

Germany's Overcoming of its Past and Japan — The “Learn from Germany Theory” and its Aftermath

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Introduction

Since the second half of the 1980s, as the perception of history began to be seen as a problem, the “learn from Germany theory” stating that Japan had not faced its past adequately and should use the example of Germany as a model began to be discussed constantly in Japan. Due to the internationalization of the perception of history problem, these discussions spread to East Asia as well.

However, subsequently, the situation surrounding Japan and Germany changed significantly. Firstly, the problems of sex on the battlefield, in particular the “comfort women” issue, and colonial rule (exceptionally, this has already been discussed in Japan), which were taboo in the world at that time, now began to attract attention.

Furthermore, both Germany and Japan were cautious about dispatching their military forces or the Self-Defense Forces overseas due to their World War II past, as symbolized by their response to the Gulf War, but subsequently Germany, in contrast to Japan, became actively involved in Afghanistan and other conflicts and as a result it got drawn into combat, etc. and 116 of its people were killed in the line of duty overseas.

Moreover, recently in the response to the Gaza conflict, as discussed below, a difference in the level of enthusiasm can be seen between Germany, which fully supports Israel, and Japan, and it has been indicated that the problem of the past is one factor behind that.

In this context, the “learn from Germany theory” is now rarely mentioned in Japan.

Therefore, in this paper, I will discuss the characteristics and problems of the “learn from Germany theory” by providing an overview of the changes to the theory over the years, with the focus on the trends in Germany and the reactions of Japan.¹

The Weizsäcker speech (1985) — spread of the “learn from Germany theory”

The “learn from Germany theory” gained currency in Japan due to the speech given by President Richard von Weizsäcker in the Bundestag (German federal parliament) on May 8, 1985, the 40th anniversary of the end of the war.

The famous passage “anyone who closes his eyes to the past is blind to the present” was frequently quoted in Japan as well. On the other hand, at that time Japan was ruled by the Yasuhiro Nakasone Cabinet which advocated “full settlement of post-war politics,” so the passage was spoken in the context of criticizing official visits to Yasukuni Shrine and “military expansion,” including abolishing the one percent of GNP limit for defense expenditure.² For that reason, at the same time as overcoming the past, the speech was also linked to and emphasized the aspect of pacifism. For example, as presented by sociologist Rokuro Hidaka, Weizsäcker’s speech was “the starting point of anti-war sentiment in Europe” (*Gekkan Shakaito*, October 1985).³

In the 1990s, the “comfort women” issue arose, discussions within Japan about how to face its past grew as the 50th anniversary of the end of the war approached, and the “learn from Germany theory” gained more currency. For example, the Mainichi Shimbun (the Mainichi Newspapers) in its editorial of August 13, 1995 said that Germany had eliminated the sense of caution felt by Western countries due to its historical reflections on the war, but Japan had not recovered trust to the extent Germany had, and pointed out the following.

“If we are to learn from the wisdom of Germany, we should acknowledge that past wars and invasions were attempts to Japanize Asia.”

Furthermore, in editorials on August 15, 1995, seven newspapers mentioned former president Weizsäcker in relation to war responsibility.⁴

Moreover, from about 50 years after the war the “learn from Germany theory” spread into East Asia, including China and the Republic of Korea, etc. For example, in June 1995 Xinhua News Agency pointed out in the context of commenting on Japan’s resolution on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of the war that “there is a world of difference in the way that Japan and Germany have handled the post-war period.”⁵

Meanwhile, the popularity of former president Weizsäcker did not wane in Japan even after he retired, and he was twice invited by newspaper companies to come to Japan to give lectures, in 1995, 50 years after the war, and in 1999, and he himself could not conceal his surprise, saying “I never imagined my influence would still be this strong.”

However, the former president himself was cautious about making simple comparisons between Germany

and Japan, saying that although the two countries have similarities there are major differences in terms of the continuity of their history, their cultures and societies, and the structures of their political systems, among other factors, and "it is extremely difficult to compare two countries. We must exercise great self-restraint in comparing the two countries side by side".⁶

Kosovo bombing (1999) — Japan "cannot learn" from Germany?

