



防衛研究所

The National Institute for Defense Studies



The Panmunjom Declaration for North Korea:

Nuclear Weaponry, Alignment, and Regime Competition

Takeshi Watanabe (Asia and Africa Division, Regional Studies Department)

NIDS コメンタリー

No. 74 June 6, 2018

When faced with developments which give an impression of a sudden change, observers tend to focus on finding immediate factors. However, a long-term survival strategy should depend on rational tendencies and agendas. From this perspective, this paper examines the North's agenda by citing some relevant texts from the Panmunjom Declaration. The following texts cited from the Declaration in this paper are from a Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) report on April 28, 2018.

Is Denuclearization Consistent with No-first-use?

“The north and the south confirmed the joint target on turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone through the complete denuclearization.”

Paragraph 3-4.

Roughly a week before this declaration, a resolution on nuclear weaponry was issued at the third plenary meeting of the Seventh Central Committee (CC) of the Worker's Party of Korea (WPK), hosted by Kim Jong-Un. The resolution clarified the will to dismantle the northern nuclear test ground and stated that North Korea would not use its nuclear weapons “unless there are nuclear threats and nuclear provocations against the DPRK.”¹ This is a no-first-use (NFU) policy which assumes potential confrontation between nuclear weapon states.

If North Korea becomes a non-nuclear-armed state, it should demand negative security assurance (NSA), in which a nuclear state promises not to attack a non-nuclear state with nuclear weapons, instead of a

NFU. Thus, why did North Korea support “denuclearization” in the Panmunjom Declaration, and what is the intent behind its dismantling of the nuclear test site?

There is an argument that China's behavior in the early years of its nuclear tests could help in understanding North Korea's case.² This view is convincing concerning a NFU policy. Like China, which insisted on adopting a NFU policy on October 16, 1964, when announcing its first nuclear test,³ North Korea exhibited a NFU policy in publicizing a plan for conducting their first nuclear test in October 2006. North Korea's announcement also included their support for “worldwide nuclear disarmament.”⁴ This was similar to China's support for the total ban of nuclear weaponry in the 1960s.⁵ According to the 1964 declaration, China was forced to acquire nuclear weapons because of the US's refusal to completely prohibit nuclear weapons.

As the critical condition for not beginning nuclear tests, China demanded an unrealistic denuclearization agenda to be achieved. Until the time when it stopped such tests, China established its status as a nuclear weapon state in international relations. North Korea could consider this case. In contrast to the English translation of the Panmunjom Declaration by South Korea's Unification Ministry, which stated the two Koreas shared the goal of “a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula,” the above-cited North Korean translation said that they agreed in “turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone.”⁶ A nuclear free zone could exclude even US extended nuclear deterrence for South Korea.

Even though the Korean text of the Panmunjom Declaration did not directly include the term *Bihaekjita* (nuclear-free zone), the North Korean English translation suggests a harder condition of the North's nuclear disarmament than South Koreans assume. In a memorandum on April 21, 2010, North Korea's Foreign Ministry interpreted the Joint Statement of the Fourth Six-Party Talk (September 19, 2005) as the agreement for turning the Korean Peninsula into a "nuclear-free zone," which eliminated nuclear threats even "from outside in a verifiable manner," despite the fact that the joint statement did not mention such specific terms.⁷ To justify the North's 3rd nuclear test of 2013, the KCNA stated that the US had rejected North Korea's-proposed peace zone of an Asia free from nuclear bombs⁸

Urging China to Establish a Closer Alignment with the North

"The north and the south agreed to declare the end of war this year, the 65th anniversary of the Armistice Agreement, replace the AA with a peace accord and actively promote the holding of north-south-U.S. tripartite or north-south-China-U.S. four-party talks for the building of durable and lasting peace mechanism."

Paragraph 3-3.

