Peace Operations in Africa: Patterns, Problems, and Prospects

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Introduction

This paper provides an analysis and overview of major trends in peace operations in Africa, the major challenges they have encountered, and the prospects for enhancing their effectiveness. "Peace operations" are defined as the expeditionary use of uniformed personnel (troops, military observers/experts, and police), with or without a United Nations (UN) mandate, but with an explicit mandate to: assist in the prevention of armed conflict by supporting a peace process; serve as an instrument to observe or assist in the implementation of ceasefires or peace agreements; or enforce ceasefires, peace agreements or the will of the UN Security Council in order to build stable peace. Africa refers to the entire geographic continent comprising the 54 members of the African Union plus Morocco.

The paper proceeds in three parts. The first section summarizes the major patterns of peace operations in Africa, focusing primarily on developments since 2000. It summarizes the number, locations, size and principal mandates of peace operations on the continent and offers six propositions about the main contemporary patterns evident across them. The second section examines some generic problems that these operations have faced at both the strategic and operational levels. At the strategic level, they have encountered problems related to designing political strategies for conflict resolution and ensuring coordination between multiple international actors; a gap between expectations and capabilities; and the related problem of ensuring adequate, sustainable, and predictable funding. At the operational level, peace operations have often lacked requisite capabilities such as force enablers and multipliers as well as civilian capacity; they have struggled to implement mandates related to civilian protection and public security/the rule of law; there have frequently been problems related to the use of military force as well as promoting security sector reform; and there have been problems of ensuring rapid deployment.

The final section assesses the prospects for improving the effectiveness of peace operations in Africa by calling for enhanced efforts in five main areas. These are the need for more effective partnerships between the international actors involved in peace

operations; resolution of the various problems related to financing these missions; ensuring smoother transitions across different types of missions; enhancing the ability of peacekeepers to protect civilians; and ensuring peace operations are linked to effective strategies for conflict resolution in their respective areas of operation.

Patterns

What patterns are evident across peace operations in Africa? Between 1947 and 2013, Africa experienced 90 peace operations (listed in Appendix A).[1] Of these, 77 were deployed since 1990, while 47 started since 2000. Figure 1 depicts the evolution of these operations since 1988. It also classifies them into four broad types: UN-led, UN-authorized, UN-recognized, and non-UN. They were deployed into 29 African countries (30 if one counts Western Sahara).[2]

Figure 1. Number and Types of Peace Operations in Africa, 1988-2013



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1 The total number of peace operations worldwide during this period was 175. See Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, "Trends in Peace Operations, 1947-2013" in Joachim Koops et al (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2015).

2 Angola, Burkina-Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Morocco/ Western Sahara, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe.

The rest of this section summarizes six propositions about these operations, paying particular attention to developments in the twenty-first century.

Proposition 1: Major armed conflicts in Africa attracted peace operations more regularly than the global average

Between 1947 and 2013, 47 wars took place in Africa (listed in Appendix B). Compared to other regions of the world, major armed conflicts in Africa regularly attracted the deployment of a peace operation (consistently remaining above 50%) (see Table 1).[3] The majority of peace operations were in response to wars that broke out in the 1990s and 2000s (approximately 46% of all wars on the continent, and 35% of the total number of peace operations). Since 1990, there has been at least a 70% chance that international society would deploy a peace operation as part of its response to a major armed conflict in Africa. Indeed, between 2000 and 2013, there was an 83% chance that a new African war would attract a peace operation within five years. Since 2000, only two major armed conflicts in Africa did not attract a peace operation: the communal violence in different parts of Nigeria (2004-) and the civil war in Libya (2011); the latter attracted a humanitarian military intervention.

Table 1. Wars and Peace Operations in Africa, 1946-2013

Decade	War Onsets	Wars Where Peace Operations Deployed in Response	Wars Where Peace Operations Deployed in Response (<5 years)
1940s	0	0	0
1950s	1	1 (100%)	1 (100%)
1960s	8	4 (50%)	2 (25%)
1970s	9	7 (78%)	2 (25%)
1980s	3	2 (66%)	1 (33%)
1990s	15	11 (73%)	8 (53%)
2000s	7	6 (86%)	6 (86%)
2010s	5	4 (80%)	4 (80%)
Total	48	35 (73%)	24 (50%)

[3] For the global figures and analysis see Bellamy and Williams, "Trends in Peace Operations, 1947-2013."

Proposition 2: The UN has consistently been the predominant peacekeeper in Africa

As Figure 2 illustrates, this is in line with the UN's predominant peacekeeping status worldwide but it also holds true for operations in Africa, where 33 UN-led operations have deployed (see Figure 1 and Table 2). After a Western-led retreat from peacekeeping in Africa after the "Black Hawk down" episode in Mogadishu during October 1993, the UN returned to the continent in unprecedented levels after 1999. Since then, many of the UN's operations have involved large numbers of uniformed personnel (over 10,000). At the time of writing (October 2014), the UN has authorized an all-time high of over 108,000 uniformed peacekeepers in Africa.[4]

Figure 2. Number and Types of Peace Operations Worldwide, 1947-2013



The next most common type of mission was UN-recognized, that is, operations that are not explicitly authorized by the UN Security Council but are nevertheless supported by it in resolutions or presidential statements. This reflected a trend whereby after the Cold War several African regional arrangements, most notably ECOWAS, saw the UN as an unreliable partner in conflict management on the continent and hence they had to take the lead in peacekeeping. More recently, after the creation of the African Union (AU), the number of UN-recognized missions reduced, replaced primarily by AU and sub-regional missions that deployed with authorization from the UN Security Council.

