

Chapter 7

The United States— Toward Building a Defense Posture for the 21st Century

In a presidential election held on November 2, 2004, incumbent President George W. Bush defeated the Democratic candidate John Kerry and was reelected as the 43rd president of the United States. Since the start of the Bush administration, the United States has been pressing ahead with a transformation of its military and a realignment of its defense forces for the purpose of adapting the US defense posture to the security environment of the 21st century. Meanwhile, the Bush administration has been vigorously waging a war on terrorism since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.

Characterizing the September 11 terrorist attacks as an act of war against the United States, his administration has been making an all-out effort to combat terrorism, including through military means. Having toppled both the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq by military force, the United States is busily engaged in the reconstruction of both countries with international support. However, with its armed forces still mired in combating insurgents to restore law and order in Iraq, the deployment of its armed forces in that country is likely to be prolonged, and the United States is running short of the manpower needed to adequately sustain its military presence in Iraq. Combating terrorism is a difficult task that has no end in sight. One major challenge facing the second-term Bush administration will be to restore law and order in Iraq and to reduce the burden on the US military.

While continuing the war on terrorism, the Bush administration has been undertaking a thorough review of its Cold War-legacy military posture that the United States had maintained throughout the 1990s, from two perspectives. One is "defense transformation." Shifting force planning from the "threat-driven" model to a "capabilities-based" approach, it is designed to transform the US military into a flexible force, with joint rapid-deployment and expeditionary capabilities. The other is a global posture review (GPR), a review process that seeks to recast the global US military posture in light of the new security environment that has developed since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The common objective of these two projects is to depart from the Cold War-legacy military posture in terms of the force structure and global disposition of the US military.

Naturally, the US Forces Japan (USFJ) are not exempt from the GPR. The basic policy of the Japanese government on this issue is to pursue both the maintenance of the effective deterrence by the US forces and the reduction of the burden on local communities in Japan. To achieve these two objectives,

the Japanese government will have to take policy measures from a strategic and political standpoint that goes beyond the local issues of maintaining US military bases.

Both the war on terrorism and the defense transformation are ongoing continuous processes with no definite endpoint; and the GPR is also a long-term proposition. The priority for the second-term Bush administration's security policy will be to maintain the course that it has been following from the first term.

1. The War on Terrorism: The First War of the 21st Century

(1) Strategy for Combating Terrorism and Progress in Homeland Security

The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, have helped change the conventional perception of terrorism. In launching its war on terrorism, the Bush administration defined the September 11 terrorist attacks as an act of war against the United States. The US counterterrorism measures thus ceased to be confined to domestic law enforcement measures typically conducted by US attorneys and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); they now constitute a "war" to be fought using every instrument at its disposal, including the military. Over the past three years or so, "wartime president" Bush has vigorously fought this war on terrorism.

On February 14, 2003, the Bush administration released a report, the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, which spelled out a comprehensive strategy for fighting against terrorism. The report set forth four objectives of the war against terrorism—"the four Ds": defeat terrorists and their organizations; deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists; diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit; and defend US citizens and interests at home and abroad. The Bush administration strives to deal with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the activities of terrorists and their state sponsors, as well as the danger of the former's availability to the latter. Attaching importance to the preemptive strike option, the United States used force against terrorist sanctuaries and sponsors overseas. Although the United States has so far failed to apprehend Osama bin Laden, the ringleader of the September 11 terrorist attacks, it is reported that more than three quarters of al-Qaida's known leaders and associates have been detained or killed. In addition,

the United States has seized or frozen some \$200 million in terrorist assets. It is difficult to eradicate terrorism root and branch; rather, it is important to remove the environment that breeds terrorism. In this regard, the Bush administration is emphasizing the winning of a “war of ideas” against terrorists by spreading democracy and economic freedom in cooperation with its allies and friends.

Under this strategy, the Bush administration has given top priority to homeland security and devoted major efforts to creating a domestic counterterrorism structure. Empowering President Bush to pursue these policy objectives is the USA Patriot Act that Congress passed on October 26, 2001, 45 days after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. This act prescribes various counterterrorism measures needed to strengthen the security of the United States. The main domestic instruments that have been created to prevent terrorist attacks include a Homeland Security Advisory System. This system, instituted in March 2002, provides a nationwide network to disseminate information regarding the risk of terrorist acts to federal, state, and local authorities and to the American people. It gives warnings in the form of five-level terrorist “threat conditions,” and provides for surveillance, preparations, and response measures appropriate to each level of threat. In June 2002, the US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) was created with around 500 civil service employees and uniformed personnel. Headquartered in Colorado, USNORTHCOM is a unified command, charged mainly with executing homeland defense and civil support missions. USNORTHCOM has few permanently assigned forces but will be assigned forces whenever necessary by the president or by the secretary of defense. The commander of USNORTHCOM is dual-hatted as commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, whose mission is aerospace warning and control for Canada, Alaska, and the continental United States. In January 2003, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established with roughly 180,000 personnel. As a single, integrated agency focused on homeland defense, the DHS incorporates 22 federal agencies, including the US Coast Guard and the US Customs and Border Protection.

