

# Unexpected Gifts:

## The Impact and Legacy of the Pacific War in America

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### Introduction

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was arguably the most decisive event of the Twentieth Century for Americans. It triggered a war that, properly understood, lasted from December of 1941 until the end of April 1952, when the Treaty of Peace with Japan came into effect. This essay focuses on the socio-economic and cultural impact of the war, its consequences for postwar American strategy and policy, and the way Americans view it today.

Before turning to the first of those topics, I must remind us that for Americans the war that began at Pearl Harbor was a global struggle. I have tried to distinguish its specifically Pacific impacts from its more general effects, but the lines between the two cannot always be sharply drawn. In discussing the war's larger societal effects, I have narrowed the focus to California, the state most affected by fighting in the far Pacific, shined the spotlight on Los Angeles, the state's largest city, and will tell you about the changes war brought to one family—my own. They were, I will argue, typical of millions of other Americans. And the changes they experienced—sudden prosperity, new-found optimism, and openness to change itself—constituted the first unexpected gift of the Pacific War.

### Transformation

I was born a few weeks short of three years before the Pearl Harbor attack into a family that was neither rich nor poor. My parents had recently moved to Pacific Palisades, a village atop bluffs overlooking the ocean that lay on the northwestern edge of the city of Los Angeles. Thanks to a government-backed mortgage program, they had bought a lot and built a small home in what was then a racially singular, ethnically narrow, and culturally monolithic community. It had been founded nearly twenty years earlier by devout Methodists, who built the only church there, and its congregation remained the dominant group in the community.<sup>1</sup> Some of its residents earned their living in Southern California's industries of the future—motion pictures and aircraft. Others met each other's needs as mechanics or carpenters or plumbers or gas station managers. My father worked on the fringe of the region's perennial industry—real estate—as a designer of lighting fixtures for new public buildings and homes for the wealthy.<sup>2</sup> A street named for the Japanese Christian activist, Kagawa Toyohiko, a few retired missionaries, and an Asian-themed public garden built by a wealthy trans-Pacific trader

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<sup>1</sup> *The Palisadian* 22 (June 17, 1949), 5-7.

<sup>2</sup> The firm was B.B. Bell & Company. For its products, see <http://earlycaliforniaantiques.com/b-b-bell-co-spanish-revival-entry-light-1325/>.

were all that reminded Palisades residents of peoples who lived far beyond their shores.<sup>3</sup> My parents, like everyone else, hoped that the Pacific would live up to its name.

The Pearl Harbor attack and the 44 months of fighting that followed shattered that dream. It brought nightmares. First fear of another surprise attack—from Japanese submarines that torpedoed an oil tanker and shelled refineries near Santa Barbara, just up the coast to the north. Then the wrong-headed, tragic, and unjust expulsion of Japanese-Americans from their homes nearby.<sup>4</sup> But the war also bred new possibilities. War weakened individuals' sense of regional or religious identity and strengthened the impulse to cooperate. People planted victory gardens, saved fats and metals, and met to put civil defense plans into effect.<sup>5</sup> That opened the door to new possibilities for a local society in which non-Methodists like my parents would get to know and work together with the community's founding families.

Before the implications of that development manifested themselves, war brought more immediate economic changes to my family and its neighbors. My father took a new job in a new Douglas Aircraft Company facility nearby. My grandmother left housecleaning to rivet airplane part in another Douglas plant. My young aunt became a waitress in a café that served hordes of new workers who toiled their in three shifts, twenty-four hours a day, seven days of week. Those workers followed the million and a half young men (and a few women) who came to California to train and then go off to fight the Japanese. Collectively they constituted what has been called the biggest internal migration in American history.<sup>6</sup>

They came, in the wake of ten years and more of struggle amidst economic depression, in search of steady incomes and new opportunities. They got both. Before Pearl Harbor my father earned just \$1750 a year at his old job. At Douglas he gained new skills and brought home nearly 30% more annually. Between 1941 and 1945 Californians' total personal income nearly tripled. And their everyday lives were exciting. Newcomers could reinvent themselves in a new, more fluid, and ethnically and racially more diverse society.<sup>7</sup> Those like my parents, who were already there, could afford another child or set aside money for a bigger home or a new car once the war was over. Only occasionally did the sorrows of war—air raid drills that reminded us of the possibility of Japanese attack or word that some older neighbor's son or brother had died in the fighting far across the Pacific—flit across people's consciousness. My family was, like millions of other American families, safe, happy, and prospering.

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<sup>3</sup> The merchant was Adolph Bernheimer. For the history, description and photographs of his "Oriental Japanese Gardens," see [http://www.image-archeology.com/Bernheimer\\_residence\\_Ca.htm](http://www.image-archeology.com/Bernheimer_residence_Ca.htm)

<sup>4</sup> Arthur Verge, "Daily Life in Wartime California," in Roger W. Lotchin, ed., *The Way We Really Were: The Golden State in the Second Great War* (Champaign-Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 15-17; Greg Robinson, *By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment of the Japanese Americans* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 72-176.

<sup>5</sup> Roger W. Lotchin, *The Bad City in the Good War* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2003), 2, 45.

<sup>6</sup> Verge, "Daily Life in Wartime California," in Lotchin, *The Way We Really Were*, 18; Kevin Starr, *Embattled Dreams: California in War and Peace, 1940-1950* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002), 185.

<sup>7</sup> California Enumeration District 60-217 Los Angeles City and County, page 3, 1940 United States Census, accessed via Ancestry.com, May 2012; Verge, "Daily Life in Wartime California," in Lotchin, ed., *The Way We Really Were*, 18; Paul Rhode, "California in the Second World War: An Analysis of Defense Spending," in *ibid.*, 95.

When the fighting stopped in September 1945, fear of renewed economic depression when the troops came home hung over California like a dark cloud. Older Americans remembered the post-World War I economic slump. Donald Douglas, whose plants had been delivering one plane every seven minutes during the fighting, thought the future would be “as dark as the inside of a boot.” Within a week of Japan’s surrender, he laid off 90,000 workers.<sup>8</sup> Suddenly my father, my grandmother, my mother’s cousin, and possibly my aunt and uncle as well faced the possibility of unemployment.