The above paragraph, which was almost the same in the declaration at the second North-South summit meeting of 2007, reflected alliance politics in Korea by mentioning trilateral meetings for a peace treaty. North Korea started advocating a peace accord which excluded China in 1974, when China was continuing rapprochement with the US without seriously pressing them to withdraw forces from South Korea. For North Korea, whether China should be a party to a peace accord was a matter of the shared threat of the US presence in Korea to the two socialist nations. By advocating again for trilateral talks excluding China, North Korea intended to make the socialist ally more

profoundly share the North's security objectives. This is because of the two following reasons.

First, in the case of the second summit meeting, the advocacy for talks excluding China was indeed followed by China's expression of a much clearer shared perception of threat with North Korea against the US-ROK alliance. Several months after the summit meeting, on May 27, 2008, the Foreign Ministry of China defined the US-ROK alliance as "something left over from the history," and claimed that the "Northeast Asia Security Mechanism," as an agenda of the six party talks, should sustain the region instead. Given that such a mechanism in the joint statement is closely related to a peace regime, China probably considered this agenda discussed in the second inter-Korean summit meeting. It was the first time since the 1970's US-China rapprochement that China openly questioned the alliance's *raison d'être*.⁹

Second, also in the last two years, China and North Korea were continuously sharing threat perceptions.¹⁰ Even though the Chinese and North Korean media openly disputed each other in 2017, security alignment depends on common security objectives. China's repeated proposal for the "dual-track approach," which objected to promoting the denuclearizing of the peninsula and replacing the armistice with a peace treaty, reflected the nation's negativity to the US presence in Korea. In 2016, China's Vice Foreign Minister Liu advocated a "dual-track approach," following the notion that "the relevant bilateral military alliances are a product of a bygone era." In this address, Liu virtually exhibited the same position with the 2008 stance mentioned above by citing THAAD deployment to South Korea as an example of counterproductive results from alliances.¹¹

On the other hand, the North's threatening to Guam in August, followed by Kim Jong-Un's statement that he "would watch a little more" for the US response,¹² was similar to North Korea's past military-diplomatic campaigns seeking to weaken the US-ROK alliance.¹³

This action of North Korea was several days after China pressed the US to keep the promise “not to push its troops through the thirty-eighth parallel north.”¹⁴ The US keeping this promise would prevent it and South Korea from conducting combined operations against North Korea. Most likely, as a result, what the then-US Secretary of State promised before the resolution was not to seek “an excuse” to send the US military north of the parallel.¹⁵ When North Korea threatened Guam, China was also pressing the US to accept a difficult demand on security.

Furthermore, two months before Kim Jong-Un called for North-South talks in the 2018 new-year address, China imposed the so-called “three no policies,” i.e., three red-lines on the South: (1) The ROK will not join the US missile defense system (2) develop the trilateral cooperation into a military alliance or (3) make additional deployment of the THAAD system.¹⁶ South Korea’s Foreign Minister expressed these three “existing” positions a day before the China-South Korea joint statement, which stated that China expressed concerns about the same three points and South Korea explained the “existing positions” in responding to them.¹⁷ Because China drew the three red lines in the joint statement, which virtually lifted economic sanction on South Korea, the South had to expect China would impose sanction again if it disregarded the “existing positions.” In other words, China operationalized its economic power as a deterrence against South Korea.

Having the first summit meeting with President Xi Jinping of China, after agreeing to meet with President Moon could be part of Kim Jong-Un’s tactics for taking advantage in reinforcing the alignment with China. Despite that North Korea would know China’s more profound agreement with its long-standing peace regime concept, North Korea was reluctant to publically raise the issue of a peace regime during or after the first Xi-Kim meeting. What Kim Jong-Un mentioned in his speech during his visit to China was the two leaders discussing

“the issue of handling the situation of the Korean peninsula,”¹⁸ instead of a peace regime. After the China-North Korea summit, while Foreign Minister Wang Yi expressed China’s will to promote “the peaceful mechanism on the Korean Peninsula,” his North Korean counterpart did not mention that point in the press release.¹⁹ This is consistent with the Panmunjom Declaration’s statement of possible talks excluding China about a peace regime. After the Panmunjom Declaration, the Chinese Foreign Minister again held talks with their North Korean counterpart. Subsequently, only China publicized that North Korea was willing to closely communicate with them on “establishing peaceful mechanisms on the Korean Peninsula.”²⁰

Unending Regime Competition

“The north and the south will achieve comprehensive and epochal improvement and development in the north-south ties and thus relink the severed blood vessel of the nation and bring earlier the future of common prosperity and independent reunification.”

