

International Order of the 21st Century
and
the Security of East Asia

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Introduction

When the end of the Cold War began to look increasingly likely in late 1980s, it was commonly pointed out that the establishment of the new post-Cold War order would require a long time, at least ten years, unlike in the case of the end of a major war. Although there can be divergent arguments as to when the Cold War “actually” ended, few would dispute the judgment that the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991 clearly meant the end of the Cold War. This year (2001) is the tenth year since then and the even expression, “post-post Cold War,” is often seen in the discussions of international affairs nowadays. However, do we have any clearer ideas of the post-Cold War order? Certainly, from late 1980s to early 1990s, when East European and the Soviet socialist systems collapsed one after another and were transformed into the systems based on market economy and political pluralism, it seemed that the marked democracy would be the fundamental principle of the emerging new world order. However, as is often pointed out, having seen political confusion and economic stagnation in Russia after democratization, and especially after the Asian currency crisis of 1997, not a few nations in Asia have been resisting democratization and harboring doubt about utility of market mechanism in economy. As a consequence, it is pointed out that the principle of the new world order, which are supposed to lead to peace and stability, ironically have been aggravating the old conflicts, destabilizing domestic political situation, and, in some cases, even causing new tensions in East Asia.

With these observations in mind, we tried at this symposium to examine features of the international order of the 21st century, and their implications for the international security of East Asia. The problems that should be dealt with from this perspective vary widely. Among them we decided to focus on three key questions. Session I was devoted to reviewing the role the United States which had just inaugurated a new Administration, in establishing and maintaining a security order in East Asia. Session II took up security issues pending in East Asia and weighed various options for constructing an effective security order in the region by searching for ways to solve these issues. Major issues addressed in this session included those which, if not prudently dealt with soon, could destabilize the region, such as China-Taiwan relations, disputes over the territorial waters of the South China Sea, and the

situation in the Korean peninsula relating to the nuclear weapon and missile development by North Korea. Session III discussed, on the basis of the discussion in Sessions I and II, what the regional security order should be from the standpoint of the elements or principles that would constitute it – such as security dialogue, confidence building, and alliance relationships – to which East Asian countries have come to attach importance after the end of the Cold War.

In this symposium, security specialists from the United States, Russia, the Philippines, South Korea and China as well as a researcher of the National Institute for Defense Studies presented their papers. While it is normal for presenters to speak from their own country's perspectives, we decided to ask each of them to speak on the issues in which his/her country is not the primary subject.

The symposium was preceded by the opening address by Masakatsu Shinkai, President, National Institute for Defense Studies and a speech by Kenzo Yoneda, Parliamentary Secretary for Defense, Japan Defense Agency.

At Session I, which dealt with the role of the United States in maintaining the security order in East Asia, Professor Carolina G. Hernandez of the University of Philippines, president of the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, and Professor Wang Jisi, director of the Institute of American Studies at Chinese Academy of Social Science of the People's Republic of China (PRC), presented their reports.

Hernandez first pointed out that the present state of the security environment of East Asia are characterized by the stable relations between the big powers and closer economic relations among the countries of the region, brought about by globalization of their economies and market reforms. She then argued that democratization has caused complicated repercussions in the region. More specifically, these include the special emphasis some countries place on Asian values, the increasing complexity of the Taiwan issue, the destabilization of the Indonesian political situation and a consequent waning in its leadership in ASEAN, differences surfacing within the ASEAN, and the "sunshine policy" of South Korea. Also, the uncertainties concerning the future of China, as a regional and global power, poses a more serious problem for regional security.

Considerations defining the role of the United States in the emerging regional order are that its security interests in this region are least likely to change in the foreseeable future, that U.S. interests in trade with and investment and business in this region are solid and enduring, and that in order to stabilize the situation and secure its business interests, the United States must provide the region with a defense

umbrella.

