

Formation of Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

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Introduction

It is well known that Kumao Nishimura, Director-General of the Treaties Bureau of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs involved in the signing of the former Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, once commented that the Japan-U.S. relationship under this treaty had the nature of "cooperation regarding material things and people."¹ In other words, it was characterized by Japan's provision of military bases ("material things") to the United States and by the United States' provision of its forces ("people") to protect Japan. Over the course of time, this relationship gradually evolved and increasingly took on the form of "cooperation regarding people and people." The basic framework underlying the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, however, long remained "cooperation regarding material things and people." In recent years, this foundation has seen a significant transformation. While the Japan-U.S. security arrangements have undergone a number of changes since their formation, they may now be at their greatest turning point.

This paper analyzes the period of the formation of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements from Japan's point of view. Needless to say, the Shigeru Yoshida government left a considerable mark on this formation. During his government, Japan's defense capabilities were reconstructed based on the country's close relationship with the United States, let alone the signing of the former Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1951. This period also witnessed Japan's postwar rearmament program from the launch of the National Police Reserve in 1950 to the establishment of the Defense Agency and the Self-Defense Forces in 1954. For this reason Yoshida's decision-making and vision have been the focus of many studies.²

His chief aims were to swiftly conclude a peace treaty and to recover the economy of Japan. Meanwhile, the Japanese government faced the unprecedented challenge of ensuring

¹ Kumao Nishimura, *Shirizu Sengoshi no Shōgen—Senryō to Kōwa: (7) San Furanshisuko Heiwa Jōyaku Nichibei Anpo Jōyaku* [Testimony on Post-war History Series—Occupation and Peace: (7) San Francisco Peace Treaty and Japan-U.S. Security Treaty] (Tokyo: Chuokoron-Shinsha, 1999), pp. 47-48.

² For example, see: Hideo Otake, *Saigunbi to Nashonarizumu: Hoshu, Riberaru, Shakaiminshushugisha no Bōeikan* [Rearmament and Nationalism: Defense Perspectives of Conservatives, Liberals, and Social Democrats] (Tokyo: Chuokoron-Sha, 1988); Sumio Hatano, "'Saigunbi' wo meguru seijirikigaku: Bōeiryoku 'zenzō e no dōtei'" [The political dynamics surrounding rearmament: The path towards gradual increase of defense capabilities], *Nenpō Kindai Nihon Kenkyū* [Journal of Modern Japanese Studies], No. 11 (1989); Narahiko Toyoshita, *Anpo Jōyaku no Seiritsu: Yoshida Gaikō ti Tennō Gaikō* [Establishment of the Security Treaty: Yoshida Diplomacy and Emperor Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996); Hiroshi Nakanishi, *"Kōwa ni muketa Yoshida Shigeru no anzenhoshōkosō"* [Shigeru Yoshida's security vision for peace], Yukio Ito and Minoru Kawada, eds., *Kantaiheiyō no Kokusai Chitsujo no Mosaku to Nihon: Daiichiji Sekai Taisengo kara Gojūgo Nen Taisei Seiritsu* [Examination of the International Order in the Pacific Rim and Japan: From WWI to the Establishment of the 1955 System] (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1999); Kazuya Sakamoto, *Nichibei Dōmei no Kizuna: Anpo Jōyaku to Sōgosei no Mosaku* [Japan-U.S. Alliance Ties: Examination of the Security Treaty and Mutuality] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku Publishing, 2000); and Ayako Kusunoki, *Yoshida Shigeru to Anzen Hoshō Seisaku no Keisei* [Shigeru Yoshida and the Formation of His Security Policy] (Kyoto: Minerva Shobo, 2009).

national security in the post-peace treaty period—a challenge arising from the Cold War spreading to East Asia and a heated war that broke out in 1950 in the Korean Peninsula. The Yoshida government chose the course of gradually rebuilding Japan's defense capabilities in a way that did not undermine the economic recovery process as much as possible. This was done simultaneously with signing a bilateral security treaty with the United States to keep providing military bases to the United States following the conclusion of a peace treaty, and relying on the United States for Japan's security for the time being.