The most crucial element in the war on terrorism is intelligence. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, or the 9-11 Commission, made major recommendations on this question in its final report released on July 22, 2004. They included the creation of a “National Counterterrorism Center” (NCC) and the establishment of a “National

Intelligence Director.” The recommendations seek to unify with the NCC strategic intelligence and operational planning against terrorists across the existing foreign-domestic divide of governmental agencies, and to unify the intelligence community under the new director. Acting on the 9-11 Commission’s recommendations, on August 27, 2004, President Bush signed an executive order instructing the establishment of an NCC. As the primary organization for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the US government pertaining to terrorism, the NCC is charged with coordinating counterterrorism planning and the activities of agencies concerned and with disseminating transnational terrorism information among the president and key officials in the government. On August 2, 2004, President Bush submitted a bill to Congress proposing the establishment of the position of National Intelligence Director and the reorganization of the intelligence agencies under the director. Although the House of Representatives and the Senate initially had difficulties in adjusting their versions of the bill, a compromise bill passed the House of Representatives on December 7 and the Senate on December 8, and President Bush signed the bill into law on December 17. Under this law, known as the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) oversees 15 intelligence agencies including the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, all of which are agencies of the Department of Defense (DOD); the Central Intelligence Agency; and the FBI. The DNI is a cabinet-level post appointed by the president with the consent of the Senate, and serves as the principal advisor to the president on intelligence matters. When he signed the bill into law, President Bush said that the act was the most dramatic reform of the nation’s intelligence capabilities since the National Security Act of 1947, signed by then President Harry S Truman.

President George W. Bush signing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 as members of Congress look on (White House)

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 contains provisions concerning not

only the reform of intelligence agencies but also a variety of counterterrorism measures. The terrorists who carried out the September 11 terrorist attacks did not directly encounter the military power of the United States. Instead, they leveraged unpreparedness on the side of the United States and struck its vulnerabilities with asymmetric means. In order to prevent the recurrence of such terrorist attacks, it is necessary for the state to take a comprehensive approach, including measures to strengthen transportation security, border protection, and cracking down on terrorists' financial sources. This act strengthened the counterterrorism efforts the US government had been making since the September 11 terrorist attacks. Provisions contained in this act are: (a) strengthening transportation security (improving inspection of cargoes and screening of passengers and their baggage at airports); (b) tightening border security (strengthening surveillance capabilities of the northern and southwestern borders, increasing the number of border patrol agents and immigration and customs enforcement investigators, and toughening the requirements for obtaining visas); and (c) terrorism prevention measures (intercepting terrorist communications, enhancing measures to prevent money laundering, and facilitating criminal background checks of private security officers).

With the establishment of the DHS and the DNI, two important counterterrorism functions—the collection and analysis of intelligence, and the implementation of counterterrorism activities—were all integrated under a single director. Thanks to the extensive antiterrorism measures taken by the Bush administration, no terrorist attack has occurred in the United States since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.

(2) Cost of Operations in Iraq: Burden on the US Military

By its very nature, a war on terrorism, which involves the employment of military force, puts the troops on a war footing, and this has placed a heavy burden on US Army personnel in particular. According to a report released in October 2004 by the Commonwealth Institute, a private think tank in the United States, the US military has been increasingly stretched owing to the prolongation of the military campaign in Iraq. More than half of the 350,000 troops deployed overseas (about 27 percent of its active component) are engaged in actual military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Kosovo (the stabilization operation in Bosnia ended on December 2, 2004), with the rest deployed in permanent bases or as part of routine overseas rotations. Not

since the Vietnam War have so many US troops been engaged in military operations overseas. The average percentage of the active force engaged in overseas military operations for the years 2003 and 2004 is more than five times the average for the years 1992–2002.

According to the same report, given that the military force that can be sent overseas on an expeditionary mission is limited to war-fighting units that account for about 60 percent of the total US military personnel (the rest are infrastructure support units), the United States currently has deployed overseas about 45 percent of its combat personnel. The percentage varies across services: for the Air Force and Navy, the percentage overseas is somewhat smaller; but for the Marine Corps and Army, the number is higher, with more than 60 percent for the Army.

Under such circumstances, the US military are hard-pressed to sustain troop rotations in Iraq. Even after President Bush's May 1, 2003, declaration announcing the end of major combat operations in Iraq, law and order in Iraq has remained fragile, with no signs of terrorist attacks on the US troops and Iraqi citizens subsiding. Since the United States started military action in Iraq, more than 1,000 soldiers have been killed, mostly after the May 1, 2003, declaration. According to a press briefing given by the DOD on November 6, 2003, under the force rotation plan "Operation Iraqi Freedom 2" for 2004, the US forces stationed in Iraq were supposed to complete rotation in the spring of 2004 and be cut from 4 division and 17 brigade equivalents (102,000 active and 28,000 reserve personnel) to about 3 division and 13 brigade equivalents (about 66,000 active and about 39,000 reserve). However, due to the ever deteriorating situation in Iraq, the US government newly sent forces including one brigade from the 2nd Infantry Division in South Korea, and the tour of duty of those units that were supposed to return home was extended. The resulting number of US troops stationed in Iraq in 2004 stood at 135,000–138,000. On December 1, 2004, the DOD announced that, in an effort to ensure security in the run-up to a National Assembly election scheduled for January 2005, the tour of duty of those units waiting for homecoming would be extended beyond their current rotation dates, and the existing troop levels would be increased to about 150,000 by dispatching additional units. When this happens, the number of troops stationed in Iraq will increase to the highest level since the US military action in Iraq.