Paragraph 1.

North Korea has not followed the fate of the German Democratic Republic, which was absorbed by its liberal democratic competitor as the result of promoting reunification. A part of the reason will be North Korea’s rationale in designing ideology, where responding to people’s desire for reunification would never lead to the socialist regime’s collapse. “Independent reunification” in the North’s ideology is the “Federal Formula” for “tolerating the differing ideologies and systems” in the North and the South,²¹ defining peaceful reunification as a lasting division of a ruling regime within the nation.

For North Korea to survive, any North-South agreement for reunification must not define socialism as a provisional regime to be eventually absorbed by liberal democracy. Both of the previous two joint

declarations by the inter-Korean summit meetings included the elements of “independent reunification” which legitimizes the regime division from the perspective of North Korea. The first, in 2000, stated that the two Koreas agreed to settle the issue of their reunification, following the principle of “By Our Nation Itself,” and recognized that “a proposal for federation of lower stage advanced by the north side and a proposal for confederation put forth by the south side for the reunification of the country have elements in common.” The second declaration of 2007 expressed the hope for “the new era of independent reunification” if the two states cooperated on the spirit of “By our nation itself.” These clauses allowed North Korea to avoid defining German reunification as the example to be followed by Koreans.

Despite President Moon being notable for promoting the second summit meeting, he was not necessarily clear about accepting the notion of “independent reunification” which disregarded the German example after his inauguration.²² On July 6, 2017, in Berlin, President Moon addressed “the experience of Germany’s unification gives hope for unification and, at the same time, shows us the path that we should follow.” In contrast, in the same place, Berlin, on March 9, 2000, President Kim Dae-Jung of South Korea stated that the German case was not applicable to Korea, convincing North Korea to accept the first summit meeting. North Korea did not overlook President Moon and President Kim’s different views. The *Rodong Sinmun* of North Korea accused Moon’s Berlin address of the intention of seeking “unification of systems under liberal democracy.”²³

The reconfirmation of “independent unification” in the Panmunjom Declaration is a result of North Korea’s effort for letting South Korea maintaining its stance on North Korea’s legitimacy. Even in the joint press release of the inter-Korean high-level talks on January 9, 2018, where the two states agreed the North’s participation in

the Pyeongchang Olympics, only the North Korean version included “the principle of By Our Nation Itself” for managing issues between them.²⁴ North Korea has referred to the principle as a guideline for “independent reunification,” and South Korea probably rejected the term at the talks.

About a decade before the Panmunjom Declaration, North Korea confronted South Korea’s hope in replicating the fall of European socialism in the Korean peninsula. The South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak, who took office after the second summit meeting, issued his administration’s principle of reunification to approach North Korea’s human rights issues from the viewpoint of universal human values.²⁵ He stated that the South-North issues could not be resolved through “exclusive nationalism.”²⁶ North Korea strongly criticized the President’s statement as a violation of the “By Our Nation Itself” principle, and accused the administration of an anti-North “human rights racket.”²⁷

Human rights are best realized under liberal democracy, and the concept of human rights accepted by the European socialist nations in the Helsinki Final Act eventually absorbed liberal democratic principles into them, resulting in their collapse.²⁸ The Helsinki process has been referred to by both North and South Korea.