[4] In MINURSO, UNMIL, UNOCI, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, MINUSCA, UNAMID, UNMISS and UNISFA.

Table 2. Number and Types of Peace Operations in Africa, 1947-2013

Type	Number of Operations
UN-led	32 (36%)
UN-authorized	15 (17%)
UN-recognized	22 (24%)
Non-UN	21 (23%)

Proposition 3: African contributions to peace operations increased dramatically during the twenty-first century

During the 1990s, African peace operations were usually conducted by the continent's Regional Economic Communities (RECs), most prominently ECOWAS. However, with the creation of the new African Union, since 2004 most African contributions outside of UN-led missions have come via AU not REC operations (see Table 3). Specifically, the AU has now conducted ten operations, the largest being AMIS (Darfur, Sudan, 2004-07), AMISOM (Somalia, 2007-), AFISMA (Mali, 2013), and MISCA (CAR, 2013-14); where the Union authorized the deployment of over 40,000 troops, nearly 4,000 police, and over 400 civilian experts.

Table 3. African-led Peace Operations, 2004-2014

Mission	Location	Duration	Size (approx. max)	Main Task(s)
ECOMICI (ECOWAS)	Ivory Coast	2002-4	1,500	Stabilization
AMIB	Burundi	2003-4	3,250	Peacebuilding
MIOC	Comoros	2004	41	Observation
AMIS (into UNAMID)	Darfur	2004-7	c.7,700	Peacekeeping / PoC
Special Task Force Burundi	Burundi	2006-9	c.750	VIP Protection
AMISEC	Comoros	2006	1,260	Election Monitor
AMISOM	Somalia	2007-	22,126	Regime Support
MAES	Comoros	2007-8	350	Election Support

Mission	Location	Duration	Size (approx. max)	Main Task(s)
Democracy in Comoros	Comoros	2008	1,350 (+450 Comoros)	Enforcement
MICOPAX (ECCAS)	CAR	2008-13	730	Stabilization
RCI-LRA (AU-authorized)	Central Africa	2011-	c.5,000	Enforcement vs LRA
MISSANG-GB (Angola)	Guinea-Bissau	2011-12	200	Security Sector Reform
ECOMIB (ECOWAS)	Guinea-Bissau	2012-	629	Security Sector Reform
AFISMA	Mali	2012-13	9,620	Enforcement / Peacebuilding
MISCA	CAR	2013-14	3,652	Stabilization / PoC / DDR

As Figure 3 illustrates, since 2003, African states have provided increasing numbers of peacekeepers to both UN-led and AU operations. From less than 20,000 in 2003, today the number is at a record high of over 60,000.

Figure 3. African Uniformed Personnel in UN and AU Missions, 2003-2014
[Figures are at 31 July annually, except 2014, where 31 August is used]



There are, however, two important caveats to this trend. First, external assistance was important to deploy and/or sustain African peacekeepers in the respective theaters of operation. This was achieved through various ad hoc bilateral and multilateral assistance packages linked to specific missions, as well as longer-standing "train and equip" programs aimed at enhancing Africa's peacekeeping capabilities.[5] Second, African states provided very uneven numbers of personnel, with a majority of African peacekeepers originating from less than a dozen countries.[6] This inequity is partly a product of the hugely uneven distribution of military and police capabilities across the continent, and partly a product of uneven levels of political commitment to peace operations evident among African governments.

Proposition 4: The European Union has become a more important peacekeeping actor as part of its Common Defense and Security Policy

During the 2000s, the European Union (EU) significantly increased its peacekeeping presence in Africa under the framework of its new Common Defence and Security policy (see Table 4). EU missions drew significant French and German support in particular and focused on DRC and Chad/CAR.[7] In addition, through its African Peace Facility the EU proved significantly more willing to fund various African peace and security initiatives.

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5 Examples include the United States' Global Peace Operations Initiative, the French RECAMP program, Norway's Training for Peace program, Britain's peacekeeping training support programs, and the UN's Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme for the African Union.

6 The major African providers of peacekeepers since 2003 have been Burundi, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda.

7 See, for example, Gorm Rye Olsen, "The EU and Military Conflict Management in Africa: For the good of Africa or Europe?" *International Peacekeeping*, 16:2 (2009): 245-260.

Table 4. EU Peace Operations in Africa, 2003-2014

Mission	Location	Duration	Size (approx. max.)	Main Task(s)
Op. Artemis (EU)	DRC	2003	1,500	Enforcement / Civilian protection
EUPOL Kinshasa (became EUPOL RD)	DRC	2005-7	c.30	Police training
EUSEC Congo	DRC	2005-9	40	Security Sector Reform
EU Support to AMIS 2	Sudan	2005-8	100	Technical support
EUFOR RD	DRC (CAR)	2006	c.1,250	Enforcement
EUPOL RD	DRC	2007-9	39	Security Sector Reform
EU SSR Guinea-Bissau	Guinea-Bissau	2008-10	33	Security Sector Reform
EUFOR Chad/CAR	Chad and CAR	2008-9	3,700	Civilian protection
EU Training Mission	Uganda/ Somalia	2010-	125	Security Sector Reform
EU Training Mission	Mali	2013-	580	Security Sector Reform
EUFOR RCA	CAR	2014-	1,000	Enforcement / Civilian protection

Proposition 5: During the twenty-first century, peacekeepers in Africa have been concentrated in a relatively small group of countries

The new operations deployed into Africa since 2000 have been located in fifteen countries.[8] Today, peace operations remain in ten of them (see Figure 4). However, between 2006 and 2013 the majority of peacekeepers were deployed in DRC, Somalia and the Sudans. Indeed, at one stage, the four UN-led operations in DRC and (the) Sudan(s) accounted for roughly one-third of all UN peacekeepers deployed worldwide, and one-third of the entire UN peacekeeping budget, while the AU's Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was its only operation from mid-2008 until early 2013. The new missions in Mali and CAR during 2013 have diluted this concentration to some extent.

