

Presentations

Allies of a Kind: American-Japanese Mutual Defense Agreements, 1951-52 and 1960

Allan R. Millett

Like the traditional warning in gift shops—"you break it, it's yours!"—the defense relationship of Japan and the United States between 1945 and 1960 reflected the fragile strategic realignments that followed Japan's defeat in World War II. That two bitter enemies of 1941-1945 could become defense partners testifies to growth of the power of the Soviet Union, awkward American globalism, and Asian anti-imperialism. The Cold War narrative, however, overlooks the historic rivalry of Japan, China, and Russia, especially the role of Russia as a sometime ally of China after the 18th century. Japan and China faced each other as rivals before Karl Marx first inhaled the fetid industrial air of London. For Russia its late entry into the Asian war in 1945 did not satisfy the Russian lust for revenge for its defeat of 1904-1905.¹

The postwar defense policy of the United States evolved in the late 1940s as a response to Soviet bellicosity, designed to add Germany to Stalin's eastern European empire. Soviet pressures on NATO, on the evolving European economic union, and on Great Britain's struggle for redefinition as an offshore European nation kept the struggle for Europe the central concern of American defense policy. In Asia the great events were Japan's loss of empire, China's fall to a socialist revolution, and the wave of anti-colonial revolts that freed nations from Pakistan to Indonesia. For the United States, which placed Asian interests behind those of Europe and the Middle East, the strategic concept of nuclear deterrence and forward, collective defense seemed appropriate wherever the Soviets presented a military challenge. In the Asia-Pacific region Japan fit well into this concept along with the Philippines, Korea, and Taiwan. The fall-back line included Guam, Hawai'i, Alaska, New Zealand, and Australia.²

The Korean War and the imperialism of the People's Republic of China in Malaya and Indochina gave mounting immediacy to converting a reformed Japan into an armed ally, not a crushed former enemy. Mao Zedong made the transformation easier by charging that Japan still wanted to rule an Asian-Pacific empire. Japan would use the United States as its military instrument and Taiwan and South Korea as its junior partners. As the Chinese Communists analyzed their own strategic challenges, they saw Japan as a European wolf disguised as an

¹ The basic study of the Truman Administration's postwar national security policy remains Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992). The American scholarship on US-Japanese relations in the postwar period is grounded on Edwin O. Reischauer, *Japan* (4th ed., New York: Knopf, 1990); Frederick S. Dunn, *Peacemaking and the Settlement with Japan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963); and Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).

² Steven L. Rearden, *The Formative Years, 1947-1950*, Vol. I in *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense* (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, OSD, 1984).

American spaniel.³

The United States' strategy of nuclear deterrence and retaliation received full expression in Joint Emergency War Plan One (1949), the first general war plan produced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and then used for force planning and budgeting for FY 1949. The plan had a Eurocentric bias and assumed the use of overseas bases in England and along the Mediterranean. These bases would place nuclear armed bombers within range of the Soviet heartland. There was an Asian "third front" in this plan, but it was not the center of gravity in a US-USSR war. By the 1950s, however, American forces in Japan played a larger part in war planning. Air-to-air refueling and bombers of greater range allowed Strategic Air Command to envision bomber attacks across the northern polar region. The Soviet air defense system developed an Asian anchor on the Liaotung peninsula, Manchuria, and the Vladivostok area of the Maritime Province, which extended into northern Siberia. The Soviet navy created a major submarine force to patrol the Sea of Japan entrants to Japanese home waters. The triumph of the Chinese Revolution and the Korean War brought a northern shift of the US Seventh Fleet and Far East Air Forces from the Philippines to Japan and Okinawa. Even after the Korean armistice—or because of it—in 1953-1955 the US Army Forces Far East kept two divisions in Japan and two divisions in Korea with the 3rd Marine Division in Japan and Okinawa as Far East Command's theater reserve. From the Chinese perspective, the Korean War gave Japan the excuse (with US complicity) to create the air, naval, and ground units of the Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF) in 1954, commanded by veterans of the hated imperial armed forces.⁴ Even though small and ill-equipped, the JSDF initiated the remilitarization of Japan for neo-imperial operations against China, or so the Chinese thought. The JSDF did contribute to the defense of American bases that played a role in US war planning. The US armed forces might not station nuclear weapons in Japan, given the Japanese aversion to nuclear forces and the proximity to Soviet air and naval bases, but US aviation forces in Japan played an important role in electronic warfare, weather forecasting, air-sea rescue, air defense, air-to-air refueling, anti-submarine warfare, special operations, and offensive anti-air operations against Soviet bases. For two decades, the American requirement for overseas bases ensured Japan would be defended whether it wanted to be or not.⁵

From Occupation to Defense Partners, 1945 to 1955

Only those who saw Japan in late 1945 could really appreciate the psychological, social, and physical paralysis that followed Japan's surrender in August, 1945. The inspection teams of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey collected the metrics of disaster, confirmed by Japanese studies. Seventy-four million Japanese had experienced the ravages of war unknown in their modern history. Of the imperial armed forces of 7 million, 2.4 million had died,

³ Kenneth W. Condit, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1947-1949*, Vol. II in *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff* (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, 1996), 153-166; Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).

⁴ I have used JSDF to identify forces that began in 1950 as the National Police Reserve and had other titles, 1950-1954.

⁵ Rearden, *The Formative Years, 1947-1949*, 243-273.

many of them from the elite of the navy and aviation forces. The surrender left 6.5 million Japanese stranded abroad, more than half of them civilians. Civilian dead from eight months of bombing reached half a million and made 8.5 million refugees. One-third of the Japanese urban population had lost their homes; half of Japan's cities were rubble. Famine and death stalked the land. The caloric intake of the ordinary citizen fell to 1680, starvation rations. The return of millions of overseas Japanese made the food shortages worse. The Japanese economy staggered along as a salvage operation; one major source of material was the refuse of the American occupation forces. Not until the 1950s—and American spending of \$3 billion to fight in Korea—did the Japanese economy show real growth like West Germany. Japan had no Lend-Lease, Marshall Plan, or international assistance. Japanese assets abroad had been destroyed or seized for reparations. The Home Islands public property that survived the war became the trust of General Douglas MacArthur's occupation government.⁶

