

CHAPTER 3

The Future of Regional Stability and Regional Security Mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific Region

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to study how regional security mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific region should be developed, and what kind of cooperation can be possible between Japan and Russia in this area.

In the Asia-Pacific region, the traditional security issues of North Korea and the China-Taiwan problem continue to be sources of regional instability. As a result, maintaining and strengthening the US-led bilateral alliances remains essential for deterrence and response. Meanwhile, non-traditional security threats, such as the spread of an Islamic extremist terrorist network in Southeast Asia, and rampant piracy in the Malacca and Singapore Straits that are important energy supply routes for East Asian countries, are becoming more serious, and it is clear that broad multilateral security cooperation in response to these threats is increasingly needed.

While the alliance framework is effective for handling traditional security issues, multilateral issue-oriented frameworks involving the participation of a number of countries with shared interests in a specific security problem are beginning to function, as seen by the Six-Party Talks framework for handling the North Korean nuclear development problem. Meanwhile, where the multilateral security cooperation frameworks in response to non-traditional security issues are expected to be effective, responses to non-traditional threats have become an important issue for alliances, as well. After the end of the Cold War, and certainly since the events of September 11, 2001, the United States has been engaged in a war against terrorism on a global scale, and a major issue for US allies in the Asia-Pacific region, such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand, has been how much cooperation should be given to the United States in this fight. The alliances can be said to be expanding their roles into crisis management.

In considering the above situation, the alliances and the multilateral security cooperation mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, but can complement each other. Rather than relying on just one or the other, Japan and other countries in the Asia-Pacific region are required to promote multilateral security cooperation while also maintaining the alliances, so as to build a multilayered security structure. Moreover, the United States itself searches for frameworks that flexibly mix and match security cooperation partners for each conflict, without insisting

on adherence to the fixed alliances of the past. Multilateral frameworks involving coalitions of the willing have been formed, such as the countries that supported the US-UK-led armed operation against Iraq and then participated in the postwar security maintenance and reconstruction, and the countries that participated in the US-led PSI. For the United States, the bilateral alliance frameworks are convenient for making use of allies when it needs cooperation of allies, and for promoting its own regional policies. However, good allies are not necessarily always so compliant, and even cooperative allies cannot always be expected to automatically give their cooperation, but desire to be consulted to a certain degree. In any case, in the post-Cold War world where there is no longer a clear enemy, alliance management for the United States has become unavoidably more complex, and this surely lies behind the development of the Coalition of the Willing concept.⁵⁰

The following includes studies on new roles of alliances and their perspective, the significance of the Coalition of the Willing and its perspective, and the current state and perspective for the multilateral security cooperation mechanism, followed by a discussion on the possibilities for Japan-Russia security cooperation.

A. New Roles of Alliances and their Perspective

The US-led alliances in Europe and in Asia-Pacific region have been transformed in order to deal with more serious non-traditional threats. During the Cold War era the alliances' primary mission was collective defense against the traditional military threat, but after the end of the Cold War crisis management as well as territorial defense became a primary mission of alliances. This situation makes alliance management complicated for the United States. Because the US and the European countries are diverging in their threat perceptions, and problems regarding disparities between the two sides' military capabilities have surfaced, management of NATO, the organization of the US-Europe alliance have become more complicated and difficult. Moreover, efforts by the European countries to strengthen EU's own crisis management capabilities and to become more independent from the United States in the security affairs are also adding complications to the management of the US-Europe alliance.

By contrast, in the Asia-Pacific region, traditional security threats still exist, and perception of threats between the United States and the allied countries have not diverged as much as they have in Europe. In addition, the problem of disparity in military capabilities has not surfaced to the same degree as in Europe. Nevertheless, the US perception of alliances is changing here, as well, and efforts are continuing in search of a new mode of alliance suited to the post-Cold War situation. The efforts in the Japan-US realignment talks are surely

⁵⁰ The idea of the Coalition of the Willing actually arose during the Clinton Administration in discussions on alliance management, well before the events of September 11, 2001. See Yoichi Funabashi, *Domei o kangaeru* ("Thinking About the Alliances"), (Iwanami Shinsho, 1998), Chapter 8.

representative of this trend.

