CHAPTER 1

Military and Political Foundations for Security in the Asia-Pacific Region

Introduction

The arms control and disarmament efforts implemented to overcome the severe military confrontation between the East bloc and West bloc in Europe ever since the mid-1950s resulted in elimination of the military Cold War structure in Europe. By contrast, the strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region following the Cold War retained vestiges of the Cold War era in the China-Taiwan issue and in the Korean Peninsula issue, where the stand-off between north and south persisted. In addition, the United States continued to maintain and strengthen its presence in the Asia-Pacific region through bilateral alliances, a situation very different from conditions in Europe, making it difficult to build a multilateral security mechanism in the region.

For the countries of the Asia-Pacific region, however, the idea of promoting multilateral security cooperation is surely becoming increasingly significant. This is because, as the Asia-Pacific countries position economic development as a top-priority issue, it should also be important to them, just as it is in Europe, to promote military stability in the region in order to avoid being locked into military tensions, as well as to prepare efficient defense postures. Furthermore, while maintaining and strengthening an effective US presence in the Asia-Pacific region is important for long-term stability and safety in the region, it is essential that policies be formulated that can minimize the effects of such potentially disruptive factors as negative trends in the China-Russia relationship or the US-China relationship, or the possibility of an abrupt reversal in US strategy or changes in its military presence. It is vital to build a multilayered security structure that is founded on deterrence and defense while simultaneously promoting arms control and disarmament. Working this way to nurture a shared sense of values and security will culminate in stronger cooperative relationships within the region.

Alongside these efforts on the issue of territorial defense, another important issue for the countries of the Asia-Pacific region is the building of a cooperative framework for crisis management activities, as exemplified by the response to international terrorism. New non-traditional threats such as terrorism, proliferation of WMD, and piracy are becoming increasingly severe in the Asia-Pacific region. An effective response to these threats requires establishment of an international cooperative system that encompasses as many countries in the region as possible. The goal of stability in the Asia-Pacific region will need to be pursued

from both of the perspectives described above.

In this chapter, we build on the above assumptions to examine specific characteristics and issues regarding the military and political foundations for security in the Asia-Pacific region, in comparison with Europe, and consider the current state and future potential of the mechanisms for ensuring peace and stability in the region.

A. General Characteristics of the Asia-Pacific Region

One characteristic of state-to-state relationships in the Asia-Pacific region is the fact that traditional confrontations have not come to an end, and that political and ideological differences have not disappeared. In addition, economic, racial, religious, and territorial contradictions and confrontations that could, under certain conditions, develop into armed conflict still exist. In other words, the sparks of military tensions on the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan issue have not been extinguished, and there are unresolved territorial issues between Japan and South Korea, Japan and Russia, and Japan and China. Furthermore, economic growth is promoting modernization and strengthening of national armed forces in the region. As a result, the concept of arms control and disarmament has not made a great deal of progress.

A large variety of political and economic systems can be found in the Asia-Pacific region, and there is none of the homogeneity that can be seen from one European country to another. The political landscape includes both countries with avowedly democratic systems and countries like North Korea and China with completely different systems. In the economic arena, as well, countries with advanced market economies such as the United States, Japan, South Korea, and a number of the ASEAN countries sit alongside the socialist economies of North Korea and China. Furthermore, a more careful look at each country reveals democratic institutions at varying stages of advancement, or market economies at varying stages of development. Even some of the dictatorial political systems and socialist economies have implemented some degree of reform, while others have shown hardly any progress at all. In other words, one characteristic of the region is the immense diversity in the status of political, economic, and social development of the various countries. As a result, the difficulty of establishing the principles of democracy and human rights remains an issue.

Another point of difference with Europe that deserves mention is the geographical characteristics of the Asia-Pacific region. With the notable exception of the United Kingdom, the nations of Europe share land borders with each other, and their capital cities are all relatively proximate. As a result, deployment of military forces near a nation's borders for the purpose of preserving that nation's independence is perceived as a threat by neighboring countries, even when the intentions are purely defensive, leading to suspicion about the

country's intentions.[4] It is hardly surprising that Europe's strategy theorists had such a strong interest in solving the "security dilemma." One could well say that it was these challenging conditions that drove these theorists to develop policies for avoiding the security trap.