Even before the outbreak of the Korean War, the Truman Administration decided that Japan had been rehabilitated enough to be a Cold War ally. Given the viciousness of wartime propaganda, the reversal of the Japanese from despicable monsters to valiant opponents of Communism took heroic efforts by the Occupation, Washington, and the public media. Often lost then and now is the residual affection for the Japanese civilian political elite and business class held by American diplomats and corporate leaders. The role of the Republican party and its newspaper empires is often minimalized. *Newsweek* magazine and the American Council on Japan found the New Japan admirable and made more so by the shogunate run by the Republicans' favorite general, Douglas MacArthur. Although MacArthur's captive press magnified his influence on the New Japan, SCAP could claim that his championship made Japan's progressive reforms more acceptable—certainly to a US Congress shifting in its balance to the Republicans. The reforms, in fact, represented the long work of the State Department's Japan specialists. Their leaders were Joseph C. Grew, former ambassador to Japan, and Robert Murphy, John Hickerson, John M. Allison, and William Sebald. Even after Dean Acheson became Secretary of State (1949-1953), the reformers still held influential positions in both the State and Defense departments. George Kennan, the dean of the Sovietologists, used his deft mind and facile pen to argue that the time had come to make peace with Japan and welcome it back to the community of free nations.⁷

The opponents of retributive reform won a victory when they subverted Far East Command Plan 230, the blueprint for the disaggregation of the *zaibatsu*, the sixty-seven holding companies that controlled about seventy-five percent of Japan's banks, marketing companies, agro-business, and industrial corporations like Mitsui and Mitsubishi. Despite General MacArthur's support of FEC-230, a coalition of Washington business lobbies, bureaucrats, media empires, and members of Congress gave FEC-230 the death of a thousand cuts by blocking and weakening MacArthur's trust-busting activities. The survival of the

⁶ The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, *Summary Report: Pacific War* (1 July 1946) reprinted by the Air University Press, 1987-2003; John C. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999).

⁷ Howard Schonberger, "The Japan Lobby in American Diplomacy, 1947-1952," *Pacific Historical Review* 46 (August, 1977), 127-359.

zaibatsu strengthened the Yoshida government and made it more cooperative in accepting the defense requirements that accompanied the negotiations for a peace treaty. The demise of FEC-230 also dramatized the limits of MacArthur's influence in Washington, even among his Republican supporters in Congress.⁸

The civilian political appointees of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the three service departments also thought the time for a peace treaty had come. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not agree. Their concern was the security of the forces and bases on the Home Islands and Okinawa. Moving troops from internal security duties and nation-building to field training appealed to the JCS. The army was not happy with its manpower reductions. Its chiefs, Omar N. Bradley and J. Lawton Collins, saw no reason to have four divisions in Japan and only one in Germany. The peace treaty offered some immediate relief from some vexing conditions of the Occupation. It should eliminate issues and units representing eleven allies from the war with Japan. The restiveness of Japanese civilians to the constraints on their behavior was mounting. Even without a treaty, MacArthur had loosened the bonds on political behavior, even releasing indicted but untried Category A war criminal suspects in 1949. (One of them, Kishi Nobusuke, former administrator of Manchukuo, became prime minister in 1957.) As for terms, MacArthur urged forgiveness, but a semi-protectorate that made the United States Japan's patron-of-choice. The general shared two visions, one of Japan as a sovereign state allied with the United States and guarded by American and Japanese forces. His other option was a neutral, demilitarized Japan ("the Austrian-Swiss Solution") guaranteed by international agreement under United Nations protection. George Kennan liked one aspect of MacArthur's position, the elimination of American bases in Japan's Home Islands. American forces based on Okinawa, still under US control, would provide external defense. Japanese forces and national police would provide all internal policing. The JCS disagreed. Japan's defense for the foreseeable future required Home Island bases—those that existed even if consolidated and shared. Base rights on Okinawa were not negotiable, nor was a major naval base at Yokosuka. As 1950 dawned, the movement towards a peace treaty stalled, but did not stop.⁹

Since MacArthur appeared to be the major barrier to a peace treaty in the spring of 1950, the State Department needed an agent of comparable stature (and age) as well as a champion of Japan to deal with SCAP. With the approval of his own inner circle of counselors, Acheson recruited John Foster Dulles, who had proven effective as the leading Republican representative in the American delegation that drafted the Charter of the United Nations in 1945. Dulles had continued to do the nation's business at the UN. Dulles went to Tokyo as instructed and discussed the Japanese peace treaty with SCAP after his arrival on June 21, 1950. Dulles found the Japanese eager for a treaty. The press wanted to know if the Truman Administration would announce a new policy of defending Taiwan. Dulles and MacArthur agreed that Okinawa and Taiwan should

⁸ Howard H. Schonberger, "Zaibatsu Dissolution and the American Restoration of Japan," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 2 (September, 1973), 16-31. See also John W. Dower, "Occupied Japan as History and Occupation History as Politics," *Journal of Asian Studies* 34 (February, 1975), 485-504.

⁹ George F. Kennan, "Japanese Security and American Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 43 (October, 1964), 14-28; Condit, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1947-1949*, 263-273; Robert L. Beisner, *Dean Acheson* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 469-483.

be key sites in the strategy of insular basing. Dulles assured MacArthur that Acheson wanted the United States to be the only external partner in Japan's future defense. While Dulles was visiting Tokyo, the North Koreans invaded South Korea.¹⁰

The Eighth US Army—four infantry divisions—by 1950 had become an intolerable neighbor because it had started serious training in 1949. GIs no longer rotated from walled bases to bars-brothels in nearby towns but went into the countryside to shoot and move. The 7th Infantry Division on Hokkaido could find maneuver areas, but the three other divisions occupied bases near Osaka, Tokyo, and Fukuoka. Only very energetic and persistent commanders managed to mount demanding exercises. Field work meant traffic accidents and broken trucks; live ammunition brought casualties; outside their barracks the soldiers fell to injuries and illness. Even if disciplined and purposeful, American infantry divisions crowded the densely-populated Home Islands. The Fifth Air Force brought noise to a high pitch with its new F-80 and F-84 jet aircraft, hurtling down the runways of Itazuke, Tachikawa, Itami, Atsugi, and Miho. The Seventh Fleet planned to make Sasebo its home port. One count placed the number of American bases at eighty-five and another around 300, most of them former Japanese army and navy property, now attractive for civilian development. The Far East Command and Eighth Army could move out of downtown Tokyo, but US Army logistics operations still required big garrisons at Kobe and Yokohama.¹¹

