New Roles of the Military and the United States: Crisis Management and a View on Alliance-Based Cooperation

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Introduction

Non-combat duties, such as peacekeeping and nation building, came to be seen as crucial missions for the military in the post-Cold War international community.[1] Non-combat duties play an extremely significant role, although low profile in nature, in maintaining peace and stability in post-conflict states and communities. Strategists and policymakers often disregard these missions as a part of grand strategies, since they do not involve combat activities or offensive and defensive doctrines, which deal with the life and death of their military personnel and direct national interests. However, it is undeniable that missions such as the restoration of domestic order both at home and abroad following the termination of conflicts are increasingly deemed important within the international community. This paper tries to explain developments of the US's policy toward such non-traditional roles of the military.

Although the preservation of social order had been recognized as an important function of the military even during the Cold War, this issue had not yet attracted significant interest within international political arena. In the post-Cold War era, however, the international community has realized that peacekeeping and peace building should be an important asset for the international community in responding to regional conflicts and humanitarian crises. Increasingly, such measures have come to be seen as an instrumental tool to prevent conflict from recurring, and to inhibit the eruption of disputes in the first place. The international community is experienced in engaging military forces in non-combat duties, having done so in the past under the rubric of UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). Few countries, however, have classified PKO as a major function of their military, and most countries have been urged to confront the issue of how to handle a non-combat military role in the process of developing a post-Cold War national security policy. For the United States, the world's only remaining superpower, this issue has presented even greater problems.

In this regard, there were three major challenges to US security policy in the post-Cold War era. First, the US has had to respond to multifaceted and complex threats in a fluid and intricately shifting international environment. Confronted by the frequent outbreak of regional conflicts following the end of the Cold War, and the chaos brought on by civil wars in a number of third world countries, the international community has come up with the urgent need to

[1] Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, Pamela Aall, *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Response to International Conflict* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), sections 19-25.

implement certain measures to restore and rebuild the peace and stability of those regions. Moreover, in initiating the war on terrorism, the US had to call upon the broad range of its capabilities, employing all tactics from preemptive strikes to regional stabilization efforts, in order to maintain peace, stability, and order. Although the US and the international community had repeatedly emphasized these measures even before the September 11 terrorist attacks, the incident reinforced their importance, and the United States in particular begun to refocus its efforts. Indeed, the military has been asked to utilize its capacity in what had previously been classified as nontraditional roles outlined as Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW, referred to hereafter as OOTW).

The second challenge comes from the relationship between the US and the international community, especially the relationship between the US and the United Nations. Since the Cold War, the United States has conducted a reevaluation of the UN's role and its capabilities for enhancing peace and stability, and its appropriate relationship with US interests. Despite the fact that the UN was expected to play a significant role in the former President Bush's concept of the new world order, domestic political disputes regarding the UN and a natural distrust toward international institutions have kept the US from fully supporting or capitalizing on UN activities. Indeed, a similar debate was held on this issue throughout the 90's, which shows that the US is in the midst of striking a balance between its national interests and the demands of the international community at large.

The third challenge the US faces is in regard to her operational capacity. Even though OOTW and other non-traditional activities of the military are thought to be important, existing US military procedural structures were not necessarily conducive to the execution of these operations as it confronts an increasing number of OOTW. There has been constant concern on the part of the US that participation in these operations will come at the expense of the existing capability to conduct a conventional war, and rapid deployment capabilities. In fact, this concern was reinforced by the ongoing reduction of military budgets, which led to worsening conditions for US personnel management. The US Congress has demonstrated a particularly strong interest in these issues. Throughout the 90's, the Congress repeatedly opposed the Clinton administration's initiative to conduct multiple peace operations, asking what the US national interest in such activities was, and whether or not the appropriate force-commitment balance was being maintained in the defense planning of the administration. This partisan confrontation reflected the friction between the executive and legislative branches following the mid-term election of 1994, but the skeptical attitude toward peace operations exists as an undercurrent in the Bush administration as well.

Indeed, these issues are part of the process of instituting the policies necessary for the US in dealing with the new realities. Throughout the 1990s, the US continuously sought a policy that would conform to post-Cold War international systems. This struggle stemmed from the fact that policies that reflect the degree of influence of the various nations in the world, and that embody

an international universality, had to be implemented through the political means developed during the Cold War. The current Bush administration was also called upon to work through these issues. At the time of the 2000 presidential election, George W. Bush was considered to be a candidate with strong conservative tendencies, and his ability to cope with the complex demands of the international community was brought into question. In devising, however, a means by which multilateralism could be exploited from a domestic stance of political realism, and brought into line with the wishes of the international community, Bush succeeded in forming a solution to the issues that had plagued previous administrations. This solution has also proved extremely helpful in carrying out the war on terror waged since the September 11 terrorist attacks.

This paper analyzes how the current Bush administration has managed the issue of nontraditional roles assigned as a new function to the military in the post-Cold War world.

1 US Response to Multilateral Peace Operations

The US has not traditionally demonstrated a reluctance to utilize military forces for purposes other than ordinary combat or territorial defense. In fact, the US has been quite actively involved in non-combat activities. Looking further back in history, the Kennedy administration launched a Counter Insurgency (COIN) campaign under the banner of the "Alliance for Progress," and the Johnson administration pursued a policy of Internal Defense and Development (IDAD).[2] In the 1980s, low-intensity conflict (LIC) was advanced, particularly on the pretext of assisting with the political stabilization of Central and South American countries.

These policies were strongly tinged with overtones of the spread of Cold War rivalries to third world countries. The goal was to both expand the influence of forces friendly to the US and whittle away at the power of opponents in these third world countries by executing "economic and military support, propaganda campaigns, secret maneuvers, destabilization maneuvers, appeals from influential cultural and ideological forces, and indirect invasions" in these countries.[3] At the same time, the US turned away from its traditional military program of "undermining opponents' capabilities through combat," and US experiences in the Korean and Vietnam wars and combat in Central America clearly laid the foundation for the concept of eroding the opponent's military capabilities through non-combat.

