

Presentations

War Termination in Historical Perspective: Imperial Germany 1918

Holger H. Herwig

It is not enough to win a war; it is more important to organize the peace.
Aristotle

Were this a case study of German war termination in the twentieth century, the issue could quickly be summarized as follows: start two world wars, lose two world wars, and the enemy twice imposes the terms of war termination. But since we are dealing only with Imperial Germany in the Great War, the case is more complicated. After all, we are now assured by a host of revisionist historians in Great Britain as well as in Germany that the men of July 1914 were all well-intentioned, innocent actors. No one wanted war. No one believed it to be possible. Everyone, from Kaiser Wilhelm II to King George V, from Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg to Sir Edward Grey, from Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf to Sir John French was equally responsible for war when it suddenly and mysteriously came about. David Lloyd George 1920 redivivus.

The first point to be made is that war termination is not the same as peacemaking. There were plenty of peace initiatives between 1914 and 1918, beginning with the mission to Berlin, London and Paris of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's special envoy, Colonel Edward M. House, in the spring of 1915; to German Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg's peace proposals before the Parliament (Reichstag) in December 1916; to President Woodrow Wilson's "peace without victory" speech before the U.S. Senate in January 1917 and his address (the "Fourteen Points") to the Congress in January 1918; to Habsburg Emperor Karl I's secret peace proposal to France in the summer of 1917 (the so-called Sixtus-Affair); and to Pope Benedict XV's call for a peace without annexations or reparations in August 1917.¹ But they all foundered on the rock of national interests and power politics. No major player was willing publicly to state specific peace terms. For Germany, this meant the maximalist program of the "hawks" around Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and General Erich Ludendorff that demanded control of Europe from the Volga to the Marne Rivers; or the minimalist September-Program of Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg in 1914 that called for a German-dominated "Central Europe" (Mitteleuropa) and a German Central African colonial empire.² War termination for Berlin, put simply, meant a victor's peace with massive annexations and reparations.

How, then, do we deal with the concept of war termination? The U.S. Naval War College's classic "Strategy and Policy" curriculum defines war termination by way of a series

¹ For a succinct summary see "Friedensinitiativen" in *Enzyklopädie Erster Weltkrieg*, eds. Gerhard Hirschfeld, Gerd Krumeich, Irina Renz (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2003), 510-12.

² Still the standard, Fritz Fischer, *Griff nach der Weltmacht: Die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914/18* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1964).

of rhetorical questions.³ Did any power pursuing war termination rationally conclude that the costs of continuing the war outweighed the value of any political objective to be gained? Did the long-term benefits of continuing the war outweigh the short-term costs? Did a power's military operations support its diplomacy? And did military leaders heed strategic guidance from their political leaders? In the case of Imperial Germany between 1914 and 1918, I would reply in the negative to all of these queries. The pressing question, of course, is why.

The most immediate answer lies in the field of constitutional powers. Who could take the lead in bringing about war termination? The German Constitution of April 1871 was very clear: Article 11 specified that the Kaiser alone had the "duty" to conclude "treaties with foreign countries" and "to declare war and to conclude peace." His decision in either case required only the "consent" of the Upper House (Bundesrat), staffed with the ambassadors of the federal states and in which Prussia enjoyed veto powers, as well as "the countersignature of the Imperial Chancellor," the monarch's personal appointee. The Lower House, or Reichstag, merely had the authority to approve or to reject the budget.⁴ Put simply, war termination lay exclusively in the hands of the Emperor and his Chancellor. Neither the Cabinet nor the Parliament nor public peace lobbies could bring this about.

Not even the Chief of the General Staff could play an official role in the matter of war and peace. His office was not formally defined in the 1871 Constitution. He was but the "first advisor" on military matters to the Prussian King (and in August 1914 to the German Emperor as well). He commanded neither a budget line nor a troop formation. His inability to determine national policy was laid bare in November 1914 after the lost Battle of the Marne and the ill-fated follow-up campaigns in Artois and Flanders, when the Chief of the General Staff, Erich von Falkenhayn, advised the Chancellor to seek a separate peace. "It will be impossible," Falkenhayn mentored Bethmann Hollweg, "to beat Russia, France and England to such a point where we can come to a decent peace." The only way to stave off a military disaster and to escape "the danger of slowly exhausting ourselves"—read, a war of attrition—was to seek an accord with Russia.⁵ Sage counsel from an unlikely source. The Chancellor declined the invitation and vowed to fight to the bitter end for the sake of war aims.

