

Executive Summary

Nontraditional Roles of the Military and Security in East Asia (Executive Summary)

Today, in the 21st century, after a temporary reprieve following the end of the Cold War, local and ethnic conflicts have emerged as major security issues of the international community. The causes of these conflicts differ depending on the particular circumstances, but there is no doubt that many of the countries facing these problems also have difficulties in managing the impact of globalization. Too often, citizens of such countries are the victims of domestic political mismanagement, and international terrorist groups take advantage of such societies to use as safe havens. Today, the international community is increasingly charged with responsibility for taking appropriate measures to manage these conflicts.

Under these conditions, one of the critical issues confronting the international community concerns the non-traditional use of military force for the purpose of dealing with these problems, including such activities as peacekeeping, peace-building, conflict prevention and humanitarian intervention. The countries involved in these operations have to reorient resource allocations for their militaries. Furthermore, as the international community tries to ameliorate local and ethnic conflicts, it is confronted with the contradiction between compliance with the principle of non-interference in internal affairs and attainment of humanitarian justice. Lastly, as was shown in the September 11 incident, in the event that international terrorist groups possess weapons of mass destruction, the international community has to be more deliberate in determining when, where and how to conduct military operations. A common theme behind such issues is that we must reconsider the norms governing military operations and come up with new effective and internationally acceptable ways of using military forces for current international security issues.

The National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), commemorating the 50th anniversary of its founding, held the International Symposium on Security Affairs on January 21 and 22, 2003, for which the NIDS, focusing on the paradigm shift concerning the use of military force, chose the following theme: Nontraditional Roles of the Military and Security in East Asia. Based on this understanding, this symposium aimed to consider the changing nature of armed conflict and new roles of the military in the 21st century. The discussion was expected to evolve from general assessment of the situation to examination of the experience and lessons from East Asia, through which to develop regional cooperation in East Asia in this new context.

The opening session of the symposium began with opening remarks by Mr. Kyoji Yanagisawa, President of NIDS, and a welcome address by Mr. Norihiko Akagi, Senior Vice Minister for the Defense of Japan. These speeches were followed by a keynote speech by His Excellency Fidel V. Ramos, former President of the Republic of the Philippines, and a presentation by guest speaker Dr. Yoichi Funabashi, Chief Diplomatic Correspondent and

Columnist at the Asahi Shimbun.

In his keynote speech on “New Roles of the Military in the 21st Century: Issues and Prospects in the Asia-Pacific Region,” President Ramos, a key figure of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, discussed the below issues.

The globalization of today’s world, led by the revolution in information technology, has met with some resistance from an anxious general public. Regardless of how good or bad the outcome may be, however, globalization should be accepted to be the irreversible process that it is. Technological innovation has significantly impacted military strategy, as evident from current U.S. trends. With the dissemination of technology, however, terrorism and an asymmetrical approach to warfare have also gained importance. The September 11 terrorist attacks are evidence of this. In the face of cross-border terrorism, East Asian countries came to further recognize the importance of international cooperation. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), therefore, is working toward more effective conflict prevention and addressing such non-traditional security issues as the global environment and human rights. At the same time, the role of the U.S. as a balancer in the region remains important. If the Korean Peninsula is reunified and Japan becomes a “normal” country in a military sense, however, the U.S. forward deployment may become less prominent as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) advances. With these developments, a pluralistic security community will undoubtedly emerge in the East Asia/Asian Pacific region. The countries in the region share a common interest in maintaining a peaceful and stable environment, and will benefit further through economic interdependence and integration.

Dr. Funabashi began his presentation, entitled “New Roles of the Military in the 21st Century: The Japanese Perspective,” with a case study of Turkey, from which he had just returned before the symposium.

It can be argued that the Turkish army has been performing a nontraditional military role by contributing a great deal to promoting modernization and stability under the principle of the separation of politics and religion. In spite of, or perhaps because of, the active role played by the military, Turkey faces difficulty in obtaining membership in the EU, which attaches great importance to the principle of civilian control. With the change in the nature of threats and crises after the Cold War, the military is expected to act not only as a deterrent power, but also as a stabilizing factor. The latter role of the military has increased for the UN and the major powers as a result of globalization and the limited sense of state sovereignty. It requires political finesse, however, to defeat terrorism. Eliminating the root cause of terrorism is a difficult task, and the path to democratization is a complicated process. Overemphasis on morality while disregarding geopolitical factors, as is seen in the logic of humanitarian intervention and human security, constitutes another obstacle to eliminating the root causes of conflict. With regard to Japan’s contribution to peace and stability in the world, dispatching the SDF troops for PKO (Peacekeeping Operations) in Cambodia marked a turning point, wiping out the psychological

trauma caused by the so-called checkbook diplomacy during the Gulf War. The new global environment triggered by the September 11 terrorist attacks, however, caused Japan to revise its approach to international security. Japanese NGOs may have the potential to lead Japan to become a global civilian power. The proposal by Gen. Nakatani, former Director General of the JDA, in June 2002, should be noted as a new approach to foster a multidimensional security dialogue among defense authorities in the region. There is still a deep-rooted skepticism against non-traditional military operations that transcend traditional PKO activities, however. Japan must overcome a number of obstacles to become a “normal” country. In parallel with the reformation of the SDF, it is crucial for Japan to foster healthy public relations.