As factors that defines the role of the United States, she mentioned U.S. relations with other major powers and ASEAN countries. Concerning its relations with China, she said that while pursuing economic cooperation with the United States, China's fears about the U.S. tendency to seek hegemony in this region have not faded, and that relations between the two powers are fraught with dangers of destabilizing the situation in the region. China maintains that bilateral alliances led by the United States have outlived their necessity and opposes the new Defense Cooperation Guideline of the U.S.-Japan security alliance. Russia also takes the same position, but it has little leverage to change the role played by the United States. South Korea and Japan maintain an alliance with the United States and lend their support to the role played by the U.S. As ASEAN countries do not have adequate military and defense capabilities to safeguard their national interests on their own, they consider the role played by the United States in maintaining security in this region is essential. Multilateral mechanisms, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the ASEAN Plus Three (APT), can at best play a complementary role in defusing problems that the existing mechanisms could not handle. Therefore, the support of the United States for and its involvement in these multilateral mechanisms are important.

Factors potentially challenging the role of the United States in this region include the possibility of forming a security community among the countries in the region, China's opposition to the involvement of the United States, and the anxiety of Japan, South Korea and the ASEAN countries whether or not the United States would consider threats to their security as a threat to its own interests. However, as fundamental changes in the strategic environment – including the formation of a security community – would take a long time to occur, Japan, South Korea and ASEAN countries have no choice but to continuously support the role of the United States. Hernandez takes the view that a military buildup which China has been pursuing, motivated by the opposition to the U.S. role in this region, would backfire and cause these countries to step up their support for the U.S. role. The security policy of the Philippines, which has no military capability to defend the territories over which it claims sovereignty, is to actively support bilateral and multilateral security dialogues from a position based on a military alliance with the United States.

In conclusion, Hernandez argued that most of the countries in the Asia-Pacific region believe that, even though tensions arise with the United States on specific

issues, in the final analysis, it is the United States' military capability that brings about stability in this region.

Wang stated that except for the period from the 1970s to the 1980s when China formed an informal alliance with the United States against the Soviet Union, the main current of opinions in China considers the United States as a negative force for the security of East Asia. The Chinese people always associate their antagonism toward the United States with feelings of frustration and humiliation they experienced in their dealings with Western powers in modern history. And the Chinese people feel indignation toward the United States for its attempt to dominate the world at the expense of China and other developing countries. Moreover, the support the United States lends to the dissidents of the Tiananmen incident, the Dalai Lama, secessionists, and unlawful religious movements is considered a threat not only to the national security of China but also to the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 reminded the Chinese people afresh of these past indignities.

On the other hand, the United States is China's largest economic partner, and China's forthcoming admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO) is expected to further strengthen its economic ties with the United States. Cooperation between the two countries in the field of unconventional security problems— control of drug trafficking and illegal immigration, environmental protection, and the fight against international terrorism – and strengthening economic ties would go a long way toward defusing the danger of political and military clashes between them. And the two countries have shared interest in regional issues such as ensuring peace and stability in the Korean peninsula and South Asia.

Having said that, Wang pointed out that the issue of Taiwan is the most sensitive and difficult problem in the bilateral relations and the one that dominates China's strategic thinking about the role the United States plays in East Asia. America's export of weapons to Taiwan and the high regard shown by the U.S. Congress for Taiwan's democratization have inspired fears about a U.S. policy designed to "Westernize and divide China." And the Chinese people see the Taiwan question as a lever the United States is using to extend its sphere of influence in Asia. China takes the view that a strengthened Japan-U.S. alliance would tip the region's strategic balance to the disadvantage of China. China also fears that joint actions taken by Japan and the United States would undermine the credibility of its power to deter the independence of Taiwan.

As regards the Korean peninsula, China's national interest does not conflict with that of the United States. However, as efforts to ease tension in the Korean peninsula and to work out a peaceful settlement of differences between the two Koreas are making headway, China can not but keep a watchful eye on the continuing U.S. military presence in this region, and is concerned about a shift of focus of U.S. security policy toward Taiwan.

For China, the theater missile defense (TMD) and the national missile defense (NMD) systems now being pursued by the United States pose the greatest security risk in Northeastern Asia, and they are the prime cause of conflict between the United States and China. The reasons why China opposes the TMD in this region include that it deepens mutual mistrust between the two countries, that it weakens the deterrent effect of China's missiles – the most effective instrument for checking the secessionist movement – and emboldens the pro-independence faction in Taiwan, that it amplifies mutual mistrust between China and Japan, and that it spurs an arms race in East Asia.

