PROGRAM

Opening Session

9:30 – 9:35   Opening Remarks

Mr. Nobushige Takamizawa (President, NIDS)

9:35 – 9:40   Welcoming Remarks

Mr. Kimito Nakae (Administrative Vice Minister of Defense)

9:40 – 9:50   Chairman's Remarks

Prof. Junichiro Shoji (Director, Center for Military History, NIDS)

Keynote Address

9:50 – 10:30   "Thoughts on the Pacific War"

Dr. Yoko Kato (Professor, University of Tokyo）

10:30 – 10:45   Break

Session 1: Emergence of Total War

10:45 – 11:10   "What is Total War? From Clausewitz to Ludendorff"

Dr. Jan Willem Honig (Professor, King's College London)

11:10 – 11:35   "Total War and Social Changes: With a Focus on Arthur Marwick's Perspective on War"

Prof. Tomoyuki Ishizu (Chief, International Conflict Division, Center for Military History, NIDS)

11:35 – 12:05   Comment and Discussion

Discussant: Dr. Kanji Akagi (Professor, Keio University)

12:05 – 13:15   Lunch

Special Address

13:15 – 13:55   "War and the Short 20th Century"

Dr. Christopher Coker (Professor, London School of Economics and Political Science)

13:55 – 14:00   Break

Session 2: Total War in the Pacific

14:00 – 14:25   "War to the Knife: The US in the Pacific, 1941-1945"

Dr. Dennis Showalter (Professor, Colorado College)

14:25 – 14:50   "The British Empire in the Pacific War"

Dr. David Horner (Professor, Australian National University)

14:50 – 15:15   "Total War and Japan"

Dr. Atsushi Koketsu (Vice President, Yamaguchi University)

15:15 – 15:45   Comment and Discussion

Discussant: Dr. Ryoichi Tobe (Professor, International Research Center for the Japanese Studies)

15:45 – 16:05   Break

Session 3: Aspects of Total War

16:05 – 16:30   "The 'American Way of War' and the U.S. War with Japan, 1941-45"

Dr. Geoffrey D.W. Wawro (Professor, University of North Texas)

16:30 – 16:55   "Japanese Perspective of Total War"

Lieutenant Colonel Tomoyuki Wada (Fellow, Military History Division, Center for Military History, NIDS)

16:55 – 17:20   "Total War from the Economic Perspective"

Prof. Keishi Ono (Chief, Society and Economy Division, Security Studies Department, NIDS)

17:20 – 17:50   Comment and Discussion

Discussant: Lieutenant Colonel Fumio Takahashi (Professor, Air Staff College)

Closing Session

17:50 – 17:55   Closing Remarks

Maj. Gen. Masatomo Sakuragi (Vice President, NIDS)

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman

Prof. Junichiro Shoji
Director, Center for Military History, NIDS
M.A., University of Tsukuba
Hendoki no Nihon Gaiko to Gunji (Japan at the Crossroads: Crisis Diplomacy and the Role of Military) (co-authored, 1987); *Taishoki Nippon no Amerika Ninshiki* (Japanese Perception of the United States in the Taisho Era) (2001); *Nichibei Senryaku Shisoshi: Nichibei-kankei no Atarashii Shiten* (History of American and Japanese Strategic Thought) (2005); *Rekishi to Wakai* (History and Reconciliation) (co-authored, 2011).

Keynote Speaker

Dr. Yoko Kato
Professor, University of Tokyo
Ph.D., University of Tokyo
Choheisei to Kindai Nihon Shi (Conscription System in Modern Japan) (1996); *Senso no Nihon Kin-Gendai Shi* (Wars in Japanese Modern History) (2002); *Manshu Jihen kara Nitchu Senso e* (From the Manchurian Incident to the Sino-Japanese War) (2007); *Soredemo Nihonjin wa Senso wo Eranda* (Japanese Choice for Wars) (2009); *Showa Tenno to Senso no Seiki* (Emperor Showa and the Century of Warfare) (2011).

Special Speaker

Dr. Christopher Coker
Professor, London School of Economics and Political Science
Ph.D., Oxford University
The Future of War: The Re-enchantment of War in the Twenty First Century (2004); *The Warrior Ethos: Military Culture and the War on Terror* (2007); *War and Ethics in the 21st Century* (2008); *War in an Age of Risk* (2009); *Barbarous Philosophers: Reflections on the Nature of War from*

Heraclitus to Heisenberg (2010).

