

Presentations

The Japanese Counterinsurgency Operations in Mainland China

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The Marco Polo Bridge Incident that occurred on July 7, 1937, developed into an all-out war between Japan and China with fighting in Shanghai that commenced on August 13. Though the subsequent occupation of Wuhan and Guangzhou brought Japan's military capacity almost to its mobilizable limits, the Kuomintang (KMT) army led by Chiang Kai-shek continued to offer resistance with Chongqing as their base. Thus, the Japanese Imperial Army (the IJA) sought to put an end to the war through political maneuvering, rather than military operation, and the war entered a deadlock. Furthermore, as the Chinese front became the secondary front after the outbreak of the war between Japan and the United States in December 1941, the IJA in mainland China mainly focused on maintaining or recovering security in occupied areas while containing a counteroffensive by the KMT army. When the IJA began to devote full-fledged efforts to security measures, it was the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) army, rather than the Kuomintang forces, that bothered the occupation forces.

By the beginning of 1938, the IJA occupied major cities in North China, but it constituted just the "control of dots and lines, or just areas along railroads and principal roads.¹ The KMT army had already withdrawn from North China, only keeping some troops in the southern Shanxi Province, leaving a power vacuum across the entirety of North China.²

Therefore, the main mission for the IJA in North China was to stabilize regional security by combating any remained "bandits" and expand the controlled areas that only covering traffic lines and major cities into the whole region. The areas occupied by the IJA was 600,000 square kilometers and its population reached 100 million. The IJA deployed 250,000 soldiers, including 9 divisions and 12 independent mixed brigades.

Since residents in the areas without garrisons came under the control of the CCP army, the IJA tried to dispose garrisons in the county capitals (approx. 500 in North China) as much as possible and gradually establish territorial control.³ However the total number of soldiers per square kilometer was 0.37 and the Japanese garrisons were dispersed in 200 places. Thus the IJA couldn't exercise its force over the most of the areas except county capitals and it was

¹ Akira Muto, "Rikugun Chujo Muto Akira Shuki" [Memoirs of Army Lt. Gen. Akira Muto], National Institute for Defense Studies Military Archives, Japan (hereafter NIDSMA).

² Kitashina Homen Gun Shireibu, "Kita Shina Homen Gun Senkyo Chiikinai Chian Jokyo, Showa 13 nen 10 gatsu" [North China Army (NCA) Headquarters, "Security Situation of Occupied Area in North China, October 1938"], in *Showa 13 Nen Riku Shi Mitsu Dai-nikki 64 go* [Ministry of War, *Highly Confidential Daily Reports on China, 1938 No.64*], NIDSMA.

³ "Gun Senryo Chiiki Chian Jisshi Yoryo" [Operating Procedure on Security in Occupied Area] in Rikugunsho, *Showa 13 Nen Riku Shi Mitsu Dai Nikki 15 go* [Ministry of War, *Highly Confidential Daily Reports on China, 1939 No.15*], NIDSMA; Joji Shimanuki, "Hokushi no Taikyo Sen ni Tsuite" [About Anti-CCP Warfare in North China] NIDSMA.

not easy for the IJA to spread its influence.⁴

The IJA initially thought that pacification activities would be sufficient to deal with the occupied areas. “pacification activities” is the counterinsurgency operations in the occupied areas for re-establishing security, thought education, cultural activities, economic measures and industrial promotion by civilian employees in the military.⁵ However, these measures gradually lost effect due to the CCP growing its power. Because of this, the IJA began to focus on combating the CCP army and bandits.⁶ Specifically, the IJA stationed troops at strategic point and built a network of roads for security connecting these points. Therefore guard forces mopped up these areas surrounding by roads with keeping in contact and gradually tried to expand secured areas.⁷ The lessons learned at an early stage was as follows: (1) the importance of gathering information, (2) the importance of securing the roads and communication lines, (3) the importance of training self-defense groups among locals.⁸

At this time, the IJA thought of the CCP as no more than bandits and it would be extinct soon, even while recognizing as a constant menace. The Japanese forces in North China came to understand that the nature of the CCP’s threat of the CCP was trinity formed by the party, the military and the government and their strong ties of cooperation with locals. However the IJA as a whole still not fully understood threat of the CCP.⁹ It was after the summer of 1940, when the CCP army carried out large-scale sabotage and their infiltration was gradually acknowledged, that the IJA came to recognize the CCP as a real threat.¹⁰

After five consecutive annihilation campaign by the Kuomintang forces, The CCP abandoned their bases in the south at the end of 1934 and reached Northwest China after two years of escape. By around this time, unlike the traditional image, the CCP had not fully developed and refined guerrilla warfare tactics, but rather preferred to engage reckless trench warfare. It was after outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War that the CCP developed guerrilla warfare tactics, which was closely related to their survival strategy.

