# Part II Nuclear Policies of China and India

## China's Nuclear Policy and International Order in the 21st Century

#### Liping Xia<sup>1</sup>

China is one of the five recognized nuclear-weapon states. It began to develop its atomic bombs under a very special and unique environment, in which China had faced nuclear threats by one or two nuclear superpowers during the Cold War. Since it had nuclear weapons in 1964, China has been a responsible country in formulating and pursuing its nuclear policy and nuclear disarmament policy, which serves as the objective of China's national security strategy and defense policy.

#### **Major Features of China's Nuclear Strategy**

China's current nuclear strategy can be characterized as follow:

- China has implemented a self-defensive nuclear strategy;<sup>2</sup>
- China has a small amount of nuclear weapons only for self-defense; <sup>3</sup>
- China has committed itself not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and in any circumstance;
- China has committed itself unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear weapon-free zones:
- China does not participate in nuclear arms races, and has never deployed nuclear weapons abroad;<sup>4</sup>
- China maintains a numerically small yet effective nuclear counterattack ability. In order to deter the possible nuclear attacks against China by other countries, any nuclear attack by other countries against China would lead to

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Xia Liping is Dean and Professor of the School of Political Science & International Relations at Tongji University in Shanghai and General-Secretary of the Shanghai Institute for International Strategic Studies (SIISS).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, *China's National Defense in 2008* (White Paper), (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2009), p. 51.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, "China's National Defense: 2000 (White Paper)," *People's Daily*, October 17, 2000.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

China's retaliatory counterattack;<sup>5</sup>

- The numbers of China's nuclear weapons have been maintained at a relatively low level, and the scope, structure, composition and development of them are consistent with China's military strategic guideline of active defense; <sup>6</sup>
- China's nuclear forces are commanded directly by China's Central Military Commission;<sup>7</sup>
- China has adopted an extremely prudent and responsible policy towards the management of nuclear weapons, has created rigorous rules and regulations, and has taken strict preventive measures so as to have assured the safety and reliability of its nuclear weapons.<sup>8</sup>
- China's nuclear force is mainly responsible for deterring other countries from using nuclear weapons against China, and for conducting nuclear counterattacks. China's nuclear force takes as its fundamental mission the protection of China from any nuclear attack. In peacetime, the nuclear missile weapons of China are not aimed at any country. But if China comes under a nuclear threat, the nuclear missile force of China will go into a state of alert, and get ready for a nuclear counterattack to deter the enemy from using nuclear weapons against China. If China comes under a nuclear attack, the nuclear force of China will use nuclear missiles to launch a resolute counterattack against the enemy.

During the readjustment of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in the late 1990s, the PLA Second Artillery force reduced its out-dated equipment, adjusted some of its organizations, and removed and merged some organic units. <sup>9</sup> After finishing those readjustments, the PLA Second Artillery Force increased the proportion of technical units, and its structure has further tended to be reasonable. <sup>10</sup> Until 2008, the PLA Second Artillery force has had the weapon systems of short-range, mid-range, long-range and intercontinental missiles, and has possessed quick reaction and mobile war-fighting capabilities. <sup>11</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Information Office of the State Council, "China's National Defense in 2008," p. 51.

American scholars hold that China is modernizing "the PLA's nuclear capability through the creation of a small yet more accurate and versatile triad-based strategic and tactical missile force." 12 According to SIPRI Yearbook 2007: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, China has 20 CSS-4 ICBMs and 35 CSS-5 medium-range missiles. <sup>13</sup> Those assessment and data have not been confirmed.

#### Major Features of China's Nuclear Disarmament and **Nonproliferation Policy**

Since 1963, China has consistently called for the "complete prohibition and thorough destruction" of nuclear weapons and is officially opposed to the policy of nuclear deterrence based on the implicit or explicit threat to use nuclear weapons first, and to the deployment of nuclear weapons outside national territories. China has repeatedly called for an international convention to ban nuclear weapons, similar to the chemical and biological weapons conventions.

China consistently holds that the international community should promote arms control and disarmament, and observe the following principles: 1) All nations should follow the purposes and principles for safeguarding international peace and security contained in the Charter of the United Nations (UN) and other relevant international legal norms; 2) The ultimate goal of disarmament is the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (including chemical and biological weapons), the complete prohibition of outer space weapons, and reductions in conventional arms as benefits actual circumstances; 3) Preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; 4) All nations have the right to maintain an appropriate national defense capability and to legitimate self-defense; 5) All nations, especially developed nations, should strictly control the transfer of sensitive materials, technologies and military equipment, practice restraint and halt the irresponsible transfer of weapons; and 6) All nations should endorse, respect and support the arms control and disarmament measures adopted after voluntary consultation, negotiation and agreement between nations and in light of actual regional circumstances. For many years, China has adhered to these

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Michael D. Swaine, "The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking (Revised Edition)," RAND Monograph Report (1998), p. 38.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Stockholm Institute of International Peace, SIPRI Yearbook 1999: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Chinese Edition), translated by China Institute for International Studies (Beijing: World Knowledge Publishing House, 2008), p. 712.

basic principles, bearing its due share of international arms control and disarmament obligations and responsibilities.<sup>14</sup>

China has made great progress in its nuclear disarmament and arms control policy as discussed below.