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[8] Burundi, CAR, Chad, Comoros, DRC, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan.

Figure 4. Peace Operations in Africa (October 2014)



Proposition 6: Partnership peacekeeping has become the norm in Africa

A central lesson derived from the experiences of conflict management in twenty-first century Africa is that no institution or actor can deal with the challenges alone. Partnership peacekeeping—where operations involve collaboration among two or more international institutions—has thus become the norm. The emerging division of labor has seen African states provide the majority of the personnel (including for some UN missions) with other actors providing significant forms of assistance in terms of funding, training, equipment, logistics, and planning. The key partnerships in contemporary Africa are the UN-AU, EU-AU, AU-REC, and some key bilateral relationships between the African peace and security institutions and the US, France, Germany, the UK and several Scandinavian states.

Problems

What are the major challenges facing peace operations in Africa? This section analyzes the main generic problems at both the strategic and operational levels. Important strategic challenges involve designing political strategies and coordinating international

actors; gaps between expectations and capabilities; and the related problem of ensuring adequate, sustainable, and predictable funding. At the operational level, peace operations have often lacked force enablers and multipliers as well as civilian capacity; they have struggled to implement complex, multidimensional and often politically naïve mandates; there have frequently been problems related to the use of military force; and rapid deployment has proved an almost constant headache.

Strategy and Coordination

Arguably the most fundamental problem facing peace operations in Africa is designing and implementing a workable strategy to address the causes of the crisis in question. Peace operations are an instrument that can mitigate some of the worst consequences of armed conflict but they are not in and of themselves a political strategy for conflict resolution. Deploying a peace operation to a crisis zone will not ensure its resolution. While peacekeepers can and do engage in localized and operational forms of mediation and conflict resolution, they are not responsible for forcing the belligerents to reach a political settlement. Rather, peace operations should work in parallel with a peacemaking process aimed at achieving a political settlement to the crisis in question. As China's UN representative recently put it, "The deployment of peacekeeping operations itself is not the goal. Only through political dialogue, comprehensive consultation so as to settle differences and the attainment of national reconciliation can we effectively curb violent conflicts, stabilize the situation and restore security."[9] Without a strategy to achieve a political settlement, peace operations are liable to tread water for considerable periods of time, as they have done for decades in Kashmir, Cyprus, the Middle East, and Western Sahara. The same problem is now occurring in CAR, DRC, Mali, Sudan, Somalia, and South Sudan where peace operations are not tied to a viable peace process, either because that process has collapsed (as in DRC, Eritrea-Ethiopia, Mali, and Sudan) or did not exist in the first place (as in CAR, Somalia and South Sudan).

As well as often lacking a strategy for conflict resolution, peace operations also suffer from the related challenge of ensuring coordination among the various actors involved in deploying a peace operation. In the broadest sense the relevant actors are those that mandate/authorize the mission, those that deploy personnel and assets in it, and those that provide the finance. Although calls for coordination are a staple refrain of states and international organizations, it is only rarely that such actors actually

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9 Liu Jieyi, UN doc. S/PV.7275, 9 October 2014, p. 18.

allow themselves to be coordinated if this means changing their goals, priorities and/or approaches. In Africa, debates about strategic coordination involve the many moving parts but the central nexus comprises relationships between the AU, Africa's relevant Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the UN, the EU, and key bilateral players such as the United States, France and the United Kingdom.

Part of the problem here is that coordination is never a purely technical exercise but is really about ensuring the convergence of political visions and priorities. Consequently, it often highlights the different philosophies and doctrines on peace operations among these different actors. For example, while the UN is wedded to a notion of "peace-keeping" based on the principles of consent, impartiality and minimal use of force, usually after a ceasefire or peace agreement has been established, the AU is committed to a much broader notion of "peace support operations" which might involve conducting enforcement activity to impose peace by defeating spoilers.[10] Another dimension of the problem is that there are sometimes a large number of actors involved. For example, between 1997 and 2014, CAR was the site of fourteen different peace operations carried out by the UN, ECCAS, AU, EU, and France. In other cases, it is the number of actors involved to deploy a single operation. The most complex example here is the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) which receives uniformed personnel from the AU (although for several years had to work alongside parallel Ethiopian forces), its logistics support from the UN, its personnel allowances from the EU and other financial support via a UN Trust Fund of voluntary contributions, and on-the-ground training and mentorship from the EU, Ethiopia, Uganda, Djibouti and a private US firm, Bancroft Global Development.

[10] See respectively, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* (UN DPKO/DFS, 2008) and Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Partnership between the AU and the UN on Peace and Security, *Towards Greater Strategic and Political Coherence* (AU doc. PSC/PR/2(CCCVII), 9 January 2012).

Expectations and Capabilities

Many peace operations in Africa also continue to suffer from a "capability-expectations" gap.[11] This can manifest in various ways including:

- a gap between the authorized numbers of personnel and those actually deployed—with many missions taking many months or even years to reach their authorized strength;[12]
- a gap between the force requirements specified for the mission and those actually deployed—with many missions suffering debilitating gaps related to transportation, engineering, logistics, medical, information-gathering, and aviation (military and utility) units;
- a significant lag time between authorizing a mission and its actual deployment; and
- the issuing of vague and unrealistic mandates which raise local and international expectations well beyond what the peacekeepers have the capacity to deliver.

