

SECURITY PROBLEMS IN A GLOBAL AGE AND THE FUTURE COURSE OF MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

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Introduction¹

The root causes of insecurity in a global age are complex and varied. Notwithstanding this diversity, these causes are likely to manifest themselves for decades, in three different but related challenges: the challenge of poor or nonexistent governance; the problem of radical ideologies; and the problem of access to sophisticated weapons, including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.

This combustible mix of failed or failing states, extreme ideology, and proliferating weapons, in turn, may well surprise us and threaten even stronger, larger and more powerful states. Moreover, it is also possible that, over the time period covered by the life cycle of a major weapons system, a coalition of actors and states may align against the current international order and pose a still larger threat to our security.

The future course of military forces is tied to these trends, as well as other influences to be sure. Yet we do not have to engage in worst-case forecasting to describe a troubling security environment. We are in one. Indeed, the United States is presently engaged in several simultaneous conflicts, and other conflicts are more than remote possibilities.

Military strategist Anthony Cordesman contends that the United States is not simply deeply engaged in a counter-insurgency and state-building conflict in Iraq, but also in an unfinished conflict in Afghanistan, the wider global war on terrorism (which includes military actions in the Philippines, for instance), and is perceived to be a co-belligerent in

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the deadlocked Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Thus, the United States “faces the reality of *actually* fighting three low-intensity conflicts and deep strategic involvement in a fourth.² Only one of these wars, Iraq, might be considered what Richard Haass has called a “war of choice.”

Meanwhile, other potential struggles are “waiting in the wings.”³ These might include Iran and the Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons, the failure of diplomacy to stop North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, a conflict between Pakistan and India (which have experienced three regional crises since 1987), the sudden eruption of tensions across the Taiwan Strait, the long-simmering civil war and war on drugs in Colombia. To these one could add the potential for significant military action if a country like the Philippines, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, or Indonesia were to be suddenly highly destabilized.⁴

These longer-term fears could be deeply affected by near-term shifts in the course of the ongoing conflicts, especially Iraq. Failure to build a stable post-Saddam Iraq could well become a turning point for the future security environment: nullifying temporary gains made in Afghanistan and globally in the war on terrorism, and creating a vacuum of power in Iraq that could provide a haven for terrorists, destabilize the greater Middle East, and give succor to terrorists and rogue actors around the world. Such an outcome would undermine support for the broader war on terrorism both at home and abroad and fuel anti-Americanism throughout the Arab world.⁵

This paper will first examine the security challenges confronting the United States and international security in general. Next, I will discuss the major implications of these challenges for the transformation of military forces. Finally, I will offer some suggestions for how to ensure that transformation is balanced and realistic, and how these changes may affect the U.S. security posture in the Asia-Pacific region.

Security Problems in a Global Age

² Anthony H. Cordesman, “Four Wars and Counting...Enduring Conflict and the Need for a New Approach to US Strategy and Force Planning” (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, December 1, 2003).

³ Cordesman, “Four Wars and Counting...Enduring Conflict and the Need for a New Approach to US Strategy and Force Planning.”

⁴ This is based on Cordesman’s list of key regional conflicts, to which I have added India-Pakistan, and the Southeast Asian states of Indonesia and the Philippines.

⁵ These stakes were pointed out by Anthony Cordesman and quoted in this author’s “Strategy Report” (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, No. 1, January 2004).

1. Poor Governance: Recovering Failing and Failed States

States such as Iraq and Afghanistan, recovering from conflict and years of misrule, have fledgling institutions and high levels of violence. They will continue to remain high on the policy agenda of U.S. officials and defense planners. But even beyond these obvious preoccupations, it is clear that some of the most persistent threats to international security will continue to arise out of the developing world, especially those areas that are virtually ungovernable, veritable “no man’s lands” and lawless zones such as some areas along the Afghan-Pakistani border.⁶