### Actively Promoting the Process of International Nuclear Disarmament

China has long stressed and supported international nuclear disarmament. As early as 1963, the Chinese government issued a statement calling for the complete, thorough, utter and resolute prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons. On October 16, 1964, the first day it gained nuclear weapons, the Chinese government offered a solemn proposal: a summit conference to be held to discuss the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and that nuclear-weapon states commit themselves not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states, nuclear-weapon-free zones or against each other.<sup>15</sup>

In an effort to realize the objective of building a world free from nuclear weapons in a step by step fashion, in 1994 China put forward a complete, interrelated proposal for the nuclear disarmament process at the 49th session of the UN General Assembly; All nuclear-weapon states should unconditionally declare that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons and immediately begin negotiations towards a treaty to this effect; efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones should be supported and guarantees given not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states; a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty be negotiated and concluded no later than 1996; the major nuclear powers should implement existing nuclear disarmament treaties as scheduled and further substantially reduce their nuclear weapons should be negotiated and concluded; a convention prohibiting all nuclear weapons should be signed, whereby all nuclear-weapon states undertake to completely destroy existing stocks of nuclear weapons under effective international supervision; and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons while promoting

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, *China: Arms Control and Disarmament* (White Paper) (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 1995), pp. 6–7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Ibid., pp. 26 – 27.

nuclear disarmament process and international cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy.16

Since then, China has also put forward some more views about nuclear disarmament. Until now, China's stance on nuclear disarmament can be catalogued as follows:

- Nuclear major powers should give up their nuclear first-use policy;
- Nuclear-weapon states with big nuclear arsenals should further substantially reduce their nuclear weapons; 17
- All nuclear-weapon states should commit themselves not be the first to use nuclear weapons, and should conclude international legally binding documents on this issue as soon as possible;
- All nuclear-weapon states should commit themselves not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear weaponfree zones, and should conclude international legally binding documents on this issue as soon as possible;
- · All states deploying nuclear weapons abroad should commit themselves to supporting the appeal of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, respecting their positions, and bearing in mind their relevant responsibilities;
- · All states deploying nuclear weapons abroad should bring their nuclear weapons home; 18
- · All states should not develop and deploy weapon systems for outer space and missile defense, which will disturb strategic security and stability;
- · All states should negotiate and conclude international legally binding documents on complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.19

China has acceded to a series of major international nuclear arms control treaties, including the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty on Principles of Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty), and the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Ibid., pp. 28-29.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Xia Liping, Arms Control and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2002), p. 603.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Ibid., p. 604.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Seabed Treaty), among others.

#### Making Good Progress in Establishing Nuclear Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs)

In September 1994, the leading figures of China and Russia issued a joint statement "on no first use of nuclear weapons against each other and on not targeting their respective strategic nuclear weapons at each other". This is the first bilateral agreement on no first use of nuclear weapons in the world.

In June 1998, during China-US summit meeting in Beijing, both sides decided that the two countries would not target the nuclear strategic weapons under their control to each other. This is the first bilateral agreement of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) on nuclear weapons between China and the United States. The agreement is beneficial for security and peace of both countries.

In May 2000, China and four other nuclear-weapon states made a joint statement that all nuclear weapons owned by them would not target any state.<sup>20</sup> On April 5, 1995, China made an official statement, reiterating its unconditional provision of "negative security assurance" to all non-nuclear-weapon states, at the same time undertaking to provide these nations with "positive security assurance." The positive security assurance includes that if a non-nuclear weapon state is attacked by nuclear weapons, China will take action in the UN Security Council, so that the Security Council can take appropriate measures to provide necessary aid to victim states, and to impose serious and effective sanctions against attacker states. These positions taken by China have won the support of many countries without nuclear weapons.

In the efforts by China and other members of the UN Security Council, on 11 April 1995, the Security Council passed the historic Resolution 984, in which China and four other nuclear-weapon states (namely the United States, Russia, Britain and France) committed themselves to standing by the side of non-nuclear-weapon states threatened by nuclear weapons.

