Chapter 8

Japan—
Reviewing the National Defense Program Guidelines

The Japan-US alliance was greatly strengthened during George W. Bush's eight-year tenure as the president of the United States, particularly in terms of its posture toward global security issues. As a result, Japan-US relations were seen by some observers as "better than ever." In order for this alliance to function stably and achieve further growth, both sides must resolve issues and friction that arise between them, eliminate factors that threaten to destabilize the alliance, and cooperate in tackling political challenges related to regional and global security. Such endeavors as these were actively pursued during the Bush administration, which is one of the main reasons why the alliance was lauded as having reached new heights. Now that the United States is under the leadership of the Barack Obama administration, continued effort needs to be made in order to further develop the alliance. Specifically, both nations must clearly identify the political goals that are common to them, and use that shared understanding as a platform for cooperation.

One area where such cooperation is likely to take place is global security. The National Defense Program Guidelines formulated by Japan in 2004 (hereafter, "NDPG2004") called for proactive, self-initiated deployment of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in peace cooperation activities. However, the SDF's involvement in international peace cooperation activities still remains limited to an extremely narrow range of activities. Such a state of affairs cannot be considered desirable for a country like Japan, whose lack of self-sufficiency makes the economy dependent on foreign trade and investment. International trade and investment are unable to develop steadily without a stable global security environment to support them. Accordingly, a broad perspective of Japan's national interests dictates that the nation be actively involved in responses to situations that jeopardize the global security environment's stability, even when those situations do not pose a direct threat to national security.

The Japanese government is currently reviewing the content of NDPG2004. As part of this process, there are five key tasks that should be addressed. First, Japan's security-related political goals need to be clearly delineated, since prioritizing of those goals is essential to the pursuit of defense development under budgetary restraints. Second, the government should reaffirm the significance of Japan's involvement in global security issues. Active cooperation in the international community's actions regarding failed states and other potential security destabilizers that can have a global impact serves Japan's national interest as a

country that depends on foreign trade and investment. This means working to preventively eliminate the seeds of conflict and instability from the international landscape. Third, Japan must decide how to deal with China's emergence as a major power. China's new status holds various implications, all of which must be taken into consideration in Japan's policies toward the construction of a mutually beneficial relationship with China based on common strategic interests. Fourth, defense must be developed using an approach that emphasizes readiness and sustainability. Today's world is seeing an increase in military operations that cannot be characterized within the traditional scope of either peacetime or wartime. Many of those operations involve responses to large-scale disasters, humanitarian crises, and other sudden contingencies, or involve efforts that need to be sustained for a long time, such as post-conflict peace-building. As such, a well-developed defense force must possess the readiness to deal with sudden crises, and the sustainability to handle long-term operations. Fifth, the issue of resource allocation needs to be considered. Despite the growing diversification of the SDF's role, Japan's defense budget is unlikely to increase in the near future. For this reason, the government must strive to reduce defense costs wherever possible, and work out a reasonable defense budget that adequately takes into account the security environment surrounding Japan.

1. The Japan-US Alliance under the Bush Administration and Challenges Going Forward

(1) The Japan-US Alliance—"Better Than Ever"

In the mid-1990s, Japan and the United States became strongly concerned that their alliance had started to drift following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, a country that they had perceived as a common threat. This sense of crisis motivated both sides to initiate a process of reaffirming and redefining their alliance so as to revitalize it and adapt it to the increasingly unclear and uncertain security environment of the Asia-Pacific region in the post-Cold War era. As the process passed through such milestones as the 1996 Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security, the 1997 revision of the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation, and Japan's 1999 enactment of the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, the Japan-US alliance evolved into a stronger defense

partnership for stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, various other moves were made to bolster the alliance. In 1996, the Japanese and US governments, responding to an incident in which US Marine Corps members raped a schoolgirl in Okinawa in the preceding year, reached an agreement for relocating Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma and taking other steps to consolidate and realign US Forces Japan (USFJ) facilities in Okinawa, based on a report by the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO). In another instance, the two allies agreed in 1999 to engage in joint research for developing ballistic missile defense (BMD) technologies.

As a result of such agreements, Japan and the United States began to steadily strengthen bilateral security cooperation by reinforcing defense cooperation under the aforesaid guidelines, pursuing joint BMD research, and implementing other collaborative efforts. Nevertheless, progress became stalled in the process for relocating MCAS Futenma, which was aimed at alleviating the burden imposed on the Okinawan population by USFJ bases. Due to this and other setbacks, the reaffirmed and redefined Japan-US alliance started to lose its bearings at some point, and once again seemed to be drifting by the end of the 1990s. However, this situation was quickly rectified following the inauguration of the Bush administration in 2001. One of the major factors behind this turnaround was that several key posts in the administration were filled with pro-Japan officials, which helped to shift US foreign policy toward distinct emphasis on the Japan-US alliance. Among those experts was Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who in October 2000 co-released the bipartisan report *US and Japan: Advancing toward a Mature Partnership* (also known as the "Armitage Report"), which advocated action toward strengthening the alliance. The biggest factor, however, was that the alliance's mission was expanded to encompass the War on Terrorism when, immediately following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi pledged Japan's support to the United States, and then provided substantial cooperation by deploying Japan Maritime SDF (JMSDF) refueling ships to the Indian Ocean in November after the Diet enacted the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law.

Following the toppling of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, Japan extended further cooperation to the United States by deploying the Japan Ground SDF (JGSDF) and Japan Air SDF (JASDF) to Iraq in 2004 to provide humanitarian reconstruction operation. By expanding the horizons of SDF operations to include

support in the Indian Ocean and Iraq based on political goals shared with Washington, Japan greatly bolstered its ties with the United States, particularly with regard to the duty of responding to global security issues. Consequently, concern over the perceived drifting of the Japan-US alliance was replaced by the upbeat view that the two nations' relationship was "better than ever." At the May 2003 Japan-US summit in Crawford, Texas, both sides talked of "the Japan-US alliance in the global context as an indication of their intention to reshape the alliance as a force for not only maintaining the security of Japan and the Asia-Pacific region, but also tackling global security issues. The joint statement of the February 2005 meeting of the Japan-US Security Consultative Committee (SCC, or the "2+2" talks) noted that realignment of the USFJ, which will be discussed later, would be founded on common strategic objectives for Japan-US cooperation in both the region and throughout the world. The global common strategic objectives included promoting the fundamental values of the international community, consolidating the Japan-US partnership in international peace cooperation activities, promoting WMD non-proliferation, preventing and eradicating terrorism, reforming the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and maintaining and enhancing the stability of the global energy supply.

(2) The USFJ Realignment—Moving from Agreement to Action

The most important advance achieved in the Japan-US alliance during the eight years of the Bush administration was the formation of an agreement on the realignment of USFJ bases and on cooperation regarding the roles, missions, and capabilities (hereafter, "RMC") of the SDF and the US military. This agreement emerged from SCC talks that were set against the backdrop of the Global Posture Review, a US initiative to reconfigure its military deployments around the world. Set into motion by the joint statement issued at the December 2002 meeting of the SCC, the process evolved through the establishment of common strategic objectives at the February 2005 meeting and adoption of the agreement "Transformation and Realignment for the Future" in the following October before it culminated in the announcement of the "Japan-US Roadmap for Realignment Implementation" in May 2006.