The goal of the COIN campaign of the Kennedy administration was to encourage third world countries to adopt pro-American policy. In essence, the US expected the friendly governments in the third world to reduce instabilities within their borders, and to eliminate the domestic political

[2] Michael McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: US Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992).
[3] Osamu Ishii, *Kokusai Seijishi Toshiteno 20 Seiki (The 20th Century as International Political History)* (Yushindo, 2000), pp. 229-230.

and economic support bases of the opposition groups and rebels. The groups hostile to the US would then lose their support from domestic society, thereby lowering the costs incurred with victory obtained through combat. In the mid-1960s, an IDAD policy was introduced to go beyond COIN and develop "stabilization operations," which consolidated the policies to be taken by civilians and military personnel to permit local administrations to implement necessary political, economic and social reforms. The US military expected much from these campaigns in terms of maintaining order in the societies in which they would be implemented.

Beginning in the 1980s, the US began to initiate LIC-oriented policies, particularly with regard to Central and South American countries. LIC is defined as "limited political and military engagement designed to achieve political, social, economic and psychological objectives."[4] What is interesting about LIC is its domestic implications. It tried to deal with the memory of the worst US nightmare in recent history. LIC was used to deal with the deep-seated "Vietnam syndrome" within US society. The US military participation in LIC was limited solely to the training of local forces, advisory positions, and logistical support, with actual combat conducted by local forces equipped by the US.

In the post-Cold War world, the attention of the international community came to focus squarely on nontraditional military roles, with their historical pretext as described above. This attention is closely linked to the increased awareness in the UN that peacekeeping activities may allow it to play a significant role in restoring peace and order in post-conflict societies. The concept of the new world order advocated by the previous President Bush following the Gulf War further enforced this trend. With the end of the Cold War era, the tone of the debate among the international community, at least among democratic nations, turned to the democratic peace theory, which states that wars among democratic countries are obsolescent.[5] Although ethnic, religious and racial differences had been recognized as underlying causes for conflict primarily in the third world countries, those conflicts were clearly de-linked from the Cold War logic, thus they had little possibility of causing an impact to the strategic level interests of the developed world. Therefore, the international community expected the UN to provide the international legitimacy to help mobilize the international community, since the UN had been invested in pursuing mediation, post-conflict peace building, and regional stabilization in these areas of conflict.

The US considered this trend to be a positive development. In January 1992, former President Bush pledged unqualified US support to UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and proposed a basic policy of enhancing UN peacekeeping activities.[6] He also released

[4] Field Circular "Low-Intensity Conflict," FC 100-20, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth/Kansas, May 30, 1986, p. v; Michael T. Klare, "Low-Intensity Conflict: The New US Strategic Doctrine," *The Nation*, 4/1/86.

[5] Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

[6] President Bush's remarks read, "We look to the Secretary-General to present to this Council his

National Security Directive (NSD) 74 in November 1992, declaring for the first time since the Truman administration that the US stood in support of UN peacekeeping activities.[7] This policy was welcomed in the international community in general; however, it met with fierce domestic opposition. While acknowledging that the UN's unique abilities in the field of peacekeeping are something the US should take advantage of, the Department of Defense was concerned about expanding the scope of US participation in these activities. Furthermore, though Bush spoke at a UN general assembly meeting in September 1992 about US cooperation in efforts to improve the information-gathering capacity and strengthen the financial foundation of UN peacekeeping activities, this recommendation was never translated directly into policy due to strong opposition in the Congress.[8]

The COIN and LIC policies shared a number of military operational and political similarities with the peacekeeping activities and peace operations that Bush attempted to advance under the auspices of the UN. There were, however, considerable differences in terms of US motivations between the clear political motives backed by the Cold War structures of the former, and the UN activities backed by the prescriptive motives of stabilizing and restoring order to unstable regions. It was not until the September 2001 terrorist attacks that US policy came to reflect an understanding that a lack of order permits the spread of terrorism, consequently, filling local political vacuums and resolving confusion have become important elements for US national security. Accordingly, the UN, not the US, primarily led the increased emphasis on nontraditional roles for the military in the post-Cold War era, as reflected in Secretary-General Ghali's publication of *An Agenda for Peace* in 1992, which was particularly notable for its enthusiastic advocacy of an active role in peacekeeping and peace enforcement for the UN. Despite the negative tone of debate within the US on this issue, Bush determined to cooperate with these efforts, dispatching troops to Somalia for Operation Restore Hope under a separate framework from that under which peacekeeping activities were conducted. These operations, however, led to a grave mission failure during the Clinton administration, bringing skepticism over peace operations to the fore in the US.[9]

As a presidential candidate, Clinton stated during his election campaign that he would welcome US participation in UN peacekeeping operations as a way to reduce the costs born by the US in contributing to international operations. Clinton also advocated establishing a UN emergency deployment force trained to respond to situations that could not be dealt with under

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recommendations to ensure effective and efficient peacekeeping, peacemaking, and preventive diplomacy. And we look forward to exploring these ideas together." Remarks to the United Nations Security Council in New York City, *Public Papers of the Presidents: George Bush* - 1992, Vol. 1, pp. 175-177.

[7] National Security Directive 74, November 24, 1992.
http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/nsd/NSD/NSD%2074/0001.pdf.

[8] "Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City," *Public Papers of the Presidents: George Bush, Bush Presidential Library*, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1992/92092100.html.

[9] Louis J. Klarevas, "The Polls-Trends: The United States Peace Operations in Somalia," *Public Opinion*

traditional peacekeeping operations.[10] In the spring of 1993, following his inauguration, the Clinton administration issued Policy Review Document (PRD) 13, which called for the fortification of UN peacekeeping operations as part of Clinton's stance that the US demonstrate its leadership within a multilateral approach.[11] The administration followed up on the policies outlined in PRD13 in Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, issued on May 3, 1994.