Professor Yoshinobu Yamamoto of the University of Tokyo, the commentator, stated, as assumptions underlying his comment, that in East Asia, three processes – (1) zero-sum strategic interactions centered around territorial disputes and military strength, (2) economic interactions that lead to positive sum if all goes as well as hoped, and (3) developments toward a new world order involving domestic political processes such as democratization, human rights, and human security – are intertwined. On this basis, he raised the following questions: How should we assess the consequences of democratization? ; What are the grounds for justifying the utility of multilateralism, particularly the ASEAN Plus Three (APT)?; Has the ASEAN way outlived its relevance?; Can't there be a definition of China's strategic interest that is not confined to the Taiwan question?; and What would China's nuclear strategy be, given TMD and NMD?

In the course of discussion that followed, a question was raised as to why the commitment by the United States to maintaining security in this region is always questioned. If people say that the United States should handle its relations with the East Asian region more wisely, what, then, are the specific steps the United States should take? And it was also pointed out that it is wrong to characterize the Taiwan policy of the United States merely as part of its strategy for dealing with China.

Commenting on democratization, an argument was made that economic growth unaccompanied by the development of civil society and democratization would

not bring about positive results. As regards the relationship between domestic politics and diplomacy, one participant observed that as interests in China diversify, unity among top leaders and their political loyalty to the party have taken on a growing importance. He added, however, that the definition of the official policy line is no longer as strict as it used to be, and that its expression in the course of implementation can now imply a range of different nuances.

On the question of multilateralism, the point was made that it is still in the process of taking shape, and that opinions in Asia are divided over the role of the United States. It was also pointed out that given the limited scale of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and the absence of the United States, the tough stance China takes on it might be eased. Then, the argument was made that because of disappearance of the border between domestic politics and diplomacy caused by comprehensive security and globalization, international relations have undergone profound changes and thus the effectiveness of the ASEAN way has diminished.

Concerning the U.S. policy toward Taiwan, it was argued that, from the Chinese point of view, the deep suspicion about the U.S. design to achieve worldwide hegemony is unavoidable, but that since China is an emerging regional power, it is natural for it to be concerned about any moves the United States makes in this region. As regards China's nuclear strategy, it was pointed that, although some in China do advocate that Taiwan should be exempted from its policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, the mainstream view is that conventional arms should be used to check the independence movement of Taiwan and the no-first-use policy should be firmly maintained. It was also pointed out that China's nuclear capability is extremely limited and that the use of its nuclear weapons against the United States, even as a threat, is unthinkable.

At Session II, which was devoted to reviewing pending issues of security of East Asia with a view to establishing the direction for constructing a new order in this region, Kyongsoo Lho, Associate Dean and Department Head, National University of South Korea and Professor Hideshi Takesada, Chief of the Third Research Office, the Second Research Department of the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) presented papers.

Lho argued that for more than 25 years East Asia has enjoyed peace, but that the region faces a paradoxical situation in the sense that its security is "monopolized " by major powers. In other words, the strategic stability of East Asia has depended on protracted absence of conflicts among big powers. To be sure, there are a number of potentially dangerous problems. However, the use of military forces

to solve these problems would not only fail to bring about a meaningful settlement but would exact a heavy cost. At the same time, even if an alliance were strengthened in the way that would not pose a threat to China, it would not necessarily be effective. In order to cope effectively with security challenges in East Asia today, we need something more than security alliances. What we need is prudent application of flexible and pragmatic foreign policy measures. After the end of the Cold War, the United States had room to take unilateral actions, but instead, it sought to achieve attainable objectives by prudently applying extremely limited pressure.

East Asia is the most heavily armed region in the world, but there is no regional security arrangement. The diversity of political aspirations of the countries in the region also makes it difficult to achieve stability. Moreover, with the exception of the United States and Japan, regional actors are not oriented toward maintaining status quo. However, the fact remains that small-to-medium sized countries of the region are beneficiaries of the existing order, and their actions are not likely to destabilize it fundamentally in the foreseeable future. However, Taiwan and North Korea are unknown quantities.