⁴ Boeicho Boei Kenshujo Senshi-shitsu, *Shina Jihen Rikugun Sakusen (3) – Showa 16 Nen 12 Gatsu Made* [National Institute for Defense Studies Military History Department, *Army Operations during War in China*], Asagumo, 1975, vol. 3, pp. 255-256. For example, the 37th Division stationed its troops in a total of 234 locations (105 garrisons and 129 trenches), with the force of 14,347 Japanese troops confronting a total of 89,800 Chinese troops in a range of defense as wide as 18,000 square kilometers; Yutaka Toyoda, “Haru Otozureshi Dai Kouga: Dai Sanjunana Shidan Shinnan Keibi Senki” [Memoir of the 37th Division], 1977, p. 140, p. 144.

⁵ Tada Butai Honbu, “Senbu Han Shoshi” [NCA Headquarters, “Short History on the Pacification Team”] NIDSMA.

⁶ Kitashina Homengun Shireibu, “Gun Senryo Chiiki Chian Jisshi Yoryo” [NCA Headquarters, “Operating Procedure on Security in Occupied Area”], in *Showa 13 Nen Riku Shi Mitsu Dai-nikki, 15go* [Ministry of War, *Highly Confidential Daily Reports on China*, 1938 No. 15], NIDSMA.

⁷ Sugiyama Butai Honbu, “Chian Kosaku Keiken Shuroku” [NCA Headquarters, “Gleaning from Experience on Security Operation”], 1939, vol. 1, p. 1, NIDSMA.

⁸ Masanobu Tazoe, “Jinchu Tsuisoroku” (Dai 2 Hen Satsu Nan Sho, Naimo no Keibi to Sento) [Memoirs of Lt. Gen. Masanobu Tazoe], NIDSMA.

⁹ “Saikin ni Okeru Hokushi Kyosan Tou Katsudo Gaikyo” [Overview of CCP’s Recent Activities in North China], in *Showa 13 Nen Riku Shi Mitsu Dai Nikki 16go* [Ministry of War, *Highly Confidential Daily Reports on China*, 1938, No. 16], NIDSMA.

¹⁰ Kitashina Homengun Shireibu, “Kitashina Homen Kyosan Seiryoku ni Taisuru Kansatsu” [NCA Headquarters, “Observations on the influence of the CCP in North China”], Oct. 1940, NIDSMA.

The CCP, which used to have over 300,000 soldiers, left with 10,000 by the time they reached Northwest China, and had to rebuild their force in the wasteland not suitable for farming. Furthermore, even after reaching northwest, the CCP was kept to be pressed by KMT army and confront critical situation. However, with the Xian Incident, the CCP has legitimized; thus, they could expand their survival space and rapidly increased power after outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War.

In the early phase of the war, many of the CCP leaders planned to engage in frontal battles against the IJA in collaboration with the Kuomintang forces.¹¹ However, Mao Zedong insisted on independent guerrilla warfare in mountainous areas for the survival and development of the CCP army, and argued for committing protracted war in order to turn the tables. Mao's stance was eventually adopted by the CCP.¹² Thus, the CCP were able to develop without facing any pressure while the IJA and the KMT were locked in fierce fighting.