1. New Roles of Alliance and its perspective in Europe

In Europe, NATO intervened in the Yugoslavian civil war in search of its new roles. In the civil war that broke out in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992, NATO intervened militarily for the purpose of crisis management in a out-of-area conflict. After a ceasefire was achieved in the civil war, NATO dispatched 60,000 peace enforcement troops, and led post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization. NATO's attempt in this case came to be seen as a new responsibility for the alliance in the 21st century. In the Kosovo conflict that broke out in 1999, NATO bombed Belgrade from the viewpoint of a humanitarian intervention although authorization for the use of armed forces could not be obtained in the UN Security Council due to the opposition from China and Russia. After the ceasefire, NATO deployed 50,000 troops. Moreover, in Macedonia, adjacent country to Kosovo, the United States deployed its forces to prevent the conflict from spreading. These experiences promoted gradually the formation of a mechanism for preventing conflicts in Europe.

In search of NATO's new roles, the United States and the European countries began to transform NATO units that had mainly been responsible for European defense into highly mobile forces capable of distant deployment. The transformation of NATO consists of the following three points⁵¹.

First, NATO must find a new balance between addressing its traditional, European defense missions and tackling the new global threats, such as terrorism and WMD. Second, it must acquire the military capabilities to fulfill its new missions of dealing with the new global threats. And, third, it must learn to react quickly and flexibly to new challenges. NATO summit held in Prague in autumn of 2002 adopted the Prague Capability Commitment that corrects disparities in military capabilities between the United States and Europe, and agreed on the establishment of the NATO Response Force (NRF).

It is indispensable for NATO to strengthen the capabilities of rapid response and force projection in order to tackle the new global threats, but there is a huge capability gap in these points between the United States and Europe. As the table below shows, there is a huge gap between the both sides in the scale of ground forces that can be rapidly deployed within one to three months. As a result, the United States is moving toward the assignment of relatively low-intensified stabilization operations to its allies, which frees up US forces for insertion into the fight against global terror.

⁵¹ Michael Rühle, "NATO after Prague: Learning the Lessons of 9/11," *Parameters*, Vol.33, No2, Summer 2003, pp.93-97.

Capabilities for Pre-Emptive and Preventive Action and Military Intervention — Gap between the US and Europe

	Ground forces (A)	Ground forces (B) (Can be positioned in 1-3 months, and deployed for one year)	Proportion of units capable of rapid deployment (B/A)
United States	649,000	400,000	62%
United Kingdom	121,000	25,000	21%
France	152,000	15,000	10%
Germany	212,000	10,000	5%
Italy	138,000	5,000	4%
Canada	19,000	4,000	21%
Netherlands	15,000	4,000	27%
Total NATO countries (excluding the United States)	1,499,000	84,000	6%

Source: Michael O'Hanlon and P. W. Singer, "The Humanitarian Transformation: Expanding Global Intervention Capability," *Survival*, Vol.46, No.1 (Spring 2004), p.84.

At the present time, NATO has virtually completed its tasks in Bosnia and is now directing the Kosovo Force for nation reconstruction (KFOR) in Kosovo and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, NATO deploys Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to outlying areas to boost the authority of the central government in Kabul, and now controls about 50% of the entire national territory. As the above examples show, it would seem that allied countries are assuming milder roles, moving in to replace US forces that were in charge of initial battle tasks in order to perform stabilization and reconstruction support operations. The effects of these patterns on allied countries in the Asia-Pacific region will need to be scrutinized, however.

2. New Roles of Japan-US Alliance and its Transformation

In the Asia-Pacific region, traditional security threats still exist, and territorial defense remains primary mission for the US-led bilateral alliances. Meanwhile, because non-traditional threats have become more serious in the Asia-Pacific region, the multilateral security cooperation in response to these threats are expected to be effective, and alliances are required to respond flexibly to these threats, as well.

The Japan-US alliance went through a reconfirmation process in 1996 and 1997, and both Japan and the United States confirmed that the security relationship between the two countries constitutes a foundation for maintenance of stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. Furthermore, the two countries agreed at the Japan-US summit meeting in 2003 not only on strengthening cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, but also on the need for greater cooperation between the two countries in tackling global security issues.