The Taiwan Strait crisis of March 1996 heralded a tension that could occur in that area. The intent of China was to remind Taiwan that its defiance of "One China" would court unification by force of arms. Taiwan panicked, and the United States dispatched two aircraft carriers to the seas adjacent to Taiwan to assuage fears of the Taiwanese and to remind Beijing that the United States would not tolerate the use of force against Taiwan. The main objective of the United States was to maintain a military balance between Beijing and Taipei to avert armed conflict between them.

The crisis over the development of nuclear weapons and missiles by North Korea swept over East Asia in the 1990s. The launching of a Taepo Dong missile by North Korea in the summer of 1998 jolted Japan into vigilance and prompted it to join forces with the United States in the development of technologies for missile defenses. Come 2001, however, the threat of North Korea has dwindled, and the South Korean policy of deterrence and engagement has begun to pay. It is the Taiwan question not the Korean peninsula that could destabilize the situation in this region in the foreseeable future.

After the Cold War, two fundamental changes have occurred in the strategic landscape of East Asia: the disappearance of the threat of the Soviet Union, and the diminished importance of China in the foreign and security policy of the United States. Meanwhile, the formation of a new world order in accordance with the self-image of

the United States has turned out to be more difficult than initially thought around 1991, since not only rogue states and the Islamic world were opposed to it but also Europe, which recognized the importance of the U.S. power projection capability, had some reservations. Alarmed by America's design to establish a "uni-polar" system, Europe and Asia sought to strengthen the existing arrangements or to create a new regime such as the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). China's mistrust of the United States has deepened during the past ten years and China has come to see no benefit from cooperating with the United States. It has also come to view the Japan-U.S. alliance as a relatively short-term security threat.

Under such circumstances, the United States is promoting the construction of a theater missile defense (TMD) system in East Asia and a national missile defense (NMD) system on the American continent. Their purpose is to defend the United States and its allies in East Asia from rogue states and terrorists. Both China and Russia are vehemently opposed. An air-tight TMD would enhance the safety of the U.S. armed forces stationed in East Asia (South Korea and Japan), and Taiwan but the question is whether or not it would strengthen the security of East Asia. The security of East Asia in the 21st century decisively depends on the absence of disputes between the United States and China. Therefore, the strategic dialogue between the United States and China is the most important process for ensuring the security of this region.

Takesada's paper focused its attention on the problem of the Korean peninsula. As changes that have taken place on the Korean peninsula following the inter-Korea summit in June 2000, he pointed to divisions that have occurred in South Korean views about North Korea, diminution in the role played by the United States, and expansion of the role played by China. He then discussed at length problems that have not changed even after the inter-Korea summit – the military strength of North Korea in general, and the pending issue of its missile development in particular.

As issues that must be addressed in building confidence among the countries in Northeast Asia, he pointed out (1) that while progress is being made in coordinating policies among Japan, the United States, and South Korea, commonality in international policies of China, North Korea, and Russia has been growing, (2) that North Korea has been consistently seeking to settle problems through bilateral talks, particularly they insist on negotiating on military issues exclusively with the United States, and (3) that the role Japan should play in constructing a framework of confidence building in this region is not assured.

On the basis of these observations, he reviewed the existing and proposed security mechanism in Northeast Asia, including consultation among the parties, the multilateral confidence building and the alliance relationships. In the area of consultation among the parties, he reviewed the four-party talks (North and South Korea, the United States, and China), the proposed tripartite talks (North and South Korea and the United States), and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). In the area of multilateral confidence building, he discussed the proposals of the six-party talks and the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Northeast Asia. In the area of building a framework incorporating alliances and deterrence, he reviewed the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) (the framework for policy coordination among Japan, South Korea, and the United States) and the Track 2 dialogues among these three countries.