The CCP's doctrine was derived from Mao Zedong's thinking as follows. The war between Japan and China can be divided into three stages by their power relations and the nature of war. The first stage is the enemy's strategic advances and China taking the strategic defense, the second stage is the stage of the enemy's strategic holding and China preparing for a counterblow, and the third stage is the stage of China's strategic counteroffensive and the enemy's strategic retreat. Strategically, the CCP would conduct guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines and establish and defend bases in the first stage, gradually turn guerrilla command into regular forces in the second stage, and in the third, prepare for maneuver warfare. In the initial stage, the CCP give a priority to guerrilla warfare.¹³

Since the CCP focused on establishing bases, accepting militia and reorganizing them, its force reached 500,000 by the end of 1940. The regular CCP army were responsible for the defense of bases and attacks on the enemy's main forces, while guerrilla units and other local forces attempted surprise attack, with militias guarding the villages. At the time, The CCP avoided conventional warfare and tried to develop own forces by guerrilla warfare. This can be seen in the rise in the ratio of guerrilla units and other local forces to the regular forces. In 1940, the regular forces were double the size of the local forces, but the local forces grew to

¹¹ Zhonggong Zhongyang, "Queli Quanguo Kangzhan zhi Zhanlue Jihua ji Zuozhan Yuanzean"[CPC Central Committee, "Establishment of the Strategy and Draft Plan of Operations for the Resistance War against Japan"], (Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Zhanshi Junshi Jiaoyu Xueyuan Hanshoubu, *Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Zhanshi Wenxian Ziliao Xuanbian* [People's Liberation Army Academy of Military Education, *Documents on War History of People's Liberation Army*], Beijing: Correspondence Department, People's Liberation Army Academy of Military Education, 1990, pp. 151-152.

¹² "Guanyu Hongjun Zuozhan de Yuanze" [On The Principles for the Red Army's Operations], "Jianchi Duli Zizhu de Shandi Youjizhan Yuanze" [The Principles of Keeping Self-Driven Guerrilla Warfare in Mountainous Areas], Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi, Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Junshi Kexueyuan ed., *Mao Zedong Junshi Wenji* [Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee and People's Liberation Army Academy of Military Science ed., *Selected Military Writings of Mao Zedong*], Beijing: Military Science Publishing House and Central Party Literature Press, 1993, Vol. 2, pp. 20-21, pp. 53-54.

¹³ Mao Zedong "Lun Chijiuzhan" [On Protracted War], Mo Takuto Bunkenshiryo Kenkyukai, *Mo Takuto Shu* [The Society for the Study of Mao Zedong's Historical Materials, *Selected Writings of Mao Zedong*], Hokubosha, 1970, Vol. 6, pp. 49-145.

double the size of the regular forces by 1942.¹⁴ As seen above, due to their poor equipment, the CCP fought mainly in guerrilla warfare and political maneuvering among the military forces and locals. By the outbreak of the Pacific War, the CCP had grown to real threat for the IJA.

The CCP carried out guerrilla warfare in order to develop own bases and sphere of influence. Thus, it was initially for self-defense. Guerrilla warfare requires both physical and material support. Political maneuvering was quite effective in obtaining such support¹⁵, and there were three targets: the CCP's own forces, enemy forces and the locals at large. Firstly, for its own forces, the CCP placed the core party branch in each company and party groups in platoons to provide political education.¹⁶ This education covered soldiers' attitudes toward locals and military discipline.¹⁷ For the enemy forces, the CCP appealed for better treatment of prisoners of war¹⁸ and encourage double crossing for bringing down the enemy.¹⁹ Also, the CCP detect and eliminate infiltrated spy.²⁰ Since this had been linked with the rapid expansion of the military forces, the CCP severely investigated themselves.²¹ For the general public, the CCP forfeited the property of enemy's collaborators, enhanced economic incentives by reducing or exempting farm rent, and provided preferential economic and welfare treatment for families of people who joined the CCP army. Through these policy measures, the CCP

¹⁴ Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Junshi Bianxiezu ed., *Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Junshi* [People's Liberation Army Military History editorial group ed., *People's Liberation Army Military History*], Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2010, Vol. 2, p. 261.

¹⁵ Balujun Zhengzhibu "Zhanshi Zhengzhi Gongzuo" [The Eighth Route Army Political Department, "Wartime Political Work"], Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Zongzhengzhibu bangongting ed., *Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Zhengzhi Gongzuo Lishi Ziliao Xuanbian* [General office of People's Liberation Army General Political Department ed., *Selected Documents on People's Liberation Army's Political Work*], Beijing: People's Liberation Army Publishing House, 2001, Part 4, pp. 152-165.