The Japanese government engaged in these talks under a basic policy aimed at reducing the burden on local communities and maintaining deterrence. The goal of burden reduction was geared toward alleviating the discontent of local

communities regarding noise, accidents, and crimes stemming from the presence of USFJ bases, as such dissatisfaction threatened to undermine the Japan-US alliance. The goal of maintaining deterrence was based on military considerations and was intended to steer USFJ drawdowns in a direction that would not destabilize the regional security environment. This two-pronged approach to the talks means that the agreement on base realignment and RMC cooperation should be seen as a single package.

With regard to the base realignment component of the package, the members of SACO, as indicated earlier, reached an agreement on the base realignment within the context of reducing the burden on local communities, but the plans for relocating MCAS Futenma became stalled. Under the new package, the original plan to move the base to an offshore site expressly built for that purpose was replaced with a proposal to construct two runways in a V-shape on part of Camp Schwab and on reclaimed land (see Figure 8.1). In addition, Japan and the United States agreed to implement other measures to relieve the local burden, including the return of the Futenma site and five other USFJ installations south of Kadena and the transfer to Guam of 8,000 personnel of the III Marine Expeditionary

Figure 8.1. Proposals for replacement of MCAS Futenma



Force (III MEF) headquarters. In consideration of the need to maintain deterrence, both sides also agreed to move the JGSDF Central Readiness Force headquarters to Camp Zama, where the US Army I Corps headquarters (forward) was already scheduled to be relocated, and to place the JASDF Air Defense Command headquarters alongside the US Fifth Air Force headquarters at Yokota Air Base. As for the RMC cooperation component of the package, both sides, recognizing the importance of that cooperation in the maintenance of deterrence, pledged to pursue bilateral defense cooperation based on 15 examples listed in the 2005 "Transformation and Realignment for the Future."

One of the most important aspects of the current agreement is the relocation of MCAS Futenma, which failed to materialize under the SACO framework. The transfer of the III MEF headquarters to Guam, a key element of the effort to reduce the burden on Okinawan communities, hinges upon not only Japanese funding to support development of the necessary facilities and infrastructure on Guam, but also the achievement of tangible progress toward construction of the facility for replacing MCAS Futenma. As such, successful completion of the Futenma relocation project is a vital step toward alleviating the local burden and implementing the bilateral agreements reached through SACO and subsequent talks.

The November 2006 gubernatorial election in Okinawa was won by Hirokazu Nakaima, who had shown during his candidacy a positive attitude toward relocating the Futenma replacement facility within Okinawa. Since then, the national government and Okinawa Prefecture have been coordinating the process for bringing the replacement facility to reality. Although Nakaima is in favor of relocating the replacement facility within Okinawa, he diverges from the national government's position in that he advocates building the replacement airfield farther offshore than specified in the May 2006 roadmap. Nevertheless, the national and prefectural governments' concur that the Futenma runways need to be relocated in order to eliminate the hazards posed by their current urban location. This shared opinion helped to bring about the August 2006 launch of the Council Meetings on Measures for Relocation of MCAS Futenma, which was tasked with discussing such issues as the replacement facility construction project, safety and environmental policies (including terms of facility use), elimination of the hazards posed by the existing airfield, and regional development. During the eighth and most recent session of the council meetings, which was held on July 18, 2008, the members agreed to set up two working teams, with one focusing on hazard

elimination and the other on smooth implementation of replacement facility construction planning and environmental impact assessment. These teams have been engaging in working-level discussion of issues pertaining to their respective focuses. In August 2007, the council sent a scoping document on the proposed environmental impact assessment protocol to Nakaima and the heads of relevant municipalities, and afterwards publicly announced the proposal and made the scoping document available for public inspection. Following the receipt of statements of opinion from Nakaima, citizens, and other parties, the council revised the scoping document to reflect the opinions submitted, and then resent it to Nakaima and the heads of relevant municipalities on March 14, 2008. The assessment work began on the following day with the launch of a climate and airborne salt survey based on the scoping document.

Although running slightly behind the original schedule, the MCAS Futenma relocation project is gradually making headway. Table 8.1 shows the state of implementation of other agreements, which include the relocation of training areas. As is indicated, a certain degree of progress has been achieved in those projects as well.

The steady implementation of these agreements is a critical task in the effort to strengthen the foundation of the Japan-US alliance in a manner that reduces the local burden without sacrificing deterrence. As explained earlier, the Futenma relocation project was not carried out in the form originally envisioned by the SACO and approved by the Japanese cabinet; instead, it was taken back to the drawing board and redesigned with a different replacement facility proposal as part of the new agreement package. If, in this way, the bilateral agreement process continues to be subjected to clean-slate review, the mutual trust underlying the Japan-US alliance could become greatly weakened. It is hoped that all parties will determinedly work together to cement Japan-US ties into a stronger partnership.

(3) Post-Bush Administration Challenges for the Japan-US Alliance

There are two major tasks that Japan and the United States need to undertake in order to enable their alliance to function stably and continue growing. The first is to eliminate problems and friction between both sides, as failure to do so would jeopardize the alliance's stability. The second is to cooperate in tackling the political challenges surrounding regional and global security. It can be said that progress toward these two goals was achieved during the eight years of the Bush

Table 8.1. Progress in implementation of the Defense Policy Review Initiative agreement

Details of reorganization (Names of relevant facilities)	Key areas of progress (Schedule shown in roadmap)	
Return of land south of Kadena Air Base (Camp Kuwae) (Camp Foster) (MCAS Futenma) (Makiminato Service Area) (Naha Port Facility) (Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1)	Aug 8, 2007	☐ At talks between Japanese and US defense ministers, then Minister of Defense Yuriko Koike asks Secretary Robert Gates to return as much as possible of Camp Foster
	Aug 9	☐ Consultative meeting held on relocation of Naha Port Facility (Relevant local public organizations agree on location and shape of replacement facility, including additional dump)
	Nov 8	☐ Then Minister of Defense Shigeru Ishiba requests Secretary Robert Gates to return as much of Camp Foster as possible
	Dec 11	☐ Japan-US Joint Committee agrees on location and shape of replacement for Naha Port Facility, including additional dump
	Mar 19, 2008	☐ Consultative meeting held on relocation of Naha Port Facility (Reports agreement on location and shape of replacement facility to Japan-US Joint Committee)
Joint use by JGSDF (Camp Hansen)	Feb 7, 2008	☐ Japan-US Joint Committee agrees to joint use of Camp Hansen
	Mar 4	☐ Cabinet approval of joint use of Camp Hansen and signing of intergovernmental agreement
	Mar-	☐ Start of JGSDF exercises
Deployment of PAC-3 (Kadena Air Base, Kadena Ammunition Storage Area)	Jul 19, 2006	☐ US informs Japanese government of deployment
	Nov 30	☐ Ceremony to commemorate start of PAC-3 unit mission
	end-Dec-	☐ Start of operations
Deployment of X-band radar (Shariki Sub Base)	Jun 26, 2006-	☐ Start of operations
Relocation of JASDF Air Defense Command, etc. (Yokota Air Base)	Oct 27, 2006	☐ Japan-US Joint Committee agrees to partial reduction of Yokota airspace
	Jul 2, 2007	☐ Japan-US Joint Committee agrees to joint use of JASDF Air Defense Command building site
	Jan 30, 2008	☐ Contract for construction of Command building
	Sep 25	☐ Partial reduction of Yokota airspace
Improvement of US Army Command and Control Capability (Sagami General Depot, Camp Zama)	Dec 19, 2006	☐ Inauguration of I Corps (Forward), US Army Japan Headquarters
	Jun 6, 2008	☐ Japan-US Joint Committee agrees to return of part of land (17 ha) at Sagami General Depot
	end-Sep-	☐ Reorganization of I Corps (Forward), US Army Japan Headquarters
Relocation of carrier-based aircraft from Atsugi to Iwakuni Relocation of KC-130s from Futenma to Iwakuni Relocation of JMSDF aircraft from Iwakuni to Atsugi	Jan 30, 2007	☐ In response to inquiry about intentions regarding provision of US military housing at Atagoyama development site in Yamaguchi Prefecture, Defense Ministry says Atagoyama is a leading candidate if land can be secured
	May17-18	☐ Explanation to local government bodies concerning master plan for comprehensive facilities drawn up by US side
	Mar 27, 2008	☐ Agreement on work to improve ground for eastern taxiway at MCAS Iwakuni

