# Chapter 7

# Japan—
# Aiming for Broader, Deeper
# Regional Security Cooperation

In the past several years, the realignment of US Forces Japan (USFJ) has been a critical challenge in Japan's defense policy. An important milestone was reached in May 2006, when the realignment consultations between Japan and the United States culminated with the agreement United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (hereinafter, "5/1 Joint Document"), an achievement that signaled the transition from talks to action.

Japan's defense policy in 2007 showed some big developments for broader, deeper regional security cooperation, as exemplified by its security cooperation with Australia and India. The Asia-Pacific region is now seeing the emergence of a new form of regional cooperation—functional cooperation for common concerns, such as anti-terrorist and anti-piracy measures—that is different from the hub-and-spoke arrangement of bilateral alliances between the United States (the hub) and other nations, and from multilateral security frameworks like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). By complementarily combining these different forms of cooperation, Asia-Pacific partners are building up their ability to make a region-based response to complex security challenges. It is against this backdrop that Japan's security cooperation with Australia and India has made large strides forward.

Another key development in Japan's defense policy was the January 2007 enlargement of the Self-defense Force's (SDF) primary mission to include international peace cooperation activities. As of the end of 2007, however, Japan's involvement in international peace cooperation activities remained limited to relatively small operations. The reason for this was not that Japan took a reluctant stance toward involvement in global security problems, but that it independently decided the nature of its involvement based on strong attention to the activity's relevance to Japan's security. In fact, Japan has dispatched personnel to the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) as part of its contribution to Asia, and is actively participating in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), an activity that is closely intertwined with Japan's security. Nevertheless, in the context of the war on terrorism, it is Japan's responsibility to become more actively involved in global security issues. As such, it is to be hoped that Japan's government and citizens will engage in a more vigorous discussion of the roles that the nation should play in that regard.

# 1. Japan-US Relations—Policy Challenges following the USFJ Realignment Agreement

## (1) The Advancement of USFJ Realignment and Japan-US Strategic Consultations

The December 2002 meeting of the Japan-US Security Consultative Committee (SCC, the "2+2" talks) set into motion the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), a series of consultations between Japan and the United States on transforming their alliance, especially with regard to USFJ realignment. Guided by the principles of maintaining deterrence and reducing the burdens on local communities, Japan has used the DPRI as a forum to discuss with the United States the roles, missions, and capabilities of SDF and USFJ, and the path for USFJ base realignment. The DPRI process led to the formulation of "US-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future," a joint statement released at the October 2005 SCC meeting, and culminated with the 5/1 Joint Document at the May 2006 SCC meeting. However, an agreement is simply just an agreement until put into action, so both sides now have to deal with the policy challenges of actually implementing the objectives of the 5/1 Joint Document.

On the whole, steady advances have been made in translating the 5/1 Joint Document into action. One of the most noticeable examples of this progress is the relocation of training exercises away from Kadena Air Base, Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni, and Misawa Air Base. Specifically, Type I training, which involves one to five aircraft and lasts for a period of one to seven days, was conducted at Tsuiki Air Base (March 5–8, 2007), Komatsu Air Base (May 16–23), Tsuiki Air Base (June 18–22), Misawa Air Base (July 16-21), Nyutabaru Air Base (September 3 and 4), and Hyakuri Air Base (October 15–19). Progress was also seen in the deployment of Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) interceptors to Kadena Air Base and Kadena Ammunition Storage Area, where the missiles and other equipment were delivered from October 2 to 13, 2006, and the system was partially put into operation at the end of the following December. Moreover, an X-band Radar system was installed at the Air Self-defense Force (ASDF) Shariki Sub-base (Tsugaru, Aomori Prefecture) in June 2006, and further details were worked out with regard to the plans for returning to Japanese control six USFJ facilities south of Kadena Air Base—Camp Kuwae, Camp Zukeran, MCAS Futenma, Makiminato Service Area, Naha Port, and Army POL Depot Kuwae

Tank Farm No.1.

The key to the successful implementation of that return is the relocation of MCAS Futenma. Despite delays, some advances were attained in realigning, consolidating, and reducing USFJ facilities in Okinawa in accordance with the final report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa, which was established in response to the 1995 rape of an Okinawan schoolgirl by US marines. However, the biggest step in that process, the relocation of MCAS Futenma, has failed to move forward and achieve the planned easing of the burden on local communities. Local burden reduction is one of the original objectives of the ongoing USFJ realignment, and it cannot be accomplished without the successful relocation of MCAS Futenma. Furthermore, as indicated in the 5/1 Joint Document, concrete progress toward completing the Futenma Replacement Facility is a prerequisite for the return of the six facilities and the relocation of some 8,000 marines and their families to Guam.

The November 2006 gubernatorial election in Okinawa was won by Hirokazu Nakaima, who has at times shown a positive attitude toward the relocation of MCAS Futenma within Okinawa. Nakaima is requesting that the replacement facility be built further offshore, a position that puts him at odds with the national government. To date, officials of the national government, Okinawa Prefecture, and Nago City have met in five sessions of the Council Meetings on Measures for Relocation of Futenma Air Station in order to discuss options for early implementation of the relocation and the land return. Other small but steady steps have been made toward the relocation, including the initiation of a field survey in waters near Camp Schwab in May 2007, and the submission in August of a statement on environmental impact assessment methods to the governments of Okinawa, Nago, and Ginoza Village. As mentioned above, the relocation of MCAS Futenma is of extreme importance since it forms a linchpin for the overall process of USFJ realignment. Although differences of opinion exist between the national and Okinawan governments, further progress is to be expected since both sides are in agreement that the relocation needs to be carried out soon to alleviate the burden on the local population.

At the same time that the USFJ base realignment process nudged forward, strategic consultations continued to be held between Japan and the United States. The joint statement issued at a May 1, 2007 SCC meeting (hereafter, “May 2007 joint statement”) was largely a follow-up report on the progress toward realignment,

but it also revalidated the position that the United States provided a strong deterrent effect for Japan based on their alliance, proclaiming that the United States "reaffirmed that the full range of US military capabilities—both nuclear and non-nuclear strike forces and defensive capabilities—form the core of extended deterrence and support US commitments to the defense of Japan." The term "full range" here was also used by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice during a statement she made when visiting Japan immediately after North Korea declared its conducting of a nuclear test in October 2006. It signifies that the United States is prepared to use, when necessary, any of it military capabilities, including strategic nuclear forces, to fulfill its commitment to defend Japan.