China, as a nuclear-weapon state, always insists on its due obligations, advocating that nuclear-weapon states should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and repeatedly proposing that nuclear-weapon states negotiate

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Information Office of the State Council, "China's National Defense: 2000."

and conclude an international treaty on no-first-use of nuclear weapons against each other. In January 1994, China formally presented a draft for the Treaty on the No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons to the United States, Russia, Britain, France and other countries, proposing that the five nuclear-weapon states hold first-round discussions on the treaty in Beijing as soon as possible.

#### Pursuing a Positive Policy of Prevention of Nuclear Proliferation

The Chinese government has persistently pursued the policy of no advocating, no encouragement and no engagement of nuclear proliferation, and no helping other countries develop nuclear weapons. China advocates the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons as part of the process of eliminating such weapons. The Chinese government holds that in the process of reaching the objective of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, nuclear proliferation should be prevented.

China supports the three major goals set forth in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT): preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, accelerating nuclear disarmament, and promoting international cooperation in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. In March 1991, China formally became a party to the NPT treaty. In May 1995, at the Conference on the Review and Extension of the NPT treaty, the Chinese government expressed its support of the decision to indefinitely extend the treaty. China believes that the indefinite extension of this treaty reaffirms the objectives of international cooperation in nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and should not be interpreted as permitting nuclear-weapon states to retain their possession of nuclear weapons forever.<sup>21</sup>

When cooperating with other countries in peaceful use of nuclear energy, the Chinese government has stuck to the three principles: 1) To make it sure that all projects must be used for peaceful objectives; 2) All projects must be under the supervision of the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); and 3) Relevant items and technologies should not be transferred to third parties without the permission of China. China does not provide help for any nuclear facility that has not accepted the safeguards of the IAEA. China holds that the safeguards regime

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Information Office of the State Council, China: Arms Control and Disarmament, p. 28.

of the IAEA is an important component of the efforts to assure the effectiveness of the NPT. Even prior to acceding to the treaty, China undertook to fulfill the obligations stipulated by the IAEA statute, including the obligation to apply IAEA safeguards. Since 1992, when it became a party to the treaty, it has strictly fulfilled all its obligations under the Treaty, including the obligation to cooperate fully with the IAEA in safeguard applications. China follows three principles regarding nuclear exports: exports serving peaceful use only, accepting IAEA's safeguards and no retransfers to a third country without China's consent. Chinese government regulations hold that all export of nuclear materials and equipment should be subject to IAEA safeguards.

In 1985, China declared that it would of its own free will submit part of its civilian nuclear facilities to the IAEA for safeguards. In 1987, the Chinese government issued the Regulation on Management of Nuclear Materials. In 1988 China and the IAEA signed an agreement on voluntary safeguards, under which China provided the IAEA with a list of facilities subject to such safeguard and established the SSAC. The system is supervised, administered and operated respectively by the competent government department, the facility concerned and technological support unit. The competent government department is responsible for organizing the implementation of the safeguard agreement between China and the IAEA. The nuclear facility management is responsible for establishing measurement, recording and reporting regimes in line with the requirements of the agreement, as well as receiving on-site inspections by IAEA inspectors.<sup>22</sup>

With a view to supporting the IAEA, in November 1991, China officially declared that on a continuing basis, it would report to the IAEA any export to or import from non-nuclear weapon states involving nuclear materials of one effective kilogram or above. In July, 1993, China formally promised that it would voluntarily report to the IAEA any imports or exports of nuclear materials, and all exports of nuclear equipment and relevant non-nuclear materials.

On 28 March 2002, the Chinese government informed the IAEA that China has finished the legal procedure of making effective the Additional Protocol of Safeguard Agreement with IAEA.<sup>23</sup> The Agreement has been formally effective since that day. China is the first country in the five nuclear-weapon states that has finished the legal

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Ibid., pp. 19-20.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Head of Chinese Delegation Zhang Huazhu's Speech at the Council Meeting of IAEA in Vienna, June 10, 2002.

procedure.

In May 1997, The State Council of the People's Republic of China (PRC) issued "the Notice on Strictly Pursuing China's Policy of Nuclear Exports," which clearly regulates that none of nuclear materials, nuclear equipment and their technologies, non-nuclear materials to be used for nuclear reactors, and dual-use equipment, materials and technologies related to nuclear purposes are permitted to be exported to nuclear facilities of other countries that have not be under the supervision of the IAEA. No Chinese companies are permitted to cooperate or to exchange experts and technology information with nuclear facilities of other countries.

On 10 September 1997, the State Council of the PRC issued "the Regulation on Nuclear Export Management," which stipulated that 1) All business of nuclear exports should be monopolized by the units assigned by the State Council of the PRC, and no other units or personnel in China are permitted to do this business; 2) A system of licenses is applied to all nuclear exports, and every item and relevant technology listed on the List of Nuclear Export Management should apply for permission and license; and 3) the List of Nuclear Export Management will be as same as "The Trigger List" of the Zangger Committee (ZAC).

