

European Analyses of the Prospects for Transatlantic Harmony and the Fight against Terror under the Second Bush Administration

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1. Euro-American Relations and the Prospects for Transatlantic Harmony

There are three separate aspects to the current transatlantic relationship which must be kept distinct. The first is the systemic interplay of great power politics. The second derives from the specific historical circumstances of the emergence from the Cold War era. The third is the “Bush factor”.

At the first level, there is nothing automatic about transatlantic harmony. Europeans and Americans share much in the way of history, values and cultural norms. They share many interests. But the reality is that the U.S. and the EU constitute two massive great-power blocs and that great powers, historically, have not perceived one another as “natural” allies. The 229 years since 1776, with the exception of the 40 Cold War years, witnessed constant systemic Euro-Atlantic disputes involving—at least up until 1945—many Euro-American wars. We cannot take EU-U.S. harmony for granted. Transatlantic interests often diverge. Both sides need to work hard at overcoming those divergences. The good news at this level is that, while disputes are unavoidable, serious confrontation is now unthinkable. Wars between nuclear democracies do not happen. Moreover, all the reasons why the U.S. got involved in European wars in the past (“anti-imperialism,” “off-shore balancing”) have now disappeared.

The second dimension of the relationship has to do with the end of the Cold War. It is all the more normal that Europeans and Americans should have squabbled in recent years in that the type of cozy relationship they shared during the Cold War was a historical aberration. For forty years, the threat from the USSR was so massive and so direct that the transatlantic family, while occasionally indulging in the odd spat, could not afford the luxury of a full scale domestic row. Moreover, the relationship—of hegemony and dependency—which characterized that period was also aberrant. What we have been witnessing since the fall of the Berlin Wall is nothing more than a new chapter in a centuries old process of adjustment. This jostling for position was rendered all the more dramatic because the emergence from the Cold War (which would have engendered jostling anyway) coincided with the rise of Europe to quasi-superpower status.¹ Under these conditions, a re-ordering of the world was inevitable. A

¹ For a journalistic view of this process, see T.R. Reid, *The United States of Europe: the new superpower and the end of American supremacy* (New York: Penguin, 2004).

complex part of that re-ordering will be for the U.S. to accept a less unbalanced partnership.

At this second level, many academic theories predicted growing conflict between the U.S. and Europe. The collapse of the Atlantic Alliance was even a hypothesis raised in a year 2000 CIA Study on Global Trends 2015.² The reality is very different. Economic, commercial and investment interdependence is at an astronomical all-time high. Europe and America are more structurally interdependent than any two entities have ever been in the history of the world.³ However, the complicating aspect of that same story is that the EU has overtaken the U.S. in many areas: market size; population; GDP; world trade in services; numbers and performance of MNCs. The EU operates a healthy trading surplus, while the U.S. trade deficit is close to \$500 billion. Worse still, the U.S. federal debt was projected by the IMF to top \$520 billion in 2004. Competition in critical sectors is intensifying, as witnessed in the Boeing-Airbus row. If the two sides are going to succeed in managing what is an increasingly competitive relationship, they are going to have to work very hard at it. They need partnership, but partnerships suppose equals. That will constitute a political challenge for the U.S.⁴

It will be an even greater challenge in that the U.S.'s overwhelming military superiority no longer affords it the leverage it enjoyed during the Cold War. Disengagement is no longer an effective threat. With the U.S. Global Posture Review, it is a fact. The EU has no problem with the relocation of U.S. troops. The Union is, little by little, nudging towards something recognizable as security autonomy.⁵ Three points about autonomy suggest themselves. First, it has emerged more through U.S. impetus than through European aspiration. Second, it will operate more to promote U.S.-EU complementarity than to foment competition or rivalry. The third point is that we cannot foretell today where EU autonomy will take us in 25 years. There is no point in trying to double-guess what Harold Macmillan called "events." Both sides have been schizophrenic about European autonomy. But both sides will have to learn to live with it.

