Chapter 7

The United States—
The Bush Administration
at the Crossroads

Since its inauguration in 2001, the administration of President George W. Bush has pursued a transformation and realignment of the US military, while vigorously waging a war on terror after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In its second term, the administration, while maintaining the policy of spreading freedom and democracy across the world, has toned down the unilateralism it followed during its first term and is fostering a pragmatic policy of promoting cooperation and coordination with its allies and partners under its leadership. This changed approach was highlighted in the *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (2006QDR) and *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2006NSS) released in February and March 2006, respectively.

The Bush administration defined Afghanistan and Iraq as the "front lines in the war on terror," and has deployed troops in these two countries to maintain law and order and train local security forces. In Iraq, a sectarian conflict between Shiites and Sunnis intensified, posing the biggest threat to that country's internal security. In response, voices calling for Iraq to be united in the form of a federal system composed of areas ruled by different religious and ethnic groups, or for a policy of engagement with neighboring countries (Iran and Syria), have emerged prominently in the United States. Meanwhile, the American people registered their discontent over the Iraq policy of the Bush administration by giving the Democrats a majority in both the House and the Senate in the mid-term elections held in November 2006. Following the Republican defeat in the elections, President Bush signaled a new direction for the US Iraq policy by replacing Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld with Robert Gates, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

In addition to the war on terror, the Bush administration is confronted with the challenges of the issues associated with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Although the United States is seeking to resolve the Iranian and North Korean nuclear issues through multilateral diplomacy, North Korea's missile and nuclear tests have created a serious situation.

In East Asia, the United States is trying to strengthen alliances and multilateral cooperation to deal with an array of new security challenges. With regard to a rising China, the United States welcomes China as a "responsible stakeholder" that plays a constructive role in the international community, while heightening its vigilance against the opaqueness of China's intent to strengthen its military power.

1. The US National Strategy in a Time of War

(1) Promoting Multilateral Cooperation under US Leadership

As a global superpower, the United States has maintained unparalleled military, economic, and international influence while pursuing long-standing efforts to spread democracy and market economy principles to other parts of the world. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration came to recognize the threat of international terrorism, along with the threats posed by rogue states and WMD proliferation, as the most critical national security challenges facing the United States. In light of this new security environment, the Bush administration judged the traditional notion of deterrence to be inadequate against rogue states and non-state actors, and thus asserted the legitimacy of so-called "preemptive actions" in the September 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (2002 NSS). A case in point is the US preemptive attack against Iraq in March 2003, which generated considerable controversy in the international community. During his second term, President Bush slightly shifted course away from the unilateralism that marked in his first term, and is now leading efforts to spread democracy by taking a more pragmatic approach that involves deeper cooperation with allies and partners.

On March 16, 2006, the Bush administration released the 2006 NSS as the second document of its kind articulating the US national security strategy, following the 2002 NSS issued in September 2002. The 2006 NSS highlights past and ongoing efforts aimed at achieving the US strategic objectives, and identifies challenges to be addressed. In the preface, President Bush defines the document as "a wartime national security strategy," recounts the efforts of his administration over the preceding four years—including combating terrorism, promoting democracy, and cultivating stable and cooperative relationships with all the major powers of the world—and advocates an approach that is idealistic about the US national goals, and realistic about the means to achieve them. He also specifies two pillars for his strategy (a) to promote freedom, justice, and human dignity by "working to end tyranny, to promote effective democracies, and to extend prosperity through free and fair trade and wise development policies," and (b) to lead the growing community of democracies in responding to such global challenges as the threat of pandemic disease, WMD proliferation, terrorism,

human trafficking, and natural disasters, since effective multinational efforts are indispensable to the resolution of those problems that "reach across borders."

There are three salient features in the 2006 NSS. The first is its unprecedentedly strong emphasis on promotion of freedom and democracy as a goal of the national security strategy. It declares that "promoting democracy is the most effective long-term measure for strengthening international stability; reducing regional conflicts; countering terrorism and terror-supporting extremism; and extending peace and prosperity," and then names seven nations as having tyrannical regimes: North Korea, Iran, Syria, Cuba, Belarus, Burma (Myanmar), and Zimbabwe. In addition, it asserts that promoting effective democracies is an important task requiring not only the holding of elections, but also other specific conditions, such as protection of human rights, the rule of law, and establishment of democratic systems that support freedom.

The second feature of the 2006 NSS is that the entire document consistently stresses the need for cooperation with allies and partners, and efforts by the international community in order to tackle such security challenges as the war on terror and proliferation of WMD. Although it preserves the place of preemption in the national security strategy, it shifts the focus to seeking diplomatic solutions through cooperation with allies and partners. Iran and North Korea are singled out as serious nuclear proliferation threats that may require preemptive actions if necessary, but here, too, the 2006 NSS underscores the importance of resolving those issues through diplomatic, peaceful means. Furthermore, Section 10, which covers globalization-related issues, lists a number of new challenges that lie outside the traditional bounds of national security issues: the spread of AIDS, avian influenza, and other pandemics; illicit trade, particularly trade in human beings and drugs; and environmental disasters caused by human behavior or such mega-disasters as floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, and tsunami. It indicates the importance of confronting these challenges by concentrating national power on them, coordinating responses within the Federal government, and with state, local, and private-sector partners, and by calling into action international institutions and "coalitions of the willing."

The third salient feature of the 2006 NSS is that it puts forward a hedging strategy regarding China—the Bush administration will encourage China to make the right strategic choices as a responsible stakeholder, but will also prepare for the possibility that those choices are not made. While welcoming China's emergence as a peaceful and prosperous nation, the Bush administration remains

concerned about China's non-transparent military expansion, locking up of energy supplies around the world, and support for "resource-rich countries without regard to the misrule at home or misbehavior abroad of those regimes."