The May 2007 joint statement also reasserted and augmented the common strategic goals laid out in the joint statement of the February 2005 SCC meeting (hereafter, "February 2005 joint statement"), noting that both sides "reconfirmed their commitment to these common strategic objectives, taking the current international security environment into account." According to the May 2007 joint statement, Japan and the United States share an interest in not only the North Korean nuclear issue and the emergence of China as a major power, but also Iran's behavior, the growth of India, economic reconstruction and political stability in Afghanistan, Japan-US-Australia cooperation, and cooperation between Japan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). With regard to the North Korean nuclear issue, the May 2007 joint statement indicated that Japan and the United States would continue working toward the goals of "achieving denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through the Six-party Talks and fully implementing the Joint Statement of September 19, 2005," as well as "achieving swift and full implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718."

As for the common strategic goal regarding China, the May 2007 joint statement said that Japan and the United States recognized "the importance of

China's contributions to regional and global security," and would continue to encourage China "to conduct itself as a responsible international stakeholder, improve transparency in its military affairs, and maintain consistency between its stated policies and actions." There are two points of interest regarding China that can be drawn from a comparison of this joint statement with the February 2005 joint statement.

The first is the placement of a demand for improvements by China in the second half of the May 2007 joint statement. The February 2005 joint statement indicated that both sides would "encourage China to improve transparency of its military affairs," while the May 2007 joint statement said, as mentioned above, that both sides reaffirmed their commitments to the February 2005 common strategic objectives and would encourage transparency in Chinese military affairs. By repeating this language, the May 2007 joint statement made a strong demand for China to remove the shroud covering its defense policies. Furthermore, the latter joint statement's call for China to "maintain consistency between its stated policies and actions" revealed that Japan and the United States were dissatisfied with the ambiguity of Chinese defense policy.

The second point of interest is that despite such expressions of displeasure, the two joint statements clearly indicate that the relationship with China is not perceived as a "we versus them" conflict. In this context, there are two changes that can be seen when the language of the May 2007 joint statement is juxtaposed with the February 2005 joint statement's phrase that both sides would "develop a cooperative relationship with China, welcoming the country to play a responsible and constructive role regionally as well as globally." The first is that in February 2005 Japan and the United States were calling upon China to begin playing a positive role in regional and global affairs, but in May 2007 they recognized that China was already making important contributions in that regard. The second is that the May 2007 joint statement referred to China as a "responsible international stakeholder," showing that Japan now officially supported the US policy of framing China as a responsible stakeholder in the international community. During the evolution of their strategic common objectives between 2005 and 2007, Japan and the United States increasingly came to see China as not just a source of concerns, but more importantly as a responsible partner that could help to preserve the stability of the international order.

### (2) Japan and the War on Terrorism

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the international community has become strongly aware of the importance of the war on terrorism as a security undertaking. In addition to military action, the war on terrorism is incorporating various other tactics, including law enforcement, financial restrictions, and immigration controls. In December 2005, the Japanese government formulated the Action Plan for Prevention of Terrorism to outline policies for strengthening measures to prevent terrorist entry into Japan, hinder the free movement of terrorists, block sources of terrorist funding, and enhance the security of critical facilities.

Although law enforcement and other such institutional measures are a key part of fighting the war on terrorism, that war cannot be won without military action to physically restrict the activities of terrorist groups. One major example of this military action is the maritime interdiction campaign being waged as a sub-operation of "Operation Enduring Freedom," a multinational endeavor led by the United States. The goal of this campaign is to sever seaborne channels that link al-Qaeda—the Islamic extremist group believed to be based in Afghanistan—with terrorist groups in other regions. Since it involves blocking the flow of terrorist weapons and personnel, illegal drugs, and human trafficking, the campaign can also be characterized as a maritime police action. In November 2001, Japan began to physically support that effort through ship refueling operations conducted by the Maritime Self-defense Force (MSDF) based on the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Act (hereafter, "Anti-terrorism Act"). Needless to say, the Japanese Constitution prohibits the state's use of force for any purpose other than defense, but refueling and other replenishment operations for maritime interdiction do not constitute use of armed force, and the presence of vessels capable of resupplying other ships on the high seas is indispensable to the safe, efficient execution of maritime interdiction. Moreover, since only a limited number of nations are able to provide resupply on the high seas, the MSDF refueling operations can be considered the best feasible choice for Japanese cooperation in preventing global terrorism and, by extension, advancing the reconstruction process in Afghanistan.

The Anti-terrorism Act, being a temporary law enacted in 2001, was extended in 2003, 2005, and 2006. Since the 2006 extension was limited to a period of one year, the Anti-terrorism Act needed to be renewed again in 2007 in order for the relevant refueling operations to continue beyond that year. However, the prospects for extension dimmed when the ruling coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party

(LDP) and the New Komeito Party (NKP) lost its majority hold on the Diet's upper house in the July 28, 2007 elections for that house. This was because Ichiro Ozawa, president of the upper house's new leading party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), declared on July 31 that his party was opposed to extending the Anti-terrorism Act. As a result, even if the lower house were to pass an extension, there was greater likelihood that the upper house would reject it. However, the Japanese Constitution allows bills rejected by the upper house to be passed into law, provided that approval is received from a two-thirds majority in a second vote by the lower house. Furthermore, if the upper house fails to vote on a bill within sixty days of its passage in the lower house, the lower house can deem the bill to be rejected by the upper house and thus can hold a second vote on it. Since the LDP and NKP still maintained a two-thirds majority hold on the lower house following the upper house elections, it was technically possible for the Anti-terrorism Act to be adopted through a second vote in the lower house. As the deadline for the law's renewal was November 1, the proponents of extension needed to get the bill through the lower house by the end of August in order to prepare for the possibility that the upper house would sit on the bill for sixty days. However, it was difficult to schedule to Diet agenda to facilitate that tactic, so it appeared impossible to pass the extension without the DPJ's support.

Nevertheless, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe sought to have the extension passed, as he felt that sustaining the MSDF's refueling operations in the Indian Ocean was in Japan's interest. While attending the 2007 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Sydney, Abe gave a news conference on September 9 in which he indicated that he would gamble his prime ministership on getting the DPJ and other opposition parties to support the extension. However, as prospects for extension failed to emerge, Abe announced on September 12 his intention to step down.

