Chapter 9

U.S. Security Policy for East Asia—One Year after September 11

How have the security policies of the United States, and its bilateral relations with the countries important to it, changed in the year following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001?

The attacks forced the United States to closely reexamine its security policy at the outset of the 21st century. The United States focused its efforts on the war in Afghanistan, and prepared for a prolonged and widespread fight against terrorism. Homeland security has become the top priority of the U.S. military, and the government has announced that it retains the option for preemptive strikes. The Bush administration realizes that the link between terrorist groups and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is its most serious threat, and made Iraq its next target in the war against terrorism. In addition, international cooperation for military operations in Afghanistan and combating terrorism are likely to pave the way for the United States to build up its presence in Central Asian countries bordering Afghanistan, raising the likelihood that the security environment will change in central Eurasia.

In East Asia, the United States and China confirmed their commitment to build "constructive and cooperative" relations, and since September 11, they have been cooperating in the war against terrorism. However, this cooperation has not bridged their differences over Taiwan and the abuse of human rights. The growing U.S. military presence in Central Asia, combined with the western Pacific, has in effect encircled China, impacting the basic structure of U.S.-China relations—a confrontation between a maritime power (the United States) and a land power (China). The Bush administration has become increasingly critical of North Korea, especially since September 11. Though the United States seeks a peaceful solution, U.S.-North Korea relations have become tense since the latter admitted to pursuing nuclear weapons. The necessity to coordinate the policies of Japan, the United States, and South Korea regarding developments in North Korea, especially after Prime Minister Koizumi's visit to Pyongyang, has become increasingly urgent.

1. Developing Measures for Combating Terrorism

(1) A Review of Security Policy

As the January 1991 Gulf War has become the model for U.S. defense programs of the 1990s, the September 11 terrorist attacks had a profound effect on U.S. security policy at the outset of the 21st century. It may be concluded, from a review of U.S. security policy, that the United States wanted to strike a pose of being ready to fight a prolonged war on terrorism—on the domestic as well as international fronts—while engaged in the war on terrorism in Afghanistan, with the key word of its policy being "safety."

During this period, the Bush administration published three reports dealing with U.S. security policy: (1) *Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2001 (QDR01)*, released by the Defense Department in September 2001; (2) The Defense Secretary's *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, in August 2002; and (3) *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (The President's Report)*, released by the White House in September 2002. These reports summarize U.S. security policies from different post-September 11 perspectives. According to the President's Report, "U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests. The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better." The report states that the United States, with its military superiority as the only superpower in the world, will maintain forces "strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military buildup in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States." Some common threads of the Bush administration's security policy since September 11, contained in the three reports, may be summarized as follows.

The first point concerns U.S. perceptions of the strategic environment. Undoubtedly, the biggest impact of the September 11 attacks was U.S. recognition that its homeland was no longer safe. Unlike

the nuclear threat it faced during the Cold War, the United States—"an insular power of continental size" as it is separated from both ends of the Eurasian Continent by two oceans—is now vulnerable to a surprise attack by a different type of enemy, which has made homeland defense the top U.S. military priority.

Related to this new awareness of the strategic environment is the U.S. government's view that along a broad arc of instability that stretches from the Middle East to Northeast Asia, there exists a volatile mix of rising and declining regional powers. The Defense Secretary's Report points out the possibility of a large-scale arms race developing in Asia, and predicts that "maintaining a stable balance in Asia will be both a critical and formidable task. The possibility exists that a military competitor with a substantial resource base will emerge in the region." It is obvious that the author has China in mind. For this reason, the Bush administration has reviewed its global force deployment and is considering a major force deployment shift to this region. When viewed from a U.S. perspective, the distances are vast, and the density of U.S. basing and en route infrastructure is lower than in other critical regions. This places a premium on securing additional access and infrastructure agreements and on developing systems capable of sustained operations at long distances with minimal theater-based support.

The fact that Afghanistan is a hotbed of terrorism suggests that September 11 drew world attention to the danger and threats harbored in weak states and ungoverned areas. The absence of capable or responsible governments in many countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America creates a fertile ground for non-state actors to engage in terrorism, in acquiring nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons, in illegal drug trafficking, and other illicit activities across borders. The Bush administration believes that September 11 demonstrated that terrorists possess both the motivation and ability to conduct devastating attacks on U.S. territory, its citizens and infrastructure, and the government is on full alert against the threat of WMD by non-state actors.

The second point—a logical consequence of the post-September 11 strategic environment outlined above—is a review of America's global military presence, aiming to strengthen its forward deterrence. This is based on the belief that its overseas presence, concentrated in Western Europe and Northeast Asia as a result of the Cold War, is inadequate to deal with the new environment in which U.S. interests are global and potential threats are emerging in other areas of the world. The United States feels that in order to deter threats and an invasion of the homeland or its allies, forward deployment of its forces in Europe, Northeast Asia, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia is necessary, according to the needs of the respective areas. Needless to say, regional security cooperation

Commentary

The Department of Homeland Security

On November 25, 2002, President George W. Bush signed into the law for the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security. According to this law, 22 federal agencies were integrated into the Department of Homeland Security, with an annual budget of approximately $37 billion and a staff of 170,000 people.

