

Chapter 7

The United States— Challenges Facing the Second-term Bush Administration

The Bush administration's second term began in January 2005. In both his inaugural speech and also in his State of the Union address, President George W. Bush reaffirmed that US policy was to spread freedom and democracy across the world, and he made clear that his administration would continue the basic foreign policy objectives of his first term. However, the second-term administration appears to be staffed by those who are more practical-minded than those in the first term in dealing with international issues. As a result, the United States may be shifting away from "unilateralism," thus giving higher priority to cooperation with allies and friends.

The president has continued the defense policy articulated in the *National Security Strategy of the United States* announced in September 2002 (2002 NSS) during his first term, on the basis of which the US government released a series of strategy-related documents such as the *National Defense Strategy*, the *National Military Strategy*, and *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*.

Aware that international terrorism is a serious threat to the security of the United States and the international community, President Bush is vigorously waging a global war on terror as a wartime president.

Despite the headway being made in Iraq on the political front, law and order still remain elusive, and the Bush administration is faced with a number of difficult problems, not least the mounting number of US casualties, the increasing burden in terms of manpower and finances of stationing forces in Iraq, and the delay in restoring peace and order. If the situation in Iraq escalates into a civil war, this would deal a blow to the international credibility of the United States. Therefore, it is necessary for the United States to strengthen the Iraqis' ability to govern and to enlist greater and broader-based international cooperation in assisting Iraq.

At present, the United States and China are strengthening their good relations in wide-ranging areas—political, economic, and military—while various problems have still to be addressed. Co-opting China into the international community and leading it in a direction in which it can fulfill constructive responsibilities represent a big challenge for the United States and its allies and friends.

As regards the problem relating to North Korea's nuclear weapons, the Six-party Talks held in Beijing issued a first-ever joint statement on September 19, 2005. However, the work of drafting concrete plans, measures to be taken, and schedules for implementing the agreement was left for further discussions.

1. The Defense Policy of the Second-term Bush Administration

(1) Characteristics and Lineup of the New Administration

The Bush administration's second term began in January 2005. In his inaugural address, President Bush stated that "The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world." He added that the expansion of freedom was the policy of the United States, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in the world. In his State of the Union address delivered on February 2, he said that in order to ensure US economic prosperity, government spending must be curtailed, and pledged that his administration would halve the budget deficit by 2009. The greatest challenge facing the Bush administration's second term is to ensure national security while sustaining the country's leadership position in the world by strengthening its economy. He also vowed that the United States would carry on an offensive against terrorists until it won the war on terror, would keep on building a "coalition of the willing" to defend against new threats, and would promote democracy in the Middle East and the world in cooperation with its allies in pursuit of the ultimate goal of ending tyranny.

An idealistic desire to spread liberty and democracy throughout the world has characterized the foreign policy orientation of successive US administrations. In practice, however, the strategy of the United States more often than not has given priority to stabilizing the international order and US foreign relations. In the Cold War era in particular, the primary emphasis of US foreign policy was on containing the Communist camp led by the former Soviet Union, hence the United States

sometimes had to adopt a pragmatic approach as when cooperating with, or conceding to the demands of, authoritarian regimes. However, the strategy of the Bush administration is characterized by a "practical idealism." As a result, the United States does not tolerate tyranny in other countries, attaches importance to spreading freedom and democracy, and steadfastly translates this goal



President Bush delivers his State of the Union address following reelection (February 2, 2005). (White House photo)

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into its actual foreign policy. But while it does not bend the principle of its strategy—spreading freedom and democracy—it takes a pragmatic approach in so far as it reflects the views of its allies on tactical aspects.

The Bush administration's strong commitment to idealism may be attributed to the following factors. First, after the Cold War, the United States became the only superpower in the world, and, more particularly, is in a predominant position militarily. Second, with economic globalization gathering pace, the spread of democracy offers advantages in dealing with new types of security threat—terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Third, President Bush and his aides believe in spreading freedom and democracy and have a strong sense of mission, and the American public takes democratic values and traditional ethics seriously.

Hence the diplomatic goals of the second-term Bush administration, as with the first, are to build “a balance of power that favors human freedom,” as articulated in the 2002 NSS. In other words, in order to realize democratic values in the international community, an international balance of power that favors such values must be created. In this context, a noteworthy change is the Bush administration's shifting foreign policy approach from the unilateralism it pursued during its first term—in particular, its much-criticized invasion of Iraq, which strained relations with its European allies—to cooperation with its allies and friends in the second term. At a confirmation hearing held in the Senate on January 18, 2005, Secretary of State-designate Condoleezza Rice criticized six countries (Cuba, Myanmar, North Korea, Iran, Belarus, and Zimbabwe) by name as “outposts of tyranny” and this comment seems designed to improve US relations with European countries by highlighting human rights abuses. In an address delivered at the National Defense University on March 8, 2005, President Bush adopted a pragmatic position by declaring that encouraging democracy in the Middle East was a “generational commitment.” In his approach to the Iran and North Korea problems, a changed attitude attaching importance to cooperation with allies and friends has stood out. In dealing with the problem of Iran's nuclear development program, for instance, he has thus far pursued a foreign policy that places a premium on cooperation with European countries.

The new lineup of the Bush administration in the second term suggests that the president's leadership has strengthened to a considerable extent. Secretary of State Colin Powell and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who had

been at odds with Vice President Richard Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, were replaced by Condoleezza Rice (then assistant to the president for national security affairs) and Stephen Hadley (then deputy national security advisor).