A year after the tragedy of September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration made clear that international security is now more threatened by failed and failing states than by stable, powerful states. The 2002 National Security Strategy builds the case that development is central preserving peace around the world. As President Bush noted, “The events of September 11th, 2001, taught us that *weak states*, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists or murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.”⁷

The bifurcation of the world between those countries and groups of people benefiting from globalization and those left behind is becoming more rather than less pronounced since the end of the Cold War.⁸ The 75 poorest countries in the world have been almost universally stuck in poverty for decades, and there are few remedies in sight. The United States and many other international donors are starting to focus on helping the best performing poor countries through such innovations as the Millennium Challenge Account.⁹ But thus far the means of dealing with failing states and those low-income countries mired in civil and regional conflict are restricted to mostly humanitarian

⁶George Tenet, “The Worldwide Threat in 2003: Evolving Dangers in a Complex World,” Director of Central Intelligence Threat Briefing as prepared for delivery, February 11, 2003.

⁷ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), available at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html, accessed March 1, 2003. The author elaborates on this argument in his chapter, “Foreign Aid,” in Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes, editors, *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2004), pp. 238-260.

⁸ The doubled-edged dimensions of globalization are analyzed in incisive detail in Stephen J. Flanagan, Ellen L. Frost, and Richard L. Kugler, editors, *Challenges of the Global Century: Report of the Project on Globalization and National Security* (Washington, D.C. National Defense University, 2001).

⁹ The Millennium Challenge Account is being created by President George W. Bush to focus billions of new development assistance money a year go to underdeveloped countries hewing to transparent indicators of governing justly, providing economic freedom, and investing in their people. The first recipient countries are set to be selected this year, and some other donors have expressed an interest in ensuring their development programs in these countries are congruent and well coordinated.

assistance save for a few hot spots such as the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, and perhaps Sudan. As the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, George Tenet, testified before Congress last year, we must be concerned about “the numbers of societies and peoples excluded from the benefits of an expanding economy, where the daily lot is hunger, disease, and displacement—and that produce large populations of disaffected youth who are prime recruits for our extremist foes.”¹⁰

The challenge of governance is global, yet it is especially pronounced in the developing world, where the effective maintenance of justice and a rule of law, or basic health and education services, are lacking. But the absence of more democratic and effective governance could well threaten the stability of other states as far removed as Venezuela, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Indonesia, to name only a few. The problem is potentially most acute in majority Muslim countries susceptible to the spread of extreme forms of political Islam.

2. Radical Ideology

Terrorism fueled by religious extremism often masks large, simmering pools of frustration and anger. Grassroots frustration and anger are particularly common in Muslim communities across much of the world, and a broad sweep of public opinion in the Muslim world shows that much of this anger is directed toward Western nations—particularly the United States. Thus, the challenge of waging a broader war against terrorism is complicated by the related need to contain Muslim anger with the West: indeed, an over exertion of military muscle can potentially exacerbate rather than ameliorate the threat of terrorism.

These resentments have built up over many years and can be too nebulous to use for threat planning. There are many terrorist organizations, but few are as focused on demonstrating the limits of American power, destabilizing if not overthrowing major regimes such as Saudi Arabia, and exhibited a global reach with a desire to acquire weapons of mass destruction such as radiological bombs as is al-Qa’ida. The fluctuating alert levels in the United States these past two years have been directly related to intelligence concerning potential al-Qa’ida activity in the United States, in the wider Middle East, especially the Gulf, and around the world.

The very stateless nature of al-Qa’ida points to some of the difficulties the

¹⁰ Tenet, “The Worldwide Threat in 2003: Evolving Dangers in a Complex World.”

international community faces in confronting what is at heart more about ideas and ideology than the traditional trappings of sovereign power. This is not to say money and weapons and training are not important, but that an order of battle is meaningless when confronted with such a threat.