This is not to suggest that the nature of the bilateral security relationship, namely, “cooperation regarding material things and people,” was taken for granted in Japan from this time. There were various debates over the future vision of the Japan-U.S. security relationship in the post-peace treaty period, not only among opposition parties such as the Social Democratic Party of Japan, but also among politicians from conservative parties including Ichiro Hatoyama as well as former officers of the Imperial Army and Navy. This paper focuses on the arguments made by actors who were critical of the security policies of the Yoshida government, especially those on the conservative side of the political spectrum. By so doing, this paper examines the characteristics of the security policies chosen by the Yoshida government, in particular of the relations with the United States.

Signing of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty

In September 1951, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was signed on the evening of the same day as the San Francisco Peace Treaty. In stark contrast to the spectacular signing ceremony held for the Treaty of Peace with Japan (San Francisco Peace Treaty) at the War Memorial Opera House, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was signed at the noncommissioned officers club at the Presidio of the Sixth U.S. Army headquarters in the outskirts of San Francisco.

As is well known, this former Security Treaty was unfair to Japan. Under the “Far East article,” Japan assumed an obligation to provide military bases to the United States. Conversely, the Treaty stated that the U.S. Forces in Japan in the post-peace treaty period pursuant to the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty “may be utilized” for the defense of Japan, but this was not an obligation. Furthermore, the Treaty provided that the U.S. Forces Japan may be mobilized at the request of the Japanese government in the event of internal disturbances in Japan, and this “internal disturbances clause” was also viewed unfavorably. Further still, though treaties ordinarily have a period of validity, the former Security Treaty did not have a period of validity. Moreover, the treaty did not require the United States to consult Japan about major movements of military units into and out of U.S. bases in Japan, or regarding equipment modifications. In short, its content made it anything but a treaty signed between equal states. Against this backdrop, Japan later requested a revision of the Security Treaty to the United States.³

Apart from the content of the treaty, dissatisfaction also arose over aspects of the Japan-U.S. security relationship that came to the forefront on the basis of the treaty. First of all, there was dissatisfaction over the continued stationing of the U.S. Forces, even after the signing of

³ See Sakamoto, *Nichibei Dōmei no Kizuna*, etc.

the peace treaty. In other words, there was dissatisfaction over the continued presence of many foreign forces, despite the end of Japan's occupation and Japan regaining its independence. The constant presence of foreign forces in Japan was met with greater resistance compared to today.⁴

Secondly, dissatisfaction arose over the structure of the National Police Reserve. The National Police Reserve was established in August 1950 by eliminating former career military officers and appointing former police officials to senior positions. The organization of units and training approaches were modeled on the U.S. Forces, with instructors from the U.S. Forces providing guidance.⁵ This situation drew criticism from critics who viewed that the National Police Reserve was a mercenary of the U.S. Forces.

Shigeru Yoshida's Vision

The vision of Shigeru Yoshida, then Prime Minister of Japan, was something like the following: give priority to restoring the Japanese economy that suffered a major setback due to the war; proceed with Japan's armament as gradually as possible so as not to undermine the economic recovery process; and relying on the United States for security for the time being.

Although Yoshida was anti-communist, he perceived that the Cold War would not become a heated war, i.e., it would not have direct repercussions on Japan and the Soviet Union would not invade Japan. Additionally, while Yoshida was not completely against revising the Constitution, he at the very least did not share the same enthusiasm of other politicians discussed later; rather, Yoshida sought to utilize this as a type of shield to circumvent pressure from the United States to enhance Japan's defense capabilities.⁶

It was not that Yoshida had no interest in the nature of Japan's armament or that he believed military capabilities had no significance in postwar Japan. He envisioned training an "exemplary military force" in the long-term. By this Yoshida meant a new military force suitable for a democratic nation and different from the prewar Japanese army. Yoshida envisaged developing such an organization from a long-term perspective. Here in lies one of the reasons for his reluctance to expand Japan's defense capabilities rapidly. Should Japan attempt a rapid expansion of its defense capabilities, it would inevitably need to recruit large numbers of former Japanese military personnel. Yoshida's wish was to create a new military force modeled on the U.S. military organization.