Josef Stalin, Mao Zedong, and Kim Il-sung gave a new impetus to the movement to make peace with Japan. The North Korean invasion and Chinese intervention, plus direct Soviet participation in the air war, seemed to prove that the fears of Communist neo-imperialism had not been alarmist. Inside the sound and fury of a real war, the State Department went ahead with its plan to hold an international conference in San Francisco to sign a peace treaty with Japan that would restore its sovereignty. The details of the agreement came from hundreds of consultations in Tokyo and the capitals of all the belligerents. Many problems arose over the use of military facilities and their cost. The American military presence in Japan swelled. During the Korean War, almost four million service personnel passed through Japan, and at any one time half a million service personnel worked for United Nations Command in Japan. Against this background, the United States increased its military assistance to French Indochina, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan, as well as Japan. Much of the JSDF assistance did not appear in the MDAP authorizations, but came in the transfer of weapons, ships, aircraft, and materiel as newer equipment flowed to UNC in 1951. The total value of US

¹⁰ On Dulles' role, see Howard B. Schonberger, *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1989), 236-278; Everett F. Drumright, memo, "Visit to Korea of John Foster Dulles," US Embassy Seoul, June 23, 1950 with enclosures, John Foster Dulles Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Library, Princeton University.

¹¹ Doris M. Condit, *The Test of War, 1950-1953*, Vol. 2 in *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense* (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, OSD, 1988), 41-47; Roy E. Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu* (June-November 1950), Vol 1 in *United States Army in the Korean War* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1961), 12-20, 36-58; Thomas E. Hanson, *Combat Ready? The Eighth U.S. Army on the Eve of the Korean War* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2010).

aid to Japan may have been as much as \$3 billion.¹²

The Korean War gave the Japanese economy a much-needed shot of investment and job creation. In October, 1950, the US Army had 166,037 Japanese workers in direct employment. By 1952, the number of contract employees reached 225,000. The workers of Toyota Motors put 46,000 military vehicles into working order and sold light trucks to the US armed forces. Sixteen major factories made clothing, footwear, and field equipment for the US and ROK armies. Japanese farmers sent fresh vegetables to United Nations soldiers at 200 tons a day. Japanese companies helped build and staff a hospital system that provided over 11,000 beds by March, 1951. The demand for five gallon gas cans and fifty-five gallon POL drums was so great (three million) that Japanese manufacturers had to turn to Hong Kong sources to meet orders. The ports of Pusan and Inchon depended upon 500 harbor craft and 4,400 technicians from Japan. The Hirose Salvage Company provided 3,000 technicians for port heavy equipment repair and maintenance whose pay for a ten-month tour was ¥20,000, most of which they brought back to Japan as savings since the company provided room and board in Korea. Direct dollar procurement in Japan went over \$1 billion in 1952, and in the same year, Japan had a foreign trade surplus of \$540 million. The reviving textile and metals industries led the charge to prosperity. Japan's economic revival was an omen of political assertiveness.¹³

To some degree hidden by more favorable war news and MacArthur's dramatic relief, the American negotiations with its wartime allies and the government of Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru proceeded with all deliberate caution. With John Foster Dulles acting as special agent of State, the US produced a draft treaty with Yoshida in January, 1951. A peace treaty was not at hand because of Allied objections to its benign terms and rejection of any role for the People's Republic of China. The Philippines wanted no role for the PRC and special protection for Taiwan. Australia and New Zealand, with Great Britain's approval, wanted the PRC involved in the peace treaty and Chinese Nationalists stripped of any role that protected their Taiwan bastion-refuge. The Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand wanted a more punitive treaty with reparations and a multi-lateral Pacific defensive pact. The divisions within the Truman administration contributed to the sloth in negotiations. The JCS wanted the allies out of Japan, but not some bastardized version of NATO in the Pacific. Even though some sort of defensive treaty should accompany the peace treaty, the JCS saw no urgency for either. Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett thought otherwise. Lovett backed the Dulles peace and defensive draft treaties as did President Truman. Both saw the advantages of a treaty *now* in terms of cowing the allies and dealing with the US Senate in matters of ratification and money. State convinced Great Britain (with Dulles as the messenger of coercion) to forget the PRC for the moment

¹² Condit, *The Test of War*, 28-31, 194-197, 413-454. See also John W. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1979), 273-278, 377-414. Aid to European forces, however, still amounted to eighty percent of MDAP funds.

¹³ Hdqs., Japan Logistical Command, *Logistical Problems and Their Solutions* (1950-1951), February 1952, copy, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center; Roger Dingman, "The Dagger and the Gift: The Impact of the Korean War on Japan," in William J. Williams, ed., *A Revolutionary War: Korea and the Transformation of the Postwar World* (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1993), 201-223; Wada Haruki, *The Korean War* (Lanham, MD: Roman & Littlefield, 2014), 197-200; Proceedings, William J. Nimmo, ed., Symposium: "The Occupation of Japan: The Impact of the Korean War," October 16-17, 1986, MacArthur Foundation.

and use its influence to move the peace treaty along. By September, 1951, the US had made defensive treaties with New Zealand, Australia, and the Philippines. Their concession was to forget about the immediate fate of Taiwan and to abandon their demands on Japan. By the time the 53-nation conference assembled in San Francisco, the peace treaty had swelled from eight to twenty-one pages. Acheson and Dulles would not allow an open conference and rammed the peace treaty through consideration in four days (September 4-8, 1951). The Soviet Union attended but boycotted the signing. The treaty had no force until the signatories ratified it, and ratification by the United States depended upon the mutual defense treaty, signed the same day as the peace treaty by Japan and the United States.¹⁴

The Treaty of Peace with Japan contained twenty-seven articles that repeated the surrender terms of August, 1945, which divided up the Japanese empire. Most of the articles dealt with the legal and financial niceties of defeat. Even so, Articles 5 and 6 gave Japan the sovereign right of self-defense, as defined by Articles 2 and 51 of the UN Charter, but did not identify America's specific role. The Security Treaty between the United States and Japan contained only five articles, but their intent was clear. Until Japan provided "for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression," the United States had the right to base forces in Japan to defend that nation from external attack and against "internal riots and disturbances in Japan," if so requested. The US armed forces based "in and around Japan" might also be committed to missions that contributed to "the maintenance of internal peace and security in the Far East." To reinforce the mandate of Article I, Article II prohibited Japan from making agreements on base use and the use of any other ground, air, and oceanic part of Japan for military use by any third power without American agreement. The former Japanese island groups of the Ryukyus, the Bonins, five other groups of small islands, and all the Pacific island groups in the former League of Nations' mandates now fell under American administration and were not "in Japan's area." The security pact redefined the peace treaty to make Japan an American protectorate with Home Island base rights and secured Okinawa as the anchor of the US military presence in north Asia. Despite the fine language of the peace treaty and the mutual defense pact, the United States had made a victor's alliance, even though Japan had escaped draconian terms without surrendering some future changes (recognized by the use of the term "provisional") that would move toward full sovereignty in defense.¹⁵