By contrast, many countries of the Asia-Pacific region are separated by wide expanses of open sea, making one characteristic of the area a security interest that focuses on maritime security. With the issue of maritime security cooperation, and with arms control and disarmament issues related mostly to the oceans, the focus is decisively different from the European focus on arms control and disarmament of land-based armies. There are, of course, long land borders such as the one shared by China and Russia where interest focuses on how to hold down military tensions near the borders and where various confidence-building measures (CBMs) have been adopted in the border regions since the end of the Cold War.[5]

However, it appears that various changes in recent years have altered the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region, increasing the need for security cooperation in the region. First of all is the effect of globalization. Current advances in globalization have opened the way for positive effects on the region's strategic environment. This is because the countries' economies have become increasingly interdependent as a result of advancing globalization. In this situation, strengthening international cooperation is the only way that countries can attain sustainable economic development, which is why they are moving to create frameworks like the ASEAN +3.

Second is the effect of advances in military technology. Long-distance deployment capability and possession of precision-guided weaponry, both characteristics of recent advances, could render meaningless the security benefit of the relative isolation afforded to countries that are separated by oceans. If separation by distance can no longer be used to ensure security, the chance of an armed conflict developing increases when nations continue their competition in military expansion. Efforts to avoid this competition will become increasingly important in the future.

Third is the increased need for security cooperation on the high seas. For the countries of East Asia, in particular, which rely on the Middle East for the majority of their oil resources, security for seaborne energy transport routes is a critical issue. Assurance of safety for ships transiting the Malacca and Singapore straits, or other areas beset by piracy and other new threats, is a life-or-death issue for the economies of East Asia. However, the nations of Southeast Asia bordering these straits do not possess very strong naval forces or maritime security structures, so the cooperation of nations with interests in the region is essential. From this perspective, building a broadly based maritime security system among the countries of the Asia-Pacific region is becoming an important issue.

Thus, even the Asia-Pacific region, with its vestiges of the Cold War structure still in place,

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[4] Aaron L. Friedberg, "Will Europe's Past Be Asia's Future?" *Survival*, vol.42, no.3, Autumn 2000, pp.154-155.

[5] For details, see Yuzuru Kaneko, Yoshiaki Sakaguchi, and Katsuhiko Mayama, "Japan's Security in the Changing Eurasian Strategic Environment," *NIDS Security Reports*, No.4 (March 2003), pp.29-33.

is beginning to recognize the need for various kinds of security cooperation in response to the deepening severity of non-traditional threats.

B. Issues Related to Regional Security Mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific Region

With the countries of the Asia-Pacific region positioning long-term economic development as a top priority, the idea that the region as a whole must undertake development cooperatively has been gaining steam. This notion, in turn, leads to the idea that regional peace and stability is also required. This represents an incentive for the countries of the Asia-Pacific region to participate in regional security mechanisms.

While assessments of the current state of the Asia-Pacific region reveal lingering differences between nations as well as disparities in wealth, the economic situation in many countries is changing for the better, driving a stronger interest in security. In this situation, the efforts of countries in the Asia-Pacific region to build security have tended to go in one of two directions. One is for a country to strengthen its own military forces, and the other is building regional security mechanisms.

However, the interest in building multilateral security mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific region does not necessarily mean there is a shared awareness of what this means. The reasons for this can be summarized in the following three points. First, no country in the region is likely to rely on international institutions or multilateral frameworks for solutions to serious life-and-death issues. China's leadership views the Taiwan issue as a domestic affair, and works to exclude any interference from outsiders on the issue. Second, many of the region's security issues, such as the stand-off on the Korean Peninsula, the relationship between China and Taiwan, and the Northern Territories issue, are rooted in bilateral relationships. As a result, it is easy to believe that bilateral problem-solving efforts and bilateral stability are important for securing stability in regional situations. However, it is extremely difficult to solve problems bilaterally when the confrontational relationships are vestiges of the Cold War or are territorial issues with deep historical roots. Third, while some countries believe that maintaining and strengthening a US presence in the region is a stabilizing factor, other countries do not necessarily accept that premise. Not only the United States' Asia-Pacific allies, Japan, South Korea, and Australia, but also Southeast Asian countries where international terrorist networks are active, such as the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore, accept the idea that a US presence in the region and military cooperation with the United States are essential—not just for the safety of their own countries, but for regional stability as well. By contrast, China is alarmed by the strengthening of bilateral alliances with the United States, and by expansion of US-led military cooperation, which it views as intended to prevent its own ascendancy. For example, US attempts to strengthen its cooperative relationship with India are clearly intended to restrain the rise of China, and

China has been attempting to resist these US moves by reinforcing its relationships with nearby countries, to prevent the spread of US influence in China's vicinity.[6] The United States, meanwhile, is less than enthusiastic about seeing multilateral relationships come into existence alongside its own bilateral alliances.