However, a third factor has entered the transatlantic equation, rendering what would have been a difficult adjustment in any event all the more difficult, because of both the style and the substance of U.S. policy under the administration of George W. Bush. Favorable impressions of the United States fell in 2003/04 to all-time lows in most European countries,

² Available at http://www.cia.gov/nic/NIC_globaltrend2015.html.

³ Joseph P. Quinlan *Drifting Apart or Growing Together? The Primacy of the Transatlantic Economy* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2003).

⁴ For good insights into this aspect, see Jeremy Rifkin, *The European Dream: How Europe's Vision of the Future is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream* (London: Penguin, 2004).

⁵ See Jolyon Howorth & John T.S. Keeler (eds), *Defending Europe: the EU, NATO and the Quest for Security Autonomy* (New York: Palgrave, 2003).

with the Bush administration's foreign policy being the overwhelming determinant of this collapse. When asked specifically if they thought the problem was "mostly Bush," 74% of Germans and French agreed, along with 59% of British respondents.⁶ According to another poll, as many as 58% of Europeans found strong U.S. leadership undesirable.⁷ In a BBC poll conducted in 21 countries after November 2004, huge majorities in European countries felt that Bush's re-election was a negative factor for peace and security in the world.⁸ This is a phenomenon unprecedented in the history of the transatlantic relationship.

There can be no denying that damage has been done. There are three key issues. First, the NATO Alliance as such has been repeatedly short-circuited in favor of ad-hoc coalitions. The formula "the mission determines the coalition" has serious consequences for the functioning of Alliances. I shall return to this point. A second source of damage was the shift—from an explicit and constantly articulated belief that the unity of Europe was in the U.S. national interest—to an approach which, through the mischievous differentiation between "old" and "new" Europe, sought to divide the EU internally. Finally, Iraq was "the first major crisis to take place in the Alliance in the absence of an agreed upon danger."⁹ The consequences of all this have been felt first and foremost at the level of popular perceptions. An ever growing number of Europeans in all countries (including "coalition partners" Poland, the UK and Italy) wish the EU to become a military power "in order to become more independent of the U.S.": Poland 77%; France, Italy and Portugal 71%; the Netherlands and Spain 61%; and even 59% in the UK and Turkey. Moreover, while almost 80% of Americans polled said they wanted the EU and the U.S. to become closer partners, the figure across Europe was only 46%—with over 50% saying they actually wanted the two blocs to move further apart.¹⁰ In a general sense, the prospects for U.S.-EU convergence under a Bush-2 administration do not look promising. An assessment of the two sides' approaches to terrorism reveals symptomatic elements of the complexity of the relationship.

⁶ Pew Research Center, *A Year After Iraq*: <http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=206>.

⁷ German Marshall Fund of the USA, *Transatlantic Trends 2004*. <http://www.transatlantictrends.org/>.

⁸ 77% in Germany, 75% in France, 64% in the UK, and 82% in Turkey. Large majorities also said that the Bush re-election made them feel more negative towards the American people. Results available from: http://www.globescan.com/news_archives/bbcpoll.html.

⁹ [Council on Foreign Relations], *Renewing the Atlantic Partnership. Report of an Independent Task Force* chaired by Henry A. Kissinger and Lawrence H. Summers (Washington DC: CFR, 2004).

¹⁰ German Marshall Fund of the USA, *Transatlantic Trends 2004*. <http://www.transatlantictrends.org/>.