The percentages of the Reserve component (National Guard and Reserves) being activated and sent overseas have been rising. According to a report

released by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) on April 30, 2004, the largest number of National Guard members since the Second World War has been activated (350,000 Army Guard personnel and 107,000 Air Guard personnel) after the September 11 terrorist attacks. The constant and large-scale Reserve component call-up has given rise to a number of problems. Firstly, over 51 percent of Army Guard personnel and 31 percent of Air Guard personnel have been either placed on alert or activated for federal homeland security missions or overseas missions related to the global war on terrorism. Secondly, with the rise in demand for units with certain specialties, such as military police, transportation, and combat arms, their tour lengths have been extended or they have been repeatedly activated. According to the GAO report, the Army Guard is retraining and transferring low-demand units, such as field artillery, for high-demand missions like security to make up for the personnel shortage. As the Air Guard basically maintains readiness for a quick deployment, it is least affected by the rapid mobilization now taking place, but its personnel have been placed on alert or activated for missions related to combat operations in Iraq or federal homeland security missions. Although the percentage of those called up for active duty in the Air Guard has declined during the past year, some of them have been activated outside their normal rotational schedules and their tour lengths have been extended. Some units have been assigned new homeland security missions such as flying combat air patrols and providing radar coverage over the United States. As of December 1, 2004, the federal government had activated a total of 183,431 National Guard and Reserve personnel.

The prolonged stationing of troops in Iraq is placing a heavy burden on the US forces, not only in financial terms but also in terms of manpower. The DOD is working to rebalance the active and reserve components in order to improve their overall balance and their response capabilities in times of conflict. With a view to using its military human resources effectively, the DOD is pressing ahead with a program for converting nonmilitary tasks currently conducted by uniformed personnel into civilian or private contractors' jobs. In fact, the DOD has already identified more than 50,000 positions that can be so reallocated, and has been converting them at a rate of 10,000 positions a year.

In addition to being stretched in terms of manpower, a shortage of some types of equipment has been identified in Iraq. In particularly short supply are up-armored Humvees (UAHs) and add-on armor kits, designed to provide

personnel and vehicles with additional protection against terrorist attacks. According to a briefing given by the US Army Materiel Command (USAMC) on October 29, 2004, nearly 5,100 UAHs have been deployed in Iraq, while the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) is asking for 8,105. The USAMC has sent 8,800 add-on armor kits to Iraq, but USCENTCOM is asking for 13,872. The Army, meanwhile, is in the process of introducing new Armored Support Vehicles that are larger and have more armor protection than UAHs. Seventy of these “mini Stryker” vehicles are already on their way to Iraq.

As things stand, the fight against terrorism and the US military operations in Iraq show no signs of ending any time soon. Therefore, the manpower shortages are likely to persist for some time to come. Given the near absence of a pool of strategic reserves, an outbreak of a new conflict would force the United States to make some hard choices. Therefore, reducing the military manpower requirements in Iraq and burden on the US military by achieving an early stabilization of that country will be an important task of the second-term Bush administration. Aware of this, the Bush administration is making major efforts to strengthen the nascent Iraqi security forces so that the Iraqis themselves can manage law-and-order tasks in the country. According to a DOD briefing on December 1, 2004, about 115,000 members of the Iraqi security force were trained and equipped, and that number was to be increased to 125,000 by the end of January 2005. To ensure the stabilization of the situation in Iraq it will also be essential to build a broader-based international assistance framework with the participation of countries such as France and Germany that had opposed the US military action in Iraq.

2. Shedding the Cold War-legacy Military Posture: Defense Transformation and the Global Posture Review (GPR)

(1) Defense Transformation: Restructuring the Cold War-legacy Force

The origin of the post-Cold War reviews of the US conventional military posture dates back to the administration of George Bush. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the Gulf War in 1991 had a decisive impact on the direction of these review processes that took place thereafter. The Clinton administration conducted the Bottom-up Review in 1993, and decided to change the conventional force-planning paradigm from one that is primarily

designed to deter and fight Soviet aggression to a strategy that seeks to deal with two nearly simultaneous major theater wars (MTW). As a result, the administration sharply reduced the force levels of the US military, including the manpower strength of the entire military and the number of active Army divisions, Air Force wings, and Navy carrier battle groups. However, it made little, if any, progress in changing the fundamental structure of the military from what it was in the Cold War era. Most notably, the Army's armor-heavy force structure and the concentration of the US forces overseas in Europe and Northeast Asia were largely kept intact.