At the Department of State, John Bolton, under secretary of state for arms control and international security affairs, was transferred to the post of US ambassador to the United Nations, and the new lineup favors Secretary of State Rice, who enjoys the full confidence of President Bush. Meanwhile, US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick was picked to fill the number two post (deputy secretary of state), and Ambassador Nicholas Burns, US permanent representative to NATO, was chosen to fill the number three post (under secretary of state for political affairs). In the Department of State, a number of career diplomats and former department members were picked as assistant secretaries of state in charge of important aspects of US foreign policy. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea Christopher Hill was appointed as assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, Ambassador to the Arab Republic of Egypt David Welch as assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, and Senior Director for European and Eurasian Affairs at the National Security Council Daniel Fried as assistant secretary for European and Eurasian affairs.

At the Department of Defense (DOD), Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz quit the post and was succeeded by Secretary of the Navy Gordon England, while Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith resigned in August 2005 and was replaced by a career diplomat, Ambassador to Turkey Eric Edelman. With the departure of Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz and Under Secretary of Defense Feith, the new DOD lineup places pragmatic national interest over ideology.

In its second term, the Bush administration has brought in individuals who are more practical-minded than those in the first term in dealing with international issues, while championing the foreign policy doctrines of the first-term administration—freedom, democracy, and a market economy. Meanwhile, the approach of its foreign policy appears to be shifting from unilateralism to cooperation with allies and friends. At the same time, however, a series of events have combined to push down the approval rating of President Bush even among the Republicans who supported his reelection: the worsening situation in Iraq, mounting criticism of the administration for its delay in responding to the effects

of Hurricane Katrina, the energy gridlock that pushed up gasoline prices to an unprecedented high, a political scandal involving Republican Congressmen, the withdrawal of a nomination for chief justice, and the leaking of the name of a CIA agent. With a mid-term election (scheduled for November 2006) and a presidential election (in 2008) drawing closer, the Bush administration may shift its priorities to domestic issues rather than to external relations.

(2) Defense Policy Trends

Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, awareness that terrorism and the proliferation of WMD are the gravest threats to the security of the United States has increased. If WMD fall into the hands of terrorists or rogue nations, this would result in a situation in which traditional containment or deterrence would be difficult or inadequate. In a commencement address delivered at the United States Military Academy, West Point, on June 1, 2002, President Bush said that the United States was prepared to take preemptive action to defend the safety of the nation. In order to deal with new types of threat, he said, “We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt its plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge.” This idea has been incorporated into the 2002 NSS of the first-term Bush administration. A series of defense-related documents—the *National Defense Strategy*, the *National Military Strategy*, and *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*—have been prepared on the basis of the 2002 NSS.

Three core elements were incorporated into the 2002 NSS. First is the view that the United States is a superpower enjoying a position of unparalleled military strength, as well as great economic and political influence. Second is a sense of mission that the United States must spread democratic values—freedom, democracy, and a market economy—across the world. Third is the determination that the United States will not hesitate to take preemptive action—alone, if necessary—to forestall or prevent hostile acts by terrorists or rogue nations. While saying that no nation should use preemption as a pretext for aggression, the United States leaves its options open by (a) building better, more integrated intelligence capabilities to provide timely and accurate information on threats; (b) coordinating closely with its allies to form a common assessment of the most dangerous threats; and (c) continuing to transform the US military to ensure its ability to conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results. According to the 2002 NSS, the highest priority of US forces is the defense of the United States. To carry

out this mission effectively, US forces must (a) assure the allies and friends of the United States that the US will defend their common interests; (b) dissuade future military competition; (c) deter threats against US interests, allies, and friends; and (d) decisively defeat any adversary if deterrence fails.

In March 2005, the DOD released the *National Defense Strategy of the United States* (2005 NDS). This served as its guideline for implementing the 2002 NSS and as a basis for formulating the *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* released in February 2006 (2006 QDR). Regarding the main ideas underlying the 2005 NDS, then Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith mentioned three factors: (a) the need to deal with strategic uncertainty; (b) the value of early measures and early action to prevent problems from becoming crises or crises from becoming wars; and (c) the importance of building partnership capacity so that the United States can work with allies and friends.

The 2005 NDS mentions the following four kinds of security challenges facing the United States.

(1) Traditional challenges. These include military conflicts fought with conventional arms and threats of conventional military competition. The incentive to compete with the United States in this arena is lessened because of the superiority of the United States and its allies in traditional domains and the mounting costs of traditional military competition. However, as the possibility of traditional challenges cannot be ruled out, the United States must maintain sufficient combat capability in key areas of military competition.

(2) Irregular challenges. Two factors—the rise of extremist ideologies and the absence of effective governance—are increasing the number of irregular challenges (such as terrorism and insurgency) that the United States faces. The United States and its allies need to reorient their military capabilities to contend with such challenges more effectively.

(3) Catastrophic challenges. Some problem countries seeking to proliferate WMD, to acquire WMD, to build terrorist networks, or to hold WMD are increasing the magnitude of catastrophic threats. The United States must have the capability to dissuade other countries from acquiring WMD, to deter their use, and when necessary, to defeat them before WMD can be employed.

(4) Disruptive challenges. Some potential adversaries are seeking disruptive capabilities to exploit US vulnerabilities and offset the current advantages of the United States. Advances in biotechnology, cyber operations, or space weapons

could seriously endanger the security of the United States. As such breakthroughs are unpredictable, the United States should recognize their potential consequences and hedge against them.

To tackle these security problems, the 2005 NDS sets forth the following strategic objectives: (a) secure the United States from direct attack; (b) secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action; (c) strengthen alliances and partnerships; and (d) establish favorable security conditions. To achieve these objectives, it sets forth the following methods: (a) assure allies and friends that the United States will defend its common interest shared with them and fulfill its security commitments; (b) dissuade potential adversaries from adopting threatening capabilities, methods and ambitions; (c) deter aggression and counter coercion by maintaining rapidly deployable military forces; (d) defeat adversaries at the time, place, and in the manner of its choosing, setting the conditions for future security. To win a victory over terrorism, the 2005 NDS emphasizes three elements: protecting the homeland, countering ideological support for terrorism, and disrupting and attacking terrorist networks.