administration, particularly around 2003, the year when the concept of "the Japan-US alliance in the global context" emerged from the Crawford summit. For example, Japan cooperated with the United States in conducting the War on Terrorism—a global political challenge—by deploying JGSDF units to the Indian Ocean and Iraq. Moreover, by defining common strategic objectives and discussing concrete forms of RMC cooperation, both sides further developed the platform for using their alliance to address political challenges concerning regional and global security. They also made advances toward resolving the issue of USFJ bases—a problem standing between them—by discussing, under the scope of their defense policy review, measures to realign the bases in a way that would alleviate the local burden while maintaining deterrence.

As these examples demonstrate, Japan and the United States employed their military forces in tangible cooperation for responding to their common political challenges in security, and also pursued strategic consultation for enhancing the effectiveness of such cooperation. This progress, coupled with the personal chemistry between Prime Minister Koizumi and President Bush, helped to transform the state of the alliance from "drifting" to "better than ever."

The most critical challenge in the current context of Japan-US relations is the implementation of USFJ base realignment as spelled out by the existing bilateral agreements. Needless to say, these agreements are meaningless unless they are brought to reality, so it is imperative that solid momentum be achieved in the realignment process, particularly with regard to the relocation of MCAS Futenma. Advancement of this process is also necessary for further deepening the two allies' mutual trust and thereby reinforcing the foundation for continued bilateral cooperation toward resolving regional and global security issues.

It is inevitable, however, that various problems and friction will arise during implementation of the realignment, so the process should not be allowed to persist as the main political challenge for the alliance. While translating the agreements into action is an important political task in terms of clearing up problems and friction between both sides, concentrating on this objective only would impair the ability of both sides to further enhance the effectiveness of their alliance.

Given that transformation of the alliance into a better-than-ever partnership was powered by the SDF and US military's cooperation toward common political aims through operations in the Indian Ocean and Iraq, it can be argued that the first task in Japan-US collaboration for tackling political challenges is to expand

tangible cooperation. The SDF's refueling mission in the Indian Ocean, which opened the door to a stronger Japan-US alliance, was briefly interrupted by the expiration of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law in late 2007, but was resumed in the following February by the enactment of the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law. This mandate was extended for another year in December, enabling the mission to continue through 2009. However, the JGSDF personnel deployed to Iraq for humanitarian reconstruction operation were withdrawn in July 2006, and the JASDF unit engaged in airlift operations in Iraq using C-130H transport aircraft was recalled in December 2008. As a result, the global SDF operations that underpinned tangible Japan-US cooperation in the era of better-than-ever relations were scaled back to what is now a very limited deployment.

The Japan-US agreements on common strategic objectives and RMC cooperation can be a force for advancing tangible cooperation in the years ahead. The common strategic objectives in particular should be fully exploited as a roadmap of the political challenges that need to be dealt with through regional and global cooperation between both countries. However, during the four years since the establishment of those objectives, many new developments emerged on the international scene, such as the nuclear and missile tests conducted by North Korea, the disablement of North Korean nuclear facilities based on modest progress in the Six-party Talks, China's antisatellite test, and conflict between Russia and Georgia. Consequently, it would be wise for Japan and the United States to take a second look at the common strategic objectives and update them as needed. Now that the Bush era has given way to the Obama administration, it is precisely this sort of action that Japan needs to take in order to contribute to the further growth of its alliance with the United States.

2. A Crossroads for SDF Involvement in International Peace Cooperation

(1) International Peace Cooperation Activities as Defined by the NDPG2004, and SDF Involvement in UN Peacekeeping Operations

Japan's basic defense policy and posture are outlined in the document *National Defense Program Guidelines* (hereafter, "NDPG"), which was first laid out in 1976, in the midst of the Cold War. The NDPG was revised in 1995 following the

end of the Cold War, and was updated once more in 2004. The latest edition, the NDPG2004, states, "Japan will, on its own initiative, actively participate in international peace cooperation activities as an integral part of its diplomatic efforts." The NDPG2004 also uses the expression "international peace cooperation activities" to describe the SDF's overseas operations instead of the term "international contribution," which had been frequently used in discussion during the period encompassing the 1991 Gulf War and the 1993 UN peacekeeping operation (PKO) in Cambodia. This change of language was made because "international contribution" was seen as holding the nuance that Japan is a detached third party that does not see issues in the international community as Japanese issues. In today's increasingly globalized world, even situations in remote locations can threaten or affect Japan, so the nation must become involved in international challenges not as a third-party actor, but as a responsible member of the international community. It was this perspective that lead to the choice of "international peace cooperation activities" for talking about SDF activities in other countries.

The NDPG2004's shift to an emphasis on active, self-initiated overseas deployment of the SDF is set against the backdrop of a significant expansion of the SDF's operations, including a series of PKO missions that began with the 1992 deployment to Cambodia, the dispatch of the JMSDF to the Indian Ocean in 2001 following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the sending of JGSDF and JASDF units to Iraq in early 2004. While coming on the heels of such actual deployments, the NDPG2004 systematically delineates the basic goals and principles of SDF activities overseas. In keeping with this framework, the government identified international peace cooperation as a part of the SDF's core mission in January 2007. In the following March, the Defense Ministry established the JGSDF Central Readiness Force, which has command over international peace cooperation deployments. At the same time, the International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit was set up under the Central Readiness Force in order to strengthen the JGSDF's capabilities for those activities. Furthermore, the 2009 defense budget proposal includes funding for enhancing and enlarging the SDF's inventory of equipment for international peace cooperation activities, including the upgrading of mobile medical systems and heavy-lift helicopter engines. As these examples indicate, steady progress is being made in development of the organizations and capabilities needed for active, self-initiated deployment of the

SDF in international peace cooperation activities.

Nevertheless, as of December 2008, actual SDF deployments in international peace cooperation activities remain very limited in scale. Ironically, the number of SDF personnel deployed for international peace cooperation activities has been on a downward trend since the 2004 revision of the NDPG. As mentioned earlier, the JMSDF's Indian Ocean refueling mission is still ongoing despite a temporary interruption, but the JGSDF and JASDF units in Iraq were withdrawn in, respectively, July 2006 and December 2008. Also, no dispatches of 100 or more SDF personnel have been made to UN PKOs following the East Timor PKO deployment that ended in 2004. Excluding the 40 SDF personnel deployed with the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) to monitor the ceasefire in the Golan Heights, SDF participation in UN PKOs at the end of 2008 comprised only 6 personnel assigned to the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) and 2 personnel deployed to the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in that country's south, based on a decision made in 2008.