His successor, Yasuo Fukuda, faced not only the aforementioned Diet scheduling challenge, but also public uproar over the revelation that an earlier government report erroneously stated that 200,000 gallons of fuel had been supplied by the MSDF in the Indian Ocean refueling operations, when in fact the actual amount was 800,000 gallons. As such, he worked to have the operations continued through the enactment of a new law, the Replenishment Support Special Measures Act (hereafter, "Replenishment Support Act"). In contrast with the Anti-terrorism Act, which not only provided for the Indian Ocean refueling operations but also tasked the ASDF with cooperation support duties and humanitarian relief

activities, the Replenishment Support Act narrowed the SDF's mission to ship refueling in the Indian Ocean, and placed a one-year cap on this mission.

Moreover, since the Anti-terrorism Act covered multiple missions, it was seen requiring Diet approval on which missions were to be actually implemented. However, the Replenishment Support bill was solely focused on the refueling mission, so Diet passage of the law itself was equated with Diet authorization of the SDF's role, and hence the bill's framers did not include a clause on Diet approval, unlike the Anti-terrorism Act. The Replenishment Support bill was passed by the lower house on November 13.

However, like the Anti-terrorism Act, the Replenishment Support bill faced the possibility of being rejected or ignored for sixty days by the upper house, in which case it would have to receive two-thirds approval in a second round of lower house voting in order to be enacted. Since defense-related bills are reviewed in the upper house by the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense, which meets only on Tuesdays and Thursdays, and since allegations of bribe-taking by former Vice Defense Minister Takemasa Moriya began to emerge, it appeared that the bill could not receive a swift review in the upper house. Moreover, the current Diet session was originally scheduled to end on December 15, and any bills not adopted by then would be discarded. Consequently, the Fukuda administration and the lower house's ruling coalition decided to extend the Diet session until the following January 15 in order to provide the sixty-day leeway needed for a second vote in the lower house. Ultimately, the bill was rejected by the upper house on January 11, but was passed by a two-thirds majority in the lower house later that same day. As a result of the enactment of the Replenishment Support Act, the MSDF's Indian Ocean refueling operations were resumed on February 21.

### (3) Next-generation Fighter Adoption and Japan-US Relations

The ASDF currently operates three fighter models—F-15J, F-4EJ-Kai (modified version), and F-2—with the mission of providing air defense and dealing with violations of Japanese airspace. The F-2, which was jointly developed by Japan and the United States, is mainly tasked with the roles of air-to-ship attack and air-to-ground attack. The F-4EJ, which mainly serves the function of air defense, was first introduced in 1971 and is now slated for phased retirement starting in the 2010s, so Japan is currently studying options for a next-generation fighter to replace the F-4EJ. A plan to procure seven next-generation fighters is included in

**Figure 7.1. Transitions in ASDF interceptor operation**




*Source*: Compiled by author.

the Mid-term Defense Program FY2005-2009, with that acquisition expected to start in FY2009.

A scan of the global market for advanced fighters shows six potential candidates for Japan's search: Eurofighter Typhoon (United Kingdom and others), F-22A Raptor (United States), F-35 Lightning II (United States and others), F-18E/F Super Hornet (United States), F-15FX (United States), and Rafale (France). In March 2007, the Chief of Staff ASDF sent a team on an inspection tour to check out the Eurofighter Typhoon, F-15FX, and F-18E/F, and is apparently planning to send another team to inspect the F-35 in the near future.

Of the six candidates mentioned here, only F-22A and F-35 are considered so-called "fifth-generation" fighters, while the other four are referred to as "4.5-generation" fighters. While there are no strict definitions on the boundaries between each fighter generation, the general consensus is as follows. The first generation is exactly that—the very first group of jet-powered fighters, such as Me-262, F-86, and MiG-15. The second generation comprises F-104 and MiG-21 developed around 1955 to 1960, which were capable of speeds in excess of Mach 2 and were equipped with radar and radar-guided air-to-air missiles. The third

generation constituted models like F-4 and MiG-23, which were developed in the 1960s and were able to take on multirole missions because of their greater engine thrust and other improvements. The fourth generation was developed from 1970 to around 1990 and includes F-14, F-15, F-16, F-18, MiG-29, and Su-27, featuring sophisticated avionics and weaponry that provided even more advanced multirole capabilities, with improvements in not only speed, but also maneuverability. The 4.5 generation is characterized by further enhancements in avionics, including digital flight control, and some members have limited stealth capabilities. Finally, the fifth generation adds high-performance stealth capabilities.

Of the two fifth-generation candidates, the F-35 has yet to move out of the development stage into production, and the US Government Accountability Office reports that delays in testing threaten to set back the overall development schedule. The other fifth-generation option, the F-22A is out of development and is increasingly being put into service. It offers superior air combat capabilities that outshine fourth-generation fighters, as was demonstrated in the exercise "Northern Edge 2006," in which twelve F-22As marked up 108 kills to no losses in simulated combat against F-15s and F-18s. Although such performance makes the F-22A an attractive candidate for Japan, it is effectively out of the nation's reach, due to the Obey Amendment to the FY1998 Department of Defense Appropriations Act. The amendment, which was sponsored by Congressman David Obey, states that "none of the funds made available in this Act may be used to approve or license the sale of the F-22 advanced tactical fighter to any foreign government." Hence, unless the amendment is repealed, Japan is unable to procure the F-22A.

In a May 2007 meeting with US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Minister of Defense Fumio Kyuma requested that the United States cooperate as far as possible in supplying Japan with information on the F-22A and other fighters it was studying. Of course, this was simply a request for reference information on US-made aircraft, and not an indication that the Japanese government had settled on the F-22A for its next-generation fighter. The Japanese government is apparently taking the position that it cannot make an adequate assessment of candidates, including the F-22A, without detailed information. Further discussion between Japan and the United States resulted in a decision to jointly conduct a comprehensive study on air warfare capabilities in the region surrounding Japan, and then pursue talks based on analysis of the sort of air warfare capabilities that both countries should possess within the context of the future security environment.