Speakers

Dr. Jan Willem Honig

Professor, King's College London

Ph.D., King's College London

NATO: An Institution under Threat? Institute for East-West Security Studies Occasional Paper Series, No. 22 (1991); *Defense Policy in the North Atlantic Alliance: The Case of the Netherlands* (1993); *Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime* (1996).

Prof. Tomoyuki Ishizu

Chief, International Conflict Division, Center for Military History, NIDS

M.A., King's College London

"'The Japanese Way in Warfare': Japan's Grand Strategy for the 21st Century," *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* (Summer 2000); "Air Power in Japan's National Strategy," *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 153, No. 5 (October 2008); "The Rising Sun Strikes," in Daniel Marston, ed., *The Pacific War Companion: From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima* (2005); *Conflicting Currents: Japan and the United States in the Pacific* (co-ed., 2009).

Dr. Dennis Showalter

Professor, Colorado College

Ph.D., University of Minnesota

Patton and Rommel: Men of War in the Twentieth Century (2005); *Soldier's Lives Through History. The Early Modern World* (2007); *If the Allies Had Fallen: Sixty Alternate Scenarios of World War II* (2010).

Dr. David Horner

Professor, Australian National University

Ph.D., Australian National University

Blamey: The Commander-in-Chief (1998); *Strategic Command, General Sir John Wilton and Australia's Asian Wars* (2005); *Australia and the 'New World Order'* (2011).

Dr. Atsushi Koketsu

Vice President, Yamaguchi University

Ph.D., Meiji University

Soryokusen Taisei Kenkyu: Nihon Rikugun no Kokka Sodoin Koso (A Study of the System of the Total War: The Japanese Imperial Army's Visions of National General Mobilization) (1981); *Nihon Kaigun no Shusen Kosaku* (The Japanese Imperial Navy's Political Plot for the War End) (1996); *Tanaka Giichi: Soryokusen Kokka no Sendosha* (Giichi Tanaka: The Leader of Japan's Total War) (2009).

Dr. Geoffrey D.W. Wawro

Professor, University of North Texas

Ph.D., Yale University

The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870-71 (2003); *Historical Atlas: A Comprehensive History of the World* (2008); *Quicksand: America's Pursuit of Power in the Middle East* (2010).

Lieutenant Colonel Tomoyuki Wada

Fellow, Military History Division, Center for Military History, NIDS

M.A., The Open University of Japan

"Taiheiyo Senso ni Okeru Senso Shido: Rikugun no Senso Shuketsu Koso wo Chushin to Shite" (Conduct of the War in the Latter Phase of the Pacific War: Focusing on the IJA's Strategy for Terminating the War) (2010).

Prof. Keishi Ono

Chief, Society and Economy Division, Security Studies Department, NIDS

M.S.c., SOAS, University of London

"Japan Self-Defense Forces and their Reconstruction Support Operations in Iraq" *The Liaison*, Vol.4, No.1 (July 2008); "Post-conflict Reconstruction and Private Security Companies (PSC)," (June, 2008); "The War, Military Expenditures and Postbellum Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Japan" *Rethinking the Russo-Japanese War 1904-5*, Vol.1 (2007).

Discussants

Dr. Kanji Akagi

Professor, Keio University

Ph.D., Keio University

Betonamu Senso no Kigen (The Origins of the Vietnam War) (1991); *Dainiji Sekai Taisen no Seiji to Senryaku* (Politics and Strategy of the Second World War) (1997); *Chosen Senso: Kyusen Gojunen no Kensho, Hanto no Uchi to Soto kara* (The Korean War: Revisiting the War from International and Domestic Perspectives) (2003).

Dr. Ryoichi Tobe

Professor, International Research Center for the Japanese Studies

Ph.D., Kyoto University

Shippai no Honshitsu: Nihongun no Soshikiteki Kenkyu (The Essence of Failure: Studies of the IJA and IJN's organizations) (co-authored, 1984); *Peace Feeler: Shina Jihen Wahei Kosaku no Gunzo* (Peace Feeler: Peace Overture in the China Incident) (1991); *Nihonrikugun to Chugoku: "Shinatsu" ni miru Yume to Satetsu* (The Imperial Japanese Army and China: The Hope and Despair of "China-hands") (1999).