Yoshida's vision to train a new organization from a long-term perspective can also be seen especially from his eagerness to establish the National Defense Academy of Japan. He

⁴ For example, see: Kiichi Miyazawa, *Shirizu Sengoshi no Shōgen—Senryō to Kōwa: (1) Tokyo-Washington no Mitsudan* [Testimony on Post-war History Series—Occupation and Peace: (1) Tokyo-Washington Confidential Talks] (Tokyo: Chuokoron-Shinsha, 1999), pp. 129-130.

⁵ Shingo Nakajima, *Sengo Nihon no Bōei Seisaku: "Yoshida Rosen" wo meguru Seiji, Gaikō, Gunji* [Defense Policy of Postwar Japan: Politics, Diplomacy and Military Affairs over "Yoshida's Policy Line"] (Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2006), Chapter 1.

⁶ Hatano, "'Saigunbi' wo meguru seijirikigaku," pp. 186-195; Otake, *Saigunbi to Nashonarizumu*, pp. 62-65; and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ed., *Nihon Gaikō Bunsho: Heiwa Jōyaku no Teiketsu ni kansuru Chōsho Dai 1 Satsu* [Japan's Diplomatic Documents: Record Regarding the Conclusion of the Peace Treaty, Vol. 1] (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002), p. 559.

believed that postwar Japan's new military force can be realized for the first time after a new officer training system got off the ground. Yoshida was not only involved in the selection of the principal; he made visits (at times sudden visits) to the National Defense Academy, both while he was Prime Minister and after leaving office, and gave encouragement to the students who came under social scrutiny at the time.⁷

Ichiro Hatoyama

Unlike Yoshida with a diplomat's background, Ichiro Hatoyama was a politician belonging to a political party from before World War II. Though he became somewhat of an enemy to Yoshida late in life, Hatoyama and Yoshida were comrades when Japan was headed towards war during the prewar period and were both looked upon with disdain by the regime. After the war ended, the political party led by Hatoyama won the first postwar general election, and thus, Hatoyama was set to become the Prime Minister. However, he was purged from public office at the decision of the GHQ, and entrusted Yoshida to become Prime Minister. From then on the relationship between the two gradually became a strained relationship.

The purge from public office was lifted in 1951, and Hatoyama returned to politics in 1952. He went on to become a leading politician condemning the rearmament policy of Yoshida. Hatoyama's priorities varied by time period and, also, Hatoyama gradually changed his arguments, making them elusive.

At least until around the time Hatoyama returned to politics, he advocated the most for revising the Constitution for Japan's rearmament. He shared Yoshida's opposition to communism, but differed from Yoshida in regarding outside powers as a strong threat. He denied the Yoshida government's "gradual rearmament" approach of rearming without revising the Constitution, describing it as deceiving. He pushed for establishing a self-defense force and adopting a conscription system upon revising the Constitution. In addition, he criticized that the National Police Reserve acted as the mercenary of the U.S. Forces and was useless. In this regard, Hatoyama's views contradicted with Yoshida's vision to establish a new organization modeled on the U.S. Forces.⁸ As will be discussed later, Hatoyama's views were influenced by former military officers.

In this vein Hatoyama stated as follows. Following the signing of the peace treaty, "The post-WWII strategic thought is premised on Japan participating actively in the defense mechanism created by democratic nations and playing a role in joint defense." "This does not mean Japan is entrusting national defense to other countries; it means Japan will build up defense capabilities and organize a joint formation with the troops of other countries. Accordingly, Japan needs to rearm itself after gaining independence." "The reality needs to

⁷ Nakajima, *Sengo Nihon no Bōei Seisaku*, pp. 30-32; and Military History Department, The National Institute for Defense Studies, ed., *Sakuma Makoto Ōraru Historii Jō* [Oral History of Makoto Sakuma, Vol. I] (Tokyo: The National Institute for Defense Studies, 2007), pp. 29-30.