President Bush first proposed the homeland security department concept in June 2002, seeking a way to effectively deal with terrorist attacks on the United States. A similar agency, the Homeland Security Agency, had been established in the White House immediately after September 11. Behind the concept was the absolute necessity of creating a leading federal agency capable of closer and faster coordination and the exchange of information between the various government agencies responsible for preventing terrorism.

The mandate of the Department of Homeland Security is to prevent terrorism in the United States, to reduce the country's vulnerability to terrorism, and to localize—and repair—damage following a terrorist attack. To carry out these duties, four bureaus are charged with the responsibility to: (1) ensure the safety of borders and transportation; (2) prepare for, and respond to, an emergency; (3) take countermeasures against an attack by chemical, biological, radioactive, or nuclear weapons; and (4) analyze information and protect the country's infrastructure.

The Homeland Security Department oversees more than 100 government agencies concerned with protecting the country. However, since organizations that had previously been dealing with terrorism, such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI), have remained pretty much intact, problems may arise regarding cooperation and the division of responsibilities among the various agencies.

Nearly Two Dozen Agencies Move to Homeland

Congress made few changes to President Bush's consolidation of agencies into a Homeland Security Department. Some, such as the Secret Service, Coast Guard and Transportation Security Administration, will retain their identities.

Agency Moved from	Homeland Security Department			
	Border and Transportation Security	Emergency Preparedness and Response	Science and Technology	Information Analysis Infrastructure and Protection
Justice	•Immigration and Naturalization Service •Office of Domestic Preparedness	•Domestic emergency support team •National Domestic Preparedness Office (FBI)		•National Infrastructure Protection Center
Treasury	•U.S. Customs Service •Federal Law Enforcement Training Center			
Agriculture			•Plum Island Animal Disease Center	
Transportation	•Transportation Security Administration			
GSA	•Federal Protective Service			•Federal Computer Response Center
HHS		•Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear response assets		
Energy		•Nuclear incident response	•Lawrence Livemore National Laboratory •Environment Measurements Laboratory	•National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center •Energy Security Program
Defense			•National Bio-Weapons Defense Analysis Center	•National Communications System
Commerce		•Integrated Hazard Information System		•Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office
Independent Agencies		•Federal Emergency Management Agency		
Other	The Coast Guard (from Transportation), the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (from Agriculture), and Secret Service (from Treasury) report directly to the department secretary.			

Source: *Congressional Quarterly*, November 16, 2002.

with its allies should be emphasized.

In reviewing the posture of the U.S. military presence overseas, the following key requirements have been emphasized: new combinations of immediately deployable forward-stationed forces; globally available reconnaissance, strike, and command and control assets, information operations; and rapidly deployable, highly lethal and sustainable forces that may come from outside a theater of operations. Although in a review of the U.S. military presence in the Western Pacific, the *QDR01* indicates that the navy will increase its aircraft carrier battle group presence, and add three to four surface combat ships and guided cruise missile submarines (SSGNs) to the theater, at present, there are no signs of an increase. While small units have moved to the Southwestern Asia region on a rotating basis, there has been no substantial change in U.S. fighting capability in the region. On the other hand, international cooperation with the United States in Afghanistan and the war on terrorism—particularly, the agreements allowing the stationing of U.S. troops in the Eurasian Continent—have improved the environment for operations in remote areas.

The third point is the U.S. option to launch a preemptive strike to combat terrorism. The United States did not rule out this option in the past as part of its traditional strategy of deterrence based on the threat of retaliation. However, the U.S. emphasis on the necessity of a preemptive strike over the past year or so is a direct result of the September 11 terrorist attacks, and this has become a top priority with its homeland defense in the war on terrorism.

Behind the adoption of these guidelines lies the imminent threat of a rogue state tying up with terrorists who seek to acquire WMD. The President's Report points out the following characteristics of rogue states: (1) they brutalize their own people and squander their national resources for the personal gain of the rulers; (2) they display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbors, and callously violate international treaties to which they are party; (3) they are determined to acquire WMD, along with other advanced

military technology, to be used as threats or employed offensively to achieve the aggressive designs of these regimes; (4) they sponsor terrorism around the globe; and (5) they reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands.

The notion of "rogue states" emerged after the Gulf War, in the defense debates of the 1990s, and they replaced the Cold War-era Soviet Union as the new type of threat in the threat-based defense planning. Some doubted the accuracy of applying the term to Iraq and North Korea, due to an overestimation of their military power, yet during the ensuing years, this nightmare—WMD and ballistic missiles developed by rogue states getting into the hands of terrorists—has taken on new meaning following the September 11 terrorist attacks.

In his State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002, President Bush declared that Iran, Iraq, and North Korea constituted "an axis of evil," and that "the United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons." The President's Report goes on to say, "Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today's threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries' choice of weapons, do not permit that option." He declared that he did not rule out the option of striking first, because "traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against suicide-bombing terrorists whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents." The President's Report also says that the United States makes no distinction between terrorists and states that offer them safe haven and assistance, and that, moreover, terrorism-sponsoring states are often the same ones trying to acquire WMD. It follows, therefore, that the direct targets in the war on terrorism are global terrorist organizations and terrorism-sponsoring states that attempt to acquire—and use—WMD. This is why the United States has chosen

the so-called "axis of evil," more particularly Iraq, as the next target of its war on terrorism.