Lieutenant Colonel Fumio Takahashi

Professor, Air Staff College

M.A., Sophia University

"Keizai Fusa kara mita Taiheiyo Senso no Kaisen keii" (Sanction or Blockade?: The U. S. Economic Measures against Japan before the War in the Pacific) *NIDS Military History Studies Annual*, No. 14 (March 2011); "The First War Plan Orange and the First Imperial Japanese Defense Policy: An Interpretation from the Geopolitical Strategic Perspective" *NIDS Security Reports*, No. 5 (March 2004).

Keynote Address

Thoughts on the Pacific War

Yoko Kato

The morning edition of the Nikkei [Nihon Keizai Shimbun] of 29 July 2011 reported in detail that an interdepartmental team, including Kurt M. Campbell, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and Admiral Patrick Walsh, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, visited eight Pacific Island states (Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, the Marshall Islands, Kiribati, Samoa, and Tonga) from 29 June to 1 July and discussed bilateral-approach plans for various issues.

The newspaper concluded that the U.S. had two major aims for the tour: to secure their freedom to execute missions in the Pacific Ocean area, whose center is Guam, the front base for U.S. military strategy execution, and also to watch as well as counter China's attempt to expand its influence in the East and South China Sea areas for the sake of natural resources.

Coincidentally, on 27 July, China's Ministry of National Defense officially acknowledged for the first time that they had an aircraft carrier, which until then they had kept quiet about. Recently, the disputes over the right of possession of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea between China and the other states making claims, such as the Philippines and Vietnam, are getting worse. The military expansion of China in the Pacific region, including both the East and South China Seas has already become a major factor causing tension among the states around that area. Observing the current situation mentioned above, times have changed: during the 1920s and 1930s, on the grounds of the London Naval Treaty and the Washington Naval Treaty, the U.S. and the U.K. tried with much effort to control and restrain Japan from expanding its naval forces; however, you can see that Chinese naval forces have now become the ones to watch in the Pacific region. The situation has certainly changed.

On the other hand, one opinion has been gaining in popularity among people in Japan in recent years: that it is appropriate to change the name of the war—which broke out with the first strikes of Japanese forces on British-controlled Malaya and on Pearl Harbor—the Asia and Pacific War rather than the Pacific War (they called it the Greater East Asia War in those days). If you took into consideration the two facts that Japan fought against not only the U.S. but also other states and that the Pacific islands are not the only areas where they caused damage during the war, you can consider such an opinion persuasive enough seen from the current viewpoint.

Nevertheless, in my opinion, it is important to pay attention to the fact that the Japanese in the middle of 1920s actually used the term "the Pacific Ocean" with a connotation of a larger area than only the sea lying between Japan and the U.S. By using the term, they meant to include not only the areas and states in the Pacific Ocean, but also those in and connected to the Pacific Rim. For example, Japan is surrounded by five seas: the Bering Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk, the Japan Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea. In accordance with that, they acquired a spatial sense including the regions, states, and colonies around those seas in the Pacific area.

Such an idea is supported by the actual activities of the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR). The IPR started its activities in 1925: its central committee was composed of members from territories and states such as Australia, Canada, China, Hawaii, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, the U.S. and the U.K. It is noteworthy to underscore the fact that Hawaii, the U.S., "Korea" and Japan sent their own respective committee members. The IPR hosted the Kyoto conference in 1929 and had participants from not only Pacific rim countries such as Japan, the U.K., the U.S., China, the Philippines, and New Zealand, but also "Korea", the League of Nations, the USSR, Mexico, and the Netherlands, etc. The IPR was a non-governmental organization that was organized mainly by Japanese, British, and American Christians and bourgeoisie. The members of the Comintern (or the Communist International) also perceived the world in front of them with a concept of the expansive Pacific area, as the IPR did. Those polar-opposite groups in some sense seemed to share the common idea of an expansive Pacific area. This fact deserves greater attention. In this report I would like to clarify what the concept of the Pacific area was during the 1920s and 1930s.

