of the democratization process. Therefore theorists of containment assert that the scenario with the highest probability is maintenance of the current regime in China. In other words, no matter how out-dated and unjust China is regarded as by the outside world, China will continue to order the People's Liberation Army to maintain security, and while adhering fast to the ideological dictatorship of the Communist Party, the Chinese leaders will continue the totalitarian system. Bernstein and Munro point out that the Chinese leaders will plan procurement of modern weapons using the huge trade surplus amount as the resource while continuing the totalitarian government, and plan to steadily improve the power projection capability. Their hegemony has become solid by the combination of the rise of nationalism, traditional doubts about the western world, longing for the international position and other traditional Chinese factors and the self-righteous self-assertion backed with economic growth. They draw the conclusion of the "coming conflict with China" form here.[78]

Theorists of engagement argue against the other that use of the countermeasure against the Chinese hegemony with containment will exert destructive impact to the international relations in the East Asia, contrary to the original intention. David Shambaugh, a specialist of Chinese studies, judged that the engagement policy that will open China is preferable in the long run after he conducted comparative analyses on engagement and containment. According to Shambaugh, while the domestic politics, policy making and recognition of elites are positioned as the decisive factors in the Chinese diplomacy, it cannot be denied that they hold deep-rooted suspicions against multilateralism and liberal rules or organizations created by the Western states. Therefore, China prefers traditional bi-lateral relations to multi-lateral negotiations, and becomes cooperative when there are specific profits. As a result, it is difficult to assume that the United States and China will build a "reciprocal" relations. Thus Shambaugh admits that there is a certain limitation in engagement with China. He insists firmly, however, that when the deep-rooted suspicions are taken into consideration, the containment theory will deteriorate this situation even further and will not provide any indicator for resolution of the problems.[79]

Rosemary Foot who wrote the history of the relations between the United States and China

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[77] Alastair Iain Johnston, "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China,"in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 216-268.

[78] Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, *The Coming Conflict with China* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997).

[79] David Shambaugh, "China's military: Real or Paper Tiger?" *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol.19, No.2 (Spring 1996), pp. 19-36 ; Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China?" *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 180-209.

asserts that the Chinese leaders have the sense of balance in the temptation for union and precaution against dependency, and the hegemonistic tendency will not be eliminated in one day. She speculates that the Chinese diplomacy will go through a number of vicissitudes since the desire to learn from outsiders and the desire to maintain the traditional Chinese nature are closely mingled together.[80]

(c) Estimation on Chinese military

It seems unnecessary to devote pages on the arguments of containment of the Chinese military extension since they are well-known. The author shall discuss the counter-arguments from the theorists of engagement, especially their fundamental concept here.

First, Robert Ross counter-argues that the "Chinese threat" is a misconception of facts as follows. First, there is a limit in the types of weapons which China can import, and they have no choice but to develop weapons themselves to obtain full-fledged power projection capability. Since it takes time, even if China starts to develop an aircraft carrier, it will be 2005 to 2010 when it can be operated. Therefore the South China Sea will remain under the control of the United States even in the 21st century, and if China reinforces the military, it is obvious that it will cause an alarm in Japan and the United States, which will place China under unfavorable conditions without being able to achieve security in the coastal regions and other targets.

It is remarkable that theorists of conditional engagement advocate "asymmetric" approach, not "symmetric" approach to the hegemony of China in the military field.[81] According to the abovementioned report by the Council on Foreign Affairs, the "symmetric tit-for-tat"[82] strategy may be applied to economic engagement. If, for instance, China imposes 10% tariff on the imports from the United States, it will be judged to be appropriate if the United States impose the tariff in the same rate to the imports from China. In other words, it is allowed in the economic relations to apply sanction according to the actions of the other party.

On the other hand, exercising such symmetric sanctions in the security field is considered to be inappropriate because it will cause "unexpected results" where the confrontation or competition becomes more intensive. It is, for example, not a good idea for the United States to commit non-compliance with Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) as a countermeasure against missile export by China. If the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) abandons the confidence building measures (CBMs) because there is little transparency in the Chinese military, it would deteriorate the overall security environment. These are the examples of the "echo-effects"[83] caused by the "symmetric tit-for-tat" strategy.

The "asymmetric" approach is the response to a Chinese action in the measures which the

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[80] Foot, *Practice of Power*, p. 21.
[81] See, Shinn, "Security Engagement," in *Weaving the Net*, p. 65.
[82] On the "tit-for-tat" policy, see, Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
[83] Robert O. Keohane, "Reciprocity in International Relations," *International Organization*, Vol. 40, No.1 (Winter 1986), p. 10.

United States deems appropriate. An example is the option to dispose the F-16 fighters to the areas where China has strong concern as a countermeasure to furnishing missiles to the Middle Eastern countries.

It would require skillful combination of the "carrots" and "sticks," but it must be recognized regrettably that the "carrots" are limited in the military field. The "carrots" for the security aspect of China, for instance, might be military technology transfer and support to the People's Liberation Army or enlargement of contacts with the military personnel, but it is highly likely that China would gain one-sided gain from them. In other words, China would heighten its prestige through international exchange, and the personnel in charge of that negotiation would try to strengthen its position, or some may find it profitable in the intelligence activities when the contact between the militaries[84] are promoted.

On the other hand, the "stick" to China in the security field would be reinforcement of alliances (with Japan, Korea and ASEAN members) by the United States. The measures would include requests for larger defense budgets, fair burden-sharing among the allied nations, improvement of interoperability in the equipment and communication fields, and enlargement of joint exercises.[85] As discussed earlier, the combination of "carrots" and "stick" in the conditional containment approach has the same theoretical structure as the Nixon-Kissinger's detente diplomacy.

(4) Prospect of American policies on China

Arguments on the policies on China concerning containment and engagement in the past few years have begun to lead to discovery of common foundation, though it is still ambiguous. The containment theory with excessive emphasis on military is anachronistic which takes the U.S. - China relations back to the Mao Zedong period, but unconditional engagement theory cannot restrain the hegemony oriented actions of China. The conditional engagement theory cuts off both extremes as such and presents the policy option with both hard and soft approaches, which accommodates the actual conditions of the international relations in the East Asia where both cooperation and confrontations are present.

The conditional engagement theory is played with Joseph Nye's "soft power" concept and former Defense Secretary William Perry's "cooperative security" concept on the continued bass. Both concepts emphasize the universal principles such as democracy, market economy and governing by laws as the instructive conceptions in the international society, and place greater significance on enlargement and engagement of the Western conception than on containment. This does not mean that the power political occasions are gone from the relations between the United States and China. It is the method of execution of power that has changed. In the present international environment, agenda-setting capability is important as the source of power.

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[84] Shinn, "Security Engagement," in *Weaving the Net*, pp. 68-69.
[85] Ibid., p. 71.

In other words, setting agenda, presentation of standards and monitoring observance of those standards will assure the relative position of power. It is the West with the United States at the center that takes this position, not China.

It would be too optimistic to expect that both nations will develop truly creative partnership in the near future when such asymmetry of their relations is taken into consideration. As Harry Harding points out, the basis of the relations between the United States and China is fragile, and the common interests for both parties remain limited.[86] The economic relations between the United States and China is limited to unilateral investment of the United States to China and dependency to the American market by China, and is not even interdependent. In the fields other than economy, the relations between the two have not reached the level of interdependence where explicit rules and standards are shared. For the time being, instead, the cooperative aspect that promote constructive participation of China in the international order and the competitive aspect where each party restrains the regional hegemony as needed will co-exist. In other words, what looks like contradicting relations will continue, but when cooperation in higher levels is required, it would be China, not the United States, that must take the first action.

The binomial distinction of containment and engagement would be inappropriate in understanding such complex, asymmetrical relationship between the two, and such excessive simplification will fade out eventually. The concepts of containment and engagement should be positioned in the policy option spectrum, and should not be regarded as antinomic relations. The rising issue in the United States today is the "means" of engagement (active or passive, cooperative or competitive, conditional or non-conditional), not the "end" of engagement. Considering the current situation where the United States is leaning toward the conditional policy, it is natural for Japan not to neglect the preparation against emergencies such as the Taiwan Strait Crisis, and it would shake up the fundamental relations between Japan and the United States if Japan casually leans toward the containment of China concept.