## Japan's Search for a Next-generation Fighter

As discussed in this chapter, Japan's search for a next-generation fighter is focused on six possible candidates. The challenge in assessing those candidates, however, is not simply a matter of comparing their capabilities as combat aircraft; it also involves determining which one can provide the best strategic benefit for Japan in today's security environment.

In the years ahead, the regions encompassing the Ryukyu Islands and the Sakishima Islands are likely to take on greater weight within Japan's national security policy. Together, they represent a vast region that has only one ASDF base in its midst, the Naha Air Base on Okinawa. The geographical requirement of having a single base cover such an expansive area makes aircraft speed a highly critical factor, as defending aircraft must be able to reach remote locations in the shortest time possible. However, the key here is not maximum speed, but cruising speed. Published data on jet fighter performance usually indicate the aircraft's top speed, but whether it be Mach 2.5 or even higher, this value represents a speed that can be attained only when the engine power is peaked at maximum thrust, such as through the use of afterburners—an operating condition that rapidly depletes the aircraft's fuel. As such, aircraft that need to reach a distant location quickly must be capable of flying at high cruising speeds that are achieved through powerful yet relatively fuel-efficient engine output that does not rely on afterburning. In this context, an extremely desirable aircraft feature is supercruise capability, which is the ability to cruise at supersonic speeds without the need for afterburners. This feature is offered by the F-22A and Eurofighter Typhoon.

Furthermore, modern air strategy is based on the concept of network-centric warfare (NCW), in which military capabilities are judged by the performance of not only the weapons, but also the information networks that link them. A vital element of NCW is the possession of an airborne warning and control system (AWACS), which is an airborne platform that monitors air activity using high-performance radar and acts as a network hub to control operations under its watch. Currently, Japan and the United States are the only countries that operate full-scale AWACS capabilities in Northeast Asia, and the qualitative strategic superiority enjoyed by both nations largely derives from those capabilities. However, some security experts hold that it is only a matter of time before China puts full-fledged AWACS capabilities into operation. This means that there is strong potential for the future balance in air power to tip toward China in terms of not only the number of fourth-generation fighters, but also NCW capabilities. Given the criticality of those capabilities, it is necessary to have the capacity for protecting one's own AWACS assets and disabling those of the adversary. For this reason, stealth capabilities are an important consideration in the selection of a next-generation fighter. Moreover, since the new fighter will function as an interceptor, its anti-aircraft capabilities and air combat maneuverability also represent key points of concern.

Seen in this light, the F-22A is, as far as can be determined from published data, a very attractive candidate. The Eurofighter Typhoon, a multirole fighter with excellent supercruise capability, should also be fully considered, partly because it offers the potential to diversify Japan's arms procurement sources and to expand technological cooperation with Europe. However, Japan will not be able to render

a decision on any candidates unless it receives detailed information on them. The answer to this challenge will likely be gained through the comprehensive study that Japan and the United States are expected to make regarding air warfare capabilities in the region surrounding Japan.

The most noticeable development in the overall balance of air warfare capabilities in Northeast Asia is China's increased deployment of Su-27 and Su-30 fourth-generation fighters. In sheer terms of number of fourth-generation fighters owned, China already rivals Japan and may take the lead in the near future. If that happens, the balance in air power would greatly shift in China's favor, with Japan losing the qualitative superiority it has so far enjoyed. As such, the discussion of Japan's next-generation fighter options comes at a time when the regional strategic balance is changing, and thus is a critical concern for both Japan and the United States.

## 2. Strengthening of International Security Cooperation

### (1) Expansion of Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region

The establishment of the ARF in 1994 greatly paved the way for the broadening and deepening of security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. Prior to then, regional security cooperation mainly consisted of a "hub-and-spoke" arrangement in which the United States formed the hub, and its various bilateral alliance partners—such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia—formed the spokes. However, that system lacked a framework for political dialogue on security for the region as a whole. Meanwhile, the growth of Asian economies was accompanied by a trend toward expansion of military strength across the region, creating the need for a framework of multilateral dialogue to deal with security issues and provide stability to the region. It was in this setting that the ARF was launched in 1994 with three key objectives laid out in "The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper": Stage 1, promotion of confidence-building measures; Stage 2, development of preventive diplomacy mechanisms; and Stage 3, development of conflict-resolution mechanisms.

The ARF members are seen as having made strong achievements with regard to the first stage, the promotion of confidence-building measures, as China and many

other nations in the region began publishing white papers on defense and engaging in a variety of bilateral defense exchanges and security dialogues. In 2001, the ARF issued the "Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy," which defined preventive diplomacy as efforts to "help prevent disputes and conflicts from arising between States that could potentially pose a threat to regional peace and stability; to help prevent such disputes and conflicts from escalating into armed confrontation; and to help minimise the impact of such disputes and conflicts on the region." To this end, the statement advocated such measures as confidence building, norms building, enhancement of communication channels, and strengthening of the ARF chair's role. However, the ARF has yet to make a transition to the second stage, the actual development of those preventive diplomacy mechanisms.

Nevertheless, this does not imply that progress hasn't been made in Asia-Pacific security cooperation. The ARF has been bolstering its efforts in disaster relief, and the steady advancement of functional cooperation between the military forces and law enforcement agencies of regional nations has been complementing the ARF's endeavors. One example is the May 2001 exercise "Team Challenge," which integrated four existing bilateral exercises that the United States had undertaken with regional nations. The exercise was focused mainly on improving interoperability in multinational humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping.

This approach to regional cooperation was underscored in "From Wheels to Webs: Reconstructing Asia-Pacific Security Arrangements," a winter 2001 Washington Quarterly article written by Commander-in-chief of US Pacific Command Dennis Blair and his then strategic adviser, John Hanley. The article argued that security in the Asia-Pacific region was founded on US bilateral alliances, particularly the alliance with Japan, and advocated the formation of a web of functionally cooperative relationships in order to enhance regional capabilities for addressing various issues like humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping.

This trend in security cooperation was greatly accelerated by the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the ensuing war on terrorism. For example, the United States expanded functional cooperation with regional countries in order to crack down on Asian terrorist groups like the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Jemaah Islamiyah, as was seen in US-Indonesia cooperation and anti-ASG operations supported by the US-Philippine exercise "Balikatan." Moreover, the "Cobra Gold" exercise that the United States and Thailand had conducted bilaterally since 1982 was opened up to participation by other countries. The May 2007 "Cobra Gold" brought together

Thailand, the United States, Singapore, Indonesia, and Japan as the primary participants, joined by the Philippines, Australia, France, China, Germany, and South Korea as observers. The key objective of the program was to enhance multinational functional cooperation with regard to various regional scenarios, and it comprised such activities as command post exercises based on computer simulation, field training exercises, and humanitarian assistance and civic projects.