These presentations were followed by Session 1, entitled “The Changing Nature of Armed Conflicts and New Roles of the Military,” in which Dr. Wang Yizhou (Deputy Director, Institute of World Economics and Politics (IWEP), Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), made a presentation “The International Political and Security Situation after 9·11 Attack,” and Dr. Heigo Sato (Senior Research Fellow, First Research Office, Second Research Department, NIDS) made a presentation on “New Roles of the Military and the United States: Crisis Management and a View on Alliance-Based Cooperation.”

Dr. Wang asserted that there is still a strong resistance in China to dispatching the People’s Liberation Army abroad, whose primary role has been to defend its borders. China is, for the time being, bound by the negative images associated with the term “overseas dispatch of troops,” but it will show a positive attitude as a permanent member of the UN Security Council on the use of the military abroad within the context of UN activities in the long run. While China acknowledges the urgent need to address international terrorism in the post-September 11 world, it is concerned that the counter-terrorism efforts of the international community are focused heavily on military responses, which encourages U.S. unilateralism and neo-imperialism, in disregard of international norms. In China, new political leaders identify the root cause of terrorism with economic disparities. They have faced a test of strength as domestic economy reformers, and also as political reformers to cope with Islamic movements in the border areas. The Chinese government has proposed a framework of comprehensive security in which the Islamic forces in the border area between Asia and Europe that may affect the future course of China’s security should be involved.

Dr. Sato focused on three dilemmas that the U.S. faces in conducting non-combat missions. First, in contrast to the welcoming attitude of the U.S. toward multinational peace activities as alternatives to its direct international engagements, the international community has interpreted the U.S. attitude as reluctance to get involved in international affairs, which has raised skepticism over U.S. leadership. Second, in the U.S. people have been anxious about the increasing cost of participation in multinational non-combat missions, and about the decrease in combat readiness of its own military forces. Third, the U.S. has become aware of the gap between the

necessary strength of military forces and their actual strength since the September 11 incident and the subsequent anti-terrorism campaigns, as the demand has begun to emerge for intervention in the failed states in which terrorist groups are based. In resolving these dilemmas, the U.S. has put forth a policy to cooperate with their allies and friends based on the stance that issues of “threats to human dignity” are matters not only for the U.S., but also for their allies and friends. Therein lie two problems. The first is that even though the U.S. tries to share the military role with international organizations and allied countries, the gap in military capabilities between the U.S. and the others prevents the U.S. from conducting joint operations. This fact compels the U.S. to clarify its position toward all issues that the international community expects the U.S. to engage in. The second problem is that the U.S. has to justify its use of military forces in humanitarian intervention and restoration of peace in the context of the indivisibility between its national interest and international interest, and in the context of the strengthening of the UN role.

Prof. Jitsuo Tsuchiyama (Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University) made the following comments on these two presentations.

Dr. Wang pointed out the changing nature of international relations after the September 11 terrorist attacks. As U.S. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell stated, world leaders certainly share an understanding that the “post-Cold War” era is over today. Although the debate over national security policy in the post-Cold War era that began with the issue of a “peace dividend” focused on other soft aspects such as human security, cooperative security, and environmental security, the September 11 incident changed the basic tenor of the debate drastically. While Dr. Sato emphasized a positive aspect of this change, Dr. Wang expressed a concern that U.S. military action will be increasingly justified in the name of the war on terror, and that the 2002 U.S. defense budget was the highest since the end of the Cold War. He considers that these tendencies reflect U.S. imperialism and unilateralism, which will lead to its contravention of international norms. While it is true that the U.S. has become an “empire,” it has gained its status through efforts to create such international institutions as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and military alliances.

Dr. Wang pointed out the flaws of relying solely on military force in coping with global terrorism and other international problems. Although it is difficult to prevent terrorism even by preemptive attacks, one has to admit, however, that the response to terrorism depends to no small extent on the military, and in that sense, traditional usage of the military should be taken into consideration. In addition, Dr. Wang anticipated a clash of civilizations between the Christian and Islamic worlds. The U.S. attack on Iraq may result in a deterioration of relations between the two sides. In that case, what stance would China take? Dr. Wang also touched on the fact that China’s political leaders have begun to refer to comprehensive security. What objectives do they have in mind? Are they trying to fend off the Chinese military threat perceived by other countries? How do they evaluate the relationship between the buildup of nuclear and conventional forces and the promotion of confidence building?