The text of the security treaty, as well as the territorial changes of the peace treaty, required further refinement. In a third tier of negotiations, the Defense Department took the lead in drafting an Administrative Agreement (AA) that would expand and define the mutual security treaty. The process of drafting an AA that Japan and the US Senate would accept presented serious problems. At the geo-strategic level, the issue was the role of the People's Republic of

¹⁴ The negotiations that preceded the San Francisco conference may be found in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951* (7 vols., Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1977-1985) in which Volume 6 is *Japan*. Key reports are in *FRUS, 1951*, Vol. 6, *Japan*, 1437-1439, 1443-1450, 1466-1470. For a concise narrative, see Condit, *Test of War*, 187-204.

¹⁵ The texts of the peace treaty and mutual security treaty are available (from among several sources) on-line by the Avalon Project, a collection of historic documents, sponsored by the Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale University Law School (Avalon.law.Yale.edu/20th_century/japan001.asp). See Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, 236-278.

China. Great Britain encouraged Japanese politicians (Left and Right) who favored overtures to the PRC to oppose ties to Taiwan, most of them driven by economic factors. The corollary to this policy would be to reduce or eliminate the defensive and economic development of Taiwan. The Congressional “China Lobby” rose to the defense of the security treaty and the AA with terms that would not allow a Japan-PRC rapprochement through the backdoor of the peace treaty, the security treaty, and the Administrative Agreement. On September 12, 1951, Senator William Knowland (R -California and Taiwan) sent Acheson a letter of caution signed by fifty-six senators from both parties: unless Japan became an ally of the Chinese Nationalists, there would be no ratification of the two treaties. Without a ratified security treaty, the AA would have no force even if the Yoshida government accepted it. Exhausted and frustrated by negotiations with the Europeans over the peace treaty and NATO defense, Acheson again turned to Dulles, who had scored one win over the British and relished another over the PRC.¹⁶

Without waiting for the US and Japan to complete the AA, Dulles tasked Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs and a deft survivor of McCarthyism, to write a letter for Prime Minister Yoshida that Yoshida would then send to Truman and Acheson as a public document. The letter would pledge Japan to accept the Republic of China as the only legitimate China and a future ally in the war against Communism. Such a commitment might very well bring down the Yoshida cabinet and endanger the AA, but that risk had to be accepted as the cost of doing business with the US Senate. Under Dulles’ guidance, Rusk went to Tokyo and explained the letter’s purpose to Yoshida and Foreign Minister Fujiyama, who were realistic about becoming an ally of the ROC and very unhappy about the domestic political cost of siding with the ROC when the PRC looked like a much better economic investment. Restored as a special envoy to Japan in October, 1951, Dulles, accompanied by the majority party (Sen. John Sparkman, AL) and minority (Sen. H. Alexander Smith, NJ) leaders of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, went to Tokyo to pressure Yoshida to issue the letter that committed Japan to become an ally of the ROC. On December 24, 1951 the prime minister published the Acheson-Yoshida letter. The Americans agreed to continue working on the Administrative Agreement. Yoshida and his cabinet counted their days in office after the Diet assembled and opened a loud campaign of complaint about the Acheson-Yoshida letter. In the meantime, the State and Defense members of the Rusk Mission continued to revise the Administrative Agreement. On February 28 the two sides announced that the AA had become minimally acceptable to all parties and would go into effect on April 28, 1952, along with the mutual defense treaty. Senate approval was only a formality. The new alliance, dictated by the

¹⁶ The twists and turns of US-Japan 1951 negotiations that followed the San Francisco conference may be assessed in JCS to Sec Def, December 12, 1951, in *FRUS 1951*, Vol. 6, 1432-1437. See also Beisner, *Dean Acheson*, 469-481, and Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, 377-414.

The Diet affirmative vote was:

	Peace Treaty	Defensive Treaty
Lower House	307-47	289-71
Upper House	174-45	147-76

United States, seemed to reduce the Sino-Soviet threat immediately.¹⁷

The “New Look”

The end of the Korean War forced the United States and Japan to reexamine the extemporized defense treaty and its amplifying Administrative Agreement of 1951-1952. For Japan the major problem was an economic slowdown that created balance of payments problems (critical to Japan’s export-centered economy) and a slowed economic growth rate. Much of American economic assistance came in the form of credit, loan, and monetary arrangements that neared \$1 billion in future obligations. The Diet and Japanese corporate leaders, backed by a histrionic press and public pressure groups, took vocal issue with their coerced commitments to Taiwan. The Liberal Democratic Party made a special issue of improved trade with the People’s Republic of China, blocked by American insistence that Japan help support the Republic of China. The LDP viewed Taiwan as a US client state of no future value. In the narrower strategic sense, the development of nuclear weapons by both the US and USSR dramatized the fact that Japan had done little to provide for its own air and naval defense. The JCS estimated that Japan could replace much of the US Far East Air Forces if it created a 600-aircraft Aviation Self-Defense Force that stressed air defense against the USSR. (No bombers for the JASDF!) Such an air force would cost at least \$1 billion or about ten times what Congress might approve in aid. The restoration of the Japanese navy carried the same urgency in US contingency plans to defend Japan. The Diet showed no interest in investing in air and naval units that would carry high price tags, especially if they might be armed with nuclear weapons.¹⁸

In the wake of the Korean War armistice, the new Eisenhower Administration (1953-1961) declared war on US defense costs, which had quadrupled in four years. It announced that it would bring new order and rationality to strategic planning. “The New Look,” which would create “security with solvency,” represented intent, not accomplishment. The administration, for its own internal guidance, put words to its goals in two series of documents: (1) plans and orders written by the National Security Council staff and approved by the President and (2) the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, written by the Joint Staff and approved by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The NSC documents usually tried to reconcile domestic

¹⁷ POLAD to CINCFE (W. Sebald) to Amb. Dean Rusk, January 2, 1952 in U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1952-1954* Vol. 14, *China and Japan*, pt. 2 (26 vols., Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1979-1989), 1065-1069; memorandum to John Foster Dulles, consultant to the Secretary of State, January 9, 1952, *Ibid.*, 1071-1075; draft memoranda, Administrative Agreement, January 18 and 22, 1952, *Ibid.*, 1095-1100; memorandum, Sec State to President Truman, April 14, 1952, *Ibid.*, 1228-1230.