In October 1997, China became a party of the Zangger Committee. On 1 June 1998, the State Council of the PRC passed the Regulation on Export Management of Nuclear Dual-use Items and Their Relevant Technologies".

China has taken positive attitudes towards the negotiation on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). In March 1995 at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, a mandate was given to establish an ad hoc committee to consider how to ban fissile material production for weapon purposes. However, because of disagreement concerning existing stockpiles of military plutonium and highly-enriched uranium (HEU), and the relation between nuclear disarmament and arms control in outer space, negotiations remained deadlocked until recently. While in August 1998 the decision was made to start negotiations on a treaty to halt the production of fissile material, the process has been thwarted, since the CD has been unable to reconvene the ad hoc committee charged with negotiating the treaty.

#### Playing an Important Role in the Prohibition of Nuclear Tests

China advocates the total prohibition of nuclear weapon explosion tests during the process to advance towards the objective of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and a nuclear-free world.

On 29 July 1996, the Chinese government declared that China would suspend its nuclear explosion tests. China actively participated in the negotiations of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), showing a constructive spirit and flexible attitude during the negotiations. On 24 September 1996, the Chinese government signed the CTBT treaty. The treaty is the first international legally binding document, prohibiting any nuclear weapon explosion test or other nuclear explosion test in any environment and any spot in the world, which is conducive to the process of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear proliferation, so as to improve international peace and security.

China endorses the verification measures to be taken in accordance with the regulation of the CTBT treaty. At the same time, China opposes any country abusing these rights in order to interfere in China's internal affairs and harm China's proper security interests.

China holds that prohibition of nuclear tests themselves is not the objective, but one of the steps to realize the final goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. However, on October 13, 1999, the US Senate failed to ratify the CTBT. That has exerted great negative influence over the process of international arms control and may lead to new nuclear proliferation. Because of the failure, both India and Pakistan have still refused to sign the CTBT. Concerned with the intentions of the United States, some other countries have slowed down the process of ratification of the Treaty. The Russian State Duma ratified the CTBT on 21 April 2000.

#### Strongly Supporting the Establishment of Nuclear Weapon-Free **Zones**

China supports the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZs) in general, because China thinks that the establishment of such zones is of great importance to the advancement of nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear proliferation, and the promotion of international and regional peace and security.<sup>24</sup> In a statement to the NPT Review and Extension Conference on 18 April 1995, the Chinese Foreign Minster stated: "China supports the efforts of relevant countries and regions

<sup>24 &</sup>quot;Speech by Head of the Chinese Delegation to the International Conference 'Central Asia: Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone," Tashkent, Uzbekistan, September 15, 1997.

to establish nuclear weapon-free zones or zones free of weapons of mass destruction through voluntary consultations." 25

On 15 September 1997, China presented its seven principles on the Creation of NWFZs, in which there are four important principles, including: 1) Establishing nuclear weapon-free zones should follow the purpose of the Charter of the United Nations and established principles of international laws; 2) Nuclear-weapon-free zones should be established on the basis of equality and voluntary consultations between relevant countries according to the realities of the regions; 3) The geographical scope of nuclear-weapon-free zones should not include continental shelves and exclusive economic zones (EEZ) as well as areas over which there are disputes with countries outside the nuclear-weapon-free zone about territorial sovereignty and marine rights; 4) The position of nuclear-weapon-free zones should not been influenced by other security mechanisms, and none of the parties of nuclear-weapon-free zones should refuse to do its duty for any reason, including military alliances.

Until now, China has signed and ratified the following relevant legally binding documents related to nuclear-weapon-free zones: the Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the relevant protocols of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone (Treaty of Rarotonga), and the African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Pelindaba). On 15 July 1999, during his visit to Mongolia, Chinese President Jiang Zemin expressed that China respects the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia. On 27 July 1999, during the ASEAN Regional Forum, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan said that the Chinese government has agreed in principle to sign the Protocol of the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty.

The other four nuclear-weapon states (NWS), namely the United States, Russia, Britain and France, have also singed the relevant protocols of the Tlatelolco, Rarotonga and Pelindaba Treaties, committing themselves not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against regional state parties. Nuclear-weapon-free zones are part of the architecture that can usefully encourage and support a nuclear-weaponfree world. The progress of NWFZs has been making us nearer and nearer to the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> "Statement by H. E. Qian Qichen, Vice Premier and Foreign Minister and Head of Delegation of the People's Republic of China at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," April 18, 1995, <a href="http://www.nti.org/db/China/engdocs/">http://www.nti.org/db/China/engdocs/</a> qian0495.htm>.