(2) Building Capabilities to Address 21st Century Security Challenges

Prior to the release of the 2006 NSS by the White House, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) on February 3, 2006, marking the third edition following the QDRs of 1997 and 2001. It was also the second QDR to be published during President George W. Bush's tenure. Founded on the *National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, published in March 2005, the 2006 QDR provides a comprehensive vision for the US military over the next 20 years.

The 2006 QDR lists four major security challenges facing the United States: (a) traditional threats, meaning military conflict or competition based on conventional forces; (b) irregular threats in the form of terrorism, insurgency, guerilla warfare, and other asymmetric attacks; (c) catastrophic threats in which terrorists or rogue states employ WMD; and (d) disruptive threats, such as cyber-attacks or other operations that prey upon the United States' weaknesses. In other words, the United States will sustain its superior military capabilities for dealing with conventional warfare and other traditional threats, while also building up its capabilities to counter terrorism, WMD proliferation, and other forms of new threats. Specifically, the United States will concentrate its capability-building efforts on four priority areas: (a) defeating terrorist networks; (b) defending the homeland in depth; (c) shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads; and (d) preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using WMD.

The 2006 QDR provides a revised force planning construct that reflects the United States' experiences in the Iraq War and other recent events. The 2001 QDR adopted a "1-4-2-1" force-sizing construct, which was aimed at achieving four objectives: (a) defense of the homeland; (b) forward deterrence of aggression in four critical regions (Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian littoral, and the Middle East/Southwest Asia); (c) defeating aggression in overlapping major conflicts (while preserving the option to seek decisive victory in one of them, including the possibility of regime change or occupation); and (d) conducting a

limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations. This construct is fundamentally revised in the 2006 QDR, which calls for a shift in posture capable of responding to irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges, while maintaining capabilities to address traditional challenges. The new document also articulates a force planning construct focusing on three objective areas: homeland defense; war on terror/irregular warfare; and conventional campaigns. The new construct defines two states of operation: (a) "steady-state," in which the United States deters aggression through forward-deployed forces, and uses combined exercises, military exchanges, and other forms of security cooperation to boost the readiness of allies and partners; and (b) "surge," in which the United States wages two nearly simultaneous conventional campaigns, or one conventional campaign if already engaged in a large-scale, long-duration irregular campaign.

In addition, the 2006 QDR exhibits several other noteworthy features. The first is that it broadens the scope of the war on terror beyond the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, defining it as a "long war" against terrorist networks dispersed around the world, and stressing the need to reinforce capabilities in that regard. Secondly, the report acknowledges the limitations of the DOD or the United States in single-handedly taking on the increasingly diverse and complicated security challenges of the 21st century, and it highlights the importance of coordination and cooperation within the government and with allies and partners. Thirdly, it specifies a number of tasks to be carried out to support the war on terror and strengthen capabilities in detecting, locating, and removing WMD so that the weapons do not fall into the hands of terrorists in cases where proliferation safeguards fail. Those tasks include increasing special operations force personnel by 15 percent, expanding the number of special forces battalions, establishing a special operations command within the Marine Corps, forming an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) squadron, and enlarging psychological operations and civil affairs units by 3,700 personnel (33 percent increase). As these goals illustrate, the 2006 QDR emphasizes the need for capabilities and operations aimed at identifying and neutralizing unseen adversaries, as opposed to those aimed at conducting conventional operations. A fourth distinctive element is that it declares the choices of such nations as China, Russia, and India to be "key factors in determining the international security environment of the 21st century," and it balances the hope that China will be an economic partner and a responsible stakeholder with the concern that "China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United

States." Also mentioned is the need to prepare for the future possibility of hostile intents toward the United States by China or other major powers. This would require the United States to develop a posture for deterring aggression and coercion during times of peace, and for ensuring freedom of action in emergencies. Lastly, the 2006 QDR's emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region should be noted. Although the United States will reduce the number of aircraft carriers it deploys worldwide from twelve to eleven, it will deploy in the Pacific six of them and 60 percent of its submarine fleet (currently 50 percent) in order to strengthen its rapid response forces and deterrence in the Asia-Pacific region.

According to Western media sources and experts, the 2006 QDR is being criticized for a number of perceived inadequacies, including its lack of long-term defense budget plans, postponing of changes in the development and deployment plans for key weapons (F-22 fighters, DDX destroyers, etc.), and its failure to provide for sufficient army forces to wage the war on terror.

2. Efforts to Tackle Major Security Challenges

(1) The War on Terror: A Focus on Iraq and Afghanistan

Ever since the September 11 terrorist attacks, President Bush has aggressively pursued the war on terror in his capacity as a wartime president. Despite the 2006 NSS prioritization of Afghanistan and Iraq as the "front lines in the war on terror," public order has continued to deteriorate in both states, presenting arduous challenges for the United States. *Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States*, a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) partially declassified for release on September 9, 2006, evaluates the US-led counterterrorism efforts as having "seriously damaged the leadership of al-Qaeda and disrupted its operation," but also concedes that the Iraq War has spawned a new generation of jihadists, increased worldwide resentment toward the United States, and boosted support for the global jihadist movement. The US public's dissatisfaction with the Bush administration's handling of Iraq was reflected in the outcome of the November 2006 midterm Congressional elections, in which the Democratic Party gained control over both houses. In response to the Republican Party's defeat, President Bush announced at a November 8 press conference that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had resigned, and that former CIA Director Robert Gates was being appointed as his successor, signaling a new direction for the US Iraq policy.

Following Gates's assumption of his new post on December 18, the Bush administration announced in early 2007 that Army Lt. Gen. David Petraeus would replace Gen. George Casey as commander of the multinational forces in Iraq, and also made other reassignments of high-level military and diplomatic officers as part of the drive to overhaul US policies on Iraq.