The State Department calculated that by September 1952 it had spent \$2 billion on Japan and only \$1.2 billion on Germany. It proposed to collect \$750 million with 2 ½ percent interest for occupation costs. It didn’t. (Staff report for the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems, Dept. of State, “Settlement of Postwar Economic Assistance to Japan,” September 15, 1953, *FRUS, 1952-1954*, Vol. 14, *China and Japan*, pt. 2, 1505-1506.

The Acheson-Yoshida letter is treated at length in Robert L. Beisner, *Dean Acheson* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 469-483.

¹⁸ POLAD SCAP (N. Bond) to Dept. State, April 7, 1952 in *FRUS 1952-1954*, Vol. 14, *China and Japan*, pt. 2, 1234-1235; JCS to CINCFE, March 19, 1953, *Ibid.*, 1390-1392; memoranda, NSC 125/2 and NSC 125/6, “United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Japan,” October 27, 1954, *Ibid.*, 1761-1767.

political issues with traditional diplomacy as conducted by the Department of State. The plans of the JCS, a fusion of plans from the service departments and those generated by the unified and specified commands like Pacific Command and Strategic Air Command, focused on war and lesser military contingencies. Over a decade (1947-1958) the Joint Emergency War Plan (JEWP) divided and multiplied like an amoeba into the Joint Strategic Integrated Objectives Plan (the JSIOP) for nuclear war with the Soviet Union and “lesser” theater contingencies. At the Washington level, the contingency plans helped to shape the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP), the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and the Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimate (JLRSE). All of these plans reflected a common concern: what force structure best supported a national security policy of strategic nuclear deterrence and forward, collective defense? The plausible answers were many and complex and depended on assessing costs, risks, likelihood, and legitimacy with surety beyond human ken. Add the complexity of alliance relations, and strategic planning becomes an oxymoron.¹⁹

The Eisenhower administration decided to stress the imagined deterrent effect of spreading nuclear weapons throughout all four of the US armed services. The miniaturization of fission warheads made the explosive multiplication of tactical nuclear weapons possible. By the 1960s the US armed forces could fire nuclear shells from artillery pieces and short range guided missiles. Carrier aircraft and USAF fighter-bombers could carry small nuclear bombs. Surface ships, aircraft, and submarines could employ nuclear torpedoes, surface-to-surface missiles, and ASW weapons. While the Air Force struggled to develop ICBMs, the Army and Air Force developed limited range nuclear missiles (IRBMs and MRBMs) that required foreign basing or shipboard deployments which depended upon naval basing abroad. Correctly anticipating similar Soviet nuclear diversity, the US services invested in early warning systems (ground and satellite-based) and anti-missile defense systems. All of these nuclear adaptation programs, targeted for enemy forces and not cities, demanded major shifts in defense investment. The only way to pay for the investment, other than by enlarging the defense budget, was to reduce active force manpower. The Eisenhower administration cut ground forces manpower with a vengeance. From 1954 until 1961, the active duty force shrank from 3.29 million to 2.72 million.²⁰

¹⁹ Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Richard M. Leighton, *Strategy, Money and the New Look, 1953-1956*, Vol. 3, in *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense* (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, OSD, 2001), 1-4, 65-113; C. Stuart Kelley, Joseph P. Harahan et. al., *Defense's Nuclear Agency, 1947-1997* (Washington, D.C.: Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 2002), 75-106; NSC 125/2, “United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Japan,” August 7, 1952, *FRUS 1952-1954*, Vol. 14, *Japan*, 1304-1308.

²⁰ The MDAP funding priorities are established in Bureau of Public Affairs, Dept. of State, “Foreign Assistance Policies under the Mutual Security Program,” 1953; memo, Ass’t Dir. Mutual Security Administration (MSA) to Special Ass’t to the Sec State (MSA), “FY 1953 Program—Basic Programing Figures,” January 31, 1952; Dept. of State, “Points of Concern to members of Congressional Committees on 1953 Mutual Security Program,” March, 1952, Dept. of State, “U.S. Mutual Security Legislation for 1952,” all printed in *FRUS, 1952-1954* (26 Vols., Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1979-1989), Vol. 1, *General: Economic and Political Matters*, pt. 1, 460-509. The regional biases are clear in Operations Section, Executive Secretariat, Dept. of State, “FY 1955 Foreign Aid—Far East,” September 4, 1953 and NSC 5407, “The Mutual Security Program,” March 11, 1954 in *Ibid.*, 649-652 and 684-729.

The distribution of foreign military assistance after the Korean War showed a preference for European allies and Middle Eastern client-nations. In rough terms the Mutual Defense Assistance Program in the 1950s ran in the \$5-7 billion annual range. Aid to Asian recipients seldom reached \$1 billion, and such aid went disproportionately to Taiwan and Vietnam. Of the \$12 billion distribution of MDAP funds in 1951-1953, \$9.8 billion went to NATO countries. Japan showed scant interest in investing in critical naval and air units for the JSDF, but it had little difficulty in raising two ground force divisions to replace American base defense forces. The American expectation that Japan would field highly-capable warships and air fleets—as it had in World War II—proved flawed. First, the United States would provide these forces anyway, and in addition, air and sea defense required expensive warships and high performance jet aircraft. Japanese opponents of rearmament saw air and naval units as more likely to draw Japan into unconstitutional military action. A rifleman in Hokkaido's snow-filled forests carried no such risk.²¹