Japan and the United States also agreed that they share concerns about such new threats as international terrorism, proliferation of WMD, and their potential acquisition and use by non-state actors, and are united in their recognition of the need for closer cooperation in response to these threats.

A Report by the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities Report (Araki Report) in October 2004, and the New Defense Program Guidelines in December 2004, place emphasis on Japan's effort to improve international security environment from the perspective of its national interest, and on achieving this goal through cooperation with allied countries and with international community.

Japan and the United States have been engaged in realignment of the Japan-US alliance as part of the on-going military transformation in the United States. In the process of Japan-US talks on realignment of the alliance, the two countries agreed on joint strategic goals, including cooperation in international peace cooperation activities, nonproliferation of WMD, and prevention and elimination of terrorism, and discussed how to improve the capabilities of the Japan-US alliance in order to achieve these goals. Furthermore, the two sides revealed their intent to use the realignment of the US Forces Japan to expand and strengthen ties between the Self-Defense Forces and the US forces.

The Japan-US alliance is progressively expanding its range of application beyond East Asia to the Asia-Pacific region and even beyond, to global security issues. The alliance can be said to have deepened from a simple mechanism responsible merely for territorial defense to a mechanism for stabilization of the regional and global security environment.

On the other hand, non-allied countries have been anxious about strengthening function of the Japan-US alliance and expanding its range of application. If Japan and the United States do not make an effort to relieve the anxiety of China and Russia which were targets of the alliance, it will not be easy for Japan and the United States to coexist with China and Russia and to obtain and maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, it will be necessary for Japan and the United States to make an effort not only to transform and strengthen the alliance, but also to develop multilateral security frameworks in this region, to continue CBMs and policy dialogues, and finally to institutionalize regional security mechanisms⁵². As is discussed below, such an effort has been continued within the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), but it is necessary to strengthen its function. Mechanisms such as ARF for multilateral security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region are not backed up by force, and the US-led bilateral alliances can compensate for that deficiency.

B. Possibilities and Perspective for the Coalition of the Willing

The countries of the Asia-Pacific region are confronted with a diverse range of security

⁵² See Funabashi, *Domei o kangaeru*, Chapter 9.

issues, extending beyond military matters to include economic, trade-related, environmental, and humanitarian issues. Bilateral cooperation is not sufficient to resolve these diverse security issues, and multilateral cooperation involving the participation of as many countries in the region as possible is essential.⁵³ While it would probably be best if such efforts proceeded under UN guidance, the UN itself is not responding very well to the new situation, and many new problems have erupted that cannot be handled under existing international law. The Coalition of the Willing undoubtedly arose from the idea that the UN was not responding very well and some other way of resolving these new problems was required.⁵⁴ In addition, existing fixed allied countries do not always support the United States in some cases, and the United States is forced to turn to this kind of framework of international cooperation for dealing with these new problems. Specifically, the multinational forces sent in support of the US-UK-led armed operations in Iraq, and to participate in postwar security maintenance and humanitarian reconstruction, as well as the countries participating in the US-led PSI, are considered to be parts of the Coalition of the Willing.

One important sector for cooperation that has been a focus of attention in the Japan-US alliance realignment discussions from the perspective of the Asia-Pacific regional and global security has been PSI. The United States regards PSI as a type of Coalition of the Willing. This shows the US tendency to use the alliance as propelling power of the Coalition of the Willing, and such a US stance can affect the future course of the alliance. Moreover, this cooperation framework has also been regarded as a way to prevent North Korean trade in WMD, and in related materials and methods of transport, and we must pay attention to it from the perspective of building a regional security mechanism in the Asia-Pacific region.

The United States proposed PSI in May 2003, and it currently consists of 15 countries as core members (the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Australia, France, Germany, Spain, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Canada, Norway, and Russia). This grouping can be considered a Coalition of the Willing for strengthening the global nonproliferation system. PSI is an effort to study measures that participating countries can jointly take within existing international law and their respective domestic laws, and is related to actions based on UN Security Council Resolution 1540. Moreover, this approach does not target specific countries, and is an effort to strengthen controls over countries that are under suspicion of engaging in proliferation.