As guidelines for implementing the formulation and decision of defense plans, the 2005 NDS mentions the following four elements.

(1) Active, layered defense. The key to achieving this objective lies in prevention. Preventive measures include security cooperation with allies and friends, frontline deterrence, humanitarian assistance and peace cooperation, nonproliferation initiatives, prevention of outbreak of war, and defense of the governments of allies and friends including taking military action. Direct defense of the homeland of the United States, such as missile defense, is an important element constituting active, layered defense.

(2) Continuous transformation. Transformation is a long-term process of transforming the entire defense system by combining not just technologies but also ideas about methods of fighting, capability, manpower, and organization. It also includes military capabilities, administrative reform of the DOD, and changes in international partnerships.

(3) Capabilities-based approach. This means an approach that attaches importance to how adversaries may challenge the United States, rather than who the adversaries are, and build capabilities necessary to deal with it.

(4) Risk management. This is how to manage various risks, such as operational risks, risks related to future challenges, managing fighting strength, and

institutional risks.

In March 2005, the DOD made public the *National Military Strategy of the United States* (2005 NMS), along with the 2005 NDS. While the 2002 NSS and the 2005 NDS set guidelines for wide-ranging strategies, the 2005 NMS articulates military objectives identified in accordance with these two documents. To support the four strategic objectives shown in the 2005 NDS, the 2005 NMS established three military objectives: to protect the United States against external attacks and aggression; to prevent conflict and surprise attack; and to prevail against adversaries when necessary.

The 2005 NMS describes the Joint Force that is required to achieve these military objectives. The Joint Force must be one that (a) fully integrates the functions and capabilities of the four services; (b) is capable of predicting threats and has the adaptability of dealing with such threats; (c) has expeditionary capability that is rapidly deployable, employable and sustainable throughout the global battlespace; and (d) is capable of formulating tactical plans to meet changing situations and of carrying out operations separately even when its fighting force is scattered. Such a Joint Force should be (a) networked (linked and synchronized in time and purpose); (b) capable of gathering and analyzing intelligence; (c) capable of promptly transmitting such intelligence on all levels (from state to tactical levels); and (d) capable of securing superiority of decision-making. The key word for operational planning is integration, and the 2005 NMS points out the importance of not just integration among the four services but also of maintaining unified cooperative relationships with other related government agencies, allies, and friends.

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld submitted the 2006 QDR together with the FY2007 budget proposals in February 6, 2006. Since 1997, the defense secretary has been required to review defense strategy and the military strength required and to submit his findings to Congress once every four years. The 2006 QDR is the third quadrennial review following those submitted in 1997 and 2001. The 2006 QDR was prepared on the basis of the strategic guidelines set forth in the already published 2005 NDS, and reflected the contents of the Global Posture Review (GPR) and the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission Implementation Plan that were proceeding concurrently. It is a blueprint of the national strategy that is formulated with an eye on changes foreseeable over the next 20 years, and encompasses three areas: (a) operational—contingency

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planning and security cooperation; (b) resources—with a budget based on capabilities planning; and (c) organizational—unified command plan and transformation planning.


The process of formulating the 2006 QDR differed from that of the 2001 QDR. First, the 2006 QDR reflects lessons learned from the war on terror fought in Iraq and Afghanistan and from measures taken in response to Hurricane Katrina—the shortage of manpower brought about by the prolonged war on terror; the roles played by the National Guard and Reserves; the financial constraints brought about by stationing armed forces in Iraq. Second, the 2006 QDR was formulated in a top-down manner, namely, the senior leadership of the DOD and the US armed forces were directly involved in the process. Under the leadership of these key officials, six teams were appointed to review various options for their respective fields. They are (a) capability mix; (b) joint enablers; (c) roles/missions and organization; (d) manning and balancing the forces; (e) business practices and processes; and (f) authorities. These teams studied the following four focus areas and formulated guidelines: (a) build partnerships to defeat terrorist extremism; (b) defend the homeland in-depth; (c) shape the choices of countries at strategic crossroads; and (d) prevent the acquisition of WMD by hostile states or non-state actors. Third, the 2006 QDR reflects views of federal government agencies other than the DOD, Congressmen, industrial leaders, allies and friends. Authors of the 2006 QDR attached particular importance to strengthening inter-agency cooperation and the capabilities of allies and friends with a view to grappling with new security challenges.

Concerning the 2006 QDR, the following points are worthy of mention. First, it characterizes the struggle against terrorism as “a long war,” and attaches importance to stability and reconstruction operations, a 15 percent increase in the number of special operation forces personnel, and the creation of an unmanned aerial vehicle corps for use by such forces. Second, it notes that choices China, Russia, and India make about the future of their respective countries will be key factors in determining the international security environment of the 21st century, and says that China, in particular, has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States. Third, the 2006 QDR says that there is a limit to what the United States alone can do in dealing with new security challenges and stresses the importance of a closer cooperative relationship with its international allies and partners. Fourth, it seeks to strengthen US response and deterrence in the

Pacific by deploying six aircraft carriers and 60 percent of its submarines there, while cutting the total number of its aircraft carriers deployed across the world from 12 to 11.