There were also domestic considerations behind this refusal seriously to consider war termination before the armies had been exhausted and defeated. War develops its own dynamic. Who, after August 1914, remembered, and much less cared about, Archduke Francis Ferdinand? Or Sophie Chotek? Or Sarajevo? In the troglodyte world of the trenches, millions of young men cared about the future of their family, jobs and society—as did millions of women suffering horrendously on the home front. The longer that the casualty lists grew, the more emphatically the government and the military insisted that the war be fought through to a victorious conclusion. After all, the slaughter must not have been in vain! The chief editor of the influential Berliner Tageblatt, Theodor Wolff, early in 1917 laid out the connection between

³ Strategy and Policy, Joint Professional Military Education, Phase II Senior Level Course Syllabus 2015, 15-16. Accessed on 7 July 2015 at: www.usnwc.edu/Departments—Colleges/Strategy-and-Policy.aspx.

⁴ Walter Farleigh Dodd, *Modern Constitutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1909), vol. 1, 330-31.

⁵ Holger Afflerbach, *Falkenhayn: Politisches Denken und Handeln im Kaiserreich* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1994), 198-203.

victory on the battlefield and domestic dominance by the ruling elite during a discussion with Johann Heinrich Count von Bernstorff, the Reich's ambassador to Washington: "One will no longer be able to rule in such a reactionary manner once the people return from the trenches." Walther Rathenau, head of German General Electric and the initial organizer of the War Raw Materials Section for the Prussian War Office, in July 1917 warned General Ludendorff that the wages of the lower classes would have to be raised by a staggering 50 percent to head off domestic unrest after the war. "The [war in the] trenches cannot be paid for with a deterioration in the standard of living." Alfred Hugenberg, chief director of the gigantic Krupp armaments firm and a leading "hawk" on the issue of war aims, likewise warned that the men would return from the trenches with a "very increased sense of power." And he made clear to fellow industrialists the connection between war aims and domestic tranquility. "It would therefore be well advised, in order to avoid internal difficulties, to distract the attention of the people and to give fantasies concerning the extension of German territory room to play."⁶ Territorial expansion would be the bread and circuses of Imperial Germany. War termination could be considered only on this basis were the Hohenzollern Monarchy to survive.

We do know what war termination by a victorious Imperial Germany would have looked like. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, concluded in March 1918 with the new Bolshevik regime of V. I. Lenin, gave Germany virtual control over Finland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Estonia, Courland, Livonia, and Poland as well as 50 percent of Russia's industry and 30 percent of its population.⁷ Two months later, in the Treaty of Bucharest, Berlin and Vienna took over the Romanian oil fields, forced Bucharest to demobilize one-third of its armed forces, and reduced Bessarabia to a vassal state.⁸ Economic hegemony over Mitteleuropa—a primary German war aim since September 1914—was thus very nearly accomplished. A victorious peace in the West would have been every bit as Draconian, with Scandinavia as benevolent client states, Belgium and the Netherlands reduced to vassal states, France dismembered, and the Channel ports in German hands.

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To achieve its national-policy goals—or, in Carl von Clausewitz's vocabulary, "to compel the enemy to do our will"⁹—Imperial Germany mounted five "bids" for victory between 1914 and 1917: the modified Schlieffen-Moltke plan in September 1914; the misnamed "race to the sea" in Artois and Flanders in October-November 1914; the Gorlice-Tarnów offensive in the East in May 1915; the "meat grinder" of Verdun in the West in 1916; and the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare in February 1917.¹⁰ Each brought what the German official history of the war (*Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918*) called "ordinary victories"; none forced

⁶ All citations from Holger H. Herwig, *The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914 – 1918* (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 308.