The “New Look” years in American defense policy made treaty revision with Japan more compelling than ever, but more complex than it had been in 1951. The prospect of American nuclear weapons based in Japan, actually considered by the JCS in 1956, was anathema to all Japanese political parties (at least in public) and Japanese voters. Yet the existing bases in Japan (and certainly on Okinawa) added more air and naval units to the strategic bombers of SAC that served as the heart of the US deterrent forces. Nuclear-armed submarines and warships might, for example, blast gaps in the Soviet air defense system that would allow the SAC bombers to reach Soviet inland targets. The same concept applied to China. A further rationale for putting nuclear weapons throughout Pacific Command was the defense of Taiwan and the implied commitment to help the Chinese Nationalists hold the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. The American strategic planners had no illusions that nations which allowed nuclear forces on their soil would be happy hosts. Until the United States developed ICBMs, submarines with solid fuel ballistic nuclear missiles, and bombers with intercontinental range (with air-to-air refueling), foreign basing seemed unavoidable. Whether or not Japan would become a nuclear host nation became a central issue in any treaty negotiation.²²

The best bargaining chip the United States had to offer was a reduction of the numbers and types of ground troops stationed in Japan. Even after the Korean War demobilization, completed in 1955, the US armed forces in Japan numbered nearly 100,000 uniformed personnel, plus thousands of civilians and dependents. Although about half the force belonged to the US Air Force, the remaining half included the 1st Cavalry Division and much of the 3rd Marine Division, not yet relocated to Okinawa. An “Honest John” battalion, a droll name for a 762mm rocket that could fire a twenty kiloton nuclear warhead fifteen miles with uncertain accuracy, deployed to Japan. Another unwelcome visitor was a battalion of 280mm

²¹ Kenneth W. Condit, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1955-1956*, Vol. 6 in *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff* (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, OSD, 1998), 59-78, 193-220.

²² Amb. J. M. Allison to Dept. State, September 3, 1953, *FRUS 1952-1954* Vol. 14, *China and Japan*, pt. 2, 1491-1496; Amb. D. MacArthur to Dept. State, June 5, 1958, *FRUS, 1958-1960* (19 vols., Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1986-1996), Vol. 18, 34-36; Sec State to US Embassy Japan, June 23, 1958, *Ibid.*, 36-38; Hdqs., USAFFE, *The Far East Command, 1947-1957* (Tokyo, Far East Command, 1957).

nuclear-capable artillery, sent to Okinawa. Although servicing American forces enriched some Japanese contractors and merchants, foreign troops at work and play did not make many local friends, especially if the troops were as foreign as the Americans and reminded the Japanese every day of their humiliating defeat in World War II. “Yankees, go home” had irresistible appeal to vote-seeking Diet members, regardless of party.²³

Pressed by the State Department to make concessions to Japan without treaty revision, the Department of Defense reduced its presence on the islands of Kyushu and Honshu in the late 1950s. The ground defense of Hokkaido became a mission of the Japanese Self-Defense Agency. The US 1st Cavalry Division shifted its flag to South Korea, allowing the 24th Infantry Division to fade away. The 3rd Marine Division consolidated its units in the northern third of Okinawa. Only elements of the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing remained based on the Home Islands, folded into the air base at Iwakuni. Token forces of United Nations Command and the Occupation either moved to South Korea or simply disappeared. In a major effort to reduce the Americanization of downtown Tokyo, Far East Command and US Army Forces Far East consolidated Army bases on Honshu. In 1957 Far East Command disappeared as a theater command, and its responsibilities became those of Pacific Command (Hawaii) or United Nations Command (Seoul). The remaining American forces in the Home Islands in 1959 numbered half those stationed there in 1957. The American flag no longer flew over the Dai Ichi building, and the regal arrivals and departures of Douglas MacArthur became a memory.²⁴

The unilateral changes in the American military presence in Japan did not satisfy either the Japanese government or the Department of Defense. As the decade of the 1950s appeared to be ending with an outbreak of reduced tension, the State Department believed the time had come to restore full Japanese sovereignty and to put US-Japanese defense on a more collaborative basis. Before his death in 1959, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the principal architect of the 1951 peace treaty and defense agreement, insured that America’s Asian diplomacy focused on binding Japan and the United States to one another, a personal goal of his since 1945. Dulles made certain his principal subordinates shared his vision. Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II, nephew of the Supreme Commander, represented the United States in Tokyo. Secretary of State Christian Herter (1959-1961) did not change his department’s commitment to putting US-Japanese relations on a different foundation, beginning with an altered mutual defense agreement.²⁵

²³ Robert J. Watson, *Into the Missile Age, 1956-1960*, Vol. 4, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense* (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, OSD, 1997), 630-640; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Report: “Security Treaty—Japan,” September 10, 1958 with enclosure, “Security Treaty-Japan,” *FRUS 1958-1960*, Vol. 18, 69-73.

²⁴ Byron R. Fairchild and Walter S. Poole, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1956-1960*, Vol. 7, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff* (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, OSD, 2000), 31-42, 197-215.

²⁵ Memorandum of conversation, Sec State Dulles, Amb. MacArthur and others, “Security Arrangements for Japan,” September 8, 1958, *FRUS 1958-1960*, Vol. 18, 58-63; memorandum of conversation, Defense-State planning group, “Japanese Security Arrangements,” September 9, 1958, *Ibid.*, 64-69; memorandum of conversation, US State-Defense groups and FM Fujiyama and Foreign Ministry group, Washington, D.C., September 11, 1958, *Ibid.*, 73-84. The draft treaty is reprinted in *Ibid.*, 85-88. Dulles signed his last instructions on Japan on December 6, 1958, resigned for ill health in April 1959 and died of cancer the same year.

The Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarded State's eagerness for treaty revision with suspicion. At a time in which the Soviet Union had modernized its armed forces and accelerated the development of its ICBM force and nuclear-armed submarine fleet, the JCS saw a real danger in changing its basic approach to Asia-Pacific defense. To confront and deter Soviet forces in Asia, the United States had built an offshore defense system, anchored in the south with the naval base at Subic Bay and the 13th Air Force, Clark Air Force Base, the Philippines. The southern forces could extend aid to both South Vietnam and Taiwan. The ground and air forces in South Korea, the joint forces on Okinawa, and the air and naval units in Japan provided the northern anchor to the system with forces directly facing China, North Korea, and the Soviet Union. The maps the JCS and Strategic Air Command used gave special attention to the short air and sea distances between Vladivostok, the Sea of Okhotsk, the Kuriles, Sakhalin Island, Hokkaido, and the Aleutian island chain of the new state of Alaska (1958). The northern Pacific-polar region presented the US and USSR with special defense problems since any nuclear confrontation would probably develop in the air space above the North Pole. Whether or not a planner examined the challenges of World War III or another Korean War or a military confrontation with the People's Republic of China, Japanese bases remained crucial to American contingency planning in 1960.²⁶