The Bush administration is providing political, security, and economic support to Iraq. The National Security Council's (NSC) November 2005 *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq* defines goals for victory in Iraq according to three stages. The short-term goal is to make steady progress in fighting terrorists, developing democratic institutions, and nurturing the Iraqi Security Forces. The medium-term goal is to have Iraq firmly establish a constitutional government, promote economic growth, combat terrorists, and ensure its own security. The long-term goal is to integrate Iraq into the international community as a peaceful, united, and stable nation, and have it function as a full partner in the war on terror. This document also sets forth eight strategic pillars, quoted as follows: (a) defeat the terrorists and neutralize the insurgency; (b) transition Iraq to security self-reliance; (c) help Iraqis form a national compact for democratic government; (d) help Iraq build government capacity and provide essential services; (e) help Iraq strengthen its economy; (f) help Iraq strengthen the rule of law and promote civil rights; (g) increase international support for Iraq; and (h) strengthen public understanding of coalition efforts and public isolation of the insurgents. At the same time, it does not set a definite deadline for withdrawal of US forces from Iraq, and indicates instead that withdrawal hinges upon the progress of Iraq's political process and security forces development.

Despite steady advances in some arenas, Iraq's political process remains mired in uncertainty. After achieving such milestones as elections for the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) in January 2005, launching of the Iraqi Transitional Government in April, a national referendum that approved the constitution in October, and elections

President Bush (center) **announcing the replacement of Defense Secretary Rumsfeld** (left) **with former CIA Director Gates** (right) **(November 8, 2006)** (White House photo by Paul Morse)

for the permanent constitutional government in December, the official government of Iraq was finally set into motion on May 20, 2006. Although newly elected Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shi'a Muslim, attempted to harmonize the various sectarian and ethnic factions by appointing some Kurdish and Sunni ministers to his cabinet, the government has essentially been a Shi'ite-dominated administration, with Shi'ites heading up the Interior, National Security, Oil, and Finance ministries. On October 11, 2006, the Council of Representatives passed a bill for creating a federal system, paving the way for Shi'ites to create an autonomous region in Iraq's oil-rich south. However, implementation of the system has been put on hold for at least a year and a half because of opposition stemming from the perception that the bill's proponent, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), was attempting to secure oil rights by gaining authority over the predominantly Shi'ite south. The legislation was fiercely resisted by Sunni blocs, as the heavily Sunni western and central regions lack significant oil reserves. During the freeze on establishment of a southern Shi'ite federal region, the national assembly is engaging debate over the constitution amendment that provides for the federal system, equitable sharing of oil revenues with Sunnis, and various other issues.

The most critical challenge facing Iraq's new government, the restoration of public order, has grown more daunting as security conditions continue to deteriorate. The February 22, 2006, bombing of the Shi'ite Askariya Golden Mosque in Samarra, north of Baghdad, unleashed an intense wave of conflict and clashes between Shi'ite and Sunni groups. Many residents have been forced to flee from their homes due to intimidation by insurgents and militias, creating a growing population of refugees that totaled around 100,000 as of late February. On August 29, the DOD presented to the US Congress a report, "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq," indicating that the number of Iraqi casualties resulting from terrorist attacks or sectarian violence rose by 51 percent during the preceding quarter, while the average number of weekly attacks increased by 15 percent over the previous average. The DOD also stated that the situation in Iraq was not a civil war, but conditions existed that could lead to the outbreak of a civil war. According to a report issued in September by UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), 6,599 Iraqi civilians were killed by suicide bombings, indiscriminate murders, and other violence in July and August, representing an average of more than 100 deaths per day. In an interview with the BBC in March 2006, Iyad Allawi,

former interim prime minister, warned that Iraq was already in the grip of a civil war in which civilians were being killed at a rate of 50 to 60 per day.

In addition to conducting security sweeps targeted at Sunni insurgents, al-Qaeda operatives, and other terrorists, the US military is cultivating the Iraqi Security Forces so that they can stand on their own feet. In June 2006, the coalition forces conducted an air strike that killed the intended target, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Subsequently, the Bush administration adopted a plan to downsize the US military presence in Iraq, numbering somewhere between 130,000 and 140,000, to a level around 100,000 by the end of the year, but the escalation of sectarian discord evolved into the top threat against public order, forcing the Bush administration to abandon its plan in favor of deploying more troops to Iraq. On September 19, 2006, Commander of US Central Command Gen. John Abizaid stated that there was very little probability that the current US deployment, 147,000 personnel, would be reduced any time before the following spring, and that there was the possibility that the force size would be increased if deemed necessary. Likewise, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Schoomaker announced on October 11 that, of the nearly 140,000 US military personnel stationed in Iraq, the army would maintain a force of roughly 120,000 troops there up to 2010. Such developments as these have fomented wider criticism of the Bush administration's policies on Iraq.

In an essay published in the April–May 2006 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, Stephen Biddle, a military analyst for the Council on Foreign Relations, contends that the existing state of affairs in Iraq represents a "communal civil war" rather than the sort of nationalist insurgency encountered by the United States in the Vietnam War, and that shifting responsibility for counterinsurgency operations from the United States to the Iraqi Army (Iraqi Security Forces) or the Iraqi Police would only aggravate ethno-sectarian conflict. Given that attacks by Sunni insurgents have been directed chiefly at Iraq's army and police forces, which are composed mainly of Shi'ite and Kurdish members, buildup of those forces could provoke a rise in ethno-sectarian violence, according to Biddle. Conversely, increased recruitment of Sunnis as soldiers and police officers could allow more insurgents to infiltrate security units and thus disrupt their operations. Therefore, Biddle argues, the United States needs to adopt a new strategy of decelerating that buildup and threatening to "manipulate the military balance of power among Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds to coerce them to negotiate."