As conditions under which Japan can play a larger role, he mentioned that the Japan-U.S. alliance and the U.S.-South Korea alliance be maintained in a healthy state, that the TCOG be actively utilized, that steps to engage North Korea in the peacemaking process be taken jointly by Japan, the United States, and South Korea, and that a new framework for dialogue and consultation be created to enhance the mutual confidence between Japan and South Korea. On that basis, Takesada proposed launching of a four-party talks mechanism by Japan, the United States, South Korea and North Korea to deal with food aid and missile problems. And he argued that this new four-party talks should be expanded to include China and Russia in the future, and talks among these parties should be carried out in parallel with the “old” four-party talks that address the cease-fire agreement.

Commenting on these presentations, Professor Yuji Suzuki of Hosei University, the commentator, raised the following three points. First, has the Cold War really ended in this region? If yes, what does it mean? Divided countries are problems left over from the Cold War, but one might ask whether these countries should be unified. Second, when viewed from Southeast Asian perspectives, with changes in the types of states, the meaning of nationalism changed. In other words, the collapse of authoritarianism brought about domestic conflicts rather than democracy in some countries, and, faced with a choice between centralization and decentralization of administrative power, these countries are opting for decentralization. Under such circumstances, nationalism has become a symbol not of unity but of separatism and division. What is the significance of nationalism in dealing with the questions of Taiwan and the Korean peninsula?

Third, a nonmilitary approach as a means for achieving security in the region is taking on a growing importance. The chain reaction of cause and effect – economic growth brings about stability of domestic politics, which in turn leads to regional stability – is important, and in this respect, Japan has a big role to play. That said, he asked the following questions: Aren't the neighboring countries perpetuating problems of Taiwan and the Korean peninsula? Given the nuclear capability of the United States, China, and Russia, is it possible to check proliferation of nuclear weapons, and to establish an anti-hegemonistic order? Given the necessity of a multilateral safety net for the Korean peninsula, how strongly can or will the United States commit itself to it? This will test the leadership of the United States in this region.

In the course of the following discussion, a participant pointed out that the North Korean leadership does not share the same values with Japan, the United States, and South Korea, and that this is prolonging the Cold War in this region. He also argued that the continuation of the Cold War and the lack of modernization of society have kept an old style nationalism in North Korean. In response, one participant in the floor argued that the Cold War should be viewed as a state of international relations where a hot war was held in check by the threat of retaliation, and that it presupposes the existence of two mutually hostile camps.

On the question of the multilateral framework, a participant observed that prospects for the formation of a security framework any time soon are dim and that such being the outlook, countries in this region have no choice but to rely on the U.S. leadership. Having said that, he argued that as the situation in the region has changed profoundly, U.S. reliance on its military strength to maintain its influence in the region has lessened. It was also argued that the new four-party talks Takasada proposed should become a mechanism for a multilateral dialogue (on issues including food aid to North Korea and environmental protection) and deterrence.

Commenting on a remark made by Suzuki that policies pursued by neighboring countries might have perpetuated conflicts on the Korean peninsula, a participant concurred that in the case of Germany, to be sure, the absence of external pressure had made it easier for the two Germanies to achieve re-unification. But he also criticized the view of Takesada, who had underlined the conflict between the Sino-Russian alliance and the Japan-U.S. alliance, saying that China and Russia stood to gain nothing from taking a confrontational stand against the United States which is their partner on both security and economic issues.

From the floor, one participant asked the presenters about the regional

significance of South Korea's defense buildup, and if it can be explained sufficiently by the threat from the North. An answer to this question was that while South Korea's navy has a slogan "to the sea and to the world," it is short on specifics and that it has no working-level concept, nor is there an adequate working-level coordination with the U.S. navy. Another speaker cited the active participation of the South Korean army in UN peacekeeping operations as an example of South Korean new security concept.

Referring to the possibility of the Korean peninsula problem spilling over to the Taiwan question mentioned in the Session I, one participant asked whether China recognizes the defense effort made by the United States and South Korea on the Korean peninsula as long as it does not extend to Taiwan, and whether China accepts the presence of the U.S. armed forces in South Korea and yet questions the legitimacy of the U.S. forces on Okinawa. In response it was pointed out that the external policy of China is defensive and reactive, and that as in the cases of the cession of Taiwan after the Sino-Japanese war (1894-95) and the dispatch of the U.S. Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait after the outbreak of the Korean War (1950) two issues were interrelated historically. It was also pointed out that although China can live with the military presence of the United States in this region, the acceptance is conditional upon mutual strategic understanding between the two countries.