Post-war Germany consistently took a position of caution regarding dispatching troops outside the NATO region, due to the constraints of its Basic Law and its World War II past. In the 1991 Gulf War as well, Germany, like Japan, provided a large amount of financial assistance, but limited itself to the dispatch of minesweepers and did not make any military personnel contributions, so it received criticism for "checkbook diplomacy."⁷

Learning the lessons from the Gulf War, Germany began to actively dispatch troops overseas to Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and other conflict zones from May 1992 in Cambodia (the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia = UNTAC) onward. They were mainly rear-echelon support troops providing medical care, etc., but within Germany opinion was divided regarding whether or not the dispatch of troops outside the NATO region was constitutional.

In that sense, the July 1994 decision by the Federal Constitutional Court that dispatch of the Bundeswehr (federal armed forces) outside the NATO region was constitutional on the condition of approval by the Bundestag was groundbreaking. A variety of frameworks restricting post-war Germany's security policy vanished, and it was pointed out that "Germany's "post-war period" had ended both in name and in reality, and a movement seeking a new national image had begun."⁸

Subsequently, on the occasion of the Kosovo conflict, in March 1999 Germany's Gerhard Schröder administration dispatched combat troops outside the NATO region for the first time since the war to participate in the bombing of Yugoslavia as a "humanitarian intervention." It was NATO's first military action and at the same time Germany embarked on its first use of military force overseas since World War II, so it was a crucial turning point.

In particular, the decision to dispatch troops was made by a left-wing coalition administration which advocated pacifism and comprised the Social Democratic Party (SPD), Alliance 90, and the Green Party, and in addition the region which was bombed was in the former Yugoslavia which Germany previously invaded in World War II, so this decision caused widespread astonishment and bewilderment among people who had advocated the "learn from Germany theory." In Japan pacifism and the problem of overcoming the past were understood to be linked, so the shock was even greater and was even described as "the blind alley of the 'left wing' in Japan."⁹

House of Councillors member Hideo Den of the Social Democratic Party had been promoting the idea of learning from Germany, but he stated that “given that Germany has carried out bombings we can no longer use it as a model for the perception of history or the problem of reparations” and Communist Party Chair Tetsuzo Fuwa remarked “You too Germany?”

Furthermore, when asked if the position of supporters of the current constitution of Japan was difficult given that Germany had carried out the bombings, Takako Doi, the leader of the Social Democratic Party, said “that’s a short-sighted thing to say” and argued against this viewpoint as follows.

“The reasoning that because Germany did something Japan should too does not hold water. We must not forget the differences between Japan and Germany. Firstly, we have different constitutions. Germany has military forces, but the Constitution of Japan completely renounces war. Secondly, there is the problem of post-war reparations. Japan’s current situation, which invites apprehension and distrust from neighboring countries, cannot be compared to Germany’s situation.”¹⁰

There are differences in the meaning of pacifism and the lessons learned from history in the background to this gap between Germany and Japan.

The principles of post-war Germany’s foreign and security policies are, firstly, avoiding unilateralism (not going alone); in other words, placing importance on a multilateral framework (multilateralism). Secondly, is the principle of the renunciation of war arising from the fact that Germany had caused two world wars (Never Again War). Thirdly, was “do not repeat Auschwitz” born from reflection on the Holocaust which was symbolized by Auschwitz (Never Again Auschwitz). In other words, the policies respected humanity and human rights and did not permit atrocities such as ethnic cleansing, etc. The second principle, the “renunciation of war,” and the third principle, “do not repeat Auschwitz,” have fundamental commonalities with each other but at the same time there was the possibility of a contradiction arising, namely the use of military force to stop killings in the case that a third country committed atrocities.¹¹

That was precisely the nature of the Kosovo conflict for Germany, in which it decided to embark on the use of military force from a humanitarian perspective in order to stop ethnic cleansing (genocide) by Serbian troops against Muslim Albanians in Kosovo. Humanity was truly given priority over the “renunciation of war.”