The fourth characteristic is the new U.S. defense strategy built around the concept of a "capabilities-based" approach to defense, rather than the previous Cold War approach of responding to threats that continued even through the 1990s. This is based on the assumption that while the United States cannot know with certainty what hostile forces threaten vital U.S. interests, it is possible to anticipate an adversary's capability to do harm. In other words, the new defense program focuses on being able to deal with how an adversary might fight rather than who the adversary might be and where a war might occur. Therefore, the focus of the U.S. military buildup will shift from one dealing with major theater wars—Northeast Asia and Southwest Asia—as was the case in the 1990s, to one capable of accomplishing the mission at an acceptable risk in all conceivable war scenarios. Under the capabilities-based defense program in the Defense Secretary's Report, the United States will retain its ability to undertake major combat operations on a global basis, as well as to conduct an effective campaign to swiftly defeat attacks against U.S. allies in any two theaters, in overlapping timeframes, and win a decisive victory in one. At the same time, the United States maintains and prepares its forces for smaller contingency operations in peacetime, in concert with allies as much as possible. This approach is based on the recognition that such contingencies could vary in duration, frequency, intensity, and the number of personnel required.

President George Bush addressing the U.N. General Assembly (September 12, 2002, New York) (Reuters/Kyodo)

The military plan based on this new approach emphasizes the unique operational demands associated with homeland defense,

which becomes the Defense Department's primary mission. In October 2002, the Defense Department established the Northern Command, responsible for defending U.S. territory. In addition, the U.S. government has been integrating various government agencies to execute its war on terrorism. In July, President Bush released a report entitled *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, stating that to prevent terrorist attacks in the United States, to reduce U.S. vulnerability to terrorism, and to localize terrorist damage, the Department of Homeland Security was created with a staff of 170,000 by reorganizing federal agencies as well as overhauling the FBI. A bill establishing the department passed Congress toward the end of November. (For details, see Commentary: "The Department of Homeland Security.")

A war on terrorism is a long-term effort entailing the mobilization of all the resources of a state, including military, economic, diplomatic, financial, law enforcement, judicial, and intelligence. The yearlong review of security policies was mainly directed at creating a posture to combat terrorism. At the same time, the United States had been seeking long-term military reform aimed at strengthening its integrated operational capabilities and at exploiting the superiority of its information technology. The Defense Secretary's Report says that terrorism is a deadly asymmetric threat, but not necessarily the only one. The next threat could come from missiles or a cyber attack. The report goes on to say "the rise of asymmetric threats does not preclude the possibility that in the future great regional powers will seek to challenge the United States or its allies and friends by conventional means. Even as the United States wages war against terrorism, it must prepare for challenges beyond this war. The armed forces must be prepared for the next war—a war that could be nothing like the one they must fight today."

(2) Progress in International Cooperation

Although the Taliban regime collapsed, Afghanistan has become

the main battlefield of a U.S./U.K.-led war against terrorism since October 7, 2001, with U.S. military operations still going on and U.S. forces likely to remain there for some time. At the end of January 2002, the Bush administration also sent a 660-man army contingent to support the Philippine army's hostage-rescuing operations and to mop up an Islamic extremist bandit group known as Abu Sayyaf, based in Mindanao. The U.S. mission was to train the Philippine army and to participate in joint exercises, but some soldiers remained in the Philippines even after the exercise, marking the revival of military cooperation between the two countries after ten years, since U.S. troops withdrew at the end of 1992.

In a speech on September 20, 2001, President Bush said "Every nation in every region now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists." In response, many countries cooperated with the United States in the war against terrorism over the past year or so, and a "coalition of the willing" was formed. The U.S. Department of Defense released two reports (February and June 2002) on the state of international cooperation in the war against terrorism. According to its June 2002 report, a total of 69 countries supported the global war on terrorism in various ways. To date, 20 have deployed more than 16,000 troops to the U.S. Central Command's region of responsibility. In Afghanistan alone, coalition partners contributed more than 8,000 troops to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and to the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul—making up more than half of the 15,000 non-Afghan forces in Afghanistan. In East Asia, Japan and South Korea provided logistical supply help, Malaysia granted overflight rights and shared intelligence, and the Philippines granted overflight rights, offered transit bases for U.S. forces used in OEF and medical and logistical support. In addition, Australia and New Zealand sent Australian Special Operations Forces and New Zealand Special Air Service troops, respectively.

The Defense Department reports admit that the U.S. did not cover all aspects of international cooperation in the war against

terrorism, and neither report mentions China. As we shall later see, China has cooperated with the United States in security matters in the war against terrorism, but the failure to mention it suggests that the Defense Department does not recognize China as a partner in the execution of the war against terrorism, and this is worthy of note.

Another noteworthy point in the context of military operations in Afghanistan and international cooperation is the fact that the operations paved the way for U.S. forces to establish a presence in Central Asian countries surrounding Afghanistan. Historically, Russia has had a large stake in this region, and behind Russia agreeing to the U.S. military presence in the region lies the entente between the two countries in the execution of the war on terrorism that developed after September 11. The tolerance of Central Asian countries for U.S. military presence in the region, and their expectations for reward, vary from one country to another (see Chapter 3). According to the Defense Department's June report: Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan allowed U.S. forces to use base facilities in their countries and granted them overflight rights; Kazakhstan granted overflight rights and allowed transshipment of supplies to U.S. forces stationed in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan; and Turkmenistan granted overflight rights and land corridor rights for humanitarian aid destined for Afghanistan, and supplied fuel to U.S. personnel engaged in humanitarian assistance operations.