In light of the new threat posed by escalating sectarian violence in Iraq, Democratic Senator Joseph Biden, and Council on Foreign Relations President Emeritus Leslie Gelb issued a proposal calling for the Bush administration to change tack in its strategy by adopting a policy of decentralizing Iraq and developing it into a federal system, based on the following five suggestions. First, create three largely autonomous regions in the form of Sunni Arab, Shi'a Arab, and Kurdish regions, and assign them responsibility for their local administrative and security affairs. At the same time, give the central government (Baghdad) the power to administer national defense, foreign affairs, and gas/oil production and revenue distribution. Second, amend the constitution to guarantee Sunnis a share of oil revenues and thereby provide them with an incentive to join the federal system. Third, expand US aid to Iraq in order to develop a large-scale employment program, with the condition that the rights of women and minorities be protected. Fourth, set a course to withdraw and redeploy US forces by the end of 2008, but maintain in Iraq a small contingent to counter terrorism. Fifth, hold an international conference to work toward a treaty of nonaggression in which Iraq's neighbors pledge to respect Iraq's borders and federal system. Biden and Gelb view the creation of a federal Iraq through decentralization as the last chance to avoid civil war, and hold that the options of maintaining the Bush administration's existing strategy or implementing an early withdrawal of US forces would not only worsen the state of security but also risk its escalation into a regional conflict.

On December 6, 2006, the Iraq Study Group—a bipartisan group headed by former secretary of state James Baker and Lee Hamilton, a Democratic former member of Congress—released a report detailing suggestions for realigning the Bush administration's Iraq strategy, changing the primary mission of US forces in Iraq, and approaching Iraq's neighbors, such as Iran and Syria.

In addition to dealing with the issues of Iraq, the United States also faces challenges in Afghanistan, where insurgents continue to disrupt progress toward stability. As of the end of 2006, 37 nations had deployed approximately 32,000 troops to Afghanistan as members of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Under the command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the ISAF is conducting security sweeps and other operations to maintain order, and is providing reconstruction support as well. In October 2006, NATO boosted its strength by assuming command of approximately 12,000 US military personnel in eastern Afghanistan, and thereby expanded the ISAF's area of operation to

encompass the entire country. Apart from the ISAF, a nearly 8,000-strong multinational force comprising mainly US troops is likewise performing cleanup operations and training Afghan security personnel and police.

Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki shaking hands with President Bush (November 30, 2006) (White House photo by Paul Morse)

In 2006, the Taliban stepped up their campaign of suicide attacks and roadside bombings. Consequently, the declining security situation has become the most serious challenge to be addressed. Analysts attribute the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan to a number of factors, including: insufficient US and NATO force strength; delays in infrastructure building and other reconstruction assistance; inadequacies in Afghan security and police forces; increased production of opium poppies, a key source of funding for the Taliban; and the ability of Taliban fighters to receive training in neighboring Pakistan and cross back into Afghanistan to launch attacks. As relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan had begun to sour over security-related policies, President Bush invited Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai and Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf to the White House on September 27 to strongly urge them to share intelligence and cooperate in countering the insurgency. Given the current state of affairs, the United States needs to continue its support for the Karzai administration's nation-building initiatives and the ISAF's security operations, and promote tighter control of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border by pursuing closer cooperation and coordination with Pakistan.

(2) Preventing WMD Proliferation: Iran and North Korea

In addition to the war on terror, countering WMD proliferation has been another critical test of the Bush administration. In his January 29, 2002 State of the Union address, the president declared Iran, Iraq, and North Korea to represent an "axis of evil" that threatened world peace, and he avowed that the United States would not "permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us [the United States] with the world's most destructive weapons." Following the Bush administration's use of force against Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein's government in March 2003, the

failure to uncover the alleged WMD that formed the pretext for the invasion incited global censure of the United State's unilateralism and marred US relations with many nations in Europe and the Middle East. Apparently taking a lesson from that experience, the Bush administration shows a change of stance in the 2006 NSS. Although this document directly names Iraq and North Korea as states posing serious WMD proliferation threats, it stresses that the United States is seeking to resolve these threats not through US-led armed action, but through multilateral diplomacy centered on coordination and cooperation with allies and partners. Specifically, the NSS indicates that the United States is searching for a solution to the issue of Iran's nuclear program by coordinating efforts with European Union (EU), Russia, China, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and is tackling the North Korean nuclear challenge by advancing multinational efforts, particularly through the Six-party Talks and diplomacy at the United Nations.

The suspicion that Iran has been pursuing nuclear weapons development took root in August 2002, when the National Council of Resistance of Iran revealed that nuclear facilities were being clandestinely constructed in central Natanz and elsewhere in Iran. After the United States referred this matter to the UN Security Council (UNSC), diplomatic efforts spearheaded by the United Kingdom, France, and Germany succeeded in crafting the November 2004 Paris Agreement, in which Iran pledged to terminate its uranium enrichment activities in return for economic and technological assistance. However, the Ahmadinejad government, which came to power in August 2005, declared its intent to resume nuclear-related activities for "research purposes," taking a hard-line course to pursue nuclear development in defiance of Western opposition. In the same month, the Iranian government proceeded to initiate uranium conversion operations, the process that precedes enrichment, and in January 2006, it announced that it would recommence research using the uranium hexafluoride produced by the conversion operations. In February, the government acknowledged that it had resumed enrichment activities in central Natanz. The Natanz site comprises an above-ground laboratory capable of housing up to 1,000 enrichment centrifuges and an underground commercial facility that can accommodate 50,000 enrichment centrifuges. The laboratory is currently engaging in enrichment activities. The five permanent UNSC members and Germany coordinated a response to the situation in Iran, leading to the adoption of a presidential statement in March that called upon Iran to suspend its nuclear activities.