⁸ Ichiro Hatoyama, *Hatoyama Ichiro Kaisōroku* [Memoir of Ichiro Hatoyama] (Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 1957), p. 91; Kiyotada Tsutsui, *Ishibashi Tanzan: Jiyūshugi Seijika no Kiseki* [Tanzan Ishibashi: The Course of a Liberal Politician] (Tokyo: Chuokoron-Sha, 1986), pp. 8-43; and Ichiro Hatoyama, "Kueru nihon no kensetsu" [Building a vibrant Japan], *Toyo Keizai Shinpo*, No. 2486 (August 1951), pp. 31-32.

set in that there is no other course to maintain peace but armament.”⁹

Hatoyama advocated the need for rearmament, and emphasized that Japan should, in the future, participate in a collective defense mechanism created among democratic nations. He did not seek independent defense. Meanwhile, compared to Yoshida, Hatoyama was slightly less keen about Japan-U.S. security arrangements. While Hatoyama never directly denied such arrangements, he considered that the bilateral security relationship had relative importance, stating that if a regional collective defense mechanism like NATO were established, it could cover Japan-U.S. security.¹⁰ This is not surprising given how Hatoyama criticized Yoshida’s foreign policy as being exclusively devoted to the United States, while urging for the restoration of Japan-Soviet diplomatic relations and the diversification of Japanese diplomacy.

Hatoyama and Yoshida differed also on their stances towards issues in relation to the U.S. Forces Japan. Following the signing of the peace treaty, Hatoyama and his circle discussed the withdrawal of the U.S. Forces Japan in connection with the establishment of a self-defense force, whereas the Yoshida Cabinet gave hardly any emphasis to the withdrawal of the U.S. Forces Japan. After Japan signed the peace treaty and gained independence, over 200,000 U.S. troops were stationed in Japan in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, leading to the outbreak of anti-base movements all across Japan. The public sentiment grew stronger that the U.S. Forces Japan represented only a change in name from “occupation forces” to “stationed forces,” accompanied by no change in the situation, and that their presence was an extension of the occupation.¹¹

Yoshida considered that the presence of the U.S. Forces Japan would reduce Japan’s defense expenses, at least for the time being, which would have positive effects on the economic recovery of Japan. Yoshida construed this issue in terms of finances, not nationalism. He of course did not see this issue as one that the Cabinet should resolve.¹²

Former Military Officers

Next we turn to the situation of former career military officers. The Imperial Army and Navy were dismantled after WWII, causing military officers to lose their jobs and be expelled from public office. Some of them nevertheless engaged in demobilization work, or conducted rearmament studies on the sidelines of their war history research. All were former officers who had core roles in the Army and Navy. Some, valued for their military experience and knowledge, even gained close access to politicians.

Those joining Hatoyama’s circle were former military officers who were critical of the

⁹ Ichiro Hatoyama, “*Kokumin to tomoni nan ni omomukan*” [Facing Up to Difficulties with the People], *Saiken* [Rebuilding], Vol. 5, No. 8 (September 1951), pp. 32-33.

¹⁰ Ichiro Hatoyama, *Aru Daigishi no Seikatsu to Iken* [The Life and Opinions of a Certain Diet Member] (Tokyo: Tokyo Shuppan, 1952), pp. 287-288.

¹¹ Hideo Otake, ed., *Sengo Nihon Bōei Mondai Shiryōshū Dai 3 Kan Jieitai no Sōsetsu* [Collection of Materials on Postwar Japan Defense Issues, Vol. III, Establishment of the Self-Defense Forces] (Tokyo: San-ichi Publishing, 1993), pp. 712-714; and Kichi Taisaku Zenkoku Renraku Kaigi, ed., *Nihon no Gunji Kichi* [Military Bases in Japan] (Tokyo: Shin-Nihon Publishing, 1983), pp. 203-205.