That nightmare never happened because the Pacific War brought about fundamental and enduring change in California. Millions of men and women who came to the state on their way to combat or defense-related jobs found they liked the state and decided to stay there. They made growth Los Angeles’s number one problem—and number one industry. By the time the peace and security treaties came into effect in 1952, Los Angeles County had nearly a third more residents than it had at the moment of Japan’s surrender.<sup>9</sup> These new residents did not suffer unemployment because they came with more skills than the rural migrants of the 1930s and had gained skills transferable to civilian industry during the fighting. The veterans among them benefited from the GI Bill which gave them money for living costs and college or trade school tuition while they trained for new careers.<sup>10</sup> These newcomers, together existing residents like my family, transformed Los Angeles into the biggest city west of the Mississippi that was a new industrial hub. By 1952, LA workers assembled more cars than any American city other than Detroit; made more tires than any city other than Akron, Ohio; built more furniture than Grand Rapids, Michigan, and stitched together more clothes than any city other than New York.<sup>11</sup>

War-driven changes in the first half of the 1940s set the stage for the geospatial transformation of California between 1945 and 1952: suburbanization. People who had lived cheek by jowl in battle zones or defense plant areas wanted space. They got it—all over the state and in Pacific Palisades as well. Between 1945 and 1949, nearly 1500 new homes whose value spiraled steadily upward were built in Pacific Palisades. My father, who had formed an architectural design firm with a friend from Douglas, designed many of them. And before long he teamed up with my aunt’s second husband, a veteran from Omaha, Nebraska, who scouted out huge tracts of land and became a successful developer. Together they, like many others in the construction industry, industrialized home building.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Wilbur H. Morrison, *Donald W. Douglas: A Heart with Wings* (Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press, 1991), 164.

<sup>9</sup> Rhode, “California in the Second World War: An Analysis of Defense Spending,” in Lotchin, *The Way We Really Were*, 100-101; <http://www.laep.org/target/science/population/table.html>

<sup>10</sup> Glenn C. Altschuler and Stuart M. Blumin, *The G.I. Bill: The New Deal for Veterans* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009) examines the GI Bill from a historical perspective. Suzanne Mettler, *Soldiers to Citizens: The G I Bill and the Making of the Greatest Generation* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007) details its long term results on the basis of survey research.

<sup>11</sup> Andrew Rolle, *Los Angeles: From Pueblo to City of the Future* (2nd ed. San Francisco, CA: MTL, Inc., 1995), 74; History of Los Angeles, 22-23, at [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Los\\_Angeles\\_California](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Los_Angeles_California)

<sup>12</sup> *The Palisadian* 22 (June 17, 1949), 8; 1940 Census, Los Angeles City and County, ED 60-217, page 16, accessed via Ancestry.com; Rolle, *Los Angeles*, 141.

Suburbanization sped up the ethnic and racial diversification of the community where I lived, Los Angeles more generally, and California as a whole.

The neighbors near my family's first home came from neighboring states and were all Christians of one sort or another. Our new home, built in 1948, was surrounded on three sides by Jewish families headed, respectively, by a Chicago clothing manufacturer who moved his factory to Los Angeles, a world-class Russian cellist, and a physicist. Thanks to them my sister and I learned to love borscht, appreciate classical music, and avoid the angry Yiddish words that peppered their intra-familial quarrels. My Boy Scout troop soon gained its first non-white member—the son of a Japanese-American family returning from internment that chose to move out into American society at large rather than return to its ethnically homogenous pre-war neighborhood.<sup>13</sup> The Palisades got its first restaurant late in the 1940s, during the occupation phase of the Pacific War. Its Chinese-American owners served delicious but then-exotic food and fought temperance-minded Methodist elders of the community so as to be able to serve beer. These war-induced changes in my family's community were the first small steps down the road that led toward the ethnic, racial, and cultural diversification of Los Angeles, of California, and of the United States whole.<sup>14</sup>

Suburbanization, industrialization, and self-sustaining economic growth made it possible for my father to provide for our family in the post-combat years of the Pacific War as never before. We had new cars, new home appliances, and new educational opportunities. My sister and I attended private (Catholic) elementary schools and went on to achieve college degrees—something my father longed for but never got—from private universities. We watched the signing of the Japanese peace and security treaties in September 1951 on our very first television set. We traveled, first by car all over the American West, then in 1952 did something unimaginable for an ordinary middle class family before Pearl Harbor. We flew to Detroit, picked up a new car, drove it to New York and Washington, DC, and then on home through President Truman's home town in Missouri. That trip would never have been possible without dollars saved during the fighting phase and monies earned during the occupation phase of the Pacific War.

More money, the ability to travel, and a new home in a more diverse and cross-culturally rich community were all gifts of that war to my family and millions of other Americans across the nation. But the greatest, perhaps most unexpected gift of the Pacific war was something intangible: the so-called “can-do spirit.” Nearly seventy years after its end, amidst the prolonged political and economic gridlock of the so-called “Great Recession, Americans can hardly imagine how powerful and widespread that feeling was for the generation that fought and lived through the Pacific War. Victory over Japan after surprise attack and humiliating defeats early in the war produced elation and fed the conviction that sacrifice, determination,

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<sup>13</sup> Rolle, *Los Angeles*, 121 notes that few ethnic enclaves remained in the city after the war-induced “dispersal of ethnic groups.” Greg Robinson, *Japanese-Americans: Life after the War and Internment* (Berkeley, CA; University of California Press, 2012) details the postwar resettlement and dispersal of Japanese-Americans.

<sup>14</sup> Lotchin, *The Bad City in the Good War*, 104, 135-145 develops a broader argument as to how the war moved California toward greater “ethnocultural accommodation.”

and cooperation had produced triumph. If success had been won in war, then what could be impossible in peace?