Session III was designed to review how the security order in the Asian region should be constructed from the standpoint of its constituent principles or elements. Professor Gennady Chufrin, Project Leader of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), discussed it from a Russian standpoint, and Professor Harry Harding, Dean of the Elliot School of International Affairs, George Washington University, discussed the issue from an American standpoint.

Chufrin observed, after confirming that Russia assigns top security priority to the peace and stability of East Asia, that a positive tendency has emerged after the Cold War between Russia and East Asian countries. But as sources of concern still persisting, he pointed out three factors, namely, the U.S. TMD program, the long-standing disputes such as the Korean peninsula problem, and unconventional threats to the security of Russia.

Chufrin stated that Russia and China felt that the TMD program had not taken their security interests into consideration, that their perception of the TMD program had driven the two countries to cooperate more closely in their efforts to enhance security, and that in July 2000 President Vladimir Putin of Russia and

President Jiang Zemin of China issued a joint declaration to the effect that the creation of a non-strategic missile defense system would undermine the security of other countries and could establish and strengthen a closed military block. He also argued that China and Japan should be invited to participate in strategic stability talks between the United States and Russia that have been effectively functioning, and said that the idea of applying the collective non-strategic missile defense system that Russia suggested to European countries to East Asia deserves due consideration.

Chufrin highly appreciated the inter-Korea summit held in June 2000 as a development bolstering the recent tendency toward détente in an area bordering on Russia. He argued that the announcement of Kim Jong Il – made public through President Putin who visited North Korea the month following the summit – that North Korea would suspend its missile development program if it got assistance from other countries in launching a satellite, helped improve the prospect for regional security. He took up the territorial dispute between Japan and Russia as one of the other regional disputes still persisting. While acknowledging that the Japan-Russia summit meeting held in September 2000 was a failure, he pointed out that the expansion of the exchange of visits by Russians and Japanese and the launching of joint economic projects concerning the four islands augured well for the security of the region. He also underlined the significance of the summit meeting in that, despite the importance of the territorial dispute, its agenda was not limited to that one issue.

As regards the unconventional threat to security, he touched on the fact that Russia's new National Security Concept stressed the threat posed by transnational crime syndicates and international terrorists, and explained the significance of the Shanghai Forum. He also pointed out that a decrease in the population of the Russian Far East and Siberia and an increase in illegal immigrants there have aroused a sense of crisis that Russia may lose control of these areas.

Harding said that U.S. views on the security order of Asia were not exactly uniform, and he categorized them into the following five schools of thought. (1) Create a Pacific Community: This is designed to create a regime of economic and security cooperation through existing regional organizations such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). This school stresses that thanks to the end of the Cold War, barriers that had impeded cooperation among the countries in the region have lowered, and that the necessity of cooperation has been strengthened by deepening interdependence. (2) Form a Concert of Power: Those who belong to this school pursue the possibility of cooperation along the lines of (1)

above, but are not optimistic about the possibility of creating effective regional organizations. They seek, instead, to promote cooperation among major powers at sub-regional level issue by issue. (3) Strengthen the Network of U.S. Allies: Unlike those belonging to Schools (1) and (2), proponents of this school are not optimistic about cooperation among the major powers of the region. They argue that the United States should strengthen its alliance relationships in the region, and that Japan is the linchpin in this region. Some of those who belong to this school maintain that the bilateral alliances led by the United States should be integrated into a multilateral framework of alliances. (4) Maintain the Balance of Power: Those who belong to this school question the validity of the views advocated by these three schools of thought, and argue that the United States should seek to develop friendly relationships with as many countries as possible through strategic dialogue with them, form coalitions to deal with specific conflicts in the region, and check the formation of a coalition that runs counter to the national interests of the United States. Among them are those who advocate a wide-ranging involvement of the United States in Asian affairs, and those who favor the role of a “distant balancer.” (5) A New Containment Policy: Those who belong to this school take the view that conflict with China is inevitable, and maintain that the United States should create a strong network of cooperation among Asian countries in order to contain the expansion of Chinese influence, and, better yet, destabilize China’s domestic politics.