¹⁶ Tan Zheng, Sanwan Gaibian [Sanwan Reorganization], Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Zhengzhi Xueyuan Zhengzhi Gongzuo Jiaoyanshi, *Jundui Zhengzhi Gongzuo Lishi Ziliao* [People's Liberation Army Political School Political Works Research Section ed., *Historical Materials of People's Liberation Army Political Work*], People's Liberation Army Fighter's Publishing House, 1982, Part 2, p. 44.

¹⁷ "Zongzhengzhibu Guanyu Budui Jiaoyu de Zhishi" [Instructions of the General Political Department on Education of Army Units], Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Zongzhengzhibu Bangongting ed., *Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Zhengzhi Gongzuo Lishi Ziliao Xuanbian* [General office of People's Liberation Army General Political Department ed., *Selected Historical Materials on People's Liberation Army Political Work*], Beijing: People's Liberation Army Publishing House, 2001, Part 4, pp. 63-64.

¹⁸ "Dibalujun Zongzhihuibu Guanyu Duirifulu Zhengce de Minglin" [Policy Order of the General Command of the Eighth Route Army on Japanese POW], Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Lishi Ziliao Congshu Bianshen Weiyuanhui ed., *Balujun – Wenxian* [People's Liberation Army Historical Material Series Editorial Board ed., *Eighth Route Army- Documents*], Beijing, People's Liberation Army Publishing House, 1994, p. 82.

¹⁹ Zongzhengzhibu Lianluobu, *Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Lianluo Gongzuoshi* [People's Liberation Army General Political Department Liaison Office ed., *History of Liaison Work of People's Liberation Army*], Beijing: Liaison Office of General Political Department, 1999, Vol. 1, pp. 31-78, p. 698.

²⁰ "Zhonggong Zhongyang Junwei Guanyu zai Junduizhong Chengli Chujianju de Dianling" [Order of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (CMCCPC) on establishing the office of counter-espionage], Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Lishi Ziliao Congshu Bianshen Weiyuanhui ed., *Balujun – Wenxian* [People's Liberation Army Historical Material Series Editorial Board ed., *Eighth Route Army- Documents*], Beijing, People's Liberation Army Publishing House, 1994, p. 211.

²¹ "Zhongyang Zhengzhiju Guanyu GongguDang de Jueding" [Decision of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee on the Consolidation of Party Foundation], Gongchandangren Bianji Weiyuanhui ed., Gongchandangren ["Communist" Editorial Board ed., *Communist*], Yanan, The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, First Period, October 1939, pp. 11-13.

encouraged the Chinese people to participate in self-defense group and gradually incorporated them into regular forces.²² The CCP developed its influence by organizing people who left production activities into guerrilla units.²³ The CCP also spread its tangible and intangible influence on areas under control of the enemy forces by circulating own currency.²⁴

The popular support as described above made the CCP possible to carry out guerrilla warfare. Thus, the conventional search-and-destroy operations had little effect against the CCP's guerrilla warfare that supported by locals.

The next question, then, is what tactics the CCP employed for guerrilla warfare. Essentially, the CCP utilized guerrilla warfare to advance mobile warfare by its regular forces and develop own bases and forces. Mao Zedong summarized the situations where guerrilla warfare should be adopted as follows: situations that the enemy is defensive and is unlikely to concentrate on combat at present, and the CCP can threaten the enemy over a broad range; situations that the CCP can mount destabilizing attacks and sabotage all across the area where the enemy forces is dispersed and weak; situations that the CCP must spread out and escape since they cannot break a siege; situations that the CCP suffers from geographic or supply limitations; or situations that the CCP carries out the mass movements in broad areas.²⁵

The CCP's tactics are characterized by extremely systematic fighting while avoiding frontal attacks. Basically, they disperse the units, then repeatedly assemble and disperse for successive attacks and retreats with surrounding the enemy. These tactics were successful in disrupting and battering the enemy and also pretend to be large forces.²⁶ From point of the lessons learned by the IJA, the CCP's guerrilla warfare had the following characteristics. For example, they put up brave challenge against a small contingent, and try to lay siege by