Americans, transformed individually and collectively by the fight against Japan, shouted “Nothing!” in answer to that question. That response epitomized the socio-economic, cultural, and attitudinal changes that swept over them during the Pacific War. They had become not just “a people of plenty,”<sup>15</sup> but a people more confident, more open to change, and more determined to shape their own and their nation’s destiny in the years that lay ahead. That new attitude was perhaps the most valuable, unexpected socio-economic gift that war conferred upon America.

## Strategy and Policy

A people transformed by war was the foundation upon which Washington strategists and policy makers built a grand design for the future safety of the United States and permanent peace in the Pacific. Secretary of State Dean Acheson proclaimed its essence to the American people and the world on January 12, 1950. He announced that the nation’s first line of defense had moved forward from the mid-Pacific where it had been at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack to the island chain along the Pacific’s northern and western shores. It stretched from Alaska west through the Aleutians, down to the Japanese home islands, and then looped southward through Okinawa and the lesser Ryukyu Islands to the Philippines.<sup>16</sup>

A few days later, the USS *Boxer* put muscle behind Secretary Acheson’s words. The aircraft carrier sailed west from under the Golden Gate to join ships that would shortly be designated the United States Navy Seventh Fleet.<sup>17</sup> That force embodied the fundamental principle underlying the United States’ post-Pearl Harbor Pacific strategy and policy. America was, and would remain, the preponderant power in the Pacific. It would use whatever force necessary to hold the line that Secretary Acheson had drawn.

Critics pilloried Acheson for not including Taiwan within the line, and when Kim Il Sung ordered his forces across the 38th Parallel a few months later, his political foes claimed his failure to mention Korea had given the North Korean dictator a “green light” to attack. President Truman responded by sending troops to Korea and ordering the Seventh Fleet to patrol the Taiwan Strait. Those decisions modified America’s forward defense line and prompted American historians for decades thereafter to interpret Acheson’s speech in Cold

<sup>15</sup> The phrase is the title of David M. Potter’s influential best-selling book published by the University of Chicago Press in 1958.

<sup>16</sup> *New York Times*, January 13, 1950; Robert L. Beisner, *Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 327-328.

<sup>17</sup> Edward J. Marolda, *Ready Seapower: A History of the U.S. Seventh Fleet* (Washington, DC: Naval History and Heritage Command, Department of the Navy, 2012), viii; Jeffrey G. Barlow, *From Hot War to Cold: The U.S. Navy and National Security Affairs, 1945-1955* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 245-254 traces the tangled history of the re-emergence of the Seventh Fleet.

War terms.<sup>18</sup>

Those interpreters misread the significance of his remarks. America's new defense line was born of the Pacific War and encapsulated its impact on American strategy and policy. They secretary's words were based as much on the lessons of the past as on the perils of the present. What he implied about Japan mattered far more than what he failed to say about Korea and Taiwan. Japan, the enemy of the past, was now to become America's essential partner in preserving peace for the future. That change was the ultimate unexpected strategic gift of the Pacific War to the United States.

The new defense line took shape during the combat phase of the war. The fighting changed the way it was designed. Before Pearl Harbor there was little coordination of strategy and policy in Washington. Admirals and generals developed separate war plans and force structures for their respective services.<sup>19</sup> They spoke separately to congressional committees, occasionally to the president, and rarely to their State Department counterparts. Managing a two-front global war demanded better coordination, and President Roosevelt responded on February 9, 1942, by creating via executive order the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That group of four senior officers grew, by 1945, into a network of subordinate committees that produced more coherent defense plans.<sup>20</sup>

A similar change occurred within the State Department. Secretary of State Cordell Hull broke professional diplomats' monopoly on policy development and prepared for peace amidst war by establishing a network of advisory postwar policy planning committees. Their meetings became a forum in which mid-career diplomats and academics with knowledge and experience of Japan brought their expertise to bear on postwar strategy and policy for the Pacific. By the time the fighting stopped, Pentagon and State Department officials were meeting regularly to plan and oversee the occupation phase of the war against Japan.<sup>21</sup>

Long before then, Washington officials had agreed in principle on where America's

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<sup>18</sup> Beisner, *Dean Acheson*, 339, 347-350; Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 337-338, 342-343; Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War: Volume II: The Roaring of the Cataract* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 408-428; Xiaobing Li, "Truman and Taiwan: A US Policy Change from Face to Faith," in James I. Matray, ed., *Northeast Asia and the Legacy of Harry S. Truman: Japan, China, and the Two Koreas* (Kirkwood, MO: Truman State University Press, 2012), 119-116 offers a post-Cold War perspective on the Seventh Fleet interposition decision.

<sup>19</sup> Edward S. Miller, *War Plan ORANGE* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 1-285; and John T. Kuehn, *Agents of Innovation: The General Board and the Design of the Fleet that Defeated the Japanese Navy* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 8-22, 175-177; Brian McAllister Linn, *Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army of the Pacific, 1902-1940* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 165-184, 219-246 details army war planning and force structure development in the two decades prior to Pearl Harbor.

<sup>20</sup> Mark A. Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 104-106, 109, 138-141.

