Chapter 1

India's Foreign and Security Policy: Expanding Roles and Influence in the Region and Beyond

Concomitant with its growing power, India is expanding its influence, both within the region and in global arena. While Indian diplomacy has been struggling to bridge the gap between what the country believes is its rightful place in the international community, on the one hand, and the actual status, on the other, its status and role as a major power finally came to be recognized throughout the decade of the 2000s.

India's recognition as a great power is preceded by the development of a partnership relation with the United States. That partnership, which has now become irrevocable, was set forth in March 2000, with the visit to India by President Bill Clinton. In its "rebalance" policy toward Asia, the United States has been trying to position India as an important strategic partner. However, India has recently begun to carry out a cautious debate about whether or not to further strengthen its strategic relation with the United States, from the perspective of strategic autonomy.

In the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions, India has been promoting multifaceted bilateral defense and security cooperation. Two forms of cooperation can be observed: one oriented toward classical defense cooperation, primarily cooperation in military equipment and hardware, the other through cooperative military-to-military relations, with its Navy as the main proponent. With Chinese influence growing in the region since the mid-2000s, India has been accelerating its defense and security cooperation with countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Also, on the global stage, India is now urging greater participation in the United Nations (UN) decision-making process, utilizing its score in UN peacekeeping operations as a new diplomatic resource.

1. India's Perception of the Strategic Environment, and Asia

(1) US-India Strategic Partnership while Maintaining India's Strategic Autonomy

In 2001, India quietly revised its traditional nonalignment policy and shifted to engagement with the United States. A report drafted by a group of ministers titled *Reforming the National Security System* clearly stated that "US pre-eminence in the global strategic architecture" was "unlikely to diminish in the foreseeable future," explaining that "broad-based engagement" with the United States would have a beneficial impact on Indian security concerns. Although the

Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government, which first took power in 1998, did not have the slightest sense of affinity or sympathy with the ideals of nonaligned movement, the Ministry of Defence Annual Reports it prepared annually through 2001 stated that the national security objective was to engage in cooperative security initiatives jointly with nonaligned countries, as well as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). However, since then, the nonaligned movement lost most of its significance in Indian foreign and security policy, and in the following decade, India has made the building of partnerships with major countries one of the central pillars of its foreign and security policy, instead of siding with the nonalignment movement. The Ministry of Defence *Annual Report 2011-12* says, "India has strengthened its participation in multilateral institutions and deepened its strategic partnerships with various countries so as to effectively contribute, as a responsible stakeholder, to regional and global peace and stability."

After the nuclear test conducted by the BJP government in 1998, shuttle diplomacy was carried out aiming at redefining the relationship with the United States, opening the door to President Clinton's visit to India in March 2000. The process of redefining the Indo-US relationship culminated in the signing in October 2008 of US-India nuclear cooperation agreement by the Manmohan Singh government of the Indian National Congress, which had taken power in 2004.

While the nuclear cooperation agreement effectively endorsed the concept of "reliable minimum deterrence" from the perspective of nuclear policy, India was more intent on selling it to the Indian public as a way of ending restrictions on the transfer of military equipment and technology to India, and also as allowing it to promote the development of atomic energy in a manner that would assist the country in achieving energy self-sufficiency. As it worked toward the signing of the agreement, the Indian government did make certain concessions to the United States, such as voting for sanctions on Iran in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), making the opposition claim that it had conceded "too much," but the government overcame their opposition and signed the agreement on October 2008. It later drafted and passed the necessary domestic legislation, such as the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act in August 2010.

Following negotiations for atomic energy cooperation was the procurement of military equipment from the United States. The first such agreement was concluded in January 2008, with the purchase of six C-130J transport aircraft, followed by an agreement in March 2009 to purchase eight P-8A patrol aircraft for around $2.0

billion, and ten C-17A transport aircraft in June 2011 for around $4.1 billion. The United States' consideration for arms exports has been taking India's strategic orientation into account. In its *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* released in 2010, the United States gave high marks to India's military capability, stating that "India will contribute to Asia as a net provider of security." Specifically, it cited such capabilities as maritime surveillance, maritime interdiction and patrolling, aerial interdiction, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR). It evinced that cooperation in nonconventional security areas, such as the Indian Ocean tsunami and counter-piracy measures in the Gulf of Aden, as well as India's support of the US military operation in the region have promoted their shared security perception.

US Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta meeting with Defence Minister A. K. Antony in India (June 6, 2012) (DOD photo by Erin A. Kirk-Cuomo)

However, the Indo-US strategic partnership has decelerated since 2010. A symbolic event of that was the failure of the Boeing F/A-18E/F and Lockheed Martin F-16IN to be selected in April 2011 out of the six original candidates for the purchase of 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA), the two final candidates instead being the Rafale produced by Dassault of France and Eurofighter. India thus put technological transfer ahead of its relations with the United States, a fact that highlighted its orientation toward strategic autonomy.

In both its defense policy and foreign policy, moreover, India has been tending to give more balance between engagement and autonomy. The Ministry of Defence *Annual Report of 2010–11* presented having a "robust and autonomous defense and security strategy" as a complement to the policy of engagement, while the Ministry of External Affairs *Annual Report 2009–2010* said that India's foreign and security policy is closely integrated with the country's security and developmental goal, that is, to "seek a global order in which India's interests are assured; the autonomy of India's decision-making is safeguarded; and which is conducive to achievement of the overriding goal of rapid, sustained and inclusive socio-economic development of the country."

(2) A Game of Partnership as a New "Non-alignment"?

The prospect of the US-India relationship evolving from a strategic partnership into a de facto alliance appears unlikely, with the release in February 2012 of a policy report entitled *Nonalignment 2.0.* The report was compiled by seven former diplomats, military veterans, scholars, and journalists, who spent more than a year in discussions. Although the report is the product of independent analysts, one can regard it as being close to official in nature. National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon was actively involved in the discussions, and not only Menon but also former National Security Advisors M. K. Narayanan and Brajesh Mishra were present at the release. Under the coalition government led by Congress, which has governed India since 2004, the Annual Reports of both the Ministry of External Affairs and Ministry of Defence scarecely have words on the policy statement. In that situation, *Nonalignment 2.0* is a rare document that suggests the direction of Indian foreign and security policy in the coming decade. Indeed, in the Jaipur Declaration adopted by the All India Congress Committee Jaipur Convention in January 2013, the term "nonalignment principles" was revived as a long-term principle of foreign and security policy.

Nonalignment 2.0 consists of seven chapters, as follows: (1) The Asian Theatre, (2) India and the International Order, (3) Hard Power, (4) Internal Security, (5) Non-conventional Security Issues, (6) Knowledge and Information Foundations, and (7) State and Democracy. That composition itself is worthy of interest as a reflection of the parameters of Indian strategic thinking; this analysis will focus on the first two chapters of the report to extrapolate how India positions itself in Asia and what kind of order it wants to construct.

First, how does India view the Asian theater? The report describes Asia as follows: (1) "Asian economies have extraordinary dynamism"; (2) "Asia is also likely to be a theatre where a range of new institutional innovations take root"; (3) "Asia is also likely to be the theatre of many strategic rivalries. Asia has several outstanding territorial disputes, many of which involve China"; (4) "Asia is likely to remain a theatre of great power competition.... The shape of Sino-U.S. competition in Asia needs to be watched carefully"; (5) "Asia, with its vast oceans, is also likely to be the theatre of intense maritime competition. This is an area of great concern, but also potentially of comparative advantage for India"; and (6) "Finally, Asia is likely to be a theatre of competition in ideological hegemony as well." Most of those variables regarding India's perception of Asia lie under the shadow of China.