Asia-Pacific cooperation has also expanded beyond the war on terrorism to include various new cooperative arrangements for ensuring maritime order and security, such as through efforts against piracy. This area of collaboration has included diverse efforts in capacity building and bilateral cooperation, as well as multilateral coordination through the Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies Meeting and the North Pacific Coast Guard Agencies Forum, the latter of which was spearheaded by the Japan Coast Guard. These endeavors represent networked functional cooperation that is not bounded by the ARF framework.

As these examples indicate, the Asia-Pacific is now seeing the emergence of United States-led functional cooperation in formats that differ from the traditional hub-and-spoke arrangement and the ARF framework. This trend is being reflected in the Japan-US talks on USFJ realignment as well. According to the October 29, 2005 joint document US-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future, the basic tenets underpinning the roles, missions, and capabilities of both sides include: "Rapid and effective response requires flexible capabilities and can benefit from close US-Japan bilateral cooperation and policy coordination. Regular exercises, including those with third countries, can improve these capabilities" and "The US forces and the SDF will strengthen cooperation with other partners to contribute to international activities to improve the international security environment." As these statements show, the Japan-US alliance is not simply a matter of bilateral defense cooperation; it is also a vehicle for expanding that cooperation into functional cooperation with other nations in order to enhance regional stability.

In this context, Japan's security policy took a large stride forward in 2007 through the pursuit of security cooperation with Australia and India.

### (2) Augmentation of Japan-Australia Security Cooperation

In March 2007, a meeting between Prime Minister Abe and Australian Prime Minister John Howard was followed by the release of the Japan-Australia Joint

**Table 7.1. Defense ministerial exchange between Japan and Australia**

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|---|---|
| May 1990 | Visit to Australia by Minister of State for Defense Yozo Ishikawa |
| Sept. 1992 | Visit to Japan by Minister for Defence Robert Ray |
| Sept. 1997 | Visit to Japan by Minister for Defence Ian MacLachlan |
| Jan. 1998 | Visit to Australia by Minister of State for Defense Fumio Kyuma |
| May 1999 | Visit to Japan by Minister for Defence John Moore |
| June 2002 | Defense ministerial summit between Minister of State for Defense Gen Nakatani and Minister for Defence Robert Hill (Singapore) |
| Aug. 2002 | Visit to Australia by Minister of State for Defense Nakatani |
| May 2003 | Defense ministerial summit between Minister of State for Defense Shigeru Ishiba and Minister for Defence Hill (Singapore) |
| Sept.–Oct. 2003 | Visit to Japan by Minister for Defence Hill |
| May 2005 | Visit to Australia by Minister of State for Defense Yoshinori Ono |
| June 2005 | Defense ministerial summit between Minister of State for Defense Ono and Minister for Defence Hill |
| June 2006 | Defense ministerial summit between Minister of State for Defense Fukushiro Nukaga and Minister for Defence Brendon Nelson (Singapore) |
| June 2007 | Visit to Japan by Minister for Defence Nelson |

*Sources*: Compiled from media reports and other sources.

Declaration on Security Cooperation (hereafter, "March 2007 joint declaration"). This was a groundbreaking event that opened a new horizon in Japan's security strategy, as it represented the first time since the Cold War that Japan jointly issued a bilateral statement on security with a nation other than the United States.

Prior to that meeting, the SDF and the Australian military had several opportunities for unit-level interaction in security cooperation. For example, the UN peacekeeping operation (PKO) in Cambodia in 1992, which marked the SDF's first involvement in such an operation, was commanded on the military side by Lt. Gen. John Sanderson of the Australian Army. The SDF worked alongside the Australian armed forces again during its deployment to the PKO in East Timor from February 2002 to June 2005, and during its Iraq humanitarian assistance and reconstruction mission from December 2003 in the Governorate of al-Muthanna, where Australian troops were deployed from February 2005. Notably, both sides engaged in high-level, working-level, and unit-to-unit exchange based on the Australia-Japan Creative Partnership announced at their May 2002 summit, and on a memorandum for promoting defense exchange that was signed in September 2003 by then Japanese Minister of State for Defense Shigeru Ishiba and Australian Minister for Defence Robert Hill. As a roadmap grounded on such past experiences

in exchange, the March 2007 joint declaration can be considered an initiative for bringing a new dimension to Japan-Australia security cooperation.

Specifically, the March 2007 joint declaration pledges cooperation in such areas as law enforcement on combating transnational crime, border security, counterterrorism, disarmament and counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, peace operations, exchange of strategic assessments and related information, maritime and aviation security, disaster relief and other humanitarian relief operations, and planning for pandemics and other contingencies. The areas represent so-called "nontraditional" security issues, and hence indicate that the aim of the joint declaration is not to create a traditional security arrangement for opposing a specific third country, but to strengthen functional cooperation for dealing with nontraditional security challenges.

The joint declaration was followed up with a Japan-Australia-US defense ministers' meeting on June 2, 2007 in Singapore, another such gathering between Japan and Australia on June 5 in Tokyo, and a Japan-Australia Joint Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations conference on the following day, also in Tokyo. The last was a significant advancement in Japan-Australia security cooperation, as it was both nations' first "2+2" exchange with each other. Previously, Japan's only 2+2 partner had been the United States, while Australia's partners had been the United States and the United Kingdom. During the consultations, both sides confirmed that they would accelerate the pace of Japan-Australia security cooperation planning and work together to tackle common strategic issues. They also declared that they would strengthen their collaboration in expanding defense cooperation, providing disaster relief, engaging in peacekeeping and peace building, countering terrorism and proliferation, and promoting the stability of Pacific island nations. On September 9, Prime Ministers Abe and Howard met for a summit meeting in which they agreed on the action plan to implement the March 2007 joint declaration. In addition to promising to strengthen cooperation on issues of common strategic interest, the action plan calls for an updating of the Memorandum on Defence Exchange, and spells out efforts to be taken with regard to law enforcement, border security, counterterrorism, and other areas of cooperation outlined in the March 2007 joint declaration.