<sup>21</sup> James C. Thomson, Jr., "The Role of the Department of State," in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, eds., *Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations 1931-1941* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), 81-106 remains the foundational overview of the State Department's prewar policy development process; William Roger Louis, *Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1942-1946* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1978), 68-72; Robert D. Eldridge, *The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem: Okinawa in Postwar US-Japan Relations, 1945-1952* (New York, NY: Garland Publishing, 2001), 42-51, 58-59, 63.



new western Pacific defense line should be drawn. Their agreement was born of war. The Pearl Harbor attack, followed by the enemy's landings on Attu and Kiska in the Aleutians demonstrated the inadequacy of the old Alaska-Hawaii-Panama defense line. The loss of Guam and the Philippines made the folly of trying to hold an exposed, minimally defended western Pacific salient obvious. Strategists and policy-planners readily agreed that the great mistake of 1919 must not be repeated: the United States, not Japan, must hold sway over the vast central Pacific area dotted by the Marshall, Mariana, and Palau Islands. American blood shed, and American ships and planes lost during the first half of 1945 demanded that the United States have exclusive strategic control over Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and the rest of the Ryukyu Islands. The same was true for the southern anchor of the island chain, the Philippines. While they would become independent, as promised before the war, the lives lost and devastation caused by their re-conquest brought American and Filipino leaders to the shared realization that the United States must for the foreseeable future provide for Philippine security.<sup>22</sup>

American policy-makers found it much more difficult, however, to agree on how best to implement this new grand strategic design. They confronted three basic questions: What kind of forces and bases were needed to control the vast sea and air space of the Pacific? What sorts of political mechanisms were required to guarantee other nations' acceptance of American dominance over this immense maritime domain? And what would Japan's function in this new scheme of things be?

Global war triggered a great debate in Washington over how to respond to the first question, but the Pacific War had a disproportionate influence on its answers. The debate began with a series of investigations into the Pearl Harbor attack that grew into an effort to reform and restructure the armed services and define their roles and missions in the future. Civilian reformers, including President Harry S. Truman, saw inefficiency, waste, and unnecessary expense in the way the global war was fought.<sup>23</sup> The Pacific War, in their eyes, provided particularly egregious examples of that. Two separate commanders with two different notions of how best to defeat Japan directed its campaigns. Army Air Corps, Navy, and Marine Corps each developed their particular formed of projective air power but found it difficult, first at Guadalcanal, then on Saipan, and even in the last fighting on Okinawa to bring that power to bear in support of ground operations.<sup>24</sup>

To prevent such division of effort in the future the reformers advocated a combination of changes. Creation of a Central Intelligence Agency would provide better coordination and

<sup>22</sup> U.S. Navy Basic Post-War Plan No. 1, May 7, 1945, Box 191, Strategic Plans Division Records, Post-War Naval Planning and Sea Frontier Section (Series XIV) Operational Archives, Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington, DC. I am indebted to Jeffrey Barlow for making a copy of this document available to me; Louis, *Imperialism at Bay*, 81-84; Barlow, *From Hot War to Cold*, 35-55; Eldridge, *The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem*, 13-17, 23-27; Milton W. Meyer, *A Diplomatic History of the Philippine Republic* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1965), 15-16.

<sup>23</sup> Elliot Carlson, *Joe Rochefort's War: The Odyssey of the Codebreaker Who Outwitted Yamamoto at Midway* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011), 165-166, 221-225, 422, 431; [www.biblio.org/pha/pha/invest.html](http://www.biblio.org/pha/pha/invest.html); Barlow, *From Hot War to Cold*, 69-85.

<sup>24</sup> Barlow, *From Hot War to Cold*, 88-92; Ronald Spector, *Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan* (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1985), 191, 195, 206, 314; Alan Rems, "At War with the Army," *Naval History* 26 (February 2012), 24-30.

assessment of future threats to America's security. Independence for the air force within a unified armed force presided over by a single secretary of defense directly responsible to the president would yield unified action in war and cost savings in peace. But their respective Pacific War experiences prompted armed service leaders to respond quite differently to the prospect of unification. Army generals accepted it, and their air force brothers saw change as a way of assuring that strategic air power—the force, in their view, that had compelled Japan to surrender—would be the pre-eminent instrument of war in the future. Navy admirals and Marine Corps generals, on the other hand, read the word “unification” as “marginalization” or “abolition.” They argued that a combination of carrier-based air power, plus robust amphibious capacity, plus submarines’ destruction of the enemy’s naval and merchant marine power had defeated Japan. That combination of projective power would be essential in any future conflict.<sup>25</sup>

The end result of this debate, which spilled over beyond enactment of the National Defense Act of 1947 into ongoing quarrels over missions and budgets, was preservation, in its essentials, of the force structure that had fought the Pacific War. Washington gained a Central Intelligence Agency, but the individual armed services retained their own intelligence-gathering establishments. A single secretary of defense was created, but he had limited power over the army, the navy, an independent air force, and a marine corps whose existence and minimal size was guaranteed by law. In short, the force that would man the new western Pacific defense line was, in essence, the same kind of one that had fought Japan.<sup>26</sup>

Washington's struggle to define an answer to the second question went on more quietly behind the scenes. It pitted Pentagon and State Department officials against one another in bureaucratic battle. Their differences grew out of a dual legacy of war in general and the Pacific War in particular. Fighting Japan—and Germany and Italy—required inspiration and idealism as well as brute force. Americans were told by their leaders that they were fighting for democracy and freedom, not just out of revenge for Pearl Harbor or determination to destroy the Japanese Empire. That idealism complicated definition of the terms under which America would retain bases along its new western Pacific defense line. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill had proclaimed their determination to fight for freedom for all peoples and abjured any intention of territorial aggrandizement in the Atlantic Charter of August 1941. The idealism of their words took on more explicit form during the fight against Japan: The United States championed formation of a permanent United Nations organization, pledged to join it, and hosted the writing of its charter at San Francisco in the spring of 1945. A similar hope for a better, more peaceful future underlay State Department experts' thinking about eventual peace for Japan. They believed that the Japanese home islands, broadly defined,

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<sup>25</sup> Barlow, *From Hot War to Cold*, 60-88; Steve Call, *Selling Air Power: Military Aviation and American Popular Culture after World War II* (College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 2009), 55-57; Jon T. Hoffman, “Alexander A. Vandegrift, 1944-1948,” in Allan R. Millett and Jack Shulimson, eds., *Commandants of the Marine Corps* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004), 305-307; Victor Krulak, *First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984), 18-51 details Marine Corps resistance to unification from the perspective of amid-career officer at the heart of that effort.