Harding said that although the Clinton Administration committed itself to creating a Pacific Community soon after it came to power, its enthusiasm waned toward the end of its term. But it continued to seek to build cooperative relationships with Japan and China (cooperation among major powers), while the Bush Administration has tilted toward building a stronger network of alliances. And he added that no Americans who are involved in the debate entertain the idea of completely pulling out of Asia. He personally favored the idea that the United States should build a cooperative relationship with China on the basis of the existing alliances in the region, and eventually form – and institutionalize – a cooperative regime among the major countries in the region.

Commenting on these presentations, Dr. Akiko Fukushima, Senior Researcher of the National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA) of Japan, expressed the view that contrary to the expectations entertained by the international community early in the 1990s, confidence building among Asian countries has made little progress in the ten years since the end of the Cold War: the division of the Korean peninsula,

the Taiwan question, and the dispute over the Northern Territories still remain unsolved, and new problems – such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the rampancy of trans-border organized crime, and international terrorism – have surfaced. She said that although hopes for the formation of an Asia-Pacific Community ran high in Japan early in the 1990s, today nobody even talks about the concept any longer, and that economic growth has become a factor of conflict in the region. She observed that this is not to say that mutual mistrust or the impossibility of cooperation would immediately lead to a conflict or war: Track 1 and Track 2 dialogues are not designed to create a cooperative regime but to dispel mistrust, and such dialogues have offered a forum for testing new ideas.

On the basis of these observations, Fukushima asked Chufurin: How does Russia propose to settle the dispute over the Northern Territories? In December 2000 the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and Japan had discussed the situation in Central Asia. Is there room for cooperation in the Shanghai Forum between Japan and Russia? What school of thought listed by Harding does Russia belong to? She also asked Harding what are the concrete steps that would lead to the construction of an Asia-Pacific security order? Which country would play the leadership role in such a process? How would the Asia-Pacific order deal with the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons?

Concerning the questions raised to Chufurin, it was pointed out that the international situation that existed in East Asia was characterized by a multi-polar structure even during the Cold War years, and that any attempt to unilaterally force a security order, regardless of its nature, on the countries of the region would be counterproductive. On the question of cooperation between Japan and Russia through Central Asia, it was pointed out that such cooperation should be promoted on two fronts – economic cooperation and security cooperation – and that Russia and Japan should take a step-by-step strategic approach to negotiating a final compromise on the question of the four islands.

Concerning the questions raised to Harding it was pointed out that the first concrete step the United States should take to construct a security order in this region should be to enunciate its vision, and the second step should be to commit itself once again to forming a partnership with China. On the question of a leader for constructing a security order, it was pointed out that it does not have to be a single country. The point was that countries other than the United States – such as Japan, which had provided leadership in engineering the region's remarkable economic growth, Australia,

which had played a leadership role in creating APEC, South Korea, which had been instrumental in persuading China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong to join APEC, Indonesia, which had played a moderator's role in hammering out the Bogor Declaration, and Canada, which had advocated a cooperative security regime – had played leadership roles in solving respective issues.

On the question of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, a participant pointed out that there already are regimes such as NPT and CTBT that are designed to check horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, but they should not be considered as simply legal mechanisms. He also said that the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan should not be viewed as punishable violations of the treaty but as something honestly reflecting their security needs. He stated that TMD and NMD pose a problem of vertical proliferation, that there are arguments supporting vertical proliferation such as the theory of collective missile defenses expounded by Chufirin, and that in the final analysis, it is a political issue.

Comments from the floor centered on TMD and NMD. A participant argued that TMD is morally superior to weapons of mass destruction, and that there are people who entertain the idea of linking a reduction of offensive missiles with TMD. Another participant maintained that TMD would prompt China to develop multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), undermine the effectiveness of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and lead to the proliferation of missiles. And he added that TMD would violate the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Systems and could court a withdrawal of Russia from the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). A third participant reminded the audience that technologies for developing stratospheric TMD and NMD are non-existent at present, and argued that a political solution to the problem, rather than arguments for and against it, is important, and urged China to persuade North Korea not to toy with missiles.