What is Total War? From Clausewitz to Ludendorff

Jan Willem Honig

Clausewitz never used the term 'total war'. The term, and its conceptual development, firmly belong to the period between the two world wars. The person most responsible for its conceptualisation and popularisation was General Erich Ludendorff. Ludendorff claimed that his work superseded Clausewitz's. Instead of war being a continuation of politics, he argued that politics was a continuation of war by other means. The inversion of Clausewitz's dictum — and indeed the whole idea of total war as the total mobilisation of the nation by a total state in the pursuit of total aims — is often interpreted as an a-political and militarist perversion of Clausewitz's ideas. However, a closer examination of both men's theories of war suggests that Ludendorff married politics and war much more closely and coherently together than Clausewitz had managed. However repugnant in moral and practical terms, the idea of total war can be viewed as a theoretically compelling vision of war whose vestiges can still be traced in the wars conducted by the modern liberal democracies.

<u>**Session 1**</u>

Total War and Social Changes:
With a Focus on Arthur Marwick's Perspective on War

Tomoyuki Ishizu

Carl von Clausewitz, a Prussian soldier and military thinker, wrote his great work "*Vom Kriege*" [*On War*] based on his understanding of war being one of the large-scale social phenomena conducted by human beings. On the other hand, German historian Hans Delbrück revealed the fact that the particular political and social situation of the age strongly influence the faces of a war, in his major work "*Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte*" [*History of the Art of War within the Framework of Political History*]. Such viewpoints on history whose focuses are on the causal relationship between war and social change are reflected in contemporary understandings of war history: for example, those of Britain's Sir Michael Howard and the Swiss historian Stig Förster.

If there really is a strong causal relationship between war and social change, it will inevitably be possible to observe the relationship in the First and Second World Wars, which represent the age of "Total War." This can be attributed to the fact that total war is one in which both military personnel and civilians are involved. Under such conditions, the states involved mobilize not only their military power, but also the total economic, technological, and even moral resources that are potentially available.

Following the understanding of total war mentioned above, Arthur Marwick, a distinguished British historian, examines from a functionalist viewpoint total wars in his series of works. In his works, he provocatively argues that war, an irrational phenomenon at first glance, could be a driving force for rationalization and modernization, as a result of the fact that a state organizes human and other resources and institutions for the effective and efficient prosecution of the war.

In this presentation I would like to examine total wars mainly based on Marwick's viewpoint. He points out that a total war causes social change in four different dimensions in his argument concerning the causal relationship between total war and social change. The first dimension is "the destructive and disruptive dimension of war." Destruction and disruption urge people toward the reconstruction of society and sometimes to the building of a society better than the previous one. This leads to social change. The second dimension is "the test dimension." In war, the military institutions directly related thereto, as well as other systems of society, economy, and politics,

would be tested as to their suitability and survivability for the prosecution of the war. The third is "the participation dimension." War creates conditions which allow people, who up to that time have been deprived of the right and power to participate in various social activities, to participate in them. Marwick argues that the fourth dimension is "the psychological dimension." People start to get the sense that war ought to lead to something new, as a result of their suffering a strong psychological shock by way of the war.

Involved in the arguments of the causal relationship between total war and social change, many advocates emphasize two elements: the "expansion of the state" and the "leveling or even dissolution of the class system." Yasushi Yamanouchi, a Japanese sociologist, names those elements "forcible coordination" (Gleichschaltung), a concept borrowed from Talcott Parsons. Yamanouchi astutely pointed out the fact that all spheres of society were centralized into one huge system; in other words, that drastic social structural change was caused by the total mobilization of all nationals as a necessary demand of total war. This happened to major states involved in total war. It was not a matter of what regime-type the societies were: whether Fascist-type regimes considered irrational and tyrannical, or New Deal-type regimes considered rational and democratic.

In this presentation I would also like to discuss the so-called "1940 system" of Japan.

War and the Short 20th Century

Christopher Coker

War is so central to the experience of the 20th century that even in the word 'peace' there is a paradox. When we see it in print we think immediately of war. Such a diametric transference of meaning might be interpreted as a symptom of the pathology of the modern age. In reality, what it implies is the exact reverse. War was the accredited theme of the 20th century life.

The 'Short 20th Century' we now call the period from 1914-89. It was dreamed of before it arrived, and it meant different things to different people.

Many hoped that it would be continuous with the past, that it would complete what the previous century had left unfinished - in short that it would represent a further advance on the road to Progress. The great hope was that it would be continuous with the 19th century, and in many respects it was, especially in the field of scientific progress. As Norman Stone remarks, "it is probably fair to assert that Europe before 1914 produced virtually all of the ideas in which the 20th century traded, the rest being merely technical extensions of these ideas". The problem was that the marriage of science and war was finally consummated with devastating results: it made possible what the American Civil War had anticipated: the industrialised battlefield.