Among the various PKOs that have been conducted in the years following the 2004 revision of the NDPG, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), UNMIS, and the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in Sudan's north have frequently been the focus of international debate. UNIFIL was established in 1978 originally for the purpose of monitoring the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon. Following the outbreak of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel in July 2006, the operation's mission was expanded by UNSC Resolution 1701 to include monitoring of the Hezbollah and Israel ceasefire. The new mission, usually referred to as UNIFIL II, was supported by personnel from 25 countries as of December 2008. UNMIS was launched in March 2005 under UNSC Resolution 1590 following the signing of a peace accord in the preceding January to end the war that had raged in the southern part of Sudan between the Sudanese government and predominantly Christian rebel forces since the early 1980s. Approximately 10,000 personnel from 68 nations have been assigned to this mission. UNAMID was formed in July 2007 under UNSC Resolution 1769 in response to the humanitarian crisis that arose from the civil war between an Arab militia and various non-Arab groups in the western region of Darfur. It has incorporated into its operation the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which was deployed in 2004. It is planned to be an enormous presence of nearly 30,000 personnel, roughly comprising 20,000 troops, 4,000

police officers, and 5,000 civilians, but is running behind schedule in achieving full strength—as noted by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in December 2008, only 60 percent of the military component had been deployed.

The three PKOs mentioned above are being supported by personnel from not only nearby countries in Africa and Europe, but also certain Middle Eastern countries, China, and—excluding UNAMID—South Korea. In contrast, Japan has deployed only two personnel to UNMIS since 2008, which is hardly a sign of active involvement in UN PKOs. Although Japan has vigorously participated in international emergency responses to large-scale disasters overseas, such as the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, the size of SDF deployments in other international peace cooperation activities has unfortunately remained limited.

(2) Background of the Reduction in SDF International Peace Cooperation

One of the factors behind the trend toward reduced SDF involvement in international peace cooperation is the shift in the nature of UN PKOs. SDF deployment in UN PKOs has been based on the Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations, which was enacted in 1992 and premised on involvement in traditional PKOs mandated under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. This disposition remained unchanged following the Japanese government's decision in 2001 to lift its freeze on SDF participation in the so-called core operations of peace-keeping forces (PKFs). However, many recent UN PKOs have comprised not only traditional ceasefire monitoring founded on strict neutrality, but also "Chapter VII operations," which are authorized to use force under that chapter of the UN Charter. As a result, the Japanese government has found it necessary to meticulously review further SDF participation in PKOs, particularly in light of the five principles that it set for such deployments: (a) a ceasefire accord must already be in effect between the belligerents; (b) the belligerents must have consented to the PKO and Japan's participation; (c) the PKFs must remain strictly neutral; (d) Japan must be able to withdraw SDF units when any of the first three principles is no longer met; and (e) SDF personnel may use force only to the minimum degree necessary for protecting themselves. Accordingly, it has generally become difficult to deploy the SDF for UN PKOs.

Nevertheless, current interpretation of the Japanese Constitution allows for SDF deployment to Chapter VII PKOs in situations where participation is limited

to humanitarian assistance, airlift support, and similar duties in non-combat zones, as was the case in the SDF's deployment to Iraq under the Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq. Future discussion of general laws pertaining to international peace cooperation activities of the SDF should take this precedent into consideration and should be geared toward the development of a legal framework that enables Japan to actively pursue international peace cooperation at its own initiative.

Another factor underlying reduced SDF involvement in PKOs is, paradoxically, the aforementioned redefining of the SDF's overseas mission as the pursuit of active, self-initiated endeavors that serve Japan's national interests, instead of the implementation of seemingly third-party "international contributions." As explained earlier, this shift was founded on the perception that globalization has made Japan vulnerable to threats and effects from even situations in distant regions, and hence the country needs to be a global actor in order to protect its interests. For example, suppression of the international terrorist organization al-Qaeda cannot be accomplished without efforts to stabilize the failed states that might harbor its operatives, and to globally stem the flow of its members and materials. Failure to do so would keep Japan exposed to sudden dangers, even if terrorists are not active in the surrounding region. As another example, changes in the global economy and the structure of energy supply have heightened the importance of not only Middle Eastern oil and Indian Ocean sea lanes, but also Africa and Central Asia, since both regions are sources of uranium and other precious metals, and since Africa has considerable potential for economic growth.

However, the NDPG2004 places heavy emphasis on Middle Eastern resources and energy, as indicated by this passage: "In particular, stability in the region spreading from the Middle East to East Asia is critical to Japan. Japan traditionally has close economic ties with this region, its sea lines of communication run through the region, and Japan depends almost entirely on energy and natural resources from overseas. In this context, Japan will strive to stabilize the region by promoting various cooperative efforts in conjunction with other countries sharing common security challenges." It can be argued that this prioritization is inconsistent with the NDGP2004 statement indicating that Japan recognizes "that the destabilization of the international community by events such as regional conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorist attacks would directly affect its own peace and security." In reality, since 2004,

there have been times when instability in Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Sudan, and Somalia have threatened the peace and stability of the international community, but those situations have not necessarily fallen under the above description of Japan's national interests. Moreover, Japan is strongly aware of how mounting concerns regarding situations in neighboring areas—such as the North Korean nuclear issue and the rise of China—are directly relevant to its national security, and this may have influenced Japan's reluctance to deploy the SDF for UN PKOs and similar operations in Africa and other geographically remote regions. In fact, a large portion of recent PKOs are being conducted in distant Africa, which may partly explain Japan's decreased involvement in international peace cooperation.

Table 8.2 outlines major countries' foreign troop deployments according to *The Military Balance*, an annual report published by the UK-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. Among the countries listed, Japan and New Zealand are the only ones whose deployments are declining overall. The downsizing of Japanese deployments is particularly noticeable in terms of the number of personnel dispatched to UN PKOs; in this respect, Japan was ranked 79th among the 120 nations participating in PKOs worldwide as of December 2008. As the table shows, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States have also greatly trimmed down the size of their UN PKO deployments, but they have expanded their forces in Afghanistan. Consequently, unlike Japan, their foreign deployments are not decreasing on the whole.

Such a state as this can hardly be considered acceptable for a country like Japan, whose limited self-sufficiency in resources and food makes it dependent on foreign trade and investment. Japan cannot expect to maintain a stable flow of trade and investment with other countries unless the global security environment

Table 8.2. Overseas deployment of troops by major countries

	Year	JPN	ROK	CHN	PHL	IND	AUS	NZL	GBR	DEU	FRA	USA	RUS
UN PKO	2002	720	474	38	66	2,407	1,328	672	450	11	275	3,402	202
	2008	36	394	1,642	351	8,868	39	16	415	1,205	1,801	25	208
Afghanistan related (ISAF, etc.)	2002	0	90	0	0	0	0	12	400	1,333	5,106	7,500	0
	2008	0	208	0	0	400	907	108	7,398	3,379	2,318	24,708	0
Iraq-related	2002	0	0	11	0	8	0	0	1,376	14	181	6,230	0
	2008	210	1,200	0	0	0	1,576	1	6,371	0	0	168,000	0
Other	2002	0	0	0	0	0	60	69	4,250	7,210	7,641	199,690	17,050
	2008	0	1	315	0	0	1,015	289	171	2,971	4,769	144,816	25,643
Total	2002	720	564	49	66	2,415	1,388	753	6,476	8,568	13,203	216,822	17,252
	2008	246	1,803	1,957	351	9,268	3,537	414	14,355	7,555	8,888	337,549	25,851

Sources: IISS, *Military Balance 2002-2003 and Military Balance 2008*

Japan-Australia Security Cooperation

Since the SDF's first PKO deployment to Cambodia in 1992, there has been cooperation between Japan and Australia at the troop level in East Timor and in Iraq. Against this historical background, the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation was announced in March 2007 after talks between then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Australian Prime Minister John Howard. For Japan, this was the first bilateral declaration focused on security cooperation with a country other than the United States and raised Japan-Australia security cooperation to a new level. It also represented a further step towards functional cooperation between spokes in the Asia-Pacific hub-and-spoke network centered on the Japan-US alliance, lifting the capability of the region as a whole to respond to various sources of instability, including those in non-traditional fields of security.