Resisting the mounting international pressure, Iran continued its activities and announced in April 2006 that it had successfully manufactured low-level enriched uranium. In June, Germany and the permanent UNSC members presented to Iran a joint incentives package that offered economic aid in exchange for Iran's suspension of its enrichment operations. The UNSC then passed a resolution on July 31 under Article 40 of the UN Charter's Chapter 7 (covering action against threats to peace) to demand that Iran cease all its enrichment activities, including those for research purposes, and its reprocessing activities (reprocessing is associated with plutonium manufacture). The resolution also warned that failure to comply would result in the imposition of economic sanctions under Article 41. On August 22, Iran delivered to Germany and the permanent UNSC members a letter of response regarding the joint incentives package. The letter stressed Iran's long-standing assertion that its nuclear development for peaceful purposes represented an inalienable right, but also indicated a willingness to discuss enrichment suspension depending on the conditions offered. Subsequently, dialogue between the EU and Iran foundered, and the EU issued in October a written statement indicating that it had no choice but to support possible sanctions against Iran. Moreover, the United States steadfastly maintained that verifiable suspension of enrichment activities was a prerequisite for direct talks with Iran, toughening its stance in favor of sanctions. The *New York Times* reported on August 31 that the United States and the EU were planning, and suggesting to relevant UN members, a phased approach to sanctions that started with an embargo on nuclear-related exports to Iran and the freezing of Iran's overseas assets, and then, in the case of noncompliance, escalated to such measures as a ban on foreign travel for Iranian officials and restrictions on World Bank loans to Iran. In contrast, China and Russia have been taking a cautious approach toward discussion of sanctions. In the event that these two powers do not offer their support, the United States will likely pursue sanctions against Iran based on a coalition of the willing that involves Japan, European nations, and other players.

The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the US House of Representatives issued on August 23, 2006, a report stating that "it is reasonable to assume that Iran has a program to produce nuclear weapons," and that Iran could possess nuclear weapons as early as the beginning of the next decade. Iran's possession of nuclear weapons would have a serious impact on not just the Middle

East, but the world at large. In an essay in the Autumn 2006 issue of *Survival*, a journal published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Mark Fitzpatrick, former US State Department official, lists six arguments against Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons: (a) the potential that Iran might actually use those weapons; (b) the risk that its nuclear weapons would fall into the hands of terrorists; (c) such neighbors as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Turkey would feel threatened and therefore seek nuclear weapons; (d) the balance of power in the Middle East would shift to an autocratic state hostile toward the West; (e) the world oil supply would be destabilized; and (f) the global non-proliferation regime would be weakened. Other negative implications of a nuclear-armed Iran would include: the likelihood of Israel launching an armed attack against Iran; the impact that might be exerted on Iraq's Shi'ite-led government; and the risk that Iran's nuclear management system would be thrown into chaos if an internal crisis or regime change occurs.

As such, Iran's possession of nuclear weapons is unacceptable to the international community, and the United States may consider thwarting Iran's efforts to produce enriched uranium by using a preemptive strike to destroy the relevant nuclear facilities, or by effecting a change of regime in Iran. However, there are several obstacles that render such action an impractical choice: (a) Iran's nuclear facilities cannot be easily identified; (b) reprisals might be directed against US military bases in the Middle East, and US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan; (c) the anti-US sentiment of Shi'ites in Iraq would be deepened, thereby adding to the turmoil in Iraq; (d) the ire of Muslims around the world could be inflamed, thereby increasing the risk of terrorist attacks against the West; (e) US relations with Europe, Russia, and China would probably worsen; and (f) regardless of a successful regime change, postwar management, reconstruction, and rebuilding would entail enormous costs. Because of these and other reasons, it would be wise for the United States to resolve the issue of Iran's nuclear program not through a preemptive attack, but through multilateral diplomacy.

As is the case with Iran, the Bush administration is pursuing a diplomatic solution for the North Korean nuclear problem. The situation rapidly worsened when North Korea test-launched ballistic missiles on July 5, 2006, which led to a condemnatory resolution from the UNSC. On October 9, Pyongyang conducted a nuclear test, prompting the UNSC to adopt a resolution imposing sanctions on North Korea. Through China's intercession, however, the United States, North

Korea, and China reached an agreement on October 31 to restart the Six-party Talks on North Korea's nuclear problem. Those talks were resumed on December 18 in Beijing.

The September 2005 meetings of the Six-party Talks resulted in the adoption of a joint statement calling upon North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons and program, but the talks became stalled the following November, and the prospects of finding a solution continued to deteriorate. Following the US Treasury Department's imposition of anti-money laundering measures against the Banco Delta Asia of the Macau Special Administrative Region of China in September 2005, North Korea sought bilateral negotiations with the United States to press its demand that those "financial sanctions" be lifted, but the United States refused to engage in such dialogue because it considered the money-laundering issue to be unrelated to the content of the Six-party Talks. Thereafter, North Korea became increasingly antagonistic toward the United States, and test-launched on July 5, 2006, a total of seven ballistic missiles, including long-range Taepodong-2 missiles, medium-range Nodong missiles, and short-range Scud missiles. The UNSC reacted by unanimously passing Resolution 1695 on July 15 in order to: condemn the launches; demand that North Korea suspend its ballistic missile program, reinstate its moratorium on missile launches, and return immediately and unconditionally to the Six-party Talks; and require UN members to prevent the transfer of missiles and missile-related materials and technology to North Korea. The United States urged all UN members to implement the measures prescribed by the resolution.

North Korea, however, became more defiant, declaring on October 3 that it would carry out a nuclear test, and actually conducting an underground nuclear test on October 9. President Bush convened an emergency press conference on the same day and declared the test to be a provocative act to which the international community would respond. He reaffirmed that the United States would live up to its deterrent and security commitments to regional allies, including Japan and South Korea, but also stressed that the United States would continue its diplomatic efforts to resolve the issue. On October 14, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 1718 to apply economic sanctions against North Korea under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, including financial measures and cargo inspections aimed at preventing the smuggling of WMD and related materials. Later in the same month, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Tokyo, Seoul, Beijing, and

Moscow, where she confirmed that the United States would seek a diplomatic solution through the Six-party Talks.