Others drew comfort from the hope that the 20th century would represent a break with the past, that it would be discontinuous with the 19th century, that it would allow humanity to become the maker of its own history. Where the 19th century had had its great engineers, its rail builders and shipwrights, the 20th century saw the birth of something quite new: what Stalin notoriously called 'the engineers of the human soul'. This break with the past had different antecedents; it derived not from the19th century scientific positivism, but the19th century Idealism. The work of Hegel provided the framework for the self-conscious attempt to create history, not merely respond to it. The attempt to achieve autonomy was at the heart of all the great political movements from liberalism to fascism, and all harnessed war to realise their respective ambitions from 'a world made safe for democracy' the promise on which Woodrow Wilson took the US to war in 1917, to the coming of a Thousand Year Reich, a world in which war would be endless.

There was, however another 20th century, one which threatened to make the age discontinuous with the past and the future, one which threatened to end in an apocalyptic struggle, one which threatened to make the 20th century discontinuous with itself - there would be no 21st

century. It was a fear expressed at the outset of the century by the writer H.G. Wells in his novel *War in the Air* (1908): "This was no slow decadence that came to the Europeanised world - other civilisations rolled and crumbled down, the Europeanised civilisation was, as it were, blown up."

This vision became realisable for the first time in August 1945. The atom bomb was born of the 20th century, not 19th century science. It was only made possible by atomic physics, the most radical and specialised science of the day. The A bomb broke with the past - with the Newtonian killing systems such as ballistics, chemistry and aeronautics, all of which can be seen as extensions of the gunpowder revolution of the 16th century. The A-bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima did not explode because of the blending of chemicals; it exploded because of a humanely engineered change in the nature of matter.

The lesson of the 'short 20th century' probably has not been learned, but it remains a warning to us nonetheless. War may have its place in the future, or it may not - though almost certainly it would not be 'total'. But we enter the second decade of the 21st century with the admonition of Irving Babbitt, writing in 1919, in the immediate aftermath of World War I. "The world", he wrote in an ironic comment on the foundering of the Nietzschean dream, "it is hard to avoid concluding, would have been a better place if more persons had made sure they were human before setting out to be super-human".

War to the Knife: The US in the Pacific, 1941-1945

Dennis Showalter

The dominant interpretation if America's Pacific war is that it was racially inspired and racially conducted. Focal point of the argument is John Dower's *War Without Mercy*. The position is reinforced by the memory and mourning aspects of Hiroshima/Nagasaki, and by the consistently reinvestigated internment of Japanese by the US, which currently produces almost a million Google references.

This presentation offers a different approach. Its thesis is that America's initial approach to war with Japan was in the context of a "shared military culture," with no significant racially based elements. That paradigm, moreover, endured after Pearl Harbor.

From American perspectives the Japanese began as almost a secondary enemy.　Americans confronted not only a comprehensively alien, comprehensibly hostile environment but an opponent who seemed almost comfortably at home there.

The bulk of the presentation shows how the synergy between the Pacific environment and the Japanese way of war led Americans to react by waging a transcultural war in the Pacific—a war to the knife. That war's situational nature was, however, affirmed by the behavior of US servicemen in the immediate postwar occupation. Far from indulging in the rapine and pillage that led the Japanese government to create brothels staffed by volunteers as a front-line defense of Japanese virtue, with the exception of confiscated Samurai swords, the victors paid for most of what they took—women included.

The British Empire in the Pacific War

David Horner

Before the Second World War, Great Britain failed to prepare adequately to defend its empire in the Pacific. As a result, in the six months after December 1941 it suffered a massive defeat, highlighted by the fall of Singapore in February 1942, but also marked by the loss of Hong Kong, Malaya, British Borneo and Burma. Thereafter, Britain was relegated to only a peripheral part in the great allied, overwhelmingly American, counter offensive that won the Pacific War. Certainly, the British-Indian Army, based on India, conducted a long and ultimately successful campaign to regain Burma. But it is arguable whether this campaign influenced the outcome of the war.

One part of the British Empire, however, played a key role in the Pacific War. With a population of just 7 million, Australia fielded an army of half a million men. Until the end of 1943 Australian troops formed the largest part of General MacArthur's land forces. They undertook most of the fighting on land in the South West Pacific Area during this period, regaining most of New Guinea and providing a firm base for MacArthur's further offensives.

