

# **The Conceptual Definition of “Irregular Warfare” and the Today’s International Security Environment**

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(This article is translated by NIDS with permission of Prof. Tetsuya Endo)

## **Introduction**

This article is based on the presentation at the International Forum on War History held by the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) 2017, responded to its request for consideration on the subject “what is the irregular warfare.” As a scholar, the author follows the research approach of sociological and socio-historical perspectives as one, which seeks to explore the essence of military affairs and security by overlooking the way of human society throughout the history of human beings over time. In this article, based on a broad review of the concept of “irregular warfare,” the author shall attempt to consider the today’s international security environment where the discourse of “irregular warfare” is talked about. In doing so, he shall also apply the perspective of the development of civil order in the international society: that is to say, is the significance of military affairs as an aspect of social field becoming weaker in the present day? This article sets out author’s own views on the subject of “irregular warfare” and its relevant concepts. However, please note that since the respective participants of this Forum are, of course, engaged in their respective study independently, there may be cases where they adopt different standpoints and definitions from those set out in this article.

## **1. The concept and terminology of “irregular warfare”**

Firstly, the concept of “hi-seiki senso” in Japanese used in the present day is considered to have originated from the expression “irregular warfare.” It is also associated with the various concepts of “low-intensity conflict,” “asymmetrical warfare,” “guerilla warfare,” “insurgency,” and “civil war,” and the differences and relationships between the respective terminologies may not always be clearly defined. In particular, the term “unconventional warfare” was frequently used during the Cold War, and this has often been translated as “hi-tsujo senso” or “fu-seiki sen(so)” in the Japanese academic circles. As such, in order to avoid these confusion, the two concepts will be distinguished here as “irregular warfare” and “unconventional warfare” respectively.

The term “irregular warfare” is a phrase that combines two simple words that are used very frequently. Hence, its first appearance can possibly be traced very far back and is difficult to pin down. The term has been increasingly used since the 2000s—for example, in the first edition of *Strategy in the Contemporary World* (2002), a well-known British textbook on theories of strategy, an independent chapter titled “Terrorism and Irregular Warfare” was

included.<sup>1</sup> From around the mid-2000s in particular, there has been growing use of this term in U.S. military documents and doctrines, and its application across an even broader scope is conceivable. In fact, in the *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)*<sup>2</sup> drawn up by the U.S. Department of Defense in 2006, it was described as an area of “particular emphasis,”<sup>3</sup> and its use was also seen in some parts of the 2006 edition of the field manual<sup>4</sup> used by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. And in 2007, the U.S. Department of Defense presented a joint operating concept that was centered at the concept of “irregular warfare.”<sup>5</sup>

However, we should consider it natural for the concepts formulated by public agencies including military organizations, such as national governments as well as international organizations, to include the perspectives, circumstances and needs, and strategies of the organization or country in question, and furthermore, it is not unusual to keep the definition of a term ambiguous so as to be able to respond flexibly to the diverse situations that may emerge in the future. Therefore, applying such terminology and concepts wholesale to academic discourse should be seen as inappropriate. In academic writing, it is necessary either to add an explanatory comment in the form of “so-called” or “so to speak,” or to conduct a careful examination of the contents and definition of the expression beforehand from the perspective of academic objectivity, even if we were to use the “written form” of the word as it is. In such cases, it is also necessary to consider carefully if the expression means precisely what it says, or whether it is metaphorical or rhetorical.

In the liberal arts and humanities, where there are mostly no expectations of scientific reproducibility, there is a need to express truth through words that we share in common with others and to convince those around us of the logicity of our argument. For that reason, we should be conservative in our words. To ensure that the words match our assertions and leave an impact on the reader, the definition of words cannot be changed at will. In addition, the words should describe the situation, but the contents of the words should not be changed to correspond to the situation. Hence, if we were talking about “XX war,” the category should fall within the scope of the word “war.” If not, it means that the word “war” is being used as a metaphor.

