

**Program
Participants
Summaries**

PROGRAM

Opening Session

- 9:30 – 9:35 Opening Remarks
 Toshio Saito (President, NIDS)
- 9:35 – 9:40 Welcoming Remarks
 Kenji Harada (Parliamentary Secretary for Defense)
- 9:40 – 9:45 Chairman’s Remarks
 Junichiro Shoji (Director, Center for Military History [CMH], NIDS)

Keynote Address

- 9:45 – 10:15 “The Evolution and the Future of Joint and Combined Operations”
 Ryoichi Oriki (Special Adviser to the Minister of Defense; former
 Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, JSDF)
- 10:15 – 10:30 Break

Session 1: The First World War Era

- 10:30 – 10:55 “GALLIPOLI”
 Graham Dunlop (Retired Colonel, the Royal Marines)
- 10:55 – 11:20 “Joint or All-Arms Warfare on the Western Front, 1918”
 David Stevenson (Professor, London School of Economics and
 Political Science, University of London)
- 11:20 – 11:30 Comments
 Haruo Tohmatsu (Professor, National Defense Academy)
- 11:30 – 11:50 Discussion
- 11:50 – 13:00 Lunch

Special Address

- 13:00 – 13:40 “Strategy and Decisive Battle”
 Lawrence Freedman (Vice-Principal, King’s College London,
 University of London)
- 13:40 – 13:45 Break

Session 2: The Second World War Era

- 13:45 – 14:10 “Naval Air Operation: The Development of Aircraft Carrier Operations during the Second World War”
Katsuya Tsukamoto (Senior Research Fellow, Defense Policy Division, Policy Studies Department, NIDS)
- 14:10 – 14:35 “Combined and Joint War during World War II: The Anglo-American Story”
Williamson Murray (Professor Emeritus, Ohio State University)
- 14:35 – 15:00 “The 20th Indian Division in French Indo-China, 1945-46: Combined Operations and the Fog of War”
Daniel Marston (Professor, Australian National University)
- 15:00 – 15:10 Comments
Kyoichi Tachikawa (Chief, Military History Division, CMH, NIDS)
- 15:10 – 15:40 Discussion
- 15:40 – 15:55 Break

Session 3: After 1945: Theory and Practice

- 15:55 – 16:20 “AirLand Battle and Modern Warfare”
Carter Malkasian (Professor, US Center for Naval analysis)
- 16:20 – 16:45 “Anti Access: Past and Present”
Toshi Yoshihara (Professor, US Naval War College)
- 16:45 – 17:10 “Amphibious Warfare: Theory and Practice”
Tomoyuki Ishizu (Chief, International Conflict Division, CMH, NIDS)
- 17:10 – 17:20 Comments
Narushige Michishita (Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies)
- 17:20 – 17:50 Discussion

Closing Session

- 17:50 – 17:55 Closing Remarks
Yorito Yamamoto (Vice President, NIDS)

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman

Junichiro Shoji

Director, CMH, NIDS

M.A., University of Tsukuba

Taiheiyosenso to Sono Senryaku (Strategy in the Pacific War) (co-author, 3 volumes) (Tokyo: Chuokoron Shinsha, 2013); *Rekishi to Wakai*, (History and Reconciliation) (co-author) (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 2011); *Nichibei Senryaku Shisoshi: Nichibei-kankei no Atarashii Shiten*, (History of American and Japanese Strategic Thought) (co-author) (Tokyo: Sairyusha, 2005)

Keynote Speaker

Ryoichi Oriki

Former Chief of Joint Staff

B.A., National Defense Academy

General (JGSDF), Retired

Former Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, Special Adviser to the Minister of Defense

Special Speaker

Lawrence Freedman

Vice Principal, King's College London

D.Phil, Nuffield College, University of Oxford

Strategy: A History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); *A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2008); *The Transformation of Strategic Affairs* (London: Routledge for IISS, April 2006)

Speakers

Graham Dunlop

Colonel (Royal Marines UK), Retired

Ph.D., University of Edinburgh

Military Economics, Culture and Logistics in the Burma Campaign, 1942-1945 (London: Pickering & Chatto Ltd, 2009)

David Stevenson

Professor, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)

Ph.D., University of Cambridge

With Our Backs to the Wall: Victory and Defeat in 1918 (London: Penguin Books, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011); *1914-1918: The History of the First World War* (London: Penguin Press, 2004); *The Outbreak of the First World War: 1914 in Perspective* (London: Macmillan, 1997)

