How Do Allies Deal With US Military Transformation[1]

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In the advice note issued to participants in the symposium, the organisers defined the most urgent policy question that faces Japanese defence and security planners today as: "How should Japan build its defence capability to deal with new threats and adapt to the Revolution in Military Affairs." Within this broad but fundamentally important issue, I will look at the experience of the US. European allies to see what lessons, positive and negative, can be drawn from this that may be of assistance to Japan.

Firstly I would like to offer some comments on the larger scene, as defined in the main question. I do not think that today we are dealing with anything so trivial as a mere 'Revolution in Military Affairs'. I think we are dealing with a revolution in the nature of conflict, which is not just - or even primarily – military-technical, but which is also social, economic and political. The solution to problems posed by this revolution is not, therefore, to be found in the military and defence spheres alone, and most certainly not just in the realm of military technology. In their article on Future Warfare in the November 2005 issue of the US Naval Institute Proceedings, Lt Gen James Mattis and Lt Col Frank Hoffman (USMC) note…."there is less talk in Washington these days about revolutions in military affairs (RMA) or defence transformations based solely on technology. Our fascination with RMAs and transformation has been altered once again by history's enduring lessons about the predominant role of the human discussion in warfare. Our infatuation with technology was a reflection of our own mirror – imaging and an unrealistic desire to dictate the conduct of war on our own terms"…."Relevance is more important than yesterday's dominance….we argue that you [should] look at where our enemies are gathering to fight us. That is relevance."…."it is not our technology that shocks and awes our enemies. It is our capacity to produce highly motivated, innovative, and agile expeditionary warriors"

This gives us our most important indicator of the direction of US military transformation today. Having concentrated in recent years on technological, and associated organisational, developments as the core of military transformation, the US military has now made the focus of its transformation the abilities of the soldier, sailor or airman. It recognises that their abilities need to be able to span the whole range of modern military operations, from high intensity battle to peace building operations – the "three block war".

Allied armed forces now face a very difficult problem: how to maintain their ability to match its US military developments. This is not just a technological issue, not just a matter of weaponry. It applies especially to maintaining an ability to innovate, to develop new command, control and intelligence procedures. Above all it means having the capacity to educate and train officers and other ranks to extremely high levels of competence and flexibility in a very wide range of skills, including in tasks not always considered as specifically military.

This is, of course, a mutual problem, It is a problem for the ally who cannot match the high

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[1] This paper represents the opinions of the author alone. It does not seek to express the view of the Defence Academy, MoD or of any other institution.

US standard. But it is also a problem for the US which recognises the need for allies and coalition partners if success is to be achieved in the conflicts of the 21st century. It also requires military personnel to be capable of seamless cooperation with the civilian agencies which play an ever more important part in modern conflict. Indeed, if those civilian agencies do not play their full part, the result will be disaster, as modern conflicts cannot be won by military means alone. The second key issue for allies, therefore, is not just to match US military transformation but to parallel that transformation in other security spheres – diplomacy, foreign aid, post conflict reconstruction and so on.

In this paper, therefore, I will address the nature of the current revolution we are undergoing as I see it and, based on my experience over the last fifteen years working with European Armed Forced both of the East and the West, I will address the specific problem of their transformation. These problems continue to <u>haunt</u> many European countries and are in large part responsible for Europe's current Military weakness.

The Revolution in the nature of Conflict

The events of September 11th 2001 caused a rapid acceleration in the processes of change which had been ongoing in the international defence and security system since the end of the Cold War. These changes have not only been military and technological, but also social, political and economic. They have now achieved such a pace, breadth and extent that their effect on the nature of conflict is no longer simply evolutionary, but can justifiably be considered as revolutionary. Note that this is not a revolution in the nature of <u>battle</u>, which continues to evolve, but in the wider aspects of conflict. Similar "revolutions" can be seen to have occurred in and around 1648, 1789 and in 1914.

It is the extent, intensity, speed, but above all the ongoing nature of these changes in the defence and security environment that today force us to reconsider our response, and therefore how we reform our defence and security institutions to implement that response.