While continuing the war on terrorism, the Bush administration initiated a sweeping review of its Cold War-legacy military posture that the United States had maintained throughout the 1990s, from two perspectives. One is "defense transformation." In this regard, the Bush administration has already shifted defense planning from the "threat-driven" model that informed the "2-MTW strategy" to a "capabilities-based" approach. This approach focuses more on how an adversary might fight rather than who the adversary might be or where a war might occur. Having changed its defense planning paradigm, the United States is striving to transform the US military into a flexible force with joint rapid-deployment and expeditionary capabilities. The second aspect of its defense review is the GPR, a process that seeks to recast the global US military posture in light of the new security environment since the September 11 attacks. These two are not separate processes; instead, they are expected to complement with each other, with the strengthening of US military capabilities through the transformation facilitating the GPR. The common objective here is to depart from the Cold War-legacy military posture in terms of the force structure and global disposition of the US military.

Back in the late Clinton era, the US government had formulated its own transformation strategy with the aim of securing US military superiority in the 21st century. It had three components: the Revolution in Military Affairs, pursuit of a selective equipment modernization effort, and the Revolution in Business Affairs. The Bush administration's defense transformation basically builds on its predecessor's transformation strategy. Transformation is a comprehensive concept that covers the whole spectrum of national defense. It is a long-term process that transforms the entire defense posture not merely by innovating technologies or modernizing weapons, but also by combining new concepts, capabilities, people, and organizations. As such, it does not have a

specific endpoint. On November 26, 2001, the DOD established an Office of Force Transformation, which released a document entitled *Transformation Planning Guidance* in April 2003 that summed up its comprehensive policy. This office also made public *Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach* in the fall of the same year, followed by *Elements of Defense Transformation* in October 2004.

The six operational capabilities the US military aims to develop through the transformation process are: (a) to protect the US homeland and its bases overseas; (b) to project and sustain power in distant theaters; (c) to deny enemies sanctuary; (d) to protect US information networks from attack; (e) to maintain unhindered access to space and protect US space capabilities from attack; and (f) to develop an interoperable, joint C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) architecture and capability. These operational capabilities will be achieved through several stages: (a) strengthening joint operations capabilities by developing joint operating concepts; (b) exploiting US intelligence advantages; and (c) concept development and experimentation through war gaming, modeling and simulation, Joint National Training Capability exercises and experiments, and operational lessons learned. Through these processes, the US military aims to strengthen flexible, joint operations capabilities, enabling them to rapidly commit units to locations that are most suitable for overwhelming an enemy in all areas of operations with devastating effects; and these units will be able to exploit precision-strike capabilities and strong combat capabilities backed by unrivaled speed, power projection capabilities and battlespace awareness. The operational capabilities that the US forces have demonstrated in the campaigns that led to the fall of Baghdad offered a glimpse of how future wars will be waged. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz mentioned as being characteristic of the US military action in Iraq the following points: (a) the capability of gathering intelligence concerning the location and disposition of enemy forces has been vastly improved by extensively using small special operations units, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, all connected together by new communications links; (b) speed, i.e., the US forces arrived in theater in less than half the time (three months, compared to seven months in the Gulf War); (c) the use of a large number of precision-guided weapons; and (d) lethality, namely, the fact that combined with the use of an air campaign focused to a far greater degree on the destruction of Iraqi ground forces than in

the Gulf War, the United States deployed ground forces one quarter the size of those used in the Gulf War, for rapid, simultaneous operations in Iraq. He pointed out that the approach taken by the US forces in Iraq reflected the concept of “battlespace,” replacing that of the “battlefield.”

In testimonies given before the Senate and House Armed Services Committees in February and September 2004, respectively, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld explained the achievements made through the transformation. The Army is moving away from the Napoleonic division structure to a 21st century “modular army.” This is designed to scrap the traditional division-centric organizations in favor of more flexible organizations, made up of self-contained, more self-sustaining brigades. Under this approach, these brigades will be flexibly combined depending on missions or changes in the situation—they will no longer be assigned permanently to a particular division. For example, for Operation Iraqi Freedom 3, the 3rd Infantry Division was composed of its own two brigades plus the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Armored Division and the 256th Brigade of the Louisiana National Guard. Recognizing that the fight against terrorism taxes Army personnel too heavily and that conventional doctrine hinders the Army from quickly responding to regional combatant commanders’ needs, the shift to the modular army is being aggressively pursued under the leadership of US Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Schoomaker as a showpiece of the transformation. The goal of the shift is to form more agile and deployable brigades out of the existing ones each of which is permanently organized under a division, and to thereby increase the number of brigades from 33 to between 43 and 48. The communications and intelligence activities have been improved by developing Space Based Radar capable of monitoring both fixed and mobile targets deep behind enemy lines and over denied areas, in any kind of weather. The capabilities and missions of the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) have been significantly expanded. USSOCOM has moved from exclusively a “supporting” command to both a “supporting” and a “supported” command, with the authority to plan and execute missions in the global war on terrorism.