The United Nations General Assembly resolution for promoting North Korean human rights in 2006, for which South Korea first voted in favor, was labeled by North Korea as “human rights diplomacy,” like “the Helsinki Process” which the US promoted against the Soviet Union and other socialist systems.²⁹ The joint statement in the next year’s Inter-Korean summit meeting strongly suggested that North Korea raised this issue. The joint statement in the next year’s Inter-Korean summit meeting strongly suggested that North Korea raised this issue privately with the South. The second paragraph of the joint statement expressed the “independent reunification” principle, and declared

that the two sought to turn their relations into mutual respect “irrespective of differing ideologies and systems,” agreeing “not to interfere in the internal affairs of the other side.” South Korea’s vote in favor of the UN resolution on North Korean human rights would constitute “interference with internal affairs,” according to the then-Unification Minister of South Korea. When the Minister, raising this point, opposed his government voting for the UN resolution, North Korea also sent the South Korean government an unofficial message stating that the South must not support the resolution “after the historical inter-Korean summit meeting.”³⁰ Eventually, with the only exception of the abstention in 2007, South Korea continued supporting the UN human rights resolution.

The Trust Building Process (TBP) initiative promoted by the Park Geun-Hye government, which succeeded the Lee administration, was also an attempt to replicate the US “Helsinki Process” that destroyed socialist systems, according to North Korea’s accusation.³¹ Indeed, as expected from the name of the “process,” South Korea’s official explanation of the TBP mentioned the “Helsinki Process” directly.³²

The unclear position of the Moon administration before the Panmunjom Declaration on accepting “independent reunification” could mean that the government, which strongly criticized its impeached predecessor (President Park), was not immune to past tendencies in South Korea. President Moon stated that his government “will join the international community in raising a clear voice against the poor human rights situation of the North Korean people.”³³ Indeed, South Korea joined the 2017 UN human rights resolution as a co-sponsor with Japan and European nations. Before the resolution, the Unification Ministry submitted a report to South Korea’s National Assembly for implementing “the Basic Plan for Improving the Human Rights Situation in North Korea.”³⁴ North Korea condemned the report as the “master plan for promoting human

rights in the north” which indicated that the behaviors of the authorities under the Moon administration “are little short of the traitorous crimes of the Lee Myung-Bak and Park Geun-Hye groups.”³⁵

If President Moon intends to enact into law the inter-Korean agreements,³⁶ his progressive administration has to seriously consider the conservative principle for unifying the two Koreas under a liberal democratic system. Neither “By Our Nation itself” nor “tolerating the differing ideologies and systems” appeared in the Panmunjom Declaration, in contrast to the previous inter-Korean joint declarations.

The lack of terms like “By Our Nation itself” would not mean that the flexible leader Kim Jong-Un disregarded such concepts. Roughly about a week before he called for inter-Korean talks in the 2018 New Year address, Kim Jong-Un strongly suggested his awareness of the potentially serious threat of liberal democracy penetrating his regime. At the meeting of “party cells” (the smallest and lowest-ranking units of the party, placed within organizations including the military) on December 23, 2017, the North Korean leader warned against the attempts by “the US imperialists” and its followers to cause “anti-socialist phenomenon,” and stressed the importance of political education for making all of the party members “Kimilsungists/Kimjongilists.” This speech was followed by the New Year address, where he called for resolving all issues regarding inter-Korean relations “on the principle of By Our Nation Itself,” calling for “opening up a new history of national reunification.”³⁷ If the regime’s awareness of the threat of liberal democracy was real, the principle of “By Our Nation Itself” for preventing such a threat must be an important demand for North Korea in the inter-Korean talks.

According to *Rodong Shinmun*, Kim Jong-Un’s achievement in the Panmunjom Declaration should be highly praised for “opening up a new history of

independent reunification.”³⁸ The Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, a propaganda body for reunification issues, also issued a report which stated that the two Koreas issued the Panmunjom Declaration for writing “a new page of independent reunification” after the inter-Korean high-level talks agreed on the principle of “By Our Nation Itself.”³⁹

Military Power Intertwined with Regime Competition

The two-year acceleration in developing nuclear weapon was not result of increased tension with any outside power intending to invade North Korea. Even though North Korea cited the examples of Iraq or Libya in justifying nuclear weaponry,⁴⁰ it has enough military deterrence power without nuclear arms, unlike Iraq or Libya. North Korea has sustained the capabilities to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire” since it began its first nuclear diplomacy in 1993. Kim Jong-Un would understand unchanging condition which prevents the US from conducting attacks against North Korea. There is no rationale for North Korea to consider that it would be invaded by the US regardless of its nuclear capacity, and this means that outside threat cannot justify its nuclear development.