Then, how does India perceive China? "Asymmetry" is the key concept of the report in describing Sino-Indian relations. Militarily, it proposes to reduce the asymmetry in capabilities and deployment along the border, which is predicated by the awareness of China's departure at the end of 2010 from the earlier position that a political settlement of the issue could be tried through Special Representatives. The report also points out the various asymmetries in the economic and trade relationship as well, such as the trade imbalance and the big advantage of Chinese corporations when participating in competitive bidding for open tenders, going on to propose that India should bargain effectively in those fields where it can claim superiority, such as the service sector and technological power.

In response to such asymmetries, the report proposes a carefully nuanced policy distinguishing between global and regional developments. Regionally speaking, it proposes that India ought to persuade China to reconcile with the Dalai Lama, the supreme leader of Tibetan Buddhism, while on the global level, it proposes the creation of a diversified network of relations with several major powers to compel China to exercise restraint in its dealings with India. On the other hand, it stresses the need to carry out such policies in a careful manner, so as not to convey a certain threat threshold in Chinese perceptions and stir up animosity on the other side.

As for maritime capabilities in the Indian Ocean—the only area in which India has an edge over China, according to the report—it suggests that India should aim to foster closer relations with other nations serving as a counterweight to China, so as to delay China's rapid catch-up in maritime capabilities with India. It also outlines several factors perceived to be contributing to the slowdown of People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) movement into the Indian Ocean, such as the forward deployments of the US Navy in the Asia-Pacific, a more "proactive and assertive" projection of naval power by Japan, and the buildup of the naval capabilities of such countries as Indonesia, Australia, and Vietnam.

Next, how should India engage itself in the construction of the international order? The report divides discussion of that question in two ways, firstly, forming bilateral partnerships, and secondly, participating in multilateral institutions. As for the first, forming bilateral partnerships, the report lays forth the perception that India—uniquely characterized by being the most liberal and "Western" of non-Western nations—has a broad variety of options. Regarding that point, it says that India seems to be the ideal partner for the United States, particularly, while

clearly denying an alliance with the United States, although pointing out the tendency for such an alliance to be assumed as a counterweight to the relationship of direct competition with China. The reasons for that are twofold: first, the risk that "tactical upswing" in the Sino-US ties would harm the Indo-US relationship and second, it is unclear whether the United States would actually respond if China were to threaten India's interests. In addition, the report says that given the trend for the United States to place excessive demands on its allies, it would be desirable to remain a friendly country to the United States rather than be its ally. One could say that India is counting on the benefits to be gained from playing the "partnership game."

As for the second aspect—namely, the participation in multilateral institutions—the report presents certain issues in the new environment. While clearly pointing out that India should pursue a more influential role in various multilateral institutions, it also states the need for a prioritization of the institutions. It also points out several policy-choice issues, between India's unilateral actions and multilateral endeavors, explaining, as the "trade-off between investment in bilateral engagements and the commitment of resources to multilateral institutions." Moreover, it concludes by mentioning the larger issue of India's having to "define a more positive vision of international norms and rules—and decide what norms to throw its weight behind," and not just resist "norms and regimes that it saw as the vehicles of great power dominance," as has been the case so far, in order to play a more active role in the international system.

Nonalignment 2.0 keeps silence on multilateral institutions within Asia or the Asia-Pacific region. The only reference to Asia is the mention of possible partnerships with Japan, the United States, Australia, Indonesia, and Vietnam, using them as possible countervailing powers in the policy towards China. Conversely, the only international institutions given mention besides the global organization of the United Nations (UN) are the G-20, IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa) and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), the latter two groupings cited as newer avenues for "broadening our options and arenas in which we can exercise influence for different purposes." The reasons for the lack of any mention of multilateral institutions in Asia are likely the low priority given to such institutions, as well as India's failure to strike the optimum balance between bilateralism and multilateralism. India still seems to believe that the Asian strategy environment will be defined and prescribed by Sino-US

competition, interpreting multilateral institutions in Asia as an extension of the "partnership game," in the sense that they serve as a hedge for countries in the region against dependence on either China or the United States.

2. India's "Look East" Policy: Developments in the Security Arena

(1) Defense and Security Cooperation with Southeast Asia

Under the initiative of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, India hosted the Asian Relations Conference right before independence. Nehru tried to foster solidarity among Asian countries, the base of which is the common cause of anticolonialism. However, during the Cold War, India and the countries of Southeast Asia found it impossible to share a common cause in international politics, and also made different choices in their development strategies, creating an estrangement between the two sides. As India held firm to its strategy of import substitution, it was cut off from the economic growth of East Asia and Southeast Asia.

With the dramatic turn to economic liberalization in 1991, India started to strengthen ties with East Asia and Southeast Asia under the clear direction of Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao. India established a framework of ministerial-level "joint committees" with the following countries: Thailand (1990), Malaysia (1992), Indonesia (1996), and South Korea (1996). Also, the prime minister himself visited Japan (1992), South Korea (1993), China (1993), Thailand (1993), Singapore (1994), and Malaysia (1995). Bilateral relationships with those countries were prioritized in India's attempt to link itself with the economic growth of the Asia-Pacific region, with Thailand and Malaysia, as the gateway.

The relations between India and the ASEAN countries swiftly grew stronger once political obstacles were removed, thanks to peace in Cambodia, and also because the state-led developmental model of the ASEAN countries was domestically acceptable as the model. In 1992, India became a sectoral dialogue partner of ASEAN in tourism, trade, and investment sector. However, when the First ARF was held in Bangkok in July 1994—the first meeting to bring together the six ASEAN countries and seven extra-regional countries participating as dialogue partners—India did not qualify for participation. Later, in the Fifth ASEAN Summit of December 1995, India was officially upgraded to a full dialogue partner. In May 1996, finally, the ASEAN Secretariat announced that

India qualified as an ARF member. That was done in spite of reluctance on the side of the United States and Japan, on account of India's nuclear issue. Singapore and Thailand are said to have strongly supported Indian membership for ARF. India, along with Myanmar and China, joined the ARF at the Third ARF held in Jakarta in July 1996. The growing Chinese influence in Myanmar, which was under Western economic sanctions, pushed ASEAN countries to support India's membership for the ARF. One can conclude that ASEAN countries were trying to engage both China and India.

India's engagement with Myanmar

India's policy toward Myanmar has been forced to walk a thin line between the ideal of democracy and pragmatic calculation. In March 2011, with the transfer to a civilian government in that country, India has embarked on more active engagement there. In May 2012, Indian Prime Minister Singh visited Myanmar, signing twelve MOUs, including one extending $500 million in loan credits.