In the area of restructuring unified commands, the reorganized Joint Forces Command focuses on continuing transformation; USNORTHCOM is responsible for defending the homeland; and the newly established Strategic Command is in charge of early warning of, and defense against, missile attack and the conduct of long-range attacks. Under the main plans for strengthening

the force structure, a total of six brigades were earmarked for conversion into Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs) equipped with Stryker Interim Armored Vehicles. The Army has already completed conversion of two brigades. One out of the two SBCTs has been deployed to northern Iraq, and a third SBCT will be available in 2005. Besides, four *Ohio*-class nuclear-powered fleet ballistic-missile submarines carrying Trident missiles have been converted into nuclear-powered guided-missile submarines capable of delivering special forces and cruise missiles into denied areas.

The crux of transformation is “jointness” or “joint operation.” It seeks to produce “synergy effects” by combining the capabilities and functions of each service and branch. To accomplish this, it is important that they are effectively combined under the joint force commander, with their missions necessitating a flexible and impromptu unit organization as appropriate or required. As such, this approach will pose a challenge to the military culture that honors the tradition of each service and branch.

(2) The GPR: A Switchover from the Cold War-legacy Military Posture

The GPR traces its origins back to the *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* of 2001 and the *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* of September 2002. These reports stressed the inadequacy of the US global military posture in the new security environment that had emerged after the September 11 terrorist attacks, and the need for a review of US forces deployment around the world. The main point of the GPR is to ensure the flexibility of deployment of the US forces in the new security environment where it is difficult to predict when and where the United States might be confronted with threats.

During the Cold War years, the overseas presence of US forces was concentrated mainly in Europe and Northeast Asia, with a clear idea as to who the enemies were and where the battlefields lay. In Europe, the frontline lay in the border dividing Germany, and several hundreds of thousands of US troops were stationed semipermanently in West Germany in those days. On the whole, the posture was of a defensive nature aimed at deterring, and defending Europe from, a Soviet invasion. As such, it served as a tripwire that guaranteed the automatic involvement of the United States in the event of a conflict. With the end of the Cold War, the frontline disappeared in Europe and the tripwire

US Navy fleet surge exercise: “Summer Pulse 04”

The defense transformation is designed to strengthen the ability to rapidly deploy US forces to remote areas, and the US Navy conducted a large-scale fleet surge exercise for the first time from early June to August 2004. This exercise, codenamed “Summer Pulse 04,” was aimed at demonstrating the Navy’s ability to conduct global surge operations in the new Fleet Response Plan (FRP) operational construct, and at signaling to its allies and potential adversaries that substantial sea-based combat power can respond on short notice.

Seven CSGs—the USS *Kitty Hawk*, USS *Enterprise*, USS *John F. Kennedy*, USS *George Washington*, USS *John C. Stennis*, USS *Harry S Truman*, and USS *Ronald Reagan*—participated in the exercise. They validated the maritime power that the United States can bring to bear throughout the world in short order, and highlighted their inherent flexibility in adapting to the changing security environment; conducted operations in every US combatant command’s area of operations and carried out joint military and multinational exercises, significant naval training, and port visits around the world; carried out extensive logistic and shore infrastructure support that were necessary to successfully execute a large-scale surge operation; verified the operational concepts in the Navy’s “Sea Power 21” strategy; and improved its interoperability with numerous allies and coalition partners, as well as with the other services and branches of the US forces.

Crews who participated in the exercise were notified more than 30 days in advance for coordination and planning considerations with US allies and coalition partners taking part. In a real world crisis, the FRP enables the Navy to deploy six CSGs within 30 days and two additional CSGs within 90 days or less.

The USS *Enterprise* (extreme left) and the USS *Harry S Truman* (extreme right) participating in “Summer Pulse 04” (US Navy photo by Photographer’s Mate Airman Joshua E. Helgeson)

function was no longer necessary, leading to a reduction in US troops in Europe in the 1990s. However, the basic structure of the US military presence in Europe, which is heavily concentrated in Germany and centered on heavy divisions, has been maintained as a legacy of the Cold War. The GPR in Europe will need to focus on a review of such a posture.

In East Asia, on the other hand, the possibility of a large-scale conflict in the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait cannot be ruled out even after the end of the Cold War. There is a high probability that the dispute over the Spratly

Islands will become a source of conflict. The standoff across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) dividing North and South Korea continues to this day. In conducting the GPR in Northeast Asia including in particular the US Forces Korea (USFK), the United States has to take measures to maintain and strengthen deterrence so as not to give any signals hinting at the withdrawal of its military presence from the region.