C. Alliances in Europe, and in the Asia-Pacific Region

After the end of the Cold War, and particularly after the events of September 11, 2001, there arose a great awareness in the Asia-Pacific region of the need for international cooperation to deal with the new threats represented by international terrorism, and various efforts are now being implemented. This situation has unavoidably led to changes to the character of alliances originally intended to deal with traditional threats. Here, we first examine how alliances in Europe have changed since the end of the Cold War, and the efforts that are being taken primarily through the European Union (EU) as the importance of crisis management activities increases, and then turn to the role of alliances in the Asia-Pacific region.

1. "Enlargement and Engagement" of Post-Cold War Alliances in Europe

In 1989 and later, a flood of countries in Central and Eastern Europe escaped from the Soviet Union or from the Communist orbit, and a whole string of governments embracing democratic systems made their appearance. This phenomenon was encouraged by the policy of "Enlargement and Engagement" taken by the Clinton administration in the US. The basis for this policy was the idea that enlargement of an "international system" built around the pillars of democracy, market economics, and law and justice would encourage the engagement of all countries in the region, and help to form a peaceful order. Another characteristic of the changes in Europe was the direct and indirect influence of outside actors (international institutions) in each country's systemic reforms.

After the Cold War, the European Community (EC) turned into the EU and expanded from 12 countries to the current 25 countries. New entrants into the EU were asked to meet: (a) political conditions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and protection of minorities, etc.; (b) economic conditions for the market economy; and (c) social conditions to meet the obligations of member countries. Declaration of these general principles was rooted in the concept of the expansion of the "no-war community."

In the same way, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) also placed conditions on countries desiring to join that alliance, including respect for democracy, freedom, and the rule of law, support for the common defense, democratic control of the military, resolution of

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[6] For the strategic background to China's diplomatic offensive in nearby countries, see Sujit Dutta, "China's Rise: Implications and Challenges for East Asia," in N.S. Sisodia and G.V.C. Naidu (ed.), *Changing Security Dynamic in Eastern Asia* (Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses and Promila & Co., Publishers, 2005), pp.141-158.

border conflicts and ethnic conflicts, participation in the alliance's decision-making process, participation in major headquarters, contribution to the alliance budget, and respect for the alliance's basic treaties, agreements, and strategic documents. Through this insistence on satisfaction of these conditions, the EU and NATO enlargement process became a factor promoting internal reforms in the post-Cold War countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In addition, it is important to note that the direction of EU enlargement promoted unification of the European region, while the direction of NATO enlargement renewed the alliance relationship with the United States, bringing it into alignment with the demands of the times.

This expansion of the role of international frameworks has altered the way conflicts are resolved in Europe. In NATO, the emphasis has shifted to new roles for the alliance in regards to conflicts outside the region, including crisis management, humanitarian intervention, nation-state rebuilding and stabilization after a ceasefire, and deployments to prevent conflicts from widening.

2. US and European Awareness and Response to New Threats

The Bush administration in the US used the events of September 11, 2001 as an opportunity to reopen the study of certain security concepts, and summarized the study results in the National Security Strategy released in September 2002. This document positions global terrorism, and proliferation of WMD and guided missile technology, as "new threats," with pre-emptive strikes and pre-emptive action proposed as an acceptable way to address them. The concept presented in this "Bush Doctrine" was put into practice when military sanctions were commenced against Iraq in March 2003.

At the time of the Iraq crisis, the reservations expressed by the US allies France and Germany regarding the US-UK proposal for military sanctions resulted in failure of the proposal to win the approval of the United Nations Security Council, a situation that cast a long shadow over the future of the alliances. Robert Kagan's assertion that on "the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the desirability of power — American and European perspectives are diverging" is very persuasive. According to his argument, a huge gap in awareness regarding peace and stability in international society has grown up between a "Mars god of war" America that leans toward the use of force to resolve conflict and a "Venus goddess of love" Europe that leans toward peaceful resolution of conflict.[7]

3. The EU Approach to New Threats

With the appearance of this gap between the United States and Europe, the EU promoted an independent security strategy policy to differentiate itself from the strongly military

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[7] Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness," *Policy Review* (Hoover Institution), No.113 (June and July 2002) (http://www.policyreview.org/JUN02/kagan.html); *Of Paradise and Power: America vs. Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2003), pp.3-4.