<sup>26</sup> En.wikipedia.org/wiki/National\_Defense\_Act\_of\_1947; Barlow, *From Hot War to Cold*, 93-94, 175-240.



should be left intact so as to preclude feelings of revenge or irredentism in a nation that must suffer defeat.<sup>27</sup>

Fighting Japan, however, bred more realistic and even atavistic notions of how American should secure control over, and gain international acceptance of, its new defense line. By mid-1945, naval policy planners had retreated from their original insistence on annexation of islands they considered essential for American control of the Pacific north of the equator. The joint chiefs were moving toward agreement on demanding that the United States control Okinawa and the Ryukyus so as to contain Japan and bottle up in the Yellow and East China Seas any possible adversary that might try to break out from the Asian mainland into the open Pacific.<sup>28</sup> And the last, bloodiest battles of the war—Iwo Jima and Okinawa—infused those islands with an emotional significance among the American people that no policy planner could ignore. The iconic photograph of marines raising the flag atop Mt. Suribachi had stirred Americans' determination to fight on and opened their wallets to buy war bonds to pay for eventual victory. The horrific fighting on Okinawa prompted one later-to-be-famous Marine writer to insist in a letter home that America keep the island so as to keep "the Nips" from acting nice in defeat while plotting new attacks in the future.<sup>29</sup>

By the spring of 1947 diplomats and military men found compromise solutions to the problem of internationally acceptable control mechanisms for parts of the island defense chain. In effect, the admirals and generals got the substance of what they wanted—"exclusive strategic control" over the territories in question—while the diplomats determined the form it took. In the newly independent Philippines, one treaty gave the United States far more bases than had been foreseen before Pearl Harbor. A second, followed by an administrative agreement, guaranteed their use for ninety-nine years. Their stated purpose was mutual security—for the Philippines and America.<sup>30</sup> The former Japanese mandated islands became a United Nations-recognized "strategic trusteeship," under which the people of the islands would be guided toward eventual independence by American administrators and protected by the U.S. Navy. President Truman saw this Solomonic solution as the correct way to balance American national security interests and the ideals for which Americans had fought in war.<sup>31</sup>

Japan, however, presented much more serious problems. Every iteration of a western Pacific defense line contained it. But Pentagon and State Department policy planners differed sharply over just where Japan's southern limits lay and whether Okinawa should remain within them or be detached and developed as a base under the terms of another "strategic

<sup>27</sup> Eldridge, *The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem*, 42, 51, 65-66; Louis, *Imperialism at Bay*, 92, 531.

<sup>28</sup> Barlow, *From Cold War to Hot*, 37-46; Eldridge, *The Bilateral Origins of the Okinawa Problem*, 97-102.

<sup>29</sup> Karal Ann Marling and John Wetenhall, *Iwo Jima: Monuments, Memories, and the American Hero* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), especially 102-219, documents the impact of the flag-raising photograph on the American public; Eugene B. Sledge to family, September 1945, Eugene B. Sledge papers, Auburn University Library, Auburn, Alabama, quoted in Hugh Ambrose, *The Pacific* (New York: New American Library, 2010), 433.

<sup>30</sup> Milton W. Meyer, *A Diplomatic History of the Philippine Republic* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1965), 32, 44-47.

<sup>31</sup> Louis, *Imperialism at Bay*, 437, 523-524; Eldridge, *The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem*, 97-211.

trusteeship.”<sup>32</sup> They agreed that Japan must be transformed from threatening empire into cooperative, democratic nation-state through the implicit coercive force of occupation. But no one, from General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP) in Tokyo to the lowliest Japan hand in Washington thought that protracted occupation was the way to achieve that goal, secure the key position in America’s new defense line, or assure peace in the Pacific more generally. By 1947, there was a growing sense in Washington and at the highest levels of SCAP that formal peace with Japan must be made sooner rather than later.<sup>33</sup>

How, then, did the United States not only retain bases all over Japan but also conclude a security treaty with it in the peace settlement of 1951-1952? Most analysts have focused on what the victors, America foremost among them, forced upon Japan: demilitarization that destroyed the nation’s remaining weapons and democratization that purged its leadership and produced a new constitution whose famous Article IX renounced the right to go to war.<sup>34</sup> A few historians have shown how the Japanese people suffered through and ultimately accepted these changes.<sup>35</sup> None have focused adequately on what, to my mind, is the most significant consequence of the occupation phase of the Pacific War: Americans came to Japan and were changed by their experiences there in ways that left them open to the notion that their sometime enemy could become their partner in peace.<sup>36</sup>

How did that change—the ultimate unexpected strategic gift of the Pacific War—come about? It can be seen first, on the ground, when the first occupiers came ashore. They encountered people not at all like the fearsome “other” enemy that wartime propaganda had depicted. The sight of so much destruction and human misery, individually and collectively, forced them to re-think how they should deal with the Japanese people. One young naval interpreter captured that change in a letter he wrote to parents still angry over Pearl Harbor and all that followed. He could not forget the past but realized that he must deal with the Japanese as fellow human beings if the peace for which so many had fought and died was to be achieved.<sup>37</sup> Another enlisted member of the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps—WACS for short—found it impossible not to feel empathy for, photograph, and write home about the

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<sup>32</sup> Robert D. Eldridge, *The Return of the Amami Islands: The Reversion Movement and U.S.–Japan Relations* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004), 2-12.

<sup>33</sup> D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur: Triumph and Disaster 1945-1964* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985), 336-337; Richard B. Finn, *Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992), 156-158.

<sup>34</sup> Finn, *Winners in Peace*, 28-39; Howard B. Schonberger, *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1989), 40-198; Christopher Aldous, *The Police in Occupation Japan: Control, Corruption, and Resistance to Reform* (London: Routledge, 1997), 43-66 are representative examples of this interpretation.

<sup>35</sup> The pre-eminent explication of the Japanese people’s experience of occupation is John W. Dower’s *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York, NY: Norton, 1999).

<sup>36</sup> Naoko Shibusawa, *America’s Geisha Ally: Reimagining the Japanese Enemy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006) focuses on changing American images of Japan and its people but pays little attention to the occupation-era experiences of Americans in the country.