The fact is that our efforts, however heroic, to reform our national and international defence and security institutions, have constantly been overtaken by changing events in the international security system. Security Sector reform has become the major issue in many countries. The need for this reform in many countries affects the very nature of society. Responsible ministries (MOD, Interior, etc) are more and more under pressure from current crises and have less time for long term thinking, less time to plan and implement reform in response to new threats, risks and challenges. In many countries the gap between the world of think tanks and academia on the one hand, and policy makers on the other has so widened that these two groups, once so closely linked and interactive, now hardly communicate. Policy makers and decision takers are operating in a security environment which they were never educated to understand. The realization is gradually dawning that national and international institutions (ministries, alliances, armies, etc), set up everywhere to meet cold war needs, no longer suffice. They will perforce have to be changed, and changed radically, if they are to become really effective in the new security environment and able to corporate efficiently in the kinds of coalitional military and security operations on which they are likely to be deployed.

Trends in the development of military and security operations

It is not yet possible to determine the final outcome of the changes and developments currently underway in the security environment. However, our experience over the last few years allows us to identify certain distinct and almost universal trends which are useful indicators of the issues we must now confront when planning security sector reform. These trends are as

follows:

1. The traditional distinctions which used to exist between "internal" and "external" security are rapidly disappearing. This is manifest in many ways. One example is that the conduct of military action in distant countries can have an immediate and drastic impact on the attitudes and behaviour of significant elements of the population at home.

2. The relationship between the defence component and the other constituent elements that make up "national security" is changing radically. It has always been the case that "national security" has depended on more than just defence. But in the past the interaction between the military component and other components (e.g. diplomacy, societal stability, resilience, public order, the economy, etc) has been overwhelmingly at the national political or strategic level.   Today this interaction is occurring at operational and tactical levels as well.

3. To be of any real utility, defence and security forces (armed forces in particular, but also to some extent elements of police forces, border guards and other security sector agencies) will need to be (a) deployed: ie sent to where the problem is coming from, rather than waiting for the problem to come to them; (b) employed, ie to fight, or to reconstruct countries, and to act in a wide variety of roles in quick succession; and (c) sustained; ie maintained abroad for long periods to create a security environment in which political, social and economic efforts can create a lasting peace.

4. Future operations will not only be joint, they must also be integrated. As a matter of course, Armed Forces will need to interact at the tactical level with forces and entities from other ministries and agencies (eg police, border guards, intelligence, etc), with non governmental bodies, with public organisations and commercial companies.

5. For most countries, future defence and security operations are unlikely to be stand-alone but undertaken as part of a coalition (i.e. with US, NATO, EU, UN or ad hoc). The structure and nature of such coalitions are unpredictable and likely to be highly variable

6. Future defence and security operations may well be in areas of the world where we have little or no recent experience, and no existing coalition or alliance infrastructure to support operations. As expert knowledge of all likely deployment areas overseas cannot be assumed, warriors will need to be able at short notice to learn about, and understand in depth, the special conditions of the host region.

7. In future conflicts, our Armed Forces and other security forces such as police, NGO's and commercial companies deployed into war zones and post conflict zones will increasingly have to deal at the tactical level with the cultural and behavioural aspects of the opponent, taking very serious account of their societal norms.

8. It will be essential in future conflicts for military and civilian personnel (in armies, police forces, NGOs, etc) at tactical level to ensure that their tactics link into and support higher strategic and political objectives. Soldiers and policemen will need to understand that what may appear to be a military success at the tactical level can be a disaster at the strategic level.

9. Future conflicts will require new intelligence systems and intelligence will play an ever more important role than heretofore, with significant implications for command and control. Personnel at tactical level may well have a better grasp of strategically significant information than their higher military commanders or political leaders. They will need not only the appropriate machinery and procedures but also strength of character to impress their views on a less well informed superior.

10. In all future conflicts, the media will no longer be simply an important aspect, it will be an all-encompassing uncontrollable environment.   Media considerations will become as

significant and determining a factor in political and military appreciations as traditional factors such as "the ground" and "the enemy".

Obstacles to security sector reform

Although it is now possible, as I have just done, to define the shape of the revolution in the nature of conflict, and to identify the requirements that this poses to those who must now plan the transformation of national security sectors, it is the wisdom of hindsight that enables us to do this. In fact, the current revolution has come upon us quietly. Had the dramatic changes been accompanied by more violence (i.e. in developed countries, as opposed to the emerging democracies and developing world, 9/11 not withstanding), it would have been easier to recognise them for the revolution they in fact were. As it is, their cumulative revolutionary effect has only lately become apparent. Although we like to pin a date on them (e.g. 1648, 1789, 9/11/2001), revolutions actually take years to work out and only change certain things, not everything. The essence to surviving a revolution and emerging on top is to identify exactly what will change and what will not. It is this very fact that lots of things will <u>not</u> change that is the biggest problem for reform, and the greatest argument used by those who resist reform. The truth is that transformation is made even more difficult because it is not clear exactly what sort of armed forces and security forces will be needed because we cannot see the future clearly. It is also painfully true that, because of the fundamental change in the nature of the security environment, corresponding fundamental changes are needed to our entire security sectors if our societies are to respond adequately. Until we recognise and acknowledge the extent of this revolution, we will not be able to cope with it properly.