The theme of Prime Minister Singh's visit to Myanmar was "linkage and development," with two implications. The first is the fact that Myanmar is the only ASEAN country that shares a land border with India, and India hopes to be able to link the economically underdeveloped Northeast India to the ASEAN economic sphere by building an overland transport route through to Myanmar. For example, the Asian Highway concept involves the construction of a road extending a total of 1,360 kilometers across the three countries of India, Myanmar and Thailand, part of which links the Indian border town of Moreh, lying some 109 kilometers southeast of Imphal in Manipur State, with Tamu in the Myanmar division of Sagaing, and eventually with Mae Sot in Thailand. India has already built a 150-kilometer stretch of road in Myanmar from Tamu to Kalemyo, naming it the "Friendship Road." The second implication is India's expectation that the development of Northeast India will lead to the stabilization of the area. Antigovernment organizations active in the northeastern states of Tripura and Manipur also operate bases in Myanmar, but Myanmar has cooperated in recent years in helping to wipe out such havens. A declaration by Prime Minister Singh and Myanmar President Thein Sein also emphasized cooperation in border control from the perspective of the stability of both countries' border areas. Both countries have said that they share "commitment to fight the scourge of terrorism and insurgent activity," and assure that "territories of either country would not be allowed to be used for activities inimical to the other." Working consultations are also being made by deputy home ministers on both sides concerning the issue, along with trade.

India gave a briefing on the construction of the overland transport route with Myanmar at the Japan-US-India tripartite conference held on October 31, 2012. The India-Myanmar-Thailand Asian Highway was put on the agenda at the India-ASEAN Summit held in Delhi on December 19, and included in the Vision Statement.

India's defense cooperation with the ASEAN countries also started in the 1990s, although it was rarely noticed behind the dynamic turn of the economic relationship. Two forms of cooperation can be observed, one oriented toward cooperative military-to-military relations primarily between navies, and the other the classical type of defense cooperation, such as the maintenance and supply of equipment and assistance for training. Singapore can be cited as an example of the first type of cooperation, and Malaysia the second.

The type oriented toward cooperative military-to-military relations, primarily among navies, was possible only after the building of trust between the United States and India after the Cold War. India held its first joint naval exercises with the United States in May 1992, codenamed Malabar. That experience served as an opportunity for the Indian Navy to learn military diplomacy. Aiming at creating cooperative relationships with the countries of Southeast Asia, India began goodwill naval exercises with Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore in 1993. India evaluated those exercises as promoting those countries' understanding of India, particularly its naval program and security concerns.

An outstanding example of India's endeavor towards confidence building among regional navies is Milan. The first event in the Milan series, subsequently held biennially, was held in 1995, comprising of meeting and sporting events in Port Blair, on the strategic post of the Andaman & Nicobar Islands in the Indian Ocean, with Indonesia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Thailand participating. The second Milan was held in 1997, with the fleets of each participating country visiting. As for bilateral training, India held goodwill training exercises in 1995 with Singapore (for the second time) and Thailand (for the first time). The bilateral joint training with Singapore, from the beginning, has focused on antisubmarine warfare, and in 1998, the Singapore Navy anti-submarine corvette also participated in a large-scale exercise that lasted for twelve days. The annual exercises were given the code name SIMBEX in 1999.

India's defense cooperation with Malaysia is a typical example of the classical type of defense cooperation, providing equipment and training. In February 1993, India signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Malaysia on defense cooperation, also setting up the Malaysia-India Defence Committee on Cooperation (MIDCOM), which serves as a regular consultative institution at the defense secretary level. One factor propelling defense cooperation between India and Malaysia was the latter's purchase of MiG-29 fighters. At the time, Malaysia

was in the midst of selecting thirty fighter aircraft for purchase, and the rival candidates were both US-made fighters (F-16 and F/A-18). It is believed that Malaysia hurried the signing of the MOU with India because it thought that it would face a disadvantage in price negotiations if it had to depend on Russia for the maintenance of the planes. Malaysian Defence Minister Najib Razak, who signed the MOU, said, "Through this agreement, I hope India would assist Malaysia in areas such as military training, logistics support and defence industry." India already possessed MiG-29s, and was carrying out the licensed production of MiG-21 fighters. The defense cooperation between India and Malaysia came to fruition amidst the intrusion of Russia into the ASEAN market for weapons sales, where India achieved space for providing training and logistic support.

(2) Defense and Security Cooperation in the 2000s

In the 2000s, the changes in the Indo-US relationship as well as Sino-US relationships facilitated India's deepening security cooperation with the countries of Southeast Asia. The progress of the Indo-US "partnership," which began with President Clinton's visit to India in March 2000, along with the change in the power balance between the United States and China, greatly defined the security relationship between India and Southeast Asian countries.

The growing affinity of India's strategic outlook with the United States enhanced the trust of the Southeast Asian countries toward India. As stated earlier, India, which had revised its traditional nonalignment policy, deciding to engage the United States at the beginning of 2001, clearly supported the War on Terror after 9/11. From April to September 2002, India escorted twenty-four US "high valued ships" in Operation Enduring Freedom as they were making their way to the Strait of Malacca. India's support of US operations provided the impetus for cooperation with the navies of Southeast Asian countries. For example, in September 2002, Singapore granted access to Sembawang Bay to the Indian naval vessels that were escorting US cargo ships. Also, around the same time, India began annual coordinated patrols with Indonesia (INDINDOCOPRAT).

The expanding military strength and influence of China contributed to greater expectations for India's role as a hedge in the region. Vietnam and Singapore are two examples of bilateral security cooperation that significantly changed owing to the China factor.

The case of Vietnam demonstrates how bilateral cooperation expanded from the

classical defense cooperation type to the cooperative military-to-military relations type that was originally based primarily on naval cooperation. Although India had clearly supported Vietnam's position during the Cambodian war of the 1980s, maintaining its "traditional friendly relationship" with Vietnam, there had not particularly been any substantial nature to the relationship. After the settlement of the war in Cambodia, India's "Look East" policy promoted bilateral relationships, which developed into defense cooperation after the visit to Vietnam by India's then-Prime Minister Rao in 1994.

India's defense relation with Vietnam, similar to India's relations with Malaysia, established the precedence for cooperation in equipment and training. A protocol for defense cooperation was signed between India and Vietnam during Prime Minister Rao's visit to that country, and the Indian state-owned aircraft manufacturer, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) was awarded the job of overhauling the engines of Vietnam's MiG-21 fighters.

In March 2000, visit to Vietnam, Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes signed a new protocol on defense cooperation, expanding its scope to include India's supply of electronic equipment and radar for Vietnam's MiG-21s, along with the training of pilots. In addition, India agreed to cooperate in fostering the Vietnamese defense industry. Moreover, the Vietnam Marine Police and the Indian Coast Guard agreed to conduct joint patrols. Defence Minister Fernandes made reference to the fact that "India has surveillance capability in the South China Sea, as well as the capability to contain regional disputes," and that statement is thought to mark the beginning of both countries' interest in the improvement in Vietnam's maritime surveillance capability. In May 2003, both countries signed a joint declaration on the "framework for comprehensive cooperation." After that, there was not so much progress in the supply of equipment as had been expected, particularly in the supply of spare parts for weapons made by the former Soviet Union.

When Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung visited India in July 2007, a joint declaration on strategic partnership was announced, the text of which cited three items related to the defense and security relationship, as follows: (1) "Recognising the important role that India and Viet Nam are called to play in the promotion of regional security, the two leaders...pledged themselves to strengthen cooperation in defence supplies, joint projects, training cooperation and intelligence exchanges"; (2) "Recognising that both countries have extensive

maritime interests, the two sides agreed to work closely to enhance cooperation in capacity building, technical assistance and information sharing...for ensuring security of sea-lanes"; and (3) "Recognising that terrorism constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security, the two leaders...resolved to strengthen bilateral cooperation in combating terrorism in a comprehensive and sustained manner." Behind "maritime interests" was the joint exploration of resources in the South China Sea. In May 2006, the Indian state-run Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Videsh Ltd. (OVL), along with the Vietnamese state-run petroleum company PetroVietnam, agreed to jointly develop two blocks (#127 and #128) in Vietnam's Phu Kanh Basin. OVL, which had been exploring another block (#6.1) in an agreement signed with Vietnam in 1988, was successful in 1992, with commercial production beginning in 2003. The strengthened relationship between Vietnam and India run in parallel as the development of friendly relations between China and Vietnam and between China and India. The idea of "securing sea lanes" did not initially have China in mind. However, after China intensified its patrols of the South China Sea around 2007, sinking Vietnamese fishing boats in the process, the revived tension between China and ASEAN countries in the South China Sea added fresh significance to the maritime security cooperation between India and Vietnam.

After forming a strategic partnership, the security-related cooperation between India and Vietnam rapidly burgeoned. In December 2007, India's Defence Minister A. K. Antony visited Vietnam, and it was agreed that India would provide the Vietnamese Navy with up to 5,000 different kinds of spare parts. While no details of the agreement have been released, *Jane's Defence Weekly* said that it consisted mainly of components for *Petya*-class frigates, coming from decommissioned Indian *Petya III*-class frigates. In addition, an agreement was signed for sending Indian Army four-person team to carry out peacekeeping training and education. Also, since Vietnam decided to acquire *Kilo*-class submarines in 2009, submarine maintenance, repair and management are also expected to be on the agenda for the security dialogue between both countries' deputy foreign ministers.

In 2010, the Seventeenth ARF ministerial meeting was held in Hanoi, at which India took the position that the disputes of the South China Sea ought to be resolved multilaterally. Subsequently, India publicly came to state that it would "help Vietnam in its capacity building for repair and maintenance of its platforms,"

especially in naval matters. Indian maritime doctrine stipulates the South China Sea as a secondary interest, along with such areas as the Red Sea and the Western Pacific, and defense cooperation with Vietnam is not motivated by its strategic interest in South China Sea. However, China made two admonitions in 2011 about the cooperation between India and Vietnam. The first concerned naval cooperation between India and Vietnam, and the other concerned joint resource development in the South China Sea. On July 22, 2011, the INS *Airavat*, an amphibious assault ship of the Indian Navy on a goodwill visit to Vietnam, received a maritime radio message from someone professing to be from the PLAN warning that the ship was entering Chinese waters, as it made its way from Nha Trang Port to Haiphong. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs, when announcing the incident, stated that "India supports freedom of navigation in international waters, including in the South China Sea, and the right of passage in accordance with accepted principles of international law." As for joint resource development, when India and Vietnam signed an energy cooperation agreement in October 2011, including new investments by OVL and PetroVietnam in Blocks #127 and #128, China lodged a protest saying that it was an infringement of its sovereignty. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs then said that its cooperation with Vietnam conforms to "international laws, norms, and conventions," and that the project was purely commercial in nature, but OVL decided to pull out of Block #128 for commercial reason. However, in July 2012, it decided to continue the project after receiving a proposal from Vietnam that included new data. In the case of resource development, then, one can see how Vietnam has become more vigorous to keep India engaged.

After the OVL incident, in 2011 and thereafter, the Indian Navy chief of staff and foreign secretary began to publicly make reference to India's "interests in the South China Sea." In July 2012, at the ARF ministerial meeting held in Phnom Penh, Indian External Affairs Minister S. M. Krishna said that "India supports freedom of navigation and access to resources in accordance with principles of international law," predicating his comments by saying India was following developments in the South China Sea. The strategic partnership between India and Vietnam—no matter whether India likes it or not—has been linked to the situation in the South China Sea, causing India to publicly state its position on that issue.

The case of Singapore shows the different pass. India-Singapore defense cooperation started as the cooperative military-to-military relations type in the 1990s, but now it also includes classical types of equipment and training. Also,

not only navies but also air forces and armies are involved. There is a palpable sense of caution on the part of both countries about the extension of the PLAN, though it is not as clearly pronounced as in Vietnam's case.

In October 2003, Singaporean Defence Minister Teo Chee Hean visited India for the first time, where he signed a Defence Cooperation Agreement with Indian Defence Minister Fernandes. The agreement established an annual policy dialogue between defense secretaries. That was later expanded to include combined exercises for the other services, with several new areas of cooperation added, including that on information related to terrorism and international crime (a joint working group was established in 2003), and cooperation in defense technology (added in 2006).

In 2004, Indian Air Force and Singapore counterpart began the combined exercise SINDEX. Those exercises have been beneficial for India in that they give it close-up experience with Singapore's F-16 fighters, letting it get a grasp of the capabilities of the aircraft being also operated by Pakistan. In October 2007, the two countries concluded a bilateral agreement on the implementation of combined air force exercises in India, with India extending to the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) the use of facilities at Kalaikunda Air Force Station near Kolkata in West Bengal. The agreement allows the RSAF to conduct training at Indian bases.

Besides cooperation between the navies and air forces, the armies of Singapore and India began combined armor and artillery exercise in 2005, and the two have also been carrying out regular training in the live artillery fire Agni Warrior exercise and the armor exercises Bold Kurukshetra. In August 2008, a bilateral agreement was signed for combined army training exercises to be held in India, allowing military personnel, specific firearms, and combat vehicles from Singapore to be stationed at the Indian Babina Army Base (Uttar Pradesh) and Deolali Army Base (Maharashtra) for a five-year period.

Singapore has benefited from the cooperative arrangements with India in terms of the use of training facilities, while it is India that benefits in terms of cooperation in defense technology. India now represents Singapore's biggest market for weapons exports.

The defense ties between India and Singapore, which began with navy-to-navy cooperation, later broadened to include the Air Force and Army. It also developed into the training and equipment field as well as cooperation in defense technology. India considers cooperation in defense technology to be an extension of an

expanded relationship of trade and investment. In addition, it hopes to parlay the training it extends currently to Singapore to future capacity building assistance for Southeast Asia as a whole. Indeed, India signed a protocol with Malaysia in December 2007—shortly after signing the MOU with Singapore—regarding the training of the Malaysian Air Force. In addition, along with the horizontal expansion of the cooperation, the two have deepened the core of their cooperative efforts, namely, naval cooperation. In 2005, SIMBEX, which had theretofore taken place in the Bay of Bengal, took place in the South China Sea for the first time, and since then the South China Sea has been the venue of the exercises whenever Singapore hosts the exercises. Moreover, besides onboard training on Indian submarines, Singapore has allowed the frequent docking of Indian naval vessels at Changi Port, and is reported to be considering allowing the port to function as a refueling base for India. One can conclude that both Singapore and India share a mutual understanding about the strategic perception of the South China Sea.

(3) Dealing with Multilateral Institutions

As mentioned in the first paragraph of the first section, India has not yet fully developed a vision for the ASEAN-led multilateral institutions, instead viewing them as an extension of the bilateral "partnership game." On the other hand, India has taken initiatives in forming certain sub-regional and cross-regional groupings. Those regional groupings exist in parallel with the development of the India-ASEAN relationship, and give clues about India's perception of the regional order. They include the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and the Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) initiative, both of which are expected to bridge South Asia and ASEAN. Another example is the Indian Ocean region, where it has organized exercise Milan for naval cooperation and the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Co-operation (IOR-ARC) for economic cooperation.