<sup>37</sup> Roger Dingman, *Deciphering the Rising Sun: Navy and Marine Corps Codebreakers, Translators, and Interpreters in the Pacific War* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009), 195.

hungry, poorly clothed people she encountered in Yokohama.<sup>38</sup>

Change also came about because of the actions of insightful, forward-thinking commanders of occupation forces. General Robert Eichelberger, commander of the Eighth Army at Yokohama, wanted his troops to see and travel around Japan so as to present a friendly face to the Japanese and take home a favorable impression of them. To that end he commandeered trains and took over hotels and resorts for their use and mandated a course in Japanese customs and culture for his troops.<sup>39</sup> Captain (later Rear Admiral) Benton W. Decker, who commanded the former Imperial Japanese Navy base at Yokosuka, barely forty miles distant from Tokyo, wanted much more. He set out to clean it up, reform the surrounding city's government, and implant American-style citizen voluntary associations in the community. Decker instructed his staff to act as if the United States Navy would remain in Yokosuka for ten, or maybe even fifty, years. To that end he invited Japanese dignitaries, American celebrities, journalists, and virtually anyone else who would look and listen to Yokosuka. By 1948 his efforts netted an article in *Reader's Digest*, the most widely read magazine in America, that dubbed Yokosuka "the Gibraltar of the Pacific." It demonstrated how Americans and Japanese were working together in Yokosuka for the benefit of both. Decker's efforts helped convince his navy superiors and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the need to retain a base at the heart of Japan long before war in Korea made that truth obvious.<sup>40</sup>

That realization came about amidst a change in the way Washington strategists and policy planners viewed Japan. During the fighting they saw the country, even in eventual defeat, as a force to be secured against. To that end island bases must be expanded in the Aleutians, retained at Iwo Jima and in the former Japanese mandate islands, and maintained in Okinawa and the Philippines. By the spring of 1947, when General MacArthur proclaimed the basic goals of occupation achieved and Japan ready for peace, their feelings were mixed. The State Department official who brought a draft peace treaty to MacArthur wanted Japan proper left free of an American military presence but was open to keeping bases on nearby islands so as to monitor the onetime enemy's continued peaceful behavior and implementation of reforms.<sup>41</sup> George F. Kennan, chief of the State Department's newly established Policy Planning Staff, came to Japan a year later unsure of where any American bases should go but certain that their purpose was to protect defenseless Japan in the deepening global cold war.<sup>42</sup> By the end of 1949, long-feuding Pentagon and State Department officials agreed upon, and President

<sup>38</sup> Mary A. Kiddie to parents, October 29, November 20, November 26, 1946 in Mary A. [Kiddie] Ruggieri, *From Japan with Love 1946-1948* (San Rafael, CA: Portsmouth Publishing, 2007), 39-40, 51-55.

<sup>39</sup> Michael Cullen Green, *Black Yanks in the Pacific: Race in the Making of Military Empire after World War II* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010), 5-6, 37-39, 43.

<sup>40</sup> Roger Dingman, "The U.S. Navy and the Cold War: the Japan Case," in Craig L. Symonds, ed., *New Aspects of Naval History: Selected Papers Presented at the Fourth Naval History Symposium, United States Naval Academy, 25-26 October 1979*, 291-312 and my "Anchor for Peace: The United States Navy in the Shaping of the Japanese Peace Settlement," *Japan Forum: The Journal of the British Japanese Studies Association* 15 (September 2003), 365-388 detail more fully Decker's activities and their impact on American policy.

<sup>41</sup> Finn, *Winners in Peace*, 156-158.

<sup>42</sup> John Lewis Gaddis, *George F. Kennan: An American Life* (New York, NY: The Penguin Press, 2011), 300-301; Eldridge, *The Return of the Amami Islands*, 12.

Truman signed, a National Security Decision Memorandum that committed the United States to the retention of unspecified bases in Japan. Their purpose would be to guarantee the security of the United States and Japan alike.<sup>43</sup>

That policy would have had no effect if ordinary Americans' attitudes toward Japan had not changed. That change came about because of what they read and saw about Japan and American troops' experience there during the occupation phase of the Pacific War. The occupation was "the largest foreign policy operation in the history of the United States" to date.<sup>44</sup> The sheer size, growing diversity, and constant replenishment of the American occupation force was unprecedented. Nearly 200,000 men in uniform came to Japan at its beginning, and almost the same number remained at its end. In between, nearly 10,000 fresh occupiers—many of them African-Americans—arrived annually. In addition, from 1948 on, the number of American military families living in Japan grew dramatically, peaking at 15,000 men, women, and children.<sup>45</sup> These men and women experienced Japan and its people first hand and wrote or told friends and family back home about what they saw and did in the onetime enemy country.

They became natural subjects for the post-surrender American press corps in Japan. That group of journalists was bigger, more skilled, and better informed than its pre-Pearl Harbor counterpart. None of the prewar American journalists in Tokyo read Japanese; only a few tried to speak the language; and all were hampered by travel restrictions and dependent upon Japanese government English language handouts.<sup>46</sup> The much larger occupation era American press corps contained veteran war-trained interpreter linguists who could conduct interviews with Japanese of all sorts, use their semi-official SCAP status to gain access to Japanese officials, and travel widely to see the changes that were taking place.<sup>47</sup> The stories these new journalists wrote and broadcast changed over time from descriptions of devastation to accounts of nascent economic recovery and the growth of everyday interaction between Americans and Japanese. Collectively they increased Japan's visibility in the American media and painted a picture of the Japanese people that opened the door to the idea of cooperating with them in maintaining the peace of the Pacific.

All of that—changed individual attitudes toward the Japanese; recognition of Japan's strategic position in the new western Pacific defense line; and decline in hostility between Americans and Japanese collectively—happened before war in Korea made Japan's strategic

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<sup>43</sup> Memorandum for the President on the 50th Meeting of the National Security Council, December 30, 1949, PSF/NSC 1375, President's Secretary's Files, Truman papers, Harry S Truman Presidential Library, Independence, Missouri.