The pursuit of expanded security cooperation by Japan and Australia based on the action plan will add to the hub-and-spoke network centered around the Japan-US alliance, since it will realize functional "inter-spoke" cooperation. As such, it

can be expected to complement Japan and Australia's bilateral alliances with the United States, and to enhance region-wide response capabilities for dealing with various destabilizing factors, including nontraditional challenges. Furthermore, it will greatly contribute to Japan's interests by helping to stabilize Southeast Asia, which is an area of immense importance to Japan not only economically and politically, but also in terms of security, since numerous Japanese sea lanes pass through Southeast Asian waters.

At the same time, the significance of Japan-Australia security cooperation is not restricted to the regional level. Since international peace cooperation was added to the SDF's list of primary missions in 2007, the strengthening of Japan's partnership with a nation like Australia—which is deeply experienced in PKOs and similar operations—will help Japan to participate in international peace cooperation activities more actively and with greater initiative. Moreover, since many peace cooperation activities take place in the Asia-Pacific region, cooperation with Australia is a critical undertaking for Japanese national security. This relationship also has the potential to develop into a variety of global-level partnerships with Australia, as was the case during Japan's involvement in humanitarian assistance and reconstruction in Iraq. Given these possibilities, Japan and Australia need to build and reinforce their platform for cooperation by continuing to discuss their common strategic interests through 2+2 talks and other channels.

### (3) The Quest for Security Cooperation with India

The security of sea lanes connecting Japan with the Middle East is a vital element of Japan's national security. As a major power in the region, India plays a key role in the security of the Indian Ocean. In any effort by Japan to enhance the security of those sea lanes, it is important to promote capacity building and the formation of multilateral cooperative frameworks among nations in Southeast Asia, a region that is not populated with any big powers. However, the key to improving security in the Indian Ocean is for Japan to strengthen its ties with India, the sole dominant power in that region.

The history of Japan-India security cooperation is relatively short, with Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes' January 2001 visit to Japan marking the first time for both sides to hold formal talks on the defense ministerial level. Nevertheless, the relationship between the MSDF and the Indian Navy can be considered rather deep when compared to their relationships with other nations'

**Table 7.2. Defense ministerial exchange between Japan and India**

| | |
|---|---|
| Jan. 2000 | Visit to Japan by Defence Minister George Fernandes |
| June 2002 | Defense ministerial summit between Minister of State for Defense Gen Nakatani and Defence Minister Fernandes (Singapore) |
| July 2002 | Visit to Japan by Defence Minister Fernandes |
| May 2003 | Visit to India by Minister of State for Defense Shigeru Ishiba |
| May 2006 | Visit to Japan by Defence Minister Pranab Muhkerjee |
| June 2007 | Meeting between Minister of Defense Fumio Kyuma and Defence Minister A.K. Antony (Singapore) |
| August 2007 | Visit to India by Minister of Defense Yuriko Koike |

*Sources*: Compiled from media reports and other sources.

militaries. This closeness is a product of the two nations' focus on maritime security in their interaction, which evolved to include side-by-side training in 2007, such as the first Japan-India-US trilateral exercise in April, which will be discussed later, as well as "Malabar 07-2," a multilateral joint exercise that involved Japan, India, the United States, Australia, and Singapore. As these developments suggest, Japan's security cooperation with India, like its partnership with Australia, made considerable headway in 2007. This progress, however, was not a spontaneous occurrence; it was based on groundwork that had been steadily constructed through Japan-India defense exchange since 2000.

The catalyst that accelerated Japan-India defense exchange was the Japan-India Global Partnership in the Twenty-first Century, a bilateral agreement signed in August 2000 by Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. This set the stage for the first meetings of the Japan-India Security Dialogue and the Japan-India Military-Military Consultation, which were held in Tokyo in July 2001. In the following December, Prime Ministers Junichiro Koizumi and Vajpayee signed the Japan-India Joint Declaration, in which both sides vowed to cooperate in supporting the war on terrorism, countering the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, and ensuring the safety and security of maritime traffic, and reaffirmed their intention to foster defense exchange. Subsequently, an April 2005 meeting between Prime Minister Koizumi and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh produced the joint statement "Japan-India Partnership in a New Asian Era: Strategic Orientation of Japan-India Global Partnership," as well as an action plan called the "Eight-fold Initiative for Strengthening Japan-India Global Partnership." One of the eight goals outlined by the plan was for both sides to enhance bilateral security dialogue and cooperation

by: (a) further developing dialogue and exchanges, including through full utilization of existing consultation forums; (b) strengthening service-to-service exchanges between defense establishments of the two countries; (c) working to ensure the safety and security of maritime traffic through joint exercises against piracy and the annual Japan Coast Guard-Indian Coast Guard talks; and (d) building up cooperation between the MSDF and the Indian Navy in recognition of the importance of maritime security.

The pursuit of security cooperation further blossomed with a May 2006 meeting in Tokyo between Defence Minister Pranab Muhkerjee and Minister of State for Defense Fukushiro Nukaga, which resulted in the release of a joint statement concerning bilateral defense cooperation. This statement set forth such objectives as: (a) defense exchanges to enhance mutual understanding and promote wide-range cooperation; (b) service-to-service exchanges, including capacity building, which could lead to cooperation in disaster relief, maritime security, or other areas of mutual interest; (c) exchange of information and experiences in tackling regional and global issues, including international terrorism, proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, disaster relief and PKO; and (d) cooperation in technical areas.

At a meeting in Japan in December 2006, Prime Ministers Singh and Abe issued the Joint Statement Towards Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership, which reaffirmed the two nations' commitment to strengthen defense cooperation as part of their overall endeavors toward political, defense, and security cooperation. The statement also defined as goals in this regard the progressive enhancement of cooperative activities, such as high-level exchanges and consultation between services, and the implementation of cooperation for countering piracy and combating terrorism. The two heads of state met again in August 2007 in India, where they adopted the Joint Statement on the Roadmap for New Dimensions to the Strategic and Global Partnership between Japan

and India. This agreement confirmed that both sides shared "common interests in such fields as maintaining the safety and security of sea lanes in the Asia Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions, and fighting against transnational crimes, terrorism, piracy and proliferation of WMD," and stated that they would study the future course of their security cooperation and seek to deepen and broaden strategic dialogue through various channels, including at the foreign ministerial level of the strategic dialogue. Moreover, the statement indicated that Japan and India would steadily and qualitatively improve their security cooperation, including through vice ministerial level defense policy dialogue and the sharing of experience in international peace cooperation activities and counterterrorism, and promote cooperation between their coast guards.