The reason for India's orientation toward sub-regional or cross-regional cooperation in such a fashion has been the sluggishness in the functional cooperation of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Having succeeded in being upgraded to an ASEAN dialogue partner, India, starting in the late 1990s, poured its energies into setting up BIMSTEC ("BIMST" originally standing for the five original participants, namely, Bangladesh, India,

Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Thailand) in 1997 for the purpose of economic and technical cooperation among the countries adjoining the Bay of Bengal, and MGC in 2000 for the purpose of the economic development of Myanmar and the countries of Indochina. Both frameworks were led by Thailand and India, both of which had booming economies at the time. While not attracting much notice, India has utilized them in line with its interests. As India links its relationships with the countries around the Bay of Bengal to those fronting the larger Indian Ocean, they are important both economically and militarily. In addition, India has pinned much hope on developing a relationship with Myanmar since the 1990s, particularly via a framework of regional cooperation, so as to promote the economic development of northeastern India, a politically unstable area, and to preempt China's economic and political dominance in Myanmar.

The Indian Navy has been hosting the biennial exercise Milan. As stated earlier, the first Milan was held in 1995, which was primarily a conference aiming at confidence building among navies around the Bay of Bengal. Starting in 2003, the exercise became positioned as a multinational exercise and exchange program, including goodwill visits by warships of all participating countries and map exercise training, with Navy personnel from Australia and Myanmar also taking part. In 2008, Brunei, New Zealand, and Vietnam joined, bringing the total of participating countries to 12 (including those sending warships and those sending personnel). In 2012, the Philippines and the Maldives joined, along with Mauritius and Seychelles, both countries that lie off eastern Africa. The expansion of the number of countries participating in Milan demonstrates how the Indian Navy has expanded its area of concern, starting with the countries lying along the coast of the Bay of Bengal, then toward the east, and lately enlarging it to include the western half of the Indian Ocean as well.

IOR-ARC was inaugurated in 1995 as an intergovernmental conference among seven countries (India, South Africa, Australia, Mauritius, Kenya, Singapore, and Oman), with the aim of setting up an Indian Ocean version of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping. In 1997, Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Madagascar, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Yemen joined the aforementioned seven countries in the grouping, bringing the total to fourteen, and Thailand, Bangladesh, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) also started taking part by the year 2000. Also, five countries have become dialogue partners: Japan, China, Egypt, the United Kingdom, and France. As the IOR-ARC chair of 2011, India

Figure 1.1. Multilateral institutions bridging South Asia and ASEAN



Source: Created by author.

aimed at reinvigorating the organization, having identified six priorities, including maritime security, at the twelfth ministerial-level conference held in Bangalore (Bengaluru) in November 2011. In addition, at the fourteenth conference held in Gurgaon, outskirt of Delhi, in November 2012, Seychelles and Comoros joined to become the nineteenth and twentieth members, with the United States admitted as a dialogue partner. As the United States had expressed the desire to become a dialogue partner of the IOR-ARC at the Indo-US foreign minister-level strategic dialogue held in June of the same year, India made its move in response to that.

3. India's UN Peacekeeping: Contributing to Global Peace and Enhancing Its Status

(1) India's UN Peacekeeping Performance

While India has tended to make a low-key response to multilateral institutions on the regional level, especially those led by ASEAN, its commitments to the United Nations have had a long history. As of December 2012, the number of Indian personnel serving in UN peacekeeping operations was 7,839, representing the third-highest number in the world after Pakistan and Bangladesh. In addition, according to the annual report of the Indian Ministry of Defence, India has contributed a total around 115,000 persons to forty-two peacekeeping missions

thus far. Figure 1.2 displays the number of personnel sent from India on peacekeeping missions, showing that it increased rapidly in 2004 with the commencement of a dispatch of a brigade-sized force to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and thereafter maintained a constant level of between 8,000 and 10,000 until September 2012. India currently participates in nine missions, which are listed in Table 1.1. The large-scale units currently dispatched are the brigade in the DRC and two battalions in Sudan.

India's contribution is not only in quantity, but also in quality, such as leadership. As demonstrated by Table 1.2, twelve Indians have served in the post of force commander so far. In addition, two Indians have served as military advisor to the UN secretary-general, later "military advisor to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)" after the agency was established in 1992.

Despite such a prominent presence in peacekeeping, India used to play down its role both domestically and internationally. The first reference made in an annual Indian defense report to its own participation in peacekeeping operations was a statement about the mission to Cambodia, and it was only after the 1998–99 version that the annual defense report continually refer to such missions.

In recent years, however, India has started to make an active appeal to the

Figure 1.2. Indian contribution to UN peacekeeping operations



Note: As of Dec 31.
Source: Compiled from the UN website.

Table 1.1. Indian contribution as of December 31, 2012

Mission	Country/region	Year of establishment	Description	No. of personnel
UNFICYP	Cyprus	1964	Individual Police	8
UNIFIL	Lebanon	1978	Contingent Troops	897
MONUSCO (preceded by MONUC)	DRC	2010 (1999)	Formed Police Units: 269 (2 units) Experts: 58 Contingent Troops: 3,706 (1 Brig)	4,033
UNOCI	Côte d'Ivoire	2004	Experts	8
UNMISS (preceded by UNMIS)	South Sudan	2011 (2005)	Individual Police: 33 Experts: 5 Contingent Troops: 1,947 (2 Bns)	1,985
UNDOF	Golan Heights	1974*	Contingent Troops: (Bn Gp & SO)	192
UNMIL	Liberia	2003	Individual Police: 5 Formed Police Units: 245 (2 units)	250
MINUSTAH	Haiti	2004	Individual Police: 3 Formed Police Units: 459 (3 units)	462
UNISFA	Sudan/South Sudan border at Abyei	2011	Experts: 2 Contingent Troops: 2	4
			Total	7,839

*Indian participation from 2006.
Source: Compiled from the UN website.

international community about its contributions to peacekeeping operations. In September 2010, in a speech made at the sixty-fifth UN General Assembly session, Indian Foreign Minister Krishna described "UN peacekeeping and peace-building" as "flagship activities in the core area of maintaining international peace and security," adding that "India has contributed over 100,000 peacekeepers in nearly every major UN peacekeeping operation. It stands committed to UN peacekeeping." In addition, at a press conference held in October of the same year on the occasion of India's having been elected as a nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council, Foreign Minister Krishna mentioned that India was "a major contributor to UN peacekeeping operations," citing that characteristic—along with being the "world's largest democracy" and a "strong votary of the rights of developing countries"—as reasons for India's qualification as a member of the Security Council.