Chancellor Schröder stated that he had to decide either to lean back and watch the events unfold and thus abide by the principle of “do not repeat war” – or embark on military action for a higher principle that we have to uphold, namely, to stop the killings and deportations. Moreover, with respect to the argument that Germany should not intervene because the Balkan Peninsula was an area it had invaded previously, he made the counterargument that “one could argue exactly the reverse – that we are now under a moral obligation to help stop new atrocities being committed there.”¹²

Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer pointed out that Germany has two perceptions: “do not repeat war” and “do not permit Auschwitz,” in other words, to stand up against ethnic massacres, but now more than ever Germany had to face the question of why it did not resist the Holocaust and must not give in to ethnic

cleansing. Moreover, he stated that he himself “was an activist of the left, but not a pacifist,” and even asserted that in order to bring an end to the Kosovo conflict “it is acceptable to send ground troops to stop ethnic cleansing.”¹³

In other words, for Germany the past is first and foremost the Holocaust, and stopping the Holocaust is the “lesson of history.” War is clearly distinguished from the Holocaust and is a secondary aspect of the past. Therefore, the use of force (war) to stop ethnic cleansing was naturally affirmed and greater value was placed on “do not repeat Auschwitz,” in other words, on stopping ethnic cleansing, than on “do not repeat war.”

On the other hand, what is seen in Japan is an absolute “anti-war position and pacifism.” For example, novelist Makoto Oda stated as follows that efforts to legitimize war as a “humanitarian intervention” as seen in the Kosovo conflict were a “war on human rights” using “human rights” as a justification.¹⁴

“This means the time has now come when the value of the Pacifist Constitution of Japan, which appealed to the world through the way our own country is, or rather the way it should be, for the total abolition of war and military forces on the grounds that there is no justice in war, is being truly questioned.”

Moreover, he asserted that Japan should follow the path of a “conscientious objector nation” analogous to “conscientious objection,” the individual practice of pacifism.¹⁵

Incidentally, Oda visited Germany at that time for an NHK satellite broadcasting program called “Is There Such a Thing as a Just War?” and held a discussion with the person in charge of the Green Party, but the discussion ended in disagreement.

Japan’s pacifism is an absolute “anti-war position and pacifism” but on the other hand Germany’s pacifism is relative, so the meaning and positioning of pacifism differed between Germany and Japan. Therefore, pacifism and overcoming the past were closely linked in Japan, and consequently the “learn from Germany theory” died down after the Bundeswehr engaged in full-scale participation in the Kosovo conflict.

Afghanistan troop deployment (2002 onward) — Germany as an example of what not to do

In response to the September 11 terrorist attacks in September 2001, Chancellor Schröder declared “unlimited solidarity” with the United States. In response to NATO’s invocation of the right to collective self-defense, in January 2002 he dispatched and deployed the Bundeswehr to Afghanistan for “Operation Enduring Freedom” and as a member of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Germany undertook a major change in direction in order to fulfil its responsibility to maintain the stability of the international community.

Its initial mission was maintaining security, humanitarian support and development assistance for the purpose of reconstruction, but as the situation in Afghanistan deteriorated, Germany became embroiled in a ground war for the first time since World War II.

Even after the mission of the International Assistance Force ended (in 2014), the Bundeswehr remained in the country, downsizing and shifting its mission to training and support. For that reason, Germany dispatched approximately 150,000 soldiers over the total of 20 years until its final withdrawal in June 2021. This was the largest and longest-lasting dispatch of troops overseas among the dispatches of troops overseas by the Bundeswehr since World War II, and 59 Bundeswehr servicepeople were killed. Meanwhile, a shocking incident for Germans who had a World War II past occurred in Kunduz, where a bombing raid by the US military requested by the German Bundeswehr commander killed and injured civilians, including children.

It is said that through the dispatch of troops to Afghanistan, Germany became a "normal country." An official in the Schröder administration was also self-congratulatory, saying "in the 21st century Germany has returned to being a fully normal country. Germany has become a normal country which continues to be self-aware of its past while also fulfilling its obligations to the future."¹⁶ For Germany, becoming a "normal country" was a desire from the post-reunification Helmut Kohl administration onward, therefore, it was truly an "historical decision."

Meanwhile in Japan, it was pointed out that "it is no exaggeration to say that the security policy "taboos" derived from the history of atrocities by Nazi Germany no longer exist"¹⁷ and at the same time fierce criticism was often seen.