Alas, effects of these profound changes are still not fully appreciated in many countries and in their security institutions. Nowhere, not even in the US, have the full implications of the changes and their complex interactions been realised. Events have changed the very definition of the term 'national security'. At the start of the 1990s this term was virtually synonymous with 'defence', particularly in C&EE countries. Now it is recognised that 'defence' is only a small element of 'security', although there is no agreed boundary on what the term 'security' should encompass. Equally, the term 'deterrence' now needs re-definition. In the cold war this was by conventional forces backed up by nuclear weapons – both for NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Today there is no agreement as to what constitutes deterrence against the new threats that the fundamental change in the nature of conflict has ushered in. Where the military does have a deterrent role, this today may be expressed by pre-emption or by guarantee of drastic retribution. These are radically different functions for armed forces to perform than 'national defence', and demand very different kinds of military and societal organisation (and equipment and training) to support.

It is this factor, the change in the nature of conflict itself, which has been the major cause of the growing gap between the US and many European allies. The roots of this gap are both conceptual and practical. Most mainland European countries have, within living memory, learned by bitter experience not to put their trust in military might to ensure national security. These countries (starting half a century ago with the core of the EEC), concluded that only political and economic integration would protect them from one another. Under the umbrella of a US nuclear guarantee (i.e. NATO), this allowed them to reduce defence preparations and defence expenditure to what amounted in practice to a third rate governmental activity, and to concentrate instead on economic and political integration. Defence became something that could be taken for granted; the defence portfolio in government was rarely a route to promotion; defence expenditure became more an element of social security – jobs and profit – rather than national security. Just as this was true of many European NATO members, so it was also true of

many Central European countries in the Warsaw Pact, although for rather different reasons. Deprived as these countries were of true national control over their armed forces, their populations came to see them, at least in some measure, as agents of Russification or as an external imposition. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, 'defence' has been a third rate concern in most Central European countries too. The defence institutions of most European countries, East and West, are now proving too weak and inflexible to respond to the dramatic new challenges that face them today.

But the experiences of US, UK, Russia and Turkey in regard to the utility of military power have been very different. These countries in the 20th century owed their creation, survival or position in the world to military power, and the general level of respect in which their Armies came to be held by their populations reflected this (the US post-Vietnam experience was a temporary phenomenon). The readiness of these countries today to use force, compared to the reticence of mainland European countries (with the sometime exception of France) in similar circumstances to do the same, is already posing a problem. This is likely to be an even greater cause of friction in the future, as it is at odds with the instincts of most of mainland Europe.

The practical result of this is that many European countries, both East and West, have been unwilling or unable to pursue defence reform as far or as fast as either logic or US/NATO pressure should have dictated. In the face of the new security threats which most, if not all, European nations today acknowledge, it would make sense for most countries to move away from armies based on territorial defence towards armies (and policing forces, intelligence services etc) which are able to go to where the threat is to be found and neutralise it there. As we noted above, this requires armed forces and other Security agencies to be capable of being deployed, employed and sustained. Many countries have concluded that this requires a regular professional force instead of a conscript one, although in fact there has been little or no investigation of alternative reserve systems that could allow nations with a good geographical or historical reasons for not putting their faith in small regular forces to hedge their bets.

But however much it might 'make sense', such a course of action has not been followed. Indeed, for many European countries this has created a dilemma and has left them in an exceptionally difficult situation, resulting in the stalling of defence transformation processes in many places. Many C&EE countries have found it difficult to convince their populations of the sense of abandoning conscript territorial forces. When combined with a military establishment wedded to maintaining a large cold war conscript-based infrastructure (which, although worthless, is nevertheless frequently very profitable), it allows reform to be halted completely. Smaller countries in Central Europe have found moving from a conscript force to a regular force to be so expensive that, were they to follow this course, they could no longer maintain a force capable of fulfilling the whole range of military activity desirable for the Armed Forces of a sovereign country.