Katsuya Tsukamoto

Senior Fellow, Defense Policy Division, Policy Studies Department, NIDS

M.A., Aoyama Gakuin University

Taiheiyosenso to Sono Senryaku (Strategy in the Pacific War) (co-author; 3 volumes) (Tokyo: Chuokoron Shinsha, 2013); *Senryaku Genron: Gunji to Heiwa no Grand Strategy* (The Philosophy of Strategy: Grand Strategy on Peace and War) (co-editor) (Nihon Keizai Shinbun Press 2010); *Sea power: Sono Riron to Jissen* (Sea Power: Theory and Practice) (co-author) (Fuyo Shobo Press, 2008)

Williamson Murray

Professor Emeritus, Ohio State University

Ph.D., Yale University

War, Strategy, and Military Effectiveness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); *Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); *Air War, 1914-1945* (London: Weidendeld and Nicholson, 1999)

Daniel Marston

Professor, Australian National University

D.Phil., University of Oxford (Balliol College)

The Indian Army and the End of the Raj (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare* (editor) (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2008); *Military History of India and South Asia: From the East India Company to the Nuclear Era* (editor) (London: Praeger Publishers, 2008)

Carter Malkasian

Stability and Development Program Director, US Center for Naval analysis

D.Phil., University of Oxford (Keble College)

War Comes to Garmser: Thirty Years of Conflict on the Afghan Frontier (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare* (co-editor) (Oxford: Osprey Publishers, 2008); *A History of Modern Wars of Attrition* (Westport: Praeger, 2002)

Toshi Yoshihara

Professor, US Naval War College

Ph.D., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University

Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon (co-editor) (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2012); *Red Star over the Pacific: China's Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy* (co-author) (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2010); *Indian Naval Strategy in the 21st Century* (co-author) (London: Routledge, 2009)

Tomoyuki Ishizu

Chief, International Conflict Division, CMH, NIDS

M.A., King's College London

"Air Power in Japan's National Strategy," *RUSI Journal*, Vol.153, No. 5 (October 2008); "The Rising Sun Strikes," in Daniel Marston, ed., *The Pacific War Companion: From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima* (2005); *Conflicting Currents: Japan and the United States in the Pacific* (co-editor) (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2009).

Discussants

Haruo Tohmatsu

Professor, National Defense Academy

Ph.D., University of Oxford

Pearl Harbor (co-author) (London: Cassell, 2001); *A Gathering Darkness: The Coming of War to the Far East and the Pacific, 1921-1942* (co-author) (Lanham: SR Books, 2004); *Nippon Teikoku to Inintochiryō: Nan'yo Shoto wo meguru Kokusai Seiji, 1914-1947* (The Imperial Japan and its South Seas Mandate in International Politics, 1914-1947) (Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai, 2011).

Kyoichi Tachikawa

Chief, Division of Military History, CMH, NIDS

Ph.D., Sophia University

Dainiji Sekaitaisen to Furansuryo Indoshina: "Nichifutsu Kyoryoku" no Kenkyu (The Franco-Japanese Collaboration in French Indochina during the Second World War) (Tokyo: Sairyusha, 2000); *British and Japanese Military Leadership in the Far Eastern War, 1941-1945* (co-editor) (London: Frank Cass, 2004); *Japanese Sea Power: A Maritime Nation's Struggle for Identity* (co-author) (Canberra: Sea Power Center - Australia, 2009).

Narushige Michishita

Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies

Ph.D., Johns Hopkins University

North Korea's Military-Diplomatic Campaigns, 1966-2008 (London: Routledge, 2009); *Sea power: Sono Riron to Jissen* (Sea Power: Theory and Practice) (co-author) (Fuyo Shobo Press, 2008); *Air power: Sono Riron to Jissen* (Air Power: Theory and Practice) (co-author) (Fuyo Shobo Press, 2005).

SUMMARIES

Keynote Address

The Evolution and the Future of Joint and Combined Operations

Ryoichi Oriki

1. Introduction

2. Evolution of Japan's Joint and Combined Operations

(1) Participations in Combined Operations and their Lessons

The Boxer Rebellion / WWI / Siberian Intervention

(2) Unionism of Japanese Army and Navy and its Setback during the Pacific War

(3) Evolution of Postwar Joint Operations

Reinforcement of Joint Operations in JSDF and its Current Situation

3. Characters and Problems of Joint and Combined Operations

(1) Joint Operations

(2) Combined Operations

4. Changing Role of Military Forces and Joint and Combined Operations

Around the world, military forces have been changing in their role—from the ones to be used only in time of emergency before the Gulf War, to the ones to be used continuously even in peace time in order to deal with non-traditional security threats after the Iraq War and the Afghanistan War, entrusted with diversified missions. Meanwhile, the importance of traditional security has been increasing especially in East Asia. Thus the diversification of the required role of military forces has great impact on the way that joint and combined operations should be now and in the future.