Table 1.2. Indian Force Commanders and senior officials in the UN

Post	Name	Mission	Country/Region	Term in Service
Force Commander	Lt. Gen. P. S. Gyani	UNEF I	Gaza	1959/2-1964/1
	Gen. K. S. Thimayya	UNFICYP	Cyprus	1964/7-1965/12
	Maj. Gen. Indar Jit Rikhye	UNEF I	Gaza	1966/1-1967/6
	Lt. Gen. Dewan Prem Chand	UNFICYP	Cyprus	1969/12-1976/12
	Ditto	UNTAG	Namibia	1989/4-1990/3
	Lt. Gen. Satish Nambiar	UNPROFOR	Former Yugoslavia	1992/3-1993/3
	Brig. Gen. K. S. Shivakumar	UNAMIR	Rwanda	1995/12-1996/3
	Maj. Gen. Vijay Kumar Jetley	UNAMSIL	Sierra Leone	1999/12-2000/9
	Maj. Gen. L. M. Tiwari	UNIFIL	Southern Lebanon	2001/8-2004/2
	Lt. Gen. Rajender Singh	UNMEE	Ethiopia/Eritrea border	2004/7-2006/3
	Lt. Gen. J. S. Lidder	UNMIS	Sudan	2006/1-2008/4
	Lt. Gen. Chander Prakash	MONUSCO	DRC	2010/7-
	Maj. Gen. Iqbal Singh Singha	UNDOF	Syrian Golan Heights	2012/8-
DPKO Military Advisor*	Maj. Gen. I. J. Rikhye			1960/7-1967
	Lt. Gen. R. K. Mehta			2005/2-2007/5
DPKO Police Advisor*	Mr. O. P. Rathor			1996-
	Ms. Kiran Bedi			2003/1-2005/2
Special Representative of the Secretary-General	Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal	ONUC	Congo (formerly Zaire)	1960/9-1961/5
	Mr. Kamlesh Sharma	UNMISET	Timor-Leste	2002/5-2004/5
	Mr. Atul Khare	UNMIT	Timor-Leste	2006/10-2009/12

*Advisor to the secretary-general before the DPKO was established in 1992.

Sources: Compiled by the author from the UN website, Satish Nambiar, *For the Honour of India: A History of Indian Peacekeeping,* and other sources.

Looking back on India's peacekeeping involvement, one can see that the country has been participating in every sort of peacekeeping mission as the nature of those missions underwent various vicissitudes. It started with the First UN Emergency Force (UNEF I), which served as the template for all future peacekeeping efforts by the UN. After the Cold War, India participated in the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), in which coercive force was authorized on the basis of Article 7 of the UN Charter, and then took part in the UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM

II). It also participated in peacekeeping activities when their scale was expanded once again around the time of the *Brahimi Report*, in such countries as Sierra Leone, Timor Leste, and DRC. The following sections will take a closer look at India's post-Cold War involvement in peacekeeping operations.

(a) India's early involvement in post-Cold War peacekeeping operations

On February 21, 1992, UNPROFOR was set up by a Security Council resolution. Considering its relationship with Yugoslavia as a nonaligned country, India decided not to dispatch troops to the UN operations, and only sent a commander, Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar. Nambiar was critical of the way that the mandate of UNPROFOR was expanded, pointing that it bypassed efforts to effect an agreement among the parties involved. He was also dismayed at the way that the appropriate personnel and military equipment were not sufficiently provided to back up the expanded mandate. From its experience in UNPROFOR, India concerned about the way that a few great powers within UN Security Council were making the decisions to establish the UN mission and its mandate.

UNOSOM II was established by Security Council Resolution 814 on March 26, 1993, as the first attempt of peace enforcement. It saw the dispatch of one infantry brigade from India that was composed of some 5,000 troops. Paradoxically, India's experience in Somalia paved the way for India to confidently take part in the post-Cold War peacekeeping operations. Firstly, compared with other troops contributing countries, India believed its efforts to be relatively successful, since it could comprehend that tribal conflicts were at the core of the dispute, so it pursued a strategy of winning the hearts and minds of the people, thereby minimizing the number of civilian casualties in the area under Indian command. In addition, UNOSOM II gave India the opportunity to coordinate itself with the United States on the operational level. In November 1992, India took part in the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), composed of 24 countries and led by the United States, with its naval vessels transporting goods and supplies for humanitarian assistance. Though UNITAF was authorized by a UN Security Council resolution, it is noteworthy that India—which was skeptical about the multinational forces and the coalition of the willing led by the United States—took part in the multinational forces that were established in parallel with the UN Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I). In February 1995 as well, during the final withdrawal

phase of UNOSOM II, India sent two frigates to the combined task force (composed of the United States, Britain, France, Italy, India, Malaysia, and Pakistan) organized under the US Central Command to support the withdrawal.

From its early experiences participating in peacekeeping operations after the Cold War, India viewed the problems of peacekeeping as stemming not from the UN itself, but from the way that the major powers dominates the UN decision making process. In other words, India believed that the problems were caused by the way that the great powers overpass the UN command and control (in the case of UNPROFOR), or in tried to monopolize it (in the case of UNOSOM II). From that experience, India has made it a firm policy not to participate in missions where the UN command and control are not strictly delineated. The Indian Army has declared "basic principles" on participation in peacekeeping operations on its official website, in which it clearly states that "Peacekeeping operations…should be under the command and control of the UN."

(b) Adjusting to complex peacekeeping

Since the civil wars of Bosnia and Rwanda, coercive intervention by the international community has come to be condoned for humanitarian reasons. Accordingly, peacekeeping operations have changed in nature, expanding from their traditional purpose to include such complicated activities as conflict prevention and nation building, which involve dangerous duties. India has successively involved itself in a number of such complex peacekeeping operations in response to external demands and expectations. It has particularly responded to the demand for the new kind of peacekeeping operations in Africa, continuing to dispatch soldiers there, thereby gaining confidence in its own capacity to deal with insurgent forces while encountering various difficulties. The cases of Sierra Leone and DRC will be examined in detail below.

The UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which was established by Security Council Resolution 1270 on October 22, 1999, is held up as a successful prototype of the peace-building type of peacekeeping, with such mandates as support for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), election assistance, and the creation of a police system. In its shadow, however, lay an early example of Indian trial and error. India had sent one battalion, composed of 1,500 troops, to Sierra Leone, and also obtained is first force commander post. However, Force Commander Vijay Kumar Jetley in an attempt to assert the UN presence in

a region controlled by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a rebel force in Sierra Leone, ruffled that group's feathers, resulting in more than 500 UN troops being taken hostage in May 2000. After negotiations through diplomatic channel, the Zambian and Kenyan peacekeepers were released, but the remaining 223 Indian peacekeepers, along with military observers from eleven countries, including Britain and Russia, remained as hostages. Between July 13 and 17, Operation Khukri was carried out by UN troops under the direction of Commander Jetley—primarily from the Indian Army, whose numbers had been boosted to 3,100, along with battalions from Nigeria and Ghana and helicopters from India and Britain—successfully rescuing the hostages.

In September of that year, India decided to withdraw from UNAMSIL, allegedly because of a series of incidents that caused discord between Force Commander Jetley and the Nigerian special representative of the UN secretary-general. However, those problems were not perceived as stemming from lack of leadership by the Indian force commander himself, but rather as an issue of coordination between the UN and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In addition, the Force Commander openly made the accusation that diamond transactions were taking place between several Nigerian personnel and the RUF. The problem of the vested interests of countries in the region, as India had accused (in this case, diamond mining rights), later led to the construction of a framework for aid to the Sierra Leone government, relating to control of the mining and trading of diamonds.

The UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) was set up in 1999. India started to dispatch troops in 2003, enlarging its participation to one infantry brigade after Security Council Resolution 1565 of October 1, 2004. There, Indian soldiers carried out such activities as DDR, the training of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and support for the 2006 election. In addition, India backed up the air unit of MONUC, with two helicopter squadrons. One such squadron was composed of between five and nine Indian Air Force Mi-17 transport helicopters, entrusted with the tasks of transport and reconnaissance, while the other was composed of between four and nine Indian Air Force Mi-25 and Mi-35 attack helicopters. The Indian Air Force played a dual role: one supporting military operations, and the other supporting the UN's civilian activities. An example of its military action was the prevention of conflict between the militia organizations that entered Congo from Rwanda

around the end of 2005. However, in June 2011, India announced that it would not renew its contract to dispatch aviation units to the MONUC's successor mission, the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), citing domestic requirement.

As seen in the cases of Sierra Leone and DRC, Indian forces believe that the timely and decisive use of force, whenever it is required, has a deterrent effect on spoilers. Although India's position to pursue military objectives decisively sometimes leads to collisions with local politics and vested interests, its position of interpreting the UN mandate positively and taking on risks has won India a degree of praise from the UN and from Western countries.

(2) India's Peacekeeping and Counterinsurgency

The Indian Army faces many challenges, including unresolved border disputes with China, the continuing low-intensity conflict with Pakistan, and internal security operations. Still, the military views participation in peacekeeping positively, believing it possible to send additional forces on peacekeeping missions should the government decide to do so. The greatest reason for that is that the Indian military is able to take the lessons it has learned in internal security operations and apply them overseas, where it is appreciated, and conversely, it believes it can feed back its peacekeeping experience into internal security operations. The Indian military thus regards peacekeeping as an opportunity to grasp the relative strength of its own capabilities and qualities. At present, it evaluates its own capabilities highly, both in terms of the level of training and the quality of its professionalism. In addition, the Indian military believes that the experience in peacekeeping operations of coordinating with other militaries, as well as the experience of different military environments, provides it with low-cost training opportunities. The Indian troops sent on peacekeeping missions are selected, as a battalion, from those experienced internal security missions, and peacekeeping missions overseas are considered equivalent to training for the next internal security mission. The following sections will focus on the capacity and quality of the Indian military in its peacekeeping missions, and will study how those are connected to internal security operations.

(a) The Indian Army and counterinsurgency

The Indian Army carried out counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in the North East States in the 1950s, in Punjab State in the 1980s, and in Jammu and Kashmir State in the 1990s onwards. Those operations could not be publicized to domestic or international audiences for the long time. However, debates on the United States' COIN after Afghanistan and Iraq have brought military experts' attention to India's COIN.

The essence of India's COIN is its emphasis on getting the various parties in conflict to make agreement. As viewed from India, the United States does not have experience in quelling insurgent forces at home. India also sees the US military as an expeditionary force composed of intensively-prepared troops on a large scale not suitable for COIN. As witnessed in the cases of the peacekeeping missions in Africa, Indian soldiers work to promote the conclusion of an agreement among the local parties involved, while responding to any "spoiler" with an immediate—but minimum—use of force. The Indian military's COIN capability is precisely what is required in complex peacekeeping missions.

The United States was one of the first countries to appreciate India's COIN capability. In 2001, the US military sent three personnel to the Indian Army's Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS) in Mizoram State as trainees. It was the first time that India had accepted foreign students at the school. In 2003, the CIJWS held combined training with Special Forces of the US military, and thereafter has held such training regularly.

In addition, Indian COIN has accountability. No matter whether the Indian military undertakes missions in Kashmir or the Northeast States, a request for such operation must be first filed by the respective state government. From the bottom to the top—that is, from local law-enforcement agencies to the state governor—the military must coordinate with civilian organizations at all levels, and furthermore must respond to criticisms from the mass media. The Indian military, on account of such contacts with civilians, and the pursuit of its operations while respecting the needs and rights of civilians, has inevitably come to realize the need—even without explicit laws or regulations being specified—to incorporate in its operations such activities as providing humanitarian and medical assistance to local residents, securing the law and order, and ensuring civilians' freedom of movement. The Indian military's excellent capacity of coordinating with the civilian sector and its high level of accountability are the bases for peacekeeping.

(b) Indian paramilitary and counterinsurgency

The first civilian police forces which was separated from the military line of command was introduced in the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) to assist independence of Namibia in 1989. India sent 88 civilian police officers to that force. That was followed in 1992 by the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), to which India dispatched 429 police officers, the largest number in the mission. Starting in March 1996, India sent around 80 police officers to the International Police Task Force (IPTF) created under the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). The police were sent instead of military troops, as the latter was estimated to incur a greater political cost.

The Formed Police Unit, which responds to law and order problems and performs stabilization tasks, was first introduced in The UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). India sent two units of armed police (240 persons in total) to Kosovo after an MOU was signed in February 2000. The Indian police officers came from the Rapid Action Force (RAF) under the jurisdiction of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) of India, an elite force employed directly by the federal government. The CRPF is India's largest paramilitary, composed of 218 battalions, and its main tasks are security maintenance, COIN, and antiterrorism operations. Ten of the CRPF battalions were reorganized into the RAF in 1992 to respond to the breakout of communal violence in India. The RAF is now posted to regions in India with high communal tension, and has the capacity to quell riots. Upon completion of their mission in Kosovo, members of the RAF generally felt that the peacekeeping mission was not so difficult, making such comments as "we could put down insurgency at a safer distance in Kosovo than in India" and "the violent mobs in Kosovo were more organized than those in India." From those comments, one can perceive that the COIN capacity of the various Indian agencies broadly categorized as paramilitary can be applied in the police sector in peacekeeping as well. In 2002, the National Centre for UN Civilian Police Training was established at a post of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP)—a paramilitary force—as an organization for the training of police personnel for peacekeeping operations.

(3) Making Peacekeeping Operations a Tool for Diplomacy

India is now aiming to parlay its peacekeeping capability and performance for enhancing of its status at the UN, especially in its bid for a permanent seat on the

UN Security Council. India's diplomatic efforts toward the United States and those in the UN are analyzed in turn.

(a) India's peacekeeping operations in the Indo-US relations: Is India qualified to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council?

Although cooperation in peacekeeping had been one of the items on the agenda of Indo-US cooperation since the final days of the Clinton administration, it only progressed sluggishly. When he visited India in March 2000, after a 22-year hiatus in US presidential visits, President Clinton made a joint statement with Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in which the two leaders said that both countries would "reinforce the international security system, including the UN," and "support the peacekeeping efforts of the UN." A joint statement made by the two leaders the following September touched on the international security problems, saying "[t]hey recalled the long history of Indo-U.S. cooperation in UN peacekeeping operations, most recently in Sierra Leone," continuing that they "agreed to broaden their cooperation in peacekeeping and other areas of UN activity, including in shaping the future international security system." They also agreed to establish a Joint Working Group on UN Peacekeeping Operations, the first meeting of which was held that November in Delhi.

However, India saw a dichotomy between UN peacekeeping activities and those of the multinational forces led by the United States. After a two-month debate, the Indian Cabinet Committee on Security eventually decided in mid-July 2003 not to send troops to Iraq, after which Indo-US cooperation was allowed to slide. The difference in opinion between the United States and India on reforming the UN Security Council also hindered peacekeeping cooperation between the two countries. India criticized the way that the UN Security Council dominates the planning of peacekeeping, monopolized peacekeeping-related military information, and called for the engagement of troop-contributing countries (TCCs) by mobilizing nonaligned countries group. The United States have been concerned that approving the Indian position on peacekeeping would lead to Security Council reform.