Dr. Sato touched on nontraditional roles of the military in nation building and peace making, and argued that the successful examples of Japan and Germany are not special cases. They are special cases, however. Since the end of the Cold War, academic research on nation building and peace making has not been fully developed. The practical difficulties have not been resolved, either. Dr. Sato also touched on the use of the military in a police-like fashion against terrorism. As Gen. Richard Myers, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, mentioned on the occasion of the September 11 attacks, “we can deal well with threats that come from outside, but not with threats that come from inside.” The military is essentially an organization that points guns outward. When it looks inward, therefore, it has to change its way of thinking as well as its posture. It is desirable to create a new organization that functions both as a military and a police force in order to enhance international peace and security. An international division of labor among international organizations, states, and NGOs is another way. Dr. Sato noted that it is fortunate for the international community to have come to share the understanding that the war on terror was one of the most important issues in the world. It is not desirable, especially for the U.S., however, to focus too much on terrorism, ignoring other important security issues, just as a burnt child dreads the fire.

As evidenced by the *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* released on September 20, 2002, the Bush administration places emphasis on national security centering on the counter-terrorism operations. The U.S. faces the so-called security paradox, however, that the more it tries to enhance security, the less security it becomes. It is necessary for states to prepare for terrorism, but there is some doubt even as to the effectiveness of preemptive attacks on the terrorist groups, whose methods are diverse. We should not expect too much from missile defense systems, either, which can be effective only against ballistic missile attacks by terrorists. In the debate over the security policy of the Bush administration, Prof. G. John Ikenberry of Georgetown University argued that it is necessary for the administration to return to the traditional framework of international institutions, balance of power, alliances, and multilateralism that have contributed to international peace and stability after the World War II. In considering the future of the military, it is important to prepare for its traditional use as well as its nontraditional use.

Dr. Wang responded to Prof. Tsuchiyama’s comments as follows. Three focal points should be mentioned when China engages in regional security in a nontraditional manner. The first is the importance of constructing a regional security framework through dialogue and negotiation based on the idea of common security. The second is the importance of shared understanding with neighboring countries about the nontraditional use of military forces and of working within the UN framework. The third is the importance of the dialogue among major powers involved in East Asian security issues. The partnership between China and Russia, for example, will complement the Japan-U.S. alliance in promoting East Asian security. On China’s attitude to the idea of comprehensive security, no consensus has been reached within the People’s Liberation

Army or among national security experts on how China might play constructive roles, nor on China's roles in humanitarian intervention. The last question was on China's nuclear strategy. China has restricted its use of nuclear forces to defensive purposes, and prohibits preemption. It is true that China has been experiencing rapid generational change, with the new generation advancing a number of domestic reforms. It is not probable, however, that this will lead to a change in China's nuclear strategy.

In response to Prof. Tsuchiyama's comments, Dr. Sato pointed out that the September 11 terrorist attacks have triggered a shift in U.S. foreign policy from the unilateralism of the Clinton administration to internationalism, which can be evaluated positively. This change ties in with the issue of U.S. humanitarian intervention, which requires international legitimacy. It is notable that the Bush administration has begun to base its legitimacy of foreign policy on UN authority and international norms.

These presentations were followed by Session 2, entitled "New Roles of the Military: The Experience of East Asia and its Lessons." Gen. Takashi Watanabe (Major General, GSDF (Ground Self Defense Force), Chief, Logistics Management Division, Logistics Department, Ground Staff Office) made a presentation on "The PKO in Cambodia – Lessons Learned: The Japanese Perspective," and Prof. James Cotton (Professor, School of Politics, Australian Defense Force Academy, University of New South Wales, Australia) made a presentation on "Australia's East Timor Experience: Military Lessons and Security Dilemmas."

Gen. Watanabe, who served as Facilities Battalion Chief in the first PKO in Cambodia, Japan's first full-scale PKO participation, classified PKOs into three generations. He went on to locate the PKO in Cambodia in the second generation, where missions were defined as truce observation, peacekeeping through disarmament, and the establishment of a legitimate government through free and fair general elections. (The first generation of PKO focused on truce observation to suspend and prevent hostilities; today's PKO activities, with stronger overtones of peace enforcement in line with the concept of preventive diplomacy, constitute the third generation.) The UNTAC (UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia) grew into a large-scale body of 22,000 troops from more than 100 countries participating under the auspices of the UN – the diversity of its activities made the mission even seem to put Cambodia under a trusteeship by the UN. The UNTAC, however, faced difficulties. It was hard to achieve the two objectives, truce observation and disarmament, within a short period of time. Not armed at full combat strength, the UN troops in particular faced difficulties in forcing the Pol Pot faction to disarm. The UN further faced difficulties in keeping to the principle of neutrality in the civil war-like conflict, when the international community had started to give priority to the humanitarian issues since the end of the Cold War. Problems arose in entirely separate areas as well. Generally speaking, it takes time to rebuild a state whose social infrastructure has been destroyed over a long period of war. No one can expect the UN PKO, however, to assume this role. That is when collaboration

with NGOs becomes meaningful. Still, though, communication problems constantly arose between the NGOs and the states (military organizations) taking part in PKO activities. Problems also emerged due to a lack of sufficient safety measures on the part of the NGOs themselves. As to PKO activities beginning to evolve into the third generation, success of the operations will depend on firm grasp of the local situation, cooperation between governments and civilians, and ensured military readiness and effectiveness. It should be noted that PKO activities have provided opportunities not only for education and training, but also for military exchanges for the SDF.