⁷ Fischer, 523 ff.

⁸ Winfried Baumgart, *Deutsche Ostpolitik 1918: Von Brest-Litowsk bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges*, (Vienna and Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1966), 132 ff.

⁹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, eds. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 75. Italics in the original.

¹⁰ See Colin S. Gray, *Leverage of Sea Power: The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 193-98.

the Entente coalition to sue for peace. Indeed, by late 1917 none of the belligerents had collapsed, none had exhausted all its resources, and none had been destroyed psychologically or materially.

What to do next? Imperial Germany's sixth bid for victory—and thus war termination—witnessed a total reassessment not of its grand strategy, but rather of its operational art. Flanking and encirclement, in the biting words of the German military historian Gerhard Groß, had existed “only on paper and in the heads of several General Staff officers around Hindenburg and Ludendorff.”¹¹ By 1917 it had failed. The cumulative German war dead by the end of that year had reached a staggering 1.27 million men—compared to roughly 700 total Japanese war dead.¹² In early 1918 a wave of industrial strikes swept across Germany's northern industrial cities and roughly four million civilians took to the streets to protest against hunger, rationing and war profiteering.

Erich Ludendorff and his planners decided to square the circle: a resort to brutal break-through even in the face of modern industrial warfare featuring machine guns, flamethrowers, howitzers, gas, aircraft, and artillery. But how? Alfred von Schlieffen had virtually banned the word “Durchbruch” (break-through) from operational studies. His successor, Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, had only light-heartedly tested break-through in his war games in 1912 and 1913.

Yet, time was Germany's worst enemy. Facing a determined, hostile coalition vastly superior in both manpower and material, a war of attrition was not Germany's trump suit, especially after the United States had entered the war as an Associated Power on the side of the Entente in April 1917. Still, unlike their predecessor, Falkenhayn in November 1914, the duumvirate of Hindenburg and Ludendorff rejected war termination by way of diplomatic negotiation. They staked everything on a “peace with victory,” on an all-out Siegfrieden. All that was needed was to “punch a hole” in the enemy lines in the West. “The rest,” Ludendorff argued, “will take care of itself.”¹³ And he left no doubt that war termination rested on expansive war aims. When several of the demigods in the General Staff only days into Operation Michael questioned the efficacy of break-through, the First Quartermaster-General curtly cut them off. “What do you want from me? Am I now to conclude peace at any price?”¹⁴

In fact, “concluding peace” proved to be a major hurdle in 1918. The great Michael offensive of February 1918 in the view of almost all corps, army and army-group commanders was the Reich's “last card,” a final roll of the dice before American troops arrived in large numbers in Europe. It had run its course by 5 April 1918—at the frightful cost of a further 303,450 casualties. Moreover, in his greed for conquered lands, General Ludendorff had left almost 1 million occupation troops in the East. Senior front-line commanders now counseled

¹¹ Gerhard Groß, *Mythos und Wirklichkeit: Geschichte des operativen Denkens im deutschen Heer von Moltke d.Ä. bis Heusinger* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2012), 124.

¹² Some 408 soldiers as well as 50 sailors fell in battle and 141 died of disease in Tsingtau; another 78 sailors were killed in the Mediterranean theater. Figures courtesy of Professor Kyoichi Tachikawa of NIDS.

¹³ Kronprinz Rupprecht von Bayern, *In treue Fest: Mein Kriegstagebuch*, ed. Eugen von Frauenholz (Munich: Deutscher National Verlag, 1923), vol. 2, 372.