The Howard administration pushed for this security cooperation arrangement with Japan along with trilateral cooperation between Japan, the United States and Australia, but at the general election held in November 2008, the governing Liberal Party was defeated and the Labor Party's Kevin Rudd became prime minister. Because Prime Minister Rudd is known to be pro-Chinese, concerns have been expressed in some quarters that Japan-Australia cooperation or Japan-US-Australia cooperation might lose momentum due to a switch in Australian policies.

However, that would be a misreading of the Rudd administration's policies towards Asia. To date, the thinking underlying Prime Minister Rudd's Asian policy has been that Australia's posture towards China would be based on the US-Australia Alliance and security cooperation with Japan, with an understanding of the multifaceted implications of the rise of China.

In a speech entitled *The Rise of China and the Strategic Implications for US-Australia Relations* delivered at the US Brookings Institute in April 2007 before becoming prime minister, Rudd said that unlike the 1990s, policies towards China now had to look beyond the simplistic debate between containment and engagement. He added that actively and affirmatively engaging China in the maintenance of a regional and global rules-based order based on continued US strategic engagement in East Asia and the West Pacific anchored in the existing pattern of US alliances, including those with Japan and Australia, should form the basis of Australia's Asian policy. He further stated that Australia's challenge is to continue to maximize common economic interests with China while robustly asserting continuing points of difference and disagreement, and stating in clear and unequivocal terms to China the continued centrality of Australia's alliance relationship with the United States and support for the new joint security declaration between Australia and Japan.

In another speech entitled *Australia, the United States and the Asia Pacific Region* delivered at the Brookings Institute in March 2008 after becoming prime minister, Rudd referred to the importance of economic relations and defense cooperation with Japan as well as the importance of trilateral defense cooperation between Japan, the United States and Australia. He expressed the hope that China would make a strong contribution to strengthening the global and regional rules-based order, but also noted that China is rapidly increasing its military spending and identified a lack of transparency and uncertainties concerning its long-term strategic purpose as problems.

Thus, the Rudd administration's policies towards China are based on a multifaceted view of the economic opportunities and political challenges that China brings, rather than the two-dimensional approach of "engagement" or "containment," and the government continues to promote Japan-Australia security cooperation. In December 2008, the second Japan-Australia Joint Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations (2+2 talks) were held in Tokyo, the first having been held in June 2007. Participants in the meetings discussed Japan-Australia security cooperation, Japan-US-Australia trilateral cooperation, sharing of information, East Asian security, North Korea, and Iraq and Afghanistan. At the Australia-Japan Defence Ministers Meeting prior to that the Japan-Australia Memorandum on Defence Exchange was revised. The updated memorandum includes increased military exercises between the two countries and cooperation in international peacekeeping as well as regular exchanges of opinions on strategic policy. Thus, the stage is set for ongoing strengthening of security cooperation between Japan and Australia.

remains stable. Accordingly, Japan needs to enlarge the horizons of its national interests and become actively involved in situations that jeopardize the stability of the global security environment, even if they do not pose a direct threat to Japan.

Today's PKOs and other international endeavors in peace-building are marked by a trend toward larger, multirole involvement, as is seen in the increasing emphasis on military-civilian cooperation. As such, there is a growing need to incorporate diverse roles into those endeavors. Such activities as economic aid, civilian support, and political stabilization and humanitarian reconstruction operations by military organizations all require the participation of various entities. Japan, too, should constantly be a part of such international peace-building efforts by engaging in diverse modes of organic collaboration. In particular, the SDF's international peace cooperation activities can serve as a key element of comprehensive efforts in peace-building.

Japan's involvement in global security challenges through international peace cooperation activities is not just a matter of contributing to the resolution of those challenges. It is also important for Japan to use its involvement as a vehicle for bolstering ties with other nations involved in the problem-solving process, and in doing so increase the benefits for Japan's security. For example, during the JGSDF deployment to Samawah in Iraq's Muthanna Province, the JGSDF's collaboration with the British and Australian forces charged with maintaining security in Muthanna greatly deepened Japan's ties with those two countries. In particular, Japan's cooperative relationship with Australia took an immense stride forward,

paving the way to the March 2007 Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, which pledged to strengthen bilateral cooperation in mainly peace-building and other nontraditional security endeavors, and to the June 2007 and December 2008 meetings of the Japan-Australia Joint Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations (2+2 talks).

Given that stability in Afghanistan and antipiracy measures in Somalian waters have become major international security concerns, Japan should become more actively involved in international peace cooperation activities in Africa and the Middle East. Furthermore, this involvement should incorporate global or widespread operation of the SDF in conjunction with other means of action, based on a comprehensive roadmap for peace-building. In this respect, Japan's international peace cooperation activities are now standing at a crossroads.

(3) Afghanistan—A Need for Greater International Support

Since the Soviet invasion in 1979, Afghanistan has been mired in internal conflict that has put it on the brink of becoming a failed state. In 2001, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks perpetrated by al-Qaeda, Afghanistan became the front line in the War on Terrorism as the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom to remove the country's Taliban regime, which had close ties with al-Qaeda. With the support of forces of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, the US-led operation quickly scored military successes and managed to capture Kabul and topple the Taliban regime in a short time.

Achieving military victory, however, was not as difficult as the challenge of postwar reconstruction for reshaping Afghanistan into a stable, peaceful state. In fact, the process of bringing lasting order to a country embroiled in more than 20 years of civil strife has been much more complicated than originally envisioned.

One of the biggest hurdles is that, due to the long-lasting internal conflict and other negative factors, Afghanistan does not adequately possess the basic infrastructure needed to carry out reconstruction

and development. Another problem is that the security situation in Afghanistan has become increasingly unstable in the past several years, and will likely require close attention in the years ahead. The decline in public order is particularly noticeable in the southern, southeastern, and eastern regions bordering with Pakistan. According to a report made by the UN secretary-general in March 2008, nationwide incidents of terrorism and insurgency averaged 566 per month in 2007, rising far above the preceding year's monthly average of 425. Instead of engaging in frontal attacks upon the Afghan government or the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the terrorists and insurgents have primarily relied on such small-scale tactics as improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide attacks, assassinations, and abductions. The Secretary-General also noted that 160 suicide attacks were perpetrated and 68 were thwarted in 2007, compared with 123 perpetrated and 17 thwarted in the preceding year.

Currently, the actual task of ensuring security in Afghanistan is in the hands of

Figure 8.2. Deployment of PRTs in Afghanistan



Source: Compiled from the ISAF Web site (as of December 2008)

the ISAF, an international military force that was established under UNSC Resolution 1386 and is made up mostly of personnel from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members. The ISAF supports the Afghan government in its efforts to maintain order across the country. In response the deterioration of security, ISAF members have increased the size of their deployments. As of January 12, 2009, the ISAF comprised nearly 55,100 troops from 43 nations, compared with 36,650 troops from 37 nations in April 2007.