Taking a general view of the ways in which “irregular warfare” is typically used, and based on the definition of “regular warfare” as a war undertaken by regular forces between the countries, we can say that “irregular warfare” is a concept that refers to situations of war where at least one of the warring parties is not a “regular” country and therefore, does not use a regular army in the war. Expanding on this idea, our image of the term “irregular warfare”

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<sup>1</sup> Kiras, J. D., “Terrorism and Irregular Warfare” in Baylis, J., etc., *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, (Oxford, 2002), chap. 9.

<sup>2</sup> United States, Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006*, p. 2, <http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf>.

<sup>3</sup> The use of the phrase “irregular warfare” does not seem to have been found in any parts of the documents in the QDR for 1997 and 2001.

<sup>4</sup> United States, Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency/ Army Field Manual [FM] 3-24*, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication [MCWP] 3-33.5, December 2006, <https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=468442>.

<sup>5</sup> United States, Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare: Joint Operating Concept (JOC) ver.1.0, September 11, 2007*, [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joint\\_concepts/joc\\_iw\\_v1.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joint_concepts/joc_iw_v1.pdf).

is also accompanied by several characteristics, such as the non-use of regular war tactics in a sense that will be explained in greater detail later, the difficulty of observing the regular norms of war, and the tendency for the war to drag on for a long time without arriving at a conclusion because the party using the “irregular” army is avoiding a decisive battle, or because of the absence of a decisive gravity point such as the capital of a country.

If we were to take a look at the consistency of the manner in which the expression is written, we can see that in both English and Japanese, it is a simple compound word of “not regular” and “war.” On the other hand, the expression “regular warfare,” though not completely unused, is used infrequently; rather, we could describe it as a “hypothetical” concept that exists to validate the expression “irregular warfare.” Based on the definition of the word “regular,” this phrase is likely to refer to “typical or normative warfare.” However, it is not possible to determine, based on these words, in what aspects this war is “typical” or “normative.” In light of that, by finding its basis in some international norms, there is probably some rationality in a theory that assumes that the concept of war is expressed through the “regular force/army” encompassed in the phrase,<sup>6</sup> as well as through war that takes place between “regular” countries. Turning that idea around, “irregular warfare” would then express a situation where at least one of the warring entities does not satisfy the conditions for “regular warfare,” and this presumably leads us to the conclusion of the abovementioned definition of the expression.

## 2. Scope of “irregular warfare”

As we have seen above, “regular warfare” and “irregular warfare” could be described based on the structure of the phrases as concepts that dichotomize “warfare” along the lines of “Warfare” – “Regular warfare” = “Irregular warfare.”<sup>7</sup> However, the scope of the former is obviously clearer, while the latter has a potentially wider and more diverse scope. As shown above, since “irregular warfare” is logically positioned under the superordinate concept of “warfare,” what “irregular warfare” means ultimately overlaps with the question of where the scope of “warfare” extends. The question lies in what the lower boundary of “irregular warfare” is if we were to set the boundary of “regular warfare” as the upper boundary. In that sense, there is a wide range of categories that can potentially be labelled as “wars” depending on the circumstances, even if it would not label them as such immediately. These include revolutionary wars, anti-government rebellions, and military uprisings by separatists, as well as other objects that give rise to fatalities such as a coup d’état, labor riots or ethnic minority riots, large-scale commotions between different ethnic groups or classes, and conflicts between criminal organizations or between such organizations and the government. Of these, terrorism is also frequently included within the scope of “irregular warfare” and is often discussed in parallel with it, but whether it will be included within the scope of discussion of this article

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<sup>6</sup> ICRC website, “Definition of Armed Forces”, [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2\\_rul\\_rule4](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule4).

<sup>7</sup> In discussions about “irregular warfare,” we often see “irregular warfare” used as the opposite of “traditional warfare.” However, since the phrase itself denotes that the warfare is “irregular,” the opposite concept of “irregular warfare” should be “regular warfare;” in that case, the opposite concept for “traditional warfare” should, of course, be “untraditional warfare.”

remains one of the key issues to be considered here.