¹⁴ Albrecht Thäer, *Generalstabsdienst an der Front und in der O.H.L. Aus Briefen und Tagebuchaufzeichnungen 1915–1919*, ed. Siegfried A. Kaehler (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1958), 196-97.

war termination before their armies disintegrated. Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, commanding Sixth Army, and General Karl von Einem, commanding Third Army, by June 1918 reported that their starving troops had all too often failed to press the vital attack forward, and instead had stopped to gorge themselves on “liberated” Allied stocks of food and drink. Cases of indiscipline and desertion had escalated dramatically. While Ludendorff indulged himself in fanciful dreams of a pursuit of the “defeated” British Army to India, Crown Prince Rupprecht reported to General Staff Headquarters that fully 20 per cent of reserves called to the front failed to report for duty.¹⁵ The German military historian Wilhelm Deist estimated the number of what Ludendorff called “shirkers” and “slackers” at between 760,000 and 1 million for the last two months of the war.¹⁶ Those that did report were met with shouts of “strike breakers” by the battle-hardened veterans. Skeletal divisions manned by badly clothed, poorly armed and undernourished soldiers, and powered by emaciated horses were no match for the well-fed and well-equipped men of the Allied armies.

Yet again the question, what to do? And yet again, Ludendorff had an answer. On 1 October he informed his staff: “Prosecution of the war was senseless.” The General cared little for the soldiers, the nation, or the monarch. His primary concern was for his army. Only a “quick end” to the war, he counseled, could save it from destruction. He demanded that the Kaiser and the Chancellor “request an armistice without any hesitation.” No Siegfrieden. No annexations. No reparations. Instead, war termination through capitulation. But then, cynically, Ludendorff proposed a way in which the statesmen and soldiers who had started and managed the war since 1914 could escape responsibility for the slaughter. The Kaiser, he allowed, should leave war termination to “those circles which we mainly have to thank that things have come to this,” that is, Liberals and Social Democrats. “They can now clean up the mess for which they are responsible.”¹⁷ Ludendorff demanded acceptance of President Wilson’s famous “Fourteen Points”—which he had not even read! And then, in disguise, he headed off to Sweden to write his memoirs.

It was a singularly stunning case of war termination. Few of the staff officers present at the meeting realized that Ludendorff had just laid the foundations for what was to become the infamous “stab-in-the-back” (*Dolchstoß*) legend that was to dog the Weimar Republic throughout the course of its existence. In late 1919 Field Marshal von Hindenburg, appearing before a special Reichstag Committee of Enquiry to testify as to the exact timing of the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare in January 1917, instead gave sworn testimony that the German Army in 1918 had been “stabbed in the back” by the home front (Jews and Marxists, Pacifists and Socialists).¹⁸ Ludendorff’s and Hindenburg’s seemingly authoritative

¹⁵ Kronprinz Rupprecht von Bayern, vol. 2, 304. Entry for 25 June 1918.

¹⁶ See the splendid analysis by Wilhelm Deist, “Verdeckter Militärstreik im Kriegsjahr 1918,” in *Der Krieg des kleinen Mannes: Eine Militargeschichte von unten*, ed. Wolfram Wette (Munich and Zurich: Piper, 1992), 146-67.

¹⁷ Thaer, 234-35; Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, *Tagebuchaufzeichnungen und Lagebeurteilungen aus zwei Weltkriegen*, ed. Georg Meyer (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1976), 140. Italics in the original. See also Scott Stephenson, *The Final Battle: Soldiers on the Western Front and the German Revolution of 1918* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

¹⁸ Paul von Hindenburg, *Aus meinem Leben* (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1920), 403.

but highly inaccurate statements certainly helped pave the way for the Weimar Republic's eventual demise.

The Germans, in truth, had grasped at President Wilson's "peace-without-victory" formula and the "Fourteen Points" as a drowning man grabs at a rope. They knew that they could expect no leniency from old European warriors such as Georges Clemenceau and David Lloyd George. Thus, they turned to the Great Idealist in Washington. Wilson's first note of 8 October was, in fact, diplomatic and polite, and merely requested clarification on whether Imperial Germany fully accepted the "Fourteen Points"—five of which consisted of airy philosophical axioms such as open diplomacy, freedom of the seas, removal of trade barriers, reduction in armaments, and settlement of colonial disputes by the people affected—as the basis for future talks.¹⁹ The General Staff believed that the "Fourteen Points" would permit them to keep Ukraine and Alsace. The Foreign Office thought that they would allow the Reich to regain its overseas colonies after a peace was signed. They chose to ignore the remaining Points, which called for the restoration of an independent Belgium, the transfer of Alsace-Lorraine to France, self-determination for the peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and recognition of an independent Poland with access to the sea. The President's "frank and direct" second note of 14 October poured cold water on the rosy expectations in Berlin. He condemned what he called Germany's "illegal and inhumane" submarine warfare and its "cruel and wanton destruction" of Flanders and northern France. He also called upon Berlin formally to recognize "the present military supremacy of the armies of the United States and of the Allies in the field."²⁰ And the President's third note to Berlin of 23 October spelled out war termination for what he called "the military masters and the monarchical autocrats of Germany" in a single word: "surrender."²¹ It was brutal realpolitik.

