

PROGRAM

September 29, 2010

Opening Session

09:30 – 09:35 Opening Remarks

Mr. Kazuhiko Masuda (President, NIDS)

09:35 – 09:40 Welcoming Remarks

09:40 – 09:50 Chairman's Remarks

Maj.Gen(Ret.) Tadashi Kagatani (Director, Military History Department, NIDS)

Keynote Address

09:50 – 10:30 "The Tripartite Pact and the Idea of a Eurasian Continental Bloc"

Dr. Masaki Miyake (Emeritus Professor, Meiji University)

10:30 – 10:45 Coffee Break

Session 1: The German War and Japan

10:45 – 11:10 "Hitler's War Aims"

Dr. Gerhard Hirschfeld (Professor, University of Stuttgart)

11:10 – 11:35 "The Japanese Perspective on Germany's War"

Dr. Nobuo Tajima (Professor, Seijo University)

11:35 – 12:05 Comment and Discussion

Discussant: Prof. Junichiro Shoji (Deputy Director, Military History Department, NIDS)

12:05 – 13:20 Lunch

Special Address

13:20 – 14:00 "Culture of War"

Dr. Martin van Creveld (Professor, Hebrew University)

Session 2: The Tripartite Pact and the Soviet Reaction

14:00 – 14:25 “German Strategy in the Tripartite Pact during the Second World War”

Dr. Jost Dülffer (Professor, University of Koln)

14:25 – 14:50 “Ideology, Politics and Armaments in the Italian Strategy of the Tripartite Pact”

Dr. Nicola Labanca (Associate Professor, University of Siena)

14:50 – 15:10 Coffee Break

15:10 – 15:35 “Japan and the Tripartite Pact”

Dr. Kiyoshi Aizawa (Chief of the Second Research Office, Military History Department, NIDS)

15:35 – 16:00 “The Tripartite Pact and the Soviet Union”

Dr. Vassili Molodiakov (Visiting Professor, Takushoku University)

16:00 – 17:10 Comment and Discussion

Discussant: Dr. Kyoichi Tachikawa (Senior Fellow, Military History Department, NIDS)

Lieutenant Colonel Tomoyuki Wada (Fellow, Military History Department, NIDS)

Concluding Address

17:15 – 17:55 “Japanese Alliance Policy in the 20th Century”

Dr. Ryoichi Tobe (Professor, International Research Center for the Japanese Studies)

Closing Session

17:55 – 18:00 Closing Remarks

Maj. Gen. Seiichi Takeuchi (Vice President, NIDS)

*Unfortunately Dr. Creveld was not able to participate in the conference itself for personal reasons.

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman

Maj. Gen. Tadashi Kagatani

Director, Military History Department, NIDS

Major General, JGSDF, Retired (2006).

B.S., National Defense Academy

Special Speaker

Dr. Martin van Creveld

Professor, Hebrew University

Ph.D., London School of Economics

Culture of War (New York: Ballantine Books, 2008); *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); *The Transformation of War* (New York: Free Press, 1991); *The Rise and Decline of the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

Keynote Speaker

Dr. Masaki Miyake

Professor Emeritus, Meiji University

Ph.D., Kyoto University

Nichi Doku I Sangoku Doumei no Kenkyu (Studies of the Tripartite Pact) (Nansosha 1975), *Nichi Doku Seiji Gaikoshi Kenkyu* (Studies of the German-Japanese Political and Diplomatic History) (Kawadeshobosinsha 1996), *Yu-rasia Gaikoushi Kenkyu* (Studies of Eurasian Diplomatic History) (Kawadeshoboshinsha 2000), *Sei Gun Kankei Kenkyu* (Studies of Civil-Military Relations) (Ashishobo 2001).

Concluding Address Speaker

Dr. Ryoichi Tobe

Professor, International Research Center for the Japanese Studies

Ph.D., Kyoto University

Shippai no Honshitsu – Nihongun no Soshikiteki Kenkyu (The Essence of Failure: Studies of the IJA and IJN's organizations) (Tokyo: Daiyamondosha 1984), *Peace Feeler – Shina Jihen Wahei Kousaku no Gunzo* (Peace Feeler – Peace Overture in the China Incident) (Ronsosha 1991), *Nihonrikugun to Chugoku – “Chinatsu” ni miru Yume to Satetsu* (The Imperial Japanese Army and China – The Hope and Despair of “China-hands”) (Koudansha 1999).