¹² Shigeru Yoshida, *Kaisō Jūnen Dai 4 Kan* [Ten-Year Memoir, Vol. IV] (Tokyo: Chuokoron-Sha, 1998), pp. 42-43.

Yoshida government's rearmament policy. The "Hattori Group" is a representative example. It consisted of around 10 people in total—principally former operations officers of the General Staff Office, in addition to directors and members of the General Staff Office and the Army Ministry closely affiliated with the Operations Division. The Group continued its activities, united by strong solidarity even as fissures spread among many former Imperial Army officers. Under the protection of Major General Charles A. Willoughby of GHQ's G2 Section, the Group maintained a keen interest in rearmament and drew up a plan for rebuilding a new force led by former military officers including Hattori.¹³

When the establishment of the National Police Reserve was decided, Willoughby sought but failed to make Hattori the head of its uniformed personnel. Wishing to create a postwar defense mechanism that made a qualitatively clean break from the prewar mechanism, Yoshida shunned these moves, seeing Hattori and his group as a symbol of the Imperial Army. In 1951, during John Foster Dulles' visit to Japan, Yoshida met with General Douglas MacArthur and stated as follows:

The 50,000-person security force I proposed to Ambassador Dulles is precisely what we want to develop into an outstanding democratic military force. For this reason, we want to create an outstanding Western-style General Staff Office in the future. We would like the assistance of good U.S. military personnel. Japan gradually came to have a German-style army because we asked Germany's General Meckel to be our advisor during the Meiji Period. Japan must not repeat this mistake. We do not want to utilize the kind of Japanese military personnel who are with General Willoughby.¹⁴

An examination of Hattori and his group's views regarding rearmament and the Japan-U.S. security arrangements reveals the following. Their greatest priority was securing Japan's autonomy in defense. Around the time of the Yoshida-Dulles meeting, the Hattori Group submitted a written opinion to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which stated: "1. The primary objective of settling the peace treaty issue for Japan is to restore its autonomy, self-reliance, and the independence of a self-defending nation; the establishment of a tributary relationship shall be strictly rejected"; and "2. A situation where Japan relies on another country to defend itself or where Japan's national defense is subject to the wishes of another country shall be avoided by all means."¹⁵

¹³ Kumao Imoto, "*Iwayuru hattori gurūpu no kaisō* [Memoir of the "Hattori Group"] (January 1995). Author's interview of Kumao Imoto (January 15, 1996). Imoto is a former Army Colonel and a key member of the Hattori Group. Ichiro Hatoyama and Kaoru Hatoyama, Takashi Ito and Yoshiya Suetake, eds., *Hatoyama Ichiro Kaoru Nikki Jōkan: Hatoyama Ichirohen* [Diary of Ichiro and Kaoru Hatoyama, Vol. I, Volume of Ichiro Hatoyama], (Tokyo: Chuokoron-Shinsha, 1999), p. 755; and Yomiuri Shimbum Sengoshihan, ed., "*Saigunbi*" *no Kiseki* [Path of "Rearmament"] (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbum, 1981), pp. 300-304.

¹⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ed., *Nihon Gaikō Bunsho Heiwa Jōyaku no Teiketsu ni kansuru Chōsho Dai 2 Satsu (IV and V)* [Japan's Diplomatic Documents: Record Regarding the Conclusion of the Peace Treaty, Vol. 2 (IV and V)] (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001), p. 53.

¹⁵ "*Kōwa mondai gunji yōkō* [Guidelines for the military on peace issues] (January 15, 1951), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ed., *Nihon Gaikō Bunsho Heiwa Jōyaku no Teiketsu ni kansuru Chōsho Dai 1 Satsu*, p. 911.