2. Euro-American Agreements and Disagreements over Counter-Terrorism

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the EU held extraordinary meetings of both the Justice and Home Affairs Council (September 20, 2001) and the European Council (September 21, 2001). These meetings stated that the fight against terrorism had become a “priority objective” of the EU. Although the emphasis in these early days was clearly on intelligence sharing, on judicial and police cooperation, as well as on measures against terrorist financing, it was already clear that the Union considered that a key dimension of the fight against terror must be a new approach to the EU’s relations with third countries—particularly in the developing world. While supporting U.S. efforts to track down the perpetrators of 9/11 on the basis of UNSC 1368, the EU also stated its intention “systematically to evaluate [its] relations with third countries in the light of the support which those countries might give to terrorism,” noting that:

“The integration of all countries into a fair world system of security, prosperity and improved development is the condition for a strong and sustainable community for combating terrorism.”

Thus a twin track policy of immediate reaction/riposte and long-term international dialogue and negotiation was set in motion. This has been the main feature of the EU’s approach ever since.

Although the EU stated from the outset that its ESDP instruments would play a part in the campaign against terrorism,¹¹ and although it has regularly insisted that a military component will be a necessary part of that campaign,¹² it has never explained in any detail what specific role it foresees for military instruments. This remains an unanswered question in the EU’s approach to counter-terrorism. It is an immediate—and significant—contrast to the approach adopted by the U.S.

Although a certain amount was accomplished between 2001 and 2004 in the EU’s coordinated campaign against terrorism,¹³ and although in the European Security Strategy document published in December 2003,¹⁴ terrorism was identified as one of the key threats

¹¹ At the Extraordinary Council Meeting of 21 September 2001, the EU already stated that the effectiveness of the fight against terrorism would require “making the ESDP operational at the earliest opportunity.”

¹² This was first made explicit in the Declaration on the Contribution of the CFSP, including the ESDP, to the Fight Against Terrorism issued as Annex V to the Presidency Conclusions of the 22 June 2002 Seville European Council.

¹³ See: *European Union Factsheet: the EU and the Fight Against Terrorism* (June 2004) available at <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/europa.pdf>.

¹⁴ See: *A Secure Europe in a Better World* available at <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>.

to European interests, implementation and above all coordination of anti-terrorist measures was patchy and inadequate. In a report issued in March 2004, Javier Solana noted that “the instruments are poorly used and/or poorly understood by law enforcement and judicial authorities in some member states.”¹⁵ It was not until the terrorist bombings in Madrid on March 11, 2004 that the Union ratcheted up its counter-terrorism activities considerably, most notably with the appointment of an EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, Gijs de Vries, whose main task was to ensure maximum coordination between the EU’s Ministries of the Interior and Justice. On March 25, the EU published a Declaration on Combating Terrorism, which outlined a revised plan of action involving seven strategic objectives¹⁶ and around 150 initiatives. By the time of the European Council meeting in Brussels in December 2004, substantial progress was being reported in the following key areas: the fight against financing of terrorism; law enforcement cooperation; border and transport security; external relations; intelligence cooperation; protection of critical infrastructure; and a long-term strategy to address issues of radicalization and recruitment of terrorists.

A superficial comparison of the EU’s Declaration on Combating Terrorism (March 2004) and of the U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (February 2003) suggests that the two blocs are very much on the same wavelength. Indeed, there is nothing in one side’s approach which is not replicated in some form or another in that of the other side. Both recognize, for instance, that this is a long-term strategy, that it cannot lead to sudden “victory” or “defeat,” and that military instruments constitute but a small part of the overall thrust.¹⁷ At a meeting in Dromoland Castle, Ireland, on June 26, 2004, EU and U.S. leaders issued the EU-U.S. Declaration on Combating Terrorism,¹⁸ which reads like a perfect synthesis of the two national documents, structured according to the seven strategic objectives of the EU text.