²² “Zhonggong Zhongyang Junwei Zongzhengzhibu Guanyu Budui Jinxing Difang Dongyuan Gongzuo De Zhishi” [Instructions of CMCCPC Political Department on Military Units Mobilizing Local People], Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Lishi Ziliao Congshu Bianshen Weiyuanhui ed., *Balujun – Wenxian* [People's Liberation Army Historical Materials Series Editorial Committee ed., *Eighth Route Army-Documents*], Beijing: People's Liberation Army Publishing House, 1994, pp. 88-89; Sugiyamabutai Sanboubu, “Hokushi ni Okeru Kyosanto Seiken Shinsatuki Henku no Kyoka Jijo (Hogun Tokujō Dai 40 Go (Kyosanto))” [NCA Headquarters, “Re-education by CCP in the Jin-Cha-Ji Base Government”], included in Kitashina Homengun Shireibu, *Hosan Tokuhō Tsuzuri No. 2 1/3* [NCA Headquarters, *File of the staff of NCA Special Intelligence, No.2 1/3*], NIDSMA; Shina Chuton Kenpeitai Shireibu, “Chugoku Kyosanto no Minshu Kakutoku Kosaku no Shinso” [Military Police Headquarters in China, “Truth about the CCP's Activities Getting Local Support”] in Kitashina Homengun Shireibu, *Hokushi Joho Kiroku Kankei Shorui* [NCA Headquarters, *Documents Related to Intelligence in North China*], NIDSMA.

²³ “Zongzheng Guangyu Difang Gongzuo de Zhishi” [Instructions of the General Political Department on the Activities in Rural Area], Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Junshi Kexueyuan Zhanzheng Lilun Yanjiubu ed., *Youjizhan Cankao Ziliao Xuanbian* [War Theory Studies Section of Academy of Military Science ed., *Selected Documents Related to Guerrilla Warfare*], Beijing: Academy of Military Science, 1980, Part 2, pp. 1-3.

²⁴ Ichitani Kazuo, “Kahoku Henku Seifu no Keizai Kensetsu – Tokuni Kahei Ryutsu to Kenryokuno Shinto ni Tsuite (1937-1945 nen)” [Circulation of Money and Penetration of Power in North China: The Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region, 1937-1945], *Journal of Law and Political Studies*, No. 38, September 1998.

²⁵ Mao Zedong, *Kangri Youji Zhanzheng de Zhanlue Wenti* [Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla Warfare against Japan], Mo Takuto Bunkenshiryo Kenkyukai, *Mo Takuto Shu* [The Society for the Study of Mao Zedong's Historical Materials, *Selected Writings of Mao Zedong*], Hokubosha, 1970, Vol. 6, pp. 7-47.

²⁶ Sanbo Honbu, “Jikyoku-ho Shi-96 go: Yugeki Senjyutsu” [Army General Staff, “Report on Current Affairs (China), No. 96: On Guerrilla Tactics”], 1937, pp. 4-10, NIDSMA.

surprise. When the CCP Army attack, they selected a battlefield that would enable an easy retreat. The Chinese guerrilla forces good at prompt actions in mountain areas, dispersed in the small villages of mountains. They also deceive or frequently change unit numbers so as to avoiding identification.²⁷ In spite of poor equipment, The CCP Army were well trained and were good at communication.²⁸

Due to the series of combat with the IJA which was superior to the KMT Army in equipment and discipline, the KMT Army had been wiped out one by one. On the other hand, since the CCP Army avoided frontal attack and eager to enlarge their sphere of influence, they gradually built up intensity in North China. As the growth of the CCP, the IJA came to face some difficulties. These are summarized in three points.

First, the information gathering system was inadequate. Unlike ordinary military forces, the CCP army avoided regular combat and expand their influence through underground activities. So the IJA could hardly locate them. In addition, the CCP kept tight lid on information within its army and local residents. Thus, the IJA had difficulty in capturing the CCP army. By contrast, the CCP were very good at gathering information, and even knew where the commander of the guard unit slept and how much he drank.²⁹

Secondly, the IJA's equipment and organization were inappropriate. Since the IJA in China was originally organized for regular combat with the KMT army, they were heavily-armed and it was difficult to track and capture the CCP army which moved very quickly with only rifles.³⁰

Thirdly, the training has difficulties. As the CCP was an integrated organization incorporating the party, the government and the military, the IJA need to research and educate its uniqueness. It was also necessary to conduct training for dealing with guerrilla warfare. However, it was difficult because of the dispersed position of the Japanese troops.³¹

There were two measures taken by the IJA to overcome these problems. The first was the reinforcement of gathering intelligence capabilities, and the second was to build the Special Guard Units, which was specialized for countering CCP's guerrilla warfare.