Kennan, who was the advocate of containment in the past, commented on the Kissinger's diplomacy that, "what Henry (Kissinger) is doing is the same as what I have been thinking about," and indicated the resemblance between the containment policy and the détente in the 1970s. As discussed in this Chapter, if the conditional engagement policy shares the détente concept of Kissinger's, there is little difference in concept between the Kennan's containment and the current engagement policy. It is the political environment, policy presentation methods and the names of the policies that have changed. The conclusion in this section is that barren arguments on containment and engagement should cease, and the theme for the future policy making is the deliberation of the engagement method.

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[86] Harry Harding, *A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1971* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992).

3.   Development of Policies on China in the United States

The relations between the United States and China had been tense since the Tien An Men incident (the violent crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in and around Beijing's Tien An Men Square) in 1989, but improvement efforts are under way through the series of exchanges between the leaders since the US-China summit meetings held in 1997 (the portion of this article is written in 1998). Will future historians describe the present relations between two countries as a "short spring"? Or perhaps they might remember this period as the turning point on the U.S. policies on Asia in the post-Cold War world. Or they might simply dismiss it as one phase of the cycles of good and bad relations that started from the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1972. Whatever might be an answer, naturally it is difficult for us in the midst of the affairs to define the correct stage. We most lookback to learn from the insight of history to determine where we are. What history should we inquire is the history of U.S. foreign engagement. Indeed, the U.S. attitude toward international society construction was driven by the impulse of world's framer.

For the United States today, there is no question that the existence of China is a cause of annoyance in the American view of the world. During the cold war, China had been placed at a geopolitically significant position as one of the counterforce against the Soviet Union. Therefore, present uncomforting with China can be regarded as if the United States found it difficult to deal with because the United States had given significance to China in the world stages. Although the relations between the two countries appear improved on the surface due to the development of the exchange between the leaders since 1997,[87] there is a growing tendency in the United States that the arguments to recur to the "containment" of China activate whenever there emerge some sort of political catalysts that irritate their relations. Those of which typically appeared in the cases such as the China's reaction against the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade by the NATO forces, or the suspected spy case of Chinese scientist stealing the nuclear related technologies from the Los Alamos nuclear weapons laboratory.

There is, however, no consensus in the United States that could develop into the "containment" policy for China, and China is cautious not to provoke such movement in the United States.

Judging from the various speeches of the senior administration staff, it seems as though the United States has determined to melt China into the international society as its medium to long-term national goal. In this regard, the U.S. maintains the fundamental posture of continuous "engagement" with China as the substansive policy under the grand strategy of "enlargement" of market democracy. It has been ambiguous, however, whether the theory of "engagement" for the purpose of "enlargement" of democracy by the United States will lead to "enlargement" by "engagement" will apply to the unique case of China. Enlargement of the international influence of the American ideology, which is a long-term goal of the United States, can be seen us one of

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[87] The United States had linked the human rights issue and the trade issue concerning awarding the MFN status every year since the Tien An Men incident, but those issues have been separated since 1997.

the efforts to cross the boundary of the logic of absolute authority of a state sovereignty concept that has been established through practice as well as legal framework formation in the past few centuries. However, when it cones to the subject of the system transformation and U.S. influence, the arguments have been dichotomized into one which asserts that the United States should actively work on the system transformation of the target nation and the other which insists that the United States should emphasize to set groundwork on the surrounding environment to induce the target nation to make voluntary transformation. There have been a variety of arguments and policy proposals on this matter in the United States.

In this Chapter, the author shall describe the issues that surfaced into the US political scene concerning the relations between the United States and China, and observe how the above arguments developed into the actual policies, and what kind of political coalition is being formed on that agenda.

(1) Issues on the U.S. - China relations

As a legitimate inheritance of liberalism, the United States reassured the universal force in its national identity through the confrontation with the Soviet Union in the late 20th century.[88] One of the most essential lessons of the Cold War is the role which the prosperity by market economy and establishment of the national right of self-determination played in the process of the collapse of the Communist bloc. The Soviet Union and other communist countries (to the lesser extent authoritarian states) were forced to accept the market economy and democracy domestically, and internationally cooperate with other countries by respecting the norms of various international regimes as part of their efforts to strengthen the relations with the capitalistic societies for their own economic development.[89] It resulted in engendering contradiction with their domestic ideology supporting their society, thus transform their political system become inevitable. Various arguments having been conducted concerning the end of the Soviet Communism today. Some conservative theorists in the United States point out the collapse from within as shown in the article "The Strange Death of Soviet Communism" in the special issue of the conservative magazine *National Interest* .[90]

There are two types of issues concerning the relations between the United States and China in the post-Cold War world. One is raised by the expectation that the role and function which the liberal democracy had played in the Cold War would be exerted with the same effects to China as well. The other that has surfaced during the groping for the relations between major powers with different ideologies. In this sense, it appears that the United States is proceeding with the policy for China while diluting the "containment" tone by headlining the engagement policy. This might be the similar argument made in the second chapter that the containment

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[88] James Hurth, "War, Peace, and the Ideologies of the Twentieth Century," *Current History*, Vol.98, No.624 (January 1999), pp.3-8.
[89] James Baker, *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War & Peace, 1989-1992* (New York: Putnam Publishing, 1995).
[90] *The National Interest*, No.31 (Spring 1993).

policy for the Soviet Union drawn by George F. Kennan was similar to the engagement policy in essence. Unlike the case with the Soviet Union, the reason for the need to dilute the containment tone was that China's presence is too substantial to be an independent variable for the "enlargement" policy for the market-democracy but it has no strategic value yet to be a dependent variable for the United States.

Furthermore, it is necessary to take into consideration the skillfulness of the China's response, that led to the conclusion that Clinton's engagement policy is the best way by both "hawks" and "doves" in the United States. While China is accepting the principles of "enlargement" of the American market-democracy and the "engagement" policy selectively, it is cautiously restraining to export the pride of the Middle-Kingdom. The United States was fallen into a tactical stalemate by such attitudes of China, and forced to tango by itself.

Thus the specific contents of the "engagement," the fundamental stance of the American policy for China, has not been precisely defined. As a matter of fact, it remains ambiguous whether the "engagement policy" means standard diplomatic relationship, or it stipulates a certain special policy for China, or it is an expedient measure to avoid dichotomy of friend or enemy, or it is a separate concept of containment in the post-Cold War period. As Robert Manning points out, however, if the fundamental principle of the policy remains ambiguous while employing the word "engagement," there is a danger that the consistency of the policies in the United States might be damaged, which would cause loss of trust in the allied countries.

To avoid such a risk, the United States is pursuing different policy goals with different policies to materialize the engagement in the individual issues. First, the United States aims to transform the Chinese people's minds (Transformation of Mindset Among Chinese People). In this respect, the United States expects prosperity of the capitalistic economy in China as a major weapon. Rational of which is a theory of liberalism that states economic freedom cannot be established without freedom of the people.[91] In this context, the United States also expects China to respect the international principles on human rights as part of their engagement policy. Second, the United States expects China to participate in the multi-lateral framework and comply with the rules of which so that the China can meet the international principles (Observance to Internationally Accepted Principles). This policy is based on the neo-liberal institutionalism which argues that cooperation among nations in the anarchic world can be secured by highteng transparency of each thinking through participating international organizations.[92] Third, the U.S. takes, realistic approach towards Taiwan issue and to the rise of China speculated in the long run (Promoting Peace and Stability in East Asia). The United States does not neglect realistic considerations as seen in the dispatch of the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS Independence and USS Nimitz in the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996.

The goals of the first two policies are clear, but there is no explicit standard on how far the

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[91] Refer to the following for liberalism. Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics Revisited," in Charles W. Kegley, Jr. ed., *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp.83-106.
[92] International organizations can be the foundation for the international cooperation in the sense that they provide behavior norms and rules to the participation nations. It will require, however, that China must change policies to

goal of the third policy is to be pursued. Ambiguity concerning the engagement and containment policy toward China is generated by the simultaneous pursuits of the above policy goals by the United States. Diversity of the American policy for China has been formed by the diversified opinions of various domestic political power groups as to the priorities in the policies or the measures to exercise them. Therefore, we must elucidate the domestic political foundation of the United States in order to understand the American policy toward China.

(2) What are the issues?

The following issues are the projected flash points between the United States and China that might emerge while the United States proceeds with the policies concerning the above three policy goals ("Transformation of Mindset Among Chinese People," "Observance to Internationally Accepted Principles" and "Promoting Peace and Stability in East Asia") and compels China to compromise in each goal. The issues are interlaced and multi-stratified. The problems that will rise in the United States' efforts to tackle these issues simultaneously are: first, whether the policy measures employed at each issue can actually transform the Chinese identity, second, whether there is a possibility that urging China to compromise may become too strong and cause China to stiffen its attitude, which is contrary to the American intention, and third, whether the balancing between containment and engagement toward China may sacrifice the long term interests of the United States by emphasizing the former too much. In addition to these three uncertainties, there was a concern that China may defy the pressure from the United States, and transform the American identity using the Chinese market as the "bait", which is also contrary to the American intention.