The Treaty of 1960

In order to preempt Diet resolutions proposed by the Socialist party, Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II recommended to Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke that the PM make a request that Japan and the US begin negotiations to replace the Treaty of 1951. The Socialist resolutions would have explicitly banned nuclear weapons on Japanese territory and prohibited use of American bases on Japanese soil to mount operations outside of Japan. Both provisions would have slowed or prevented military action to defend South Korea and Taiwan. Admiral Harry D. Felt, CINCPAC, backed State's initiative, a draft treaty that admitted that the US and Japan should create a true partnership in defense issues. Secretary Dulles agreed with this analysis. Ambassador MacArthur stressed that Japan wanted an alliance with the United States, which Dulles also believed, but the Secretary of State could not "sell this treaty" to Congress unless it was clear that "Japan was casting its lot with us." MacArthur pointed out that Japan had no potential allies in Asia because of its "military adventures" since 1895. Dulles told his inner circle of advisors that the challenge would be drafting a treaty the Department of Defense would accept.²⁷

The Department of Defense agreed that a new treaty would clarify the US responsibility for the defense of Japan and encourage the Japanese Self Defense Force to replace US air and naval units now committed to Japan's defense. The critical issues remained the use of Japanese bases for American operations to defend Taiwan and Korea, including the possible deployment of nuclear weapons through Japanese bases. The base system on Okinawa, built

²⁶ Memorandum, CJCS to Sec Def, "Japan Security Treaty," December 1, 1958 *FRUS 1958-1960*, Vol. 18, 104-105; telegram, US Embassy Japan to Dept. State May 22, 1959 *Ibid.*, 177-180.

²⁷ Telegram, US Embassy Japan to Dept. State, October 5, 1958, *FRUS 1958-1960*, Vol. 18, 92-95.

in haste and at great cost, should be excluded from any agreement. That position remained at the heart of Defense's position on the alliance. The JCS shared State's judgment that a treaty made with the Kishi government would be easier to negotiate now rather than later. Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichiro encouraged this view. Ambassador MacArthur assured his Japanese colleagues that the leadership of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee favored a new alliance pact. The details of the partnership, however, would not be in the treaty, but in a new Administrative Agreement that would be worked out before the treaty went into force. One major influence on the degree of Defense cooperation was the recent experience with NATO and SEATO, which revealed the difficulty in planning for forward, collective defense in a multi-member alliance.²⁸

A September 1958 meeting in Washington between Dulles and Fujiyama established the key features of the new treaty. Dulles took the lead in reviewing the essential elements of the revised pact. First, Japan had to look like a sovereign nation in the debates sure to follow in the Diet. At the heart of the revised defense partnership was a reality that Japan had not yet faced: it had not yet done enough to create its own air and naval forces to defend the Home Islands. Japan had not fully realized the growing threat of Soviet nuclear missiles. China would soon become a nuclear power. From expense alone Japan would never match its rivals with its own armed forces. An alliance with the United States was its only option. The United States could not, however, defend Japan without the uninhibited use of Japanese bases. The United States did not expect the JSDF to operate outside the Home Islands ("the Japan area"), but it would not accept any restraints on the use of its forces stationed in Japan and Okinawa. Dulles saw no commitment by Japan to defend the United States, but for the moment Japanese logistical support was an adequate expression of partnership. No doubt future agreements would address Japanese concerns about the administration of the Ryukyus and Bonins. Minister Fujiyama, however, thought these issues paled beside the issue of US nuclear weapons deployed to Japan, a potential treaty killer. The United States found one way to handle the issue. Dulles insisted that the treaties of 1951, refined by the AA and the Acheson-Yoshida letter, committed Japan to support UN forces operating under UN direction in "the Far East." This mission would not be voided by any new treaty.²⁹

For the next seventeen months, Ambassador MacArthur managed the intricate task of helping Kishi and Fujiyama cajole the Diet into accepting the terms of the new alliance. The first task was to work out an acceptable draft in secret, one that appeared to be of Japanese origin. The first barrier was the bureaucrats of the Foreign Ministry, who asked for an endless number of explanations of the treaty language, most focused on Article VI, the bases provision. The next barrier was the leadership of the various factions of the LDP, whose opinions covered every possible objection to the treaty language. The American intelligence community predicated that Japan's interests would coincide with those of the United States into the 1960s,

²⁸ Telegram, CINCPAC (Adm. Felt) to JCS, August 19, 1958, *FRUS 1958-1960*, Vol. 18, 52-57.

²⁹ See, for example, telegram, US Embassy Tokyo to Dept. State, December 7, 1958, *FRUS 1958-1960*, Vol. 18, *Japan*, 108-110; DCI, National Intelligence Estimate, 41-58, "Probable Developments in Japan's International Orientation," December 23, 1958, *Ibid.*, 114-116; telegram, US Embassy Japan to Dept. State, December 24, 1958, *Ibid.*, 116-119.

but that economic factors might lead to better relations with China and the Soviet Union. The Japanese did not share US concern over the security of South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam, so they might object to the use of American bases for operations outside Japan. In addition, any commitment to defend islands then under American administration (i.e. Okinawa) with the JSDF would be a deal-breaker since the Japanese believed such a commitment violated Article IX of their constitution. As the new year began, the negotiations stalled.³⁰

Ambassador MacArthur and Foreign Minister Fujiyama maintained their close consultation on the Administrative Agreement. MacArthur stressed that President Eisenhower and the US Senate would not accept the full treaty unless the Agreement was acceptable to both parties. MacArthur insured that the Democratic and Republican leaders of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee knew of every linguistic twist and turn in defining the treaty's geographic area. The central political fact was that the LDP would not go to war in the Diet over ratification until the Administrative Agreement matched similar agreements with some of America's NATO allies. By the summer of 1959, the draft revisions now centered on the Administrative Agreement. The essence of the language ensured that any changes in base use and force status would entail prior consultation, but that crisis deployments were not so constrained. The text of the Agreement ran to twenty-eight detailed articles. The political situation in Japan improved for PM Kishi when some June municipal elections indicated increased LDP strength in the Diet's upper house. Other problems emerged; the most notable, the Japanese view that the new treaty should void the Acheson-Yoshida agreement of 1952 that made Korea and Taiwan a *de facto* part of "the Japanese area" and thus a Japanese defense responsibility. The Japanese political situation, however, became more complicated by changes in the LDP leadership and cabinet. Fujiyama recommended that the Diet not deal with the treaty and its accompanying explanations until the regular session began in December, but the Diet would do no real business until January, 1960. In fact, the treaty signing's postponement would provide more time to rally the public to accept the agreement and to educate the new cabinet. At this point, MacArthur opened a new front by linking the treaty to US-Japanese economic relations, troubled by restrictions on US imports and investments. MacArthur arranged for Undersecretary of State Douglas Dillon to come to Tokyo to discuss trade relations. Into December one problem after another delayed a formal agreement. In January, 1960 PM Kishi visited Washington and met with President Eisenhower to discuss the treaty and other issues. Eisenhower reassured Kishi that the United States remained Japan's ally and partner on an equal policymaking level.³¹