On the reinforcement of gathering intelligence capabilities, the IJA had to overcome two weaknesses. The first was the requirement to improve the means for collecting intelligence. The conventional human intelligence (HUMINT) was low in accuracy, and false intelligence was occasionally provided. Thus, the IJA needed to collect signals intelligence (SIGINT) and improve code breaking capability. Since late 1940, however, the CCP army began to use a

²⁷ Boeicho Boei Kenshujo Senshi-shistu, *Hokushi no Chian Sen*, [National Institute for Defense Studies Military History Department, *Counterinsurgency in North China*], War History Series, 1968, Vol. 1, p. 558.

²⁸ Kitashina homengun Shireibu, "Kitashina Homen Kyosan Seiryoku ni taisuru Kansatsu" [NCA Headquarters, "Observations on the Influence of the CCP in North China"], Oct. 1940, NIDSMA.

²⁹ "Sakata Sanbo no Kyojutsu" [Witness of Staff Officer Sakata], in *Shinsatsuki Henku Shukusei Sakusen Kankeisya Kaiso Siryo* [Memoirs of Pacification in Jin-Cha-Ji Base], NIDSMA.

³⁰ "Kanda Kazuo no Kaiso" [Reminiscence of Former Staff of the First Army Maj. Kazuo Kanda], in *Hokushi Kankei Keireki-to ni kansuru Siryo Chosahyo tsuzuri* [File on Questionnaires Related to Occupation in North China], NIDSMA.

³¹ Ibid.

one-time pad system, which made it very difficult for the IJA to decipher their messages.³² In response, the IJA reinforced Special Intelligence Section. In addition to it, the IJA investigated the communication conditions and improved the ability to grasp the CCP's activities with establishing Radio Intercept Section and a Radio Goniometric Section.³³ The second step taken was a wide-ranging survey for total understanding of the CCP. The IJA tried to understand the CCP army from the principles of Marxism - Leninism, and also carried out field surveys to grasp the actual situation of the CCP's political maneuvering.³⁴

Another step taken was the establishment of a unit dedicated to guerrilla warfare against the CCP army. Until then, it had often been pointed out that the IJA's equipment was not suitable for guerrilla warfare and lacked effective intelligence collected at the unit level. To overcome these problems, the IJA established the Special Guard Unit (SGU).³⁵ The SGU was specialized for detecting and preventing CCP's activities, combined an officer of the military police with light armed infantry. The SGU equipped mobility and communication including various intelligence functions to deal with guerilla and win the information warfare against the CCP.³⁶

In the early stages, the SGU achieved the expected outcome that contain CCP expanding its influence. However as the war situation deteriorated, the SGU had become weakened with frequent transfers and shifts of troops, diminishing equipment, declining potential of soldiers, and depressed morale because of the extraction of powerful corps to South China and activation of new units. Furthermore, as North China, an area rich in strategic resources, had become a supply base for the Japanese main land, the IJA lost the local support and stabilization of the occupied area, and after a few years later, Japan had been defeated.

The reason that the SGU ultimately failed to success was the extraction and decline of its troops due to the deterioration in the overall war situation. Furthermore, there are also several problems that should be learned.³⁷

The first problem was the frequent redeployment of troops. In order to optimize intelligence activities, it was required to stay in the same position collecting and analyzing information for at least six months. However, as the IJA frequently moved or redeployed troops, the SGU almost failed to achieve the intended results.

Secondly, combined arms did not function well. The military police did not accustomed to combat. On the other hand, infantry from the army corps were not familiar with guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare will not succeed without well-trained, skillful soldiers.

³² Zongcanmoubu Jiyaoju, *Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Jiyao Gongzuo Lishi Jianbian, Kangri Zhanzheng Shiqi: Zonghe Ce* [People's Liberation Army General Staff Confidential Bureau, *Brief History of Secret Operations of the People's Liberation Army: General Volume, Anti-Japanese War period*], Beijing: People's Liberation Army General Staff Confidential Bureau, 1995, pp. 9-11; Yukio Yokoyama, "Tokusyu Joho Kaisoki" [Memories of Special Intelligence], NIDSMA.