Instead, North Korea showed off its developing nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, which could increase the US incentive for conducting preventive strikes, because it was confident in deterrence capability without nuclear power. Nuclear development should reflect internal concerns for the regime instead of external threats from enemy forces. Nuclear weaponry can reinforce the existing regime’s legitimacy vis-à-vis alternative internal powers by realizing how the nation should appear according to people’s shared belief.⁴¹ Improving such a capability is consistent with Kim Jong-Un’s warning against “anti-socialist phenomenon.”

Even if there were no invasion, the regime could be destroyed by the general public and armed forces who

accepted the legitimacy of an alternative system. The phenomenon would be similar to the Romanian revolution, where the military joined the people’s uprising for liberal democracy. Last, I would like to cite the following text of the Panmunjom Declaration which indicates how North Korea’s military power interplays with regime competition.

“The north and the south agreed to totally stop all hostile acts against the other side in all spaces including the ground, sea and air, the root cause of military tension and conflicts. For the present, they agreed to stop all the hostile acts including the loud-speaker broadcasting and scattering of leaflets in the areas along the Military Demarcation Line from May 1, dismantle their means and make the DMZ substantial peace zone in the future.”

Paragraph 2-1.

This paragraph is similar to the joint press release on August 24, 2015, several months before North Korea began accelerating nuclear development by conducting an “H-bomb test.” The joint press release stated that North Korea “will lift the semi-war state at that time,” i.e., when South Korea terminated “all loudspeaker propaganda broadcasts” along the Military Demarcation Line (MDL). Conversely, the agreement indicated that the North would take military action against the South if it resumed loudspeaker broadcasts. The Panmunjom Declaration after the two-year-long nuclear confrontation defined ending loudspeaker operations as a necessary condition for preventing military conflicts, again indicating that North Korea would react militarily to South Korea’s propaganda.

However, in the case of the 2015 “joint” press release, only North Korea’s version included “at that time” which created the causal relationship between the North’s military retaliation and the South’s loudspeaker broadcasting. This difference in the press releases was also the result of South Korea’s refusal of the North’s

demand to include the statement. Concerning this point, in the Panmunjom Declaration, North Korea could more clearly legitimize its military retaliation against the attempt to penetrate socialism with liberal democracy. The 2018 joint declaration explicitly mentioned only “the loud-speaker broadcasting and scattering of leaflets” as examples of actions which cause military conflicts, even though the paragraph did not necessarily exclude other actions as the causes of inter-Korean tensions. Only the South would consider them as effective offensive measures.

In the Panmunjom Declaration for ending intensified military confrontation with the outside, Kim Jong-Un again returned to the agenda of the military confrontation between the two Koreas. In seeking this agenda, Kim Jong-Un also improved the military alliance with China, which also regards liberal democracy as a threat to its existing government. The loser of the Cold War is still engaging in regime competition for its survival.

¹ “Choson Rodong Dang Joongang-wiwonhwe jejlgi jesamcha Jeon-wiwonhwe Jjnheng, Choson Rodong Dang Uiwonjang Kim Jong-Un Donji keseo Byeongjinroson ui Widaehan Songrieul Geungjinop-i Seon-eon hasigo Dangw ui Saeloun Jeonlyagjeog Loseon-eul Jesihasiyeosdda [Third Plenary Meeting of Seventh C.C., WPK Held in Presence of Comrade Kim Jong Un. He Declared Proclaiming Great Victory of the Line of Simultaneous Development of Economic Construction and Building of Nuclear Force, Exhibiting the New Strategic Direction],” *Rodong Sinmun*, April 21, 2018.