As a matter of course, US overseas military bases will be either closed or consolidated under the GPR. They are divided into three types: main operating base (MOB), forward operating site (FOS), and cooperative security location (CSL). An MOB is an enduring strategic asset established in friendly territory with permanently stationed combat forces, exercise sites, command and control structures, and family support facilities. It has the function of supporting FOSs and CSLs. An FOS is a host-nation facility (“warm site”) where a limited number of US military support personnel can be stationed, and is expandable in times of a contingency. Prepositioned equipment may be stored, and it can host rotational forces and serve as a base for bilateral and regional training. A CSL is a host-nation facility with little or no permanent US presence that provides contingency access and is a focal point for security cooperation activities. It may store prepositioned equipment and can be expanded into an FOS on short notice. In order to move combat units rapidly to a desired location, it is essential to secure adequate strategic mobility. To do this, it is essential to provide not only ground, maritime, and air transport capabilities but also prepositioned equipment and command communications infrastructure along transport routes. Under the GPR, MOBs in countries like Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Japan, and South Korea are expected to be consolidated but retained. However, unlike during the Cold War years, the US forces stationed overseas are now expected not only to be ready to fight where they are but also to rapidly respond to conflicts in remote areas. With that in mind, the US government indicates that its forces will have to rely more heavily on FOSs and CSLs.

In the security environment after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the region that stretches from the Middle East to Northeast Asia and runs on to the southern fringe of the Eurasian continent—the so-called “arc of instability”—has been identified as the priority area for the US military’s rapid response capability. The final report of the 9-11 Commission referred to the following areas as potential terrorist sanctuaries: western Pakistan and the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region; southern or western Afghanistan; the

Arabian Peninsula and the region stretching from the Horn of Africa and southwestern Kenya; Southeast Asia; West Africa; and Europe, especially Central and East European cities with expatriate Muslim communities. It further argues: “In the 20th century, strategists focused on the world’s great industrial heartlands. In the 21st [century], the focus is in the opposition direction, toward remote regions and failing states. The United States has had to find ways to extend its reach, straining the limits of its influence.”

Until recently, the United States had no permanent infrastructure in these regions. Nowadays, however, as part of its efforts for the war on terrorism, the United States successfully concluded agreements with Central Asian countries neighboring Afghanistan that grant the United States contingency access and permit the use of their infrastructure. At present, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan have authorized US forces to use their base facilities and have given overflight rights to its military aircraft, and the United States maintains limited military presence in these countries. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have also given US military aircraft overflight rights and authorized transshipment of supplies to US forces. For the United States, which had no foothold in that part of the Eurasian continent sandwiched between Russia and China, the military presence and contingency access thus secured in Central Asia has crucial importance for its security policy.

Figure 7.1. US military presence overseas and the “arc of instability”



Sources: Data from the US Department of Defense Web site.

From the Chinese perspective, the US military presence in these Central Asian countries, coupled with the strengthening of its naval and air power in the Pacific region, heightens their sense of “encirclement.” With reference to this, the *Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China* released by the DOD on May 28, 2004, states that “while seeing opportunities for cooperation with the United States emerging from the global war on terrorism, China’s leaders appear to have concluded that the net effect of the US-led campaign has been further encirclement of China, specifically by placing US military forces in Central Asia, strengthening US defense relations with Pakistan, India, and Japan, and returning the US military to Southeast Asia.” Although the United States and China have developed seemingly cooperative relations, the broadening area of operations of the People’s Liberation Army—especially beyond China’s immediate coastline towards Taiwan—suggests that the two countries are potentially in a head-on-head competition.

3. The GPR and East Asia

(1) Realignment of the US Overseas Military Presence

The realignment plan of US forces overseas is being pushed under the GPR, but what will it entail? In an address delivered on August 16, 2004, President Bush said: “Although we still have a significant presence overseas, under the plan I’m announcing today, over the next 10 years, we will bring home about 60,000 to 70,000 uniformed personnel, and about 100,000 members and civilian employees and their family members.” This means a significant part of the US troops currently stationed overseas—around 200,000, excluding those currently in Iraq and Afghanistan—will be withdrawn. He also argued that the US current force posture was designed to protect the United States and its allies from Soviet aggression that no longer exists, and made clear that the United States will over the coming decade deploy a “more agile and more flexible” force, station most of them at home, and move some of the US troops and capabilities to new locations so that they can respond quickly to unexpected threats.

President Bush did not disclose any specifics of the realignment plan for each region. However, according to various remarks made by key government officials, plans already agreed or under discussion with the countries concerned include the following.

In Europe, the outdated force structure and disposition of the Cold War period will be replaced by a highly flexible force and headquarters structure capable of rapid deployment. According to his testimony given on September 23, 2004, before the US Senate Armed Services Committee, Gen. James Jones, commander of the US European Command (USEUCOM) and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, said: “Since 1991, [US]EUCOM force structure has been reduced from 315,000 troops and 1,421 installations to 112,000 troops and approximately 500 installations concentrated in Western Europe . . . Our remaining forces, now at less than 40 percent of our Cold War forces, are not necessarily equipped or sited to adequately address the emergence of an entirely new array of threats and security requirements.” Under the realignment plan, two divisions that have been deployed in Germany on the assumption that a land battle could take place in Europe will be sent back home. Jones argued that USEUCOM’s future defense posture should be more expeditionary rather than positional, capable of rapid deployment outside Europe. For this purpose, one SBCT, capable of rapid deployment, will be sent to Europe. The DOD is also working with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on the consolidation of redundant headquarters organization with that of NATO and the establishment of a NATO Response Force. According to Gen. Jones, a significant part of the US forces in Europe will be rotational, and USEUCOM is seeking access to facilities in, and routine freedom of transit through, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, and the Caucasus countries, as well as providing these countries with training assistance.