As relations between North Korea and the international community began spiraling out of control, the Bush administration faced mounting disapproval domestically and abroad for its continued rejection of direct talks with North Korea. Voices calling for bilateral talks between the United States and North Korea included those of, among other former top-level officials, former ambassador Robert Gallucci, the chief US negotiator with North Korea during the Clinton administration, and former secretary of state James Baker, as well as North Korea expert Selig Harrison, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and a number of Democratic and Republican members of the US Congress. Signaling its desire for a solution to the North Korean quandary, Congress inserted in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 a clause requesting the president to create a new policy coordinator position to reassess US policy on North Korea. Specifically, the president was to appoint within 60 days of the law's enactment a policy coordinator who would be responsible for reviewing policy on North Korea, conducting talks with other nations, providing policy direction and leadership for negotiations with North Korea, and, within 90 days of appointment, issuing a status report to the president and Congress.

During the Six-party Talks that resumed on December 18, the United States agreed to hold bilateral discussion with North Korea concerning financial issues, but also strongly demanded that North Korea take concrete action toward denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. North Korea reacted by re-asserting its right to possess nuclear weapons, and clinging to its demand that the United States terminate its "financial sanctions." As a result, the talks failed to make any real headway and went into recess on December 22 without producing agreement on specific measures, including a proposal by China, the meeting's chair, to establish five working groups on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, economic and energy-related cooperation, normalization of US-North Korea relations, normalization of Japan-North Korea relations, and security cooperation in Northeast Asia.

Consequently, 2006 ended with the urgent need to make concerted efforts to resume the Six-party Talks on one hand, and on the other hand, with growing concern that North Korea would use the time bought by the recess, or even the Six-party Talks process itself after its resumption in the future, to continue to extract

plutonium, produce more nuclear warheads, develop advanced ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, construct a 50MWe reactor at Yongbyon, pursue the suspected highly enriched uranium (HEU) program, and engage in other WMD-related activities in order to strengthen its military capabilities.

3. Trends and Prospects of US Strategy for Asia

(1) The Bush Administration's Strategy for Asia

Throughout the Cold War, the United States contributed immensely to the Asian-Pacific region's stability and prosperity in its role as a Pacific power with regional interests, achieving that success by maintaining bilateral alliances and partnerships, as well as forward-deployed forces based on those relationships. The biggest challenges now faced by the United States—including the war on terror—are issues that involve nations around the globe, and thus the United States is promoting alliances and multilateral cooperation in Asia as well in order to maintain a balance of power that favors freedom, and build up a posture capable of responding to new security threats of the 21st century. The Bush administration has not issued a document articulating its East Asian strategy like the one released by the Clinton administration, but Stephen Hadley, assistant to the president for national security affairs, has stated that the US security strategy for East Asia is founded on the following three "basic insights."

First, the United States considers its most important relationships in East Asia to be those with traditional allies and friends that share the values of freedom and democracy. Accordingly, the United States is bolstering its ties with not only Japan and South Korea, but also Mongolia in Northeast Asia and Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand in Southeast Asia.

Secondly, the United States is working with its East Asian partners to develop cooperative and creative solutions to regional and global security challenges, as exemplified by collaboration in the war on terror and the multinational cooperative response to the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami.

Thirdly, the United States is welcoming the emergence of China as a responsible stakeholder in the international community. According to Hadley, the United States has supported China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) and has encouraged China to exercise its influence in the Six-party Talks on North Korea's nuclear problem, but also harbors concerns about issues such as China's military

buildup, locking up of energy supplies around the world, and suppression of freedom of speech. Likewise, the *Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China* published by the DOD on May 23, 2006, points out the lack of transparency in China's military spending and its objectives in building up its military capability.

In recent years, the Japan-US alliance has been significantly transformed through the work of the Japan-US Security Consultative Committee (2+2 Meeting), increased Japanese Self-Defense Force (SDF) participation in international peace cooperation activities, and other cooperative activities. The Japan-US alliance can be expected to evolve into an even more effective system as exemplified in the February 2005 Japan-US agreement on common strategic objectives, the October 2005 joint document on the roles, missions, and capabilities of the SDF and the US military, and the *United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation* released in May 2006. At a summit meeting between President Bush and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on June 29, 2006, both leaders agreed that the Japan-US relationship represented "one of the most accomplished bilateral relationships in history," and declared their intent to forge a "new Japan-US Alliance of Global Cooperation in the 21st Century."

The same summit meeting produced the joint document *The Japan-US Alliance of the New Century*, which provides an assessment of and a direction for Japan-US cooperation in the areas of politics, security, and economy, based on the view that universal values and shared interests form the foundation of that cooperation at the regional and global levels. With regard to security cooperation, the joint document expresses the importance of a broad cooperative relationship within the context of the "US-Japan Global Alliance," and plots a course for the future of the alliance, emphasizing that both sides: (a) believe that the development of ballistic missile defense and Japan's legal framework for dealing with contingencies has deepened security cooperation; (b) welcome the establishment of common strategic objectives of February 2005 and of various agreements on transforming

the alliance, and feel that the US forces realignment agreements will reshape the US military presence in Japan into a more enduring and effective form while ensuring that the alliance remains capable of handling various security challenges, and that these agreements are necessary not only for Japan and the United States, but also for the Asia-Pacific region's peace and stability; (c) affirm that strong Japan-US cooperation embraces the dynamism of China and contributes to Northeast Asian peace and tranquility; (d) stress the importance of promoting strategic dialogue with regional allies and partners, such as Australia; (e) call upon North Korea to honor its pledge made in the September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-party Talks to denuclearize and maintain its moratorium on missile tests; (f) reaffirm their wide-ranging global efforts in such areas as the war on terror, support for the new Iraqi government, cooperation in counter-proliferation, including with regard to Iran; and (g) vow to collaborate on global challenges, such as strengthening capabilities to deal with natural disasters, and prevention and response to avian/pandemic influenza.