In an eleventh-hour attempt to assuage Wilson, Germany undertook reform of its semi-autocratic constitutional structure. The new Chancellor, Prince Max von Baden, aided by his Secretary of the Foreign Office, Admiral Paul von Hintze, abolished the arcane Prussian three-class voting system, made ministers responsible to the Reichstag, and voided the Kaiser's command authority over the army and navy as well as his virtual control over foreign affairs. But it was too little, too late.

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War termination in the German case, in fact, came not from Prince Max and his Cabinet, nor from the newly "responsible" Parliament, but rather by way of a defeated military. The final push for an end to the war at any price came from the High Sea Fleet. In late October 1918, Admiral Reinhard Scheer, commander-in-chief of the Imperial German Navy, and Admiral Franz von Hipper, the fleet chief, concocted Operations Plan No. 19, a desperate sortie against the British Grand Fleet, augmented by five U.S. super-dreadnought battleships, for the sake of "honor" and for the "future rebirth" of the High Sea Fleet. The sailors got wind of the planned "suicide sortie" and on 29 October 1918 doused the fires in the ships' boilers and raised the red

¹⁹ Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), vol. 51, 263-64. "A Draft Note to the German Government," 8 October 1918.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, vol. 51, 333-34. "A Draft of a Note to the German Government," 14 October 1918.

²¹ *Ibid.*, vol. 51, 417-19. "To Germany," 23 October 1918.

banner of revolt on the deadnoughts König, Kronprinz Wilhelm and Markgraf. Other fleet units quickly joined in and from Kiel the sailors took the revolution by train to Hamburg, Bremen, Cuxhaven, and Wilhelmshaven. From there, the revolt spread inland to Berlin, Dresden and Munich. The sailors' primary demand had been for an end to the war.²²

The picture was no rosier with regard to the army. General Wilhelm Groener, Ludendorff's successor as First Quartermaster-General, reminded his staff that the army was disintegrating before their very eyes: between 200,000 and 1.5 million soldiers were either "missing" or had deserted; by early November, a mere dozen combat-ready divisions was all that stood to guard the nation's borders from the Belgian Channel to the Upper Rhine River. On 9 November 1918 Groener asked his senior field commanders whether they believed that their men were still willing to fight, either at the front or at home. Only 1 of the 39 commanders queried at the meeting replied that the soldiers stood squarely behind the Kaiser. The vast majority stated bluntly that "the troops are fully exhausted . . . only the ruins [of an army] are on hand." It remained for Groener, a South German, to instruct the King of Prussia that the army "no longer stands behind Your Majesty!"²³ Wilhelm II declined suggestions that he seek an "honorable" death at the head of a regiment at the front, or that he lead the High Sea Fleet in a "death ride" against the British Grand Fleet in the southern North Sea; instead, he quietly slipped across the Dutch border into exile. On 9 November 1918 Philipp Scheidemann of the Social Democrats (SPD) simply proclaimed the birth of a German republic from a balcony of the Reichstag. Thus, 504 years of Hohenzollern rule in Brandenburg/Prussia/Germany came to an end.

In a perverse sense, war termination came on Germany's terms. It had gambled all on a roll of the dice in February 1918, and it had lost. Although its soldiers occupied Belgium, Poland, the Baltic states, Ukraine, Romania, and Russia as far as the Caspian Sea, the army that trudged home in the West did so, in the words of one anonymous veteran, "reviled, dishonored, insulted, despised."²⁴ Few were willing to continue the fight for "King and Fatherland."