The 2006 QDR also shows a change in estimating the scale of the fighting strength the United States needs. The Clinton administration in the 1990s had adopted a force planning construct that was capable of fighting and winning two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously. However, the 2001 QDR took a different view and adopted a “1-4-2-1” force sizing construct. This specifically shapes forces (a) to defend the homeland of the United States; (b) to deter aggression and coercion in critical regions (Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian littoral, and the Middle East/Southeast Asia); (c) to swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts while preserving for the president the option to call for a decisive victory in one of the those conflicts, including a regime change and occupation of one such country; and (d) to conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations. In drawing up the 2006 QDR, DOD officials revised the “1-4-2-1” force planning construct drastically and adopted a new three-part force planning construct—homeland defense; the global war on

Figure 7.1. Four challenges and priority areas defined in the 2006 QDR



Source: US Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February 3, 2006.

terrorism and irregular war; and conventional campaigns—by shifting the emphasis to creating a balanced construct capable of dealing with irregular challenges, catastrophic challenges, and disruptive challenges, while maintaining the capabilities to deal with traditional challenges. On the basis of this new force planning construct, they formulated the force structure, roles and missions, and weapons acquisition programs.

As noted earlier, the 2005 NDS gives top priority to the defense of the US homeland, and spells out the idea of active, layered defense. In line with this, the DOD released *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support* in June 2005. The idea of active, layered defense encompasses the entire globe, including outer space. The *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support* is a document that deals with activities carried out in the United States and defines the role the DOD can play in supporting civilian authorities when they carry out duties for the defense of the homeland or in an emergency. In that document, the DOD declares that it will (a) lead military missions to deter, prevent, and defeat attacks on the United States; (b) provide defense support to civil authorities in order to prevent terrorist incidents or manage the consequences of an attack or a disaster; and (c) cooperate in strengthening the capabilities of civil authorities, allies, and friends. It also points out the necessity to strengthen information-gathering, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, for sharing information with domestic and overseas agencies, for improving interoperability, and for coordinating measures among the government agencies concerned.

2. Continuation of the Policy to Promote Democracy

(1) Development of Antiterrorism Strategy, and Prospects

More than four years have elapsed since the September 11 terrorist attacks, but key members of the international terrorist organization al-Qaida, such as Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, are still at large, and the terrorist threat to the international community is expected to persist for a long time.

Consequently, President Bush has been vigorously prosecuting a war on terror. In his February 2005 State of the Union address, he vowed that the United States would resolutely fight terrorism in cooperation with its allies and friends, and reaffirmed the necessity to continuously build a coalition to overcome the threat of terrorism. In an address delivered at the FBI Academy on July 11, 2005, he

condemned the July 7 terrorist attacks on London's public transport system and stressed his resolve not to give in to terrorism by saying that "we will continue to take the fight to the enemy, and we will fight until this enemy is defeated." In another address at a meeting of the National Endowment for Democracy on October 6, 2005, he outlined a five-point strategy to win the war on terror: "First, we are preventing terrorist attacks before they occur; second, we are denying weapons of mass destruction to outlaw regimes and their terrorist allies; third, we are determined to deny radical groups the support and sanctuary of outlaw regimes; fourth, we are fighting to deny the militants' control of any nation; fifth, we are denying the militants' future recruits by advancing democracy and hope across the broader Middle East." The war on terror has thus taken on an ideological tinge. In this connection, Stephen Hadley, assistant to the president, pointed out in a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations on July 19 that the US government has been urging moderate Islamic countries not to subscribe to the views of terrorists, and that Islamic clerics have come around to condemn terrorism.

As of September 2005, about 17,000 US troops and a multinational force of more than 3,000 troops were stationed in Afghanistan and engaged in mop-up operations and in maintaining law and order in that country. In addition, NATO member countries that support the Afghan government have organized an International Security Assistance Force, some 12,400 strong as of October 2005, who are engaged in maintaining law and order in areas surrounding the capital, Kabul, and in the northern and western part of Afghanistan. Although the government of President Hamid Karzai succeeded in containing efforts by Islamic armed rebels of the Taliban to interfere in parliamentary and local assembly elections held on September 18, 2005, no significant improvement in security is visible yet. As the democratic political process and the training of a national army gather pace, and as law and order are secured to a certain degree, the NATO force will take over the job of maintaining law and order in broader areas of the country.

Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, the United States has stationed its troops in Uzbekistan for the purpose of assisting Afghanistan in its antiterrorist operations. When riots broke out in the eastern city of Andijon, Uzbekistan, in May 2005, the administration of Islam Karimov put down the riot by force and a large number of Uzbek citizens were killed in the process. The United States called on the Karimov administration to allow an international investigation into

how the riot was quashed. Angered by this suggestion, the Karimov administration notified the United States in July that it was canceling the agreement allowing US forces to stay in Uzbekistan. As a result, the United States withdrew its military completely from Uzbekistan on November 21, 2005. Given this worsening of relations with Uzbekistan, US Defense Secretary Rumsfeld visited Kyrgyzstan in July to secure a strategic foothold in Central Asia and won a promise from Kyrgyzstan to allow US forces to use the airport of the capital, Bishkek, until the situation in Afghanistan has stabilized. The defense secretary also visited Tajikistan and won a promise of cooperation in the war on terror. In October 2005, US Secretary of State Rice visited Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan to strengthen their cooperation with the United States in the war on terror and to urge them to democratize their political processes.

(2) The Iraq Strategy and Its Challenges

The second-term Bush administration defined the Iraq problem as an integral part of its war on terror and has stationed 138,000–160,000 troops in Iraq to eradicate terrorists and to maintain law and order, including the training of Iraqi troops. In addition, multinational forces dispatched from some 20 countries (including Australia, Italy, Poland, and the United Kingdom) also are engaged in operations to stabilize the situation. However, suicide bombings by insurgents continue with no end in sight, and there was no sign of improvement in public security as of the end of 2005.