The presentation was followed by another presentation by Prof. Cotton on Australia's East Timor Experience. According to Prof. Cotton, Australia played three roles in the peacekeeping activities in East Timor: a leading role in the UN Sanctioned International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) operations implemented by a multilateral contingent; a management and supervisory position after these operations were taken over by the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET); and participation as a principle member in UNTAET. INTERFET is considered a relative success due to the rapid deployment of overwhelming military force, including armored battalions, and to the careful preparation of a political foundation for intervention. INTERFET constabulary activities in the field created a sense of security among those cooperating with the operations. Junior officers, especially expert linguistic officers, played a central role in the policing. On the other hand, Australia, performing a crucial role in vesting INTERFET operations with legitimacy, pushed its military capacity to its limits. These operations promoted an understanding of the importance of appointing an operational commander at an early stage, and of distributing resources through a central command appropriately. It also became clear that it is important to have both engineering units available to restore the social infrastructure, and mixed units comprising troops with varied abilities (including air and marine support, intelligence capabilities, and telecommunications). At the same time, cooperation with the civilian division was indispensable in arresting and detaining the militia. These operations triggered a domestic debate over whether Australia should emphasize traditional defense or develop a military doctrine that focuses on new security issues such as peacekeeping and anti-terrorism. The East Timor experience thus posed a dilemma for Australia with regard to PKOs, as they demand enforcement/maintenance of order and construction of the foundation of the state simultaneously. The latter occupies the public concern and is reflected in government distribution on resources.

Prof. Atsushi Kusano (Professor, Keio University) commented on the two presentations as follows.

Ten years ago, people working for the Official Development Assistance (ODA) organization had little interest in PKO activities, and those engaged in PKO had little idea of what was involved with ODA in Japan. In 1997, Prof. Kusano proposed that PKO and ODA activities be combined for distributing resources and coordinating policies. Last year, he took part in a study

group on Japan's cooperation in promoting international peace under Mr. Yasuo Fukuda, Chief Cabinet Secretary and chief spokesperson for the international cooperation. Prof. Kusano's comments will be based on the proposals he made in the study group.

Gen. Watanabe discussed the experience of the SDF in Cambodia, while Dr. Cotton addressed Australia's experience with INTERFET, a multilateral force deployed in East Timor. It should be noted that the two cases reflect on the significant differences in public opinion and the legal framework between Japan and Australia. Gen. Watanabe made it clear that Japan has some reservations for conducting PKO missions even for humanitarian purposes, which was the primary subject discussed in the study group. Prof. Cotton's presentation reminds the commentator that it takes a fair amount of time for Japan to prepare itself as fully as Australia to implement activities for international cooperation.

Coordination between the SDF and the civilian police seems essential to Japan's international peace cooperation. What does Gen. Watanabe think of the possibility of the SDF working with the civilian police? Second, most of the current peacekeeping activities are conducted based upon multilateral military forces. Strict application of the five principles set forth under the International Peace Cooperation Law (particularly the principle of impartiality), however, makes it difficult for Japan to participate in current PKO activities. How would Gen. Watanabe evaluate the alternatives put forth in the report by the study group mentioned above? Third, the International Peace Cooperation Law is composed of three sections – election monitoring, troop dispatch in PKO activities, and humanitarian rescue operations. Although the SDF can take part in humanitarian rescue activities under the existing provisions, it has had almost no actual experience in performing these missions. It is a widely acknowledged fact that the administration of the International Peace Cooperation Law requires complicated procedures such as prior consent by the Diet on the action plan submitted by the government, and that the Law lacks compatibility with the emergency deployment of the SDF, which prevents the SDF from conducting humanitarian aid. In regard to this point, might it be helpful for Gen. Watanabe to give some concrete examples that the SDF has faced? The SDF owns responsibility for logistical support missions, for which it has gained a high reputation abroad, as well as territorial defense missions. Is it possible for the SDF to fulfill the latter role effectively as the former role grows both in quantity and quality?