¹⁵ As late as March 2004, five EU countries had failed to adopt the EU-wide arrest warrant, three countries had failed to approve the common definition of terrorism and only nine countries had adopted the framework decision on joint investigation teams. Solana report accessed via www.statewatch.org/news/2004/mar/10eu-intel-centre.htm

¹⁶ (1) to deepen the international consensus and enhance international efforts to combat terrorism; (2) to reduce the access of terrorists to financial and other economic resources; (3) to maximize capacity within the EU bodies and Member States to detect, investigate and prosecute terrorists and prevent terrorist attacks; (4) to protect the security of international transport and ensure effective systems of border control; (5) to enhance the capability of the EU and of Member States to deal with the consequences of a terrorist attack; (6) to address the factors which contribute to support for, and recruitment into terrorism; and (7) to target actions under EU external relations towards priority Third Countries where counter-terrorist capacity or commitment to combating terrorism needs to be enhanced. <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/79635.pdf>.

¹⁷ Contrary to the received mythology, the U.S. document states quite clearly that: “We will not triumph solely or even primarily through military might.” *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, p.1, available at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030214-7.html>.

¹⁸ Available at: http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/10760EU_US26.06.04.pdf.

There is no doubt that EU-U.S. cooperation on counter-terrorism has been substantial and growing ever since 9/11. Intelligence sharing has been more intense and more effective than ever before—and this has included Franco-U.S. flows, which President George W. Bush acknowledged to have been important. Cooperation between law-enforcement agencies and prosecutors has been massively stepped up. On June 25, 2003, the two sides concluded an Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement facilitating extradition for many more offenses than previously.¹⁹ Despite serious European misgivings, agreement was reached in May 2004 on communication of Passenger Name Records (PNRs) in connection with international travel. In September 2004, wide-ranging agreements were reached on the safety of container transport (the Container Security Initiative), including extensive customs cooperation and the facility for U.S. officials to check container cargoes in European ports. Joint U.S.-EU investigative teams are being planned. A wide-reaching Policy Dialogue on Border and Transport Security is attempting to narrow the gap on issues such as sky-marshals and biometric data. Substantial legal and banking cooperation has been agreed on countering terrorist financing. New measures have been agreed for cooperation in response to the consequences of terrorist attack, including one with CBRN contaminants. This amounts to a substantial package of agreements, many of which would have been virtually unthinkable five years ago. However, agreement has been reached largely on administrative, legal and technical aspects of counter-terrorism rather than on the strategy itself.

There remain significant differences of opinion across the Atlantic about the Bush administration's overall conduct of what it has dubbed the "global war on terror" (GWOT).

The first, in many ways the most comprehensive—and therefore potentially the most serious—is European concern about the very notion of a "war" on terror.²⁰ In his address to the joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, President Bush not only declared war on "terrorism with a global reach," but he also made the remark which was to infuriate friends and allies around the world: "Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists."²¹ This black-and-white approach to the world was very widely regarded in Europe not just as "simplistic" (French foreign minister Hubert Védrine), but, in the words of the eminently establishment historian Sir Michael Howard, as a

¹⁹ There is a special clause (Article 13) on capital punishment which makes it clear that the EU will not extradite an offender if s/he would be subjected to the death penalty.

²⁰ For a comprehensive critique of this U.S. notion, see Gilles Andréani, "The 'War on Terror': Good Cause; Wrong Concept", *Survival*, Vol. 46, No. 4, Winter 2004-2005, pp. 31-50. I have drawn on this article in some of the points that follow.

²¹ Available at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>.

“terrible and irrevocable error.”²² According to Howard, “to declare war on terror, or even more illiterately, on terrorism, is at once to accord terrorists a status and dignity that they seek and that they do not deserve.” Worse still, he argued, “to declare that one is at war is immediately to create a war psychosis that may be totally counter-productive for the objective being sought.” The “war” cannot be “won” militarily, but the public will expect precisely such an outcome. And that is exactly what has happened. Despite official disclaimers suggesting that this is not a war like any other, it has, in the words of Andréani, now “acquire[d] a strategic reality.” The “war” has been extended beyond terrorism to “rogue states” along the “axis of evil” (Bush) but also, potentially, to a longer list of states now categorized as “outposts of tyranny” (Rice). Furthermore, that war—particularly the one being fought in Iraq—has succeeded in attracting terrorists in numbers unseen in the past. In other words, it has in fact created a “war” between terrorists and the U.S. which did not previously exist, a development which is now officially recognized by U.S. intelligence sources.²³ All this has been widely perceived in Europe as not only regrettable but counter-productive. It has, in effect, according to many Europeans (and Americans²⁴) amounted to a massive distraction from the “real” fight against terrorism in general and Al-Qaeda in particular.²⁵

But there are many other criticisms of the way the Bush administration has conducted this “war.”