Even if the stationing of the U.S. Forces following the signing of the peace treaty is inevitable for the defense of Japan, Hattori and his group conceived that this was a provisional measure, and that the U.S. Forces should withdraw from Japan once the Constitution was revised, a self-defense force was created, and the arrangements were in place. They expected the arrangements would take five years to be almost completed and eight years for completion. They aimed to have the U.S. Army and Navy begin withdrawing from Japan three years after the “new forces” was established, and to have the withdrawal finished in two years.¹⁶

They believed that collaboration and joint responses between the navies and air forces of Japan and the United States were necessary in the event of a contingency in Japan. They were, however, discontent with the Yoshida Cabinet’s rearmament policy that was modeled on the U.S. Forces, all the while relying on the United States for the equipment needed for the establishment of a self-defense force. In addition, Hattori and his group had a favorable view of the Imperial Army. “While it is true that the Imperial Japanese Army was defeated, this army with an 80-year heritage is revered by the great powers. While its weaknesses (e.g., separation from supreme command politics, political rule by the military, belittling of material force and rationalism in tactics, and negligence of individuals’ dignity [lynching]) should be done away with, its strengths should be respected. Notwithstanding this, the leaders of the Self-Defense Forces have the ideology of full denial of the Imperial Japanese Army, and are still eager to imitate the U.S. Forces.” They criticized that “the Self-Defense Forces neglect the national power, ethnic characteristics, and traditions of Japan and are a complete imitation of the U.S. Forces.”¹⁷

What were the views of the former Imperial Japanese Navy officers? They too conducted research on rearmament while engaging in demobilization work. Like the Hattori Group, they advocated that Japan rearm itself upon revising the Constitution.¹⁸ Interestingly the officers and the Hattori Group shared the view that the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan was a provisional measure. They forecast that Japan’s defense capabilities would be developed in around eight years, following which the U.S. Forces would withdraw from Japan, according to a medium-term outlook of the Maritime Security Force.¹⁹ This is very interesting if we consider the stance towards the U.S. Forces Japan upheld by what later became the Maritime Self-Defense Force.

On the other hand, the officers were very much aware that defense cooperation with the United States was needed in the post-peace treaty period and considered it essential. This

¹⁶ “*Shin-gunbi kensetsu yōkō*” (April 1954), *Hara Shiro Shiryō 1* [Historical Records of Shiro Hara 1] (Collection of Yasukuni Kaiko Bunko).

¹⁷ “*Jiei gunbi kensetsu ni kansuru iken*” [Opinion on creating self-defense armaments] (April 1954), *Hara Shiro Shiryō 1*.

¹⁸ “*Dai 2 ji tokushu kenkyū shiryō*” [Special research materials II] (April 10, 1951), *Kyū Kaigun Zanmu Shori Kikan ni okeru Gunbi Saiken ni kansuru Kenkyū Shiryō 2/3* [Research Materials on Armament Rebuilding at the Former Navy Backlog Processing Organization 2/3] (Collection of Military History Research Center, The National Institute for Defense Studies).

¹⁹ “*Bettsatsu keibiryoku zōsei keikaku an*” [Supplement: Draft plan on enhancing the security force] (June 16, 1952), *Yamamoto Shiryō: Kaijō Bōeiryoku Saiken Kankei* [Yamamoto Materials: Related to Rebuilding Naval Defense Capability] (Collection of Military History Research Center, The National Institute for Defense Studies).

was in stark contrast to the view held by the former Imperial Army officers that while yes the United States would be supplying the equipment, there was little to learn from the country. Like Yoshida, the former naval officers were intent on actively incorporating the practices of the U.S. Forces in forming a new organization. Former Navy rear admiral Yoshio Yamamoto, representative of the former Imperial Japanese Navy officers and also the point of contact with the government, reminisced as follows. “Since we were initially receiving U.S. vessels and using U.S. weapons, the trainings and other activities rested on basically forgetting everything about the customs and other aspects of the previous Japanese Navy and doing everything the American way. We believed that once we had mastered it, we can then look back on the previous Japanese Navy, incorporate its strengths, and create an even better organization.”²⁰