The advancement of the US military's global realignment also affects the US-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance, with both sides seeking to develop a new vision for the future of their relationship. The realignment of US forces in South Korea is scheduled for completion by 2009, and currently efforts are under way to carry out the relocation of Yongsan Garrison and the 2nd Infantry Division as was agreed upon in the Future of the ROK-US Alliance Policy Initiative (FOTA) talks. The Roh administration, seeking new independent foreign and security policies, requested the commander of the US-ROK Combined Forces Command (a four-star general of the US Army) to return wartime operational control to the ROK military in 2012, and the United States responded in August 2006 that it would do so in 2009. Speaking at a hearing of the US House of Representatives Committee on International Relations on September 27, 2006, Richard Lawless, deputy under secretary of defense for Asia and Pacific affairs, stated that the US-ROK Combined Forces Command would be dismantled following the transfer of wartime operational control, and that the United States and South Korea would establish their own independent commands, with the US forces performing, under their US commander, a supporting role to the ROK's lead.

In July 2006, the Bush administration and leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed a framework document for working toward the establishment of the ASEAN-US Enhanced Partnership, a com-

prehensive initiative for advancing political and security cooperation, economic cooperation, and social and educational cooperation. The United States is strengthening its cooperation with ASEAN members in wide-ranging areas, including the war on terror, maritime security, avian influenza measures, as well as negotiations for a trade and investment agreement.

In response to the September 2006 military coup d'etat in Thailand, the United States, acting in accordance with a domestic law prescribing the suspension of foreign military aid following a coup d'etat, announced that it would freeze nearly $2.4 million in aid to Thailand, including funds earmarked for military training.

In September 2005, the Bush administration decided to reinstate military aid and military-related exports to Indonesia, and restarted in February 2006 a training program for Indonesian military personnel.

(2) Transformation of the US-India Relationship, and Its Implications

The Bush administration has defined India as a strategic partner and is thus building up the US-India relationship in a broad range of spheres. The 2006 NSS states that India is a "great democracy" that shares the values held by the United States and is ready to take on "global obligations in cooperation with the United States in a way befitting a major power." Similarly, the 2006 QDR positions India as a key strategic partner for the US that can, as a great power standing at a strategic crossroads, play a key role in shaping the international security environment of the 21st century.

During the Cold War, India's adherence to a policy of nonalignment while maintaining friendly relations with the Soviet Union represented a posture that diverged from the US strategic agenda, and hence prevented the formation of close ties. Following the end of the Cold War, India initiated efforts to improve its relationship with the United States, but that endeavor hit a setback when India conducted a series of nuclear tests in May 1998, prompting the United States to impose economic sanctions against India. As a result, the relationship of the two countries became considerably strained. Nevertheless, subsequent strategic talks between senior officials of both sides provided an opportunity to mend the relationship, leading to a March 2000 visit to India by President Clinton. During that meeting, both sides produced a joint document, *India-US Relations: A Vision for the 21st Century*, which laid out several goals, including the holding of regular

bilateral summits, a moratorium on nuclear tests, and economic and technological cooperation. Another joint document was issued during Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's trip to the United States in September 2000 to call for strengthening of US-India relations in a wide spectrum of activities, such as trade, investment, arms control, counterterrorism, and countermeasures against AIDS and other infectious diseases.

Both nations took on an even closer relationship following the September 11 terrorist attacks. The United States lifted the sanctions it had imposed on India and Pakistan in response to their nuclear tests in 1998, while India and Pakistan provided full-scale cooperation to the US-led military operations against Afghanistan by granting the US forces access to their airspace and military facilities. Moreover, in April 2004 the Indian Navy escorted US freighters through the Malacca Strait in support of military operations in Afghanistan, highlighting the evolving close cooperation between the two countries. In January 2004, the leaders of both nations issued the *Next Steps in Strategic Partnership with USA* (NSSP) as a declaration of their agreement to pursue cooperation in civilian nuclear activities, civilian space programs, and high technology trade. The joint statement also affirmed that the United States and India would expand their dialogue on ballistic missile defense and work together to prevent WMD proliferation. At a meeting between President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in the following September, both sides confirmed that the first phase of the NSSP program had been completed, and espoused the US-India strategic partnership in military cooperation and other areas.

Cooperation between the United States and India has further been consolidated in the past few years, particularly in the realm of security. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee signed the New Framework for the US-India Defense Relationship on June 28, 2005, establishing a vision for security cooperation in the next 10 years. Specifically, this document stresses that the United States and India share a common set of security interests, including preserving security and stability, overcoming terrorism and violent religious extremism, preventing WMD proliferation, and protecting the flow of commerce via ground, air, and sea routes, and it pledges that both sides will conduct joint military exercises and exchanges, build capabilities for countering terrorism and WMD proliferation, examine opportunities for collaborative production or research and development of military technologies and weapons,

expand missile defense cooperation, enhance disaster relief capabilities, contribute to peacekeeping operations, and share intelligence. Agreements such as this formed the groundwork for Exercise Malabar 2005, a joint naval exercise conducted by the United States and India in the Arabian Sea in September and October of 2005, with participation by more than 6,000 personnel from both nations. The exercise, which brought together US and Indian aircraft carriers for the first time ever, comprised training related to antisubmarine warfare, counter-terrorism, surface-to-surface refueling, search and rescue, and other naval operations. In the following November, a joint US-India air exercise was held at Kalaikunda Air Station in West Bengal, representing the two nations' first exercise to involve Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft. This was followed by a company-size exercise between the US and Indian armies in the foothills of the Himalayas in January 2006, and by another naval exercise involving aircraft carriers in February. The increased frequency of joint exercises such as these has enhanced the interoperability of US and Indian armed forces. Furthermore, US-India cooperation is also growing in the area of weapons procurement, as the United States has indicated its willingness to furnish India with state-of-the-art fighters, including the F-16 and the F-18.