The need to ensure the rather basic point that mandates should match resources has been a constant maxim of peacekeeping analysts for many years. It was probably put most succinctly by the Brahimi Report's (2000) emphasis on "The pivotal importance of clear, credible and adequately resourced Security Council mandates."[13]

With this in mind, two types of mandated tasks have often raised (local and international) expectations well beyond what peacekeepers can reasonably deliver: those associated with civilian protection and security sector reform (SSR). Many peace operations have failed to engineer effective SSR either because they were asked to undertake it before the war in question was over, most notably in South Sudan, or because there remains a system of political patronage and nepotism that makes it almost impossible to build a professional set of armed forces loyal to the state as opposed to a particular regime or identity group, most notably in DRC and Somalia. With regard to civilian protection, this is a laudable and important objective but it has the unfortunate consequence of opening peace operations up to considerable criticism when they inevitably fail to meet the (understandably high) local expectations.

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[11] Christopher Hill coined the phrase in the context of European Union foreign policy. See his "The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 31:3 (1993): 305-28.

[12] AMIS, UNAMID and AMISOM were among the worst offenders on this issue.

[13] *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (The Brahimi Report) (UN doc. A/55/305–S/2000/809, 21 August 2000), para. 6b.

Paying the Bills

Funding poses a third set of strategic-level challenges. These manifest in different ways depending on the institution in question. For the UN, financial challenges generally relate to the overall level of the annual assessed budget and concerns voiced by Member States about reducing expenditure on peace operations compared to other items. Pressure on the UN to reduce its peacekeeping costs have been particularly apparent since the 2008 international financial crisis, prompting attempts to cut costs ranging from initiatives to utilize different procurement and management systems to simply keeping the numbers of personnel and assets as low as possible. The repercussions of the 2008 financial crisis have also been apparent within the EU.

But at least the UN and EU have a system of financing peace operations that works. This cannot be said for the African institutions involved. Neither the AU, nor the RECs have managed to find adequate, flexible and sustainable sources of finance for their operations. The *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union* (2002) stipulates a funding system whereby member states contributing contingents bear the cost of their participation during the first three months while the AU commits to reimburse those states within a maximum period of six months and then proceed to finance the operation.[14] But this system has never worked effectively in practice, leaving each operation to develop its own ad hoc financing mechanisms. As noted by the Prodi Panel in late 2008, this is unhelpful in several respects: "Reliance on unpredictable sources of funding means that there is no guarantee that essential capabilities will be available which, in turn, may invalidate planning assumptions. This acts as a disincentive to potential troop contributors who are understandably reluctant to commit to missions that they see as under-resourced, especially when this is accompanied by a lack of any guarantee of sustained reimbursement."[15] In place of the broken status quo, the Prodi Panel recommended that funds from the UN-assessed peacekeeping budget be used to support UN-authorized AU peace operations for a period of no longer than six months. Each decision was to be taken on a case-by-case basis, with approval by the UN Security Council and General Assembly, and the AU mission should transition to UN management within six months. The lack of indigenous financing for African peace operations raises big questions about the extent to which African governments genuinely

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14 The Protocol is available here: http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Protocol_peace_and_security.pdf.

15 *Report of the African Union–United Nations Panel on Modalities for Support to African Union Peacekeeping Operations* (UN doc. A/63/666–S/2008/813, 31 December 2008), para. 59.

"own" these missions and what level of capabilities are realistic and sustainable should the preferences of some key external donors change and their levels of financial support diminish. So far, African initiatives to generate more indigenous funds have not borne fruit.[16]

Managing Mandates

With only a few exceptions, notably in Western Sahara (MINURSO) and between Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE), peace operations in Africa have struggled under the weight of complex, multifaceted, and sometimes politically naive mandates. These often involved attempts to implant institutions of democratic governance as well as electoral supervision, human rights monitoring, civilian protection, ensuring the delivery of humanitarian relief, providing security and order, strengthening the rule of law, and overseeing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) programs. For example, the most recent UN operation, MINUSCA, was mandated to implement 27 "priority tasks" and 14 "additional tasks" ranging from protecting civilians "from threat of physical violence" to seizing illicit weapons and promoting "the rapid extension of State authority."[17] It was notable that almost the only task not asked of peacekeepers in Africa was to run the types of transitional administrations established in Kosovo, Bosnia and East Timor in the late 1990s. Nevertheless, numerous critics, such as India's representative to the UN, have lamented that mandates had "become too broad and too all-encompassing."[18]

Four types of challenges were particularly acute. First, peacekeepers were sometimes given contradictory instructions. For instance, MONUC was mandated to support President Joseph Kabila's government and protect the country's civilians yet the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) were responsible for a significant proportion of the crimes committed against Congolese civilians. UNMISS found itself in a similar dilemma, particularly after December 2013 with the outbreak of civil war in South Sudan.

A second challenge was the ambiguity and lack of clarity that often pervaded the texts handed down by the UN Security Council and other mandating authorities. As the head of the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations observed in 2009,

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[16] Specifically, proposals such as taxing tourism and air travel on the continent. See *Report of the High-Level Panel on Alternative Sources of Funding the African Union* (AU doc. EA10423, July 2013).

[17] UN Security Council Resolution 2149 (10 April 2014).

[18] UN doc. S.PV/6153 (Resumption 1), 29 June 2009, p. 13.

not only were mission mandates "more complex than ever" but "there remains a lack of consensus on how certain mandate tasks should be fulfilled."[19] Sometimes this was down to vague instructions telling peacekeepers to "assist" actors or "support" processes using "all necessary measures." At other times it was evident that even with relatively clear language, the troop/police-contributing countries held different views about how to interpret and implement the mandate in the field.