On the question of the security order in the region, one participant said that the idea of combining an Asia-Pacific Community, strengthened alliances, and cooperation among major powers is most suitable to constructing a viable security order, that as long as participants insist on a consensus on all major issues, multilateralism will not work, and that although the question remain as to the way to incorporate China in it cumulation of mini-lateralisms – where a country takes the initiative wherever it can – is the practical approach.

During the remaining hours, the symposium went into an overall discussion,

at which many and diverse questions were raised from the floor. One participant pointed out that even during the Cold War there were those who maintained that Japan-U.S. security arrangements had outlived their usefulness and their number had not really increased after the Cold War. Then he asked what is the essential feature of America's engagement policy toward China, how, if at all, will it change in the coming years, and what is the purpose of strengthening the network of alliances? He also raised a question which of the five schools of thought mentioned by Harding is acceptable to China?

In response to the first question a participant pointed out that engagement is a process, and that opinions in the United States are divided on this question. He then said that the opponents argue that the United States is going overboard by engaging China in world affairs, but their argument confuses process with results. The issue is what the United States can achieve through its engagement policy. On the question of the alliance, he said that its real objective is not to deal with threats but is a positive one such as "the global partnership" upheld in the Japan-U.S. declaration.

In response to the third question another participant said that the idea most desirable for China is a balance of power in this region, but that it is least acceptable to the United States and thus the chances of achieving it are small. He also observed that an Asia-Pacific Community and cooperation among major powers basically represent an engagement policy, one that China finds relatively easy to live with, but that both of these ideas are problematic in that the former is apt to be dominated by the United States and in the Japan-U.S.-China cooperative regime, which is a variant of the latter, China would be looked upon as junior partner. He added that China couldn't accept the idea of strengthening the network of alliances and a new containment policy because both of them are designed to bring pressure on China.

As might be gathered from the foregoing summary, participants in the symposium engaged in highly substantive debate on wide-ranging topics in the course of the three sessions. As we felt during the preparatory phase that the subject of a security order in East Asia could not possibly be exhausted in one and a half days, we decided to focus the debate on three topics, namely, the role of the United States, security issues now pending, and principles or elements of a regional security order. We also felt that we would be bound to touch upon many other issues while discussing these three topics. Our expectations were amply met, and the participants conducted animated debate on such diverse issues as TMD, globalization of economies, the

information technology (IT) revolution, and the role of Japan.

By way of a summation, we would like to make the following two points. This symposium did not come up with a clear picture of the post-Cold War (21st century) world order. However, it is fair to say that through the symposium some of the factors that are complicating this problem became clear. For instance, alliances have been given a new role that is totally different from the Cold War era, when they were based on the existence of potential enemies. As Hernandez pointed out, small countries such as the Philippines are in no position to sever their relations with the United States despite various problems such relationship entails. The five schools of thought about the regional order that Harding introduced should be taken not as alternatives but as ideal types, and the policy the United States actually pursues necessarily has to be a combination of elements in different schools. Under such circumstances, the temptation to resort to such oversimplification as the argument made by a participant in the flow that the United States is attempting to colonize Asia. Such being the tendency, it is necessary for us to cultivate intellectual stamina to squarely face up to the complexity of the reality.

The symposium did not stop at scholarly argumentations. There were also the proposal for four-party talks made by Takesada of Japan, the suggestion of applicability of the collective TMD intended for Europe to Asia made by Chufrin of Russia, the concrete advice to the United States made by Hernandez of the Philippines, and the recommendation for a step-by-step approach to building a regional security order presented by Harding of the United States. It is fair to say that these are gratifying results for a symposium hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies whose mission is to conduct studies relevant to the policy formulation of the Japan Defense Agency.

Finally, it should be pointed out that some of the papers printed below have been revised by the authors after the conclusion of the symposium, hence there may be some discrepancies between them and the above summaries.

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General Supervisor for the Symposium

This symposium was carried out by the following team.

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