However, after democratic elections were held for the first time on January 30, 2005, for the Transitional National Assembly (TNA), the political process has been making headway. On April 28, a transitional government was launched, and on October 15, a referendum on a draft constitution was held. As a result, the draft constitution was approved on October 25, elections for the National Assembly were held on December 15 in accordance with the constitution, and the duly elected representatives have begun to work toward launching a bona fide government. Under the circumstances, discontent among Sunni Islamic fundamentalists has mounted, and the ethnic and sectarian divide has widened, so much so that the nation could plunge into civil war depending on what happens over the coming months.

As things stood at the end of 2005, the Bush administration could face four difficult problems relating to the situation in Iraq. The first problem is that as US

military casualties there rise, the US public's opposition to the Bush administration's Iraq policy has grown stronger and calls for an early withdrawal of US troops have mounted. Since the war started in March 2003, the number of US troops killed in action in Iraq topped 2,000 as of October 25, 2005. According to polls conducted on October 17, 2005, by CNN, *USA Today*, and Gallop, the approval rating of President Bush plunged to an all-time low of 39 percent, while his disapproval rating rose to an all-time high of 58 percent. According to a poll conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations on September 29, 2005, a majority rejected the idea of using military force to overthrow a dictatorial regime, and a large number of respondents thought that overthrowing an authoritarian regime to establish democracy was not a compelling reason for waging war against Iraq. As mid-term Congressional elections in November 2006 draw closer, some Republicans also are calling for an early withdrawal of the US troops.

The US government, for its part, began to consider a reduction in or withdrawal of US and multinational forces from Iraq. On July 27, 2005, Gen. George Casey Jr., commanding general, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), said that if the political process in Iraq gathers pace and the Iraqi security forces can take over the responsibility for maintaining law and order, his force could start reducing a considerable number of its troops some time between the spring and the summer of 2006. On the other hand, in an Associated Press interview on August 20, US Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Schoomaker stated that in the worst case where security is not restored in Iraq, he was considering the possibility of stationing 100,000 army troops in Iraq for four more years through 2009. In August, the US government established the Coalition-Iraqi Joint Commission to Transfer Security Responsibility from Coalition Forces to Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to study what the MNF-I should do in step with the progress being made in the political process. The commission has since been discussing conditions for transferring general security responsibility to the ISF for each area on the basis of the following categories: (a) levels of present and projected insurgent activities; (b) readiness and capabilities of the ISF; (c) readiness and capabilities of relevant government institutions; and (d) the ability of coalition forces to reinforce the ISF should this become necessary. The MNF-I is supposed to begin serious consideration of troop reduction starting in 2006.

The second problem relating to the situation in Iraq is that increases in personnel costs and costs relating to the stationing of US forces there are having a serious

impact on the US defense program and the crisis management system. A report by the US Government Accounting Office (GAO) dated October 20, 2005, points out that since the September 11 terrorist attacks, many of the nation's National Guard (350,000 soldiers and 107,000 airmen) have been called up on domestic or overseas missions, and that nondeployed units have under a third of the equipment they need (radio sets and vehicles), seriously undermining their readiness or hampering their ability to prepare for overseas missions. As of July 2005, more than 30 percent (35,000) of US forces deployed to Operation Iraq Freedom are National Guard members. Making things even more difficult is the increasing financial burden caused by stationing US troops in Iraq. According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the US Library of Congress, the cumulative total of government expenditure for military activities in Iraq exceeded \$200 billion in fiscal 2005. In September 2002, President Bush's then chief economic advisor Lawrence Lindsey estimated the cost of the Iraq war at \$100 billion–\$200 billion, and in December the same year, then Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Director Mitchell Daniels, Jr. released a report that put the estimated costs at \$50 billion–\$60 billion. However, the actual costs have far exceeded these estimates. Expenditures for the Iraq war and the war on terror including those for enhancing base security (but excluding homeland security-related expenditures) since the September 11 terrorist attacks amounted to \$311.7 billion in fiscal 2005. As shown in Table 7.1, the bulk of the national budget for the war on terror has been spent on financing the stationing of US forces in Iraq. Until the situation in Iraq stabilizes and the large number of troops there is withdrawn, the United States will have no choice but to bear the considerable cost of stationing its troops in Iraq.

The third problem relating to the situation in Iraq is that although the political process is making progress, the law-and-order situation is still unstable, and long-term prospects for political and social stability remain uncertain. On June 28, 2005, in a speech at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to mark the first anniversary of the transfer of sovereignty to Iraq, President Bush emphasized various steps his administration had taken to strengthen the Iraqi security forces—joint operations carried out by the ISF and the multinational forces, and the dispatch of a team from the former to advise the latter on matters relating to the transfer of security responsibility to ISF. For all the administration's efforts, however, terrorist attacks have occurred frequently in the so-called "Sunni triangle," and voices have pointed

out the misguided strategy the United States has pursued in Iraq. In testimony given at the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on July 18, 2005, Brookings Institution Senior Fellow Kenneth Pollack stated that a strategy that emphasized offensive search-and-sweep missions would not only make ever more enemies among Iraq's Sunni tribal population and breed ever more Sunni guerrillas but would also fail to secure the safety of Iraqi citizens who held the key to national reconstruction, hence it was doomed to failure. He went on to assert that the United States should adopt a time-honored antiguerrilla strategy that puts a top priority on securing the safety of Iraqi citizens, and on steadily winning their hearts and minds by encouraging political and economic development. In an article contributed to the September/October 2005 edition of *Foreign Affairs*, Andrew Krepinevich, Jr., executive director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, also criticized search-and-sweep missions against guerrilla forces, saying they could not establish law and order. Instead, he proposed an "oil-spot strategy" for Iraq, one

Table 7.1. Changes in the costs of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and those for enhancing base security (FY2001–FY2005)