ultimate realization of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Until now, there are four existing populated NWFZs, created by the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Treaty of Rarotonga, the Treaty of Pelindaba and the Treaty of Bangkok. In addition, the Antarctic Treaty demilitarizes the Antarctic Continent. The combined areas of the zones created by the Antarctic, Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Bankok treaties constitute about 45% of the earth's surface. With the entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty, virtually all of the southern hemisphere and parts of the northern hemisphere have been covered by NWFZs.26

The progress has demonstrated that regional nuclear non-proliferation mechanisms based on NWFZs have been playing roles as important as global nuclear non-proliferation mechanisms, in some cases, even more important than the latter. For example, both non-nuclear-weapon states and nuclear weapon states undertake more responsibilities in NWFZs than in global non-proliferation mechanisms. All four existing NWFZs have their own supplemental safeguards with regional mechanisms and procedures, so the scope of the verification regimes of NWFZs goes beyond the full application of IAEA safeguards. Nuclear-weapon states provide negative security assurances to regional parties, including a commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against regional state parties. Furthermore, that nuclear threshold states or de facto nuclear weapon states return to the status of nonnuclear weapon states will depend mainly on the relaxation of the regional security situation. Both NWFZs and the IAEA are also necessary to supplement each other to prevent the status of the states from reversing.

#### Making Efforts to Further Arms Control in Outer Space

• To continue its process of participating in international nuclear nonproliferation and arms control mechanisms. During recent years, China has participated in a series of nuclear nonproliferation regimes, including the NPT, and signing of the CTBT, commitment of observing the guidelines and parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and so on. According to these international commitments, the Chinese government

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Amitav Acharya and Sola Ogunbanwo, "The nuclear weapon-free-zones in South-East Asia and Africa," SIPRI Yearbook 1998: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (New York: Oxford University Press and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1998), Appendix 10B, p. 454.

has been taking a series of measures to control the exports of its nuclear technology and materials as well as items and materials of missiles. At the same time, China has engaged in cooperation on nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction with other countries. Furthermore, since the first day of its possessing nuclear weapons, China has committed itself to realizing the final objective of a comprehensive ban and thorough destruction of all nuclear weapons in the world. That has formed the basis for China to participate in the international nuclear disarmament process in the future. The more closely China has integrated itself into the international community, the more willingly it would like to play a responsible role in international nuclear nonproliferation and arms control mechanisms.

- To actively promote the efforts to establish a nuclear weapon free world. The ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament should be total destruction of all nuclear weapons. In order to achieve this end, China would attach more importance to creating a suitable global political climate. The reason is that only by improvement of relations between countries, resolving of existing and potential conflicts, and further relaxation of regional situations can nuclearweapon states further reduce and even eliminate their nuclear weapons, and nuclear threshold states give up their nuclear options. If the United States and Russia reduce their deployed nuclear warheads to 1,000 for each of the parties, France, Britain and China will be able to join them in an international nuclear weapon disarmament regime, and all recognized nuclear weapon states should reduce their nuclear arsenals to a level of 200 warheads each under stringent verification. The three de facto nuclear states, namely India, Pakistan and Israel should stop developing and producing nuclear weapons, and store their weapons-grade nuclear materials under strict international verification. When international conditions become mature, both recognized nuclear weapon states and de facto nuclear weapon states should dismantle all their nuclear weapons. After that, all countries should sign a Nuclear Weapons Convention, which will illegalize nuclear weapons and prohibit the development, testing, production, stockpiling, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons in the world. At the same time, global verification mechanisms for a nuclear-weapon-free world should be established, in which the United Nations will play the key role.
- To increase nuclear transparency. In Chinese traditional military thinking,

there was nothing about transparency. However, since the end of the Cold War, China has gradually accepted the concept of transparency. Especially when China feels more confident about its relationship with other countries and about its international security environment, it can take more active and positive attitudes towards arms control issues and transparency issues. In fact, it has made some progress in improving its nuclear transparency. For example, China has published the white papers on both arms control and national defense. It will publish more white papers on national defense, which will mention China's policy of nuclear arms control and disarmament.

- To maintain the NPT regime. The NPT is both the basis of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and the prerequisite for progress in the nuclear disarmament process. The NPT must be observed in full and in good faith. Otherwise, international efforts for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation would be seriously harmed. Those countries which have not joined the NPT should do so at the earliest possible date so as to make the treaty truly universal. China will make efforts to observe the NPT in full and to maintain the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
- To make the CTBT come into force. The international community should continue to try its best efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. In order to do this, the Senate of the United States should ratify the CTBT soon. At the same time, India and Pakistan should sign the Treaty and other countries should also ratify the Treaty. The Standing Committee of the People's Congress of the PRC is considering the issue of ratifying the CTBT. If the US Senate ratifies the CTBT, China will ratify it soon.
- To prevent an arms race in the outer space. The international community should make great efforts to prevent an arms race from expanding into outer space. The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva should discuss the issue and pay much effort to reach the treaty on preventing the deployment of weapons in outer space. China will continue to give importance to the issue.
- To negotiate and reach the Fissile Material Production Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). That treaty will ban the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons, so as to be beneficial to both nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear proliferation. China will support the objective of finishing the treaty.