***Predator* unmanned aerial vehicle**
(Reuters/Kyodo)

At present, the U.S. military presence in Central Asia is limited to temporary access and military facilities required for the war on terrorism in Afghanistan. General Tommy R. Franks, commander of the U.S. Central Command, said that he did not anticipate a permanent presence in any country in the region. However, since it

will take a long time to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan, U.S. military presence is expected to be prolonged. With the central part of the Eurasian Continent sandwiched between Russia and China, a prolonged U.S. military presence could spell both opportunities and risks.

If the real targets of the war against terrorism are global terrorist organizations and terrorism-sponsoring states that attempt to acquire WMD, the United States has no choice but to extend its global reach. In this sense, securing a foothold in this region, a hotbed of terrorism, is an effective tool in the war on terrorism. However, supporting undemocratic governments in the region in return for their cooperation would further invite the opposition of Islamic extremists, and U.S. forces may become targets of attack.

On the other hand, driving a wedge in this region would help the United States gain a foothold to restrain the influence of Russia and China, benefit U.S. energy strategy in central Eurasia, and help the United States keep Iran's ambitions in check, a country belonging to the "axis of evil." From a Russian perspective, its cooperation in the war against terrorism may undercut its long-term influence in a region it traditionally considers its own backyard, and the Putin government may be setting itself up for criticism. From a Chinese perspective, the U.S. military presence in the region, in addition to the Western Pacific, could result in China being encircled. Wanting to pit itself against the United States—with the help of the Sino-Russian Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)—this would be the last thing China wants to see happen. Therefore, a prolonged U.S. military presence in the region would give Central Asian countries "an American card" that would help them keep China and Russia in check, and intensify rivalry between the United States, Russia, and China for influence in the region.

(3) The Iraq Issue

With military operations continuing in Afghanistan, debates sur-

faced again over a possible U.S.-led attack on Iraq in the war against terrorism, possibly leading one to ask why the United States has picked Iraq as its next target ten years after the Gulf War.

The direct target of the Bush administration's war on terrorism is terrorists and terrorism-sponsoring states that attempt to acquire and use WMD. In an address to the U.N. General Assembly on September 12, 2002, President Bush explained why Iraq is a serious threat to international peace, pointing out that Iraq had repeatedly violated U.N. Security Council (UNSC) resolutions since the Gulf War. He concluded that the conduct of the Iraqi regime threatened the authority of the United Nations as well as world peace, and declared, "the United States will work with the UNSC to pass a resolution necessary to meet the challenge posed by Iraq." President Bush also warned Iraq that if it did not comply with UNSC resolutions, military action would be unavoidable. The Bush administration also made public a report entitled *A Decade of Deception and Defiance: Saddam Hussein's Defiance of the United Nations*. According to this report, even after the Gulf War, the Hussein regime had intentionally violated 16 UNSC resolutions, including Resolution 687 in 1991 requiring it to unconditionally accept the destruction or removal of biological and chemical weapons, and to cease the development of nuclear weapons; had ignored 30 UNSC charges that these resolutions had been violated; and had given assistance and support to international terrorist organizations. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) also released a report entitled *Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Program*, in October the same year, stating that Iraq has continued its WMD programs in defiance of U.N. resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of U.N. restrictions (150 kilometers or more)." The report went on to say that if Iraq is allowed to acquire sufficient weapons-grade fissile material from abroad, it could make a nuclear weapon within a year.

The Bush administration's final objective is to remove the

Hussein regime and to completely destroy all WMD, under U.N. supervision, and it asked Congress to pass a resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq, if necessary. In response, the House passed a joint resolution on October 10 by a vote of 296 to 133, and the Senate on October 11 by a vote of 77 to 23. Congressional support for the president, unlike a similar resolution that passed by a slim margin at the time the Gulf War, was the result of a large number of Democrats crossing the aisle to vote for the resolution.

The resolution, which President Bush signed on October 16, states that: (1) the United States is justified in taking action to defend itself because Iraq has demonstrated its ability and willingness to use WMD, and there is the risk that the current Iraqi regime will either use these weapons in a surprise attack against the United States or its armed forces, or provide them to international terrorists, causing unimaginable harm to the United States; and (2) as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the president is authorized to use military force if and when he determines it necessary and appropriate to defend the national security of the United States, and to enforce all relevant UNSC resolutions regarding Iraq. By virtue of this resolution, President Bush has the power to unilaterally use U.S. military force against Iraq by informing Congress prior to the exercise of that power or as soon as possible thereafter, but in any case no later than 48 hours after.

U.N. inspectors (January 7, 2003, Al Qaim, Iraq) (AP/WWP)

In an effort to garner international support for the war against terrorism, the United States, together with the United Kingdom, worked with other permanent members of the UNSC to hammer out a resolution authorizing the use of military force. On November 6, 2002, both countries introduced a final joint resolution to the UNSC, and on November 8 the UNSC unanimously adopted it.