² “North Korean Missile Lunch,” *Arms Control Wonk*, podcast, March 8, 2018.

³ Jeffrey Lewis, *Paper Tigers: China’s Nuclear Posture*, (Oxford: Routledge 2014), 20-22.

⁴ “DPRK Foreign Ministry Clarifies Stand on New Measure to Bolster War Deterrent,” *KCNA*, October 3, 2006. For more about North Korea’s no-first-use, see Hideya Kurata, “Formation and Evolution of Kim Jong Un’s ‘Nuclear Doctrine’: The Current State of North Korea’s ‘Minimum Deterrence’ in Comparison,” *The Kim Jong Un Regime and the Future Security Environment Surrounding the Korean Peninsula*, (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2017).

⁵ Lewis, *Paper Tigers*, 21.

⁶ “Panmunjom Declaration on Peace, Prosperity and

Reunification of Korean Peninsula,” *KCNA*, April 28, 2018.

⁷ “Foreign Ministry Issues Memorandum on N-Issue,” *KCNA*, April 21, 2010.

⁸ “Nuclear Test, Part of DPRK’s Substantial Countermeasures to Defend Its Sovereignty: *KCNA Commentary*,”

⁹ Takeshi Watanabe, “The US-ROK Alliance Faces China: South Korea’s Missile Defense,” *Briefing Memo*, March 2016. Even though China has advocated its “New Security Concept,” which denies the relevancy of military alliances after the US-Japan joint declaration on alliance in 1996, it did not specifically apply the concept to the US-ROK alliance until 2007.

¹⁰ National Institute for Defense Studies, *East Asian Strategic Review 2018* (Tokyo: Japan Times, 2018), 82-85.

¹¹ PRC Foreign Ministry, “Actively Practice the Asian Security Concept and Jointly Create a New Future of Asia-Pacific Security: Remarks by Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin at the Opening Ceremony of the International Seminar on “Security Framework and Major-Power Relations In the Asia-Pacific Region,”” July 12, 2016.

¹² “Kim Jong-Un Inspects KPA Strategic Force Command,” *KCNA*, August 15, 2017.

¹³ Narushige Michishita, *North Korea’s Military-Diplomatic Campaigns, 1966-2008*, (Oxford: Routledge 2009).

¹⁴ “Security Council Toughens Sanctions Against Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2371 (2017),” SC12945, August 5, 2017.

¹⁵ “Remarks at a Press Availability,” *State Department Press Releases And Documents*, August 1, 2017.

¹⁶ ROK National Assembly, Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee Record (temporary), 2017 audit session, October 30, 2017: 6-7.

¹⁷ PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Zhonghan Shuangfang Jiu Zhonghan Guanxi Deng Jinxing Qoutong [The Two Nations will Communicate in the PRC-ROK Relations],” October 31, 2017; ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Hanchung Kwankae Kesong Kwanryon Yangkookkan Hyopwi Kyorkwa [The Result of the Bilateral Meeting for Improving the ROK-China relations],” October 31, 2017.

¹⁸ “Yeonhoe eseo Hasin Kim Jong-Un dongji ui Yeonseol [Comrade Kim Jong-Un’s Speech at a Banquet]” *Rodong Sinmun*, March 28, 2018.

¹⁹ PRC Foreign Ministry, “Wang Yi Meets with Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho of the DPRK,” April 4, 2018.

²⁰ PRC Foreign Ministry, “Wang Yi Holds Talks with Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho of the DPRK,” May 4, 2018; “Talks between DPRK and Chinese Foreign Ministers Held,” *KCNA*, May 3, 2018.

²¹ Kim Il-Sung, “Koryo Minjulyeonbang-Gonghwagug

Changlibbang-an [The Plan for Founding Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo],” Report to the Sixth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea on the Work of the Central Committee, October 10, 1980.

²² *East Asian Strategic Review 2018*, 85-86.