PDD25 lists the conditions under which the US would participate in peacekeeping operations. While not intended to make a direct contribution to the US military's strategy to secure victories in two regional conflicts fought simultaneously, as outlined in the Bottom Up Review, the directive did characterize peacekeeping operations as advancing the US interests on three fronts – the expansion of democracy, regional security, and economic growth.[12] After laying the foundation for this premise, PDD25 begins with a review of NSD74 issued by the first Bush administration, and then moves on to outline the elements previously reviewed in the Clinton administration's PRD13 – namely, suggestions for improving UN peacekeeping operations, the conditions under which US support would be provided in the case of peace operations implemented by regional organizations, reduction of the US share of UN peacekeeping costs, and the command and control policy for US military participation in UN peace operations. The directive also outlines the terms to be applied when the US participates in UN peacekeeping operations, based on a positive view of these operations as providing a "force multiplier" in situations in which the US is involved overseas.

Proponents of PDD25 hailed the policy for clearly affirming the US attitude toward participation in UN peacekeeping operations at a time of an unenthusiastic atmosphere on this issue. Opponents, however, charged that the policy rationalized nonparticipation in the missions by the conditions it imposed. In either case, while the policy of "effective and selective" participation outlined in PDD25 allowed the Clinton administration to ensure maximum political flexibility, it refrained from subjecting the US to unconditional participation in UN operations. The Clinton administration, however, was unable to garner the domestic support it had expected for stepping up UN peacekeeping operations due to the constitutional limitations it faced.

First, the Clinton administration faced the difference between the administration and the Congress in terms of calculations on, and political prioritizing of, multilateral peacekeeping operations. While the administration calculated that peace operations and peacekeeping activities would reduce US involvement overseas, Congress, on the other hand, concerned that

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Quarterly, Vol. 64, Iss. 4 (Winter 2000).

[10] Sarah B. Sewall, "US Policy and Practice Regarding Multilateral Peace Operations," Carr Center for Human Rights Policy Working Paper, March 2001, p. 8.

[11] The policy set forth in PRD13 shifts the US relationship to UN peacekeeping operations to one that is "developmental, not revolutionary," and asserts that, "the time has come to commit the political, intellectual and financial capital that UN peace keeping and our security deserve." Jeffrey Smith and Julia Preston, "United States Plans Wider Role in UN Peace Keeping," *Washington Post*, June 18, 1993.

[12] Bureau of International Organizational Affairs, US Department of State, Clinton Administration Policy on

participation in these operations would inevitably come at the expense of US military responsiveness, combat readiness, and training procedures, took an opposing stance. The majority of lawmakers, moreover, opposed the deployment of US forces under UN command.

Second, there were issues related to domestic politics. During the Clinton administration, the relationship between the Congress and the president was particularly strained in terms of the checks and balances of the US system between the separate branches of government, leaving the president severely limited in his ability to execute policy. Especially after the Republican victory of 1994 in both the Senate and the House of Representatives, the US Congress demonstrated a clear distrust of the UN on such issues as cost sharing for UN operations, and the Clinton administration was forced to concede to a certain extent to the Congress.

Third, there was the lack of a clear domestic consensus in the US about its interests in the post-Cold War era. The UN peacekeeping operations for nation building had many operational restrictions, and it was obvious that no operational flexibility for the participating militaries was guaranteed. The operations in places such as Somalia, Rwanda, Uganda, Bosnia and other places clearly demonstrated the risks and dangers of those missions. Therefore, together with an increasing number of, and an expanding budget for, peacekeeping operations emerging despite the apparent limitations, the concern arose that rather than limiting US participation, the guidelines put forth under PDD25 would instead result in an expansion of US participation with no guiding principles, and the Clinton administration was unable to provide arguments to justify the President's position on this issue.[13]

With the success of peace operations in Haiti and Kosovo in the latter half of the 1990s, the US tended to favor international deployment through regional organizations, and ad hoc alliances over UN-led operations. In these operations, UN initiatives were limited, the US played a major role, and UN cooperation made possible political legitimacy and financial support, as well as an honorable withdrawal by the US.[14] Although the above-mentioned limitations remained unresolved, the operations did fall in line with a basic policy of promoting US national interests by means of multilateralism, and enabled the implementation of substantial operations under regional organizations and other alternatives unavailable under the UN

2 US Dilemmas

Until the inauguration of President George W. Bush, US policy on peace operations faced serious problems. Domestic consensus on the multidimensional and complex post-Cold War threats, and on active US participation to counter those threats, had not been reached. Moreover,

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Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (PDD 25), February 22, 1996.

[13] Jeanne Kirkpatrick, "Where is Our Foreign Policy," *Washington Post*, August 30, 1993.

[14] Sewall, p.17.

countries such as Russia and China were critical of US-led operations and activities that lacked the legitimacy provided by the UN, as became apparent with the Kosovo operation. It was necessary for the United States to resolve those issues. Therefore, even if the US was more reluctant to utilize the framework of the UN, and was to attach more significance to regional organizations, the UN had to be revitalized in some way to provide legitimacy to the operations carried out under those auspices. Furthermore, the United States faced the issue of how the operational costs incurred in peace operations were to be apportioned while maintaining the armed forces that had the strategic capacity to simultaneously fight two large-scale regional disputes. The issue was understood to be a serious concern, particularly among those involved in national defense.

Pressured by the need to resolve this complex puzzle, the US was confronted with several dilemmas in promoting policy on peace operations. First, though the US welcomed peace operations composed of multilateral parties as an alternative to unilateral involvement, the international community took this stance as evidence of US reluctance to involve itself with international affairs, prompting doubts among the international community about the US's leadership abilities with regard to international issues. It is therefore US recognition of the legitimacy of the UN and active participation in UN operations that is essential to securing UN legitimacy in the eyes of the world. As the world's lone superpower, US support for UN peace operations intended to reduce its own commitment in international affairs would effectively dismiss the complex and multifaceted threats confronting the international community.[15]

In fact, the US has implicitly begun to show its policy of selective involvement after its failure in Somalia. Furthermore, the official declaration of this policy in PDD25 has left an indelible impression that the US has turned its back on international problems. When faced with the large-scale massacre in Rwanda, US policy on peace operations came to be recognized as a major problem. In light of the contrast between the US response to the situation in Rwanda and its proactive stance through NATO in responding to the subsequent human rights violations in Kosovo, a clear and definitive image formed in the international community that the US response to a given situation was determined according to "whether or not US interests are involved." It was at this point that criticism of US intervention as selectively implemented based on its own national interests, and of the Clinton administration's repeated advocacy of the international expansion of human rights and democratic values as merely a US "invasion" in a different form, took root among the international community.[16] This view has had a direct

[15] In this context, the direct involvement of the US military and US participation in UN activities and other peace operations must be considered separately. The US is not necessarily indifferent to peace operations. The fiscal 2003 budget allocates US$726 million to international peacekeeping activity support (14 items), US $108 million for peacekeeping operations (6 items), and US $4.107 billion for FMF.