A second major objection has been to the Bush administration’s clear policy of forging “coalitions of the willing” instead of using the existing structures and resources of the Atlantic Alliance.²⁶ The slogan “the mission determines the coalition,” with its unilateralist connotations, has been profoundly disruptive of NATO. Indeed, in its rush to prosecute the GWOT, the U.S. is perceived by many Europeans (and by even more Americans) as having, in effect, abandoned multilateralism and sounded the death-knell of NATO. At its Prague summit in November 2002, the Atlantic Alliance announced three fundamentally important

²² Michael Howard, “What’s in a Name? How to Fight Terrorism”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 1, January/February 2002.

²³ [National Intelligence Council], *Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project* (Washington DC: CIA, 2005), pp. 93-95: <http://www.foia.cia.gov/2020/2020.pdf>. For a European view of this report, see Philip Stephens, “An American Map of the Future Bush cannot ignore”, *Financial Times*, 21 January 2005.

²⁴ This was a point John Kerry made repeatedly towards the end of his election campaign.

²⁵ See: Harald Muller, *Terrorism, proliferation: a European threat assessment* (Paris: EU-ISS, 2003) (Chaillot Paper 58); Philip H. Gordon & Jeremy Shapiro, *Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis over Iraq* (Washington DC: Brookings, 2004).

²⁶ See: Jolyon Howorth et al., “L’Impact sur les Organisations de Défense du Concept de ‘Coalition de Circonstance’” (Paris: IFRI/DAS, 2004), P. 84.

developments: NATO had “become” a global alliance; a main priority was to be the GWOT; and the preferred instrument a NATO Response Force of some 20,000 troops. What has happened since Prague is that the Alliance has an out-of-area doctrine but (with the exception of Afghanistan) no out-of-area presence; a doctrine on terror which has never been applied; and a NATO Response Force which still awaits the identification of a viable mission. Prague in effect completed the process whereby NATO, originally conceived as a mechanism to guarantee delivery of U.S. commitment to Europe’s defence, became transmogrified into a mechanism designed to guarantee delivery of European commitment to U.S. global strategy. It has become clearer and clearer ever since that this simply will not work politically.²⁷

A third major objection formulated by Europeans has been against the Bush doctrine of “preemptive war.” Not only is this perceived as having abandoned the strategic approaches of deterrence and containment which characterized the post-1945 world, but it is considered to have blurred the necessary distinctions between state and non-state actors and the most effective ways of dealing with them.²⁸ This has, in effect, succeeded in undermining the solidarity of the “West’s” strategy against terrorism. Moreover, to the extent to which the war in Iraq has been perceived in Europe as a “mistake,”²⁹ one major consequence has been seen as an increase in terrorist recruitment rather than a decline, the creation of a less stable rather than a more stable Middle East and the exacerbation rather than the improvement of relations between the “West” and Islam.³⁰ Indeed, the EU—a region in which Islam is a growing presence—is appalled at the extent to which the Bush “war” on terror has been perceived as a war against Islam, thus fuelling jihadist tendencies among youth and other groups.³¹

²⁷ See: Richard E. Rupp, *NATO after 9/11: An Alliance in Decline* (London: Palgrave, forthcoming).