(In billions of \$)						
By Mission and Source of Funds	FY'01–FY'02*	FY'02	FY'03	FY'04	FY'05	Total of FY'01–FY'05
Iraq						
Department of Defense (DOD)	2.5	0	48.0	59.1	80.5	190.1
Foreign aid & diplomatic ops.	0	0	3.0	19.6	2.0	24.5
Sub-total	2.5	0	51.0	78.7	82.4	214.6
Afghanistan						
DOD	8.8	8.4	16.3	13.0	20.0	66.5
Foreign aid & diplomatic ops.	0.3	0.5	0.7	2.2	2.8	6.5
Sub-total	9.1	9.0	1.7	15.1	22.8	73.0
Enhanced base security						
DOD	7.0	5.0	6.5	3.7	2.0	24.2
Sub-total	7.0	5.0	6.5	3.7	2.0	24.2
Total						
DOD	18.3	13.4	70.8	75.7	102.5	280.7
Foreign aid & diplomatic ops.	0.3	0.5	3.7	21.7	4.8	31.0
Total: All Missions	18.6	14.0	74.5	97.5	107.3	311.7

Source: Amy Belasco, *The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan and Enhanced Base Security Since 9/11*, CRS Report for Congress, RL33110 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2005), p.10.

Note: * includes expenditures included in the post-9.11 supplementary budget and the FY2002 Defense Outlays Law.

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in which coalition forces start by focusing their security operations on certain key areas and then, over time, broadening the effort (hence the image of an expanding oil spot). According to Krepinevich, this strategy will require at least a decade of commitment and hundreds of billions of dollars and will result in longer US casualty rolls. On July 27, 2005, the Council on Foreign Relations released a report coauthored by former national security advisers Samuel Berger and Brent Scowcroft in which they blamed deteriorating law and order in Iraq on the inadequacy of postwar measures and criticized the Bush administration for mishandling its postwar management plan. The report recommends (a) that the national security adviser be formally tasked with civilian-military coordination and establishing overarching policy associated with stabilization and reconstruction activities; (b) that the president and the secretary of defense firmly establish that postwar stability and reconstruction operations are a strategic priority of the armed forces as important as combat operations; (c) that the Department of State lead all civilian efforts related to stabilization and reconstruction; and (d) that the US Agency for International Development (USAID) lead the day-to-day execution of the programs and activities on the ground.

Amidst rising criticisms of its Iraq strategy, the Bush administration's emphasis appears to be shifting to establishing the foundations of a state—infrastructure-building being carried out by the Department of State and USAID in parallel with operations carried out under the leadership of the DOD to mop up insurgents. In testimony given at a hearing of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on October 19, 2005, Secretary of State Rice explained that US strategy on Iraq was to free areas from insurgent control, to hold them securely, and to build durable, national Iraqi institutions. In order to successfully establish a real democratic government in Iraq, she said the following four conditions must be met: (a) Iraqis must continue to come together in order to build their nation by transcending their sectarian and ethnic divisions; (b) the Iraqi government must forge more effective partnerships with foreign governments, particularly in building their ministries and governmental capacity; (c) Iraq must forge stronger partnerships with the international community; and (d) the United States must strengthen and deepen the integration of its civilian and military activities. As concrete measures for building infrastructure, Rice announced a plan for creating Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). These civil-military teams will be dispatched to key areas of Iraq where they will work in concert with each of the major subordinate



President Bush delivering an address on a strategy for victory in Iraq at the United States Military Academy, West Point (November 30, 2005) (White House photo by Paul Morse)

commands, train police, set up courts, and help local governments with essential services such as sewage treatment or irrigation. This is modeled on the successful precedents used in Afghanistan. The *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq* released on November 30, 2005, stresses the importance of comprehensively implementing policies in the fields of politics, security, and the economy.

The fourth problem relating to the situation in Iraq is the uncertainty over the long-term stability of a Shi'ite-led Iraqi regime and the political direction it will take. Ethnic and sectarian conflicts over the distribution of oil revenues are intensifying, and terrorist acts perpetrated by Sunni groups and armed insurgents who have infiltrated Iraq from Syria and Iran have occurred frequently. Given the unsettled situation, it would be difficult for the United States to withdraw its forces. Even if a democratic political system is established in Iraq, there is no guarantee that a democratically-elected government will be pro-American. The Bush administration is committed to a long-term project to spread democracy in Iraq and other Middle East countries, but if the turmoil in Iraq escalates into a civil war, the international credibility of the United States could be seriously damaged. Therefore, the United States needs to strengthen the governability of Iraq and win greater international cooperation for its effort to assist Iraq.

3. The United States and East Asia

(1) New Developments in US-China Relations

Good relations between the United States and China have lately been strengthened in the political, economic, and military fields. However, various outstanding issues remain. To engage China more deeply into the international community and nudge it in a direction where it can play a responsible and constructive role represent a big challenge for the United States, its allies and friends in coming years.

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Throughout 2005, the two countries have sought to improve their relations in wide-ranging areas: government and military leaders exchanged visits in an effort to deal with the war on terror and the nuclear problems of North Korea, and to expand mutual trade. Since the beginning of the Bush administration's second term in January 2005, the two countries have carried on active diplomacy: Secretary of State Rice visited China in March; the presidents of the two countries met in New York on September 13; Defense Secretary Rumsfeld visited China in October; President Bush visited China in November; and Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick met with Deputy Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo in August for the first-ever "strategic dialogue" on the Taiwan Strait issue, the nuclear problem of North Korea, energy, antiterrorism measures, trade relations, and human rights. The idea of holding regular high-level consultations between the two countries was first proposed by President Hu Jintao when he met with President Bush during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Chile in November 2004. In March 2005, the two countries agreed to hold such consultations and the meeting between Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick and his Chinese counterpart was held in August. The second high-level consultation was held in December. In between, a number of pending issues relating to trade were discussed at a US-China summit on September 13. President Bush expressed his appreciation of China's introduction of the managed floating exchange system of the renminbi in July 2005, and President Hu Jintao confirmed his willingness to cooperate with the United States in solving the nuclear problem of North Korea, and promised to step up China's diplomatic efforts to solve the problem of the nuclear development program by Iran.