³³ Hideo Kubota, "Koku Tokusyu Joho Senshi" [War History on Special Air Intelligence], NIDSMA.

³⁴ Ryoichi Misaki, "Hokushigun no Taikyo Chosa" [Anti-CCP Research by the NCA], NIDSMA.

³⁵ "Dai Riku Mei 862 Go" [Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 862], NIDSMA.

³⁶ Mitsuhiro Omori, "Omori Mitsuhiro Shuki: Kitashina Tokubetsu Keibitai ni kansuru Mondaiten" [Issues Related to the North China Special Guard Security Unit (NCSGU)], Rikujo Jieitai Chosa Gakko [Ground Self Defense Force Intelligence School], 1958, p. 57, attached table, NIDSMA.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 33-41.

The third problem is that the IJA did not give administrative authority to the SGU. Since it was difficult to defeat the CCP only by military power, the SGU needed unified command over all military, administrative, economic, police and propaganda.

The fourth problem was the most important and essential: the IJA failed to win the hearts and minds of the local Chinese people. Colonel Mitsuhiko Ohmori, who served on the staff of the Special Guard Unit, recalled: “Guerrilla warfare can be carried out essentially with local support. The IJA in North China lacked military discipline, because of illegal acts against the locals by Japanese military units, servicemen, civilian employees of the Japanese army and Japanese residents there. However, the CCP army was controlled with rigid discipline and treated farmers gently suffered in war. The contrast was so vast that the sphere of influence of the IJA was gradually reduced only to the army garrisons and the belts along railroads, while the entire farming area coming under the control of the CCP.”³⁸

The IJA also exercised counterinsurgency operations named Seigo Kosaku against the CCP army in the plains of Central China. The operations mobilized a great number of troops to blockade traffic with cleaning up target areas, and then expanded it gradually.³⁹ After the mopping-up operations, local Chinese authorities carried out pacification operations to help improving public sentiment and get local support.⁴⁰ However, these methods were very costly and hard to sustain for a long period of time. The Chinese authorities, which cooperated with the IJA, hardly get local support, either, due to own problems.⁴¹ Because of these factors, as deterioration of the war in the Pacific, the IJA became even more exploitative, and this made it even more difficult to get local support and maintain security.

As discussed above, in order to counter guerrilla warfare and carry out counterinsurgency operations, it was absolutely necessary to win the hearts and minds of local Chinese people. It needed not only pacification operation but also policy measures that could get people’s real support. On this point, the IJA was far surpassed by the CCP. Needless to say, even if the IJA understood this point, it would still have been difficult to implement these measures. Particularly after the Pacific War deteriorated further, goods fell into short supply and the IJA became more exploitative, making the implementation of the above measures particularly difficult. Subsequently, the IJA surrendered without any capacity to take any new measure to cope with difficulties.

³⁸ Mitsuhiko Omori, “Kitashina Tokubetsu Keibitai ni kansuru Mondaiten Dai Ichi Bu” [Issues related on NCSGU Part 1], NIDSMA.

³⁹ Atsutane Haruke, “Shina Jihen Oyobi Daitoa Senso ni Okeru Taishi Seisaku ni Tsuite Sono Ni” [About Measures toward China in the War Part 2], NIDSMA; “Seigo Kosaku ni Tsuite (1)” [About the Seigo Kosaku (1)], Koain Seimubu, *Joho* [Political Bureau of East Asia Development Board, *Information*], No. 52, October 1941, pp. 22-23.

⁴⁰ Akira Nagano, “Seigo Kosaku no Rinen to Jitsujo” [The Idea and the Realities of the Seigo Kosaku], Koain Seimubu, *Joho* [Political Bureau of East Asia Development Board, *Information*], No. 75, September 1942, p. 14.

⁴¹ “Ohno Hideo Chusa no Kaisou” [Memoirs of Lt. Col. Hideo Ohno], in *Hokushi Homen Gun Kankeisha Kaisoroku Sono Ichi* [Memoirs of Officers of NCA Part 1], NIDSMA; Atsutane Haruke, “Shina Jihen Oyobi Daitoa Senso ni Okeru Taishi Seisaku ni Tsuite Sono Ni” [About Measures toward China in the War Part 2], NIDSMA.