Eiichi Kido, an expert in contemporary German politics, pointed out that "military forces are after all military forces. Moreover, the situation of military forces which have been deployed outside their own country and actually engaged in acts of combat is full of warnings for Japan after the War Act [note: the Security Bill]" while also concluding that "the civil societies of Germany and Japan must strengthen cooperation in order to stem the tide of militarization in both of their countries and the world."¹⁸ As the word "warnings" suggests, Germany is not a model (teacher) from which Japan should learn but rather has already become an example of what not to do.

In particular, at that time a Security Bill was being discussed in Japan, so this was mentioned in relation to the overseas dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces. Incidentally, the German government stated that the cabinet decision by the Shinzo Abe cabinet in July 2014 to change the interpretation of the Constitution to enable use of the right of collective self-defense was an "extremely normal and ordinary step" and that "Japan will become able to participate more strongly in the United Nations peacekeeping forces" and that "Germany clearly welcomed" this. Moreover, Germany fully "welcomed" the security legislation the following year as well.¹⁹

Furthermore, the Asahi Shimbun (the Asahi Newspapers)'s article titled "Genjitsu Rosen ga Miushinatta Mono Berurin (Chikyugi) (What the Realistic Policy has Lost: Berlin (Globe))" (April 2, 2002 morning edition) asserted that the troop deployment of the German Bundeswehr to Afghanistan was unimaginable at the

time of the Gulf War when Germany was restrained in the same way as Japan, and Germany was claiming that it should respond responsibly as a “normal country,” but made the criticism that Germany had perhaps “implemented its realistic response too hastily while the important principle of listening to the views of its citizens took a back seat.”

Furthermore, while being a “normal country” was understood positively in Germany, in Japan it was evaluated negatively, for example as in “Germany has fallen into being a ‘normal country’” (Yoko Iwama, “Shureda Seiken no Nana-nen (Seven Years of the Schröder Administration),” *Yomiuri Shimbun*, October 20, 2005 evening edition).

Gaza conflict — “learn from Japan theory”?

After the Gaza conflict broke out last autumn, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz was the first G7 leader to visit Israel, which he did immediately after the military clashes, and subsequently Germany consistently provided full support for Israel’s “right to self-defense” and initially adopted a negative attitude to an immediate ceasefire for the reason that it could result in denying Israel’s “right to self-defense.”

Furthermore, when South Africa filed a lawsuit to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at the end of the year alleging that Israel’s actions were “genocide,” the German government issued a statement saying that South Africa’s allegations were baseless and that it was firmly opposed to the lawsuit.

This stance was so conspicuous that it was criticized, for example mainly by Islamic countries in the United Nations Human Rights Council, and even the Japanese media reported it with interest, along with the background to the stance.

Meanwhile, Japan’s Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa stated that “Israel certainly has a right to defend itself and its people as a sovereign nation, and generally speaking, it goes without saying that such a right should be exercised in accordance with international law.” Moreover, in light of the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip, she called on the Israeli side for a humanitarian pause, saying “we consider a humanitarian pause ... to be necessary.”²⁰

Furthermore, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi went no further than to state about South Africa’s lawsuit that the International Court of Justice was currently conducting a trial on the question of whether actions of Israel constitute genocide, so Japan would closely monitor the situation. In this way, there was a difference in the level of enthusiasm of the response between Germany and Japan, and in the background to that was the lessons they each learned from their World War II past, with Germany singling out the Holocaust and Japan singling out pacifism.

In any case, this attitude of Germany is said to originate from Germany’s own “raison d’être.” When Chancellor Angela Merkel visited Israel on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the founding of Israel in

2008, she gave a speech in the national parliament (the Knesset) in which she asserted that relations with Israel were special relations derived from Germany's historical responsibility for the Holocaust and then stated that "Israel's security is part of Germany's *raison d'être*."

Immediately after the military clashes, the Bundestag unanimously passed a resolution stating that "Israel's security is part of Germany's *raison d'être*" and Chancellor Scholz made a statement to the same effect when he visited Israel.

It goes without saying that the background to this is the history of the Holocaust, as seen in Merkel's speech. That is closer to being a "debt" than a mere "negative legacy."