The problem of the “lower boundary” in defining warfare is a question that has long troubled scholars. With regard to this boundary, the number of victims is often used as the basis when adopting the approach of estimating the number of war occurrences statistically. An example would be standards such as “more than a thousand combatant deaths in a year.” However, this gives rise to arguments about what to do with a case where a single preemptive strike causes the death of more than a thousand combatants but combats cease to occur with that one strike, or a case where 996 combatants lose their lives in a battle that continues for one year, therefore leaving it outside of the scope of “warfare” as the number of deaths is four short of a thousand. Hence, the number of victims cannot be described as a clearly established criterion.

Here, the author has adopted an approach that focuses on the format of the warfare and the essential character of the actors at war. We can say that the field of “military affairs” has always existed as an inseparable part of war as the social field. Even if there are factors involved other than war in the broad sense, such as security, the field of military affairs cannot possibly be established if the element of warfare were to be excluded from it. In the long history that the military affairs have occupied within the history of human beings, people have refined the “art of war” in tandem with the development of weapons, and have long given the name of “war” to acts by generals and commanders from all times and places that make the best use of the art in their battles. These practices, including preparations during peacetime for an emergency, have developed to form the core of the military affairs, which can be lined up alongside with social fields such as “diplomacy” and “economics.”

Fundamentally, the “art of war” is considered to be of a geographical nature. This is because a battle goes through the following steps: a military force that is present in friendly territory or territory under its control departs from that location; it maneuvers while controlling, disabling enemies and/or making them non-hostile at certain geographically important locations; it defeats the enemy power, or dodges the enemy to pursue something of significant value such as an enemy strongpoint or sovereign, threatening it or making it succumb;<sup>8</sup> conversely, it obstructs such invasions through the skillful deployment of defenses to crush such intentions. These are the typical forms that warfare has “geographical” essence.

The activities of naval and air forces, as well as indirect disturbances through the destruction of communications and logistics lines, as in the case of T.E. Lawrence, are ultimately no exceptions of the argument on the geographical nature in the sense that they aim to restrain and/or support the actions of military forces on the ground, and the final ideal goal lies in gaining decisive geographical ascendancy. Owing to the power of modern airstrikes and the increasing precision of such attacks, there is growing possibility that countries can inflict such major and intolerable damage on an enemy state as to make it possible to bring a war to its conclusion; it cannot be considered decisive for now, however, to the extent of eliminating the format of ending war through ultimate geographical ascendancy. Even in the war in Iraq, where the concept of “Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)” was put to the test, the eventual

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<sup>8</sup> In ancient and medieval times, there were also times when the consequence of war was the annihilation or enslavement of the enemy population.

outcome was still the accumulation of geographical control. Furthermore, under the joint operating concept for “irregular warfare” drawn up by the U.S. Department of Defense, which was outlined earlier, the focus of “irregular warfare” was placed on the struggle for control and influence on the relevant populations,<sup>9</sup> as opposed to the usual wars where the primary goal is to defeat enemy forces through one’s military forces. While this may be an indirect approach, geographical control is assumed to be the ultimate objective.

Because of this geographical nature of war, which has been present since ancient times, drawing battle lines and formations has been the basic approach adopted in war strategies and tactics. These strategies include avoiding or making detour strikes on the enemy as well as attempting to apply geometrical dynamics. The consideration of such geographical processes is precisely a “regular strategy/tactic” that is rarely used in “irregular warfare”—this constitutes one of the characteristics of “irregular warfare,” as explained earlier.

Guerilla warfare could be described as one of the representative forms of “irregular warfare” that involves fighting without setting out clear battle lines. As we can see from Mao Zedong’s *On Guerilla Warfare*,<sup>10</sup> guerilla warfare adopts the following method: taking advantage of geographical conditions such as mountains or jungles, villages, or border zones with neighboring countries, in order to secure a sanctuary that serves as the base of the war and without establishing a clear battle line as to avoid a decisive battle, all in order to expand its influence by gradually strengthening the concentration of its gradation of geographical control. This format of not drawing up and clarifying battles lines differs from the format of “regular warfare,” but it shares the similarity of having a geographical nature. Thus, the author considers warfare to be an act that is carried out between “territorial actors.”