Speakers

Dr. Gerhard Hirschfeld

Director of the Library of Contemporary History and Professor, University of Stuttgart.

Ph.D., Universities of Cologne

Fremdherrschaft und Kollaboration. Die Niederlande unter deutscher Besatzung 1940-1945 (The Netherlands under German Occupation, 1940-1945), (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt 1984), *Kollaboration in Frankreich, Politik, Wirtschaft und Kultur während der nationalsozialistischen Besatzung 1940-1944* (Collaboration in France. Politics and Culture during the Nazi Occupation 1940-1944) (Frankfurt am Main: S.Fischer 1991).

Dr. Nobuo Tajima

Professor, Seikei University

Ph.D., Hokkaido University

Nachizumu Gaiko to “Manshukoku” (The Diplomacy of Nazism and “Manchukuo”) (Chikurashobo 1992), *Nachizumu Kyokuto Senryaku* (The Nazism Strategy in the Far East) (Koudansha 1997), *Nichi-Doku Kankeisi 1890-1945*, (A History of Japanese-German Relations, 1890-1945, Vol-II-III) (University of Tokyo Press 2008).

Dr. Jost Dülffer

Professor, Universität zu Köln

Dr. phil., University of Freiburg

Weimar, Hitler und die Marine. Reichspolitik und Flottenbau 1920-1939 (Weimar, Hitler and the Navy. Imperial Politics and Fleet Construction) (1973); *Regeln gegen den Krieg? Die Haager Friedenskonferenzen 1899 und 1907 in der internationalen Politik* (Rules against War? The Hague Peace conferences 1899 and 1907 in international politics) (1981); *Faith and Annihilation. Nazi Germany 1933-1945* (1996), *Peace, War and Violence from Antiquity to the Present. Transcultural Studies* (ed., 2009).

Dr. Nicola Labanca

Associate Professor, University of Siena

Ph.D, University of Turin

Repertorio degli studiosi italiani di storia militare, (Milano: Unicopli, 2005), *Guerre contemporanee. Dal 1945 ad oggi*, (Firenze, Giunti, 2008), *Storia illustrata delle armi da fuoco. Dall'archibugio alle bombe intelligenti invenzioni e tecnologie che hanno cambiato l'arte della guerra*, (Firenze: Giunti, 2009).

Dr. Kiyoshi Aizawa

Chief of the Second Research Office, Military History Department, NIDS

Ph.D., Sophia University

Nicchu Senso no Shoso (Aspects of the Sino-Japanese War) (co-authored, 1997); *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000; vol.3, The Military Dimension* (co-authored, 2003); *Kaigun no Sentaku* (Japanese Navy's Road to Pearl Harbor) (2002).

Dr. Vassili E. Molodiakov

Visiting Professor/Senior Researcher, Takushoku University

Ph.D., LL.D, Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Oriental Studies

'Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo: Possible Axis That Never Was' (Moscow: Veche, 2004); 'Time of Struggle – Toshio Shiratori (1887-1949), Japanese Diplomat, Politician and Thinker' (Moscow: AIRO, 2006), 'History of Japan: XX Century' (co-auth.) (Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies, 2007), 'Ribbentrop – A Biography' (Moscow: AST-Press, 2008).

Discussants

Prof. Junichiro Shoji

Deputy Director, Military History Department, NIDS.

M.A., University of Tsukuba.

Hendoki no Nihon Gaiko to Gunji (Japan at the Crossroads: Crisis Diplomacy and the Role of Military) (co-authored, 1987); *Taishoki Nippon no Amerika Ninshiki* (Japanese Perception of the United States in the Taisho Era) (2001); *Nichibei Senryaku Shisoshi: Nichibei-kankei no atarashii Shiten* (History of American and Japanese Strategic Thought) (2005).

Dr. Kyoichi Tachikawa

Senior Fellow, Military History Department, NIDS

Ph.D., Sophia University

Dainiji Sekai Taisen to Indosina (The World War II and Indo-China) (Sairyusha 2000), *Air Power* (Fuyoshobo 2005), *Sea Power* (Fuyoshobo 2008), *British and Japanese Military Leadership in the Far Eastern War, 1941-1945* (Franc Cass 2004).