The first issue in the specific arguments on the relations between the United States and China is the human rights issue. This issue is related to the "Transformation of Mindset Among Chinese People" and "Observance to Internationally Accepted Principles" described above. The American Congress reviews the normal nation status for China every June based on the State Department's annual country reports on human rights practices submitted in February in the same year. This is done in accordance with the provision in the Jackson-Vanik Amendment in the Trade Act that stipulates that the most favored nation status shall not be awarded to the nations that restrict freedom of immigration. Through this process, the United States extends the freedom of immigration to the domestic and economic issues that concern the sovereignty of China, which has caused distortion in the situation.   The United States demands China to release the political prisoners who were arrested at the Tien An Men incident, stop oppression to democratization movements and stop oppression to the minorities in Tibet and Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Historically, China had been denying the existence of such problems and reluctant to

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meet the requirements of the existing norms of the international organizations before it can participate in international organizations and enjoy the benefits for being a member of the international society. This will enable the United States to take the best advantage of the merits of the existing international order. Keohane, *After Hegemony*.

comply with the demands by the United States. However, China has become more flexible in more generalized talk after the U.S.-China Summit Meeting in 1997. Since that year, de-coupling of the human rights issue and the awarding of the MFN status is in progress. This was because the United States is beginning to realize that drastic policy changes cannot be expected by application of sanctions, and it was deemed that policy changes will be more likely to occur through the inducement measures, such as admission to the WTO or maintenance of trade relations.

The second issue concerns the U.S. - China economic relations. This issue has a sub-domain of the problems of China's participation in the World Trade Organization, WTO) and the U.S. trade deficit against China.[93] They are both related to the "Transformation of Mindset Among Chinese People" and "Observance to Internationally Accepted Principles" as the first issue. With regard to China's participation in the WTO, the U.S. and China reached a negotiated settlement of Chinese participation in November 1999. There what remain is the U.S. tactical stalemate. There are possibilities that if China is admitted to the WTO in the present conditions where the opening of their market is still insufficient and there is no improvement efforts for the human rights issue, it might cause a problem similar to the conflict in the Japan-U.S. economic dispute. It might also obstruct the diplomatic maneuver of urging the social reform by applying economic pressure to China. Should the U.S. - China conflict over China's economic policy and trade practices be intensified, it is speculated that negotiations with China would face substantial difficulties unlike those with Japan which relies on the alliance with the United States on the security matters. This is not what the United States would like to face.

The U.S. trade deficit against China is not being focused as much as the case with Japan although it is on the increase year by year. This is partly due to the asymmetry in the export products of both countries. While China is exporting labor intensive products that have not been produced in the United States, the United States is exporting knowledge intensive products such as civil aviation and air traffic control equipment, retail software products and games and entertainment software, and cellular networks. Henry Rowen asserts that "in short, the Sino-American bilateral trade balance reflects market behavior far more than official manipulation."[94] Indeed, there is an opinion in the United States that business with China is easier due ironically to their "corruption", and is more versatile than with Japan or Korea, country which is abided by laws and regulations. The Chinese Government acquired higher trust from the American economic community when they strictly regulated the piracy of CD and Video software which was a source of problems between the two countries in the mid-90s. They also lowered the customs duties aiming toward participation in the WTO, and conducted restructuring of the

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[93] For the most favored nation status at the WTO, "each member nation is granted 'exemption' from the most favored nation status for ten years as a general rule by stipulating the most favored nation status obligations immediately and unconditionally as a "general obligation" and listing non-applicable items in the exemption list by nation upon effectuation of the agreement, and this content was maintained in the final agreement document," Service Trade Section, Economics Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "WTO Service Trade General Agreement: Recent Movements and Interpretation," (Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1997), p.55.

[94] Henry Rowen, "Off-Center on the Middle Kingdom," *The National Interest*, No.48 (Summer 1997), p.104.

government organizations at the same time, which are highly estimated as bold legislation measures in contrast to the Japanese practices.

The third issue is the nuclear proliferation problem. It is suspected that Chinese government owned firms/provincial government owned firms have exported nuclear materials and related technologies and missile manufacturing technologies to Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and other regions that are the strategic interests of the United States. This issue includes a long term political consideration of the United States to nurture China to become a stable power that observes international rules in the future. In the categorization above, it is in the arena where the "Observance to Internationally Accepted Principles" and the "Promoting Peace and Stability in East Asia" intersect The United States has already enacted domestic legislation which aim to curve the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Those laws stipulate the sanction measures which the United States should exercise against undesirable exports by foreign countries. The sanction measures include restriction on trade with the United States against the nations or enterprises that have breached the American laws and termination or reservance of various foreign aids defined under Foreign Assistant Act. They also include the U.S. intervention to the decision of financing by international organizations.

According to the State Department, there are suspicions of violations of the following laws in the Chinese actions concerning proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The first violations is of the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This treaty set forth a provision on banning export of nuclear related materials and technologies. The U.S. domestic legislations that accommodates this provision include the Symington Amendment of 1976 and the Glenn Amendment of 1977 of the Foreign Trade Act. Chinese conduct is subjected to the violation to these provisions. China's violation of the Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 is also in the purview of these amended provisions. Secondly, the Iraq-Iran Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 bans transfer of ordinary weapons to those two nations, but again China is suspected to have clashed this domestic law. China is also suspected of a violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).[95] China assured not to export the nuclear related technologies to Iran and other nations and pleaded innocent of the suspected exports immediately before the U.S. - China summit meeting in 1997 to clear those suspicions. At the summit meeting in November 1997, both parties agreed to defreeze the U.S. - PRC Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation and to the export of nuclear power stations to China became feasible, which reflect Chinese assurance on cooperation in the various nonproliferation regimes.[96] The compromise between the United States and China is in progress in this field, as apparent in the confirmation of commitment on the common goals to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction at the Beijing Summit agreements built on October 1997 Summit between Clinton and Jiang Zemin.

The fourth issue is the Taiwan problem. The focus of this problem is whether U.S.'s policy

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[95] *Washington Post*, February 11, 1996.
[96] Robert S. Ross, "Why Our Hardliners Are Wrong," *The National Interest*, No.49 (Fall 1997), pp.44-46.

of strategic ambiguity have gone away the United States put into difficult position is will be what measures to take at another hostile threats by China against Taiwan as witnessed in the Taiwan Strait Crisis in March 1996. The Clinton Administration endeavors to quiet down the problem because it is an issue that might develop into armed conflicts between the United States and China if misunderstanding culminate into serious confrontation. It will likely to exert strong impacts on the U.S. - China and U.S. - Japan relations and stabilize the region. At the Summit Meeting in November, the United States asserted that it would recognize the "One China" doctrine, but it is opposed to the forced unification of Taiwan. Likewise, China demanded the U.S. observance to the three U.S. - China Joint Communiques and banning of weapons exports to Taiwan. During his visit to China in 1998, Clinton confirmed them as the "policies of Three NOs" although it was made during a radio interview. The gist of this issue is how to pursue the policy goal of the "Promoting Peace and Stability in East Asia." Apart from the historical circumstances, the American people view the current movement of democratization of Taiwan as "they have risen up to seek political freedom from the authoritarian rules," and believe it is the moral obligation of the United States to support Taiwan people, who is sharing the same experience that he had in the post.

On the other hand, however, there are deep-rooted realistic opinions that since supporting Taiwan would be a challenge to the Chinese interests, and it will aggravate the political relationships between US and China. It is true for the United States, that Taiwan will consists a geopolitical "thorn" against the projected Chinese expansion in the maritime territory in the long run. Therefore, an implicit restraint of the United States against China to maintain the status-quo and the unofficial alliance with Taiwan is essential fabric of U.S. east asian policy.[97] Resultanty, the United States will not approve Taiwan's declaration of independence in order to avoid its negative affects on the U.S. - China relations. In this context, some voice the opinion that strategic ambiguous doctrine should be reviewed.[98]

The last issue is caused by the domestic politics of the United States. Triggered by the Democratic Party fund-raising practice issue, the spotlight of attention is placed on the problem whether the contribution of political funds to the Democratic Party by the pro-China lobby group affected the Clinton Administration's policy on China. This issue is a weak point of the American democracy, and there is apprehension that the American system is fragile against infiltration of influence from outside group. Recently a treaty was signed that internationally ban bribes to the bureaucrats and government officials of the business partner countries. This issue also concerns the "Observance of Internationally Accepted Practices." One of the aims of the treaty reflects precaution against the commercial practices of China.[99]

Furthermore, the suspected leak of the nuclear related technologies by Chinese-American researchers has been a serious political issue in the United States since 1998. In May 1999, the

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[97] Yoichi Funabashi, *Domei Hyouryuu* (Alliance Drift) (Iwanami Shoten, 1997), pp. 398, 412-413.