As a means of simultaneously advancing reconstruction work along with efforts to improve security, provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) consisting of military personnel and civilian reconstruction specialists have been deployed in 26 locations across much of Afghanistan, under the command of 14 participating nations (see Figure 8.2.). The first PRT was deployed in Gardez, Paktia Province in December 2002, and was followed by deployments in Bamiyan, Kunduz, Mazari Sharif, Kandahar, and Herat in early 2003. Since each PRT's organization and activities are designed to serve the needs of the region where it operates, there is no single organizational pattern that characterizes them all. On average, however, a PRT is staffed with somewhere around 100 to 200 military personnel and 10 or so civilians. All PRTs were placed under the ISAF's control when UNSC Resolution 1510 expanded ISAF security responsibilities to regions outside Kabul in October 2003. The civilian component includes diplomats, employees of development agencies, police officers, and various personnel deemed essential for meeting each region's reconstruction needs. Since Afghanistan's unstable security situation poses a barrier to reconstruction, the combination of security personnel with reconstruction personnel in PRTs is aimed at bringing success to development projects and thereby helping to expand the Afghan government's influence to regions outside the capital.

Japan has supported Afghanistan by providing large-scale economic assistance. The Japanese government hosted the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan in Tokyo in January 2002, and has provided $1,450 million in aid to Afghanistan. Moreover, Japan pledged a further $550 million at the International Conference in Support of Afghanistan, which was held in Paris in June 2008. In addition to humanitarian reconstruction operation, Japan has extended support to Afghanistan's political process, the improvement of security, and reconstruction. The political support has included assistance for elections, constitution framing, and governmental expenses, while the security support has

focused on such efforts as the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR; targeted at former militia members) program and the ongoing Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) program. Reconstruction support has comprised construction of trunk roads in such areas as Kabul and Kandahar, comprehensive regional development (mainly agricultural and rural development), construction of schools, and supply of medical equipment and medicine.

At the same time, Japan has since December 2001 deployed the JMSDF, under the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and later the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law, to provide replenishment support to other nations' ships engaged in maritime interdiction of terrorists and terrorism-related materials.

The maritime interdiction operation, which is aimed at such objectives as thwarting the Taliban's efforts to raise funds through the narcotics trade and blocking the flow of terrorist weapons into Afghanistan, is a key part of the international community's efforts to stabilize Afghanistan, and the JMSDF's replenishment support represents a significant contribution to that mission. Whether it be executing the War on Terrorism or dealing with the problem of the narcotics trade, stabilizing Afghanistan is a key to the fundamental resolution of such challenges. Stability is indispensable to the implementation of humanitarian, reconstruction, and economic assistance, and, conversely, progress in implementing that assistance is critical to the achievement of stability. As such, it is imperative for the international community to closely coordinate efforts on both sides of this equation in order to build up a stable Afghanistan that will not lapse into chaotic, failed-state-like conditions.

In light of this discussion, Japan should become more directly involved in international efforts to stabilize Afghanistan, and, in the course of this involvement, draw upon its past experience, particularly its successful coordination of official development assistance (including gratis grassroots support) with SDF humanitarian activities in Samawah, Iraq. There are various options available for Japanese involvement, such reconstruction support by Japan-led PRTs or through participation in PRTs headed by other countries. Of course, Japan's participation must extend beyond SDF deployment to encompass social infrastructure reconstruction support by civilians. One effective option would be to form "Japanese-style" PRTs that would combine civilian-implemented support with exploitation of the SDF's self-contained operability and advanced transportation capabilities, albeit within constitutional limitations.

Also, now that ISAF oversees security for all of Afghanistan, its core force, NATO, suffers from an inadequate supply of helicopters and is eager to receive support in this regard from Japan, which possesses more than 50 CH-47 heavy-lift helicopters. From the perspective of implementing the NDPG2004's call for active, self-initiated Japanese involvement in international peace cooperation activities to improve the international security environment, it is necessary for the Japanese government and public to engage in broad discussion of strategies for active participation in the process of stabilizing Afghanistan, an undertaking that is very important in the context of international security.

(4) The Escalating Problem of Somalian Piracy

Although the word "piracy" tends to bring to mind anachronistic images from the Age of Sail, the threat that piracy poses to maritime traffic is certainly not just a thing of the past. In fact, it is re-emerging as a significant threat to maritime security.

Previously, the regions considered hot spots for modern piracy were primarily the Strait of Malacca and the island-studded waters of Southeast Asia, but the incidence of piracy in the Strait of Malacca has declined in recent years as a result of various international efforts, including the combined patrols conducted there by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore since 2004 (Thailand has also participated since 2008), and the establishment of an information sharing center under the 2006 Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia. At the same time, however, piracy has skyrocketed in the Gulf of Aden and other waters off the coast of Somalia, and has come to be recognized by the international community as a critical threat to maritime security (see Figures 8.3 and 8.4).

The Gulf of Aden, which forms the entrance to the Red Sea, is part of the extremely vital Suez Canal shipping route that links Asia and Europe. Nearly 18,000 vessels transit the Suez Canal every year, a figure that falls well short of the 93,000 passing through the Strait of Malacca, but surpassing the 14,000 that go through the Panama Canal. As such, the Gulf of Aden is a very important waterway, but its expansiveness—a length of roughly 1,000 kilometers and a maximum width of 400 kilometers, compared with the Strait of Malacca's dimensions of 500 kilometers and 140 kilometers—presents a considerable barrier to effective implementation of antipiracy measures.

Every year, roughly 2,000 ships owned or operated by Japanese companies sail

through the Gulf of Aden. Automobile carriers account for 41 percent of this number, followed by container ships (34 percent), bulk freighters (9 percent), LNG tankers (6 percent), and chemical tankers (5 percent). Moreover, approximately 20 percent of all automobiles exported by Japan are transported through this waterway. Consequently, Japan is directly exposed to the large maritime security threat posed by piracy off Somalia. In point of fact, Japanese ships have been attacked by pirates off Somalia, such as the October 28, 2007 hijacking of the chemical tanker *Golden Nori* owned by Dorval Kaiun K.K., and the April 21, 2008 raid on the oil tanker *Takayama* owned by Nippon Yusen Kaisha Line. Twelve incidents involving Japanese companies occurred between January and December 1, 2008, with five vessels being seajacked. This prompted the Japanese Shipowners' Association to ask the minister of land, infrastructure and transportation in October 2008 to implement more effective and concrete measures to repress piracy, including overhauling Japanese laws and collaborating with relevant countries in accordance with international treaties, in order to secure Japanese shipping.