coloration shown by the United States in the Iraq sanctions. Javier Solana, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), was placed in charge of preparing the policy, and in June 2003 published "A Secure Europe in a Better World."[8] The document asserted at the outset that the complex problems of today cannot be single-handedly resolved by any one country, and that the EU should itself assume responsibility as a global actor and become engaged in international peace. In addition, the document designates terrorism, proliferation of WMD, failed states, and organized crime as "new threats," and sets construction of an international order based on multilateralism as a strategic goal. Furthermore, the document touches on the realization that order cannot be built only through the use of armed force after a crisis has developed, and calls instead for a new "strategic culture" where intervention is made before the crisis appears. In other words, the document positions pre-emptive engagement, in the form of trade and financial support or sanctions, to promote political reforms and improve governance in the target country. In response, the EU commissioners met in Brussels in December 2003 and, after making some emendations to the document, such as substitution of "preventive" for "pre-emptive" because the latter term was associated with the US National Security Strategy,[9] the document was adopted as the EU's official security strategy.[10]

The next issue was to create a framework for pursuing this strategy. In September 2004, a four-member group headed by Professor Mary Kaldor of London University came out with a policy proposal document for the EU under the title of "A Human Security Doctrine for Europe."[11] The main characteristic of this document was its proposal to change the framework for crisis management activities in terms of the cooperative relationship between civilians and military, to establish a new activity unit that brings civilians and military together in a single unit. In other words, a part of the EU Rapid Deployment Force (about 10,000 military personnel) is proposed to join with police officers, legal experts, development and human rights officials, administrators, and other civilians (about 5,000 people, or about one-third of the total or more) to form a multinational "Human Security Response Force" of 15,000 people that will constitute the core of preventive engagement.

As a result, the center of the EU's crisis management activities can be expected to shift from actions taken after a crisis has occurred to activities based on preventive diplomacy. From the standpoint of the EU's military capabilities, which cannot measure up with the United States, and of reduction of casualties and increased cost effectiveness for engagement, it is more rational to start work before the spark of conflict has appeared.

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[8] *A Secure Europe in a Better World* (European Council, Thessaloniki, 20 June 2003)

[9] White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, September 2002. In this document, the US government categorized the post-Cold War threats as terrorism and proliferation of WMD, and specifically refused to exclude "pre-emption" as a possible response to these threats.

[10] *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy* (Brussels, 12 December 2003)

[11] *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities*

As long as the EU moves ahead with the above plans for crisis management activities, and the United States refuses to back away from its stance of placing priority on military solutions, the distance between the United States and Europe is certain to widen still more. As a result, crisis management will become increasingly difficult for NATO.[12]

4. Transformation of the Japan-US Alliance in the Asia-Pacific Region after the Cold War

After the collapse of the East-West Cold War structure, uncertainty and opacity have increased in Asia. In fact, while the North Korea nuclear development problem, the Taiwan Strait crisis, and other "East Asian crises"[13] attracted attention during the 1990s, conflict resolution under the auspices of international institutions or multilateral frameworks was virtually non-existent, a very different situation from that of Europe.[14]

In the Asia-Pacific region, this gap has been filled by bilateral alliances built up during the Cold War period. A reconfirmation[15] process for the Japan-US alliance was promoted in the latter 1990s, which completely overturned expectations that alliances would lose their reason for existence after the end of the Cold War, and that they would be replaced by establishment of a cooperative multilateral collective security system. At the time, in fact, with Asian countries moving to build up and modernize their defenses, and the reigniting of traditional state rivalries in the Asia-Pacific region and alarms being raised over the accompanying danger of confrontations within a new balance of power, there could be no chance of the role of alliances disappearing.[16] Japan's 1995 revision of the National Defense Program

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[12] In regard to the human rights issue, a backlash has been spreading in Europe against the allegation that the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had established secret facilities in countries of Eastern Europe to hold captives seized during the War on Terror. To stem the criticism, US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice assured a meeting of NATO foreign ministers in December 2005 that the United States observes the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, ratified by the United States in 1994, in areas outside of the United States, as well. Nevertheless, this issue shows no sign of going away in Europe. At a meeting of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Council of Europe held in Paris immediately after the NATO meeting, committee rapporteur Dick Marty presented a report backing up the allegations, and revealed that he had already sent fact-finding requests to Poland, Rumania, which are named as the target countries, and to the United States, which has observer status in the Council of Europe. See Council of Europe, *Alleged existence of secret detention centres in Council of Europe member states: statement by Dick Marty, rapporteur of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights,* 13.12.2005. If the existence of these facilities were to be proven, the countries involved could be stripped of their right to vote within the EU.