Japan actively participates in PSI to strengthen nonproliferation of WMD and missiles, and also participates in reaching out to other countries. In October, 2004, Japan was the host country for Team Samurai 2004, a maritime interdiction exercise.

Japan-Russia cooperation in PSI and security issues for the Asia-Pacific region is likely to develop because of the characteristics of PSI, which are, in other words: (a) openness

⁵³ Chalk, *Non-Military Security and Global Order*, pp.1-10.

⁵⁴ For discussions about the possibilities and perspective for the Coalition of the Willing, see National Institute for Defense Studies, ed. "Proceedings of the Council of Defense-Strategic Studies," (November 2005 issue), pp.3-6.

without specifying countries participating in efforts; (b) a cooperative approach without specifying a target (Japan-Russia joint approach to countries that are under suspicion of engaging in proliferation can provide momentum for the Six-Party Talks); (c) a practical aim to strengthen the existing nonproliferation regime (the unity of Japan's stance orienting toward nuclear disarmament with Russia's stance of respect for the NPT framework); and (d) conflict resolution on the G8 and UN Security Council (common stance for Japan and Russia to collaborate with the US and Europe).⁵⁵

At present, the Coalitions of the Willing tend to be US-led groupings of parties who agree with policies pursued by the US government, and are very weak. For example, in some countries which participate in security maintenance or humanitarian reconstruction efforts in Iraq, the majority of citizens do not support their government's decision to participate in such efforts. As a result, there is uncertainty whether each specific Coalition of the Willing will function well. The US war against global terrorism will be a fight lasting a considerably long time, and its success depends on the US efforts to cooperate with as many countries as possible for as long a time as possible. Moreover, if what the United States is aiming for is some sort of global order under the leadership of the United States, this aim may well be a direction that differs from the international order founded on sovereign states. And if the former direction will be superior to the latter, then countries sharing interests, concerns, and capabilities with the United States will be faced with the difficult problem to decide whether they should support the global order even if it means suppressing their own national interests.⁵⁶

In addition, the Coalition of the Willing, such as PSI, is a framework in which a number of countries voluntarily cooperate out of consideration for the content of a UN resolution, but it will not need to receive authorization from the UN Security Council, unlike the case of the multi-national forces at the time of the Gulf War. On this point, much tension may arise between the United States and UN embodying the international order.

C. Multilateral Security Cooperation Mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific Region

1. Criteria for Security Mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific Region

In considering security mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific region, two criteria are needed. One is the problem of legitimacy, while the other is the problem of effectiveness. The important criteria for determining legitimacy is whether a UN Security Council resolution exists.

Two elements can be specified for the criteria used to determine effectiveness. One element is who is involved. In the case of the Northeast Asian sub-region, one key point is

⁵⁵ For Russia, PSI is one of today's most important issues, and it may be well to point out that Japan and Russia share a particular interest in applying PSI to the situation on the Korean Peninsula.

⁵⁶ See above, "Proceedings of the Council of Defense-Strategic Studies."

how to get great power China to participate. At the other extreme, there is the danger of losing effectiveness if the group has become too large. The other element is whether the mechanism possesses an effective method of resolving problems. In other words, we can summarize these points as the following; it stops at the level of mere security dialogue, or it has a real method of resolving problems.

The Asia-Pacific region covers a very wide area. When security mechanisms capable of covering such a wide region are considered, one option that is not possible is a NATO-like collective defense mechanism. NATO was originally a threat-response security mechanism, and its target was exclusively the threat from the Soviet Union. Since that threat no longer exists, NATO faced the problem of ensuring legitimacy of its existence. As a result, from the perspective of ensuring legitimacy, NATO has boosted its emphasis on missions dealing with international terrorism, WMD, and other new threats, and thus appears to be answering the question of legitimacy. But it is not clear whether NATO will be able to conduct its crisis management activities very well. Furthermore, in the case of Japan, participation in a collective defense mechanism does not appear to be a practical option because of its constitutional restrictions.