²⁸ François Heisbourg, “A Work in Progress: the Bush Doctrine and its Consequences”, *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 2, Spring 2003, 75-88; Lawrence Freedman, “Prevention, not Preemption”, *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 2, Spring 2003, 105-114

²⁹ In a January 2005 BBC poll, as many as 80% to 90% of respondents in many European countries believe this to be the case.

³⁰ As EU External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten put it in a speech to the European Parliament on 15 September 2004, “Is the world today safer than before the overthrow of the appalling Saddam? Is global terrorism in retreat? Are we closer to building bridges between Islam and the West? Is the world’s only super-power more widely respected? Have the citizens in our democracies been treated in a way that will encourage them to give governments the benefit of the doubt next time they are told that force needs to be used pre-emptively to deal with an imminent threat? I simply pose the questions. Honourable Members will have their own answers.” See also Chatham House Middle East Programme Report, *Iraq in Transition: Vortex or Catalyst?* (London: RIIA, September 2004).

³¹ “bin Laden [...] has been able to capitalize on the growing resentment of the Muslim diaspora, especially in Europe.” [Center for Strategic and International Studies], *The Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism: Initial Findings* (Washington DC: August 2004), p.6.

A fourth area of criticism has focused on U.S. disregard for the norms of international law both with respect to the Geneva Convention and with respect to human rights.³² There has been considerable disquiet about the Patriot Act and its restrictions on human rights and basic freedoms—all of which are explicitly protected in the EU Constitution's Charter of Fundamental Rights. This is a theme which is regularly—albeit diplomatically—raised by visiting EU counter-terrorism officials in the U.S.³³ It has also constituted the main concern of European analysts of the impact of the GWOT on basic freedoms and human rights.³⁴ Connected to this criticism has been widespread concern across Europe about U.S. approaches to “winning the peace” in Iraq. Aside from regretting the evident lack of any considered plan for the post-conflict phase of the Iraq engagement, Europeans deplored the mistakes made by the Coalition Provisional Authority in failing to provide for law and order, in hastily disbanding the Iraqi army and the Ba’ath Party as well as in underestimating the role the United Nations could play in the peace process. The U.S. has been perceived as having badly misjudged the challenge of democratization in Iraq and has been (perhaps unfairly) accused of wishing to move far too quickly towards an “exit strategy”.³⁵ More generally, whereas the EU gives high priority to cooperation with the United Nations and its various counter-terrorism organisms and initiatives, the U.S. tends—at least overtly—to minimize this pathway.³⁶

The fifth main area of differentiation between U.S. and EU approaches to dealing with terrorism has to do with their respective attitudes towards finding a long-term solution to the root causes of terror. Although the U.S. National Strategy document draws attention to what it calls “underlying conditions”—such as poverty, corruption, religious and ethnic strife—which help foster terrorism, the emphasis is much less on these conditions per se than on the fact that terrorists can “exploit” them to attract recruits.³⁷ The EU Declaration of March 2004 is much more explicit in stressing the need to adopt a long-term strategy to address root

³² Adam Roberts, “Law and the Use of Force after Iraq”, *Survival*, Vol. 45, No. 2, Summer 2003, 31-56; Christopher Greenwood, “International Law and the ‘war against terrorism’”, *International Affairs*, 78/2, April 2002.

³³ Thus Gijs de Vries on his first visit to Washington in May 2004: “we must be careful to preserve and protect the rights and liberties, the principles and values terrorists are seeking to destroy” (CSIS speech 13 May 2004, pp.2-3).

³⁴ Monica Den Boer, *9/11 and the Europeanisation of Anti-Terrorism Policy: A Critical Assessment* (Paris: Notre Europe, Policy Paper 6), September 2003.

³⁵ Simon Chesterman, “Bush, the United Nations and Nation-Building”, *Survival*, Vol. 46, No. 1, Spring 2004; Toby Dodge, “A Sovereign Iraq?”, *Survival*, Vol. 46, No. 3, Autumn 2004.