[16] It should be noted that the very idea of expanding human rights and democracy through peace operations was the subject of criticism. Pundits asserted that the introduction through external force of political systems unsuitable to the situation in a particular region would in fact invite instability in these countries or regions. It

bearing on the decline of US leadership in the international arena.

The second dilemma that confronted the US related to the disparity between operational requirements and equipped capability. For the US military, which was trying to reduce the size and uses of its military to match the strategic needs of the post-Cold War era, the expanding engagement of its military in non-combat duties was a great headache. The US grew increasingly concerned about whether it could effectively increase the duties of its military, and at the same time, maintain the country's military readiness.

In fact, OOTW had a wide variety of operations on its menu. The *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* identifies 16 types of OOTW.[17] In *Army Vision 2010*, the Army divides its functions into a "Spectrum of Peace" and a "Spectrum of Combat," defining a total of 24 military duties, and the OOTW duties fall into the realm in which these spectrums overlap.[18] Granting the importance of these duties in securing international peace and US national security, the cost of implementing all of these operations would be extremely high. Although the non-combat military duties stipulated by the US are different from the peacekeeping operations of the UN, the loss in resources allocated to conventional military duties resulting from US military participation in the various peace operations and multilateral operations authorized by the UN is a matter of great concern for the US, as the international community increasingly expects the military to carry out functions other than combat actions.[19]

Cost as discussed in this context pertains both to the human and financial costs in conjunction with the increasing number of peace operations, and the issue of cost in the sense of training and force structures not designed for peace operations. These issues were not recognized as major problems until the middle of the 1990s. In fact, few UN peacekeeping operations were implemented during the Cold War, and with limited US military involvement, the Department of Defense had not set up special accounting categories for these operations. From the mid-1990s, however, the increasing number of peace operations prompted the Department of Defense to create a supplementary budget to cover the costs of these operations, which brought the issue to the attention of the US Congress and generated widespread criticism of US involvement in these operations. This criticism found its way into the Bottom Up Review and the 1997 Quadrennial

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should also be noted that the Clinton administration used the same line of reasoning to explain its policy of "selective intervention." Roland Paris, "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism," *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 5-89.

[17] These are arms control, combating terrorism, counter-drug operations, enforcement of sanctions/maritime intercept operations, enforcing exclusion zones, humanitarian assistance, ensuring freedom of navigation and over-flight, military support to civil authorities, national assistance/support to counterinsurgency, non-combatant evacuation operations, peace operations, protection of shipping, recovery operations, show of force operations, strikes and raids, and support to insurgencies. Joint Publication (PUB) 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, April 1993, p. ix.

[18] Department of the Army, *Army Vision 2010*, November 1996, p. 5.

[19] Congressional Budget Office, "CBO Paper: Making Peace While Staying Ready for War: The Challenges of US Military Participation in Peace Operations," December 1999.

Defense Review (QRD) and National Defense Panel (NDP) as a debate over the balance between "capability and commitment."

The debate over balancing "capability and commitment" provided the Republican-controlled Congress with the opportunity to politicize criticism that the security strategy proposed by the Clinton administration ignored the public financial base that funds the implementation of these strategies. The debate was essentially about what should be the appropriate size of the defense budget to meet the declared security strategy. The Republicans were especially concerned that the defense budget cuts that began at the beginning of the 1990s strained soldiers' wages and deteriorated their benefits. Congress further insisted that increasing the budget for peace operations in a manner that sacrificed already shrinking budgets for training and next-generation force development posed a major problem in terms of US national security strategy. In reality, the budget for peacekeeping operations never exceeded 2% of the total defense budget and only small numbers of troops were deployed throughout the Clinton administration.[20] Against a backdrop of displeasure with the UN, however, peacekeeping operations were the target of posturing from the Republican-controlled Congress and conservatives. The inclusion of an Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF) on the list of Department of Defense budget items between the 104th and 106th Congresses administratively solved this issue, which was finally resolved in 2001 when George W. Bush offered a political resolution by declaring to the 107th Congress a shift in US policy on the Balkans and Southwest Asia.

We remember that in the presidential election of 2000 there was a strong statement by both candidates in favor of improving benefits for servicemen and women and restoring the morale of the US armed forces by scaling back the excessive troop deployments pursued under the Clinton administration. As a presidential candidate, George W. Bush gained more of the votes from servicemen and women by taking a stronger stance than candidate Gore in favor of this policy. Keeping his campaign promise, in George W. Bush's administration, before the September 11 attacks, US participation in peace operations was limited, although the major scaling back Bush advocated during the election campaign did not take place.[21] The fact, however, that the problem of participation in peace operations played a major role in the presidential election campaign indicates the high level of interest in the issue of military-related costs. Prior to the election, the US had been reevaluating the positive aspects of US military participation in peace operations, and in a 2002 survey of military commanders, a significant number of respondents

[20] Lawrence J. Korb, "US Defense Spending After the Cold War: Fact and Fiction," Cindy Williams, ed., *Holding the Line: US Defense Alternatives for the Early 21st Century* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), p. 48.