When Defense Secretary Rumsfeld visited China on October 19, 2005, for the first time since taking office, he met with President Hu Jintao and Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan and talked about the expansion of military dialogue between the two countries and discussed a number of issues: (a) opening a hotline between military leaders of the two countries; (b) creating a system of crisis prevention at sea that sets down guidelines for dealing with a clash that may occur between the armed forces of the two countries; (c) establishing a system of prior notification of military exercises; (d) encouraging mutual visits by the navies of the two countries; and (e) exchanging military instructors between them. Although they agreed to expand the exchange of defense officials, they failed to agree to open a hotline between their military leaders and to improve the transparency of the Chinese

defense spending. On January 31 and February 1, 2005, a US-China special policy dialogue on security cooperation was held in which US Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless and Director of the PLA's Foreign Affairs Office Zhang Bangdong exchanged views on the Taiwan issue. Late in March, USS *Blue Ridge*, the command ship of the US Seventh Fleet, paid a friendly visit to Zhanjiang, where China's South Sea Fleet is based. On April 28, 2005, under secretary of defense-level talks were held between the two countries, and, in September, Admiral William Fallon, commander of the US Pacific Command, visited China. The two countries have thus actively engaged in exchange visits by their defense officials. At a US-China summit meeting held in Beijing on November 20, 2005, the leaders of the two countries discussed a wide range of subjects, including economic issues (the trade imbalance and a revaluation of the renminbi), antiterrorism measures, efforts to prevent avian influenza, cooperation in the Six-party Talks, the Taiwan question, cooperation in the field of energy, human rights, and democratization of China. Although he acknowledged the complexity of US-China relations, President Bush strongly called for the democratization of China and stressed the importance of China as a trading partner.

While US-China relations have made visible progress in many areas, there still remain a number of issues that could have an adverse impact on the security of the region and the world in coming years. At an IISS Asia Security Conference (Shangri-La Dialogue) held on June 4, 2005, under the auspices of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), US Defense Secretary Rumsfeld recognized the outstanding contribution China had made in coaxing North Korea back to the Six-party Talks, but at the same time cast doubt upon increases in China's defense spending and the expansion of its missile capability. On July 19, the DOD released an *Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People's Republic of China* that warned, "Over the long term, if current trends persist, PLA capabilities could pose a credible threat to other modern militaries operating in the region." The report also pointed out that the information made public by the Chinese government lacked transparency regarding the scale and capabilities of the PLA, and that estimates put China's defense spending at two to three times the officially published figure (about \$29.9 billion). It says that "The cross-strait military balance appears to be shifting toward Beijing as a result of China's sustained economic growth, growing diplomatic leverage, and improvements in the PLA's military capabilities," that China has been increasing the number of mobile short-

range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) deployed in areas opposite Taiwan at an annual rate of about 100, and that at present some 650–730 SRBMs are deployed there. It also pointed out that “In the future, as Chinese military power grows, China’s leaders may be tempted to resort to force or coercion more quickly to press diplomatic advantage, advance



Defense Secretary Rumsfeld visiting China (October 19, 2005) (DOD photo by Master Sgt. James M. Bowman, US Air Force)

security interests, or resolve disputes” over resources and dominium. It further noted that the Chinese government has been moving closer to problem countries such as Iran, Sudan, and Venezuela to gain access to resources. The report analyzes China’s nuclear deterrence, precision strike capability, expeditionary operations, the modernization of air defense, space weapons, and the strategy for an emergency in the Taiwan Strait. While seeing China facing a strategic crossroads, the report warns that in the long run, China could match the military capabilities of the United States.

Acting on the basis of such perception, the United States started taking various measures designed to restrain the military capabilities and diplomatic leverage of China. On the military front, the United States has been deploying nuclear-powered attack submarines, B-2 bombers, mid-air refueling aircraft, and Global Hawk unmanned reconnaissance planes in Guam with a crisis in the Taiwan Strait in mind. On the diplomatic front, the Bush administration is devoting major efforts to building military cooperation with countries surrounding China (India and Southeast Asian countries). The New Framework for the US-India Defense Relationship signed by the United States and India on June 28, 2005, commits the two countries to promoting comprehensive military cooperation. A joint statement released on July 18 after a meeting between President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India defined the US-India relationship as a “global partnership,” and confirmed their commitment to a cooperative relationship in wide-ranging areas including the military field. Prior to that, on July 12, the United States and Singapore signed a strategic framework agreement between the two countries for a closer partnership in defense and security.

The US government and Congress are becoming more vigilant toward the development of military technologies by China, and they expressed concern over the pressure China brought to bear on the European Union (EU) to lift the arms embargo imposed by the EU after the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989 by saying that the export of advanced military equipment to China could upset the military balance in East Asia. According to the October 24, 2005, issue of the *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, a leading Japanese business daily, the US government came up with a policy to toughen export regulations for dual-use materials and technologies to China and was drawing up new regulations, for implementation early in 2006, that would sharply expand the list of items banned for export to firms affiliated with China's PLA.

In this way, the Bush administration encourages China to play a responsible and constructive role in the international community despite various issues outstanding between the two countries. In a speech at a meeting of the National Committee on US-China Relations held on September 21, 2005, Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick stated that China today is not the Soviet Union of the late 1940s. As reasons, he made the following four points: (a) China does not seek to spread radical anti-American ideologies; (b) while not yet democratic, China does not see itself in a conflict with democracy; (c) while at times mercantilist, China does not see itself in a death struggle with capitalism; and (d) China does not believe that its future depends on overturning the fundamental order of the international system. Rather, Chinese leaders believe that China being networked with the modern world is the key to its success. He felt that China does not want to have any trouble with the United States, and stressed the necessity to deepen the cooperative relationship with China in various fields such as the nuclear problem of North Korea and the struggle against terrorism.