This non-state terror threat is driving much of the contemporary push to innovate in the American military and security apparatus as a whole. Improving intelligence, preparing for counter-insurgency and asymmetric warfare, focusing on how to support the creation of effective state institutions in key countries—all of these are responses to the post-September 11 world in which extreme forms of political Islam have been reawakened and found some teeth 25 years after the Iranian revolution. There are other extreme ideologies that advocate violence, but none is so clearly on the scene to stay as that proffered by the *jihadists* who advocate indiscriminate violence in the name of a religion. It is this extremism that makes fear of weapons proliferation a mounting concern.

3. *The New Proliferation*

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has been a problem for decade. But it is changing and will continue to do so in the decades ahead. The leading change is that proliferation is occurring often at the sub-national level, among firms, traders, terrorist groups, and in an unholy alliance among terrorists, organized criminals and drug lords. We are in a “new world of proliferation,” one in which “knowledgeable non-state purveyors of WMD (weapons of mass destruction) materials and technology,” CIA Director George Tenet has warned.¹¹ Technologies and know-how abound not so much because of states but despite them. Chinese firms have been a key supplier of missile technology to Pakistan, and Russia’s support for dual-use programs has also contributed to our proliferation challenge. The emerging threat of biological weapons is accelerating because of scientific advances in the life sciences, most of which have been done outside of the clandestine confines of Cold War nuclear programs.

Another change is the safety of such weapons: for instance, not only is there mounting evidence that Pakistan has been a pivotal player in proliferation, but the recent assassinations attempts against General Pervez Musharraf remind us that the only thing preventing nuclear weapons from getting into the hands of terrorists is the Pakistani military.

¹¹ Tenet, “The Worldwide Threat in 2003: Evolving Dangers in a Complex World.”

The recent Iraq war, justified in part to prevent lethal weapons from being used outside of Iraqi borders, complicates the effort to forge a common front to counter proliferation. Because the alleged weapons programs of Saddam Hussein persisted, so far as we know now, only on paper, common military action to prevent advances in proliferation by states operating outside the boundaries of international law and control regimes will be even harder to create. Yet the recent deal with Libya to invite a full inspection regime of its embryonic nuclear weapons program, as well as some of the signs emanating out of Iran, offer some hope for developing a revitalized approach to countering weapons of mass destruction short of the preemptive military force.

To summarize, security problems in the decades ahead will stem from a combustible mix of weak governance, radical ideology, and proliferating weapons of mass destruction. Weak governance confronts us now in the form of failed and failing states, or newly recovering states (as in Afghanistan and Iraq). But governance problems in the future may not be limited to the poorest countries; in addition, wealthy Gulf countries, large Asian countries and other states may well find themselves at risk of being overrun or marginalized by groups bent on violent opposition to the local, regional and international order. Extreme forms of political Islam are likely to pose the biggest ideological threat to governance, the interests of the major powers, and international order in the coming years. Globalization and access to nuclear or radiological, biological, or chemical weapons may make even small rogue actors or terrorists capable of threatening international security to a far greater degree than in the past century. Within these three parameters of governance, ideology and proliferating weapons of mass destruction, defense transformation is gradually unfolding.

Implications for Military Transformation: Winning Future Wars

What is meant in the United States by the term military transformation? Transformation, after all, an update to the search that started in the former Soviet Union to find a “military-technical revolution,” which in the United States became a quest for a “revolution in military affairs.”¹²

Transformation is about more than the incremental modernization of military forces.

¹² See Ian Roxborough, “From Revolution to Transformation: The State of the Field,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, Autumn 2002, pp. 68-75.

Instead, transformation will incorporate and blend technological change, organizational change, and operational change. Technology will continue to alter land, sea and air warfare in ways that will further refine and improve the speed and range of targeting a battle space with lethal force and further empower smaller units and individual soldiers. Organizational changes may contribute to evolving a post-World War Two military into a more agile, global force. And operations are likely to be conducted with allies and other leading powers, in tandem with coalitions of the willing, and within an evolving but still relatively weak international legal and institutional framework.