In the Kosovo conflict, the universal human right of stopping ethnic cleansing trumped pacifism and led to the use of military force. In the present Gaza conflict, reflection on the Holocaust was given priority over human rights, namely the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip. In other words, it is no exaggeration to say that in a sense Germany's overcoming of its past largely singles out its response to the "debt" that is the Holocaust. Moreover, it has been deemed to be impossible to compare the Holocaust with other crimes, as pointed out by former president Weizsäcker who said "the Holocaust was a grave crime incomparable with anything in history, and all forms of relativization of it are prohibited."²¹

On the other hand, it has been pointed out that there are problems with Germany's overcoming its past by singling out the Holocaust. Henning Melber (Extraordinary Professor at the University of Pretoria) and Reinhart Kössler (Professor at the University of Freiburg), both authorities on research into German colonial rule, have stated that the culture of remembrance, concerning also dire aspects of the past, that's been engendered in Germany is viewed by many as exemplary. But it nevertheless has some grave shortcomings.

They say firstly that virtually singling out the Shoah (the Holocaust) marginalizes and disregards other mass crimes of the Nazi period. For example, there were the victims in the eastern territories during World War II era, particularly in the German-Soviet war.

Furthermore, they point out that another glaring lacuna concerns Germany's past as a colonial power. The colonial administration period lasted from 1884 to 1919. Despite the relatively short duration, this experience had a great impact on Germany's violent trajectory during the first half of the 20th century. Since 1945, however, this history has been largely forgotten. Melber et al. named this phenomenon "selective amnesia."²²

Therefore, in the Gaza conflict as well, when Germany criticized the position of South Africa for taking out a lawsuit in the International Court of Justice claiming that the actions of Israel were genocide, President Hage Geingob of Namibia, a former colony of Germany, criticized Germany, saying that he "expressed deep concern at the shocking position" of Germany and that he "rejects Germany's support of the genocidal intent of the racist Israeli state." Moreover, he said the German Government is yet to fully atone for the genocide it committed in Namibia and stated that Germany had not been able to "draw lessons from its horrific history."

Melber stated that Germany has turned its feelings of guilt regarding the Holocaust into uncritical loyalty

to Israel at the expense of Palestine and that is in marked contrast to Germany's response with respect to Namibia. Moreover, he pointed that President Geingob's strongly worded reaction reflects the emotions of many Namibians with respect to the "double standards and moral hypocrisy" of Germans.²³

Actually, the current situation is that the problem of colonial rule is being overlooked not only in Germany but around the world. In that sense, although Japan has yet to reach a solution, it has tackled the issue exceptionally and progressively, and it has even been pointed out that Japan is a "world leader" in terms of the perception of history.²⁴ Moreover, the problem of sex on the battlefield during the World War II era was also taboo in Germany for many years, but that country has gradually begun to address this issue after Japan's "comfort women" issue arose.²⁵

Reinhard Zöllner (Professor at the University of Bonn) said the following.²⁶

"It is said that Japan should 'learn from Germany' with respect to war responsibility, but the same cannot be said concerning this problem. The only time the problem of sexual violence in World War II has been discussed systematically and thoroughly since the war is the comfort women issue in Japan. Japan has been addressing this problem alone for more than 20 years."

Perhaps we should rather "learn from Japan" concerning the problems of colonial rule and sex on the battlefield?

Meanwhile, in the wake of the Gaza conflict, antisemitism is once again on the rise in Germany, in contrast to the government's support for Israel. Historian Michael Wolffsohn²⁷ pointed out in the remembrance ceremony for the 80th anniversary of *Kristallnacht* (The Night of Broken Glass) in the Bundestag in November last year that remembrance of the Jews who had died (the victims of the Holocaust) by society and politically, as had occurred in the Federal Republic of Germany since 1949, was historically exceptional and worthy of praise, while on the other hand many of the Jews currently living are being criticized by Germans.

He went on to make the criticism that antisemitism had been inherited in a variety of settings in post-war Germany and that in fact it had "become radicalized and normalized," which was a "failure of the German state." Moreover, Wolffsohn sounded a warning that it was naive to believe that education was a panacea for antisemitism.²⁸

We can conclude that the points Wolffsohn make suggest that it is truly difficult for all human beings, not just Germans, to face and learn from a "negative legacy."