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea treats pirates as enemies of mankind in general, declaring that all countries have a duty to cooperate in the repression of piracy (Article 100) while also recognizing the right of all countries to seize pirate ships or aircraft (Article 105). Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, UNSC Resolution 1816, adopted on June 2, 2008, further

Figure 8.3. Trends in acts of piracy (including abortive acts)



Source: Compiled from International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Annual Report 2008

urges states whose naval vessels and military aircraft operate off the coast of Somalia to be vigilant to acts of piracy and armed robbery. It also authorizes entry into territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose of repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea and the use, within the territorial waters of Somalia, in a manner consistent with action permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy under relevant international law, all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery for a period of six months from the date of the resolution. UNSC Resolution 1838, adopted on October 7, 2008, further urges states interested in the security of maritime activities to deploy naval vessels and military aircraft to actively fight piracy on the high seas off the coast of Somalia in a manner consistent with international law. UNSC Resolution 1846, adopted on December 2, 2008, calls upon states and regional organizations that have the capacity to do so, to take part actively in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, in particular, consistent with this resolution and relevant international law, by deploying naval vessels and military aircraft. It further authorizes them to enter into the territorial waters of Somalia to take all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, as authorized under UNSC Resolution 1816, for a period of 12 months from the date of the resolution. Resolution 1863, adopted in January 2009, expresses the UNSC's intent to establish a United Nations PKO in Somalia as a follow-on force to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), subject to a further decision of the UNSC by June 1, 2009.

Figure 8.4. Acts of piracy in waters off Somalia and Gulf of Aden



Source: Compiled from International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Piracy Attacks Map (as of December 16, 2008)

International organizations such as NATO and the European Union (EU) have taken action in response to the various UNSC resolutions, while many states, including France, Spain, and Russia, have deployed naval vessels. However, protecting the numerous ships that transit an expansive area of sea like the Gulf of

Aden is no easy matter. The surest way is to supply an escort for each ship, but that would require an enormous number of escort vessels. Another way would be to organize an armed convoy, but doing that would significantly impair the efficiency of maritime operations. Under these circumstances, therefore, the most effective approach is to subdue the bases from which the pirates operate in order to inhibit the activities of the pirate vessels themselves. Accordingly, UNSC Resolution 1851, adopted on December 16, 2008, incorporates a provision authorizing all necessary action within Somalia itself, based on a request by the Somalia Transitional Federal Government, implicitly condoning attacks on land and coastal positions.

Chemical tanker Golden Nori receiving assistance from US naval personnel (December 12, 2007) (US Navy Photo by Lt. j.g. Deanna Fisher)

The seas are public property belonging to the international community and their stability is indispensable for the prosperity and development of states like Japan whose economic activity depends on secure maritime transportation. Threats to maritime security must therefore be viewed as a serious policy concern. Based on UNSC Resolution 1846, which calls upon states that have the capacity to do so to deploy naval vessels and aircraft to take part actively in the fight against piracy, Japan plans to announce officially its intention to implement sea patrols as an emergency step and has started organizing the necessary force and to collect intelligence, including field reconnaissance.

Any further discussion on this matter inevitably has to deal with the fact that the underlying reason for the piracy problem is the lack of a functioning internal administration in Somalia, which has become a failed state. Measures to deal with piracy are no more than a temporary expedient and there can be no fundamental solution without the establishment of stable internal order inside Somalia. For that reason, some kind of international framework, such as a PKO or multinational force operating within Somalia itself, is likely to be created, as referred to in UNSC Resolution 1863. It will be important for Japan to study broadly how it might contribute to international cooperation while monitoring carefully the direction of the debate on these matters.

3. Challenges for Japan's Defense Capabilities

(1) NDPG2004—Two Objectives and Three Approaches

As stated earlier, the basic document spelling out Japan's defense policy and posture is the NDPG. This document describes Japan's basic assessment of the situation and the role and duties of Japan's defenses, while also showing specifically the breakdown of the SDF's troop strength in a separate table. The NDPG forms the basis for the five-year Mid-Term Defense Plan, and that in turn underlies each year's defense budget.

The current NDPG (NDPG2004) was adopted in December 2004, but unlike the previous two NDPGs, which included no time limit on when they should be reviewed, the NDPG2004 states that there will be a review and, if necessary, the guidelines "will be revised after five years or should there be a significant change in the security environment, taking into consideration such change in the environment, technological progress and other relevant factors at the time." This means the contents will come up for review at the end of 2009. Accordingly, a full-scale debate on the nature of Japan's defense capabilities and future challenges has already begun.

Without recapping in detail the contents of the NDPG2004, it is possible to summarize the thinking behind the guidelines in three points as follows.

Point 1: The NDPG2004 identifies the defense of Japan and improving the international security environment as security objectives and then presents three approaches for achieving each of these two objectives: Japan's own efforts, cooperation with allies, and cooperation with the international community. This yields six combinations. Thus, the framework for Japan's security policy can be regarded as covering 2 x 3 = 6 fields.

Point 2: While recognizing the reduced threat of "full-scale aggression," such as the landing of invading forces, the NDPG2004 acknowledges the importance of dealing with "new threats and diverse contingencies," such as a ballistic missile attack and the invasion of Japan's offshore islands. In other words, while the need to be prepared for a high-intensity threat has moderated, the underlying assumption is that there is now a broader range of threats to address.

Point 3: In addition to defenses focused on deterrent effect, there is a heavier emphasis on "response capability." The assumption is that traditional deterrence will not necessarily function against "new threats and diverse contingencies" and

that there are likely to be more situations requiring an ex post facto response. The NDPG2004 recognizes that in order to prevent these threats from materializing or to respond nimbly to emergencies that might arise, there is a need for a dynamic response rather than defense capabilities focused on static deterrence, meaning a need for greater readiness and mobility.

Based on these changes in perceived threats and in Japan's defense capabilities as well as budgetary and personnel limitations, the NDPG2004 presents a new defense force concept framed around the keywords of "multifunctional," "flexible," and "effectiveness," while retaining the valid parts of the Basic Defense Force Concept embodied in previous NDPGs.

(2) Assessment of Basic Thinking Underlying the NDPG2004

Below is an assessment of the above features of the NDPG2004 from the present vantage point.

Concerning the combination of two objectives and three approaches (Point 1), the addition of "improving the international security environment" represents a significant change. The NDPG1995 also identified the creation of a more stable security environment as a role of defense, but the NDPG2004 is the first to treat this as a policy objective. As stated in the preceding section, the adoption of this objective actually came on the heels of the deployment of the SDF in the Indian Ocean and Iraq. Moreover, it could hardly be said that the objective is being realized in practice at this point of time. Nevertheless, it has at least broadened the horizons of SDF activities and unquestionably demonstrates a stance that leans more towards proactive involvement in global security issues.

These two objectives—defending one's own country and improving the international security environment—are goals that any reasonably strong state attempting to fulfill its responsibilities in the international community would naturally be expected to have. Because the two objectives cover just about all security-related policies, it is hard to prioritize specific policies based on them.

Combining the two objectives and three approaches generates six fields for implementation of security policies, but the NDPG2004 does no more than identify the combinations of objectives and approaches and there is no indication how each combination contributes to Japan's security or in what form. For example, there are differences in the degree and form in which Japan's own efforts, the cooperation with allies and the cooperation with the international community contribute to

Japan's security, but it is not possible to pin down the differences from the guidelines. Prioritization of policies is indispensable when considering ways to upgrade defense capabilities within the scope of a limited budget, but merely presenting six combinations makes it hard to set policy priorities.

Point 2 refers to the perceived need to pay more attention to dealing with "new threats and diverse contingencies" as the threat of "full-scale aggression" has receded, which is also relevant to the current situation. Although unstable factors persist in the neighboring region, it is hard to imagine the type of invasion involving the landing of 3-5 divisions that was envisaged during the Cold War. At the same time, the nature of the threat has changed, with the War on Terrorism and the proliferation of WMD remaining unresolved problems. Furthermore, to prepare for future uncertainties, the most fundamental or core parts concerned with the ability to deal with a full-scale invasion should probably be maintained.