[98] Joseph S. Nye Jr., "A Taiwan Deal," *Washington Post*, March 8, 1998.

[99] Stanley J. Marcuss and Seth Goldschlager, "An Uneven international Playing Field," *Washington Post*, December 17, 1997.

bipartisan Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military (Cox Committee) issued a report which concluded that the American technologies had been exploited to downsize the warheads of Chinese nuclear weapons by which to enhance MIRV capabilities. This issue arose because there is a growing suspicion that China might have been modernizing its military by taking advantage of the reconciliatory characteristics of the American policy rather than being dragged by the inducement for the system transformation policy of the United States behind the Clinton Administration's "engagement" policy, regardless of whether the suspicion is factual or not. The United States must turn a watchful eye to the negative effects of democratization as well. The "enlargement" of the market-democracy by the United States would collapse if China's direction is oriented toward nationalism instead of respecting the primacy of the United States as China proceed with the market-democratization. The sign of which was demonstrated in the furious reactions of the Chinese people against the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade by NATO.

(3) American actions

In discussion regarding the possibilities of execution of the military forces by the United States, and if the history of executions of the American military forces in the post-Cold War period is referred to, the possible scenarios would include the following two cases. One is the case where China adopts adventurism against Taiwan or other areas that cannot be ignored in view of the moral principles as witnessed in the Kosovo case, and another case where China continues to export mass destruction weapons. Although there are two extreme arguments, one that advocates preparedness for an all-out war with China and the other that asserts complete acceptance of the Chinese actions, there is an overwhelming intermediate argument that asserts the United States should not let China misunderstand the American intentions and should avoid humiliating China. The focus is in the tactical level. It is, for instance, an issue of determining what military action by the United States could satisfy the above conditions which need to be categorized by when and what actions China takes against Taiwan.[100] There is no objection, however, against the monitoring and data collection by the military for the mass destruction weapon proliferation problem.

There are, however, no policy makers who believe in the direct American military intervention to China in the above issues. It is apparent even in the exceptional case of Taiwan problem that execution of the military forces would not solve the problems. The United States would not approve Taiwan's serge against the mainland, and even if Taiwan intends to serge the mainland, it would not succeed. The United States would not support such military actions by Taiwan.

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[100] The decision by the Secretary of Defense Perry to dispatch the Navy aircraft carriers at the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996 was favorably received by Senator Robert Dole and other hard-liners against China. But the hard-liners against China were not completely satisfied, and ridiculed Perry as "a favorite of the Chinese military" criticizing that his decision came late. *American Spectator*, April, 1996.

On the other hand, however, the United States might exercise military power if China invades the Taiwan Island or any of the 10,000 strong small islands surrounding Taiwan. Then it would be certain that China would lose economic growth and international trust as a price, and it could hardly be of Chinese interests. China would review the "Strait 961" operation since they learned at the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996 that military actions around Taiwan would infringe the American interests.[101] Therefore, it seems that the future scenario of these issues would depict continuation of symbolic intercourse of political rituals where China conducts a certain military action and the United States responds to it by demonstrative military action.

Opinions in the United States are divided for the human rights issue and the economic issue. Arguments are going on concerning whether to take coercive statecraft (linking the human rights issue and the most favored nation status and other measures). Specifically, arguments are exchanged concerning how to give comparative consideration on the merits and demerits of execution of economic pressure. Arguments have developed on the theme on whether economic pressure can change the policies of foreign countries ever since the foundation of the United States. Recently heated arguments were exchanged on the Jackson Vanik amendment on the Trade Act. The Jackson Vanik amendment linked the right of free immigration of Russian Jewish and the most favored nation status stipulated in the Trade Act. In this issue, the Jewish lobby groups and the human rights activists groups (though had less influence at that time) agreed with the hardliners against the Soviet Union and this coalition propelled passing of this amendment bill. This was a curious coalition of the doves (human rights groups) and the hawks (hardliners against the Soviet Union), and a similar coalition is being formed concerning the issue of the most favored nation status for China.

In the Congress in the past few years, four opinion groups have existed for the China issue. The first is the group that emphasizes the merits of execution of economic pressure. This group has the opinions that   China will yield to economic pressure,   China cannot ignore the American market and transfer of technologies,   we can show the moral stance, and   it will encourage to nurture the civil society in China thus gives a pressure to present regime. They believe that the United States should apply economic pressure by itself, and if possible, invite international cooperation. Specifically, the human rights activists, pro-human rights group within the State Department and the pro-human rights group in the Congress make up this group. The second is a group that finds merits in not applying economic pressure. This group insists that appeasement of confrontation stance will facilitate compromise by China in various areas,   it will produce room for diplomatic negotiations and   it will help maintain and develop economic ties with which lead to the solution of the human rights problem in China. This group consists of the trade industries and pro-trade groups in the Congress.[102] The third is a group that finds

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[101] Funabashi, *Domei Hyouryuu*, pp. 385-402.
[102] As a typical opinion of the trade industry, senior vice-president of Boeing at the hearing of the House of Representatives in September 1996 asserted that repeated arguments on the most favored nation status have caused absence of forecastablity in the U.S. policy for China and damaged the businesses. He said, "Europe has continued the most favored nation status and standard tariff system to China. It is exactly the same as the case with many other trade partners in granting permanent most favored nation status. Beijing will not overlook this difference in

demerits in application of economic pressure. This group presupposes that execution of economic sanction will make it difficult to obtain cooperation in security and other issues from China, the option of economic sanction should be reserved for more emergent situation. This group generally advocates the comprehensive engagement policy. Specifically, many in the Clinton Administration and the legislative bodies (including former government officials) hold strong in this group. The last is the group that sees demerits in not executing economic pressure. This group regards China as a new threat to the United States in the post-Cold War world, and insists on the containment policy. Specifically, this group consists of the hawks in the Congress, former Cold War warriors and the isolationists.[103]

The first and the fourth groups show curious concurrence of hard line policies against China. In the Congress, it is a coalition of the left-wing faction of the Democratic Party and the right-wing faction of the Republican Party. In the domestic politics, they have been two extremes, since the left-wing faction of the Democratic Party campaign for better social welfare while the right-wing faction of the Republican Party strongly insist on non-intervention of the Federal government. It should be noted that these two groups that confronted with each other concerning the military budget during the Cold War agreed on regarding China as a threat in the post-Cold War world, and both believe that China is a challenger against the American values and indeed is present a military/political threat.. This is similar to the situation at the Jackson-Vanik amendment issue in 1973. Judging from the voting on the most favored nation status issue at the Congress for the past few years, these groups are steadily expanding its influence. It is, however, also certain that the power of the right-wing faction of the Republican Party is held in check as the military industry reduces dependence on the munitions. The right-wing faction of the Democratic Party is showing indications of development into a major power thanks to the support for the sanction against China executed independently by state governments.

On the other hand, the second and third groups agree on the approach that the United States should urge China's system transformation while maintaining engagement and economic interests in China. The members of these groups are a mixture of the centrists and right-wing faction of the Democratic Party and the left-wing faction of the Republican Party and it is difficult to separate them. It is, however, possible to separate them by the manners of presentation of the arguments on the logic within the United States. The second group is premised on an assumption that economic interdependence will promote transformation of China, while the third group expects that it is possible to transform China into a nation that observes international

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policies. It is obvious that this difference was one of the factors that made China to decide the 1.5 billion dollar worth procurement of the Airbus aircraft from Europe last April."

[103] Jim Hogland, a columnist for the *Washington Post* said, "China does not want to be bound by the rules and morals defined by the United States. Lack of policies in the Clinton administration made China believe they can restrain the United States if they buy over the policies and threaten the U.S. And as a result of this policy, the powers that supported Clinton's fast track and the stance against China have started to withdraw. Since neither engagement (increase of summit meetings, unlimited trade and investment and exchanges in the military level) nor containment (enveloping China by military and making China isolated economically) functions, we should take the intermediate strategy (to deter China's expansion of power in Asia, specifically not to approve the hegemonic regime of China and support democratic regime)." *Washington Post*, March 23, 1997.

norms by promoting exchange and dialogues between the United States and China. Some, however, recognize that China has not shown any sign of transformation even though ten years have passed since the Tien An Men incident and the exchange has been maintained to develop economic interdependence during that period. The theme of the future arguments on the issue of China's participation in the WTO will be whether they should admit China as a full-fledged member or whether they should approve an exceptional measures with due consideration to the domestic condition of China before admitting China to the WTO.