It is important to bear in mind that the meanings of territorial existence and non-territorial existence differ greatly in the social sciences. In territorial existence, it is possible to develop one’s own military force without hindrance from government officials and to engage in the production of drugs, which are an agricultural product that form a large part of the raw materials. On the other hand, if the control extends to the mid- to long-term, administrative needs will arise in the form of taxation, police, medical care, welfare, and education for the people living in the areas under its control. Another significant characteristic of territorial existence is that it is accompanied by “visibility.” Territorial existence is not an imagined entity that is dependent on recognition and interpretation by human beings. As described above, even if its boundaries are ambiguous, it has an external form. Interests that are not easily eliminated will develop between the territorial existence and a higher-order wide-area governing body or the territorial actors in the surrounding region because the actors that possess a territory cannot move and leave that territory easily. In the history of humankind, war has been one of the methods for resolving this problem.

On the other hand, knowing at least where the geographical scope lies can also be a source of trust. While it is difficult to conduct negotiations and form agreements with non-territorial

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<sup>9</sup> U.S. DoD, *Irregular Warfare: Joint Operating Concept*, p. 8.

<sup>10</sup> Mao Zedong, “On Guerilla Warfare,” translated by Keiichi Fujita and Tomio Yoshida, *Chuokoron-Shinsha*, 2014, pp. 115-138.

actors that convert their unknown whereabouts and anonymity into a strength (we could also say that it is how they remain in existence), guerilla forces that are territorial actors are often invited to, and turn up at, events of international diplomacy as parties to peace negotiations and agreements. In this respect, despite the ambiguity, it is not considered appropriate to apply the term “non-state actor”—which is used to describe international organizations and multinational corporations—to guerilla forces that are territorial actors controlling a certain dominant territory and a reasonable number of troops. It may be more appropriate to label them as “military sub-state actors.”

Returning to the topic of the lower boundary of “irregular warfare,” despite not being a scholar specializing in terrorism research, I have previously given thought to its definition based on needs in security study. Based on that consideration, terrorism, like fraud or robbery, is the name given to a “means” that can be carried out by individuals or groups; terrorism lies in a completely different dimension from war, which is a collective behavior that accompanies the structural character of human society. Since terrorism is a “means,” there are organizations that employ only the method of terrorism exclusively, as well as other organizations that sometimes employ the means of terrorism, including guerilla organizations at war such as the Viet Cong and the drug cartels of Colombia that are criminal organizations working in times of peace. Within the boundaries of terrorism, there are acts carried out by individuals and acts that are undertaken only once. As the word suggests, terrorism is a means founded upon the act of terrorizing people. This differs from special military operations (commando operations) that target enemy hinterlands, where they infiltrate without being noticed where possible with the objective of causing destruction.

To sort out this problem, the author distinguishes between terrorism of the form represented by the conflicts in Northern Ireland and other forms of general terrorism based on the concept of “territorial terrorism war.” Territorial terrorism war can be said to be a state of war where those living in a territory that they recognize to be their own “motherland” ultimately choose to use terrorism as a means of fighting when they desire to engage in armed conflict, based on a common and shared identity among the residents of the territory, with the wish of gaining independence from or expelling rulers that they regard as the enemy or outsiders. The residents choose terrorism because of (1) a geographical environment that does not allow for a Mao-Zedong-style guerilla strategy of securing a base in a jungle or village in the case of an urbanized state or region, or (2) an overly large difference between them and the enemy, among other reasons that make it impossible for the residents to form a regular army or guerilla forces to confront the enemy.

General terrorism as a private form of social violence that has no geographical background typically comes to a conclusion when the terrorist is captured/killed. In contrast, in territorial terrorism war, it is difficult to reach a short-term solution through the use of force because a foundation of geographical and population support exists there and a decisive battle is avoided. In this sense, territorial terrorism war can be described as falling within the scope of the definition of the phrase “irregular warfare.”