(1) Changes in Security Environment and Response

Non-traditional Security Threats

Traditional Security

“Gray-zone” Situations

Fifth Dimensions in Operational Environment due to Progress of Science

(2) Military Alliance and Coalition

(3) Joint and Combined Operations in the Future

5. Conclusion

Session 1

GALLIPOLI

Graham Dunlop

The Gallipoli campaign of February 1915 to January 1916 was one of the most incompetent amphibious operations ever conducted by the British Empire. One part of it, though, is undoubtedly one of the best. My aim is to explain and justify that comment. I will focus on amphibious aspects.

Brief narrative outline of the campaign.

Strategic and operational development of the plan—what went wrong?

Under-estimation of the Turks.

Operational and tactical plans not developed jointly from the outset.

Dithering and uncertainty over land force generation.

Selection of land forces—lack of experience—inadequate combat and logistic support.

Very short planning, training and preparatory time frame.

Poor intelligence and security.

The tactical level—brief narrative—what went wrong?

Inadequate bases.

Lack of suitable amphibious shipping and landing craft.

Separation of the landing force staff.

Loss of surprise.

Poor choice of landing beaches—inadequate capacity and dominated by enemy.

Inadequate force on the point of main effort (Cape Helles)—forces too dispersed.

Therefore failure to seize over-optimistic but vital initial objectives.

Navigation errors.

Shortcomings of naval gunfire to support land operations.

Inadequate combat, logistic and medical support.

Poor communications.

Command myopia.

The Suvla landing—brief narrative—what went wrong?

Poor selection and preparation of commanders and forces.

Confused orders and failure of interpretation.

Insufficient reconnaissance.

Navigation errors.

Lack of energy and initiative.

The withdrawal—brief narrative—why did it go so well?

Good, experienced tactical commanders and staffs.

Excellent staff-work despite short planning timeframe.

Proper provision of naval forces.

sound tactical plans.

Effective security and deception.

Luck.

Session 1

Joint or All-Arms Warfare on the Western Front, 1918

David Stevenson

This presentation will start with the contrast between the relatively static campaigning on the Western Front in 1915-1917 and the more mobile operations in 1918. It will analyse the reasons for this greater mobility in two phases:

- (i) March-July 1918. Germany's 'Ludendorff Offensives'; the Allies on the defensive. Between March and July 1918 the Germans launched five major attacks and three times were able to break through the Allies' prepared defences and advance up to fifty miles. This success was partly due to all-arms collaboration, particularly between the artillery and the infantry, as well as to the so-called 'Bruchmüller System' of co-ordinating artillery bombardments and (though this is more disputed) to distinctive infantry tactics. The Allies gradually evolved procedures for countering and repelling the German attacks. This included the formation of a supreme command for the Western Front (under Marshal Ferdinand Foch), which controlled the strategic reserve, as well as superior reconnaissance and intelligence and more flexible logistics. Conversely, the Germans' new integrated system repeatedly broke down after initial breakthroughs, partly because of supply failures and loss of surprise.
- (ii) July-November 1918. During this period the Allies and Americans launched and sustained a succession of co-ordinated and successful offensives. One of the reasons for this success was the tactical system used most spectacularly by the British Empire forces at the Battle of Amiens on 8 August 1918, which combined infantry, artillery, airpower, tanks, and cavalry. However, this was not typical, and most of the Allied attacks used more conventional methods, based primarily on the artillery and infantry. However, aerial photo-reconnaissance was vital to the artillery's counter-battery action, and the creeping barrage to the success of infantry assaults. It should be stressed, however, that the Allies also benefited from superior numbers (particularly because of mass shipments of American forces across the North Atlantic), and that German discipline and morale were dwindling.

The conclusion will stress the contribution of all-arms co-ordination but also its limits (for example, the shortage of portable radios). It plays an important part in explaining the pattern of Western Front campaigning in 1918, but does not provide the whole story.