This last conclusion has been so shocking for some C&EE countries that they have shied away from it. Giving up national territorial defence is difficult for armed forces brought up to understand only this concept of force generation. It is also a difficult thing to do for national populations of countries that history and geography have condemned to be close to a big neighbour which they do not yet fully trust - as they do not yet fully trust (or even fully understand the complex nature of) the Alliance which many of them have so recently joined. For C&EE countries that have so recently regained their sovereignty, the idea of surrendering part of it by sharing military systems is still difficult to swallow. It has not helped matters that some of these countries, have received contradictory advice from the different countries helping them. Some of these have continued to advocate universal conscription and territorial defence as the basis for defence. Others have advised the opposite – to adopt small, professional armies. Trying to do both at once in a small country has proved impossible and has caused much

confusion.

NATO (and EU too) do not yet have an answer to this problem. NATO asks for deliverable military capabilities and a minimum defence expenditure (2% of GNP). But NATO as yet has no mechanisms to broker the sharing of force capabilities in a way which would ensure the <u>guaranteed</u> delivery of a balanced force structure from a variety of different national components. A few C&EE nations are exploring tentatively the idea of joint forces on the lines of the Belgian-Netherlands model of a combined Navy, but this process is just beginning. Another approach open to small C&EE countries is to try for 'niche capabilities' where nations offer a small specialist military capability to a multi-national force or coalition. This is a good stop gap idea. But it runs the risk of also being an excuse for not pushing for wider defence reform.

On the whole, therefore, Central and Eastern European countries are still maintaining fully national armed forces which copy all the poor economies of scale that we have seen for decades in Western Europe. Like many Western Armies today, only a tiny fraction of their current forces are useable in the context of any new security threat as these are currently envisaged. 'Lots of bucks, but not much bang' would sum up the result.

The Technological Revolution

A further factor which compounds the transformation problem is the pace of technological innovation. This means that the cost of an item of equipment is constantly rising relative to the whole defence budget, because the equipment is becoming more complex and technologically sophisticated. For example, the purchase cost of a new aircraft rises in real terms by about 12-15% per year, and associated training and maintenance costs rise even faster. Therefore, if a defence budget is pegged at a given level, rising only by the rate of inflation, then each year the force that can be maintained for this budget must either become smaller or more obsolete. In practice, C&EE countries have all become both smaller and more obsolete as they have struggled to maintain capabilities that they cannot afford. Many are now faced with the problem of how to generate an effective military ethos for a force base which is so small that it cannot maintain effective <u>combat</u> capability. "We cannot recruit soldiers just to be logisticians" one C&EE ChoD was recently heard to complain. It is hard not to sympathise with this sentiment. What is happening is striking at the very essence of traditional military practices. Only some really radical new ideas, and a very powerful political motive to implement them, will resolve this dilemma.

The problem of national defence industries in C&EE further compounds the difficulties of defence reform. The Warsaw Pact and Soviet System rationalised defence production, allocating national (and in the USSR regional) specialisations and concentrating R&D mostly in the Russian homeland. The break-up of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact often fragmented this coherent industrial system, rendering most of the constituent parts non-viable. This specialisation; the linkage to Soviet production standards; the collapse of demand in world arms markets and the absence of domestic markets; all these factors have reduced the C&EE defence industrial base to a fraction of its former self. Reform has proved impossible. Closure seems to be the only option for all but a small slice of the industry. Where factories have been subsidised or artificially converted (ie with no sound economic basis – quite a common situation in Russia) the result more resembles a day-care centre for the unemployed rather than a serious viable enterprise.

This industrial factor contributes to the overall drastic fall in European military capabilities that the post decade and a half have witnessed. When this is compared to the potential for a rise in capability that the proliferation of technology (coupled with the cleverness in using it) has

provided to new 'enemy' – ie, the likely sources of (asymmetric) threat that Europe will face in the next decade - the failure of security sector reform in Europe is all the more striking.