The atmospherics for the signing and ratification of the new treaty did not improve in 1960, largely because of Japanese politics. External events drove the negotiations into new areas. The U-2 crisis produced heated debates over whether the US could use Japanese bases

³⁰ US Embassy Japan to Dept. State, March 7 and 14, 1959, *Ibid.*, 121-126; Four telegrams US Embassy Japan to Dept. State, April 29, 1959, *Ibid.*, 126-155 with draft treaty and comments as well as revisions of the Administrative Agreement. Telegram, US Embassy, Japan to Dept. State, July 14, 1959, *Ibid.*, 204-206; memorandum of conversation, US Ambassador and Finance Minister Sato, July 17, 1959 *Ibid.*, 206-212; memorandum, Deputy Ass't Sec State (FEA) to Sec State, December 26, 1959, *Ibid.*, 256-258.

³¹ Memorandum of conversations, President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Kishi, January 19, 1960, *FRUS 1958-1960*, Vol. 18, *Japan*, 259-268.

for intelligence overflights to China and the Soviet Union. Diet hearings on the treaty were rescheduled for May. MacArthur pressed Kishi for action since the US Senate would close in July and focus on the November elections. In its May 31 meeting, the National Security Council conducted a broad review of relations with Japan, captured in NSC 6008. No one challenged the value of the alliance or regarded the problems as insurmountable. There were, however, positions that differed on the future of Okinawa, Japan's regional role (if any), and the level of US military assistance. The President took Defense's position on controlling Okinawa, but took a more flexible position on pressuring Japan to do more for its own defense. The execution of the new mutual security agreement first needed US help for the Kishi government to get the treaty ratified in the Diet. At Kishi's recommendation, Eisenhower cancelled a June visit to Japan because of the level of public protests against the US-Japan alliance. Radical student groups and the riot police battled in the streets, and protestors disrupted the Diet. The protestors wanted Okinawa "liberated" and Yankee troops to go home. Eisenhower responded by supporting more development aid for the Ryukyus. The crisis mounted until Kishi announced he intended to resign and force a national election, but he did so only after the Diet's lower house ratified the treaty on May 19 by preventing the Socialists from disrupting the session and using police to keep order in the chamber. Oppositionist LDP members boycotted the meeting. The LDP provided 248 pro-treaty voters in a quorum of 273. The next step was upper house approval, predicted for June 19, the last meeting of the session. The vote for ratification took place on June 19, followed by US Senate ratification on June 20, 1960. Celebration in Washington and Tokyo was muted, but real.³²

Six months later Secretary of State-designate Dean Rusk visited Tokyo and received a tutorial on US-Japan relations from Ambassador MacArthur. The ambassador believed that between 1957 and 1960 the US and Japan had established a sound basis for an enduring relationship that included a military alliance. The 1960 treaty and other actions had eliminated or reduced accumulated grievances that suggested that Japan was still occupied or at least ignored. Unilateral action in response to Japanese complaints had established a higher level of confidence that made the new treaty possible. MacArthur produced an impressive list of adjustments:

- a. Reduced US forces in Japan by half, and removed all ground troops
- b. Returned military bases and facilities to Japan
- c. Eliminated support costs charged to Japan for US forces, but retained use of rent-free facilities paid for by Japan
- d. Released some 100 suspected war criminals and provided compensation and other forms of aid to the Bonin islanders and Okinawans
- e. Suspended nuclear testing in the Pacific
- f. Maintained a trade policy that made Japan the second largest exporter to the US
- g. Supported Japan's UN membership and access to the Import-Export Bank and other sources of loans

³² Memorandum of conversation, 446th meeting, NSC, to consider NSC 6008, "Policy Toward Japan," May 31, 1960, *Ibid.*, 314-324, followed by NSC 6008/1, "United States Policy Toward Japan," June 11, 1960, *Ibid.*, 335-349; telegrams, US Embassy to Dept. State June 15 and 16, 1960, *Ibid.*, 356-364; memorandum of conversation, "President's Far Eastern Trip," June 19, 1960, *Ibid.*, 413-423.

The majority Liberal Democratic Party and most Japanese saw a mutual defense pact as an expression of shared interests, if not shared cultures and history. The natural response to Japanese imperialism's defeat might have produced a return to Japan's historic isolationism. Instead Japan had restored its internationalism and economic interdependence of 1905-1932, however fragile that precedent. American encouragement, even if rooted in Cold War fears, had made the return of a "good" Japan easier. The treaty of 1960 continued this policy.³³

The fate of the Fuji-McNair Maneuver Ground, 51,000 acres on the eastern slopes of Mount Fujiyama, reflected the changing relationship. Used for live firing by American ground forces since the occupation and sanctified by the Administrative Agreement of 1952, the area had become an annoyance to the local residents and the thousands of pilgrims who came to the mountain for exercise and contemplation. Its status was an issue in treaty ratification, even though the area's use had dropped with the exodus of the American divisions. In drafting the 1960 Administrative Agreement, the Japanese diplomats suggested that the JSDF take control of the area and then provide no-cost use of the area to US forces as requested. This victory, however symbolic, gave the LDP a needed boost to its patriotic image and spared the US public outrage. Mount Fujiyama, burdened by so much historic symbolism, might also stand for a new era of Japanese and American defense partnership.³⁴

³³ Telegram, U.S. Embassy Japan to Dept. of State, December 16, 1960, *Ibid.*, 413-423.

³⁴ For a retrospective critique, see George R. Packard, "Some Thoughts on the 50th Anniversary of the US-Japan Security Treaty," *Asia Pacific Review* 17 (November, 2010), 1-9.