After pointing out Iraq's history of UNSC resolution violations, this new resolution, No. 1441, demanded that Iraq completely disarm itself of WMD, in accordance with the following procedure: (1) Iraq shall submit to the UNSC within seven days from the date of the resolution, or no later than November 15, acceptance of the terms and conditions of Resolution 1441 ("the resolution"); (2) Iraq shall provide to the UNSC within 30 days, or no later than December 8, a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its program to develop NBC weapons; (3) U.N. weapons inspectors (UNMOVIC) shall start inspection within 45 days, or no later than December 23, and Iraq shall comply with U.N. inspections unconditionally and without restrictions; and (4) U.N. weapons inspectors shall submit to the UNSC a report of their findings within 60 days from the start of their inspections, or no later than late February, 2003. The resolution directs the executive chairman of UNMOVIC and the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to immediately report to the council any interference by Iraq with inspection activities. If the council receives such a report, it shall discuss actions to be taken, and pay attention to the fact that the council has repeatedly warned that Iraq will face serious consequences if it continues to violate its obligations.

The Iraqi government indicated its intention to fully comply with the resolution on November 13, and U.N. inspectors resumed their work on November 27 for the first time in four years, pursuant to resolution 1441. On December 7, Iraq submitted to the UNSC a 12,000-page document detailing its WMD program, and released a statement at the same time apologizing for its invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Findings made by the inspectors were checked against Iraq's declaration, with the first series of findings reported to the UNSC on January 27, 2003. The United States appraised the contents of Iraq's declaration on the basis of intelligence it had gathered on its own, past inspections, information provided by other countries, and data on materials Iraq had purchased thus far, and on December 19, the U.S. government released an assess-

Reference

U.S. Public Opinion on Attacking Iraq

The American Enterprise Institute, a private conservative think tank, analyzed various U.S. polls conducted before January 3, 2003, on the possibility of a U.S. attack on Iraq, organized its findings into three questions, and arranged the data in graphs.

The majority of Americans support U.S. military action in Iraq, however those opposed to the employment of ground forces in response to Q1-1 exceed those responding to Q1-2. Responses to Q2 show that a considerable number are dissatisfied with President Bush's explanation for attacking Iraq. Though a preemptive strike is an important policy in the war against terrorism, Q3-1 shows that the respondents are divided over this policy in general, while as Q3-2 indicates a majority in favor of a preemptive strike against a specific target, Iraq.

Q1-1. Do you favor or oppose a U.S. invasion of Iraq to remove the Hussein regime? (Polls conducted by Gallup, LIFE, CNN and USA Today.)



Note 1. Responses during November 26-27, 2001, were to the question, "Do you favor or oppose sending U.S. troops to the Persian Gulf to remove the Hussein regime?" Those periods from June 17-19, 2002 to September 13-16, 2002, were to the question, "Do you favor or oppose sending U.S. ground forces to the Persian Gulf to remove the Hussein regime?" (Only the findings of 1992 polls are from Gallup and Life.)

Q1-2. Do you favor or oppose U.S. military operations to remove the Hussein regime? (Polls conducted by Fox News and Opinion Dynamics)



Note 1. Responses October 8-9, 2002 or later were to the question, "Do you favor or oppose U.S. military operations to disarm Iraq and remove the Hussein regime?"

Q-2 Do you think President Bush has clearly explained his reasons for the U.S. to take military action? (Polls conducted by PSRA and Pew Research Center)



Q3-1: Which of the following most closely reflects your thinking?
1. The United States should not attack a country unless it is attacked first.
2. The United States may attack another country to prevent an attack upon itself.
(Polls conducted by CBS News and The New York Times)



Q3-2: Which of the following most closely reflects your thinking?
1. The United States should not attack Iraq unless first attacked by Iraq.
2. The United States may attack Iraq if it thinks Iraq will attack first.
(Polls conducted by CBS News and The New York Times)



Q3-3 Do you think the United States should attack a terrorist organization or another country if there is evidence proving its commitment to ter-rorism? Or do you think the United States should not attack unless an act of terrorism has been committed?
(Polls conducted by NBC and Wall Street Journal)



ment of the Iraqi declaration. Secretary of State Colin Powell issued a statement pointing out that the Iraqi declaration failed to meet the requirements stipulated in UNSC Resolution 1441—"a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration"—and that from the U.S. perspective, the Iraqi declaration constituted a new material breach of Resolution 1441.

Paragraph 2 of the resolution states that Iraq is being given a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations, and paragraph 13 warns that Iraq will face serious consequences if it

continues to violate its obligations under the resolution. However, Resolution 1441 does not automatically authorize the United States or any other members of the United Nations to "use all necessary measures" (military force) to disarm Iraq in the event of non-compliance.

The question is what the next step the UNSC can—and should—take in case U.N. inspectors find a breach of the resolution. Would the United States take the plunge and use force on the pretext that Iraq has violated the resolution that requires a full and complete disclosure of information concerning its development of WMD? Would the United States ask the UNSC to pass a new resolution authorizing the use of force before it mounts an attack on Iraq? Or would UNSC members, other than the United States and the United Kingdom, seek to pass a new resolution demanding further and more severe inspections? Many in and out of the UNSC feared that a U.S. unilateral attack, in the absence of a UNSC resolution explicitly authorizing it, would set a dangerous precedent, possibly allowing another country to remove a regime it might arbitrarily judge a risk to its security.