<sup>44</sup> Finn, *Winners in Peace*, 28.

<sup>45</sup> Green, *Black Yanks*, 46, 49.

<sup>46</sup> Ernest R. May, "U.S. Press Coverage of Japan 1931-1941," in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, eds., *Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations 1931-1941* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press), 515, 519-525, 531.

<sup>47</sup> The Tokyo Foreign Correspondents Club counted 35-50 members annually between 1945 and 1950—a number nearly four times the size of the prewar American press corps in Japan. Charles Pomeroy, ed., *Foreign Correspondents in Japan: Reporting a Half Century of Upheavals: From 1945 to the Present* (Rutland, VT: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1998), 6, 18, 28, 36, 42, 48; Dingman, *Deciphering the Rising Sun*, 236-239.

value to the United States obvious. The Korean War brought a whole new generation of American combatants to Japan. The Army guaranteed each soldier five days' leave there for every six weeks of combat duty in Korea.<sup>48</sup> Hordes of American sailors thronged Yokosuka and Sasebo, the secondary naval base closest to Korea.<sup>49</sup> Japan became not just an "unsinkable aircraft carrier," but the essential supplier of materials of all kinds with which Americans fought in Korea. And in the process Japan's economy climbed ever more steeply toward recovery from the devastation of the Pacific War.<sup>50</sup>

The Korean War also made it easier for American diplomats to take the lead in negotiating a formal end to the Pacific War. The full story of that process lies beyond the scope of this essay.<sup>51</sup> But the documents it produced—the treaty of peace with Japan and the United States-Japan Security Treaty—codified the changes in American strategy and policy that the war in its entirety brought about. The United States had a new forward defense line meant to insure the predominance of its power in the Pacific. Armed forces reconfigured to embody of the fighting that had ended were deployed on bases meant to hold that line. And Americans recognized Japan, their onetime foe, as their most valuable partner in preservation of peace in the Pacific for the future. That last change, surely the most unexpected of the war's gifts, remains the fundamental premise underlying American strategy and policy in the Pacific to this day.

## Legacy

Americans today believe that the United States is and must remain the predominant power in the Pacific. That conviction derives from the third unexpected gift of the Pacific War: a shared national public memory of a war fought and won long ago by men and women of "the greatest generation."<sup>52</sup> That reconstruction of America's Pacific War has become a defining element of Americans' understanding of who they are and what their role in the Pacific must continue to be.

National public memory is what a people collectively remember about the past. Unlike individual memory, which is a singular artifact of the past, public memory is plural in origin, formed not just by what happened in the past but also by forces that come into play much later. It is a mosaic made of pieces from different overlapping generations that over time forms a coherent image of the past. National public memory finds expression in many forms—in art and literature, films and television programs, and in public monuments. It is bounded by

<sup>48</sup> Green, *Black Yanks*, 67.

<sup>49</sup> Roger Dingman, "Sasebo, Japan, U.S. Naval Fleet Activities, 1945—" and "Yokosuka, Japan, U.S. Naval Base, 1945—" in Paolo E. Coletta, ed., *United States Navy and Marine Corps Bases, Overseas* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985), 306, 396.

<sup>50</sup> Roger Dingman, "The Dagger and the Gift: the Impact of the Korean War on Japan," *Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 2 (Spring 1993), 29-55.

<sup>51</sup> Roger Dingman, "Truman's Gift: The Japanese Peace Settlement," in Matray, ed., *Northeast Asia and the Legacy of Harry S. Truman*, 46-72 provides an overview of the treaties' negotiation process and the president's role in it.

<sup>52</sup> Tom Brokaw coined this phrase and made it the title of his *The Greatest Generation* (New York, NY: Random House, 1998).

nationalism which shapes and often distorts the past in ways that give in coherence in the minds of a particular people.<sup>53</sup>

Elements of Americans' current national public memory of the Pacific War first took shape from the conflict's iconic moments—the Pearl Harbor attack; the raising of the stars and stripes over Iwo Jima; the mushroom clouds over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and Japan's surrender aboard the USS *Missouri*. The essence of its current form has appeared only over the last twenty years.<sup>54</sup> The Pacific War is now seen as a “good war,” in part because it had a clear-cut beginning—a morally unambiguous response to attack—and a successful end—military defeat of the enemy followed by his transformation into a friend through occupation. That structure sets it apart from America's later wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan Vietnam that were murky in origins and less than decisive in their conclusions.

The Pacific War remains a “good war” in Americans' minds even more because it was fought by good men and women. Studs Terkel planted the seeds of that idea in the mid-1980s with his best-selling book of that title.<sup>55</sup> A decade later prominent veterans asserted it forcefully in response to what they perceived as a skewed portrayal of their actions in dropping the first atomic bombs on Japan in the Smithsonian Institution's planned exhibition of the *Enola Gay*. The museum's director resigned, the exhibit was modified, and professional historians protested to no avail. The veterans won what amounted to the last American battle over the Pacific War.<sup>56</sup> Three years later Tom Brokaw transformed them and those who supported them on the home front into “the greatest generation that any society has produced” in his best-selling *The Greatest Generation*.<sup>57</sup>

That image has since been enshrined in American national public memory by the construction of the National World War II Memorial in Washington D.C. That structure sits between the Washington Monument and the Lincoln memorial, symbolizing the equality in importance of the conflict it commemorates with the revolutionary and civil wars in America's

<sup>53</sup> This definition of national public memory derives from, and is elaborated upon, in my *Ghost of War: The Sinking of the Awa maru and Japanese-American Relations, 1945-1995* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 149-203. It has been enriched by Akira Iriye's remarks in Iriye, et. al., “A Roundtable Discussion of Hiroshi Kitamura's Screening Enlightenment: Hollywood and the Cultural Reconstruction of Defeated Japan,” *Perspectives: The Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations Review* 43 (September 2012), 6-7.