Conclusion

In this paper, I have traced how the "learn from Germany theory" gradually ceased to be mentioned in

Japan because there was a large gap in overcoming the past between Germany, which placed importance on the Holocaust, and Japan, which placed importance on pacifism.

At the same time, Germany's overcoming the past had the problem that due to its focus on the "incomparable" Holocaust only, the problems of colonial rule and sex on the battlefield were overlooked. These kinds of problems are beginning to be understood not only in Japan, where the "learn from Germany theory" is not mentioned anymore, but also in East Asia.

For example, previously in 2012, when the "comfort women" issue became a concern between Japan and the Republic of Korea, a Korean group erected a giant billboard in New York's Times Square which displayed a photograph of German Chancellor Willy Brandt kneeling at the Monument to the Ghetto Heroes in Warsaw, and demanded an apology from Japan. The Ghetto Monument was erected to praise the actions of the Jews who launched an armed uprising in 1943 in the ghetto, which was a separated area for Jews, but were ultimately suppressed, so it is literally related to the "incomparable" Holocaust.

However, in today's Republic of Korea, a column titled "Namibiajiiin ni Warawareru 'Shazai Suru Doitsu ni Nihon ha Minarae' Ron (The Theory that 'Japan Should Learn from Germany which Has Apologized' is Laughable to Namibians)" was published in a newspaper, and the column pointed that we often cite Germany as an example but Germany has not apologized to Namibia, noting that "if we said Japan should 'learn from Germany,' etc. in front of Namibians they would surely laugh at us" and raising concerns about Germany's response to its colonial rule.²⁹

It is important for Japan to sincerely face its own past of a "negative legacy." However, Japan has a tendency to frequently use overseas cases as examples in order not only to overcome its past but also to criticize its own problems, but comparisons are complex and difficult work, so we should probably abstain from simple comparisons.³⁰

The changes to the "learn from Germany theory" over the years perhaps show the characteristics of thought in post-war Japan and at the same time vividly illustrate the problems that arise when making comparisons with overseas, as is often seen in Japan.

¹ Refer to the following regarding the problems in comparisons of Germany and Japan concerning the past. Junichiro Shoji, "'Kako' womeguru Nichidokuhikaku no Muzukashisa: Motomerareru Shinchosa (The Difficulty in Comparing Japan's and Germany's 'Past': The Caution that is Required)," in *The Japan Institute of International Affairs: Columns* (May 29, 2014). (<https://www.jiia.or.jp/column/column-234.html>)

² Rokuro Hidaka, "Mitsu no Yonjunenme: 'Kioku wo Ikiki to Tamotsu Koto' no Imi (The Three 40th Anniversaries: the Meaning of 'Keeping Memories Alive'," in *Sekai*, September 1985; Ken Takeuchi, "Sengo Yonjunen Shidosha no Rakusa Rekishi ni Manabu Mono Rekishi wo Yugameru Mono (The Differences in Leaders in the 40 Years After the War: Those who Learn from History and Those who Distort History)," in the *Asahi Journal*, December 27, 1985, etc.

³ However, there was a considerable gap between Weizsäcker and the Japanese people who had high expectations of him when it came to his view of security and perception of history, in particular regarding pacifism (Junichiro Shoji, "'Vaitsuzekka' wo 'Tsumamigui' Suru Nakare (Don't Exploit Weizsäcker)," *Shokun!*, August 2001).

⁴ "Nihon no Sekinin, Fushime ni Tou 8/15 Kakushi Shasetsu Sengo Gojunen (Media) (Examining the Responsibility of Japan on this Milestone; Editorials of Newspapers on August 15, 50 Years after the War (Media))," *Asahi Shimbun*, August 16, 1995 morning edition.