The two clear objectives of an attack on Iraq are to remove the Hussein regime and to disarm the country of WMD. How much military power would be needed to accomplish these objectives, and how many casualties would the United States suffer were both serious political questions the United States had to consider. The United States would also have to decide at what point it begins to wind down its military operations, and what the endgame, militarily and politically, would be.

In the event that the Hussein regime surrendered and was stripped of its WMD (two of the objectives of any military action), or if the regime was disarmed of its WMD not by military force but of its own volition under the supervision of the United Nations, the Bush administration would have faced a difficult decision about what to do with the surviving regime. There was speculation about President Saddam Hussein seeking exile in a third country to avert

war. Moreover, if Iraq had decided to attack Israel in an effort to blunt U.S. war efforts, the United States might have been hard pressed to localize the theater and to determine the end of its military operations. Even though the United States won the war in Iraq, it faces another daunting task—the reconstruction of the state of Iraq.

On the question of a post-Saddam Iraq, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld argues that Iraq should be a single country that neither threatens its neighbors nor suppresses minorities within its borders. To accomplish this, the United States is considering a plan to station an international force there for a certain period of time. As Afghanistan suggests, reconstructing Iraq will take a long time and will require international cooperation.

2. Development of Security Policy for East Asia

(1) U.S.-China Relations after September 11

What was September 11's impact on U.S.-China relations? One long-term result worthy of note was U.S. military presence in Central Asia, gained in the course of winning international cooperation for its war against terrorism. The basic structure of U.S.-China relations in the post-Cold War era stems from the tension between U.S. superiority in the sea and China's superiority on the land. Backed by the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation it signed with Russia, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), China has established a foothold in those Central Asian countries with whom it has come to share a border after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the mid-1990s, China also established diplomatic relations with South Korea, a U.S. ally, and the two countries have been developing their economic relations.

The United States, as a global maritime power, has maintained its superiority in the oceans bordering East Asia. A chain of island countries hems the Eurasian Continent, starting from the Japanese islands in Northeastern Asia to Malaysia in Southeast

Asia. The United States maintains strategic alliances with, or has access to the base facilities of, all countries hemming the Eurasian Continent. Since September 11, the United States has altered its view of the broad arc of the Eurasian Continent—stretching from the Middle East to Northeast Asia—as a highly volatile region, and has been trying to focus its operational capability to this region.

As long as their vital regional interests and military capabilities do not clash, the strategic rivalry between the United States and China is expected to remain muted. However, Chinese and Russian concern over the growing U.S. military presence in the central part of the Eurasian Continent since September 11 may intensify their rivalry for influence in Central Asia. On the other hand, China's buildup of sea and air power in East Asia carries the risk of triggering a large-scale arms race in Asia. The collision of a U.S. EP-3E surveillance plane with a Chinese jet fighter over the South China Sea in April 2001 suggests heightened military tension between the United States and China in East Asia.

Every year since 1997, the U.S. Defense Department has submitted to Congress a report on China's military power. The Bush administration submitted its first report (*Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China*) in July 2002. Among other things, the report stressed that China's modernization of its armed forces, especially its growing missile capability and sea and air power, posed a threat to its neighbors, including Taiwan.

According to this report, China's strategy for regional security is aimed at the following: (1) to prevent Taipei's moves toward *de jure* independence; (2) to counter Japan's growing military cooperation with the United States; (3) to prevent the development and implementation of a regional theater missile defense system, particularly one involving Taiwan; (4) to cope with challenges to its claims in the East and South China Seas; and (5) to promote its economic interests through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the ASEAN Regional Forum

(ARF). The report also points out that the United States will remain central to these regional priorities, that China's actions will be shaped by its assessment of U.S. policies, particularly America's regional alliance and defense relationships, and that while seeking a stable relationship with Washington, China will continue to seek opportunities to diminish U.S. influence in the region.

The report says that China's drive to modernize its military is primarily driven by its need to prepare for a potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait, and that as China's air force and navy are modernized, the scope of their reach will extend to the Taiwan Strait and surrounding waters. Since this means that China will be advancing to oceans where the United States maintains superiority, one must pay attention to China's move. The 2002 report also mentions, for the first time, that China has been strengthening its military relationships with Russia and former Soviet republics in Central Asia.

China's moves on the Eurasian Continent and oceans are designed to counteract the U.S. military presence and influence responsible for China feeling encircled, and they suggest the possibility of an intensified strategic rivalry between the United States and China. While welcoming "the emergence of a strong, peaceful, and prosperous China" in the report referred to earlier, President Bush pointed out that "in pursuing advanced military capabilities that can threaten its neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region, China is following an outdated path that, in the end, will hamper its own pursuit of national greatness."

American and Chinese heads of states exchanged visits in February and October 2002, reaffirming their commitment to a "constructive and cooperative" relationship. During his visit to China (February 21-22, 2002), President Bush stated that there were areas in which the United States shared interests with China and those over which the two countries disagreed, but as a result of candid discussions, they shared the recognition that terrorism was a threat to both countries, and he welcomed China's cooperation in

the war against terrorism. Since the September 11 attacks, the two countries have cooperated in the war against terrorism and have discussed various measures to deal with the problem. During his August 2002 visit to China, Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage called the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a separatist organization in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region that China has tried to suppress, a terrorist organization.