Based on the author’s stance that war is of a geographical nature, territorial terrorism war can be perceived as a special type of war that takes place under circumstances where one of the

parties has completely lost the territory under its control, or when an ethnic group is present in the absence of a state government or a domain governed politically.<sup>11</sup> According to the author’s views, the boundary of “irregular warfare” stops here as far as terrorism is concerned.

### **3. The current global security environment in the context of “irregular warfare” discourse**

In the following section, the author shall provide a broad overview of the current security environment in the international community through time, from the perspective of world history.

One of the negative views of the concept of “irregular warfare” is the criticism that it lacks the “diachronic” aspect in the history of war. For example, Vacca and Davidson of the United States distinguish “regular warfare” from the concept of “irregular warfare” by explaining the following: “Deductively, analysts fail to apply the general body of knowledge about warfare to the specific situation at hand. ... Inductively, analysts fail to place the specific war into the accumulated body of general knowledge about warfare.”<sup>12</sup> To be sure, we can say that the institutionalization of sovereign states within the context of modernity after the mid-17th century is the premise for the asymmetrical warfare between a country that uses its regular army and an actor that cannot be described as a country. However, even after the Peace of Westphalia,<sup>13</sup> we should say that it was necessary to wait until the 20th century before this norm that originated in Western Europe spread across the world. The national character of the parties that the European empires fought against in Eurasia and Africa, outside of Europe, during the era of imperialism from the 18th to 19th century was not necessarily acknowledged by European countries at the time, even though some of the parties are known as “kingdoms” in the history textbooks of the present day, and there were also actors like the tribal federations in the wars in North America. As the integration as a single territorial state in other regions was not as clear-cut as in European countries during the same era, it was sometimes possible for feudal lords with their own territories in the monarchy to battle with the state, just like during the Shimonoseki War (which was more similar to a battle than a war). In the same way that privateers were completely prohibited at the start of the 20th century,<sup>14</sup> the concept of the “regular army” of a country has not necessarily been firmly present for a long time in history.

It has only been a short period of time—possibly less than a century to the present day—since the perception that the entity of war should be a regular state or its regular army began to be taken for granted around the world. Wars in which the warring entities are not regular countries have been a common event, such as in wars that took place in colonies during the 20th century. In modern-day Africa, long before the phrase “irregular warfare” came to

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<sup>11</sup> “Territorial terrorism war” here is very similar in concept to post-war resistance. The difference between the two lies in the fact that while the former is mainly carried out in an environment with a strong degree of civil order, which will be explained in greater detail later, the latter is carried out in a post-war environment as an extension of a military situation.

<sup>12</sup> Vacca, W.A., and Davidson, M., “The Regularity of Irregular Warfare,” *Parameters*, Spring 2011, p. 26.

<sup>13</sup> However, touching on the national character of the Holy Roman Empire as territorial state from the conclusion of the Peace of Westphalia to its dissolution by Napoleon, many have argued that the said treaty did not necessarily give birth to the sovereign state system of the present day as we may commonly think.

<sup>14</sup> Mamoru Inamoto, “A Historical View on the European Privateering and Piracy,” *Journal of the Tokyo University of Marine Science and Technology*, No. 5, 2009, pp. 5 and 51.

be used frequently, such forms of war were not unusual; in fact, they are considered to be a more frequent occurrence than “regular warfare.”<sup>15</sup> Much more so since during the long period of human history before the early modern or modern times, the concept of what constitutes a regular country or army itself was not always a clearly defined one. Hence, from a diachronic perspective, the idea of defining wars based on the classification of whether they are “regular” or “irregular” does not seem to hold much significance.