[21] Before the inauguration of the current administration, Condeleeza Rice, the administration's national security advisor, had called for US withdrawal from the Balkans operations. After the inauguration, Donald Rumsfeld, the US secretary of defense, also called for US withdrawal from peace operations in the Balkans and Sinai, and from the experimental training of military troops from African countries for peacekeeping operations. Nina M. Serafino, "Peacekeeping: Issues of US Military Involvement," *CRS Issue Brief for Congress*, November 1, 2001, p. 3.

expressed the opinion that participating in peace operations would improve soldier training and morale. The same survey also found that commanders rated US participation in multilateral operations favorably as a means of providing practical training for the joint operations in which the military expected to take part in the future.[22]

The issue of cost associated with military equipment is one of the most significant problems that the US army faces. For example, the dramatically short life cycles of the equipment used in peace operations compared to the equipment remaining in the military stockpile raised the issue of the disparity of the life cycle cost of army equipment. In considering the cost issue, experts argued that the Army's budget had to be increased in order to sustain the appropriate level of readiness, if current life cycles were to be maintained.[23] However, a portion of the peace operations budget has been incorporated in the conventional budgets of different branches of the military since fiscal 2002, which makes it difficult to obtain precise calculations in relation to the problem of cost.

The third dilemma the US has faced is the gap between the actual execution of peace operations and the actual capacity of the country to perform them.

Peace operations require a variety of operational skills, including civilian administration, psychological operations (PSYOPS), and military policing. Nation building has historically been carried out through reconstruction after warfare. Today, however, nation building through reconstruction work is not exclusively implemented at the winning party's privilege, and must be accomplished through democratic processes with a consensus of domestic and foreign forces. The presence of unsatisfied factions within the society invites the frequent outbreak of violence when undemocratic forces seek to undertake nation building.[24] In order to prevent these outbreaks of violence, the international community is morally obliged to intervene as a third party, thereby providing a peaceful and accommodating process for nation building. As mentioned above, the deployment of military troops to restore social order in a foreign country is not a new issue. A well-known example of this is the Allied Forces' occupation of Japan and Germany following World War II, and the coalition's leadership role in transforming those countries into democratic nations. Another example of nation and peace building involving military forces is the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), comprised primarily of British forces, assigned to maintain security in the Kabul region from the end of the Afghanistan war through the end of 2002.

The international community has been engaged in an intense debate on what kinds of troops and capabilities are needed to implement these operations in order for them to be kept secured

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[22] A Project of the Peace Through Law Education Fund, *A Force for Peace and Security: US and Allied Commanders' Views of the Military's Role in Peace Operations and the Impact on Terrorism of States in Conflict*, February 2002.
[23] GAO/NSIAD-00-164, July 2000.
[24] Marina Ottaway, "Think Again: Nation Building," *Foreign Policy*, (Sept/Oct 2002).

and organized. The debate had significant implications for the US policy toward peace operations. For the United States, it needed large amounts of fund for military transformation, and it attempted to change the budget share of each of its services. A concurrent move in the US defense establishment provoked a stark argument. Based on an assumption that a military force working off a foundation of high-performance technology with a superior strike capability should form the core of national security strategy, some argue that airpower dominance is the goal, while others assert the utility of land forces. However, the Army argued that the Air Force, in particular, could not guarantee the protection of civilian lives. Indeed, there is general recognition of the importance of air capabilities in peace operations, but the majority opinion holds that ultimately a ground presence is key to regional stability.[25] Proponents of this argument estimate the number of ground troops needed at 540,000 (in the case of troops engaged in two Major Regional Contingencies (MRC) and multiple peacekeeping activities), suggesting that the specified number of 480,000 troops currently being maintained should be increased significantly. Others advocate increasing reserve forces to participate on the peacekeeping missions, and some advocate the creation of a special force specifically for peace operations.[26]

The debate about military organization is closely related to the debate over the military's role in the 21st century. Various proposals on the role the military should play were put forward throughout the 1990s. One in particular, *Rebuilding America's Defense*, offered by Republican Party neo-conservatives in September 2000, has gained paramount attention in recent years.[27] This report formed the blueprint for the defense policy of the neo-conservatives who subsequently gained office. *Rebuilding America's Defense* calls for shoring up US defense capabilities in the 21st century to achieve four objectives – defense of the homeland, strengthened capacity to secure definitive victories in wars erupting simultaneously in more than one region, reinforcement of the military's constabulary duties to create a secure environment in areas of vital importance, and military transformation in response to the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Of these, the primary focus and main objective is the reinforcement of the military's constabulary duties.

The military's constabulary duties have come into focus as an important issue since the terrorist attacks of September 11. Although targeting the root causes of regional disputes forms the crux of efforts to annihilate terrorist organizations, there is growing recognition of the need for developing an environment that will permit the support brought in to accomplish the primary target of bringing about democratization and regional stabilization. The war on terror waged by the current Bush administration now utilizes all available political means – diplomatic, economical, military and social – to eliminate all of the conditions that enable terrorism,

[25] John Hillen, "Peacekeeping at the Speed of Sound," *Aerospace Power Journal*, (Winter 1998).
[26] Serafino, pp. 12-13.
[27] Project for the New American Century (PNAC), *Rebuilding America's Defense: Strategy, Forces and Resources For a New Century*, September 2000.

terrorists and their activities. Along the lines of this argument, the QDR published in September 2001 calls for limited occupation of countries or regions involved in conflict in order to eliminate these conditions. In some sense, the US has begun to rediscover the importance of peace operations to its national security. The fact is, however, that the upkeep of the equipment and the development of training systems needed to counter these conditions has been neglected. The demands of "reality" in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq war can be expected to quickly draw the US-led coalition forces into nation building through limited occupation in order to bring about regime change in the country.

3 Security Policy and Alliance-Based Cooperation in the George W. Bush Administration

The current Bush administration developed its policy on peace operations and new military roles against the conditions of the dilemmas inherited from the previous Bush administration and the Clinton administration.