The United States was ambivalent towards accepting support from its allies. It welcomed assistance in its effort to defeat Japan. But it also wanted to control the post-war outcome in the Pacific and it was therefore reluctant to allow its allies to play a major part. Britain was excluded because its forces, based in India, could not operate easily in the Pacific. In response, Britain eventually sent a large fleet to fight beside the US Navy as it closed in on Japan; but by comparison it was still a modest contribution. The Australians were under MacArthur's strategic direction and in the last year of the war he ruthlessly sidelined them in subsidiary operations.

The Pacific War accelerated the end of the British Empire in the region – India and Burma were soon independent – but at least Britain could depart with some dignity, retaining a measure of influence for several decades. For Australia, the war shaped its domestic and foreign policies for more than half a century and, building partly on its wartime contribution, it became a significant US ally in the Pacific.

Total War and Japan

Atsushi Koketsu

1) The Impact of Total War

Ordinary Japanese people's interest in the First World War was relatively weak. In contrast, the Japanese ruling classes perceived the form of the First World War with shock, and their sense of crisis deepened. As an example, in order to prepare for war in the future, Aritomo Yamagata said: "we had no choice other than to mobilize all nationals, fully utilizing the resources of the state, and in other words dissolving the class system and then relying on the power of a united nation".[1] Tsuyoshi Inukai expounded at the Nationalist Party Conference in January 1918 that: "All Japanese males are soldiers. All factories are engaged in military industry".[2] Among the Imperial Japanese Army, early on Kazushige Ugaki started planning measures for a total war with Giichi Tanaka. He understood precisely the essence of total war as he commented: "What will decide the outcome of war in the future is a state's full-force impact and deployment logistics, in addition to combat and operational tactics.[3]

2) The Imperial Japanese Army's Preparation for Total War

Among figures of national authority, it was a group of reformist Imperial Army officers, later collectively called the "Tosei-ha" (Control Faction), who systematically executed the measures for total war. In particular, on 27 December 1915, after the outbreak of the First World War, they established a special military investigation committee, and put financial and human resources into ascertaining and examining the war situation and the war-time systems of the states involved. Its reports were featured in booklets such as "*Kaigai Sa Kenja Hokoku* (Correspondent Reports on the Differences among Foreign States)" and "*Rinji Gunji Chosa Hokoku I'inkai Geppo* (Special Military Investigation Committee Monthly)". Subsequently, as the outcomes of research

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[1] Iichiro Tokutomi, ed., *Koshaku Yamagata Aritomo Den* (Biography of Prince Aritomo Yamagata),
Vol. 3 (Yamagata Aritomo Ko Kinenjigyokai, 1933), p. 1188.
[2] Yoshinao Washio, *Inukai Bokudo Den* (Biography of Inukai Bokudo), Vol. 2 (Hara Shobo, 1980),
p. 406.
[3] Jun Tsunoda, rev., *Ugaki Kazushige* (Kazushige Ugaki), Vol. 1 (Misuzu Shobo, 1964), p. 327.

conducted by the Imperial Japanese Army, "The Need for a Whole Nation Mobilization Plan" (the General Staff Office, September 1917), "Empire Defense Resources" (the General Office Staff, August 1917), and "Ideas on a Whole Nation Mobilization" (the Special Military Investigation Committee, May 1920) were also issued successively. The preparation for the construction of a total-war system steadily proceeded with that.

3) Measures for Total War in the Age of Party Politics

After the end of the First World War, democracy and the self-determination movement became a worldwide trend. In those days, party politics also became active in Japan. Under such conditions it became inevitable to balance the idea of democracy and the democratic system with Japan's measures for total war. In other words, in what fashion to adjust and balance the repletion of democracy and the construction of the total-war system, which appeared to conflict with one other on the surface, strongly influenced the form of Japanese measures for total war.

During the time between the enactment of the "Military Industry Mobilization Law" (1918), the starting point for legal adjustments, to that of the "Whole Nation Mobilization Law" (1938), they sometimes needed to fundamentally reconsider the relationship between the military and industry. In the process of adjustment and balance, the military and industry parties confronted one another and then compromised, in repeated cycles. During the period of the Hara Cabinet, they actually established the Kokusei-in (National Census Bureau) in 1920. This was the actual start for full-scale national mobilization, and it ultimately developed into the Kikaku-in (National Policy Planning Bureau). However, it would be better to say that the adjustment among the three parties of party politicians, military officers, and bureaucrats could never be completely accomplished until the end of the Pacific War.