As these developments show, Japan and India built up security cooperation efforts at the political level, forming the groundwork for dramatic advances in cooperative activities in 2007, including the inaugural Japan-India Defence Policy Dialogue at the vice ministerial level on April 11, the first Japan-India-US maritime exercise off the Boso Peninsula of Japan on April 16, an August 24 meeting between Minister of Defense Yuriko Koike and Defence Minister A.K. Antony, and the MSDF's first participation in the multilateral maritime exercise "Malabar 07-2," which was conducted in the Bay of Bengal from September 4 to 9. Such growth in Japan's cooperative ties with India promises not only to improve the security of sea lanes in the Indian Ocean and other regional waters, but also to enhance both Japan's national security and the global security environment. In the years ahead, it will be imperative for Japan and India to continue pursuing cooperation regarding their common strategic interests—counterterrorism, maritime security, disaster relief, and so forth—in a manner that is to their mutual benefit, while taking into account India's need to follow its own national strategies.

## 3. International Peace Cooperation Challenges for the SDF

### (1) The Transition from "International Contribution" to "International Peace Cooperation Activities"

The Japanese government formulated the National Defense Program Guidelines in and after FY2005 (hereafter, "NDPG2004") in December 2004 in order to chart a new course for national defense capabilities in a security landscape that had been transformed by the 9/11 terrorist attacks. One of the key features of the

NDPG2004 is that it delineated two security objectives: "to prevent any threat from reaching Japan and, in the event that it does, repel it and minimize any damage," and "to improve the international security environment so as to reduce the chances that any threat will reach Japan in the first place." This expanded definition of defense goals was initially put forth in the summer of 2004 in a report issued by the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities (often referred to as the "Araki Report," named after the head of the council), and was founded on an integrated security strategy that was also incorporated in the NDPG2004. That strategy is a model for achieving the aforementioned security objectives based on a three-pronged approach that combines Japan's own efforts, cooperation with the United States, and cooperation with the international community. Under the NDPG2004, SDF involvement in international peace cooperation activities is positioned as a major element of cooperation with the international community, and as a voluntary undertaking that Japan will proactively pursue in tandem with diplomacy.

The National Defense Program Guidelines in and after FY1996 (hereafter, "NDPG1995"), the first NDPG drafted in the post-Cold War period, defines the roles of defense capabilities as not only "national defense," but also "response to large-scale disasters and various other situations" and "contribution to creation of a more stable security environment." Such responses and contributions, according to the NDPG1995, entail cooperation in international peace cooperation activities, international disaster relief operations, security dialogues and defense exchanges, and arms control and disarmament. This demonstrates the NDPG2004 was not the first to task Japan's defense capabilities with other roles in addition to the duty of national defense. However, the NDPG1995 does not clearly identify the effects that performance of those roles is to produce for national security. In contrast, the NDPG2004 states that improvement of the international security environment is an objective for reducing the chances that any threat will reach Japan in the first place, and thus reflects a stronger awareness of the relationship between defense roles and Japan's security.

It was within this context that the language for describing the SDF's overseas activities shifted from "international contribution" to "international peace cooperation activities." The former expression carries the nuance that Japan is a detached third party that does not see issues in the international community as Japanese issues. In today's rapidly globalizing world, however, even situations in

remote locations can threaten or affect Japan. Consequently, Japan is required to deal with the various challenges facing the world by becoming involved not as an aloof bystander, but as a responsible member of the international community. Furthermore, the SDF's overseas activities should be carried out not as a contribution to the international community, but as an endeavor that benefits Japan's security. Since not all international issues affect Japan's security, the nation should independently determine the actual response to be taken by viewing each challenge in the light of Japanese interests. Then, when a particular issue is deemed to be connected to those interests, Japan would proactively deploy the SDF to cooperate with the international community in resolving that issue within the framework of domestic laws. It was from this perspective that the NDPG2004 set the course for vigorous operation of the SDF overseas in international peace cooperation activities, rather than third-party "international contribution."

### (2) Institutional Development for Proactive International Peace Cooperation

In accordance with the thinking explicated above, the NDPG2004 specified that Japan would implement the following measures in order to engage actively in international peace cooperation activities: "develop education and training systems, highly responsive force posture for relevant units, and transport and other required capabilities; establish necessary infrastructure to quickly dispatch defense force units overseas and to carry out missions continuously; and make necessary arrangements to include the promotion of international peace cooperation activities in the Self-defense Forces mission priorities." To provide the legal basis for this endeavor, the Japanese government amended the SDF Act in January 2007 so as to make international peace cooperation activities part of the SDF primary mission.

Prior to that revision, overseas activities by the SDF were considered missions supplementary to its primary mission, whereby the capabilities developed for the primary mission—defense of Japan—would be put to use in the foreign assignments. However, with the extension of the primary mission's scope to include international peace cooperation activities, it became possible to develop capabilities specifically designed for those activities. In other words, the legal basis now exists to develop education and training systems, highly responsive force posture for relevant units, and transport capabilities for international peace

cooperation activities, not for national defense. In this sense, the new system enables Japan to engage more actively in efforts for improving the international security environment.

However, it should be noted here that the elevation of international peace cooperation activities to a primary mission did not put it on par with the traditional primary mission of national defense. Within the primary mission construct, the first priority mission is defense of Japan from direct and indirect invasions. International peace cooperation activities, however, fall under the classification of second priority missions, along with such undertakings as public security operations, maritime security operations, disaster relief operations, and patrols against violations of Japanese airspace. Moreover, international peace cooperation activities had already been provided for by the SDF Act, so the amendment of that act simply constituted a modification of the status of those activities, not the addition of a new mission to the SDF roles and missions. As such, there is no change to the legally defined scope and powers of SDF activities.

In March 2007, the International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit (IPCATU) was established under the Ground Self-defense Force's (GSDF) Central Readiness Force as part of a realignment program. As its name suggests, the IPCATU is a unit for training GSDF personnel in the execution of international peace cooperation activities. In addition to providing basic training, the IPCATU performs two other functions: research aimed at enhancing education and equipment based on lessons learned, and support of training for designated units of regional armies.