The crux of the problems the US faces revolve around the issue of how a nation that bears responsibility for the peace and stability of the international community can strike a balance between its global responsibilities and national self-interests. More specifically, this issue involves the way in which the US determines its national interests, as well as what the US seeks in justifying and rationalizing its participation in situations in which a direct threat to its strategic interests is less visible. In PDD25, the Clinton administration positioned peace operations in the context of the traditional concept of national interest, and justified participation in these operations on the grounds of expanding "national interests." This policy, however, was met with fierce domestic opposition.[28]

US participation in the Middle East, for example, is closely linked with US interests with regard to a stable oil supply and Israel's security, which makes it easy to rally unified support for US participation in peace operations in this region. It was also easy to gain support on the prevention of drug smuggling and illegal immigration from Central and South American countries. The US participation in efforts to maintain regional order and peace and be involved in the stability operations in those countries met her interests. Stipulating clear US interests, however, in South Asia, Africa, or Southeast Asian island regions has been difficult. With regard

[28] Domestic opposition to the issues of defining "national interest" and whether the military should participate in peace operations without Congressional approval was particularly fierce. The latter issue was largely linked to the enactment of the War Powers Resolution: P.L. 93-148 in November 1973, which stipulates that the president must obtain Congressional approval to engage military troops in operations. Peace operations, however, do not constitute direct combat action, miring the issue of whether the president is required under the War Powers Resolution to obtain approval in these circumstances of legal ambiguity. Richard F. Grimmett, "Multilateral Peacekeeping Operations: Proposals to Enhance Congressional Oversight," CRS Issue Brief, November 25, 1996.

to Africa, for example, US participation has been limited despite the coverage of numerous humanitarian problems stemming from regional conflict, and various problems caused by political instability.[29] In light of the Vietnam syndrome and the sentiment of a US public wishing to "avoid danger," US military participation in regions where the lives of US troops will be in danger, and a claim on obvious "national interests" is difficult to make, clearly presents a political risk.

As described above, the multilateral solution sought by the Clinton administration under PDD25 as a means of reducing the burden of US involvement in international affairs, and the gap between global and US interests, left ample space to alleviate political concerns on the domestic front. A different type of multilateralism, however, from that previously pursued began to develop in the second term of the Clinton administration and through the current Bush administration. Based on the premise that a leadership role for the US in issues that affect the international community is unavoidable, this new multilateralism entails an expanding multi-layered approach to US participation in peace operations. It involves not only traditional US allies and friends to fill the gap between global and US interests, but also concerted actions with Russia, the former Eastern European nations, and Nigeria, Brazil and other major regional powers with whom the US had maintained only tenuous security relations. It also aimed to incorporate NGOs, international organizations and other groups as well.[30] This approach offers several advantages. First and foremost, it allows the US flexibility in determining the extent to which it will participate, and the capabilities it will actually employ, in operations. At the same time, this approach also makes it possible for the US to demonstrate that it is not turning its back on its international responsibilities.

The QDR issued in September 2001, and *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* issued in September 2002, both espoused active US involvement in peace operations, stipulating at the same time that these activities be carried out in cooperation with US allies and friends.[31] Offering a way to relieve the US of the dilemmas it has faced, this formula also verified the shift in policy that has been advanced since the latter half of Clinton's second term through the current Bush administration. The QDR and *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* were both published after the September 11 terrorist attacks, and while much of their content should be taken in the context of the war on terror, the fact that a multilateral approach in peace operations was already underway at the time the publications

[29] J. Stephen Morrison and Jennifer G. Cooke, *Africa Policy in the Clinton Years: Critical Choices for the Bush Administration* (Washington DC: CSIS Press, 2001).
[30] Michael E. Brown and Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, "Internal Conflict and International Action: An Overview," in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict: Revised Edition*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 163-192; Edward Marks, "Peace Operations Involving Regional Organizations," *Strategic Forum*, No. 25, April 1995.
[31] The latter report states, "Cooperation with our European allies and international organizations is essential to constructive mediation of conflicts and successful peace operations." The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2001, p. 16.

came out should not be overlooked. A notable implication of the war on terror is the underlying view that US interests are not the only interests affected by issues that "threaten human dignity" in this manner.

Regional commanders located around the world are leading this policy shift in notable ways, improving the effective employment of the military in peace operations by increasing military cooperation in peace operations with friends and allies in their regions, and improving their mutual interoperability. Interviews with commanders on "the role of the military in peace operations" published in September 1999 reveal that, while most respondents took a negative view of the US becoming the "world's police force," military cooperation implemented under US leadership was considered a means of facilitating cost reductions in peace operations and improved military efficiency, as well as providing justification for executing operations.[32] This type of cooperation is already being tested among Central Asian countries in the Central Asian Battalion (CENTRAZBAT), and among African countries in the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI).[33]

Conceptually, the US divides peace operations into post-conflict peacekeeping activities, peace enforcement operations implemented during ongoing conflicts, and "stability operations" undertaken prior to the outbreak of conflict. Although peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations had received greater emphasis since the beginning of the 1990s, "stability operations" have been included under peace operations, since eradicating "lawlessness" in regions of conflict or at home in the war on terror was judged to be important. Peace operations are diplomatic efforts to prevent conflict under a concept with connotations of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace building. In contrast to the means used in these operations such as dialogue, mediation and support for nation building, "stability operations" entail greater force and stress the importance of military means.