The Defense Department defines transformation as “the process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people, and organizations....” The strategy for transformation is further said to be aimed at “large-scale innovation.” The transformation strategy is focused on the pillars of strengthening joint operations, exploiting intelligence, and developing new concepts of operations through experimentation.¹³

Of course, the question must be raised: transformation toward what end? One of the enduring questions becomes the balance between enduring and innovative means, as well as between short-term crisis management and long-term strategic planning. Even so, at the end of the day all of these are means, not ends. As others have written at length, the foundation of transformation is less about technology than the missions assigned and the strategy intended to prevail.¹⁴

The U.S. defense strategy today seeks to reassure allies and friends, dissuade future military competitors, deter threats and coercion against the U.S. and defeat any adversary if deterrence fails. That strategy is in turn predicated on some key tenets, including the imperative of projecting force and defending the homeland, a capabilities-based force (rather than one based on specific scenarios, such as two, near-simultaneous conflicts), and transformed defense forces.

To deal with regional threats, asymmetric threats, and threats emanating from weak states, defense forces are to be transformed by protecting critical bases, projecting force into hostile environments, denying enemy sanctuary, leveraging information technology,

¹³ *Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach* (Washington, D.C.: Director, Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Fall 2003), pp. 6-8.

¹⁴ For instance, see Hans Binnendijk, editor, *Transforming America's Military* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2002).

protecting information systems, and enhancing space capabilities. A combination of small, medium and large advances or “jumps” is anticipated to transform operations. The transformation strategy specifically cites Afghanistan as an exemplary example of the success of this approach:

“Our recent experience in Afghanistan during the conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom underscores the point that transformation is not just about new weapons or new technology. The crucial victory at Mazar-e-Sharif set in motion the Taliban’s dramatic fall from power. What actually won the battle was a combination of the ingenuity of the U.S. Special Operations Forces on the ground, advanced precision-guided munitions delivered by U.S. aircraft, and the courage of our Afghan allies. In this case, transformation involved new ideas and concepts, as well as the adaptation of old weapons to meet the challenges of a new century. The US B-52s, which played such an important role in this battle, were much older than the pilots who flew them, but they employed modern electronics and avionics and dropped ‘smart bombs’ guided by GPS [Global Positioning System].”¹⁵

Afghanistan at once highlights both the strengths and limits of transformation within the U.S. Armed Forces. If nothing else, transformation must be an ongoing push for innovation and adaptation. Analysis of transformation can become caustic when relating real, unfinished conflicts such as the one in Afghanistan, to buzzwords, such as “net-centric warfare,” which “refers to the combination of emerging tactics, techniques, and technologies that a networked force employs to create a decisive warfighting advantage.”¹⁶ In other words, it is a broad framework, and hardly a strategy or a substitute for strategy. The vulgarization of such terms can lead critics to focus on everything else that needs to go beyond the integration and harnessing of information technologies, such as training soldiers for the environment of political wars, war termination, and organizing to win the peace.

For instance, Tony Cordesman points to the limits of technology:

“...the US should learn from Afghanistan and Iraq that technology-based force transformation and the revolution in military affairs are tools with severe and sometimes crippling limits. The ability to provide IS&R coverage of the world is of immense value, but it does not mean the ability to understand the world, deal with

¹⁵ *Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach* (Washington, D.C.: Director, Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Fall 2003), p. 9.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

complex political issues, and fight effectively in the face of terrorism, many forms of low-intensity conflict and asymmetric warfare, and the need to deal with conflict termination and peace making or protect nation building.”¹⁷

Others also fear that the United States is reaching too much. Indeed, threats associated at times as simply the global war on terrorism on so broad the U.S. may be overextended. There is a mismatch between ends and means is the contention of a new monograph by Jeffrey Record, who argues that preventive war too ambitious. He further avers that deterrence sufficient, and that we must find ways short of war to deal with rogue actors. He argues that the U.S. should settle for stability rather than democracy in Iraq, and he (and many others, including those concerned about the elevated role of Guard and Reserve forces) believes the inherent need for ground forces in these types of conflict call for a reassessment of current force levels. Transformation means in part substituting technology for manpower; we may need more and better people.¹⁸