In the Middle East and South Asia, about 18,000 troops were stationed in Afghanistan, and 135,000 to 138,000 troops in Iraq, as of the end of 2004. Access sites and facilities provided by the allies and Central Asian countries during the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are highly valued as a firm base for future security cooperation. In these regions, the United States plans to maintain its military presence by rotating conventional and special operations forces, and to retain access sites for use in times of crisis. It is also working to establish a network of these sites by strengthening some of them. On the other hand, in late April 2003, the United States agreed with Saudi Arabia to withdraw most of its forces (about 5,000) from Saudi Arabia and carried it out by the end of August 2003.

In the Asia-Pacific region, the realignment plan for the USFK is under way. According to a testimony before the US House Armed Services Committee by

Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz on June 18, 2003, this plan has been drawn up to strengthen the forces' flexibility and mobility by moving them from their current positions in areas immediately south of the DMZ. These changes will put the USFK in a more advantageous position, while reducing the prospect of having to fight to recover initial losses of territory in such a conflict. The United States and South Korea have already reached an agreement on the following plans. Firstly, the United States will redeploy 12,500 USFK troops (out of about 34,000 in total) from South Korea in three phases that will last until 2008. Secondly, the US forces in the Seoul metropolitan area will be moved to the Pyongtaek-Osan area about 60 kilometers south of Seoul. USFK Headquarters and US-Republic of Korea (ROK) Combined Forces Command Headquarters at the Yongsan Garrison will also be relocated to the same area. It was also agreed to eventually relocate the 2nd Infantry Division (currently deployed immediately south of the DMZ) to the Pyongtaek-Osan area, but a final decision on the timing of the relocation will be made by taking careful account of the situation prevailing on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. Thirdly, the responsibility for patrolling the southern half of the DMZ, except the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom, will be delegated to the ROK Army. (The delegation was completed on October 31, 2004, and the ROK Army started patrols on November 1.) Finally, by 2011, the USFK will return 34 military bases (covering 12.18 million pyongs, one pyong being approximately 3.3 square meters) and training areas—a total land area of 51.57 million pyongs—to South Korea. The land used by the USFK will be reduced to 25.15 million pyongs, or 34 percent of what the USFK has been using. Since August 2004, the USFK has sent to Iraq a brigade of 3,600 troops from the 2nd Infantry Division, which is included in the planned relocation of 12,500 troops.

The implementation of this relocation plan would mark the abandonment of the tripwire strategy, which guaranteed automatic involvement of the United States in the event of an invasion by North Korea. Meanwhile, with a view to maintaining deterrence on the Korean Peninsula, where the standoff between the North and the South continues, and to strengthening the combat capabilities of the US forces in East Asia, the United States is planning to invest about \$11 billion over the next four years. The joint communiqué of the 36th US-ROK Security Consultative Meeting between US Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and his ROK counterpart Yoon Kwang-ung on October 22, 2004, reaffirmed the US commitment to the security of, and the continued provision of a nuclear

umbrella for, South Korea, and stressed the necessity to maintain the military presence of the United States and the contribution the US-ROK alliance has made to bolstering peace and stability in Northeast Asia and in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.

On the other hand, a noteworthy development in the realignment of the US military presence in this region has been the growing strategic importance of Guam. In a testimony given before the US House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific on June 26, 2003, Adm. Thomas B. Fargo, then commander of the US Pacific Command (USPACOM), stated: “[W]e think Guam is absolutely strategic, in our view, with respect to the Pacific. It has the ability to maintain our ships and certainly provide logistic support. And its key location in the near vicinity of the East Asia littoral makes it a very attractive location.” While acknowledging it would be “premature to make any commitments at this point of time,” he also stated that Guam’s future would be “very bright and positive” as a “key location for our military forces”; that the great majority of its inhabitants were welcoming the presence of the US forces there; and that two nuclear-powered attack submarines had already been home-ported on the island with a third one joining them shortly. In a Senate Armed Services Committee testimony given on September 23, 2004, Fargo stated that USPACOM will: (a) collocate an SBCT with high-speed vessels and C-17 transport aircraft in Hawaii and Alaska; (b) deploy rotational bomber elements to Guam (six bombers are routinely stationed there); and (c) permanently station the third submarine in Guam. He also stated that USPACOM plans to homeport an additional carrier strike group (CSG) in the Pacific region. If this plan reaches fruition, USPACOM will have two CSGs in the Western Pacific, including the one already homeported in Yokosuka, Japan.