<sup>54</sup> For an analysis of how American national public memories of the Pearl Harbor attack changed from 1941 to 1991, see my “Reflections on Pearl Harbor Anniversaries Past,” in Roger Dingman, ed., *Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 3 (Fall 1994), 279-293; John Bodnar, *The ‘Good War’ in American Memory* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press), 1-9 presents a sophisticated view of the contested nature of memories of the larger global war of which the Pacific struggle was a part. Marling and Wetenhall, *Iwo Jima: Monuments, Memories, and the American Hero*; Emily Rosenberg, *A Date Which Will Live: Pearl Harbor in American Memory* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003); and the essays in Marc Gallicchio, ed., *The Unpredictability of the Past: Memories of the Asia-Pacific War in U.S.-East Asian Relations* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007) stand out in the literature of the Pacific War in American national public memory.

<sup>55</sup> Studs Terkel coined “the good war” epithet in *The Good War* (New York, NY: Pantheon, 1984).

<sup>56</sup> Charles T. O'Reilly and William A. Rooney, *The Enola Gay and the Smithsonian Institution* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, 2005) provides a detailed account of the controversy from the perspective of two World War II veterans.

<sup>57</sup> Tom Brokaw, *The Greatest Generation* (New York, NY: Random House, 1998), xxx.



history. Since its completion in 2004, the Memorial has become a place of pilgrimage for schoolchildren, tourists, and even the few surviving veterans of the Pacific War.<sup>58</sup> Those who fought it have thus been elevated in the public mind to the level of the Greek gods in ancient times or ancestors who fought in the American civil war or even the superheroes of comic books and video games.

More recently, shifts in the way Americans perceive the Japanese enemy in the Pacific War have strengthened its image as a “good war” fought by “the greatest generation.” Clint Eastwood’s film, *Letters from Iwo Jima*, began the transformation of the enemy for younger generations of Americans into a noble foe whose courage and humanity amidst tragedy was worthy of respect.<sup>59</sup> Events since the September 2001 attacks continued and strengthened that change. The Japanese stood and fought like men in marked contrast to suicide bombers who indiscriminately killed Americans and ordinary civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan. The George W. Bush administration’s poorly planned, disaster-ridden, and half effective occupation of Iraq<sup>60</sup> suffered when compared to what most Americans regard as General Douglas MacArthur’s masterful and successful direction of the occupation of Japan. The contrast between the treacherous Iraqis and Afghans of today and the “good Japanese” who peacefully accepted occupation and American-dictated reform in the distant past has transformed the Pacific War foe into a people to be admired. The Pacific War, in the minds of 21st Century Americans might even be said to be a conflict in which all of those who fought and occupied or were occupied were members of “the greatest generation” that became “winners in peace.”<sup>61</sup>

The potency of Americans’ national public memory of the Pacific War is evident today—in interstate highways commemorating Pearl Harbor, in advertisements showing the marines raising the flag over Iwo Jima, and in the popularity of *Unbroken*, a best-selling account of a rascally young aviator’s “survival, resilience, and redemption” as a prisoner of the Japanese.<sup>62</sup> The power of what has become the heroic narrative of Americans fighting in the Pacific is one reason what the American public remains committed to the Pacific strategy and policy that took shape sixty years ago. The third unexpected gift of the Pacific War—a potent national public memory of that conflict—thus continues to give to this day.

<sup>58</sup> Niclaus Mills, *Their Last Battle: The Fight for the National World War II Memorial* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2004) details the debate over the design and placement of the memorial; [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National\\_World\\_War\\_II\\_Memorial](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_World_War_II_Memorial); <http://www.honorflight.org/about/> summarizes the history of the program that has brought thousands of surviving veterans to Washington so see the Memorial.

<sup>59</sup> <http://www.imdb.com>. For a different interpretation of the significance of Eastwood’s two Pacific War films, see John Bodnar, *“The Good War” in American Memory* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 216-217.

<sup>60</sup> Jeremi Suri, *Liberty’s Surest Guardian: American Nation-Building from the Founders to Obama* (New York, NY: Free Press, 2011), 248-51 offers a succinct critique of the failures of the Bush administration’s Iraq occupation policies.

<sup>61</sup> The quoted phrases are the titles of Tom Brokaw and Richard B. Finn’s previously cited books.

<sup>62</sup> Laura Hillenbrand, *Unbroken: A World War II Story of Survival, Resilience, and Redemption* (New York, NY: Random House, 2010).

## Conclusion

War is fought amidst the fog of uncertainty. It demands sacrifices and imposes sorrow on all of its combatants. War also produces unexpected gifts, some good, some bad, for the peoples and nations who fight it. The gifts the Pacific War delivered to Americans were, on balance, good gifts. That conflict profoundly changed them, their nation's position in the Pacific, and the strategies and policies they would pursue forever after. Fighting in the Pacific brought immediate prosperity and laid the foundations for long-term economic growth and positive social and cultural change. That was war's first unexpected gift. Fighting Japan fostered a "can-do" spirit that supported new national strategy and policy designed to make America the preponderant power in the Pacific. But reforming Japan yielded the second unexpected gift: transformation of the enemy into partner for peace. Success in both the combat and occupation phases of the Pacific War produced a third unexpected gift: a long-lasting, positive national public memory of the conflict that has supported maintenance of preponderant American power in the Pacific. That posture has in turn promoted the preservation of peace in the Pacific. The ultimate unexpected gift of the Pacific War has thus been the ability of the United States, in cooperation with allies—Japan foremost among them—to prevent another Pacific War.

Continued peace, however, cannot simply be guaranteed by the past. Recalling a war fought seventy years ago and reconsidering its results cannot in and of itself prevent new conflicts. But it can serve to remind all—ordinary citizens as well as strategists and policy makers—of the dangers, costs, and uncertainties of war. Perhaps that insight will breed wisdom and restraint on the part of all Pacific peoples and nations, Americans and the United States foremost among them, when dealing with disputes that threaten the peace that their forebears in the Pacific War fought so hard, and at such great cost, to establish.