- ⁵ "Nitchu Kankei Kihon Shiriyoshu 1949-1997-nen (Collection of Basic Documents on Japan-China Relations 1949-1997)," *Kazankai Foundation*, 1998, p. 1189.
- ⁶ Chunichi Shimbun ed. "Vaitsuzekka Nihon Koenroku: Rekishi ni Me wo Tozasu na (Lectures of Weizsäcker in Japan: Do Not Close Your Eyes to History)," *Iwanami Shoten*, 1996, pp. 47-48.
- ⁷ Regarding the security policies of post-war Germany, refer to Toshiya Nakamura, "Doitsu no Anzen Hosho Seisaku — Heiwa Shugi to Buryoku Koshi (German Security Policy — Pacifism and the Use of Force)," *Ichigeisha*, 2006.
- ⁸ Nakamura, "Doitsu no Anzen Hosho Seisaku (German Security Policy)," p. 132.
- ⁹ "Nippon no 'Sayoku' no Fukurokoji Doitsu no NATO Kubaku Sanka (The Blind Alley of the 'Left Wing' in Japan: Germany's Participation in the NATO Bombing)," *AERA*, June 21, 1999, pp. 20-22.
- ¹⁰ This kind of opinion was not limited to Doi and was often seen elsewhere, but journalist Norihide Miyoshi made the criticism that Germany's dispatch of troops overseas could not be explained by post-war reparations only, saying that "that is an excessively naive way of looking at it. To put it simply, the neighboring countries are accepting the expansion of Germany's international contributions because the politicians in the neighboring countries see that they contribute to the stability of Europe and match their national interests. In other words, this is nothing more than an expression of an attitude taken based on necessity at the present time" (Norihide Miyoshi, "Sengo no 'tabu' wo Seisan Suru Doitsu (Germany Settles the Post-War Taboo)," *Akishobo*, 2004, pp. 340-344).
- ¹¹ Toshiya Nakamura, "Doitsu no Anzen Hosho Kihan no Henyo — 1999-2011-nen no Kaigai Hahei Seisaku (Transformation of Security Norms in Germany: Analysis on Overseas Deployment of Bundeswehr in 1999-2011)," *Studies in Language and Culture (Nagoya University) Vol. 35 No. 1* (November 2013), pp. 1107-1109.
- ¹² "Intabyu Gyakusatsu Soshi ha Wareware no Gimu Da (Interview: It is Our Obligation to Stop Massacres)," *Newsweek Japan*, April 28, 1999, p. 31.
- ¹³ "Chijogun no Tonyu de Minzoku Joka wo Soshi Seyo (We Should Send Ground Troops to Stop Ethnic Cleansing)," *Newsweek Japan*, April 21, 1999, p. 19.
- ¹⁴ Makoto Oda, "[Seirai Toso] Hachigatsu, 'Nenju Gyoji' ga Owatte no Kanso ([Thunder in the West Trouble in the East], Thoughts on the End of the 'Annual Events' in August)," *Mainichi Shimbun*, August 29, 2000 morning edition.
- ¹⁵ Makoto Oda, "[Seirai Toso] 'Heiwa Shugi' ka 'Senso Shugi' ka ([Thunder in the West Trouble in the East], 'Pacifism' or 'Militarism?')," *Mainichi Shimbun*, August 31, 1999 morning edition.
- ¹⁶ Shujiro Kato, "Doitsu Shureda Seiken no Anzen Hosho Seisaku (The Security Policy of the Schröder Administration in Germany)," *Toyohogaku* Vol. 48 No. 2 (March 2005), p. 248.
- ¹⁷ Nakamura, "Doitsu no Anzen Hosho Seisaku (German Security Policy)," p. 159.
- ¹⁸ Eiichi Kido, "Doitsu Renpogun no Kokugai Hahei (Germany's Deployment of the Bundeswehr Outside Germany)," *Monthly Magazine Social Democratic Party* No. 726 (November 2015), pp. 7-10.
- ¹⁹ Eiichi Kido, "'Seifuku wo Kita Shimin' no Shuen? — Kokugai Hahei Jotaika no Doitsu (The End of the 'Citizen in Uniform'? Political Establishment and Public Opinion about Foreign Assignments of the Bundeswehr)," *Bulletin of Tomisaka Christian Center* No. 12 (March 2022), p. 103. *Mainichi Shimbun* July 3, 2014 morning edition.
- ²⁰ "Kamikawa Gaimu Daijin Kaiken Kiroku (Reiwa Go-nen Ju-gatsu Nijushichi-nichi (Kinyobi) Juhachi-ji Juppun Oite: Honsho Kaikenshitu (Press Conference by Foreign Minister KAMIKAWA Yoko (Friday, October 27, 2023, 6:10 p.m. Ministry of Foreign Affairs))" (https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/kaiken/kaiken6_000139.html)
- ²¹ The Asahi Shimbun Company ed. "Nihon to Doitsu — Fukakifuchiyori (Japan and Germany — From the Deep Abyss)," *The Asahi Shimbun Company*, 1995, p. 82.
- ²² Henning Melber and Reinhart Kössler, "Colonial amnesia and Germany's efforts to achieve 'internal liberation'," *The Conversation*, 19 May 2020. (<https://theconversation.com/colonial-amnesia-and-germanys-efforts-to-achieve-internal-liberation-138840>) Refer to the following for Melber's opinion about the problems in Germany's response to its past of colonial rule. "In the shadow of genocide: German colonial amnesia," *Talking Humanities*, 15 July 2020. (<https://talkinghumanities.blogs.sas.ac.uk/2020/07/15/in-the-shadow-of-genocide-german-colonial-amnesia/>)
- ²³ Henning Melber, "Namibia, Germany, and Israel: The Pitfalls of Selective Remorse and Trauma," *The Namibian*, 16 January 2024. Eliaser Ndeyanale and Donald Matthys, "Germany is running away from its sins in Namibia," *The Namibian*, 15 January 2024.
- ²⁴ Yasuaki Onuma, Shoko Egawa (interviewer), "Rekishininshiki toha Nanika: Tairitsu no Kozu wo Koete (What are Historical Perceptions? Moving Beyond the Structure of Conflict)," *Chuko-Shinsho*, 2015, p. 232.
- ²⁵ Junichiro Shoji, "Thoughts on the 'Comfort Women Statue' in Berlin," *NIDS Commentary* (The National Institute for Defense Studies) No. 161 (March 9, 2021), pp. 6-7. (<https://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/commentary/pdf/commentary161e.pdf>)
- ²⁶ Reinhard Zöllner, "'Ianfū'-mondai: 'Nihon no Meiyokafuku' niha Nani ga Hitsuyoka (The Problem of the Comfort Women: What is Required for Japan to Restore its Reputation?)," *Sekai*, February 2015, p. 149.
- ²⁷ Wolffsohn has held positions as a professor at University of the Bundeswehr Munich in Germany, etc. His specialty is the history of relations between Germany and Israel. Japanese language editions of his works include Michael Wolffsohn (translated by Shinichi Yukiya), "Horokosuto no Tsumi to Batsu — Doitsu Isuraeru Kankeishi (Crime and Punishment of the Holocaust: History of Germany-Israel Relations)," *Kodansha Gendai*