In the “Main points serving as basis of troop size decision” deemed to have been prepared around the same time, it is stated that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty signed at this point in time when Japan had no armaments was a political agreement, but that a military agreement is anticipated to be signed with the United States after Japan rearmed itself.²¹ With regard to the right to command in the military agreement, it is stated that, “The Japanese and U.S. forces would introduce a unified command system in principle,” and goes on to say that Japan would dispatch the commander for “maintaining security on the Japanese mainland and blocking and fighting off an adversary’s invasion force, conducting surveillance over the main waterworks and ports along Japan’s coast as well as having command and control of straits, and providing maritime escort for Japanese fleets navigating in foreign waters.” At the same time, in the operations classification of “destruction of an adversary’s air force, bombing of an adversary’s politico-military production and transportation strategic points, and destruction of an adversary’s naval force and ships,” Japan would take actions under the command of a U.S. Forces’ commander.²²

While they depended on the situation of the operation, it is interesting vis-a-vis the discussions of the Hattori Group which attached the greatest importance to the pursuit of Japan’s autonomy, as well as the discussions within the National Security Board at the time, that the officers anticipated scenarios in which Japan came under U.S. command. With regard to the nature of the Japan-U.S. defense cooperation in a contingency, especially with respect to the commander, Osamu Kaihara, former head of security with the National Security Board, advocated that, “Though it is in the name of the defense of Japan, someone from the U.S. Forces can be the commander since the U.S. Forces is far more powerful than the Japanese forces.” First Chief of Staff Keizo Hayashi opposed this idea, stating, “It is absurd that a commander of the Japanese-U.S. forces for defending Japan be an American.”²³ This was another point on which there was a significant divergence between the Army and the Navy.

²⁰ “*Nihon kaigun saiken urabanashi*” [An inside story of the rebuilding of the Japanese Navy] (December 16, 1960), *Nomura Kichisaburo Bunsho* [Documents of Kichisaburo Nomura] (Collection of the Constitutional Government Reference Room, National Diet Library), No. 818.

²¹ “*Heiryokuryō kettei no zentei to narubeki shoyōkō*” [Main points serving as basis of troop size decision], *Yamamoto Shiryō: Kaijō Bōeiryoku Saiken Kankei*.

²² Ibid.

²³ C.O.E. Project for Oral History and Policy Enrichment, *Kaihara Osamu Ōraru Hisutorī Jō* [Osamu Kaihara’s Oral History, Vol. I] (National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, 2001), p. 330.

The Shigemitsu Proposal

In the end of 1954, the Yoshida Cabinet resigned and was replaced by the Ichiro Hatoyama government. The policy speech of the Cabinet set forth that “the stationed forces would be withdrawn at an early date by swiftly establishing an independent defense posture.”²⁴

It is well known that in summer 1955, then Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu and Secretary of State Dulles held a meeting during which Shigemitsu brought up the issue of revising the security treaty, which was flatly rejected by Dulles. In preparation for the meeting, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had prepared a proposal at Shigemitsu’s instructions for revising the security treaty and switching to a mutual defense treaty.²⁵

The proposal set out that while mutual defense would not be invoked automatically, it would be invoked upon completing the procedures in the Constitution if either country sustains an armed attack. The proposal established the two countries’ territories in the Western Pacific and regions under their administrative rights as falling within the geographic scope of joint defense, and that the overseas dispatch of their troops would be obligatory within this limited scope.

The fact that the full withdrawal of the U.S. Forces Japan was included is another feature of the proposal. At this time, the Hatoyama Cabinet sought to establish (but failed to realize) a defense capabilities development plan called the Six-Year Defense Plan. The plan was to be put into action, and the U.S. ground forces in Japan were to be withdrawn within three months upon the execution of the plan. Furthermore, the naval and air forces were to be withdrawn within six years of the withdrawal of the ground forces. In short, it was envisioned that the U.S. Forces Japan would be fully withdrawn by 1961.