Prof. Cotton explained the process by which the Australian government, supported by public opinion, led the multilateral military force in East Timor. It seemed that not only humanitarian concerns, but also Australia's national security concerns about the instability that the political confusion in East Timor might cause, encouraged the country to play a significant role in East Timor. Prof. Cotton mentioned that participation in PKO activities gained higher priority in Australia. Does this mean that Australia will dispatch troops to regions not directly affecting its national security? Second, what type of role did the civilian police and the NGOs, both of which should have played non-military roles, play in the process of changing the framework from

INTERFET to UNTAET? Third, how has the Australian public evaluated the results of the campaigns? Prof. Cotton figured that the public's attitude was positive. Is it possible for the government to retain public support considering tight state finances? Finally, it would be helpful for Prof. Cotton to give an actual example of the importance of troop discipline that has been subject to press criticism.

Gen. Watanabe responded to Dr. Kusano's comments as follows. It is a good idea to reinforce the civilian police, but it is indispensable to set in advance an international code of conduct for the civilian police such as that used by the military. In terms of humanitarian aid activities, GSDF troops deployed in Hokkaido have been sent to perform that mission. Out of Japan's five principles for participation in peacekeeping forces, impartiality and consent by the conflicting parties seem most important. Discriminate application of the principles is not permissible, and the creation of a gray zone is wrong. In considering lifting the freeze on the assignment of the SDF for core units of peacekeeping forces, it is indispensable for Japan to make a distinction in advance between "unable to do" and "unwilling to do," and then decide consciously whether the SDF should lift the freeze or not. Full consideration must also be given to the fact that, once committed to the core units, no country can call off the mission on the way.

Prof. Cotton responded to the comments and questions by Prof. Kusano as follows. For Australia, the East Timor issue did not represent a military problem. Although successive Australian governments had attached continued importance to stability in Indonesia, the present government is unable to disregard, from the long-term point of view, the trend of public opinion that a dictatorship in Indonesia is undesirable. Australia has dispatched troops for PKO to regions not geographically adjacent to the country – Somalia, Cyprus, and Rwanda are recent examples. The Australian military has also made participation in PKO activities. It is a controversial issue among the military, however, to dispatch a rapid reaction force in the name of PKO. Many Australians, along with many Japanese, maintain that it is necessary for the international community to conduct non-military support. Specifically in regard to East Timor, the scale of Australian support is expected to total AUS\$4.0 billion over the five-year period beginning in 1999. Comparison of this figure with the AUS\$13.0 billion for Australia's annual defense expenditure shows how much Australia contributes to East Timor. Australia has also made its largest contribution to funding and equipment for East Timor through training support in civil affairs, civil society and development, as well as the formation of a national army. Public support in this area, however, will not last forever. The next issue is the relationship between the military and the media. When a massacre by an evacuation militia broke out just after the INTERFET had allowed the group to pass a checkpoint, media coverage of the incident depicted the INTERFET negatively, indicating that the INTERFET had failed in fulfilling its mission. The fact remains that the non-combat unit did not have sufficient military capability to place the militia, which had brushed off the inquiry for identification, under control. Furthermore, when the Indonesian media, which had displayed a negative attitude toward the INTERFET, reported

that Malaysia's dispatch of troops for the INTERFET was no more than an attempt to undermine Indonesia, it almost caused an international conflict.

Participants in the audience also asked several questions. In response to a question regarding cooperation between the military and NGOs, Gen. Watanabe gave an example of NGO linguistic talent that assisted SDF activities in Cambodia. Dr. Cotton responded to the same question, saying that a total of AUS\$14 million in water supply by the Australian government could have been provided by NGOs at one-tenth that price. Asked about the lessons learned from the INTERFET experience, however, Dr. Cotton cautioned against overgeneralization, pointing out that East Timor was not an integral part of Indonesia under international law (whereas Kosovo was recognized as an integral part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) and that the mission of the INTERFET was not an intervention in a failed state. With regard to the future of Japan's PKO activities, Dr. Kusano indicated that sorting out inter-organizational conflicts and overlapping functions, in and of itself would further strengthen the role.

In Session 3, entitled "Toward Regional Cooperation in East Asia in the New Context," Prof. Susumu Takai (Director, Archives and Library, NIDS) reported on "Support for Conflict Resolution and the Role of Military Power," and Dr. Tan See Seng (Singapore, Associate Professor, Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University) presented his views on "Regionalism, Institutional Change, and New Military Missions in the Asia Pacific."