#### **Factors Affecting China's Current Nuclear Policy**

China's current nuclear policy depends on China's defense policy and military strategy, which are decided by China's national development strategy. Other factors, which have also effected China's current nuclear policy, include: the objective of China's foreign policy, China's assessment of the international situation, China's relations with other major powers, other major powers' nuclear posture, missile defense, China's concepts of security, the Taiwan issue and so on.

- China's national development strategy. Since the early 1980s, China has been focusing its efforts on internal economic development in order to improve the living standard and educational level of its people. China will continue to go forward in this way for a long time. The long-term purpose of China's national development strategy is to make China become a midlevel developed country, which will be strong, democratic and civilized, by 2050.<sup>27</sup> To achieve these objectives, China will continue to pursue the policy of reform and opening, and need a long-term peaceful international environment, especially stable surroundings. This means that China does not want to do anything that may seriously disturb the current international economic and political mechanisms except when its critical national interests are threatened. Even if China can achieve that objective according to plan, because China has a very big population and its economic development is very unbalanced, it will continue to focus its attention on internal issues. At the same time, the more prosperous China is, the more cooperative it will be with other countries, because under the circumstances, China will be influenced more easily by the outside world.
- China's defense policy and military strategy. China's defense policy is purely defensive in nature. The small nuclear arsenal of China is only for the purpose of self-defense. China has unilaterally committed itself to responsibilities not yet taken by other nuclear-weapon states, including the declaration of a no-first-use policy, the commitment not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states and nuclear weapon-free zones. China has not retained any military presence beyond its own territory. China's

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> "The Report of Jiang Zemin at the 15th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party," September 12, 1997, <a href="http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64568/65445/4526285.html">http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64568/65445/4526285.html</a>.

military strategy is "active defense," which means that China's armed forces assume a self-defensive posture and will not make any provocation; but if war is ever imposed on China, its military forces will certainly retaliate. China has been reducing its armed forces by half a million troops from 1996 to 2000 following the reduction of one million troops during the 1980s. China's military expenditures has been kept at a very low level for more than one decade. In the past few years, China's military expenditure has been about 1.1–1.8% of China's GDP. Furthermore, China has declared that it will never become a superpower. So China will never impose any military threat to other countries.

- The objective of China's foreign policy. China has been pursuing its independent foreign policy of peace since the mid 1980s. The objective of China's foreign policy is to strive for a peaceful international environment, which will be beneficial for China's long-term economic and social development. So there are two outstanding characteristics in China's current foreign policy: peace and independence. Peace indicates that China formulates its foreign policy from the viewpoint of whether it is beneficial to international and regional peace and stability, instead of the viewpoint of getting military superiority. Independence indicates that China formulates its foreign policy according to its national interests and the common interests of peoples of all the countries in the world. To continue to develop its friendly cooperation based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence with all the countries in the world, including the United States, is the core of China's independent foreign policy of peace.
- China's assessment of the international situation. China thinks that there are two major subjects and two important trends in the international situation. The two major subjects are peace and development. Since the 1980s, especially after the end of the Cold War, peace and development have become the two major subjects in the world situation, although unstable factors are existing, including terrorism, regional hot spots, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and etc. The trends of peace and development will continue as the main stream of the world, which will be beneficial for nuclear arms control and disarmament.

The first of two important trends in the international situation is the trend of multi-polarization. Although the United States wants to realize a singlepolar world and the process of multi-polarization has been tortuous, the trend of multi-polarization will continue to develop, which will be beneficial to world peace in general. There will be several centers of powers: the United States, Russia, European Union, Japan, China, India, the ASEAN, and etc. As middle powers and many Third World countries play more and more important role in the international politics, they will bring more and more pressures to push for a nuclear-weapon-free world.

The second is the trend of economic interdependence between states. During recent years, economic globalization and regional economic integration has become mainstream. As one of the results, economic interdependence between states, especially between major powers, has made big progress. Under the circumstances, more countries are willing to resolve their disputes through peaceful means, and major powers are more unwilling to have conflicts between them, which will reduce the possibility of using of nuclear weapons in the future.