A third challenge occurred when conflict parties viewed peace operations and their mandates as illegitimate. Sometimes it was rebel groups that rejected the peace operations in question. In the case of EUFOR Chad/CAR for instance, some rebel groups viewed the EU's presence as illegitimate because of its close association with France, which had a long history of providing military support to President Déby's corrupt and authoritarian regime in the name of maintaining stability. In other cases, the UN and other actors have explicitly taken sides against particular non-state armed groups, such as AQIM in Mali, *al-Shabaab* in Somalia, the M-23 in DRC, or the anti-Balaka and Seleka groups in CAR.

The other variant of this problem occurs when African governments come to view peace operations as illegitimate. For example, regimes in Burundi (2006), Eritrea (2008), and Chad (2009) withdrew their consent for UN peace operations, forcing them to end. In other cases, governments threatened this, as DRC did to the UN in 2010, or complained bitterly about the mission, as in South Sudan during 2014. Another tactic used by the governments in Sudan and Ivory Coast was to place significant constraints on the activities of peacekeepers as a price for granting continued consent. This led one analysis to conclude that peacekeepers should not cross "the Darfur line," i.e. where a peace operation lacks *genuine* host-state consent.[20]

A fourth set of challenges stemmed from the sheer difficulty of the tasks peacekeepers were asked to undertake, especially with limited resources and according to externally-driven, usually unrealistic, timetables. Arguably one of the most difficult was how to physically protect civilians.[21] Although many peace operations in Africa grappled with the problems of civilian protection throughout the 1990s, it was not until 1999 that all UN multidimensional peacekeeping operations in Africa included some explicit

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[19] UN doc. S.PV/6153, 29 June 2009, p. 3.

[20] Bruce Jones, Richard Gowan, Jake Sherman et al., *Building on Brahimi: Peacekeeping in an Era of Strategic Uncertainty* (New York: Center on International Cooperation, April 2009), p. 12.

[21] For more details see Victoria Holt and Glyn Taylor with Max Kelly, *Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations* (New York: UN DPKO/OCHA, November 2009).

element of civilian protection in their mandates. Since 2003, the EU (in DRC, CAR and Chad) and the AU (in Darfur and CAR) has also given some of their operations civilian protection tasks. But it is important to recall that these mandates always came with various caveats, usually that peacekeepers should only protect civilians "under imminent threat of violence" and within their "areas of deployment." In addition, it is usually—quite rightly—left to contingent commanders on the ground to decide whether they possess sufficient capabilities to carry out specific protection tasks.[22] The fundamental problem is that there is only so much even well-resourced peacekeepers can do: they cannot "protect everyone from everything" nor can they "operate without some semblance of a 'peace to keep' or halt determined belligerents wholly backed by a state."[23]

Using Military Force

When and how to use military force represents another set of challenges. In recent years, peacekeepers in Africa have been called on to use military force for various purposes including civilian protection,[24] VIP protection, self-defence, as well as to target specific non-state armed groups. Part of the explanation for this lies in the mandates given to some missions, notably those in Somalia, Mali, DRC, and CAR, which have blurred the lines between peacekeeping and atrocity prevention, and between peacekeeping and counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations. But it is also related to the increasing tendency of some armed non-state actors to view peacekeepers as enemy combatants rather than impartial arbiters of a peace process. The result has been a rise in asymmetric attacks on peacekeepers in several theatres, particularly via the use of IEDs in both Somalia and Mali.

This raises challenges for peacekeepers in the realms of both pre-deployment training and operational effectiveness in the field. With regard to pre-deployment training, UN and other peacekeepers only recently started to receive instruction on the military tasks involved in civilian protection scenarios, and it remains unclear what, if any, training

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[22] For more detailed analysis see Paul D. Williams, "Protection, Resilience and Empowerment: United Nations Peacekeeping and Violence against Civilians in Contemporary War Zones," *Politics*, 33:4 (2013): 287-98.

[23] Holt et al., *Protecting Civilians*, pp. 12, 211.

[24] It should be noted that UN peacekeepers have been criticized for only rarely employing military force to protect civilians. Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, *Evaluation of the Implementation and Results of Protection of Civilians Mandates in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (UN doc. A/68/787, 7 March 2014).

they receive related to counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism. The AU has similar challenges. Even battle-hardened troops from Uganda and Burundi, for instance, required extensive additional field training in how to counter IEDs and conduct urban warfare operations in Somalia. The emerging lesson from both AMISOM's war against *al-Shabaab* and the Force Intervention Brigade's campaign against the M-23 rebels in DRC is that the potential for peace operations to effectively wield military power depends in large part on the willingness of the relevant TCCs to participate in proactive and risky operations.[25]

Rapid Deployment

Rapid deployment capability is the final challenge discussed here. Assuming that some unforeseen crises will erupt in Africa, the actors and institutions that might want to respond require some form of rapid deployment capability. With a couple of exceptions, UN peacekeeping operations have taken many months to reach their authorized deployment levels.[26] The exceptions were the mission between Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE) which was relatively small and drew forces from the Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), and the mission in Abyei (UNISFA) which was also relatively small and composed almost entirely of Ethiopian troops who deployed quickly to their neighboring state of Sudan.[27]

For African-led operations, the problems of rapid deployment have been even more acute. Since the early 2000s, most debate focused on constructing regional standby brigades as the building blocks of the African Standby Force (ASF). [28] Included in the ASF concept was a call to develop a "rapid deployment capability" (RDC) that would allow the AU and/or RECs to field boots on the ground within 14 days of the decision to deploy. However, neither the ASF nor the RDC reached full operational capacity as

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25 See Bronwyn E. Bruton and Paul D. Williams, *Counterinsurgency in Somalia: Lessons Learned from the African Union Mission in Somalia, 2007-2013* (US Joint Special Operations University Press, 2014) and "UN Force Intervention Brigade against the M23" SOLLIMS Lesson #1307 at http://www.nust.edu.pk/INSTITUTIONS/Schools/NIPCONS/nipcons-institutions/CIPS/Download%20Section/SOLLIMS_Lsn_1307_UN_Force_Intervention_Brigade_%2820-Nov-2013%29.pdf.