As Cordesman makes clear, one must distinguish between defeating another’s conventional forces and actually winning a war. “There are also good reasons to question whether many aspects of ‘Netcentric’ warfare are little more than a conceptual myth, concealing the military equivalent of the ‘Emperor’s new clothes’ in a dense forest of incomprehensible PowerPoint slides that cannot be translated into procurable systems, workable human interfaces, and affordable Future Year Defense Plans.”¹⁹

Military planners working on transformation have tried to match information and materiel to international relations and ideas. One creative approach to explaining how to wage a war on terrorism in a strategic manner is that of Thomas Barnett, who argues for shrinking the gap between those sharing those sharing the spoils of globalization and those who are not; he argues for focusing on the seam states that lie along the gap’s boundary lines. If it takes a network to fight a network, Barnett argues we need a military of super empowered individuals to fight super empowered individuals. But one must question the means of achieving this, wonder about selectivity, and wonder about deeper causes of terrorism.²⁰

¹⁷ Anthony H. Cordesman, “Four Wars and Counting...Enduring Conflict and the Need for a New Approach to US Strategy and Force Planning” (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, December 1, 2003), pp. 7-8.

¹⁸ Jeffrey Record, *Bounding the Global War on Terrorism* (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, December 2003), pp. 41-45.

¹⁹ Anthony H. Cordesman, “Four Wars and Counting...Enduring Conflict and the Need for a New Approach to US Strategy and Force Planning” (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, December 1, 2003), p. 8.

²⁰ Thomas P.M. Barnett, “The Pentagon’s New Map,” *Esquire*, March 2003.

But even these creative explanations that combine military transformation in light of contemporary international relations are still heavily weighted on technologies and systems at the expense of human capital and an effective integration of military and civilian means of coping with or thwarting threats as amorphous as non-state terrorism. As Andrew Krepinevich has put it, thinking about how transformation will apply to ground forces, "Identifying the need to transform is one thing; effecting military transformation is another."²¹ Again, the question arises: how much current capability to abandon and at what cost, versus how much to investing in leapfrogging a generation of systems to bring about a new concept of operations? This is indeed what permeates the day-to-day tussles in Washington that will, with each new budget decision, shape and determine the pace of the transformation of the U.S. Armed Forces for the 21st century.

Conclusion: Winning the Peace

What are the implications of transformation? There are at least three. First, the United States will make a more concerted effort to think through how to build national and international capabilities, both defense and civilian, to conduct stabilization and state-building operations. Second, the United States will continue to adapt its basing so that lighter, more agile forces are capable of deploying rapidly for global operations. Finally, the United States can only significantly advance security in this century to the extent it brings others along rather than is seen as too determined to "go it alone."

1. Organizing for Stability and Reconstruction Operations

The United States has "won" two wars but at best faces a difficult struggle for winning the peace. A major reason for this is that its focus has been on military targeting rather than the political nature of war, as authors such as Frederick W. Kagan have written recently. If failing or failed states are looming threats to American security, reconstruction and state-building is far too important to be left simply to development economists and diplomats. We need a cognitive and human transformation, not just the transformation of technology and units. Admiral Cebrowski allows that the failed effort in Somalia in the 1990s ignited his thinking about the need to have forces capable of fighting in poor, urban areas, and of enduring a fluid political environment on the ground.

²¹ Andrew E. Krepinevich, Jr., "The Army and Land Warfare: Transforming the Legions," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Autumn 2002, pp. 76-82.