Prof. Takai presented his views from the standpoint of international law. The international community has developed two means for resolving international conflicts – one peaceful and the other compulsive. The latter is used as a means of self-help to force one country's will upon another. The military has played a traditional role in this area. With the subsequent rejection of this method due to the illegalization of war, the international community has invented collective security as a new means to achieve and maintain international peace and security. As this system adopted by the UN did not function, a new method was introduced that would allow UN member states to intervene between the parties involved in a conflict after a cease-fire was agreed upon. This is the traditional type of PKO. Faced with the frequent civil wars and with the concomitant emergence of failed states, however, the international community established the current version of PKO, which would provide support for the establishment of legitimate governments. When there is a significant risk of further armed clashes, multilateral forces take action under a UN resolution authorizing the use of military force. These forces are not concerned with threats that directly confront their own countries, but rather play a non-traditional role in maintaining international peace and security, as well as recently providing support for post-conflict peace-building activities. In order to maintain law and order in East Asia, the active training and involvement of personnel on the part of Asian countries is needed. Collaborative efforts in establishing an Education and Training Center for PKO, conducting research on conflict

resolution adapted to specific regional situations, and training personnel, are likely to strengthen regional cooperation and confidence-building measures. It is also worth taking the opportunity to consider establishing an Asian Multinational Stand-by High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations. From the standpoint of preventing conflicts, a new role may be found for military forces in preventing armed conflicts at sea. Conducting research on ocean governance and educational training in OPK (Ocean-Peace Keeping), an Asian Ocean Center would be a comprehensive facility that included a base for on-call troops. Once established, it would serve as the basis for Asian regional cooperation.

Dr. Tan, who has co-written papers with his colleague Prof. Amitav Acharya, Deputy Director at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies at Nanyang Technological University, presented the following. The September 11 incident forced a rethinking of the norms under which multilateral cooperation in the Asia Pacific region would take place. Although the transition had already begun with the economic crisis Asia experienced between 1997 and 1999, September 11 clearly prompted a thorough reassessment of regional-based security through ASEAN and ARF. As a result, the region came to face such issues as what regional norms should change, what kind of institutional changes should be made, and what role the military should play in regional security cooperation. These issues have brought five challenges to the Asia Pacific region. The first is the challenge to sovereignty. ASEAN has long advocated a policy of noninterference; it is obvious, however, that this policy led to the failed joint response to the Asian economic crisis and the failure in East Timor. For this reason, the Thai government has proposed a revised approach of constructive engagement based on a policy of non-interference. Opposition to this proposal, however, has been intense. The second challenge is the development of East Asian regionalism. Although ASEAN Plus Three (APT) represents such development, the disparity between the ASEAN countries and Japan and China remains large, for which ARF plays no more role than simply addressing the problem. The third challenge is the introduction of a new legal system. This, however, again confronts the disparity between the ASEAN countries that target soft regionalism, and the other countries. Although the establishment of a nuclear-free zone and measures toward the prevention of air pollution are notable, disagreements among countries in the ASEAN-led ARF are particularly dramatic. The fourth challenge is regional democratization, which is impeded by the lack of a mature civil society. Although there are limits to participation by ordinary citizens in Track II, the ASEAN People's Assembly held in 2000, and again in 2002, is expected to serve as a forum for dialogue between the government and the public. The fifth challenge is the issue of terrorism, which has become the primary security concern since September 11. Countering terrorism, however, complicates a common response, while also promoting regional cooperation. In terms of military missions, efforts toward a shared approach on terrorism have regressed since 1998, due to an emphasis on domestic problems in each country after the Asian financial crisis. In addition, people often find it difficult to approve the missions that have U.S. support of Israel as their basis. If these

conditions continue, regionalism itself will clearly no longer serve as an appropriate approach.

Prof. Matake Kamiya (Associate Professor, National Defense Academy) commented on these two presentations as follows.

The two presentations took up a variety of topics for discussion, and both presenters pointed out that expectations for new roles for the military and regional cooperation in the Asia Pacific region are beginning to increase. Dr. Tan argued, however, that despite the change in the nature of the threat, it was unlikely that these expectations would be fulfilled immediately, since expectations for the states themselves, as well as military means within the Asia Pacific region, were not easily changed.

In terms of new roles for the military, we are now in an age that emphasizes “military force for the maintenance of order.” Regional order in the Asia Pacific region can be divided into issues of demand and supply. The former is characterized as aspects in which military force is required, and the latter is characterized as aspects in which the military deploys troops. With regard to demand issues, Dr. Tan indicated that all parties had not yet reached a shared concept of order due to a disparity in basic values among the countries in the Asia Pacific region, and a lack of consensus on the desired type of peace and order even within Japan. Reflecting these situations, proposals for concrete modes of cooperation by both Prof. Takai and Dr. Tan are limited to those sectors of military activity in which cooperation is relatively easy to implement.

In terms of the supply side, assuming for the moment that maintaining order through a framework of regional cooperation is difficult, the choice becomes one of either having only certain countries maintain order, or leaving it to the UN. If the UN is put in charge, however, China’s veto power as a permanent member of the Security Council poses a problem, since the country is involved in many of the regional challenges facing the Asia Pacific region. As a result, U.S. leadership becomes important. An isolationist tendency on the part of the U.S. has been criticized. Encouraging “controlled isolationism” in the U.S. is vital for the region.