The US provides logistical support for peacekeeping and stability operations, and directly intervenes under the authority and approval of the UN in peace enforcement activities. As the only nation with the ability to dispatch troops at the brigade level for peace enforcement operations, it is inevitable that the US will take the initiative in these types of operation.[34] At the

[32] A Project of the Peace Through Law Education Fund, *A Force for Peace: US Commanders' View of the Military's Role in Peace Operations*, September 1999.
[33] Launched in 1997, CENTRAZBAT constitutes military cooperation designed to provide soldiers from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and the US Central Command with experience in joint military exercises and training in peace operations, as well as to improve interoperability among these forces to facilitate engagement in these types of operations. Plans call for participation by Russia, the Ukraine, Turkey, Great Britain, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Mongolia. ACRI, a program inaugurated in 2000, aims to increase the capacity of African countries to respond to humanitarian crises and implement peacekeeping activities. http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/af/acri.
[34] Since the publication of the "Brahimi Report," the UN has also established a small-scale emergency deployment force to execute this concept. William J. Durch, "UN Peace Operations and the 'Brahimi Report'," The Henry Stimson Center, (October 2001); Susan Woodward, "On War and Peace-Building: Unfinished Legacy of the 1990's," http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/woodward.html.

end of 2002, the US was deployed with the approval of the UN in SFOR, FOR, Macedonia and Afghanistan operations, either unilaterally or jointly, and had dispatched troops to the Middle East to oversee the Iraqi no-fly zone in order to execute the UN resolution to that effect. The US was also providing information, communications, and naval and air transport for the Australian INTERFET in East Timor, and executing the same type of logistical support for the British-led ISAF troops. US cooperation in peacekeeping and stability operations has since been scaled back, with the country dispatching a total of merely 30 troops in six UN peacekeeping operations. US troops taking part in stability operations are currently operating in the Philippines, on the Thai-Burma border, and in areas of Indonesia.[35]

Conceptually, peace operations are clearly divided into peace enforcement operations executed directly by the US, and non-enforcement operations for which the US provides logistical support. As mentioned briefly, the ability to deploy at the brigade level gives the US authoritative input in the execution of UN peace enforcement operations. It should therefore be noted that the ability of the US to control certain aspects of the UN peace enforcement operations agenda works to restrain US criticism of these operations. This situation extends to other operations as well. Other nations can no longer expect smooth implementation of peace operations without US support. Participation under this combination of factors means less of the military personnel burden being shared by the US when it provides logistical support rather than directly participates in peace operations, which in turn quells the US debate on the issue of cost. Although certain members of the Congress argue that the US should be reimbursed by the UN for the costs incurred in providing logistical support for these operations, this issue has not gathered enough momentum to assert political pressure on the current Bush administration.

Above all, the role of peacekeeping, peace enforcement and stability operations as a way of fighting the war on terror has sustained the justification for US participation in these activities, an extremely significant factor in gaining the support of the US public. The war on terror has made it easier to argue US policy on peace operations as a global issue. Making peace operations relative to the war on terror clarifies the extent to which participation is considered legitimate and simplifies determinations on which of the vast range of OOTW options are available and in what capacity the US will participate. This has played a major role in relieving the US of the dilemmas it has faced in participating in these operations. This resolution has provided the US with the distinct driving force for the promotion of internationalism that it has sought since the end of the Cold War, providing both justification for US participation on the political front at home, and an argument to rationalize an interventionist policy.

These developments have brought the framework under which allies share the responsibilities in implementing peace operations into relief, and enabled the US to resolve the

[35] Marjorie Ann Browne, "United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress," CRS Issue Brief for Congress, December 4, 2001.

dilemmas it has faced in implementing peace operations by basing participation on this scheme.

4. Issues Facing the US

Realizing, however, a basic policy of joint response to the problems shared by the international community under the formula advocated by the US requires solutions to two broad issues.

First, US participation in joint responses with peace operations is premised on a division of operational functions among members of various international institutions or friends and allies, which requires acceptance by those allies of the division of labor formula set out by the US. As outlined above, there has been continuous debate over the issue of how the US determines if its own ground forces are to be dispatched in peace operations or, alternatively, deems US military capacity for logistical support for multilateral operations directed by the UN or led by another country to be sufficient. The crux of this debate focuses on whether the US possesses those military capabilities and whether they should be demonstrated. This debate has, however, neglected the issue of the countries taking part in peace operations in which the US military participates under the spectrum of combat, as well as which countries should direct peace operations in which the US does not directly contribute, and in which nations other than the US must take responsibility for all but certain support functions.

The US has established principles governing its participation in OOTW. Outlined in PDD25 and during the process of developing subsequent policies, these principles are clarity of objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy.[36] Of these, the operation's objective has been considered the most crucial in establishing a system for the division of labor among friends and allies. A clear objective about the operation is of the utmost importance in US peace operations. For example, clear objectives were established for humanitarian aid in Bosnia and famine relief efforts in Somalia. As support operations evolve, however, and peace operations shift into nation building, peacekeeping operations, stability operations and other aspects of peace enforcement operations, military objectives become extremely ambiguous. As evidenced by operations in Afghanistan, the US offered limited participation and tended to leave these activities to countries in the region that are held to be responsible, and to international organizations.

Although countries other than the US must accept their share of the responsibilities involved, the disparity in military capacity between the US and the rest of the international community necessitates a shared understanding of the operational objective in each case. Without a shared

[36] Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (1993); Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (1995); Steven R. Drago, "Joint Doctrine and Post-Cold War Military Intervention," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, (Winter 1996-97), pp. 106-110.

understanding, the US can be expected to refrain for political reasons from taking part in identified peace operations. In these cases, the countries involved will have to be persuaded to take on operations without US participation. During a typical peace operation, however, in which the peace enforcement and peace building stages generally overlap, a shared understanding of the operational objective among the countries involved is extremely difficult to reach when the US plays only a limited role, as proven in operations in Cambodia. Theoretical possibilities are not always feasible in the field.[37]

Second, to ensure the legitimacy of multilateral peace operations, the US must make an effort to redefine its relationship with the UN and restore the organization's authority. The number of peace operations in which the US participated increased under the Clinton administration, despite opposition from certain members of the Congress and domestic factions. With demands for peace operations by the international community also increasing, the US military has come to participate in these operations under the auspices of NATO or other groups of "like-minded states" since the failure in Somalia. Participating nations and groups, however, also have much to gain from UN authorization and approval. In addition to being able to expect sufficient funding assistance, political legitimacy, and a framework that allows more countries to participate, UN authorization is also a means of reducing the degree to which these parties contribute.