26 In some cases, it should be acknowledged that deployment was linked to political benchmarks being achieved in the peace process, as in the early stages of MONUC in the DRC.

27 For an overview of the current state of rapid deployment efforts worldwide see H. Peter Langille, *Improving United Nations Capacity for Rapid Deployment* (IPI Providing for Peacekeeping Project, Thematic Study No. 8, 2014), at http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/rapid-deployment/.

28 The brigades were subsequently renamed "Standby Forces" to reflect their multidimensional composition, which includes police and civilian elements as well as military.

planned and the timetable for completion was pushed back from 2010 to 2015. In light of this delay and the failure of African states to rapidly deploy troops to stem Mali's crisis during 2012, in early 2013 the AU unveiled the "African Immediate Crisis Response Capacity" (ACIRC). Drawing from a reservoir of 5,000 troops, the ACIRC is supposed to comprise tactical battle groups of 1,500 military personnel deployed by a lead nation or a group of AU member states and that would be sustainable for 30 days. Its purpose is to conduct stabilization and enforcement missions, neutralize terrorist groups, and provide emergency assistance to AU member states. Unlike the ASF regional standby forces, the ACIRC is a purely military capability without police or civilian elements. The ACIRC stimulated debate over whether the AU should retain its emphasis on the RDC or focus on the new ACIRC. The subsequent compromise fashioned by the AU was that the ACIRC should be conceived as a temporary and interim phase in the development of the ASF. Either way, rapid deployment will only be possible if three conditions are met: 1) timely political consensus on where, when and how to act; 2) adequate numbers of prepared troops and materiel; and 3) logistics systems in place to ensure their rapid deployment into the area of operations. With this in mind, in August 2014 the United States announced a new initiative to help the militaries of six African states—Senegal, Ghana, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda—to maintain "forces and equipment ready to rapidly deploy and state their intent to deploy as part of UN or AU missions to respond to emerging crises." Starting in FY2015, its budget is $110 million per year for 3-5 years.[29]

Prospects

How might the effectiveness of peace operations in Africa be improved? I suggest reforms and greater efforts are required in five main areas.

First, continue to enhance the partnerships between the African Union and the UN and EU. Elsewhere I have suggested a detailed set of reform proposals for the UN-AU partnership.[30] However, with the EU's growing roles in this area, greater effort should be made to make this a genuinely triangular relationship between the three institutions. While the EU has pledged a further round of funds under its African Peace

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29 White House Factsheet, "US Support for Peacekeeping in Africa," 6 August 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/06/fact-sheet-us-support-peacekeeping-africa.

30 Arthur Boutellis and Paul D. Williams, *Peace Operations, the African Union, and the United Nations: Toward More Effective Partnerships* (International Peace Institute, April 2013), http://www.ipinst.org/publication/policy-papers/detail/395-peace-operations-the-african-union-and-the-united-nations-toward-more-effective-partnerships.html.

Facility (APF) for 2014-2016 (up to a maximum of €900m),[31] debate continues over whether stronger ties can be made between the AU and EU related to planning and command and control mechanisms, as well as whether the EU should lift its prohibition on providing military equipment to the AU under the APF.

Second, a solution to the funding problem for African institutions needs to be found. This is really a political question inasmuch as African governments clearly possess enough wealth to fund their peace operations but they choose not to invest it in the African peace and security architecture. Until they do, critics will continue to conclude that this may simply be a way to attract external resources and there will be no genuinely African "ownership" of these operations.

Third, work towards smoother transitions across different types of missions, especially AU-to-UN operations.[32] This could be facilitated by conducting shared technical assessments of the situation on the ground (which would ensure a degree of convergence in the force requirements); adopting mutually agreeable timetables to facilitate smooth rotations, logistics support, and contract renewals; and ensuring that AU forces meet UN mission standards for contingent-owned equipment and relevant skills.

Fourth, although significant strides have been made with regard to doctrinal development and training, peacekeepers still need to improve their ability to protect civilians. In one sense it is inevitable that making civilian protection part of peacekeepers' mandates will lead to failure. But not attempting this task would be worse for both the legitimacy and effectiveness of peace operations. Greater efforts are therefore required to ensure that peacekeepers are appropriately equipped and well-trained before they deploy.

Finally, in many ways the most fundamental issue confronting peace operations concerns their entry strategies, specifically, under what circumstances should a peace operation deploy and how can they be linked to effective strategies to resolve the crisis in question? This is a political question about the philosophy and doctrine underpinning these missions. It requires a renewed look at the types of problems peace operations are able to fix, as well as recognizing the limits of those operations and admitting that they cannot solve all the problems of the world's war-torn states.

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31 See http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&t=PDF&gc=true&sc=false&f=ST%20 8269%202014%20INIT and http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/EU/XXV/EU/02/12/EU_21286/ imfname_10457975.pdf, p. 15.

32 There have also been EU-UN transitions (e.g. EUFOR Chad/RCA to MINURCAT) and REC-AU transitions (e.g. MICEMA to AFISMA and MICOPAX to MISCA).