On 28 June 1919 President Friedrich Ebert's socialist government accepted the humiliating 440 articles of the Treaty of Versailles. Chancellor Scheidemann had refused to sign the document, but when threatened with the resumption of the war, Germany sent Foreign Minister Hermann Müller and Transportation Minister Hans Bell to Paris to ink the accord. None of the "men of 1914" went to Paris at "the hour to settle accounts," as French Premier Georges Clemenceau termed it. Kurt Riezler, a former advisor to Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg, summed up the nation's prospects as follows: "Slavery for 100 years. The dream of world power gone forever. The end of all hubris. The scattering of Germans throughout the world. Fate of the Jews."²⁵ For many senior German officers, war termination had been made most difficult by a new Allied demand: the surrender of some 1,590 yet to be named

²² See Michael Epkenhans, "'Red Sailors' and the Demise of the German Empire, 1918," in *Naval Mutinies of the Twentieth Century*, eds. Christopher M. Bell and Bruce A. Elleman (London and Portland: Frank Cass, 2003), 80 ff.

²³ Oberkommando des Heeres, *Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918* (Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1944), 716.

²⁴ Cited in *Der Krieg des kleinen Mannes*, 120.

²⁵ Kurt Riezler, *Tagebücher, Aufsätze, Dokumente*, ed. Karl Dietrich Erdmann (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972), 480. Entry for 1 October 1918. On the peace "negotiations," see Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World*, (New York: Random House, 2001).

“war criminals,” ranging from the Supreme War Lord, Wilhelm II, to a host of lieutenants in command of submarines (formalized as Articles 228 to 230 of the Treaty of Versailles).²⁶ The Federal Republic of Germany made the last reparations payment under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles in October 2010.

Indeed, the peace was as difficult as the war even for the victors to devour. In the cunning aphorism of the great Chinese military theorist Sun Tzu, the process of war termination, much like the deployment of an army, may be compared to the snake (shuaijan) of Mt. Ch’ang. “If you strike its head the tail will respond; if you strike its tail the head will respond. If you strike the middle (of the body) both the head and the tail will react.”²⁷ That “snake” was appointed Chancellor on 30 January 1933.

As draconian as it seemed at the time, war termination for Germany did not translate into radical revolution à la Lenin. There was no purge of the officer corps, the diplomatic corps, the civil service, or the judiciary. Walther Rathenau spoke of a “revolution by accident,” and linked war termination to the army’s disintegration after the Michael Offensive. “We call the general strike of a defeated army the German revolution.”²⁸ The noted theologian Ernst Troeltsch cryptically caught the spirit of the “revolution” in Berlin: “On all faces one could read: Salaries will continue to be paid!”²⁹ The war had ended on its 1586th day.

Imperial Germany in 1918 was not, of course, the first power to experience the enormous difficulty of terminating a war that had lasted for years, drained the nation’s finances, rent asunder its social fabric, and bled its army “white.” More than 2,000 years earlier, the historian Thucydides had noted the passions aroused by war and the difficulty of reintroducing reason into statecraft. After the Athenian victory at Pylos in the seventh year of the Peloponnesian War, Spartan emissaries pleaded with their Athenian counterparts to restore peace in the ancient Greek world. Recent success, so the Lacedaemonians to their Athenian counterparts, must not make you fancy that fortune will be always with you. Sensible men are prudent enough to treat their gains as precarious, just as they would also keep a clear head in adversity, and think that war, so far from staying within the limit to which a combatant may wish to confine it, will run the course that its chances prescribe.³⁰

Alas, there was no Thucydides in official Berlin in 1917-18.

²⁶ See John Horne and Alan Kramer, *German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001), 329 ff.

²⁷ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, tr. Ralph D. Sawyer (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994), 221.

²⁸ Walther Rathenau, *Kritik der dreifachen Revolution* (Berlin: S. Fischer, 1919), 9.

²⁹ Cited in Christian Graf von Krockow, *Die Deutschen in ihrem Jahrhundert 1890 - 1990* (Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1990), 123.

³⁰ Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. R. Livingstone, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960), 206-07.