IPCATU's educational programs comprise regularly scheduled courses (four weeks for officers, two weeks for noncommissioned officers), introductory education for regional armies, and pre-deployment training for non-SDF personnel, namely, civilian police officers and cease-fire monitoring personnel. The regular courses in particular are designed as long-running programs that will improve the international peace cooperation activities skills of the GSDF as a whole.

The research activities of IPCATU for enhancing education and improving equipment for overseas operations are founded on the lessons and experiences accumulated by the GSDF during international peace cooperation activities. In the past, SDF participation in international peace cooperation activities involved the formation of ad hoc units that were made of personnel from different regional armies, and were operated under the direct supervision of the minister of defense

(previously, minister of state for defense). As a result, there was not an adequate system for archiving in one place the SDF's past experiences in international peace cooperation activities. Today, however, the IPCATU's parent organization, the Central Readiness Force, is responsible for commanding the SDF units deployed to international peace cooperation activities, meaning that the functions pertaining to those activities are concentrated within the Central Readiness Force, and hence experience-based knowledge can be efficiently accumulated at the IPCATU.

The third function of IPCATU, training of designated units, is offered to units designated for deployment to international peace cooperation activities. The GSDF constantly designates roughly 1,200 personnel in each regional army as a deployable main force for international peace cooperation activities. Those personnel undergo IPCATU training in advance, with the goal of making them deployable to overseas with a lead time of approximately ninety days.

### (3) Toward More Active Involvement in International Peace Cooperation

As indicated in the preceding discussion, the NDPG2004 states that Japan is to engage proactively in international peace cooperation activities in order to help improve the international security environment, and the Japanese government has steadily developed the institutional framework to support that goal, such as by making international peace cooperation activities a part of the SDF primary mission. This shift in thinking is based on the experience built up by Japan through its participation in several international peace cooperation activities since the first-ever deployment of the SDF to a PKO in Cambodia in 1992, and on the realization that, as demonstrated by the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the security environment was becoming increasingly globalized, and Japan could potentially be threatened or affected even by situations in areas far from its shores. Accordingly, Japan's leadership recognizes that the SDF needs to be more fully utilized for not only national defense, but also the resolution of global security issues linked to national interests, and thus has pursued various reforms for proactive involvement in international peace cooperation activities.

As of the end of 2007, however, the scale of Japanese participation in international peace cooperation activities remains limited. The MSDF supply vessels and destroyers operating in the Indian Ocean were temporarily withdrawn as a result of the November 1 expiration of the Anti-terrorism Act, and thus the

SDF's international peace cooperation activities were reduced to ASDF air transport support in Iraq, the deployment of a transportation unit to the Golan Heights in support of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, and the dispatch of military observers to UNMIN. Moreover, the overall trend has been toward a scaling back of the SDF presence in these activities. Only about fifty SDF personnel are deployed to the UN missions in the Golan Heights and Nepal, a level that is far below the 2,000-person ceiling prescribed by the International Peace Cooperation Act, which provides the legal basis for deployment to UN-sponsored PKOs.

Nevertheless, the present situation should not be construed as evidence of a reluctant Japanese stance toward global security issues. Instead, it manifests the paradigm shift from "international contribution" to "international peace cooperation activities." The latter schema brings into play a much stronger awareness of the operations' relevance to Japan's security. The effect of this shift can be seen in the Japanese stance toward the numerous PKOs operated in Africa by the UN. There is no strong link between Africa and Japanese national security, and the majority of the African PKOs are so-called "Chapter Seven operations," in which the UN Charter permits the use of armed force. Generally speaking, it is difficult for Japan to participate in many such PKOs since the government must carefully weigh them against Japan's five principles for PKO participation.

Given the new focus on international peace cooperation activities' relevance to national security, Japan will likely place greater emphasis on involvement in activities Asia, rather than in other regions. However, no situations requiring large-scale international peace cooperation activities have occurred in Asia since the international disaster relief operations for the December 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and resulting tsunami.

Therefore, the apparent reduction in Japanese participation in international peace cooperation activities is not the result of passivity; instead, Japan's new policy of basing its participation on relevance to national security has naturally led to emphasis on Asia, but situations requiring such involvement have not arisen in that region since the policy was adopted. In fact, Japan sent personnel to UNMIN and thus has been directly involved in international peace cooperation activities in Asia. Moreover, Japan has actively participated in the PSI, as the nonproliferation of WMD is deeply intertwined with Japan's national security. From October 13 to 15, 2007, Japan hosted "Pacific Shield 07," a PSI multilateral

maritime interdiction exercise that included SDF participation in joint training in Yokohama Port, Yokosuka Port, and waters near Oshima. The highly successful exercise was conducted with the aims of enhancing deterrence against WMD proliferation, improving the coordination of nonproliferation efforts among the international community, and encouraging non-PSI members to join the initiative, especially those in the Asia-Pacific region. Ships and aircraft from Japan, Australia, France, New Zealand, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and the United States took part in the training, and representatives from forty nations, including India, Pakistan, and Indonesia, attended as observers.

**PSI maritime interdiction exercise "Pacific Shield 07"**

In a sense, it is only natural for Japan to engage in international peace cooperation activities based on active assessment of whether a particular activity is relevant to national security. However, in today's increasingly globalized world, there is sufficient reason to believe that Japan's security could be unexpectedly and adversely affected by situations occurring on the opposite of the globe. Furthermore, Japan cannot simply stand by while the international community tackles one of the biggest challenges to its security—global terrorism—especially since this struggle is seen as evolving into a "long war." In this context as well, it is imperative that Japan proactively engage in international peace cooperation activities through SDF deployments. This also means that Japan should become more keenly involved in global security issues. The SDF's refueling operations in the Indian Ocean were restarted on February 21, 2008, but this is just one step forward, as there needs to be greater debate on the future shape of SDF involvement in international peace cooperation activities, including discussion aimed at enacting a permanent comprehensive law that would encompass the overall international peace cooperation activities of the SDF. Now that those activities are part of the SDF's primary mission, there will be further development of various institutions to support that role, and thus it is to be hoped that Japan's government and citizens will engage in a more vigorous discussion of how the nation should involve itself in global security challenges.