(4) Future of democracy and economic interdependence

As discussed above, the United States is not treating China explicitly as, dangerous foe like the Soviet Union during the Cold War, although conflicting groups are advocating various arguments. It is a healthy sign that different opinions exist, but some are afraid that the United States might be dragged by business interests or neglect consideration on the national interests pushed by emotional outcries of the human rights groups. Warren Cohen (director of the Woodrow Wilson Center), for instance, sent an alarm that "if the United States does not take consistent policies, China would take two negative views on the United States. First, the United States is always finding faults with China, and second, the United States is not reliable."[104] In the Clinton Administration, the Secretary of State Albright believes that "negotiation with China by threatening China's economic status every year will not bring good result in the long run," and to improve that situation, she appealed that "the United States should act in one voice."[105] The Secretary of Defense Cohen also asserts that "the U.S. - China relations require political relationship, and we should not embrace each other."[106] Some argues that since the current engagement policy has sent a wrong message, China today will act by its own rules in the international stage. And while the United States has interests in Asia in the fields of security, politics and economy, Europe regards China only as an economic market, which have created a gap between the United States and Europe, and China is taking advantage of this gap, " thus advocates international cooperation.[107]

The problems of Taiwan and the proliferation of mass destruction weapons should be considered in the context of a long term U.S. - China relations. Several opinions exist on the issue of whether China is a threat to the United States in the short term, but there seems to be a consensus that China will convert the growing economic power to military strength and be an expansionist in the long run.[108] There is also a consensus that the United States should transform

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[104] *Washington Post*, July 9, 1996.
[105] *Washington Post*, June 10, 1997.
[106] *Washington Post*, November 26, 1996.
[107] *Washington Post*, June 26, 1997.
[108] For example, Robert Kagan,(National Security Council member in the Reagan administration, editor of the *Weekly Standard*) asserts that China is not an ordinary nation and the MFN status should not be granted, and the economic sanction strategy should be continued until China is transformed. To prove China is "not an ordinary nation," he listed that: China has not reduced the defense budget, it is the only trade partner of the U.S. that is trying to exercise influence outside the borders (Taiwan issue, Spratly Island issue, export of nuclear, biological and ordinary

China into a nation that can take cooperative actions in the international stage before it becomes a world power. This melting China into the world system. Therefore, there will be no other option but to employ the American military strength as the counter-demonstration against China's challenge to the international order. At that time, the United States will make two considerations, one in which the United States will exercise every measures to demonstrate the determination that the United States will not be appeasing those challenges, and the other that even if the United States determines to resort to its military forces, the consideration of not defeating PRC completely will be deliberately paid so that the PRC would not lose its face.

This problem, however, will only be one phase of a large process that repeats itself endlessly unless the United States find the solution for co-existence with another major power. Since the Soviet Union chose confrontation either fortunately or unfortunately to the United States, the United States was able to take measures that went along its traditional dichotomy.[109] China, on the other hand, is wisely taking active part in the planning of the international order, and is in the process of participating in the security and order in the East Asia that includes the Korean Peninsula. China is approaching Russia with an assumption that the post-Cold War world will be multi-polar, avoiding "containment" of China by the "peace by a major power" in the East Asia concept of the United States, and trying actively to assure that the hegemony of China will not be created in the East Asia to calm the alarming voice in the United States. The United States wants to exercise its power in the post-Cold War world as agenda setter through collaborative framework. In this regard, the US welcomes China's active contribution to security in the East Asia. Although the United States has recognized that there is a difference in the world view in both nations, it is not a sufficient reason to take definite measures unless China creates problems in Taiwan. China must have learned that fact at the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996, and will take more cautious actions. Such structure of U.S. - China relation is likely to continue for foreseeable future.

4.   Prospects of U.S. - China Relations in the International Society and Japan

So far the authors have discussed what an international society is, how to understand the engagement policy in comparison to the containment policy in the Cold War period, and how the arguments on China are developing in the United States. Following the conclusions of those studies, in this chapter, the author will indicate that the essence of the engagement policy is

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weapons to Iran and Pakistan, and infiltration to the Persian Gulf), and the political system is totalitarian. He continued that although the United States want China to be a nation that observes the international rules, China wants to be the provider of the rules, not the receiver of the rules according to a Chinese studies specialist Keith Riverthol. *Washington Post*, June 17, 1997.

[109] The traditional dichotomy divides the concepts of the world to the nations that assimilate the interests of their own with the interests of the United States and others that do not, and the former is the ally and the latter is the enemy.

identity politics in the sense that it aims for transformation of the national identity of China (Section 1), and discuss that the future of the engagement policy will depend on the trend of domestic politics in the United States. In short, the author shall point out that the characteristic of domestic politics in the United States today is pluralistic stagnation where various opinions of diversified groups are countervailing one another and nothing can be decided, which will lead to a possibility that the United States will not be able to pursue the engagement policy consistently (Section 2). The author then shall study actions to be taken by Japan (Section 3).

(1) Engagement policy

(a) A global international society?

Our history so far has been a process of global expansion of international system. If an international system is an expedient formation by interactions of powers played by ancient city-states, powerful clans and other non-state actors in the ancient times and by nation-states of the modern ages, a variety of international systems existed throughout the world since the dawn of our history. These include the Sumerian society of city-temple states along the Tigris and the Euphrates Rivers, the ancient Persian Empire, classical city-state in Greece, ancient China and the Islamic system in the earlier times, and the recent system among nation-states of Europe in the modern age. These international systems, however, were all limited geographically. There were no significant contacts or exchanges that could form a system between the ancient city-states in Greece and ancient China.[110]

In the modern age, however, peripheral expansion of the international system started along overseas advances of the Western European nations, and the trend was accelerated in the 20th century. It was particularly apparent in the strategic interdependence in geopolitical matters. It was, for instance, the early 20th century when strategic interdependence was established between Europe and the Far East. A good example was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance against a potential enemy, Russia (1902). Up to that point, although some economic exchanges had been conducted, there had never been any strategic relations between Europe and the Far East. In the late 20th century, strategic interdependence was established on a truly global basis. Needless to say, it was a result of the confrontation between the two superpowers, namely the United States and the Soviet Union. On the other hand, however, as the Cold War historian John L. Gaddis pointed out, it should not be overlooked that the United States and the Soviet Union were independent from each other in the economic dimension.[111] An international society is different from an international system. As discussed in Section 1, the hallmark of establishment of an international society is the existence of norms, principles and rules. In other words, it is when there exists a set of norms, principles and rules among actors and when these norms are accepted by each actor as legitimate that an international society is established.[112]

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[110] Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*.
[111] Gaddis, *The Long Peace*, pp.3-19, 223-226.
[112] Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, pp.4-5; Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, pp.9-16.

There is no doubt that such international societies existed in the worlds of Sumer, ancient Greece, ancient Persia and modern Europe. Those worlds had an international society supported by common religion, myths, literature, arts and political viewpoint. In other word, it was an international society that flourished upon one civilization. One example is the establishment of the collective hegemony by five major powers based on balance of power in Europe, which was at the same time the international society based on the common European civilization.[113] Then, has a global international society been established today?

It is true that a global international system was formed during the Cold War. The difference between the United States and the Soviet Union was, however, too great to define that system as an international society. It was because the United States recognized that the Soviet Union was extremely heterogeneous that the United States developed the containment policy which started the Cold War. It was because the Soviet Union took behaviors based on deep-rooted suspicion against the West that the Soviet Union induced severe reaction of the United States based on the "patience with firmness" (Harry S. Truman). In the late 1940s, there was a live of great gap that could not be bridged in their politics, economy, ideology and all other aspects. There existed no common norms, principles nor rules between the United States and the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, however, as Gaddis pointed out, it is true that minimum tacit agreements have been nurtured between the two superpowers since the 1960s. Although the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in severe competition, the two superpowers did have some opportunities for cooperation. This cooperation was aimed at a single goal, avoidance of a nuclear war. Any leader can understand the tremendous catastrophe which a nuclear war would cause, and thus the United States and the Soviet Union reached tacit agreements driven by this necessity to avoid a nuclear war.[114] If it is allowed to broaden the range of the characteristic of the establishment of an international society, namely the existence of norms, principles and rules, from the most explicit to the most implicit, then it is possible to conclude that a kind of international society was established in the later years of the Cold War.[115] It started from creation of norms that concern the nuclear problems, but the swell of creation of norms propagated and has begun to permeate into the human rights issues (Helsinki Accord). Then while agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union shifted toward more explicitly (Gorbachev era), the Soviet Union suddenly disintegrated from within.