Today, “irregular warfare” has emerged as a popular topic in discussions. The development of this trend is probably founded in the significant fall in the number of “regular wars,” as indicated by statistics on the occurrence of wars. Wouldn’t any contemplation about the wars in the world, from which “regular warfare” is becoming an increasingly rare occurrence, necessarily mean that “irregular warfare” will come into the picture as well? In the end, if we were to consider this alongside with the discussion in the previous paragraph, “irregular warfare” is not an adequate concept to position the characteristics of a single format of war within the war history through the scale of human history; rather, we could say that it is a synchronic concept that reflects the way of war only within the security environment of the world today.

In fact, statistically, the number of wars that do not belong under the category of wars between countries has also continued in a declining trend in comparison with the Cold War period,<sup>16</sup> with the exception that it demonstrated a slight increase in number since around 2010 when the “Arab Spring” occurred.<sup>17</sup> Due to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between countries, the occurrence of “irregular warfare” looks more prominent, and we can also say that “irregular warfare” has become more localized around the world. While discussions of the subject tend to be focused on the qualitative changes of war, such quantitative changes should also not be neglected.

The decline in the number of wars between countries is taking place against the background of the international regime today, which offers few strategy choices for the weaker party apart from asymmetrical means of battle, in the face of major powers or multinational armies led by such major powers. In addition, for regular countries, the threshold for starting a war with another country is becoming extremely high. The author captures the latter situation within the framework of the growing degree of civil order in the world.<sup>18</sup>

The development of “civil order” reflects the ideas that have been woven into the social systems of modern Europe, which became the foundation for the modern social systems transplanted to countries around the world. In modern Western society, being “civil” or “civilized” has been perceived as the most important value. We can say that the form of

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<sup>15</sup> Ferreira, R., “Irregular Warfare in African Conflicts”, *Scientia Militaria - South African Journal of Military Studies*, Vol 38, No 1, 2010, p. 45, etc.

<sup>16</sup> For example, see Center for Systemic Peace, “Global Conflict Trend”, Figure 3: Global Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2016, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/conflictrends.html#fig3>; Goldstein, J.S. and Pinker, S., “War Really Is Going Out of Style?”, *New York Times*, Dec 17, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/opinion/sunday/war-really-is-going-out-of-style.html?mcubz=0>.

<sup>17</sup> In statistics, expressions such as “internal conflict” and “societal warfare” tend to be used.

<sup>18</sup> Tetsuya Endo, “An Essay on the Significance of Military Today The Retreat of Military Affairs?” *Journal of World Affairs*, December 2007, pp. 67-69.



discipline and order related to secular beings mainly consists of two types of order: “civil order” that is based on civic laws in a civilized society as well as a common understanding of manners and courtesies; and against that, “military order,” which is based on strength in the absence of rule of law, legal order and manners, or within uncivilized or savage circumstances. It is because of this savage environment that armies of civilized nations establish military law, so that they can carry out their activities in an orderly manner.

These two forms of order should, in the words of the author, be more accurately termed the “modes” of society. They are not black and white and do not offer a binary choice of one or the other. There is usually a gray area, or an area of gradation in between the two. In considerable parts of the world today, the concentration of military order has weakened significantly in comparison with past eras. The behavioral pattern of immediately attempting to solve any problems with violence, in the style of the *fehde* approach used among the aristocracy of Europe during medieval times, became regulated by modern sovereign kingdoms. As Anthony Giddens pointed out, modern nation states, as “bordered power containers,” have realized internal peace through the monopoly of violence.<sup>19</sup>

Having experienced the ravages of wars large and small across the modern times, the threshold for wars between countries is rising gradually, although this is not completely so across the board. The world itself has also made certain progress in the development of civil order to an extent where the outbreak of wars between countries would be accompanied by considerable friction. Of course, even in the world of today, as realists in the field of international relations theory may say, countries act based on national interest. While this may be true, the “military romanticism” that led youths in Europe to take the initiative and form queues at enlistment centers which would bring them into the battlefields during the First World War, such as vulgarized chivalry among the masses, as well as the epic stories told by national government, are no more than anachronisms today. The mobilization of the masses to go into war is no longer as easy a task for countries as they were in the early half of the 20th century. It is more difficult for countries today, compared to countries of the past, to exercise their military powers or send warships into the ports of other countries. Of course, the author is not advocating a Hegelian progressive view of history; hence, he is not necessarily saying here that the development of civil order and retreat of military affairs is an irreversible and inevitable fact, nor does he think that the significance of military affairs is being extinguished from the modern world. However, in discussions about military affairs and security, where the agenda tends to be established based on anxiety or a recognition of threat concerning a certain target or phenomenon, there may be value to examining the trends of the times from a more diachronic and comprehensive perspective.