Shinsho, 1995.

²⁸ Michael Wolffsohn, "Antisemitismus damals und heute; 'Jüdisches Leben ist Existenz auf Widerruf'," *Der Tages Spiegel*, 17 November 2023. Jens Anker, "'Antisemitismus ist Staatsversagen'; Der Historiker Michael Wolffsohn kritisiert im Abgeordnetenhaus fehlenden Kampf Gegen Judenhass," *Berliner Morgenpost*, 17 November 2023.

²⁹ "[Koramu] Namibiajiiin ni Warawareru 'Shazai Suru Doitsu ni Nihon ha Minarae' Ron ([Column] The Theory that 'Japan Should Learn from Germany which Has Apologized' is Laughable to Namibians)," *The Chosun Ilbo Japanese Language Edition*, January 22, 2017.

(https://www.chosunonline.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/01/20/2017012001627.html)

³⁰ Norihide Miyoshi has pointed out that "another thing I find difficult to get used to is the common tendency of Japanese people to idealize certain aspects of other countries. Being humble, open-minded, and accepting toward the world is a virtue of Japan, but this frequently goes too far, and even feels obsequious at times. The question which should be asked is whether or not we are able to have the psychological resilience to confront the logic of the other country head-on" (Norihide Miyoshi, "Doitsu Risuku — 'Yumemiru Seiji' ga Hikiokosu Konran (Germany's Risks — Confusion Caused by 'Politics which See Dreams')," *Kobunsha Shinsho*, 2015, p. 243).

PROFILE

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