4) The Limits to the Construction of the Total-War System

As I mentioned above, party politicians, military officers, and bureaucrats were always required to adjust their interests in the process of creating measures for total war; they couldn't resolve conflicts until the end of the Pacific War. In the end, they were never able to construct a Japanese model of the total-war system. The primary reason was that attribute of the Japanese state-structure of having multiple authority figures: they could not fully adjust their own interests among themselves, although the total war system was a need of the state as well as for the people. In other words, the state-structure of Japan, with multiple powerful stakeholders, turned into an element that was a critical obstacle to the construction of a total-war system.

To articulate the process of creating measures for total war, I would like to point out the

conflicts that occurred in the process; thus it is then possible to examine the essence of Japan as a state. Additionally, I would like to make the conclusion that the Japanese model of a total-war system was highly deficient, even in comparison with those of Europe and the United States.

The 'American Way of War' and the U.S. War with Japan, 1941-45

Geoffrey D.W. Wawro

The "American Way of War," a thesis coined by Russell Weigley in 1973, holds that America since the Civil War has used industrial production and technology to achieve crushing economic and military superiority in order to defeat adversaries through annihilation or attrition.

The Pacific War of 1941-45 saw the American Way of War projected with vigor, violence and a stunning degree of innovation. No power had ever fought an Oceanic War as vast and complicated as World War II in the Pacific, and the US victory there – against steep odds – was remarkable at the time, and still remarkable in retrospect.

Certainly the U.S. "production miracle" and spending facilitated victory. In all, the US spent $288 billion on World War II, which, in today's dollars, works out to $3.6 trillion.   During the war, the US produced 11-times as much coal as Japan, 222-times as much oil, 13-times as much steel, and 40-times as many artillery shells.

As early as 1943, with only 15 percent of US resources dedicated to the war in the Pacific, America was able to turn the tide in its war with Japan. That statistic alone indicated the gross economic mismatch between the two powers.

Still, economic primacy did not determine the outcome; hard fighting did.

The US war against Japan stands out as one of the most unusual wars in history, in the sense that its problems of distance and supply and the peculiar nature of its main battlefield, which was the Pacific Ocean, were beyond comparison with any other conflict, including the one with Germany.

In retrospect, we often think that Japan stood little chance in the war. But that would be to ignore the considerable advantages of surprise and geography that Tokyo enjoyed at the outset. It's fair to say that only the US and the American Way of War could have overwhelmed those advantages.

Aircraft carriers won the war in the Pacific. They halted the Japanese advance in 1942, and carried tactical airpower into range, and permitted the steady demolition of the Japanese Empire's 14,000-mile defense perimeter, from Burma to the Kuriles. They conferred mobility and the "indirect approach" on the US Navy, which was able to bypass large Japanese island garrisons and drive for the heart of the Empire.

Submarines destroyed the Japanese economy. They crippled the merchant fleet and starved the Japanese war industry of critical fuel and raw materials.

Strategic airpower, shuttled into range by the carriers, which carved out operational bases in places like Okinawa and Tinian, administered the coup de grace to a tottering Japan.

The story is familiar, but none of it was foreordained. It took tremendous sacrifice and innovation to meet and then overcome the early Japanese advantages in the Pacific theater, at a time when the war with Germany – on land and sea – was consuming the bulk of American resources.

Japanese Perspective of Total War

Tomoyuki Wada

Two weeks before the Second World War ended, the Investigation Division of the Navy Ministry drew up the report "Reflections on the Direction of the War". In the report, they raised the following question: "We strongly believe that our inferior military power to that of the U.S. is not necessarily the sole reason for our defeat in the war. Everyone says that we could not realize the full potential of the empire. Thus we ask the question: Why could we not do so?" Furthermore, they suggested the need for criticizing the direction of the war. Thus I would like to examine the direction of the war under a situation of total war, while focusing on the military strategy of Japan during the Pacific War, and then address its problems.