Appendix A. Peace Operations in Africa, 1947-2013

UN-led	UN-authorized	UN-recognized	Non-UN

Reference Number	Mission	Location	Dates	Deployed Size (est. max. uniformed)
1.	ONUC	Congo	1960-64	19,830
2.	International Observer Team in Nigeria (OTN)	Nigeria	1968-70	6
3.	Somali Observer Force	Uganda, Tanzania	1972	Unclear
4.	Inter-African Force	Zaire	1978-79	2,645
5.	Nigerian Peacekeeping Force	Chad	1979	800
6.	Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF)	Rhodesia/ Zimbabwe	1979-80	1,319
7.	OAU Peacekeeping Force 1	Chad	1980	550
8.	OAU Peacekeeping Force 2	Chad	1981-82	2,600
9.	MFO	Egypt (Sinai)	1982	2,600
10.	Monitoring Observer Group	Uganda	1985-86	Unclear
11.	Observer Commission from ANAD	Mali, Burkina-Faso	1986	16
12.	UNAVEM I	Angola	1988-91	70
13.	UNTAG	Namibia	1989-90	7,500
14.	ECOMOG	Liberia	1990-99	12,040
15.	JVC	Mozambique	1990-92	30
16.	MINURSO	Western Sahara	1991-	237
17.	OAU Mission to Western Sahara	Western Sahara	1991-?	Unclear
18.	UNAVEM II	Angola	1991-95	350
19.	OAU MOT	Rwanda	1991	15
20.	OAU NMOG I	Rwanda	1991-93	57
21.	ONUMOZ	Mozambique	1992-94	8,125
22.	UNOSOM I	Somalia	1992-93	4,270
23.	UNITAF	Somalia	1992-93	37,000
24.	UNOMIL	Liberia	1993-97	303
25.	UNOMUR	Rwanda	1993	81
26.	UNAMIR I	Rwanda	1993-94	2,500
27.	UNOSOM II	Somalia	1993-95	28,000
28.	OAU NMOG II	Rwanda	1993	70
29.	OMIB	Burundi	1993-96	47
30.	UNASOG	Chad, Libya	1994	9

Reference Number	Mission	Location	Dates	Deployed Size (est. max. uniformed)
31.	UNAMIR II	Rwanda	1994-96	5,500
32.	Commonwealth Peacekeeping Assistance Group (CPAG)	South Africa	1994	33
33.	UNAVEM III	Angola	1995-97	4,220
34.	MONUA	Angola	1997-99	3,000
35.	MISAB	CAR	1997-98	1,100
36.	ECOMOG	Sierra Leone	1997-2000	14,000
37.	OMIC	Comoros	1997-98	20
38.	MINURCA	CAR	1998-2000	1,350
39.	UNOMSIL	Sierra Leone	1998-99	217
40.	ECOMOG	Guinea-Bissau	1998-99	750
41.	MONUC -a	DRC	1999-2002	4,278
42.	UNAMSIL	Sierra Leone	1999-2005	17,670
43.	OAU Observer Mission	DRC	1999-2000	43
44.	UNMEE	Ethiopia, Eritrea	2000-08	4,200
45.	OLMEE, AULMEE	Ethiopia, Eritrea	2000-08	43
46.	Operation Palliser (UK)	Sierra Leone	2000	1,300
47.	Operations Basilica, Silkman (UK)	Sierra Leone	2000-05	250
48.	SAPSD	Burundi	2001-09	754
49.	OMIC 2	Comoros	2001-02	14
50.	CEN-SAD	CAR	2001-02	300
51.	JMC and IMU	Sudan	2002-05	24
52.	ECOMICI	Ivory Coast	2002-04	1,500
53.	Operation Licorne (France)	Ivory Coast	2002-	4,000
54.	FOMUC (CEMAC/ ECCAS)	CAR	2002-08	380
55.	OMIC 3	Comoros	2002	39
56.	MINUCI	Ivory Coast	2003-04	76
57.	MONUC -b	DRC	2003-10	22,016
58.	ECOMIL	Liberia	2003	3,600
59.	UNMIL	Liberia	2003-	16,115
60.	Operation Artemis/ IEMF	DRC	2003	2,205
61.	AMIB	Burundi	2003-04	3,250
62.	ONUB	Burundi	2004-06	5,770
63.	ONUCI	Ivory Coast	2004-	10,954
64.	AMIS	Sudan	2004-07	7,700

Reference Number	Mission	Location	Dates	Deployed Size (est. max. uniformed)
65.	MIOC	Comoros	2004	41
66.	UNMIS	Sudan	2005-11	10,519
67.	EUSEC-CONGO	DRC	2005-	50
68.	EU Support to AMIS 2	Sudan	2005-07	50
69.	EUFOR-RD	DRC	2006	2,275
70.	AMISEC	Comoros	2006	1,260
71.	AMISOM	Somalia	2007-	22,126
72.	MAES	Comoros	2007-08	356
73.	MINURCAT	Chad	2007-10	5,525
74.	Operation Democracy in the Comoros (AU)	Comoros	2008	1,800
75.	EUFOR-Chad	Chad	2008-09	3,700
76.	UNAMID	Sudan	2008-	21,600
77.	MICOPAX	CAR	2008-13	730
78.	EU SSR	Guinea-Bissau	2008-10	33
79.	MONUSCO	DRC	2010-	22,016
80.	EUTM Somalia	Somalia-Uganda	2010-	Unclear
81.	UNMISS	Sudan	2011-	7,900
82.	UNISFA	Sudan	2011-	4,250
83.	MISSANG-GB (Angola)	Guinea-Bissau	2011-12	200
84.	ECOMIB	Guinea-Bissau	2012-	629
85.	AFISMA	Mali	2012-13	9,620
86.	Operation Serval (France)	Mali	2013-	4,000
87.	EUTM Mali	Mali	2013-	450
88.	MINUSMA	Mali	2013-	12,640
89.	Operation Sangaris (France)	CAR	2013-	1,600
90.	MISCA	CAR	2013-	3,652