³⁶ There is only one explicit mention of the UN in the U.S. National Strategy document (p.11), although there is frequent reference to UNSC 1373 (28 September 2001) on international cooperation against terrorism.

³⁷ pp. 6 & 22.

causes.³⁸ This difference can be detected also in the respective post-9/11 strategies of the two sides towards the tactical use of development aid in addressing terrorism. U.S. aid, in addition to enjoying a 38% increase, has been more tightly targeted to countries that are perceived foyers of terrorist recruitment in the dual hope that economic assistance will both reduce recruitment and help foster good governance, leading to better relations between the countries targeted and the U.S. Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan are prime examples. EU aid, on the other hand, has not changed its basic philosophy which is and always has been one of reducing poverty for its own sake. And it has not shifted focus to those countries that are believed to be hot-beds of terrorist recruitment. This amounts to a “long-term view that supporting institution-building and economic growth outside the current security hotspots will save new regions from becoming states that could breed terrorism five to ten years down the road.”³⁹

In connection with this approach, a sixth area of disagreement has concerned the linkage between the fight against terrorism and the Israeli-Palestine conflict. It has been a cardinal feature of the EU approach that no lasting stabilization of the Middle East is possible without a viable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the euphoria of U.S. military victory in Iraq, there was talk in Washington of the Middle East Peace Process being kick-started in Baghdad. The Bush administration then launched the “Greater Middle East Initiative” (GMEI) in an attempt to subsume the Israeli-Palestine conflict in a vast regional process stretching from Mauritania to Pakistan.⁴⁰ Many in Europe are today hoping that the dead-ends pursued by the Bush administration both in failing to engage with the Israeli-Palestine stand-off and in launching the GMEI will be rectified by incoming Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.

³⁸ Objective 6. It is noteworthy that, in the combined U.S.-EU *Declaration* of June 2004, key issues mentioned in the EU document (“the links between extreme religious or political beliefs, as well as socio-economic and other factors, and support for terrorism”) have been dropped, to be replaced by objectives such as the promotion of “democracy, increased trade and freedom”.

³⁹ [Center for Strategic and International Studies], *The Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism: Initial Findings* (Washington DC: August 2004), p.10. This report highlights the points of agreement and disagreement between the U.S. and the EU over the struggle against terrorism.

⁴⁰ [IISS], “The Greater Middle East Initiative: Implementing a Vision” *Strategic Comments*, Vol.10, Issue 2, March 2004; Marina Ottaway & Thomas Carothers, *The Greater Middle East Initiative: Off to a False Start* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2004); Mona Yacoubian, “Promoting Middle East Democracy: European Initiatives”, United States Institute for Peace Special Report, November 2004.

Conclusion:

Despite the apparent similarities in the strategies employed by the U.S. and the EU to deal with terrorism, there are, therefore, many significant differences. All EU statesmen expressed their desire to engage in a fresh start with the Bush administration after the November 2004 elections.⁴¹ The “charm offensive” tour of Europe conducted by Condoleezza Rice in early 2005 set the scene for an even more constructive visit by George W. Bush in February. In his speech in Brussels, the President thanked his European allies for their “strong cooperation in the war on terror.”⁴² He was politely applauded. Two weeks later, Bush announced his support for the EU strategy of “constructive engagement” with Iran. Comment across Europe remained cautious. Editorialists welcomed the new tone of the Bush-2 administration and speculated that a new period of convergence was not impossible. But as spring 2005 dawned on both sides of the Atlantic, analysts awaited, with impatience, firm evidence of a breakthrough towards a new era of transatlantic harmony.

⁴¹ See, for example, “A Letter to America” written by French foreign minister Michel Barnier, *Wall Street Journal* 8 November 2004 and Thomas Ferenczi, “L’Union Européenne veut adresser un message positif”, *Le Monde*, 21 January 2005.

⁴² See Bush’s speech at the Concert Noble in Brussels, 21 February 2005, accessed at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050221.html>.