As seen above, it could be concluded that in the Cold War period, an international society was not present, then the necessity to avoid a nuclear war triggered promotion of agreements, norms and rules, and as soon as it became feasible that a global international society was ready to be established, the end of an era eventuated. The problem is what comes next.

(b) Western civilization and engagement policy

The contents of the set of agreements, norms and rules that support the global international

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[113] Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, pp.251-262.
[114] Gaddis, *The Long Peace*, pp.237-243.
[115] Refer to Section 1, Part 2 (b).

society emerging today is essentially of a Western European origin. The norms concerning government, norms concerning compensation for labor and protection of private properties, norms concerning economic system, norms concerning international relations and rules concerning trade are all of a Western European origin. These include the civil society, liberal democracy, respect for private properties and intellectual properties, market economy, respect for sovereignty and free trade.

There has been a core civilization in the international societies that existed sporadically at various parts of the world. If there is a core civilization in the current global international society, it would be the civilization of a Western European origin as discussed above. The Soviet Union began to accept it entirely in its last days, and the Eastern European states willingly accepted it. Currently the Clinton Administration adopts a platform of the engagement policy. It is the Central and Eastern European states where that policy was distinctively applied. There was a strong desire in the Central and Eastern European side to willingly be part of the Western civilization behind the achievement of that substantial success. It is a fact that the essence of the engagement policy is to make a nation comply with the norms that originated in the Western civilization in politics, economy, security and all other aspects of a nation. The basic philosophy is the same for the engagement policy for China. The goal is to integrate China into the international society originated from the Western civilization. There are, however, some difficulties in the engagement policy for China.

First, the American perception of China is not converged to a certain consensus in the United States. China is a focus of attention in the United States and various arguments are being exchanged.

In regard to the military threat, there is an agreement of opinions that China will not present military threats in the short term. The arguments for the long run, however, are still divided among security specialists.[116] There is a great difference between China and the Soviet Union as the geopolitical threat. While the Soviet Union was a global threat against the international order originated from the Western civilization, China can only be a regional threat if it is to be a threat at all. Therefore, there remains a certain kind of safety margin for the United States although the future trend of China is not distinct. It is human rights problems, lack of liberal democracy and self-determination problems (e.g. Tibet) that are distinctive in the concerns expressed about China. It is, however, a certain group of people in the left wingers of the Democratic Party who raise these problems. Recently a certain group in the Republican Party have raised problems concerning the leakage of nuclear technologies to China, and as stated in Chapter 3, a certain group of Democrats and the Republican hawks are ever more likely to form a coalition that will become an anti-China lobby. Although criticisms against China have won general sympathy from the majority of the American public, the China issue is not an urgent problem for the majority. On the other hand, there are arguments that advocate continual, calm dialogues with China instead of the emotional crying-out while admitting that there are concerns about the human rights issues and self-determination problems. Big Businesses take the viewpoint

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[116] Sutter, "China's Rising Power."

that is sympathetic to the theory of continuation of calm dialogues since China is an important market for them.[117]

As discussed above, the current condition of the United States is the whirlpool of various arguments on China. The important point is that although China is attracting much attention, there is no consistent argument about the "China issue." What is going on is various arguments on the Chinese behaviors concerning specific problems, where each influential group is presenting a variety of opinions concerning the issue of its own interest. It is as if a single issue politics is being developed at present. Under such circumstances, it is the officials in charge in the administration, a few specialists in China and other extremely limited number of persons who are in the position to integrate those various opinions on China, and it is by no means an easy task to integrate such diversified opinions into a consistent policy to China. It should be recognized that the Clinton administration's policy for China is taken under such political conditions. Furthermore, there is the second obstruction in the engagement policy for China. It is that unlike the East European states that willingly accepted the Western civilization, China may not necessarily be willing to accept the Western civilization.

(c) Appeasement policy, Containment policy and Engagement policy

The above three policies have a similar logical structure. As discussed in Chapter 2, the containment policy which George F. Kennan intended — a containment policy as an ideal type — did not have strong military affiliations. It was in a highly political dimension, and it was intended that the United States would lead the Soviet Union to a better behavior while restraining evil actions by mixed strategies that freely combine both hard and soft measures so that the Soviet Union might be a member of the international society.[118] The logic of this containment policy as an ideal type is essentially equivalent to the logic of the current engagement policy.

The appeasement policy also had the similar logic. The appeasement policy here is the policy taken for Germany which the British government pursued in the late 1930s, and it has been criticized with much misunderstanding and prejudice. In the United States and Japan, the appeasement policy still has a negative connotation due to misunderstanding and prejudice unlike in the United Kingdom where historical researches on the significance of the appeasement policy have been profoundly pursued and there is rich accumulation of historical literature. The appeasement policy was never a policy of cowards.[119] The essence of the appeasement policy was the attempt to integrate Germany into the European international society.[120] In other words, it was intended to make Germany return to the European international society as "a good European" by carefully probing into the Germany's complaints and removing the source diplomatically.

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[117] Refer to Section 3, Part (3)

[118] Refer to Section 2, Part (1)

[119] Refer to the recent studies in the U.K. John Charmley, *Chamberlain and the Lost Peace* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1989); John Charmley, *Churchill: The End of Glory* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1993).

[120] As of 1934, British Foreign Minister Simon stated that since Germany wished to be a good European, it should be supported. Refer to Yuichiro Nagao, *British Politics and the League of Nations-the Abyssinian Crisis 1935-36* (Shinzansha, 1996), p.101.

In retrospect of the two policies in the past that have similar logical structure to the engagement policy, i.e., of the appeasement policy and the containment policy, it is apparent that the appeasement policy failed, and it has to be left for future historians to make a historical appraisal of the containment policy. At present, the containment policy may be regarded as successful. It should be beneficial to discuss these two past policies in studying the future of the engagement policy. Why did the appeasement policy fail? How did the containment policy induce the transformation of the Soviet Union from within? This comparative study, however, are substantial theme in historical science and regrettably there is not adequate accumulation of studies that could produce answers to those questions as yet. There is, however, one point that is apparent in the differences in the appeasement policy and the containment policy at the present point. It is the lack of deterrence element in the appeasement policy. Although the British government in those days had recognized the necessity for deterring measures against Germany well, they failed to structure the military power that was sufficiently strong to deter Germany by 1939.[121] It should also be pointed out that there was considerable influence of pacifism in the British society in those days. The British government was unable to show a strong stance against Germany in the face of the British general public. It was suicidal for the politicians to call publicly Germany an enemy in the political atmosphere at that time.[122] On the other hand, in the case of the containment policy, the military aspect was considerably pushed forward in actuality contrary to Kennan's original intention, but that itself clearly demonstrated the deterrence element. And it should not be neglected to note that there was the Cold War consensus in the United States. In the United States in those days, the Presidents were afraid of being criticized as "chicken" to the Soviet Union, which was a distinct indication of the solid Cold War consensus. It is also apparent from the comparison between the appeasement policy and the containment policy that it will be a requirement to adopt a combined strategy of the "carrots" and "stick" in order to integrate one state into the international society or to succeed in the current engagement policy for China.

There is another beneficial viewpoint in studying the appeasement policy, the containment policy and the engagement policy. It is the viewpoint of the identity politics.

(d) Identity politics

Some nations cooperate amicably with other nations and maintain the status-quo while others present threats to the surrounding nations by taking expansionistic actions and try to destroy the status-quo. The norms that determine actions of a nation exert significant affects not only on its position in the international system but on its identity as well. There emerged, for instance, a nation that could not live peacefully in the status-quo and took actions that threatened the surrounding nations although the international system was not presenting any threat to that nation (the German Empire in the late 19th century). Why did the nation act in such a manner?