While this treaty proposal was never presented to Dulles, it served as the basis for exchanging views with the U.S. Embassy in Japan ahead of the Shigemitsu-Dulles meeting. In other words, the proposal did not simply remain as a concept within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Takeso Shimoda, Director-General of the Treaties Bureau who explained this proposal, stated as follows, while stressing they were his personal views: “Japan is not a truly independent nation if it is asking foreign forces to be stationed to defend the country. That is why the nation’s forces will be enhanced so that foreign forces can return to their countries, and Japan can enter into a mutual defense relationship with foreign countries on an equal footing.”²⁶ His comments are a testament to how concretely and how strongly the Japanese government at the time wished to secure autonomy in national security.

²⁴ Policy speech (January 22, 1955), <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/>.

²⁵ For more information regarding the Shigemitsu proposal and the August meeting with Dulles, see: Sakamoto, *Nichibei Dōmei no Kizuna*, pp. 142-164; and Sumio Hatano, *Rekishi to shiten no Nichibei Anpo Jōyaku: Kimitsu Gaikō Kiroku ga Akasu “Mitsuyaku” no Kyojitsu* [Japan-U.S. Security Treaty as History: The Truth of the “Secret Agreement” Revealed by Confidential Diplomatic Archives] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2010), pp. 29-43.

²⁶ “*Nihonkoku to amerika gatshūkoku tonō aida no sōgo bōei jōyaku (shian)*” [Mutual defense treaty between Japan and the United States of America (draft)], (July 27, 1955), Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, H22-003,062-2010-0791-08.

Conclusion

Nobusuke Kishi sat in on the Shigemitsu-Dulles meeting. Kishi became prime minister in 1957. Issues related to the U.S. Forces Japan also issued in this period, turning into largely destabilizing factors for the Japan-U.S. relationship. Kishi therefore proceeded to build up Japan's defense capabilities in order to advance the withdrawal of the U.S. ground forces in Japan. Like the earlier Shigemitsu proposal, however, Kishi never called for the complete withdrawal of the U.S. Forces Japan.

Meanwhile, it is unclear what Kishi's real intentions were behind maintaining close defense relations with the United States. Yoshida may have been the only person who had a clear stance on this issue. If anything, Kishi never opposed it.

Kishi succeeded in revising the security treaty. As a result, the U.S. obligation to defend Japan was stated in the treaty, the "internal disturbances clause" was deleted, and a pre-consultation system was introduced while the issue of "secret agreement" remained. Consequently, the inequality found in the former treaty was significantly improved for Japan.

Kishi's initial vision was to achieve the revision of the security treaty, maintain long-term rule based on this political achievement, revise the Constitution, and amend the security treaty into a mutual defense treaty. Thus, his plan was to revise the security treaty in two stages. Kishi ultimately resigned without being able to realize this plan. In his comments regarding Kishi's revision of the security treaty, Kumao Nishimura noted that although inequality for Japan was amended, there was no change to the "cooperation regarding material things and people" that is at the essence of the treaty created during Yoshida's rule.²⁷

Under the revised security treaty, the size of the U.S. Forces Japan changed but the forces remained permanently stationed thereafter. The Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces all evolved in varying degrees based on close relations with the U.S. Forces.

The permanent stationing of the U.S. Forces on the Japanese mainland and the close Japan-U.S. defense relationship may not appear all that unnatural today, more than 60 years after the security treaty was signed. The 1950s, however, were a time when the prewar national defense arrangements were still fresh in people's memory. This was also the period when the protracted U.S. occupation ended and Japan finally restored its status as an independent nation. In this context, it can be imagined that the desire to gain greater autonomy or to regain autonomy in the areas of defense and security was stronger then it is today among many Japanese people, including government officials.

The aspects of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements formed during the Yoshida government did not emerge out of an attempt at considering nationalism. There were thus aspects of the arrangements that were viewed with discomfort, even within the policy community. Conversely, these aspects could be considered the characteristics of the policy Yoshida decided.

²⁷ Sakamoto, *Nichibei Dōmei no Kizuna*, pp. 266-267.