In areas other than security, there are a number of outstanding issues that can destabilize US-China relations, including the trade imbalance, human rights, differences over freedom of religion, and US arms sales to Taiwan. On the question of building an East Asian community, the US government is leery about China's diplomatic move in seeking to create an exclusionary regional framework.

(2) Reaction to North Korea's Nuclear Development

In his State of the Union address on February 2, 2005, President Bush said that "We are working closely with the governments in Asia to convince North Korea

to abandon its nuclear ambitions.” He rejected North Korea’s proposal for bilateral talks and stressed his position in favor of solving the problem through multilateral diplomacy, namely, the Six-party Talks. However, he came under criticism that his hard-line policy had left North Korea to its own devices. North Korea announced in February 2005 that it possessed nuclear weapons, and this made an already bad situation worse. Amidst these developments, the United States employed flexible diplomacy to coax North Korea back to the Six-party Talks. On July 26, 2005, the six parties resumed their meeting in Beijing for the first time in 13 months and the participants adopted their first-ever joint statement on September 19. At the fifth round of the Six-party Talks held in Beijing early in November 2005, the participating countries continued to discuss the nuclear program of North Korea, but no prospect for a solution to the problem has emerged.

At the second round of the Six-party Talks held in February 2004, the United States maintained that it was necessary for there to be a complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of North Korea’s nuclear programs. At the third round of the talks, the United States, while steering clear of using the term CVID, proposed a concrete process designed to completely dismantle North Korea’s nuclear program. Subsequently, however, North Korea refused to participate in the Six-party Talks under the pretext that the Bush administration had not changed its hostile policy toward North Korea. On February 10, 2005, North Korea declared in a foreign ministry statement that it possessed nuclear weapons and that it would indefinitely suspend its participation in the Six-party Talks. On May 11, 2005, it announced that it had completed the removal of 8,000 spent fuel rods from the experimental graphite-moderated reactor in Yongbyon. In April, a succession of news reports spread across the world concerning activities that seemed to indicate a nuclear bomb test had occurred in North Korea. Further, then Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Director Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby made a statement at a hearing of the Senate Committee on Armed Services on April 28 acknowledging that North Korea had the capability—although he qualified his judgment as “a theoretical capability”—to strike the United States with intercontinental ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads. It was reported that the DOD had deployed 15 F-117 stealth fighters to South Korea in late May to maintain deterrence of US forces in East Asia.

Amidst mounting tensions over nuclear development by North Korea, Secretary of State Rice declared in an interview with CNN on May 9, 2005, that North

Korea is a sovereign state and said that the United States had no intention to attack or invade it. On May 13, 2005, Joseph DiTrani, US special envoy to the Six-party Talks, and James Foster, head of the Department of State's Office of Korean Affairs, visited the office of the North Korean delegation to the United Nations in New York to have a talk with UN Ambassador Pak Gil Yon and his deputy Han Song Ryol for the first time in five months to urge them to return to the Six-party Talks and to abandon the nuclear development program. On May 31, President Bush said that "We (the United States) want diplomacy to be given a chance to work, and that is exactly the position of the government. Hopefully, it will work. I think it will." At a US-South Korea summit meeting in Washington, D.C., on June 10, the two leaders agreed to call on North Korea to make an early return to the Six-party Talks. At a hearing of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on June 14, Christopher Hill, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, stressed the necessity for China to urge North Korea more strongly to resume the Six-party Talks at an early date.

Such efforts have paid off, and the fourth round of the Six-party Talks was resumed in Beijing on July 26, 2005, for the first time in 13 months. The talks continued on and off and after 20 days of consultations, the participating parties adopted their first-ever joint statement on September 19, 2005. The joint statement says that the six parties unanimously reaffirm that the goal of the Six-party Talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner. In addition, it says (a) that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards; and (b) that the United States affirmed that it has no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons. As regards the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes demanded by North Korea, the participating parties agreed to discuss the question of providing North Korea with light-water reactors (LWRs) "at an appropriate time." The United States and North Korea promised to mutually respect each other's sovereignty, to coexist peacefully, and to take steps for the normalization of their diplomatic relations.

That North Korea has for the first time ever promised at a multilateral diplomatic forum—the Six-party Talks—to abandon its nuclear development program,

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including the uranium enrichment program it has allegedly been carrying out, can be judged as highly significant. However, the question as to when and how North Korea will carry out its promises was left for future consultation. North Korea maintained that it would not comply with the demand to abandon its nuclear development program until it takes delivery of LWRs. In response, Assistant Secretary of State Hill at the plenary session of the Six-party Talks on September 19 said, with reference to the “appropriate time” to discuss the subject of providing North Korea with LWRs, that delivery would come after the country has promptly eliminated all nuclear weapons and all nuclear programs in an internationally verifiable way and after it has come into full compliance with the NPT and IAEA safeguards. In an interview with *Time* magazine the same day, Secretary of State Rice said something similar and stressed the US position that North Korea must abandon its nuclear development programs before being provided with LWRs. The chairman’s statement released on November 11 after the first meeting of the fifth round of the Six-party Talks held on November 9 reaffirmed that the joint statement adopted in September will be fully complied with in accordance with the principle of “commitment for commitment, action for action.” The work of drafting a concrete plan, measures and procedures to be followed to carry out the commitments and promises made in the joint statement will be discussed in coming months, and how they will play out bears a close watch.