OSCE encompasses every country within its region, and therefore has no problem with regards to legitimacy. However, OSCE was completely unable to effectively handle the conflicts in Bosnia or Kosovo. This type of common security mechanism will also be difficult to function on the Korean Peninsula or in China. On the other hand, one Asia-Pacific regional mechanism that has learned the lessons of OSCE is ARF.

If the US-led alliance networks were to be considered as mechanisms, then there would be constant doubt about their legitimacy. In other words, there is concern about whether these alliances truly represent the interests of the Asia-Pacific region as a whole, and China and Russia are extremely skeptical. Taking this point into consideration, Japan makes efforts to ease their skeptical view by actively promoting confidence building measures through security dialogues and defense exchanges with China and Russia.

For Japan, the Japan-US alliance is an extremely effective framework for handling the Korean Peninsula or China. On the other hand, as long as countries exist that do not agree with this line of thinking, there will be a need to build other frameworks for stability and security in the Asia-Pacific region. These frameworks can be divided into two types: (a) frameworks based on solutions for the entire Asia-Pacific region; and (b) frameworks based on cooperation at the sub-regional level.

2. Possibilities and Perspective for ARF

One framework that encompasses the entire Asia-Pacific region is ARF, which has functioned as a forum for multilateral security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region since 1994.

At the Second ARF Ministerial Meeting held in 1995, a Concept Paper was prepared, and the participants agreed to gradually promote activities in a three-stage approach which

involves: (a) progress in confidence building; (b) progress in preventive diplomacy; and (c) a full array of approaches to addressing conflict. While ARF has no problem with legitimacy, it remains only minimally institutionalized, possessing few formal structures or procedures and has not yet helped to resolve any actual conflicts or yielded any concrete institutional measures that might significantly enhance the security of its participants.⁵⁷ While ARF has shown important results as a place for confidence building, the confrontation of interests among nations comes to the surface whenever discussions turn toward the preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution approaches, and passivity and risk avoidance are the most likely results.⁵⁸

On the other hand, recently efforts have been made to strengthen the military aspect of ARF. The 8th Ministerial Meeting held in 2001 adopted “Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy,” which lays out the basis for preventive diplomacy efforts, and explained that efforts were moving from Stage 1 to Stage 2. This 8th Ministerial Meeting recognized the importance of participation of defense and military officials in the ARF process, and launched the first ARF meeting among defense and military officials in the following year of 2002, ahead of the 9th Ministerial Meeting. Moreover, every annual ministerial meeting since the 9th Ministerial Meeting has been used to strengthen ARF efforts against terrorism, proliferation of WMD, piracy, and other new threats.⁵⁹ As can be seen, ARF has developed a mechanism for participation by defense and military-related people, and by people engaged in anti-terrorism activities, and is steadily building up a structure for promoting cooperation over a wide range of security issues.

Elsewhere, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is not restricted to discussions of the region’s economic issues, having also studied many diverse issues including cooperation in the security sphere. There is also ASEAN+3, a cooperation framework consisting of ASEAN plus Japan, China, and South Korea. These trends can be viewed as the seeds for a multilateral security mechanism. The fact that these multilateral frameworks, formed mainly for discussion of economic issues, have also begun taking up security issues shows that insecurity and chaos in individual nations or sub-regions can have a serious effect on general regional economies in an era of globalization and increasing economic

⁵⁷ John S. Duffield, “Why is There No APTO? Why is There No OSCAP?: Asia-Pacific Security Institutions in Comparative Perspective,” *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol.22, No.2 (August 2001), pp.74-75.

⁵⁸ Toshiya Hoshino “*Ajia Taiheiyo chiiki anzen hoshō no tenkai – ARF to CSCAP o chushin toshite –* (Development of Asia-Pacific Regional Security – Centering on ARF and CSCAP)” *Kokusai Mondai*, May 2001 issue. See pp.38-41.