Special Address

Strategy and Decisive Battle

Lawrence Freedman

This lecture will consider the origins of contemporary military strategy. It will look back to the origins of strategy in the enlightenment and Napoleonic Wars, and the development of the classic model through theorists such as Jomini and Clausewitz. This model stressed the importance of the decisive battle, an encounter between regular forces that would lead to the elimination of the enemy army, and in consequence the subjugation of the enemy state. The lecture will then look at three stages in the development of this model. The first will be the late 19th Century and in particular the impact of von Moltke and Delbruck on the German debates. The German General Staff took to heart von Moltke's insistence that politicians should not interfere in the conduct of war but paid no attention to his warning that a future war in Europe would be peoples' war and dismissed Delbruck's contention that wars could involve a long process of exhaustion instead of the knockout blow of annihilation. The second stage came after the First World War efforts were made to explore how a future war might take advantage of airpower or tanks to avoid a stalemate on the ground. These introduced important ideas that had not been fully developed nor refined before they came to be tested in the Second World War. The third stage came after the Second World War, when developments such as nuclear deterrence and counter-insurgency seemed to mark the end of the classical model but it reasserted itself after the Vietnam War. The American military embraced the classical model in all its aspects—decisive battles and knockout blows, operational art and centres of gravity. While this gained some validity with the defeat of Iraq in 1991 it has not served the Americans well since and has had to be modified in key respects. The lecture concludes by examining the flaws in the classical model and they might best be addressed.

Session 2

Naval Air Operation: The Development of Aircraft Carrier Operations during the Second World War

Katsuya Tsukamoto

Aircraft were extensively employed for naval operations during the First World War. Their role as the “eyes” for battleship-oriented fleets had been clearly recognized at the relatively early stage. After the First World War, as aviation technology advanced, its striking power attracted increasing attention. However, it took considerable time until the aircraft became integrated into the force structure of each navy, and the ways how they were adapted were quite different.

During the interwar period, the Japanese, U.S. and British Navies introduced aircraft carriers, which enabled aircraft to operate closely with the fleet. The British Navy had first operated its carriers in the First World War and initially had an overwhelming advantage in both quality and quantity over Japan and the United States. However, at the start of the Second World War, it possessed obsolete carriers and aircraft and fell far behind from the two countries. Consequently, it was the Japanese and U.S. Navies that were able to accomplish the full-scale operation of air power over the ocean during the Second World War.

During the initial phase of the Pacific War, the Japanese Navy matched the U.S. counterpart in fleet operations. However, it failed to fully leverage the potential of aircraft carriers. In the Pacific Ocean, the carriers were effective not only in fleet battles, but also in such diversified missions as supporting landing operations, bombarding land objectives as well as escorting convoys and conducting anti-submarine warfare. But it was the U.S. Navy that succeeded in demonstrating the potential power of aircraft carriers in these aspects.

My presentation addresses the joint air-sea operations matured during the Second World War by comparing the three countries in view of the strategic environment, operational thought and organization. In particular, since most previous studies focused on the U.S. and British cases, my presentation will focus more closely on the Japanese Navy.

Session 2

Combined and Joint War during World War II: The Anglo-American Story

Williamson Murray

This paper describes the conduct of combined and joint warfare during the Second World War by the Anglo-American powers. It provides a brief overview of the slow but steady improvement in both categories by senior political and military leaders in the two nations in developing and articulating a combined Allied strategy and in the joint arena improving the willingness of the services to cooperate in formulating joint operations. In both cases, arguments and differences marked the path leading to success, but that is in the very nature of successful processes in human affairs. Moreover, the fact that the Japanese and German enemies were also adapting made the task that much more difficult.

In the case of combined operation the extent of the arguments played a major role in Allied success. The British fought long and hard in 1942 and 1943 to prevent the launching of a major invasion of Northwest Europe. Not only did the force the Americans to back down from such an operation, but they were correct in their estimation that such an operations would undoubtedly have disastrous consequences. However, in 1944 the Americans were correct to insist in not only Operation OVERLORD, but in the execution of Operation ANVIL, the landing in southern France in August 1944. They also prevented the Allies from wasting resources in a major campaign that would have led nowhere.

In terms on joint warfare, the military services of Britain and the United States were not prepared to wage joint warfare. For the British such lack of jointness led to the disaster of the Norwegian operation in spring 1940, as well as the defeats in North Africa in 1941 and 1942. Interestingly, the very extent and maritime nature of the Pacific theater forced the Americans to adapt much more quickly to joint warfare than was the case in Europe. In Europe the lack of jointness, particularly by General Omar Bradley came close to defeat at Omaha Beach and thereby the loss of Operation Overlord.

The paper concludes with a discussion of what current military and political leaders might learn from the anglo-American experiences of the Second World War.