The Bush Administration shifted its Department of Defense focus away from peacekeeping to “stability” operations, and the result has been an evolving Stability Operations Joint Operational Concept—to maintain, re-establish and promote stability—as attempt to define the American military role in future stability operations. As planning slides have summarized future missions, the U.S. must adapt to a different kind of war, “*Especially if we are now involved in a clash of civilizations and have to look forward to a series of enduring Intifadas wherever we choose to fight and achieve lasting political victory.*” The practitioners are trying to redefine what conflict is, when “combat ends” and what constitutes “victory.” These missions imply a far greater overlap of combat, stability operations and civil reconstruction plans, both separately and in combination. Military commanders cannot dismantle assembled capabilities after battle phase.²²

Transformation must focus on more than the “effective use of information superiority, precision strike, and rapid maneuver on the battlefield.” Must be prepared to deal promptly and over time with a lack of order and rule of law, basic services and the infrastructure and institutions that provide them, and attacks on forces providing defense in the collapse of a dictator or outlaw regime’s security. Military planning primarily has focused on mounting forces into theater and defeating the conventional forces of a foe. Now what is needed is more than rapid, decisive, even preemptive force operations. In particular, Hans Binnendijk and others have called for fielding two stabilization and reconstruction division-equivalents with joint assets: mostly forces from reserve component, and he also indicates that the U.S. should examine a U.S.-supported international peacekeeping force with regional training centers.²³

The activities of nations in this capacity fall under different rubrics: nation building, peace building, and post-conflict reconstruction. Carl Bildt, the former Prime Minister of Sweden and UN representative on the Balkans rightly makes the distinction, in this author’s view, that principally what is needed and what is practicable is the building of institutions to make a state work: “The task is not about ‘building nations’,” Bildt writes, “but building states, very often in areas where several nations and nationalities have to coexist within one framework.” He adds that “State building...requires skills across a far wider range than a purely security-focused organization can provide. It remains an essentially political and economic task, not a military one. Thus, leadership must rest with institutions that can command a wide range of resources.” He calls for creating a

²² Based on unclassified briefing slides of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, September 2003.

²³ *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*, Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson, editors (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Center for Technology and National Security Policy, November 12, 2003).

European Institute of Peace “to bring together Europe’s expertise and experience on these issues,” “an instrument for informal diplomacy and preventive political activities....”²⁴

The same could be said, I think, about a regional center for all Asia-Pacific nations. Japan is the logical center for such activities, furthermore, given its evolving but significant role in “peace-making.” The training of peacekeepers, military police, forces willing to help interdict potential illegal weapons sales, and police and civilian officials designed to facilitate diplomatic discussion and provide technical state-building expertise could all come together under one roof for the sake of having more a more effective cadre of officials capable of dealing with the complex contingencies of the 21st century.

2. Creating a New Global Basing Network

Abstract concepts of defense transformation start to become understandable when they are translated into troop movements and establishing new bases of operation. The United States needs to continue its gradual process of realigning its global basing network to allow for global force sourcing rather than more fixed, static and heavy forces designed to stay in a particular locale, be it defending NATO territory or the Republic of Korea. Obviously extreme caution must be made not to reduce deterrence, and a realignment of leaner but more capable forces can, if done well, actually strengthen deterrence. This global force sourcing is a major change—not one that in and of itself can compensate for strategy, but an overdue adaptation to the status quo that came about for historic reasons that may largely no longer obtain.

Under prevailing concepts of global force sourcing, regional military Commanders-in-Chief would no longer control all assets, including reserves, but rather some portion would have to be ready to deploy globally wherever needed. Secretary Rumsfeld wants to realign and transform forces from a static, defensive Cold War posture to one with far more agility and mobility. This means ensuring the deployability of troops, finding new places and not just bases, including in Eastern Europe and the Pacific around the areas more likely to require intervention.