The Interdependency of Security Sector Reform and Societal Reform

However, of all the obstacles to security sector reform that European countries have had to face, the greatest has been the truly <u>fundamental</u> nature of the social, political and economic reforms that are needed if security sector reform is to be possible.   What is demanded is nothing less than a total change in the relationship between Armed Forces and Security Forces and their societies.   Recruitment, funding, management and leadership, civil-military relations and democratic control – all the core business of an army or a police force – have had to change completely.   Attempts at reform – many of which failed – have improved our understanding of the interactive nature of the relationship between Army and society.   It is now clear, for example, that countries such as Germany cannot institute such radical military reform as they perceive they need without a correspondingly great reform of their social systems.   As Germany abandons conscription in favour of professional regular forces, the national health-care system would be in danger of collapse, so much does it rely on the virtually free labour provided by young men who opt for civilian service rather than military conscription.   Norway has so integrated its military role into its national social infrastructure – for very good historical reasons based on its unhappy experiences in 1940 - that to reform its army seriously requires a massive programme of social change and alternative mechanisms to support the national civilian infrastructure of this large, thinly populated country. Norway <u>is</u> pursuing reform, but the total <u>deployable</u> force it will be able to generate will be very small indeed compared to the input in terms of effort and finance.

It is indeed the failure of repeated reform efforts in many countries which has reminded us that military and security sector reform goes hand in hand with social, economic and political reform.   We cannot have one without the other, and this is not just a problem of C&EE.   Perhaps the most extreme and evident example is Russia, where time and again military reform efforts have come to nothing because society itself has not found adequate new political, social and economic mechanisms.   Russia, moreover, is also a good example of the fact that the greater role an Army plays in national life, the more its failure to reform hinders national reform in general.   Because of their resistance to change, the Russian armed forces and security forces themselves are one of the major obstacles to societal reform.   Changes there have been aplenty in the Russian Army, but of reform there has been precious little.

Education as a crucial factor in security sector transformation

Education is perhaps the most important factor enabling a national defence and security sector to change to meet the challenges of the new security landscape.   Yet in almost all countries this receives least attention.   Indeed in many countries resistance to reform is greatest within the educational system of the armed forces, police and so on.

The problem is, of course, that in the security sector – in war, in policing, in intelligence and so on - so much depends on practice rather than a theory that education tends to be developed mainly on this basis.   That means that young officers are taught on the basis of past action, ie on the basis of experience.   But as we pointed out earlier in this paper, at a time of revolution (rather than evolution), excessive reliance on experience can be fatal.   Teaching done on the basis of 'what worked last time' can be dangerously counter productive.   Furthermore, such teaching very soon moves from being education to training, and therein lies the problem.

If, overall, the main characteristics of future conflict are likely to be its unpredictability, its

breadth and depth, its variety, and the short notice at which it occurs, then these characteristics force us today to face the issues of training and education when planning the professional development of security sector officers and NGOs. The essence of training is to extract best practice from past experience and to instil this as a basis or model for planning future operations. The assumption is that all future problems will simply be a new iterations of past problems and that experience is our best asset in solving such problems.

But the scope and breadth that future military and security operations are likely to cover are now so great that it is simply not possible to train officers, NCOs and officials to be ready to tackle every problem that they may face. The pace of change is so rapid that it has become impossible to predict likely forms of future conflict and even its probable geographical locations.

Consequently, training alone is no longer a reliable basis even for junior officer and NCO professional development. For all elements of the security sector, it is important that a greater and greater amount of time is spent on education. Education (the word in English comes from the latin "e duco" – I lead out) implies the need to teach an understanding of basic principles rather than rehearsing models or templates. It means imparting not only knowledge but also a deep understanding of a wide variety of essential factors – military, social, political. It requires the cultivation of an ability to apply mature consideration and judgement, to include a great many unforeseeable variables, into decision making. It needs officers to be exercised in the practice of applying their knowledge, expertise, analytical capability and judgement, so that they become competent at using the intellectual tools with which the teaching process has provided them. Without this last factor, their knowledge will remain theoretical. They will have been taught, but they will not have been educated to bring out their abilities to solve new problems.

Education, of course, is altogether more demanding of both staff and students. It has serious implications for the traditional practices of command, and for the whole structure of our career development processes. However, the changes in the defence and security landscape now force us to address this issue of reform in particular.

Prerequisites for successful security sector reform

There is, of course, no one model for security sector reform. Each country must develop its own unique solution reflecting social, political; historical and financial realities as well as the perceived threat. Just as there is no single model, so also there is no perfection. There will always be tension when essentially disciplined and non-democratic institutions are embedded with democracies, and there will never be sufficient resources in a balanced market economy to do everything that a security specialist might want to do to guarantee national safety.