We are confronted with several problems when we turn to Japan’s role in the region. Yesterday Dr. Funabashi stated that over the past ten years Japan has begun to focus on the goal of becoming a “normal” country in a military sense. It is difficult to say, however, that military force is something that contributes to peace. Situations continue in which Japan is unable to even propose military cooperation with its neighbors.

In response to these comments made by Prof. Kamiya, Prof. Takai responded as follows. Although the mode of military cooperation in East Asian regional security is an important subject, Japan faces constitutional limitations and restrictions on military deployments. It also faces a restriction on the exercise of its right to collective self-defense. Moreover, there is no sense of a common threat or common interests among the region as a whole. For this reason, as Prof. Kamiya pointed out, regional cooperation for maintaining order in East Asia inevitably becomes a “peripheral” subject. The current mode of PKO, therefore, is the most conducive form of maintaining order in today’s circumstances. Support from the international community

will be won by finding common denominators, such as rebuilding failed states, protecting human rights, and providing humanitarian aid, as well as by calling on the involvement of the UN as an external actor. This would make participation by both East Asian countries and countries from other regions possible. Today the military is called upon to stand between opposing hostile forces, where communication and contact skills gain greater importance. A commander's judgment in the field is crucial, and judgments suited to specific circumstances are especially important in joint activities with troops from neighboring countries or NGOs. Sharing training and educational curricula to prepare troops for these exercises is important. An East Asian version of the multilateral UN troop deployment is based on the same ideas. With regard to the PKO Training Center, individual countries may take responsibility for certain aspects of training, while concentrated training in one location in the form of an international center would also be effective. Another measure for obtaining a commitment from the U.S. is OPK. Although according to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea individual countries are responsible for various duties, the reality is that few countries have sufficient capability to carry out those duties. It is worth considering an establishment of a mixed regiment in which naval forces from various countries would participate to make up for the lack of such capability. Plenty of room exists for U.S. participation in these activities.

Dr. Tan offered the following responses. Prof. Kamiya brought up the fundamental issue that a shared understanding among Asia Pacific countries on a desirable mode of order and peace should be developed before an appropriate military role is determined. Professor Aaron L. Friedberg of Princeton University has projected that the Asia Pacific region will be the next site of competition among the major countries. Establishing a Helsinki-style process maybe necessary to prevent this from occurring. Employing not only Track I, but Tracks II and III as well, could also be effective. At the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Conference (Shangrila Dialogue) held in Singapore last year, former Director General of the Defense Agency Gen. Nakatani proposed a ministerial-level conference on national defense. We need to develop a concept of an ideal Asia and an ideal future, which may turn the existing ARF framework into a Helsinki-style process. As former President Ramos touched upon, ARF is an unprecedented security framework with a large number of participating countries, including major powers. Each ASEAN country must reevaluate its own leadership position and share its political role with other major countries, such as Japan. At the same time, pursuing the ARF framework not only between governments, but also with parallel moves on a number of tracks, will promote regional liberalization and democratization. Although this journey will be a long one, I am yet optimistic while being cautious. I agree with Prof. Kamiya on the U.S. role. I had the opportunity to speak with a diplomat from China who laughingly told me that China "does not accept" U.S. strategic dominance in Asia but, "could live with it." The U.S. hegemonic role is necessary, and without it, Asia would have fallen into terrible circumstances and is at risk for the same situation in the future. The U.S. will, however, be called upon to assume its

responsibility as a cornerstone for Asia Pacific security, while exhibiting what Prof. Ikenberry calls strategic restraint.

A member of the audience pointed out the importance, in terms of regional cooperation, of a common approach to international crimes that transcend national borders. In response, Prof. Takai cited the problem of piracy, asserting that OPK operations were also needed to avoid suits in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea against coastal states that do not follow their obligation to fight piracy. He also posited that landlocked regions were subject to the principle of noninterference in domestic affairs as stipulated in the seventh clause of Article 2 of the UN Charter. This principle, however, is not applicable when it comes to issues of international concern such as the outflow of refugees. With regard to these issues, Dr. Tan pointed out that Southeast Asian countries had already become advanced in information sharing and exchange in the Cold War era. He also added that the “fusions of horizons,” which Hans G. Gadamer has spoken about, has begun with Tracks II and III in line with the expansion of civil society. Asked about non-traditional roles for the military and shared norms for peaceful conflict resolution among countries in ASEAN, Dr. Tan cited the Singaporean concept of total defense, asserting that ASEAN countries, taking security in the broadest sense, had long incorporated non-traditional roles for their militaries. With regard to the principle of noninterference in domestic affairs, he pointed out that the search for standards that transcend traditional frameworks had begun, which was evident in statements by Anwar Ibrahim, former deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, on “constructive engagement,” as well as the concept of “flexible engagement,” espoused by Surin Pitsuwan, the former Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs.