[13] Masao Okonogi and Tomoyuki Kojima, eds. *Higashi Ajia kiki no kozu* ("East Asia: Composition of Crisis") (Toyo Keizai Shimbunsha, 1997)

[14] In response to the North Korea nuclear problem after 1993, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was established, and much was expected of formation of a multilateral regime involving Japan, the United States, South Korea, and the EU. However, construction of a light water reactor in North Korea did not proceed as planned.

[15] The Japan-US alliance did not officially use the term "redefinition," which means that the process differed from that of NATO, where adoption of the "New Strategic Concept" was perceived by both insiders and others as a redefinition.

[16] For a representative example of this argument, see Paul Dibb, *Towards a New Balance of Power in Asia*, Adelphi Papers, No. 295 (May 1995).

Guidelines, as well as the Defense White Paper for that year, indicated that the Asia-Pacific region: (a) exhibits a complex pattern of confrontations; (b) shows diverse security perspectives from country to country, (c) has a number of unresolved problems, such as the Korean Peninsula, the Spratly Islands, and the Northern Territories; and (d) has not shown any of the major changes that were seen in Europe at the end of the Cold War.

To forestall this regional destabilization, the Clinton administration promoted an "enlargement and engagement" policy for China as well. This policy consisted of a visit to China by President Clinton and China's entry into the WTO, which was intended to strengthen the strategic partnership between the United States and China. Meanwhile, the 1996 Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security stated that "peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region" is a common goal for the two countries, and Japan's "surrounding conditions" were the focus when revising the guidelines the following year for Japan-US defense cooperation. In response to this, China became alarmed over the revival of the Japan-US alliance. This picture was similar to the pattern of opposition shown by Russia to NATO's eastward expansion.

5. The Japan-US Alliance and Threat Awareness

Based on the Special Measures Laws, Japan joined in the anti-terrorism campaign in Afghanistan in 2001, and participated in humanitarian assistance activities in Iraq in 2003. These are excellent examples showing how global crises outside of the East Asia region directly affect Japan's security policies. In response to these changes, the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities Report (Araki Report) (October 2004) and the New Defense Program Guidelines (December 2004) proposed new approaches to achieving regional stability. Building on these results, Japan's 2005 Defense White Paper sets out two policy goals as basic policy for Japan's security, including: (a) prevention, exclusion, and minimization of direct threats to Japan; and (b) improvement of the international security environment. While previous Guidelines had displayed some interest in improvement of the international environment, this emphasis marked a new advance from the perspective of the national interest. Moreover, the policy goals were to be pursued under three approaches: (a) efforts by Japan; (b) cooperation with allied countries; and (c) cooperation with the international community. In this pattern can be seen the roots for a strategic concept emphasizing the mutual relationship between policy goals and approaches. In addition, the focus on defense capabilities marks a shift from an emphasis on basic defense capabilities or effective deterrence toward an emphasis on multi-functional, flexible and effective response capabilities.[17]

The result was that Japan's threat awareness came to share many points with those of the United States and Europe. Two of the threats named by the United States and the EU,

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[17] Japan Defense Agency, *Boei hakusho* ("Defense White Paper") (Gyosei, 2005), pp.91-92

terrorism and WMD, are also named in Japan's Defense White Paper. Moreover, the remaining three threats — regional conflict, failed states and rogue states, and organized crime — generally corresponds to the US and EU mentions of preparation for serious incursions, pro-active and action-oriented efforts to improve the international security environment, and handling guerrillas and special forces.

It is important to note that, in the Asia-Pacific region, the problem of performance disparity between members of the alliance has not become as much of an issue as it has in NATO. There are three reasons why this may be the case. First, Japan and the United States have never played the role of allies in a joint operation like the bombing campaign run by NATO in the former Yugoslavia area, so that the existence of disparities in military performance has yet to become a political issue. The alliance in the Asia-Pacific region has never felt this sense of urgency. Second, the Asia-Pacific region has not seen a gap appear between the traditional alliance and the Coalition of the Willing. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld of the US lambasted the NATO bombing campaign of Kosovo, conducted during the previous Clinton administration, as being a "war by committee," and placed priority on forming a Coalition of the Willing for the Iraq War. This sort of either-or situation is not as serious a problem in the Asia-Pacific region as it is in Europe. Third, in the Asia-Pacific region there are still unresolved issues of divided nations and territorial disputes left over from the Cold War, and awareness of many threats continues to be shared between alliance members. For example, the Bush administration's awareness of the 21st century threat of WMD coupled with terrorist states is closer in many respects to the traditional confrontational structure still visible in Northeast Asia than to Europe, where obvious threats have disappeared. In this sense, the Japan-US Security Treaty is an alliance based on a shared awareness, and should be able to provide the foundation for broader regional stability.