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[121] Refer to Nagao, *Ibid.*, Section 4, Part 2 for rearmament of the U.K.
[122] *Ibid.*

There is a substantially persuasive answer to that question. It is the problem of national identity.[123]

In view of the national identity of a nation, both appeasement policy and the containment policy were the attempts to transform the identity of the subject nation. The appeasement policy failed, and it was because the national identity of Germany could not be transformed under the various conditions present in the 1930s. In the case of Germany, it was after the Second World War that its national identity was transformed to become a status-quo nation. Germany was a status-quo nation taking pains for maintenance of the Concert of Europe under the leadership of Otto von Bismarck, but it was transformed drastically in the late 19th century. One of the major reasons was that the German society was seized by jingoistic nationalism as the mass society emerged. There remains a question as to what was behind the emergence of such hyper-nationalism. It was mostly due to the schizophrenic irresolution on its own identity. Germany in those days tried to define its identity by linking to the "East" in competition against the "West," but at the same time there was adoration for the "West", which caused the incertitude in its own identity to continue.[124] The incertitude of the national self-image of Germany was most apparent in the books written during the period around the First World War. Thomas Mann's opinions, for example, oscillated significantly during the pre-War to the post-War times. At first, Mann appealed for defense of spiritual "Deutsche (German Culture)" against the materialistic, momentary pleasure seeking Western democracy, but after the defeat in the War, he made efforts to accept democracy.[125] It should be easy to understand his anguish being caught between the "West" and the "East" through his books. Germany went through drastic changes by the reformation by the occupation forces after the Second World War. But it was not simply the efforts of the occupation forces that transformed Germany. Transformation could not have lasted long without voluntary efforts from within. As a matter of fact, transformation of Germany owed considerably to the achievement of Konrad Adenauer. Adenauer and other pro-West groups intended to integrate the newly born Federal Republic of Germany into the Atlantic Alliance and settle the trouble of incertitude in its own identity which had been an inveterate disease of Germany. Establishment of the capital in Bonn is an symbolic indication of such efforts. There was of course no royal road, and the politics concerning the self-image of Germany, that is precisely the identity politics, developed in the domestic administration of Germany in those days. Generally speaking, politics is understood to be struggles on who get what, but that is not the complete picture of politics. Politics is occasionally developed around whose future visions will determine the future of the society of that nation. Such politics is called identity politics, and it is developed in and out of that nation. When victor nations fought among each other concerning the future of Germany, international identity politics was unfolded, and

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[123] Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security*.

[124] Thomas U. Berger, "Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan," Katzenstein ed., *The Culture of National Security*, p.336.

[125] Thomas Mann appealed in his book *Reflection on Non-Political Humans* to defend the non-political, spiritual "German Culture" against the superficial Western democracy, but accepted the Western democracy in the Weimar era after the defeat in the War.

simultaneously national identity politics was developed within Germany. As a result, Adenauer won the victory in the Federal Republic of Germany, and Germany which had been schizophrenic about its position between the "West" and "East" established its own identity as a member of the "West" and became a nation that strictly observe the international norms that were originated from the Western civilization.

It should not be omitted here that Japan also renewed its identity through the similar process to the Germany's after the Second World War. Backed by the American occupation forces, Shigeru Yoshida and other moderate conservatives won the victory in the identity politics. Since then Japan has taken the capitalist system economically, and politically it established its own identity as a member of the Western bloc based on the principle of liberal democracy.

The containment policy was aimed at transformation of the identity of the Soviet Union when it was conceived by Kennan. Detailed historical science studies in the future will determine the actual process of the transformation of identity of the Soviet Union as described earlier, but at least there seems to be no question that since the Stalin era, as the changes of leadership repeated, the pro-West power began to rise, which brought about the euthanasia of the Soviet Union.[126] It must be noted, however, that the new-born Russia has not solved the problem of its national identity yet. Power struggles continue in the Russian politics between the pro-West side and the opposing side even today.

This concludes the listing of the past examples, and here are some notes. The history of international politics in the 20th century is a history of development of international politics that centers on transformation of the national identity of a nation. There was no such event in the international politics in the 18th and 19th centuries. In the 18th century, naked power politics between dynastic families were developed in Europe, and in the 19th century, the "balance of power" history was developed. On the other hand, in the 20th century the epicenters of the tremor in intentional politics were Japan and Germany (World War II) and the Soviet Union (Cold War), and the problems were the national identities of those nations. The 20th century did not see only the power politics. The problems were the internal characters of Germany (Nazism), Japan (Militarism) and the Soviet Union (Marxism-Leninism). All of these nations went through internal transformation by the pressure from outside powers. International politics concerning the national identity is continuing even today at very end of the 20th century, and the major subject of it is China. Needless to say, actual actions of China so far are not to be criticized, but China is expected to be cooperative with the international society because of the potential of its huge national power.

It is noted that there is a significant difference between the case of Germany and Japan and the case of the Soviet Union. For Germany and Japan, the transformation promoting side was extremely advantageous because those two were both loser nations in the War, and the occupation forces were able to intervene the domestic politics. On the other hand, there were no such conditions in the case of containment of the Soviet Union, and it required patient efforts that

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[126] Robert G. Herman, "Identity, Norms, and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution and the End of the Cold War," Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security*, pp.271-316.

had continued for half a century. The United States is advocating promotion of the engagement policy for China today, but it would require patient, consistent efforts for a long period of time considering the fact the China will not necessarily accept the Western civilization. Thus, the question is again thrown to the United States. Can the United States deal with China in a consistent stance?

(2) Pluralistic stagnation

As discussed above, various arguments on China are swirling in the United States. The Clinton Administration is pursuing the engagement policy under such circumstances. There remain, however, shadows of ambiguity in the engagement policy since it radiates varying iridescent shades by each angle of the view, which is mostly due to the political conditions of the United States. In short, the engagement policy is generating unique ambiguity in the political background where no consensus on how to deal with China has been established. There has been no diplomatic consensus in the United States ever since the Cold War consensus was gone. Will the United States be able to pursue a consistent policy on China that is supported by the domestic consensus in the future?

There is an apprehension in the American trend. It is the pluralistic stagnation which is an inveterate ailment of the contemporary American politics. It is highly likely that the pluralistic stagnation may obstruct the pursuit of the consistent engagement policy for China.

It seems that a certain trend has become more intensified not only in the diplomatic issues but in the American politics in general as well in recent years. It is the trend where diversified groups advocate a variety of arguments that are contrary to one another, and as they countervail one another, formation of definite policies become impossible. This is the pluralistic stagnation. The United States has had a system of separation of powers, and has the power structure characterized as decentralized and diffusive. The American politics has the characteristic of complicated combination of coalition and anti-coalition caused by conflicts between the federal government and state governments, conflicts between the administration (President) and the legislation (Congress), conflicts between parties in the Congress, conflicts among various political factions in the same political parties, conflicts among departments and agencies within the administration, conflicts among the three armed services, conflicts among regions in the United States, and conflicts among various interests groups.

Such characteristics of the American politics has increasingly intensified since the mid-20th century, and the new term "pluralistic stagnation" was coined in the end. One of the reasons behind this condition is emergence of a variety of groups that pursue theoretical values in specific issues and the accompanying overheating in politics. The specific issues include the human rights issue, gun-control issue, environmental issue and abortion issue. The politics on these issues has a remarkable characteristic. The politics now calls the American Creed in the 20th century in question. It is sufficient to interpret the term "American Creed" as the various values stipulated in the United States Constitution for the time being, and in short, it is the values based on individualism with the liberty and equality at the core. The problem is that these theoretical values were set in the 18th century and can no longer accommodate for the conditions in the

20th century. Here is an example. Under the conditions in the 20th century, preservation of the environment is becoming increasingly significant in value, but on the other hand, execution of the environmental regulations cannot avoid breach of the principle of respect for private property which is one of the most holy creeds of the Americans. The same applies to the gun-control issue. The necessity for gun-control is intensifying in present days where crimes are frequently committed, but execution of gun-control would also contradict with the principle of American liberalism (right to resist the central government). It is the politics on specific issues that arise from the clash between the new theoretical values that have being produced under the present conditions and the traditional theoretical values that are being eroded. This politics caused emergence of diversified groups that pursue either realization of new values or defense of traditional values, both of which are developing heated political campaigns. Such politics that accompanies collision of values tends to become overheated, and thus political solutions are by no means easy and stagnation is likely to occur.

Emergence of groups that are tenacious of a specific issue, such as the human rights issue, gun-control issue, environmental issue and racialism issue, that disregard the entire politics makes integration of policies difficult. As discussed earlier, there is no "China issue." There are bursts of movements that focus on certain argument point as the problem. The human rights activists regard China as a problem from the viewpoint of human rights and they lack the geopolitical view on how to position China in the East Asian situation. Under these circumstances, integration of opinions on the policy for China must be a difficult task.