EA-6B electronic warfare plane taking off from USS *Enterprise* (October 11, 2001) (Reuters/Kyodo)

During a U.S.-China summit in October in Crawford, Texas, President Bush and President Jiang Zemin discussed the Iraqi threat. China supported Iraq's strict compliance with previous UNSC resolutions, and President Bush urged him to support the new resolution demanding full disarmament of its WMD. On November 8, the UNSC, including China, unanimously adopted UNSC Resolution 1441.

One of the most important questions facing both countries over preventing the proliferation of WMD was how to handle North Korea's nuclear weapon development program. The United States had been trying to solve the problem diplomatically, with the cooperation of China and Russia in addition to that of Japan and South Korea. For China also, a North Korea armed with nuclear weapons and the means to delivery them is also a security risk, so this was a serious issue that would shape future relations between the United States and China. They agreed to continue to work toward a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and a peaceful solution to the problem.

The Taiwan issue, however, is one that the two countries greatly differ over, and these differences did not change even after September 11. With the intensified rivalry caused by China's modernization of its military, the strategic environment surrounding

Taiwan is likely to grow more serious. In an address on June 10, 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell, while saying that the U.S. position upholding the one-China policy and insisting on a peaceful solution to the Taiwan issue has not changed, stated "the United States took its responsibilities under the Taiwan Relations Act very, very seriously." The Taiwan Relations Act does not commit the United States to defend Taiwan, but it promises to provide Taiwan with sufficient military equipment to meet the needs of its own defense. Based on this, the Bush administration decided on April 24, 2001, to sell to Taiwan four *Kidd*-class destroyers, 12 P-3C patrol aircraft, MH-53 minesweeping helicopters, eight diesel engine-driven submarines, AAV7-A1 amphibious assault vehicles, and M109-A6 self-propelled guns. At the two meetings with President Jiang, President Bush said that he would uphold the one-China policy but also stated his commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act.

(2) A Strong Stand against North Korea

In June 2001, the Bush administration completed a review of its policy toward North Korea since President Bush took office, and urged a dialogue with North Korea on a broad range of issues, including: (1) improved implementation of the Agreed Framework relating to North Korea's nuclear activities; (2) verifiable constraints on North Korea's missile programs, and a ban on its missile exports; and (3) a less threatening conventional military posture. However, no substantial progress was made in the ensuing months. Since September 11, the Bush administration's position toward North Korea has become increasingly critical as a result of the grave threat posed by terrorists accessing WMD from rogue states.

During the past year, a string of shocking developments related to North Korea occurred. In his State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002, President Bush said, "North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens," and named it as a member of the "axis of

evil." While the Bush administration prepared to attack Iraq (which it considered its most imminent security threat), it was ready to resume talks with North Korea at any time. In an interview on February 20, during his visit to South Korea, President Bush made three points very clear: (1) he supported the South's Sunshine Policy; (2) he wanted to solve the nuclear weapon problem through dialogue with North Korea; and (3) he had no intention of invading North Korea. The president also said that as its largest food donor, the United States has been providing North Korea with 300,000 tons of food a year and would continue to help its hungry citizens. His comments about the "axis of evil" were directed at the regime, not the North Korean people. When he visited China on February 21, he also asked President Jiang Zemin for his cooperation to resume a dialogue with North Korea.

In an address on June 10, Secretary of State Colin Powell said that "working with South Korea and Japan, the United States is prepared to take important steps to help North Korea move its relations with the U.S. toward normalcy," that the United States would continue its food aid, and reiterated his willingness to resume a dialogue with North Korea. He went on to say that progress toward improving relations between the United States and North Korea would depend on Pyongyang's behavior on a number of key issues: (1) a ban on the export of ballistic missiles and the elimination of long-range missiles; (2) a more serious effort to provide for its suffering citizens; (3) taking steps to lessen the threat posed by its conventional military and adhering to past pledges to create goodwill with the South; and (4) full compliance with the IAEA safeguards it agreed to by signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. These are, as it were, preconditions for normalization of diplomatic relations, and the United States believes that the ball is now in North Korea's court, and the world is watching to see how it responds. If North Korea is not more forthcoming, the United States might intensify its military pressure.

While the United States was preparing to attack Iraq, a series of

important events occurred between Japan and North Korea, including Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visit to North Korea that culminated, on September 17, with the signing of the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration, and on October 15, five Japanese citizens who had been abducted to North Korea were released. During the summit, Prime Minister Koizumi conveyed a message from the United States stating that it was ready to resume a dialogue with North Korea. On September 26, President Bush said that the United States, working closely with Japan and South Korea, urged North Korea to engage in a comprehensive dialogue. The U.S. government announced that it would send Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly to North Korea for three days (October 3-5) to press for an early solution to longstanding problems, marking the first visit to North Korea by a senior official of the Bush administration.

Yet Assistant Secretary Kelly brought the most shocking event of the year to light. On October 16, the U.S. State Department issued a statement revealing that North Korea has been carrying out a program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons, and declared the 1994 Agreed Framework nullified. At the same time, the statement said: (1) the United States was prepared to offer economic and political steps to improve the lives of the North Korean people, provided the North dramatically altered its behavior across a range of outstanding issues, but in the light of its concerns about the North's nuclear weapons programs, the Bush administration was unable to pursue this approach; (2) North Korea's secret nuclear weapons program was a serious violation of its commitments under the Agreed Framework, as well as the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the IAEA safeguards agreement, and the Joint North-South Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (1991); (3) the United States and its allies were calling on North Korea to honor its commitments under the Nonproliferation Treaty, and to eliminate its nuclear weapon program in a verifiable manner; and (4) the United States sought a peaceful solution to

this problem, and that no peaceful nation in the region wanted to see a nuclear-armed North Korea.