Undersecretaries Douglas Feith and Marc Grossman visited Romania, Poland, Bulgaria, Turkey and other countries last month looking at moving some of 117,000 troops currently stationed in Western Europe. The idea is not simply to move east but to change the nature of basing itself. “We want to do things in a highly expeditionary way: land a

²⁴ Carl Bildt, “We Should Build States Not Nations,” *Financial Times*, January 16, 2004, p. 15.

battalion, train for a couple of months with a host nation, leave, and then come back six months later. We want a family of bases that can go from cold to warm to hot,” said General James Jones, the U.S. CINCEUR.²⁵

The decision to announce the move of most US forces out of Seoul and relocate to the south of the Republic of Korea has been an issue of alliance negotiation for years. Undisclosed but rumored plans will look at relocating and reequipping the two brigades of the Army’s 2nd Infantry Division from positions on the DMZ to well south of Seoul, and consolidating the logistical base structure around fewer—by about half—but larger facilities; making it available for other assignments including possibly Iraq; removing some of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force from Okinawa to Guam; acquiring new facilities for preposition of equipment and training activities in Thailand, the Philippines and Australia; and bolstering air and naval forces on Guam, including the possible relocation of an aircraft carrier battle group now based in the United States.²⁶

However quickly or comprehensively these changes come about, the trend toward a new global basing posture remains a focal point of U.S. defense transformation, and one with practical implications for allies and partners throughout the world.

3. Enhancing International Cooperation

The implications quickly become operational in nature, as not just joint but also combined operations with allies and coalition partners become critical. Whether the U.S. military is moving decisively enough and far enough on this front is open to debate, but the important point is that the Bush Administration and the Democratic opposition genuinely seem to accept this as a bipartisan axiom, notwithstanding the manner in which the Iraq war occurred. Signs of diplomacy over Libya and attempts at finding peaceful solutions to proliferating states such as Iran and North Korea, give reason for cautious optimism. And the rift of the Iraq conflict is slowly healing across the Atlantic, and with the coming of a sovereign Iraqi regime in the summer, perhaps with the United Nations as well.

As Tony Cordesman argues, a world filled with low-intensity operations, asymmetric warfare, and political war and terrorism begs for more rather than less international cooperation. Indeed, this kind of world makes the term “superpower” a dangerous term

²⁵ Quoted in Andrew Purvis, “All Ready on the Eastern Front,” *Time Europe* (January 19, 2004, Vol. 163, No. 3).

²⁶ Oxford Analytica report on Secretary Rumsfeld’s trip to Asia, published December 2003.

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because coalitions and alliances are more important than ever. Our policies must take full account of the views of others, and “Our military strategy must give interoperability and military advisory efforts the same priority as jointness. In order to lead we must also learn to follow.”²⁷

²⁷ Cordesman, “Four Wars and Counting...Enduring Conflict and the Need for a New Approach to US Strategy and Force Planning,” p. 5

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Biographical Description of the Author

Dr. Patrick M. Cronin is the Senior Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. In that post, Dr. Cronin leads the overall research agenda of CSIS and conducts his own research and writing. He also is Executive Director of the Hills Program on Governance, which is partnering with leading institutions in Asia to conduct research and find practical solutions to the pervasive problems of corruption and weak economic governance.

Dr. Cronin joined CSIS after serving more than two years in the Bush Administration as assistant administrator for policy and program coordination with the U.S. Agency for International Development. As the third-ranking official at USAID, Dr. Cronin served a variety of roles at a critical time of major post-conflict planning and rebuilding in Afghanistan and Iraq and major development initiatives, which ranged from preventing famine and AIDS to creating programs to reduce extremism, bolster good governance and promote economic growth and sustainable development. Regarding economic growth, Dr. Cronin headed up the interagency task force designing the Millennium Challenge Corporation, which is slated to become a new, multi-billion-a-year development agency focused on economic growth.

Before his confirmation by the U.S. Senate as assistant administrator, he was the director of research and studies at the U.S. Institute of Peace. Prior to that Dr. Cronin was at the National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS). As deputy director and director of research at INSS, he directed advanced research efforts on long-range strategy and Asian security.

Dr. Cronin's most recent books are *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2003, coedited with Robert J. Art) and *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future* (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999, coedited with Michael J. Green).

Dr. Cronin holds a master's and doctorate from the University of Oxford, and he has taught at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, the Johns Hopkins University, and the University of Virginia. He lives in Washington, D.C. and can be reached at pcronin@csis.org.