Throughout the 1990s, the US position with regard to the UN can be described as complicated. The confusion not only stemmed from domestic political pressures, with the president working to convince a reluctant Congress that the US should participate in international institutions, but was also greatly impacted by the lack of a clear stance on the part of the president himself with regard to those institutions. The tendency of the US to distance itself from the UN evident at the beginning of the Clinton administration planted the seeds of distrust among the international community of conspicuous US unilateralism that has been difficult to overcome. President Clinton later described the UN as an indispensable institution in a speech to the UN in 1999, stating, "The United Nations advances our own national interests, because it deals with problems that the US does not wish to respond to alone." Ambassador Holbrooke also stated, "This issue transcends areas that are directly related to US strategic interests, but the UN can only play an important role in issues that involve certain US interests." While undoubtedly indications are that the US expects the UN to play a role in issues in which its own strategic interests are only marginally involved, these statements can also be taken as a broadly favorable view on the part of the US toward the restoration of the UN's position in international affairs.

In this manner, US expectations of the role international institutions should play have risen

[37] John Sanderson, "The Changing Face of Peace Operations: A View From the Field," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 55, No. 2 (Spring 2002), p. 6.

dramatically since the current Bush administration took power. Recognition in the days following the September 11 terror attacks by the UN Security Council of the right of nations to defend themselves against terrorist actions, while based on individual rights to self-defense, was a particularly historic event. Although this resolution merely reflected the conclusion reached during the debate among the international community on international terrorism, a debate that had been ongoing since the 1960s, it did have an immeasurable impact in that, by granting the approval of an authoritative international institution to US action, it provided the basis for subsequent support for the US war on terror. By the same reasoning, the 21st century international community will also hold the US responsible for providing evidence that its own national interests are inseparable from the interests of the international community at large, when the US regards military force as essential for humanitarian intervention or the restoration of peace. These developments also sanction a new role for military forces and indicate an inclination to further strengthen the forces of the United Nations.

The US share of the UN PKO budget and the International Criminal Court (ICC), however, are two areas related to peace operations in which the US stance is impeding efforts to grant greater authority to the UN. The issue of revising the proportion of the PKO budget to be financed by the US was a well-publicized point of contention between the Congress and the president during the Clinton administration. Efforts by Richard Holbrooke, the US ambassador to the UN under the Clinton administration, culminated in consensus among the international community on reducing the US share of the budget, with an agreement reached that the US would pay equally into the regular budget and the special PKO budget. Critics, however, charge that the agreement leaves "carry-over debt" on the US share of financing in arrears, the result of which has been to curtail PKO activities by the UN. Although the current Bush administration has earmarked a record high total budget for UN peacekeeping activities, this figure is not sufficient to cover the debt owed from the Clinton administration.

The ICC issue represents an even more serious problem. The ICC was established in July 2002 after a sufficient number of ratifying countries were secured for the Court, a landmark event in efforts to try war criminals, to enter into force. Since signing the treaty, however, the issue of whether the treaty should be ratified has been the subject of continuous debate in the US in light of the possibility that US soldiers who have taken part in PKO and other operations could be tried for war crimes in the ICC. President Clinton avoided a final decision on the matter by declaring that he would not send the signed treaty on to the Senate for ratification, and ended his term proposing that the incoming president should also refrain from sending it to the Senate. Since the ICC entered into force, the US Congress has argued that, under the American Servicemembers' Protection Act, the US should not participate in peace operations without confirmation of the following three points: UN Security Council authorize a US exemption from the ICC, US soldiers be dispatched in peace operations only in countries that have not ratified the ICC treaty, and US troops be guaranteed not to be tried for war crimes in the ICC. The

current Bush administration has taken the opportunity offered by the lawmakers' stance to demand of a number of countries that US soldiers participating in peace operations not be tried in the ICC. The debate on this issue continues today. Exceptional measures within the ICC that provide certain countries with a type of sanctuary during peace operations that would be established if the US stance prevails will give rise to a sense of unfairness among the countries participating in these operations. Conversely, if the US stance is rejected, the US could become extremely restrained and cynical about its participation in peace operations.

Although the US stands to benefit significantly from making use of the UN, the myriad issues outlined above must be resolved if it is to do so.

Conclusion

Faced with the realities of increasing demands on the UN and other international organizations to act in the post-Cold War international environment, and a domestic will to curb excessive involvement and define US contributions by a traditional national security strategy, US policy on peace operations was ill defined throughout the 1990s. While the UN is increasingly expected to play a major role, particularly in responding to fluid and complex regional conflicts, there is also growing awareness that, as a nation expected to act as a major international player, US ambivalence toward the UN is not only a US issue, but poses a significant problem for the international community as well. The US has now come face to face with the dilemma that in coping with an array of regional conflicts, it is dependent upon the very international institutions that it has itself served to undermine.

The previous Bush administration and the Clinton administration fully understood the expansion of UN activities as a prescription for releasing the US from its role as the "world's police force." As the lone superpower in the post-Cold War world, however, these administrations were unable to adequately reconcile the outcome of selective and selfish international involvement with the realities of US responsibilities and interest in maintaining international order. It remains to be seen which country other than the US would be capable of bearing the costs and shouldering the responsibilities involved in maintaining and expanding world order if the US were to refuse to become involved in international affairs. The administrations preceding the current Bush administration were unable to provide a clear answer to this question.

In terms of resolving this issue, the current Bush administration has been fortunate in two respects. First, during his second term Clinton quietly expanded military cooperation among US friends and allies, which has provided a basic framework for the division of operational functions between the US and other countries involved in implementing peace operations. Second, the fight against terrorism launched after the September 11 terrorist attacks is an issue that affects the entire international community, and there is now a common understanding that a

coordinated response to this threat is in the global interest. The world has not, of course, succumbed to the US stance unconditionally. Participation in this war instead reflects the national interests of each party. Specific circumstances aside, however, a common awareness that terrorism is capable of threatening a nation's very foundation is taking shape.

These conditions have made it possible for the current Bush administration to advance US interests, avoid excessively burdening US military capacity, and ensure legitimacy in OOTW under peace operations mobilized by the US. This could in fact be called a new form of US internationalism. These conditions have done much to ease the tension between the US and the international community that was the subject of much concern at the end of the Clinton administration, and offer an avenue for invigorating the role of the UN in the 21st century.