In the Final Session for general discussion, lively discussions took place among the panelists on whether non-traditional roles of the military should be understood as transitional ones or not, and whether it is appropriate or not to assign costly military forces to nontraditional roles.

In response to the first question, Dr. Sato shared his view that nontraditional military roles should be comprehended as a phenomenon in the process of creating an international system at the beginning of the 21st century. No major objections were raised to his assertion. Then the discussions moved on to the second question. In this respect, Dr. Sato pointed out that the U.S. had begun to classify troops and equipment into high and low grade categories, and the U.S. seemed to assign relatively low grade categories of the allies to nontraditional roles. Dr. Cotton took up the cases of Kosovo and East Timor and said that in reality these operations resembled traditional military activities even though they were categorized as non-traditional missions. He added that it was because they reflected the conflicts of the Cold War era like harsh Soviet control over Eastern Europe, coercion of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the victory of the Communists in Vietnam. He continued that considering the Korean issue as a legacy of the Cold War, though the Third World would oppose the military intervention that the Brahimi Report suggested, the international community would not fail to face the reality that, “while

PKO operations are not the job of the military, they are a job only the military can assume,” especially when the restoration of order in Northeast Asia became critical after the collapse of North Korea. In response to this same issue, Prof. Takai mentioned that the international community should not only extend the range of PKO activities, but also keep the military for traditional roles in order to manage new types of missions in the future. Prof. Kamiya stated that it was true that the distribution of military resources became critical for each country because the recession of the traditional military threats had brought about the non-traditional threats, but if it was contemplated that traditional military conflicts still remained in the world, traditional roles for militaries would not be diminished. Dr. Tan shared another perspective on the issue and mentioned that justification for the use of military power seemed to progress without consultation among peoples, and added that the U.S. military-industry complex would become another source of conflict in the world.

Prof. Seiichiro Takagi, Director of the NIDS Second Research Department, summarized the International Symposium on Security Affairs as follows.

In the two-day symposium, though we had defined traditional roles of the military as using military forces for territorial defense, and nontraditional roles of the military as using it for other purposes. But in the process of advancing our discussions, we left the interpretation in panelists’ hands. As Dr. Funabashi mentioned, the military used to play the leading role on the road to nationhood in the developing countries. At the same time, however, the international community cannot ignore the “new roles of the military ” and “new aspects of conflicts” that it is faced with today.

Through the discussions, first of all, we have gained the broad consensus that nontraditional roles of the military are inseparable from traditional ones. As many panelists suggested, this notion is particularly compatible with the situation in Northeast Asia.

President Ramos and Dr. Funabashi pointed out the fact that the diversification of military roles was caused by the end of the Cold War, the multidimensional nature of conflict, and globalization. In particular, the rapid expansion of globalization has expanded the gap between rich and poor and increased the number of “losers.” It can be said that this gap provides a hotbed for international terrorism. The gap has brought about diversification of conflict in the world, and the September 11 incident has accelerated this tendency. In this sense, in addition to the conflict resolution by arms, we have to pay much more attention to the elimination of the root causes of conflict.

By the way, it is obvious that the U.S. approach to the international community affects the future course of the world order. In regard to this point, some panelists pointed out the fact that the U.S. had assigned nontraditional roles to its military before the end of the Cold War. As for the U.S., however, it is clear that there are some international problems that “cannot be solved without the U.S.,” and that “cannot be solved by the U.S. alone.” When the U.S. engages in the

domestic problems of other countries, it may face an acute dilemma; limitations of its military capability, difficulties in gaining domestic support from taxpayers, and difficulties in gaining consent for its activities from the international community. The U.S. may face another such dilemma when a rapid military action is called for on the one hand, and it takes a long time to get a U.N. Security Council resolution for justifying its military activity on the other hand. In addition, recent PKO experiences may give the U.S. another task of coping with the NGOs.

What role should alliances play under these conditions? Different views among allies on coping with terrorism must lead to different military actions among them. We are faced with difficulties in managing alliances, too.

The two-day symposium ended with closing remarks by Gen. You Suzuki, Vice President, NIDS.

In this symposium, focusing on the paradigm shift in the roles of the military at the beginning of the 21st century, we chose “Non-traditional Military Roles and Security in East Asia,” as our topic. We are happy if this symposium has provided readers with some helpful reference points when considering this topic.

Finally, it should be pointed out that some of the papers printed below have been revised by the authors after the conclusion of the symposium, hence there may be some discrepancies between their papers and the above summaries.

Yuzuru Kaneko

The following NIDS team coordinated the International Symposium on Security Affairs in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the founding of NIDS:

General Supervisor: Seiichiro Takagi

Principal Organizer: Yuzuru Kaneko

Team Members: Yasuaki Hashimoto, Tomonori Yoshizaki, Heigo Sato, Yasufumi Miyahara, Takeshi Yuasa, and Yoshihide Matsuura.