- China' relationship with the United States. China and the U.S. have still shared many common interests in the security field as well as in the economic field. September 11th expanded the basis for China-US security cooperation, and has made them lay the new basis for their strategic cooperation once again. Since then, the China-US relationship has made some important developments. In particular, they have developed their security and strategic cooperation. However, the two countries still have negative factors in their relations. If both sides can lay more importance on their cooperation, and deal properly with the negative factors in their relationship, they can continue to improve their security cooperation and military relations, which will be not only in the interests of the two countries, but also benefit the Asia-Pacific region as well as the whole world. After the Obama Administration was inaugurated, China-US relations have been relatively stable, although some people in the U.S. still talk about the "China threat" and the two countries have different views about many issues.
- Other major powers' nuclear posture. On May 24, 2002, US President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT), in which both sides committed themselves to reducing their operationally deployed strategic nuclear

warheads to 1,700-2,200 for each party by December 31, 2012.28 If the two countries can fulfill their obligation, it will be beneficial for international nuclear disarmament. However, US reduced deployed strategic nuclear warheads will not be destroyed. Instead, they will be deposited at some place in the United States. So if the United States thinks it is necessary, it will deploy them again soon.

Furthermore, on December 31, 2001, the US Department of Defense (DoD) submitted the Nuclear Posture Review report to the US Congress. This report establishes a new triad composed of: 1) Offensive strike system (both nuclear and non-nuclear); 2) Defenses (both active and passive); and 3) A revitalized defense infrastructure that will provide new capabilities in a timely fashion to meet emerging threats.<sup>29</sup> In this report, DoD holds: "Nuclear weapons could be employed against targets able to withstand non-nuclear attack, (for example, deep underground bunkers or bio weapon facilities)." 30 That will greatly increase the possibility for the United States to use nuclear weapons, and set spurs to non-nuclear-weapon states to develop nuclear weapons. In a testimony before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Joseph Cirincione, Director of the Carnegie Non-Proliferation Project, criticized the report as a deeply flawed review, saying "the proposed policies could make the use of nuclear weapons by the United States or other nations more likely." <sup>31</sup> Moreover, in this report, Pentagon holds: "Due to the combination of China's developing strategic objectives, its ongoing modernization of its nuclear and non-nuclear forces, China is a country that could be involved in an immediate or potential contingency." <sup>32</sup> This means that the Pentagon puts China on the list as a target of its nuclear weapons.

In spite of economic difficulties, Russia has still intended to maintain its position as a nuclear great power and has made smooth progress in pursuing the plan, which gives priority to develop strategic missiles. Russia is deploying a new type of strategic missile called Poplar-M (SS-27), in large numbers, and is quickening its steps to construct a new type of strategic submarines so as to replace the old Typhoon

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> "Text of Arms Control Treaty Signed in Moscow," Washington Post, May 25, 2005.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> The US Department of Defense's report to the US Congress, "Nuclear Posture Review," December 31, 2001, <a href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm">http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> Joseph Cirincione, "A Deeply Flawed Review,' in a testimony before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee," May 16, 2002, <a href="http://www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/templates/publications.asp">http://www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/templates/publications.asp</a>>.

<sup>32</sup> The US Department of Defense's report to the US Congress, "Nuclear Posture Review," December 31, 2002.

strategic submarines. The research and development of nuclear weapons by the two nuclear superpowers have increased the danger of use of nuclear weapons in future armed conflicts and has become one of the major reasons for nuclear threshold states to stay out of international nuclear non-proliferation regimes.

#### **New Security Concepts**

Since the end of the Cold War, China has adopted more and more new security concepts. In 1996, according to the new trends of time and characteristics of the Asia-Pacific region, China put forward the proposal to jointly cultivate a new kind of security concept, focused on the improvement of trust through dialogue and security through cooperation. Afterwards, China holds that the core of the new security concept should be mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination.<sup>33</sup> The new security concept should be also the guideline to resolve disputes in international arms control and disarmament.34

The new security concepts China has adopted include: 1) The concept of "mutual security." During the Cold War, the concept of zero-sum games had been playing the most important role in the international politics. After the end of the Cold War, countries should accept the concept of mutual security because of the changed situation. We should oppose any country building their own security upon the insecurity of others. According to the concept, nuclear powers, especially two nuclear superpowers, should speed up their process of nuclear disarmament. 2) The concept of cooperation. At present, all countries are facing many nontraditional security threats or transnational problems, such as environmental problem, the greenhouse effect, drug trafficking, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and so on. They should make common efforts and cooperate to deal with the challenges. In particular, they should pay more attention to nuclear disarmament, because nuclear weapons are still hanging like a sword of Damocles above mankind and have never ceased threatening the survival of humanity. 3) Emphasis should be changed from on military security to on comprehensive security. After the end of the Cold War, although geopolitical, military security and ideological factors still play

33 Chinese Delegation at the meeting of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) held in Seri Begawan, the Capital of Brunei, "China's Document about the Position of New Security Concept," on July 31, 2002. 34 Chinese Ambassador of Disarmament Hu Xiaodi's Speech at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, on 7 February 2002.

important role in some politicians' mind, the role of economic factors is becoming more outstanding in international relations. Thus, all countries should try to seek for the settlement of divergences and disputes between nations through peaceful means.