On 15 November 1941, the Liaison Conference between the Government and Imperial General Headquarters adopted the "Draft Proposal for Hastening the End of the War against the U.S, Britain, Holland and Chiang" (hereinafter, referred to as "Draft Proposal"). This "Draft Proposal" could be called the only Japanese war plan or grand strategy already completed before the Pacific War broke out, as Lieutenant Colonel Kumao Imoto (later Colonel) commented. As a matter of fact, "the Outline to be Followed in the Future for Guiding the War" (hereinafter, referred to as the "Outline") was revised four times. As a starting point, it provides the fundamental issues for military strategy as well as for other political strategy measures at the different times.

The principle for ending the war the "Draft Proposal" described was to force the U.S. to lose the will to continue the war by defeating the U.K. and China, its major allies in the west and east respectively. The main enemy was the U.S. However, Japanese leaders at that time fully understood that Japan did not have the military power to defeat the U.S. in direct confrontation; Japan did not have sufficient strategic material resources to prosecute a long-term total war with the U.S., which was what they highly expected. Japanese leaders as a result came to aim toward defeating China or the U.K. in order to discourage the U.S. from continuing the war, while securing a southern region that produced important natural resources and key shipping routes to ready for a long-term war. With the anticipation or expectation that compromise from their enemies would bring the chance of peace talks, as had happened in previous wars, they drew up the "Outline".

Since the grand strategy, which was to control the war as a whole, was based on the extremely vague above-mentioned vision of the end of war, the "Outline" derived therefrom was a "Outline" with the juxtaposition of the different strategic ideas of the Imperial Army and Navy, or different connotations of those ideas. The juxtaposed or different-connotation "Outline" could not control the operations of the Army and Navy; as a result, the course of the war drastically changed in terms of the goals of operations; and the frontline also gradually extended. As the course of the war was turning to the worse, the conflict between the Army and Navy, or the Imperial General Headquarters (the Office of the Army's General Staff and the Naval General Staff) and the department of the military administration (the Army Ministry and the Navy Ministry) steadily intensified, with dispute over the limited national resources.

The Japanese war plan for a long-term total war failed to realize a fully-united national power, resulting from the dissonance and the division in strategies of the Army and Navy. Japan finally had to face defeat.

Total War from the Economic Perspective

Keishi Ono

From an economic point of view, a war is large scale consumption by a government, therefore sustainment of the consumption for a long period is inevitable should a long lasting total war occur. In this presentation, Pacific War as a total war for Japan from the economic point of view is discussed, focusing on the relation between variables of national income account. In addition, the discussion here is mainly on securing war expenditure while traditionally material mobilization has been focal point of relation between economic affairs and total war. Most of the analyses on Japanese national income during the Pacific War, published both in and out of Japan, is based on the series of *Long-Term Economic Statistics* by a research group of Hitotsubashi University led by Kazushi Ohkawa. The research itself is highly evaluated, however, as Prof. Ohkawa admits, its study on war period national income does not take Extraordinary Special Account of War into account. Then in this presentation, Japanese war expenditure is reviewed empirically along with global picture from a macro-economic view.

Framework of analyses

Added value (= national income (Y)) is a dependent variable stems from production using capital (K) and labor force (L) (see (1) below). In the process of economic circulation, national income is divided into consumption (war expenditure (W) and normal consumption (C)) and savings (S) (see (2) below). The normal consumption here includes both private and government consumption excluding war expenditure. In order to sustain a total war or "large scale consumption," war expenditure (W) has to be increased through the decrease of savings (S) and normal consumption (C). However, since savings (S) is the source of investment (I) (see below (3)), its restriction limits the investment, which is necessary for arms production. In addition, if the savings (S) is not sufficient to afford depreciation (D), capital (K) will be decreased (see (4) and (1) below) and it is going to deteriorate the national income (Y) and eventually the capability of a total war as well. Though the shrink of normal consumption (C) enables the reallocation of resource to war expenditure (W), it will force common people economic poverty. On the other hand, large scale conscription leads to the decrease of labor force (L) that also diminish national income (Y) (see (1) below) resulting erosion of a country's ability for a long-term total war.

$$Y_n = f\ (K_n, L_n) \qquad \cdots (1)$$
$$Y_n = W_n + C_n + S_n \qquad \cdots (2)$$
$$S_n = I_n \qquad \cdots (3)$$
$$K_n = K_{n-1} - D_{n-1} + I_{n-1}\ (D_{n-1} = \delta K_{n-1}: \delta \text{ is constant}) \qquad \cdots (4)$$

("n" stands for time)