Session 2

The 20th Indian Division in French Indo-China, 1945-46: Combined Operations and the Fog of War

Daniel Marston

This paper will focus on a difficult and controversial aspect of the Second World War and its immediate aftermath: occupation responsibilities in French Indo-China. In July 1945 at Potsdam, Germany, His Majesty's Government (HMG) in London agreed to expand the area of responsibility for South East Asia Command (SEAC). This put SEAC in the position of relying upon the largely volunteer Indian Army to carry out an expanded mission, principally involving occupation duties. The conscript British Army could not meet this need, as it was having great difficulties keeping numbers high enough amid demobilization pressures at the end of the war in the east. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the Indian Army found itself carrying out occupation duties not just in British colonies such as Burma and Malaya, but also in the colonies of French Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies (later Indonesia).

The intervention in French Indo-China (FIC)¹ would prove to be one of the most controversial aspects of the ending of the Second World War², and Indian Army divisions in both places found themselves, as one officer would state later, 'the piggy in the middle.'³ Divisional and corps commanders had to negotiate the complexities of overseeing emancipation of Allied prisoners of war and civilians; disarming thousands of Imperial Japanese soldiers; and eventually, fighting counterinsurgency campaigns against nationalist guerrilla units who perceived them as enabling the return of French colonial administrations, in colonies that did not belong to the British. For some battalions, the campaigns during this period involved

¹ This intervention was carried out at the same time as Indian Army divisions moved into the Netherlands East Indies to carry out the same mission.

² This paper will deal with the complexities of the Indian Army campaign in French Indo-China (FIC). For further details on the larger issues surrounding this campaign, see the following: John Springhall, 'Kicking out the Vietminh: How Britain allowed France to Reoccupy South Indo-China, 1945-6,' in *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol 40 (1), pp 115-130, January 2005; Ronald Spector, 'After Hiroshima: Allied Military Occupations and the Fate of Japan's Empire, 1945-7,' *Journal of Military History*, Vol 69, No. 4, October 2005, pp 1121-1136; Peter Neville, *Britain in Vietnam: Prelude to Disaster, 1945-6*, London: Routledge, 2007; Peter Dennis, *Troubled Days of Peace: Mountbatten and South East Asia Command, 1945-6*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987; Louis Allen, *The End of the War in Asia*, London: Hart-Davis MacGibbon, 1976; Peter Dunn, *The First Indo-China War*, London: C. Hurst & Co, 1985; F.S.V. Donnison, *British Military Administration in the Far East, 1943-6*, London: HMSO, 1956; Woodburn Kirby, *The War Against Japan*, Vol. 5, London: HMSO, 1969; Earl Mountbatten of Burma, *Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Commander, South East Asia, 1943-1946*, London: HMSO, 1951; and *Post Surrender Tasks; Section E of the Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Allied Commander South-East Asia, 1943-1946*, London: HMSO, 1969; *Transfer of Power*, Vols. 5, 6, and 7; as well as the papers of General Sir Douglas Gracey, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's London, and for more details.

³ Interview with Major G.C. Coppen, 1/11/1999.

combat almost as intensive and bitter as it had been against the Japanese in Burma. Occupation duties were further complicated by a lack of clear strategy; mission statements appeared to change throughout the occupation period, and the only constant seemed to be a thorough lack of comprehension among SEAC, HMG, and India Command on what the Indian Army should be doing.

This paper will discuss the many issues that arose within an Allied combined operation, and how commanders on the ground in French Indo-China attempted to complete their mission as they understood it. One of the great ironies of this campaign is that necessity eventually turned it into a partial combined operation between the two former enemies—the Indian Army and the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA)—when personnel shortages meant that IJA soldiers were rearmed to fight alongside the Indian Army against the Viet Minh insurgency.

Session 3

AirLand Battle and Modern Warfare

Carter Malkasian

AirLand battle, also known as maneuver warfare, was adopted as the tactical and operational approach of the US Army and Marine Corps in the 1980s. It was meant to allow outnumbered US forces to prevail against the Soviet army in Europe. An intellectual movement preceded its adoption, which was heavily influenced by the desire in the US Army to get away from the irregular way of war of Vietnam. The 1973 Yom Kippur War fed heavily into the development of the doctrine, as did German blitzkrieg tactics of the Second World War.