²³ “Choson bando Pyeonghwa wa Tong-il-eul Wihan Jinloga Mueos-inji Ttoggtoghi Al-aya handa [Firmly Understand What is Necessary for Peace and Unification of the Korean Peninsula],” *Rodong Shinmun*, July 15, 2017.

²⁴ “Nambug Gowigeub Hwedam Jjnheng [Inter-Korean high-level talks Held],” *Rodong Shinmun*, January 10, 2018; ROK Ministry of Unification, “Nambug Gowigeub Hwedam Gongdong Bodomun [Joint Press Release of the Inter-Korean High-Level Government Talks],” January 9, 2018.

²⁵ Republic of Korea Ministry of Unification, *Sangsengkwa Kongyongue Daepuk Jongchek: Hanpando Tongile Gumi Kagawojimnida* [North Korea Policy for Coexistence and Prosperity: The Peace Unification of Korea will Come Closer], August, 2008, 7.

²⁶ Republic of Korea Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, *Lee Myung-bak Taedongryong Yonsol Munjip* [The Speeches of President Lee Myung-bak], Vol.1, (Seoul: Republic of Korea President Office, 2009), 53.

²⁷ “Lee Myung Bak Group’s Traitorous and Anti-Reunification Acts Assailed,” *KCNA*, July 5, 2008.

²⁸ Daniel Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) 224-256.

²⁹ “KCNA Urges U.S. to Stop Trumpeting about “Human Rights Issue”,” *KCNA*, November 22, 2006

³⁰ Song Min-soon, *Pinghanun Umjiginda: Pihaekhwawa Tongile Hyonjang* [A Gracier will Move: The Scene of Denuclearization and Diplomacy for Unification], (Seoul: Changbi, 2016), 452, 448-449.

³¹ “Hanpangdo Sinrae Process eul Pyongham [Criticizing the Trust-Building Process of the Korean Peninsula],” *Rodong Shinmun*, October 24, 2013

³² ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperative Initiative: Moving beyond the Asian Paradox towards Peace and Cooperation in Northeast Asia*, 2013, 13.

³³ ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Address at the Körber Foundation,” July 6, 2017.

³⁴ ROK Ministry of Unification, Regular Press Briefing, August 29, 2017.

³⁵ “KCNA Commentary Denounces S. Korean Authorities' Confrontation Racket,” *KCNA* October 10, 2017.

³⁶ “Choson Rodong Dang Uiwonjang Kim Jong-Un Donji keseo Choson Rodong Dang jeocha Sepo Uiwonjang Taehweeso Yoksajeog Yeonseol eul Hasiyeosda [Comrade Kim Jong-Un Delivered a Historical Speech at the 5th Conference of Cell

Chairpersons of the Worker’s Party of Korea]” *Rodong Shinmun*, December 24, 2017.

³⁷ “Sinnyonsa [New Year Address],” *Rodong Shinmun*, January 1, 2018.

³⁸ “Jaju Tongil ue Se Yoksaoul Pyeoljisin Takuwolhan Gonjeog [A Great Achievement in Opening Up a New History of Independent Reunification],” *Rodong Shinmun*, May 6, 2018.

³⁹ “Jeolsewiin-i Pyeolchyeojun Minjog-ui Hwahae Danhabgwa Pyeonghwabeon-yeong ue Se Yoksa: Chosun Minjujuwi Inmin Gonghwaguk Choguk Pyeonghwa-Tongil Uiwonhwe Sangbo [The Incredible great Leader Opened Up A New History of Our Race’s Cohesion, Reconciliation, Peace and Independent Reunification: A Detailed Report from the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland],” *Rodong Shinmun*, May 13, 2018.

⁴⁰ “KCNA Commentary Lauds Successful H-bomb Test in DPRK,” *KCNA*, January 8, 2016.

⁴¹ Takeshi Watanabe, “Without Incentives: North Korea's Response to Denuclearization,” *NIDS Journal of Defense and Security*, no.18 (December 2017); Scott Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” *International Security* 21, no. 3 (1996).