There was no reference to peacekeeping in the joint declaration made by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President George W. Bush in July 2005 and March 2006. The India-US Joint Working Group on UN Peacekeeping Operations was

far from active.

In November 2009, President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Singh made a joint declaration, after a three-and-a-half-year hiatus, reviving their cooperation on peacekeeping. As one item of global cooperation, the statement reaffirmed that there was "scope for their countries to increase cooperation in peacekeeping, development and the promotion of essential human freedoms" (note that the term "UN" was not prefixed). In the next declaration, made in November 2010, cooperation on "UN peacekeeping operations" was more straightforwardly linked to UN Security Council reform. After explicitly stating that "in the years ahead, the United States looks forward to a reformed UN Security Council that includes India as a permanent member," it also "agreed to hold regular consultations on UN matters, including on the long-term sustainability of UN peacekeeping operations." In a speech before the Indian -parliament on the same day, President Obama used a similar wording when he expressed clear support for India's goal of becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Before that, also, he said that "[w]e salute India's long history as a leading contributor to United Nations peacekeeping missions." Just as India had intended, the Obama administration came to support India's accession to permanent membership of the UN Security Council through endorsing its role in peacekeeping activities.

(b) Participating in UN decision making

India's claim that TCCs should participate in the UN decision-making process has been the engine for institutionalization of consultations between TCCs and the Security Council. The idea of involving TCCs, referred to by the UN in Security Council Resolution 1353 in 2001, was preceded by unofficial consultations made when India and Jordanian withdrew their troops from UNAMSIL. The importance of TCC consultations was also recognized in *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* (the so-called Capstone Doctrine) announced by the UNDPKO in 2008.

India has continued to assert the need for tripartite consultations among the UN Security Council, the TCCs, and the UN Secretariat to make consultations more substantive. For example, during a debate in the UN Security Council in June 2009 on peacekeeping issues, the Indian Ambassador to the UN, Hardeep Singh Puri, appealed for the need to consult with TCCs at an earlier stage, citing the case of MONUC in which the "change in the Rules of Engagement…was communicated

to the TCCs *after* they had been notified by the Under Secretary General during a consultation meeting." Also, Ambassador Puri referred to the advisory in the Brahimi Report that "mandates be clear and achievable," going on to state that it "will not be possible without substantively involving countries who contribute manpower and resources to Peacekeeping Operations" when the mandates are drawn up. His statement that "the lack of clarity in mandates has practical repercussions" represents the military's interest. In addition, India and the other TCCs are calling for more information-sharing, stemming from their earnest desire to minimize the risk of their soldiers on the field.

India also participates in the agenda making in the UN peacekeeping through its practices. As for the agenda of women and peace and conflict, when policy guidelines were issued in 2006 to expand the number of female peacekeepers, so as to serve as role models to encourage the participation of women in post-conflict society, India responded by dispatching a police unit to Liberia consisting entirely of 125 women selected from the CRPF. Before that, the first female high-ranking Indian police officer, Kiran Bedi, served as police advisor to the UNDPKO. By timely responding to the UN agenda, India not only tries to appeal its role and responsibility, but also links agenda making with getting high-ranking UN posts for Indian nationals.

India's record of peacekeeping has come to be utilized as resource in the country's quest to participate in UN decision-making, and ultimately, to win status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The factors enabling peacekeeping operations to be used as a diplomatic resource are the long list of sustainable commitments over more than half a century, along with changes in the external environment since the end of the Cold War.

India has viewed peacekeeping as military operations, and for the Indian military itself, peacekeeping has come to represent an extension of COIN operations at home. Changes in the external environment after the end of the Cold War—namely, the changes in the nature of peacekeeping and

the expanded participation of developing countries—resulted in a heightened appreciation of India's peacekeeping capability. India's COIN has been reevaluated as a qualified capability for complex peacekeeping, and the quality of its professionalism has additionally been praised as something that other developing countries cannot replicate. Peacekeeping is thus coming to function as a means by which India pursues its role and influence as a great power.

Evolution of Indo-Japanese partnership

The impetus for the development of the Indo-Japanese relationship into a "Strategic and Global Partnership" was Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori's visit to India in August 2000. It was the first official visit to India by a Japanese prime minister after Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu traveled there in 1990. Although Japan's "measures" against Indian nuclear tests were still in place during the time of his visit, Prime Minister Mori sent out a political message emphasizing the forward-looking aspects that cooperation with a growing India would yield, as was shown in his visit to Bangalore, the center of India's IT industry. Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee made a visit to Japan in December 2001, and issued a joint declaration with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in which the two leaders affirmed that both countries, which "share the ideas of democracy and market economy," would strengthen their "Global Partnership" in ways that "contribute towards the stability and prosperity of Asia and the world in the 21st century." In the subsequent joint declaration in April 2005, entitled "Japan-India Partnership in a New Asian Era: Strategic Orientation of Japan-India Global Partnership," the two countries stipulated that the partnership be oriented toward three-tired cooperation bilateral, regional, and global. Furthermore, the ties was upgraded to a "Strategic and Global Partnership" in the joint statement made by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in December 2006. In October 2008, Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso and Indian Prime Minister Singh signed a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, specifying the fields of cooperation, including defense dialogue and cooperation.

The foremost factor driving Japan to pursue defense and security cooperation with India is that India is important for Japan in the alliance context as well as for multifaceted institution-building. The US-Japan Security Consultative Committee ("2+2") meeting in May 2007, highlighted "continuing to build upon partnerships with India" as a common strategic objective in the joint statement "Alliance Transformation." At the same time, Japan strongly supports the inclusion of India in the East Asia Summit (EAS), as it sees it as a step toward the creation of an East Asian Community. The second factor, is the positioning of India as the link between the East and West in the "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity" proposed by the Abe and Aso governments. In August 2007, Prime Minister Abe delivered a speech before the Indian Parliament entitled "Confluence of the Two Seas," in which he forcefully commented that "as this new 'broader Asia' takes shape at the confluence of the two seas of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, I feel that it is

imperative that the democratic nations located at opposite edges of these seas deepen the friendship among their citizens at every possible level."

Indo-Japanese defense cooperation is moving forward on the basis of an action plan agreed upon in December 2009 to advence security cooperation. The action plan includes: (1) regular dialogue and consultation on the levels of defense ministers, defense secretary/administrative vice minister, (2) military-to-military talks between the joint secretary and the deputy director-general, (3) regular visits of service chiefs, (4) Ground-to-Ground and Navy-to-Navy staff talks, (5) bilateral and multilateral naval exercises, and (6) cooperation in anti-piracy operations. The level of cooperation between military branches has advanced the most in the naval area, with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) taking part in the Indo-US Malabar exercises in 2007 and 2009, and the Indian Navy and JMSDF carrying out their first-ever bilateral combined training exercises off Sagami Bay in Japan in June 2012. Also, JMSDF and the Indian Navy, in activities in the Gulf of Aden off Somalia, have exchanged schedules for the escort of civilian vessels. The Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) has also worked with Indian Army forming a logistics battalion in UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights. The Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) is also reinforcing its relationship with its Indian counterpart, with JASDF chief of staff having paid a visit to India on November 2012, on the heels of the 2010 visit to Japan by the Indian Air Force chief of staff. In October 2012, the second vice-ministerial "2+2" meeting was held after a hiatus of two years, in which the two sides discussed maritime and outer space security, and agreed to hold a Indo-Japanese Cyber Dialogue.