AirLand battle seeks to decisively defeat enemy forces through placing them in a disadvantageous position on the battlefield. Rather than frontal assaults or cautious advances, daring and mobile flanking movements, encirclements, infiltration tactic, or airborne assaults are used to seize the initiative and attack the enemy where least expected. For example, Liddell Hart's indirect approach called for unexpectedly hitting enemy weak points in order to break through his front. Optimally, enemy positions are then attacked successively and lines of communications and command centers are destroyed as friendly forces drive forward in an "expanding torrent." Maneuver warfare is highly risky. Its ultimate goal is to come to grips with the enemy. The fate of a nation is potentially staked on a single battle. Examples of maneuver warfare are Napoleon's campaigns, German blitzkrieg, and the 1991 Gulf War.

As official doctrine, AirLand Battle was superseded in 2001 by "full spectrum operations" and later by "decisive action" and "combined arms maneuver." In these forms it remains the dominant method for waging conventional war in the US military.

Today, AirLand battle is useful as a tactical doctrine, but not as a strategic, or even operational approach. The nature of modern warfare constrains the use of AirLand battle, especially against a nuclear power. First, nuclear war makes the kind of bold armored dashes envisioned in AirLand battle incredibly risky. Such operations in China or North Korea would invite nuclear retaliation. After all, it was this kind of operation that provoked China's entry into the Korean War in 1950. Second, lesser powers will resort to guerrilla war rather than fight a major power head on. These two constraints leave AirLand battle suited only for proxy wars against the limited number of no-great powers that would attempt to the United States conventionally, as Iraq did in 1991 and, to a lesser extent, in 2003.

AirLand battle is a throwback to the Second World War. Modern warfare is more likely to involve guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency, precision air campaigns, limited naval battles (both ship-to-ship and shore-to-ship), and special forces operations. Conventional ground operations may still occur but they will be limited in means and ends; AirLand battle a select tool for a specific problem, rather than a general method of war.

Session 3

Anti Access: Past and Present

Toshi Yoshihara

Anti-access is having an enormous impact on strategic affairs in Asia and beyond. It is a catchall concept for campaigns and tactics designed to complicate or deny enemy military operations in the global commons. While the term is a relatively new member of military lexicon, anti-access enjoys a long pedigree in military history. Understanding its role in the past may allow scholars and practitioners today to peer into the future.

Over the past decade, China's anti-access strategy has proved most worrisome to Beijing's neighbors and the United States. Called "counter intervention" in China's strategic community, it challenges long-held American and allied assumptions about unfettered use of bases, airspace, and open seas in the western Pacific. Countervailing responses by regional players, including Japan, increasingly involve measures that preclude China's access to its offshore periphery, turning the tables on Chinese forces. Anti-access seems to beget more anti-access. Outside of East Asia, Iran and Pakistan have adopted their own versions of anti-access to blunt the power projection capabilities of their main rivals

Ready availability of precision-strike weaponry has in large measure contributed to this spread of anti-access postures along the eastern and southern rimlands of Eurasia. In particular, the proliferation of missile technologies, guidance systems, and sensors has enabled second-rate military powers and even non-state actors to acquire the ability to strike accurately and lethally. The intensely technical character of anti-access has lent this military trend an aura of novelty. Yet, a look back at history shows that anti-access is not new. Indeed, many anti-access technologies in use today trace their origins to a century ago. Beyond the material realm, the rationales and organizing principles behind current anti-access strategies would have been instantly recognizable to defense planners of past belligerents.

This paper proposes a retrospective look in order to gain greater analytical purchase on the concept. It will specifically examine wars of the 20th century that feature key elements of anti-access. In particular, the Russo-Japanese War, World War I, and the Pacific War offer fruitful strategic, operational, and technological insights. From these historical case studies, this paper will illustrate the enduring logic of anti-access, drawing larger lessons that can be applied to the contemporary era.

Session 3

Amphibious Warfare: Theory and Practice

Tomoyuki Ishizu

In December 2013, the Government of Japan released its first “National Security Strategy” and announced the “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond.” This new Guideline sets forth the buildup of “dynamic joint defense force” calling for a sufficient amphibious operations capability by means of amphibious vehicles and tilt-rotor aircraft, for example, to cope with potential enemy attack against any of Japan’s remote islands.

This paper analyzes amphibious warfare from a historical viewpoint to show its major framework and concept.

It is no wonder that the scale and form of amphibious operations may differ significantly among states depending on their national strategy, status of military power in national strategy, military objectives, and historical or geographical conditions. With all these facts taken into account, however, this paper attempts to propose typical models of amphibious operations, especially for landing operations, and to sort out ideas and terms used in such operations.