⁵⁹ Specifically, the following declarations have been adopted, and the following efforts taken to handle new threats. Establishment of intersessional meetings for anti-terrorist measures, and chairman’s declaration on funding for measures against terrorism (9th Meeting); declaration regarding cooperation against piracy and other threats at sea, and declaration on border control cooperation against terrorism (10th Meeting); declaration on nonproliferation, and declaration on strengthening transport security from international terrorism (11th Meeting); declaration on sharing information, exchanging intelligence, and ensuring the security of personal ID cards, to strengthen cooperation in the fight against terrorism and other crimes that cross national borders (12th Meeting).

interdependence.

3. Need for Sub-regional Frameworks

These frameworks, however, are not necessarily the most practical venues for the discussion of specific security issues because the number of member countries is so large. Of more practical significance are the issue-oriented frameworks in which countries sharing interest in a specific security issue can participate. Specifically, as mentioned above, the Six-Party Talks consisting of South Korea, North Korea, China, the United States, Japan, and Russia is an important process that is currently underway in regard to the North Korean nuclear development issue. If this framework, formed from all nations in Northeast Asia plus the United States, can be maintained as a continuing framework for discussions, it has the potential possibility for developing in the future into a collective security framework in Northeast Asia. Russia clearly participates in the framework in view of this possibility.⁶⁰

Contrary to some participating countries' expectation of this possibility, the Six-Party Talks have been mere place of discussions and led no results in regard to stopping the North Korean nuclear development program. North Korea dislikes attending the Six-Party Talks, a multilateral dialogue framework which mainly discusses on the North Korean nuclear development issue, and pursues the direct bilateral dialogue with the United States. But the Bush administration reacts negatively to North Korea's hope to talk directly with the United States. Moreover, approaches of the participating countries toward North Korea do not always coincide. The participating countries can be divided into two groups. One group consists of China, Russia and South Korea which think taking soft approach toward North Korea very important. The other group consists of the United States and Japan which think taking strong approach toward North Korea indispensable. The disagreement between the two groups is fixed. The former thinks that in order to make North Korea abandon its nuclear development program, it is effective to give North Korea security of its regime and to help North Korea to improve and stabilize its economy. On the other hand, the latter thinks that the abandonment by North Korea of its nuclear development program is a precondition for the United States and Japan to take cooperative policy toward North Korea. Because South Korea is concerned about the serious effects that a conflict in the Korean Peninsula would have on its own politics and economy, the approach taken by Seoul toward North Korea is to avoid putting pressure and continue patient dialogue. The US approach toward North Korea is different from South Korea's approach, and this disagreement within the US-South Korea alliance is a reason why the Six-Party Talks come to a deadlock.

⁶⁰ On November 29, 2004, when Yoshiaki Sakaguchi participated in a study group with the Center for Military-Strategic Studies for discussions regarding the situation in the Korean Peninsula, the Russian participants asserted the need for strengthening dialogue in regards to the Korean Peninsula, adding that Russia supports the Six-Party Talks and looks forward to the possibility of building a multilateral security framework.

While the above problem is what currently occupies the attention of the Six-Party Talks, this framework needs to be continued and maintained so that a mechanism can be developed for studying the various issues that exist in Northeast Asia. Awareness of this point is shared to some degree by all of the participants in the Six-Party Talks. Japan's current representative at the Six-Party Talks, Director-General for Asian and Oceanian Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Kenichiro Sasae, revealed the extent of this awareness when he recently stated that the Six-Party Talks needs to operate as an effective framework so as to be able to quickly resolve the North Korea nuclear development problem as its core issue, and to achieve peaceful solutions to various other diplomatic and security concerns essential for attaining lasting peace in Northeast Asia.⁶¹

In Europe, confidence building among countries that is the base of regional peace and stability has been strengthened through the long efforts to tackle security issues, and this European experience shows well that to continue dialogues and discussions is not quite meaningless.

4. SCO and Multilateral Security Mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific Region

In studying the possibility of cooperation between Japan and Russia in multilateral security mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific region, a major point that should probably be raised is the question of whether a multilateral security mechanism led by Russia can be linked with various frameworks in the Asia-Pacific region.