On the realignment of the USFJ, Japan and the United States have yet to reach a concrete agreement. In his aforementioned testimony in September, Adm. Fargo said that the United States had been working closely with Japan to reduce the overall number of US troops in Japan, to lessen the burden on the local communities and to adjust the force posture in Okinawa. He went on to say that through these consultations, the United States would mature and strengthen the US-Japan security alliance and assure an enduring presence of critical forward forces and war-fighting capability. In a joint statement issued after a meeting of the Japan-US Security Consultative Committee held on February 19, 2005, the two sides confirmed common strategic objectives of the

two countries, produced as a result of efforts by the defense and foreign policy authorities of the two countries. The statement also confirmed that the two countries will continue to examine the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan's Self-Defense Forces and the US Armed Forces for effective response to diverse challenges. Besides, Japan and the United States agreed to intensify consultations on realignment of US force structure in Japan, with a view to reducing the burden on local communities while maintaining the USFJ's deterrence and capabilities.

(2) Allies and Realignment

The GPR now being pushed by the Bush administration is likely to have a far-reaching impact on the defense relations between the United States and its allies. After the Cold War, the United States made a commitment to maintain around 100,000 troops in the Asia-Pacific region. The sheer number of troops had a psychological effect, symbolizing the firmness of US commitment to the region. However, with the current US defense policy under the Bush administration emphasizing "capability" rather than mere "number," this situation is bound to change in a fundamental manner.

But this does not mean that the firmness of the US commitment to Asia-Pacific security will be diminished with the reduction of its troops. At the Senate Armed Services Committee, for instance, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld replied as follows to the question whether realigning the US military posture might send a dangerous message to North Korea about its commitment to the South: "The answer is an emphatic 'no'. We know that sheer numbers are no longer appropriate measures of commitment or capability. As I have said earlier, our capabilities in defending the Republic of Korea are increasing, not decreasing."

The availability of military bases is essential for the United States to overcome its vast distance from, and maintain access to, East Asia. In his testimony quoted above, Secretary Rumsfeld also explained the importance of the existing military bases in East Asia by saying that "our ideas build upon our current ground, air, and naval access to overcome vast distances." And for the Bush administration, the importance of the US-Japan alliance as the linchpin of the US security strategy in Asia has not changed.

On the other hand, massive military power has been built up in East Asia, and a number of countries in this region are devoting major efforts to

modernizing their military. There still remain uncertain and unpredictable factors, such as the problems of the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait. North Korea has developed WMD programs and deployed ballistic missiles. It also has large-scale special operations forces. China has been pressing ahead with the modernization of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and the naval and air forces, and seeking to expand its area of operations at sea. This being the case, the US military presence in East Asia and the Japan-US security arrangements are critical to the peace and security of the Asia-Pacific region.

After all, the GPR cannot be carried out unilaterally by the United States. The Bush administration attaches great importance to consultation with its allies about the issues that arise in its process. In a statement released on November 25, 2003, President Bush said that “US national security is closely linked to the security of our friends, allies, and global partners, and this [global posture] review will serve to strengthen existing relationships and increase our ability to carry out our defense commitments more effectively. To meet this objective, we will invite the full participation of our friends and allies.”

Defense Secretary Rumsfeld said that “our troops should be located in places where they are wanted, welcomed, and needed” and underlined the need to “work out arrangements with countries that are interested in the presence of the US and which are in closer proximity to the regions of the world where our troops are more likely to be needed in the future.” US troops should be located in environments that are hospitable to their movements. Pointing out that existing legal arrangements with US allies have become inadequate, he further maintained that since US soldiers may be called to a variety of locations in the war on terrorism, the United States should develop more flexible legal and support arrangements with its allies and partners where it might choose to locate, deploy or exercise its troops.

At the Japan-US summit meeting held on September 21, 2004, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi stressed to President Bush that while maintaining deterrence by the US forces, the United States should consider reducing the burden imposed on the people of localities hosting US bases. In response President Bush said that the US would make efforts to reduce the burden on the local people by achieving efficient deterrence. The National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005–, adopted by the Security Council of Japan and the cabinet on December 10, 2004, state that “Japan will proactively engage in strategic dialogue with the United States on wide-ranging security issues such

as role-sharing between the two countries and US military posture, including the structure of US forces in Japan . . . In doing so, the Government of Japan will bear in mind the need to reduce the excessive burden that the existence of US military bases and facilities places on local communities, while maintaining the deterrent that the US military presence in Japan provides.”

Through the GPR, the United States aims to expand defense relationships with its allies and build new partnerships by tailoring its presence in such a way that would optimally balance the 21st century military requirements of the United States, its relationships with allies and partners, the strategic environment of the region, and its impact on host nations. In order to pursue its two objectives of securing regional deterrence capabilities of the US forces in Japan and reducing the burden on the local communities, Japan on its part will need to map out a coherent, strategic response that will be based on an analysis of the entire picture and aims of the US realignment plans and take into account the changing functions of US bases and forces.