At the summit meeting on July 18, 2005, President Bush and Prime Minister Singh announced that US-India relations would be taken to a higher plane through the creation of a global partnership. In the joint statement, they declared the completion of the 2004 NSSP and promised to cooperate in a diverse range of concerns, including economic matters, energy, the environment, security, advanced technology, and space development. One of the striking aspects of the agreement is that the United States has altered its traditional stance regarding nuclear cooperation with India, a nuclear power that is not a party to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). President Bush commended India's solid commitment to preventing WMD proliferation and its record as a "responsible state with advanced nuclear technology," and said that he would strive to achieve civilian nuclear cooperation with India. For its part, India agreed to: (a) identify and separate its nuclear facilities and programs according to civilian and military applications; (b) voluntarily comply with the implementation of IAEA safeguards at its civilian nuclear facilities; (c) maintain its moratorium on nuclear testing; (d) refrain from transferring enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states without those capabilities; and (e) adhere to the Missile Technology Control

Regime (MTCR) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines. President Bush also indicated that he would ask Congress to approve amendments of the relevant US laws, and would approach the NSG to work out an international system that would make it possible for India to engage in civilian nuclear cooperation and trade.

Building on these basic agreements, the United States and India made further advances in their negotiations, achieving on March 2, 2006 a "historic" final agreement on the details of civilian nuclear cooperation—the US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative. In the joint statement issued on that day, President Bush and Prime Minister Singh said that both sides would pursue cooperation in many areas, including the economy, trade, the environment, and security. India's promises under the agreement include: (a) designating 14 of its 22 power reactors now in operation or under construction as civilian reactors, and placing them under IAEA safeguards; (b) putting all future civilian thermal power and breeder reactors under safeguards; (c) negotiating with the IAEA for a perpetual safeguards agreement; (d) abstaining from transferring enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states without those capabilities; (e) sustaining its nuclear testing moratorium; and (f) working with the United States to create a multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. In a speech given before India's parliament on March 7, Prime Minister Singh announced that: (a) the 14 targeted reactors would be placed under IAEA safeguards between 2006 and 2014 in a phased manner; (b) the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor and the Fast Breeder Test Reactor in Kalpakkam, Tamil Nadu, would not be subjected to safeguards; and (c) all future civilian thermal power and breeder reactors would be placed under safeguards, but the right to decide which reactors would be civilian would rest solely with India.

In testimony given before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the US House Committee on International Relations on April 5, 2006, Secretary of State Rice called for support of the US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, explaining that it would produce the following five advantages for the United States. First, it would deepen the global strategic partnership between the United States and India. Namely, it would take the partnership to a new strategic dimension through a broad framework of collaborative efforts, including cooperation in agriculture, space development, and science and technology, a doubling of bilateral trade in the next three years, expanded defense cooperation in maritime security. Second, it would enhance India's energy security by

diversifying energy sources so that India could meet the economic growth-driven rise in domestic energy demand without increasing its reliance on oil and gas from Iran and other foreign suppliers. As a result, the share of total electrical generation derived from nuclear power, currently two percent, would be raised to approximately 20 percent over the long run. Third, India's greater use of cleaner energy technology, such as nuclear plants, would benefit the environment, since it would mitigate the problems of air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. Fourth, the initiative would stimulate civilian nuclear trade and investment, creating new business opportunities for US companies. Fifth, it would enhance the international nuclear nonproliferation regime by making India a part of that regime, thus yielding "a net gain for global nuclear nonproliferation efforts."

The initiative sparked some concern that it would undermine the global nonproliferation regime, as the United States was, in effect, recognizing a non-NPT signatory as a legitimate nuclear power. Secretary of State Rice addressed this concern at the above hearing by quoting IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei's assessment of the initiative—"[It will] bring India closer as an important partner in the nonproliferation regime...It would be a milestone, timely for ongoing efforts to consolidate the nonproliferation regime, combat nuclear terrorism and strengthen nuclear safety"—and by asserting that incorporating India into the international nonproliferation regime through bilateral cooperation with the United States would be far more likely to produce positive effects than would isolating India from that regime. Noting that there was criticism that recognizing India as a legitimate nuclear power while denying the same status to Iran and North Korea represented a double standard in the US nonproliferation policy, Rice countered this argument by saying that India, as a democracy with a responsible nonproliferation record, could not be compared with North Korea or Iran, as both were NPT signatories guilty of repeated violations of the treaty. With regard to concern that the initiative would allow India to continue developing nuclear arms and thus trigger an arms race in South Asia, Rice stated that prospects for such an arms race would be determined by India-Pakistan relations, not by the initiative itself.

On July 26, 2006, the House of Representatives passed a bill supporting US-India civilian nuclear cooperation by margin of 359 to 68, and the Senate adopted a similar bill with a vote of 85 to 12 on November 16. Subsequently, the two bills were integrated into a single package that was passed by Congress on December

9 and signed into law by President Bush on December 18. However, two necessary steps for the initiative—a safeguard agreement between India and the IAEA, and approval by the NSG—have yet to be completed, so the international community's attention will likely be focused on how these and other preparations unfold.

In sum, the United States has made a fundamental shift in its nonproliferation policy regarding India, adding a new strategic dimension to the US-India relationship by redefining it as a global strategic partnership. This transformation holds profound implications for US security in the 21st century. Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace argues that a robust US-Indian partnership is essential for the achievement of three strategic objectives: (a) to construct a stable geopolitical order in Asia that supports peace and prosperity; (b) to establish an effective nonproliferation regime that prevents the diffusion of nuclear materials and technologies; and (c) to maintain a world order that protects liberal societies and promotes freedom. While some observers perceive the US-India partnership as an attempt to contain China, Tellis points out that any policy for containing China is, at this point, unrealistic and unnecessary, given that the current governments of the United States and India have no desire to foment hostile relations with China. Also, India has already indicated at IAEA Board of Governors meetings in November 2005 and February 2006 that it supports Western powers' drive to block the Iranian nuclear development program. How India develops its policy toward Iran will be watched with close attention.