## Conclusion

Advancements in the development of civil order is, in principle, a positive trend. However, the growing development of civil order in the world, accompanied by the rising threshold for war, means that there is a stronger possibility than before for any entity to attempt to profit,

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<sup>19</sup> Giddens, A., *The Nation State and Violence*, University of California Press, 1982, p. 4, p. 120.

or to deliver a blow to its adversary or competitor, through means other than legal or illegal direct violence in which the visibility or potential for identification of the act or actor is low, such as information manipulation or sabotage, or through exercising physical violence that cannot be labeled either as “war” or “military acts”—in other words, through attacks or means of coercion other than war.<sup>20</sup> The dynamics for this are similar to changes in criminal tactics as a result of the development of social norms, which has made it difficult to carry out extortion on the streets through an explicit and blatant display of violence, leading to the emergence of intellectual offenses such as telephone scams and cyber-fraud.

From the perspective of broadly defining the phrase “irregular warfare” as a form of war that also uses means other than military power, as well as the perspective based on the concept of “hybrid wars” that has been used increasingly in recent years, the use of “attacks or means of coercion other than war” here may perhaps be seen as a component of war, or as war itself. To be sure, if they are “supporting attacks” used in parallel with purely military attacks, they should probably be regarded as a part of war; even if they were carried out as single events, there may be cases where they are regarded as serious events or indirect invasions that call for firm, emergency response, including the introduction of military intervention. However, we should be cautious in discussing phenomenon that can be identified as an “attack,” carried out based on such means, in the context of “war” without any hesitation right from the start.

The Danish academician, Ole Wæver, put forth the concepts of “securitization” and “de-securitization.” He mentioned that the act of defining an issue as a “security issue” is a form of social behavior in itself, in the sense that it gives rise to the following context: “the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures, and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure,” explaining the importance of that act itself.<sup>21</sup> Based on a similar line of thought, defining an act in the civil domain that can be interpreted as an attack on any person in any form as “war” immediately; this could introduce the military context into civil society and give rise to social context or dynamics, which is different from viewing the act as an event or crime that has occurred in society, such as a zero-sum perspective of victory or defeat, continuous tolerance or limitations until the final defeat of the enemy, the prioritized injection of social resources, etc.

In the past, when free cities of Europe were surrounded and attacked, civil order would be suspended temporarily and a form of order based on martial law, which shifts the society into military mode, would be put in place. However, in order to prevent problems in the civil domain from being converted to the context of military order or marshal law for as long as possible, it is considered appropriate to put the greatest effort into dealing with such problems

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<sup>20</sup> The author organizes the respective characteristics based on the following three points: “stealth,” in which the presence of the entity or the dangers that it poses are difficult to detect, or where the facts are difficult to determine; “dualism,” in which national/public elements are used alongside with civil elements, or where the two types of elements are difficult to distinguish; “niche,” in which new methods are adopted, such as technological development, weaknesses arising as a result of social changes, the gap between laws and systems, etc.

<sup>21</sup> Wæver, O., “Security Analysis: Conceptual Apparatus”, in Buzan, B., Wæver, O., de Wilde, J., *Security: A New Framework of Analysis*, (Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp. 23-24, Wæver, O., “Securitization and De-securitization” in Lipschutz, R. D., (ed.); *On Security*, (Columbia University, 1995), pp. 54-57.

from within the civil mode. Defining “war” in the international security environment of the present day is increasingly becoming an issue that calls for more careful review for each separate occasion.