Generally speaking, it is the usual state that the American politics is caught in the midst of this pluralistic stagnation, and formation of a policy that is supported by the nationwide consensus is rather rare. Emergence of a firm national consensus such as the Cold War consensus is perhaps even a rarer case in the American history. The Soviet Union became a perfect target due to its awkward diplomatic behavior in the late 1940s, which made formation of the Cold War consensus easier, but it is unlikely to be the case with China. China will take a wiser behavior to avoid crystallization of a hostile policy for China. On the other hand, however, it should not be overlooked that although formation of the nationwide consensus is preferable, there is a risk that it might create considerable side effects. As one columnist argued once, the United States will continue unabatedly to seek out an enemy like a tobacco addict who is out of cigarettes and frantically searching for one (Russel Baker), and the United States knows that if it does not do so, it would make the unification of policies and further more the unity of the State difficult. The consensus formed under these circumstances tends to become extreme. During the formation of the Cold War consensus, Kennan's containment policy was transformed into extremely militaristic nature, and the famous McCarthyism emanated a number of poisonous miasmas.

Furthermore, there is another tendency in the United States that should not be neglected. It is the trend that the way of thinking universally has spread out as the globalism emerged. Human rights activists demand improvement of the human rights consideration for all the people all over the world. This is just an example, but as the way of thinking universally spreads wider, it might cause the people to think lightly of the history and geography. In the field of security, the emphasis on the issue of prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in recent years may reflect the spread of the way of thinking universally. The issue of prevention of

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction can be pursued independently from the geopolitical consideration. Furthermore, the pursuit of prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction might create a gap between the geopolitical consideration. A good example would be the American response at the issue of suspicious development of nuclear weapons in North Korea.[127] It cannot be ignored that there is a possibility of such trends affecting the policy for China. If China is regarded as a problem from the viewpoint of the human rights or from the viewpoint of prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and if the countermeasures against that problem is the policy for China, then it would be much more likely that the geopolitical reality in East Asia will be neglected. Here is a stumbling block for the engagement policy in the future. The principles prevailing in current international arena are extremely abstract as apparent in the case of human rights issue for example, and if China is regarded as too much of a problem nation by their poor performance of observance of a certain international principle, there is a serious danger that the measures against such performance might be substituted for the policy for China. In the case of the appeasement policy discussed earlier, there was less danger. It was because the significance of the European international society was far more specific. In this sense, it should be remembered that the engagement policy itself contains a danger that obstruct formation of significant policy for China.

(2) Role of Japan

When the two tendencies that are intensified in the United States are taken into consideration, the worst scenario for the future would be as follows. Pluralistic stagnation will cause frequent delays in pursuit of consistent engagement policy for China, and may generate vacuum of attention to China inside the United States. The influence of China will certainly infiltrate through the gap created by the vacuum, although it will be limited to regional. This regional infiltration of the Chinese influence will be supported by the spread of the way of thinking universally in the United States. It is because issues such as the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, not the China issue, will dominate the security issue, and the United States will overlook subtle geopolitical realities in the East Asia. And by the time the United States realizes that, a Chinese hegemony will have been established in the Northeastern and Southeastern Asia.

To avoid an outcome of such situations, Japan should constantly urge the United States to pursue consistent policy for China. On the other hand, however, should the United States regard China as an enemy, Japan would be the "front line state," and exposed to considerable risks. Here is the subtle dilemma for Japan in the U.S. - China relations. This problem, however, is not confined to Japan, and as it concerns all the East Asian nations, here is the role that Japan should play in the East Asia. Since Japan is an actor in the Japan - U.S. security treaty which is the most important alliance in the East Asia, Japan should support the moderate groups in the United States from this prestigious position. Japan must support the administration because

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[127] Tokunari Michishita, "NPT System and Security in Korean Peninsula," *Shin Boei Ronshu*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (March 1995), pp.50-64.

needless to say it is the administration that can succeed in integrating the policy for China from responsible positions while there is a tendency to fall into pluralistic stagnation by emergence of a number of groups that regard China as a problem from their particular perspectives. To support the administration, Japan must make certain achievement in its own policy for China. Japan should assist the US's effort to integrate China into the international society by forming the optimal policy for China because the goals for the engagement policy for China will be significantly beneficial to Japan as well.

There are some points to be considered concerning the Japan - U.S. security treaty. Needless to say, the alliance between Japan and the United States is extremely important as the anchor for stability in the Asia-Pacific region, but it would be insufficient if Japan focuses the United States alone diplomatically. If Japan only follows the footsteps of the United States, Japan would be a valueless ally for the United States in a certain sense, and it would cause China to disregard Japan. If China deems that Japan is only following the United States, there would be no need for China to deal with Japan seriously, and it would be sufficient for China to deal only with the United States. Should that become the case, Japan would not be able to exert any influence on China. Therefore, Japan should pursue its own diplomacy with China. It does never mean, however, that a kind of "independent diplomacy" would reduce the necessity to keep in step with the United States. In this sense, Japan would be required to maneuver subtle rein handling but it is only when Japan accomplishes that, Japan could be influential toward China, be a more valuable partner to the United States, and the political and strategic weight of the Japan - U.S. alliance would be further reinforced.

What can Japan do for the China issue? There are common elements between Japan and China in the identity politics viewpoint. Unlike the Western nations, neither Japan nor China had experienced a history of endogeneous development into the modern state based on a separation of state and civil society, but was confronted with a historical crisis where immediate accommodation for the international society became inevitable by the sudden exertion of external forces at one point in the 19th century. Although Japan is cooperating well as a member of the international society based on the Western civilization today, it had by no means been an easy road.[128] Perhaps Japan might be able to support China in its effort to cooperate with the international society with a different attitude from those of the European nations or the United States which often tend to urge China to cooperate with the international society impetuously.

China seems to hold ambivalent feelings toward the Western civilization today. That may be demonstrated by the fact that the book titled "The China That Can Say No" became a best-seller in China.[129] While China holds adoration for the United States and the Western Europe,

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[128] Masao Maruyama's "Open Country" and "Problem of National Reason in History of Modern Japanese Philosophies" are suggestive of this point. Both theses are collected in *Loyalty and Treason* (Chikuma Gakugei Bunko, 1998).

[129] Son Qiang, Zhang Cangcang, Tang Zhengyu, Gu Qingsheng and Qiao Bian, *No to Ieru Chugoku* (China That Can Say No) (Nihon Keizai Shimbun Sha, 1996); Son Qiang, Zhang Cangcang, Tang Zhengyu, Gu Qingsheng and Qiao Bian, *Soredemo No to Ieru Chugoku* (China That Still Can Say No) (Nihon Keizai Shimbun Sha, 1997). Both are originally written in Chinese and translated into Japanese by Mo Bang Fu and Kaori Suzuki.

it still holds deep-rooted suspicion against the West through the historical experience of having to suffer considerable damages due to the encroachment by the West and by Japan.[130]

Discussion on the details of the current situations of China would be beyond the purview of this study on the U.S. - China relations with the focus on the United States, but fortunately, China is placing priority on economic growth at the moment and hopes the surrounding international environment to be peaceful. The significance of that is the fact that there still is time allowed to try to transform the national identity of China.

Economic growth that China today aims for is definitely targetted for the national prosperity and military strength. No one knows, however, what China will do after it has accomplished the goal of national prosperity and military strength. Tomoyuki Kojima has pointed out that two-sidedness of the "all-directions diplomacy" and "hegemonic firmness diplomacy" intersect in the current Chinese diplomacy, but it cannot be denied that there is a possibility where China might push the hegemonic firmness diplomacy forward after it has accomplished national prosperity and military strength.[131] More precisely, however, perhaps China itself is not completely certain about that aspect yet. It is also uncertain when China will accomplish the national prosperity and military strength, but at least it is certain that it would not be within a ten-year span. It should take twenty years or even longer time as a matter of course, and it will be some time after 2020 at the earliest. Looking back in the past history, the time span of twenty years is long enough for one international order or one system of a state to transform itself. Will China decide to take an expansionist policy after it has accomplished national prosperity and military strength? That all depends on whether we can make China transform itself during the next twenty years. If that can be accomplished, its significance in the world history would not be a small one in the context of realization of a global-based international society.

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[130] The following books are suggestive of the ambivalent attitude of China toward the U.S. David Shambaugh, *Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972-1990* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).
[131] Tomoyuki Kojima, *China in The New Century* (Ashi Shobo, 1996), pp.48-53.