#### Missile Defense

The reason why China is very concerned about the Missile Defense system (MD) is that if the United States provides MD to Taiwan, that will not only violate its commitment made in the three China-US joint communiques and China's sovereignty, but also make some separatists on Taiwan think if they declare Taiwan independent, the MD can protect them from being attacked from the mainland, which will spur them go further toward independence. That will be very dangerous. And if the United States transfers MD to Taiwan, that will hurt the process of arms control and nonproliferation in the Asia-Pacific region and make it very difficult for China to give positive considerations to formally participate in the MTCR. Now the United States uses a double-standard. On one hand, it imposes sanctions on some countries in accusation of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles; on the other hand, it provides many sophisticated weapons to some regions. Moreover, there are some technologies in the MD systems which violate the MTCR. If the stability in the Taiwan Strait can be maintained and reunification with the mainland through peaceful means can be finally realized, that will be beneficial for the interests of people on Taiwan as well as peoples of all countries in the Asia-Pacific region, including the United States.

#### The Taiwan Issue

Both the mainland and Taiwan belong to China. The Taiwan issue is China's internal affair and in China's key national interests, to which China favors a peaceful reunification. But China cannot commit itself to the renouncement of the use of force as a final resort to halt the independence of Taiwan and foreign intervention into Taiwan. Therefore, force is also the guarantee that the Taiwan issue might be resolved peacefully.

Economic and personnel exchanges across the Strait have been steadily developing. From the long run, with the integration of economy and society between

the two sides, the mainland and Taiwan will be finally reunified, although it will take time.

#### China Supports the Establishment of a Nuclear-Zero World

China would make great efforts to build a safer and harmonious world for all without nuclear weapons. So China fosters a peaceful and stable international environment, resolve international disputes through peaceful means, and increase the sense of security for all countries. China also promotes development, eradicate poverty, and remove the root causes of conflict and instability. In order to realize such world, China holds that we should maintain global strategic balance and stability and vigorously advance nuclear disarmament. All nuclear-weapon states should fulfill in good faith obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the NPT, and publicly undertake not to seek permanent possession of nuclear weapons. Countries with the largest nuclear arsenals should continue to take the lead in making drastic and substantive reductions in their nuclear weapons. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty should be brought into force at an early date, and negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty should start as soon as possible. When conditions are ripe, other nuclear-weapon states should also join the multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament. To attain the ultimate goal of complete and thorough nuclear disarmament, the international community should develop, at an appropriate time, a viable, long-term plan composed of phased actions, including the conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. 35

China also holds that all nuclear-weapon states abandon the nuclear deterrence policy based on first use of nuclear weapons and take credible steps to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons. All nuclear-weapon states should make an unequivocal commitment of unconditionally not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and conclude a legally-binding international instrument in this regard. In the meantime nuclearweapon states should negotiate and conclude a treaty on no-first-use of nuclear weapons against one another.

In order to consolidate the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, China holds that all countries should

<sup>35</sup> Hu Jintao, "Work Together to Build a Safer World for All," Statement at the United Nations Security Council Summit on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament, New York, September 24, 2009.

join the NPT and real efforts should be made to uphold and enhance its authority and effectiveness. The function of the IAEA in safeguards should be strengthened. All countries should strictly comply with non-proliferation obligations, refrain from double standards, and tighten and improve export control to prevent proliferation. China also holds that all countries take strong measures to enhance nuclear security and reduce nuclear risks. Countries should act in strict observance of all international legal instruments governing nuclear security, take credible steps to ensure the security of their nuclear facilities and materials, and prevent the diversion of nuclear materials with effective means. The international community should intensify cooperation and combat nuclear terrorism through concerted efforts. China will continue to play a constructive role in upholding the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

#### Conclusion

With the integration of China into the international economic and political mechanisms, China will continue its responsible role as a major power in international nuclear arms control and non-proliferation in the future. Since the United States withdrew from the ABM treaty in June 2002, it is necessary for major powers to establish a new framework of strategic stability between them to replace the old one. At the same time, after the 9/11 attacks, the United State has closely connected the nuclear proliferation issue with the terrorism issue. Under the circumstances, the international community should cooperate to establish a new framework of strategic stability between major powers, based on nuclear arms control, nuclear non-proliferation and strategic cooperation on anti-nontraditional threats, including anti-terror. Furthermore, China and the United States should cooperate in preventing Taiwan from declaring independence, because they have common interests in maintaining stability across the Taiwan Strait. If both countries can cooperate in preventing Taiwan from declaring independence and the new framework of strategic stability between major powers can be established, China would play a more positive and active role in nuclear arms control and nonproliferation in the future.