On the question of "effective response to new threats and diverse contingencies," five specific types of contingencies are identified, all of which have to do with the defense of Japan: dealing with ballistic missile attacks, dealing with attacks by guerrillas or special forces, dealing with invasion of Japan's offshore islands, patrol and surveillance of sea and airspace surrounding Japan, and responses to violations of Japan's airspace and intrusion of armed special operation vessels and other vessels, and dealing with large-scale and special disasters. Concerning improving the international security environment, the other objective, the NDPG2004 refers to "establishing the infrastructure necessary to quickly dispatch and maintain defense force units overseas by developing education and training systems, maintaining highly ready force posture for relevant units, and improving transport and other capabilities," but there are no references to specific contingencies or types of activities in connection with these. In the current world, global security problems impact Japan's own security, and if Japan is to engage proactively and on its own initiative in international peace cooperation activities, it should spell out clearly the contingencies and activities that it has to deal with both from the perspective of protecting the homeland and improving the international security environment, and link these to the upgrading of its defense capabilities, organization and systems.

Point 3 refers to a heavier emphasis on "response capability" in addition to defenses focused on deterrence. In terms of overall direction, this is relevant to the current security environment, but there is room for debate on whether defense

capability should be seen as a dichotomy between "deterrence" and "response." This type of dichotomization might be meaningful where it is possible to distinguish clearly between peacetime and emergencies, as during the Cold War. In the current world, however, activities to improve the international security environment, such as the War on Terrorism, efforts to restore peace in failed states, or anti-pirate patrols, are of a continuous nature. In other words, there has been an increase in operations that fall in between peacetime and emergency activities. These activities focus mainly on initiatives such as humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, which are different from the deterrence and response approach for dealing with high-intensity conflicts that is the traditional role of military force. Moreover, these types of activities generally last longer than high-intensity conflicts. That means there is a need for capabilities that differ from the capabilities required to deter high-intensity conflicts or to respond if there is an emergency due to the failure of deterrence. To address this trend it would be more appropriate to place greater emphasis on operations that fall in between peacetime and emergency activities rather than rely on the dichotomization into deterrence and response.

(3) Debate Concerning Nature of Japan's Defense Capability Going Forward

Below are key points to consider when discussing the nature of Japan's defense capability going forward.

The first point is to clarify security-related policy challenges. The security policy framework of the NDPG2004 comprises two objectives and three approaches, but as stated earlier, it is hard to prioritize policies because of the abstract nature of the objectives, which can include all eventualities. However, a ranking of policy priorities is essential in order to maintain Japan's defenses within the confines of a limited budget. Consequently, it will be necessary to develop a more concrete definition of the policy challenges that Japan must deal with to achieve its security goals than the two objectives contained in the NDPG2004. Conceivable objectives might include protection of Japan's sovereignty, dealing with the changing global power balance stemming from the rise of China and India, maritime security, efforts to prevent proliferation of WMD, the War on Terrorism, and addressing the problem of failed states.

The second point is to reconfirm what it means to be involved in global security issues. In a globalized world, even problems arising in geographies far removed

from Japan can have security implications for Japan. The increasingly serious problem of piracy off Somalia demonstrates how, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, lack of action on failed states can give rise to a serious international security crisis with a global impact. That is why Japan should be involved in efforts to eliminate incipient sources of instability and conflicts in the international community through proactive cooperation with initiatives by the international community to tackle factors contributing to security instability, such as failed states, that could have a global impact.

Obviously, such efforts should not be limited to SDF deployment, but it is also important to realize that utilization of the SDF to confront global security problems not only contributes to the resolution of problems but helps strengthen cooperative relationships with other states.

The third point is how to deal with a rising China. The relationship between Japan and a rising China is qualitatively different from Japan's relationship with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The rise of China should not merely be characterized as an uncertain factor in international security. Along with economic opportunities, it also gives hope that China will play a role in stabilizing the international security environment by acting responsibly as a major power. Thus, the rise of China has multifaceted implications. The first implication has to do with military concerns. Backed by its economic growth, China has been boosting its defense spending and modernizing its military equipment. If China fulfills its responsibility as a major power to maintain order in a way that is positive for Japan's security, the modernization of China's military will not in itself pose a threat. However, the fact that it is happening in a non-transparent manner and at a rapid pace while China is becoming more active in the surrounding area could raise concerns. The second implication relates to the issue of diplomatic rivalry. This refers to potential rivalry between Japan and China for influence in the region, which is a different dimension from the question of military balance. However, rivalry per se is not necessarily negative. Constructive rivalry between Japan and China over policies to stabilize the region would have positive effect on regional security. The third implication has to do with partnership in matters of shared interest, such as the economy and transnational issues. China is stepping up its involvement in efforts to stabilize the global security environment through such actions as deploying naval vessels to deal with the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia. Since the economies of Japan and China both depend heavily on

overseas trade, there are ways in which the two countries can cooperate to tackle security problems like these with global implications. It is also possible to identify several ways in which Japan and China could cooperate on transnational issues in the local region, including disaster relief, measures against infectious diseases and dealing with climate change.

Because of the multiple implications that the rise of China has for Japan, Japan's security policies must be shaped in a way that is capable of addressing all of them. As set out in the March 2008 Japan-China Joint Communiqué, the ultimate goal is to construct a strategic reciprocal relationship. It is also to encourage action as responsible international stakeholders, as enunciated in the May 2007 SCC joint statement, and to strengthen the partnership aspect, one of the multifaceted implications referred to earlier. In the process of achieving this, the role of defense should not be merely the maintenance of military balance, but should encompass a more comprehensive approach including confidence building and security cooperation.

The fourth point is to establish defense capabilities focused on responsiveness and sustainability. As stated earlier, there has been an increase in operations that fall between peacetime and emergency activities. The United States' military action in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrates that operations do not end simply with taking control of the capital and subduing the government of the other country, but also require large-scale military activity during the follow-up processes of restoring order and reconstruction. Thus, the military-activity time axis itself is not merely limited to the period of war, but has stretched to include the follow-up period. These, too, are operations that fall between peacetime and emergency activities.

Operations falling between peacetime and emergency activities are often prolonged; for example, responding to unexpected events, such as major disasters or humanitarian crises, or post-conflict peace building. Creating the defense capabilities to deal with such situations, therefore, requires the responsiveness needed to deal with unexpected events and the sustainability to handle prolonged activities based on the understanding that many situations in today's security environment call for continuous defense operations of an intermediate nature between peacetime and emergency activities. Moreover, if these types of intermediate activities are to be carried out globally, there will also be a need for long-range mobility. Given the changing mission and nature of defense as

outlined above, other important challenges will be how to nurture the necessary human resources and what type of decision-making system is required to deal with these changes.

The fifth point deals with the issue of resource allocation. While the SDF's mission has become more diversified, given the current economic crisis, compounded by Japan's severe fiscal situation, there is little prospect of increasing defense spending. Rather than a build-up of Japan's defense capabilities based on "a please-everyone policy," therefore, it will be necessary to build capabilities that dovetail with policy priorities and to strive to reduce costs as far as possible through more efficient procurement and other measures. That said, major countries throughout the world other than Japan have been boosting national defense spending. It is uncertain what impact the current economic crisis will have on each country's defense spending going forward, but there is probably also the need for a broad debate on how much Japan should be spending on defense.