That said, there are certain common factors that are essential if successful security sector transformation is to be achieved. The first is knowledge. There can be no successful fundamental reform if the civilian government does not have available an independent basis of knowledge of defence and security sector issues. This essential "strategic community" of civil servants, journalists, academics, parliamentarians and even businessmen need not be big. But it must be trusted as well as trustworthy. It can be built, and it can grow of its own accord. But without it reform will be limited to a matter of detail. An expert civilian community is essential to developing that relationship of mutual respect between armed and security forces and government which is necessary for both a healthy society and effective security forces.

The second feature essential to success is a realistic threat assessment. Without this, how can a country know what sort of armed forces or security forces it needs? This seems so obvious, yet it is surprising how often it is lacking, and how often the real drivers in the reform process are such things as finance, vested interest, power struggles or ideological conviction. Some countries find it difficult to make a real threat assessment for political reasons – fear of

offending a neighbour, for example. These countries are in an impossible situation unless they have a national consensus on the threat which allows that the threat need never be openly voiced.

Political will to respond to the threat is the third prerequisite. Without political will it is impossible to drive through the very difficult radical changes that fundamental reform requires. Without political will a population will not be persuaded of the necessity to find the necessary resources for reform. 'Political will' does not just denote a ruthless politician. It means having an effective political system that permits policy to be turned into action when the will is there, gaining the support of voters that is essential in a democracy. It is a measure of a country's political maturity. It also requires that the political leadership recognise the reality of a security threat and the need to act to deal with it.

The fourth essential is closely linked to the third. A country undertaking serious reform needs allies, help, friends. Certainly under some circumstances countries have pursued defence and security sector reform alone. But this is not an option for many countries today, when new security threats have created such new conditions. Only with allies or friends one can trust is it possible for a country to let down its guard – reduce its security capabilities – whilst it reforms its structures. The smaller and poorer a country is, the more this is so. Help – and the ability and preparedness to accept it – will also ensure that a country can learn from the mistakes of others. For many reasons it has proved easier for countries to accept help for reform of armed forces than for reform of interior forces and police. Yet it is in this latter area that reform is now arguably more important, given the nature of today's threats.

Conclusion

The security architecture of the cold war allowed most developed countries to reduce expenditure on national security to a level so low it is historically unprecedented. In Europe, for example, two generations have grown up in this sense of security, which EU and NATO membership have now extended to much of Central and Eastern Europe. This stability has encouraged the thinking that defence/expenditure is a waste, and a low governmental priority.

The focus of the world's military power has shifted from Europe to the Far East. Assessments as to what constitutes the new security threats differ from country to country. Where they do not differ, there is frequently a difference in the way countries think it appropriate to respond. Very few mainland European politicians seem to think it scandalous that so little useable military power is generated by Europe, despite the enormous amount of money spent on defence. Even the US cannot be complacent. Huge though its defence and security budget is, it often gets poor value for money. Consequently its forces are already stretched. It cannot be satisfied that it will be able to continue to increase spending to handle new threats. Nor can it be satisfied that it is getting a good return for its investment when measured against the tiny costs borne by the opponent in the asymmetrical conflict of today.

What is now needed is a serious and concentrated intellectual effort to understand better the nature of today's security threats and the challenges of responding to those threats. This improved compound understanding must be transmitted to governments in a way that will enable them to develop appropriate policies more effectively. This is the task which faces the academic and scientific communities now – not only to conduct their analysis but to deliver it to the policy makers in a timely and useable manner. This means working more closely with the policy maker, rebuilding the bridges between the think tank and policy communities in Europe which worked well during the cold war but which collapsed during the last decade. In reaching out to other countries, particularly those in North Africa, the Middle East, and now Iraq and Afghanistan, it would be best to help them learn by pointing our European failings and mistakes. There is plenty of material here on which to draw.

One final word of caution. We have been talking primarily of military transformation, although we have pointed out that security is no longer just a matter of defence but requires military forces to work with other, non-military agencies. One often hears this simplified into "the military is not the solution to today's security problems". Well, yes and no. Agreed, the military alone is not the solution. But the military is part of the solution. Unfortunately is seems often to be the case that the other parts of the solution are not available in sufficient quality and quantity. It would seem that in the absence of effective support from other government agencies, that the military might going to be left 'holding the baby' with increasing frequency. Tomorrow's problem is not just for allies to match US military transformation, it is for all developed countries, US included, to improve the performance of the non-military agencies needed to ensure that a military victory can indeed be turned into a policy success.