Appendix B. Wars and Peace Operations, 1947-2013

	War	Onset	Intensity#	Peace Operation	Name of Peace Operation(s) (year deployed)
1.	Egypt (Sinai)	1955	3	Yes	UNEF I (1956)
2.	Algeria*	1961	3	No	
3.	Ethiopia (1)	1962	3	No	
4.	Sudan (1)	1963	3	No	
5.	DRC (1)	1964	3	Yes	ONUC (1960)
6.	Chad (1)	1965	3	Yes	Nigerian PK force (1979)
7.	South Africa	1966	3	Yes	CPAG (1994)
8.	Nigeria (1)	1967	3	Yes	OTN Nigeria (1967)
9.	Zimbabwe	1972	3	Yes	Commonwealth MF (1979)
10.	Uganda (1)	1974	3	Yes	Monitoring Obs Group (1985)
11.	Morocco (W. Sahara)	1975	3	Yes	MINURSO (1991), OAU Obs Mission (1991)
12.	Angola (1)	1975	3	Yes	UNAVEM I (1988), UNAVEM II (1992)
13.	Ethiopia (2)	1976	3	No	
14.	Ethiopia (3)	1976	3	No	
15.	Mozambique	1977	3	Yes	JVC (1990), ONUMOZ (1992)
16.	DRC (Zaire) (2)	1977	2	Yes	Inter-African Force (1978)
17.	Chad (1) (Libya)	1978	2	Yes	OAU PKF I & II (1980), UNASOG (1994)
18.	Somalia (1)	1981	3	No	
19.	Sudan (2)	1983	3	Yes	JMC/IMU (2002), UNMIS (2005)
20.	Liberia (1)	1989	3	Yes	ECOMOG (1990), UNOMIL (1993)
21.	Senegal	1990	2	No	
22.	Rwanda (1)	1990	3	Yes	OAU MOT/NMOG I (1991), UNOMUR (1992), UNAMIR I (1993), OAU NMOG II (1993), UNAMIR II (1994)
23.	Sierra Leone (1)	1991	3	Yes	UNOMSIL (1998), UNAMSIL (1999), Ops Palliser, Basilica, Silkman (2000)
24.	Burundi (1)	1991	3	Yes	OMIB (1993), SAPSD (2001), AMIB (2003), ONUB (2004)
25.	Algeria (2)	1991	3	No	
26.	Somalia (2)	1991	3	Yes	UNOSOM I (1992), UNITAF (1992), UNOSOM II (1993)
27.	Uganda (2)	1994	3	No	
28.	DRC (Zaire) (3)	1996	3	No	

	War	Onset	Intensity#	Peace Operation	Name of Peace Operation(s) (year deployed)
29.	Rwanda (2)	1997	2	No	
30.	Chad (1)	1997	2	Yes	MINURCAT (2007), EUFOR-Chad (2008)
31.	DRC	1997	3	No	
32.	DRC (4)	1998	3	Yes	MONUC-a (1999), OAU Obs Mission (1999), MONUC-b (2003), Op. Artemis (2003), EUSEC/Congo (2005)
33.	Guinea-Bissau	1998	3	Yes	ECOMOG (1998)
34.	Ethiopia (4) (Eritrea)	1998	3	Yes	UNMEE (2000), OLMEE/AUMEE (1999)
35.	Angola (2)	1998	3	Yes	MONUA (1997)
36.	Liberia (2)	2000	3	Yes	ECOMIL (2003), UNMIL (2003)
37.	Cote d'Ivoire	2002	3	Yes	ECOMICI (2002), Op. Licorne (2002), MINUCI (2003), UNOCI (2004)
38.	Sudan (3)	2003	3	Yes	AMIS (2004), EU support to AMIS II (2005), UNAMID (2008)
39.	Nigeria (2)	2004	2	No	
40.	Somalia (3)	2006	3	Yes	AMISOM (2007), EUTM (2010)
41.	DRC (Kivus) (5)	2006	2	Yes	MONUC-b (2003), MONUSCO (2010)
42.	Sudan (4)	2009	3	Yes	UNMIS (2005), EUFOR Chad (2009), MINURCAT (2009)
43.	Sudan (S. Sudan) (5)	2011	3	Yes	UNMISS (2011), UNISFA (2011)
44.	Libya	2011	3	No	
45.	Mali	2012	3	Yes	AFISMA (2012), Op Serval (2013), EUTM (2013), MINUSMA (2013)
46.	CAR	2013	3	Yes	Op Sangaris (2013), MISCA (2013)
47.	South Sudan	2013	2	Yes	UNMISS (2011)

Notes

This dataset is based on Annex 1 in Havard Strand, "Onset of Armed Conflict: A New List for the Period 1946-2004 with Applications," University of Oslo and PRIO, at http://www.prio.no/upload/983/Onset.pdf. I have modified the information by including additional qualifying armed conflicts and updating the information from 2005 to 2013.

* Categorized as "France" by Strand, "Onset of Armed Conflict."

Measure of Intensity:

2 refers to 1,000 cumulative battle-related deaths.

3 refers to 1,000 battle-related deaths in a single year.

Excluded: Armed conflicts that did not reach 1,000 cumulative battle-related deaths.