As the above makes clear, North Korea has continued its nuclear weapons development program in defiance of the Agreed Framework it signed with the United States in 1994. In an interview on October 17, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld revealed the assessment by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that the North may have developed one or two nuclear weapons since the early 1990s, and said that he personally believes they have a small number of nuclear weapons. From a U.S. perspective, if North Korea already has nuclear weapons, its threat is equal or greater than that posed by Iraq. However, unlike Iraq, military operations against North Korea would be extremely difficult and dangerous. As already noted in Chapter 1, there are several reasons for this. Firstly, Japan and South Korea, American allies, desire a peaceful solution. Secondly, military action against North Korea would be strategically difficult, given the war in Afghanistan and military operations in Iraq, entailing a three-front operation. Thirdly, unlike the war in Iraq, there are large armies of North and South Korea facing each other, meaning it would be difficult to localize the conflict, so that heavy casualties among South Koreans and U.S. troops would be inevitable. Fourthly, China and Russia would not sit idly by and watch North Korea crushed.

As the United States wants to solve the problem in a peaceful manner, it discussed the matter with China at an October summit and with Japan and South Korea at a three-way meeting in Mexico; and repeatedly sent senior State Department officials to Japan, South Korea, China, and Russia. The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) decided at its executive board meeting on November 14 to freeze oil shipments to North Korea starting in December 2002.

North Korea responded by refusing to allow inspections of its nuclear facilities by the IAEA on December 2, resumed operation of its nuclear facility on December 12 and subsequently removed the

seals from its nuclear facilities, expelled IAEA inspectors, and finally declared its withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty on January 11, 2003. These measures seem to signal that North Korea has no intention of abandoning its nuclear weapon program for the time being, thus turning back the clock to 1993-94.

Although the United States might believe that its massive military preparations against Iraq send a strong message to North Korea, it will have to continue seeking a peaceful solution due to the danger and difficulty of a conflict with the North. The United States must, simply, persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapon program, making it clear that it does not consider North Korea an enemy and has no intention of invading it. Therefore, unlike Iraq, the United States and its allies will have to negotiate with the current North Korean regime the compensation for removing the threat posed by its nuclear weapons development program and huge conventional military. The fact remains that the "nuclear card" of North Korea, whatever its intent, is a dangerous factor in Northeast Asia.

(3) Cooperation in Antiterrorist Activities, and Japan-U.S. Relations

From February 17-22, President Bush visited Japan, South Korea, and China. During talks with Prime Minister Koizumi of Japan, he stressed that the United States would continue to honor its commitments to the Asia-Pacific region and the all-important Japan-U.S. alliance, and expressed his support for Prime Minister Koizumi's policy toward North Korea. In an address to the Diet on February 18, President Bush said: (1) for half a century now, the United States and Japan have formed one of the greatest and most enduring alliances of modern times; (2) the bonds of friendship and trust between our two people were never more evident than in the days and months following September 11th; and (3) Japan's response to the threat of terrorism has demonstrated the strength of our alliance.

The Bush administration highly appreciated the cooperation Japan has extended in the war against terrorism following September 11. In a speech on June 10, Secretary of State Colin Powell expressed his deep appreciation for the logistical support of Japanese vessels in the Indian Ocean, as well as his high regard for Japan's superb leadership as cosponsor of the Afghan Reconstruction Conference. In May, Japan extended for another six months the logistical support provided under the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law. With the prolonged U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, Japan re-extended its logistical support until November 2003, and dispatched an Aegis destroyer to the Indian Ocean.

The U.S. war against terrorism and WMD will be a prolonged fight, one whose scope of activities will be wide and far-reaching. Therefore, Japan may be asked to provide full and long-term support not bound by temporary legislation, as is currently the case.

Another issue to be noted is related to Japan's policy toward North Korea. Due to the North's admission of continuing to develop nuclear weapons, Japan has been forced to urgently coordinate its policy toward North Korea not just with the United States but also with South Korea. The North's development of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons is directly threatening the security of Japan. The United States has been looking for a peaceful solution to the problem by consulting with Japan, South Korea, China, and Russia. At a Japan-U.S.-South Korea summit on October 26 in Los Cabos, Mexico, the leaders reconfirmed their commitment to peacefully solving the problem, with the close cooperation of other countries. At a Security Consultative Committee ("2+2") meeting of American and Japanese defense and foreign ministers in Washington, D.C. on December 16, the ministers expressed "grave concern about the threat North Korea continues to pose to regional security and stability . . . and great regret over North Korea's resumption of the operation and construction of it nuclear facilities." After warning that North Korean use of WMD "would have the

gravest consequences," the ministers reiterated their strong interest in a peaceful resolution of security issues associated with North Korea. Japan, the United States, and South Korea must come to grips with the nuclear issue by maintaining mutual cooperation and by consulting with the countries concerned.