The criteria for a multilateral security mechanism, upon which Russia places emphasis, would include the two points of legitimacy and effectiveness, as well as the factor of universality. In other words, security mechanisms need to be able to do more than just conflict resolution, to be capable of resolving all other types of issues. On this point, while it may not lie strictly within the Asia-Pacific region, it may be instructive to look at the establishment and stand-up operations of the SCO mechanism in Central Asia. Security experts in Russia assert that SCO is not like NATO, which was set up to meet an external threat, but constitutes a completely new type of security mechanism.

In August 2005, Russia and China held their first joint military exercise. According to their own explanation, this exercise was held within the SCO framework, and will in the future be expanded into a multilateral anti-terrorism exercise that includes the Central Asian countries as well as India (an SCO observer). The objectives of the exercise are to respond to terrorism, they said, and they have become active now because the threat of terrorism has spread to the entire Asia-Pacific region. The SCO anti-terrorism exercise, they said, assumes a joint response to problems within the SCO.

In addition, the security experts in Russia assert that Iran was allowed observer status in SCO so that Iran could be dissuaded from becoming a terror-supporting nation, and that the

⁶¹ http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/n_korea/6kaigo/6kaigo4_kh.html.

nuclear weapon-holding nations of India and Pakistan were given semi-membership status to dissuade them from passing nuclear weapons into the hands of terrorists.

While it is difficult to discern how much of these explanations from the Russian security experts are fact and how much is polite diplomatic language for external consumption, the important point is that these SCO exercises are planned to take place in Central Asia, a region that is viewed from the perspective of global security as an extremely unstable part of today's world.

There is a need for some kind of mechanism linking SCO with the Japan-US alliance, or SCO with ARF. The SCO and the Japan-US alliance share a common threat perception. In other words, both the SCO and the Japan-US alliance share a recognition that instability in the Central Asia region can lead to deterioration in the international security environment. Japan and the United States have a joint strategic goal of eliminating international terrorism, and surely one of the regions of interest is Central Asia. In addition, the situation has changed somewhat in recent years, but both Russia and China have cooperated with the US-led fight on global terrorism. In other words, the foundation for cooperation between the two sides has already been built.

SCO and ARF can complement each other. What this means is that both Russia and China are members of ARF, and suppression of terrorism in Central Asia can only be effective when linked to suppression of the global terror network. Russia, which is currently embroiled in the Chechen problem, is said to have a strong interest in the activities of terror networks in Southeast Asia. From this perspective, the recent move in ARF to make anti-terrorism an important part of its agenda is surely a desirable direction for SCO as well.

5. Significance and Possibilities for Japan-Russia Cooperation

There is a limit to what bilateral military alliances can do in response to international terrorism and other new non-traditional threats that are challenging many countries, and multilateral joint efforts are essential. This is a fact that the United States itself understands, and rather than relying on the old fixed alliances (while perhaps using those alliances as cores for new ones), it has searched for Coalition of the Willing frameworks to handle problems. In May 2004, the United States and Russia held a joint anti-terrorism military exercise for the first time, so that while the two countries may disagree in regard to various international issues, behind the scenes there has been definite progress in the military relationship between the two countries. Japan also needs to have a firm grasp on the significance of these moves by the United States. This means that the United States can flexibly change its security cooperation partners from the viewpoint of its national interest and the most effective way to achieve its mission. For Japan, this means that it will need to build a multilayered security mechanism with the Japan-US alliance as the base of its security policies. Strengthening the Japan-Russia cooperative relationship would be of benefit for both Japan and Russia, in terms of loosening the Japan-US versus China-Russia

confrontational pattern in Northeast Asia.

In addition, for Japan, building a stable relationship with Russia and other nearby countries is important for smoothing cooperation with the United States as well. If Japan is to move toward strengthening its international peace cooperation activities, it will need to acquire military capabilities that Japan has severely restricted. Nearby countries can understand that deploying self-defense forces abroad for international peace cooperation activities is not deploying combat forces abroad. Nevertheless, because Japan is a great power and has big potential, deploying self-defense forces abroad will certainly awaken disquiet among nearby countries. To avoid falling into this situation, Japan always needs to make efforts to build a stable and good relationship with Russia and other nearby countries. Failure to do so will prevent Japan from strengthening its cooperation with the United States for international peace cooperation activities, and could even have a negative impact on the management of the US-Japan alliance.