Lieut. Col. Tomoyuki Wada

Fellow, Military History Department, NIDS

Lieutenant Colonel of JGSDF

B.S., National Defense Academy

“Taiheiyō Senso Ni Okeru Senso Shido – Rikugun No Senso Shuketsu Kousou Wo Chushinto Shite”

(Conduct of the War in the Latter Phase of the Pacific War: Focusing on the IJA's Strategy for Terminating the War) (*NIDS Military History Studies Annual*, Number 13, March 2010).

Keynote Speaker

The Tripartite Pact and the Idea of a Eurasian Continental Bloc

Masaki Miyake

1) The Eurasian Continental Bloc Plan and Shinpei Goto as its Originator

It is often said that Yosuke Matsuoka and Joachim von Ribbentrop had a plan for the Eurasian Continental bloc. The prototype of this plan can be seen in Shinpei Goto's (1867-1929) idea, "the confrontation between the New Continent and the Old Continent." Goto had studied hygiene in Berlin and Munich. He obtained a DMSc. through a comparative study of the medical police (Medizinalpolizei) and medical administration (Medizinalverwaltung) in Japan and other countries under Max Pettenkofer's supervision. Following this, he came back to Japan.

When Goto was the head of civilian affairs in Taiwan, he was very much impressed by *Der Wettkampf der Völker, mit besonderer Bezugnahme auf Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika* (The various competitions among nations: paying attention especially to Germany and the United States of America) (Jena, 1905), which was a posthumous work by Emil Schalk (1838~1904). Schalk was a German, who settled in the US at an early age, and spent the rest of his life there. He believed that Russia and the US, especially the latter, would be superpowers in the future. Therefore he raised alarm to people in his motherland, Germany, who mostly were unaware that the two states were rising superpowers. To confront them, he urged that Germany should settle its conflict with France; and then, they should organize the Union of Central European States including the Netherlands, Italy, Austria, Hungary, and Spain.

Goto was probably shocked by Schalk's warning about the US as a rising superpower. This was the starting point for his idea. Developing Schalk's idea, he finally arrived at his original concept, "the confrontation between the New Continent and the Old Continent" which Schalk had never mentioned in his work. To confront the US, the coalition of the Old Continent, namely, the Eurasian Continental bloc, was essential, Goto insisted. Goto visited Itsukushima, Hiroshima Prefecture in September 1907 for meeting with Hirobumi Ito (1841~1909), the Governor General of Korea at that time and he explained his concept to Ito of the confrontation between two Continents throughout three days. Ito ignored him at first, but gradually accepted Goto's concept. This process is described in his essay, "Itsukushima Yawa" (Itsukushima Night Story) with an impressive style of writing. He then recommended Ito to see

Kokovtsov (1853-1943), an influential Russian politician. He succeeded in inviting the Russian politician to Harbin, who had already met Goto in Petrograd. Ito's trip to Harbin, however, was to be his death trip: Ito, who was against the annexation of Korea, was assassinated just after he had finished the meeting with Kokovtsov.

After the Bolsheviks came to power following the November Revolution 1917, Goto, as the Foreign Minister, played a role in supporting Japan's Siberian Invasion. Once he acknowledged that the invasion had failed, he made his best efforts to restore diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and invited Adolf Ioffe (1883~1927) to Japan in 1923. Japanese nationalists campaigned against Goto, and threatened to kill him. Yet he was unflinching. In December 1927, the middle of winter, he visited Moscow, despite his serious health condition caused resulting from an intracranial hemorrhage. He met Stalin twice during January 1928. He kept on seeking a way to form the Union of Japan, the Soviet Union, and Germany, since he believed that the significance of the Soviet Union's geopolitical position for Japan had not changed even with the Revolution.

2) Document about the Plan for a Bloc of Japan, Soviet Union, Germany, and Italy found at Yomei Library (19 July 1939)

In Udano, Ukyo-ku, Kyoto, Yomei Bunko (Yomei Library) still stands quietly amid woodland. It is the Konoe family's private library, and Fumimaro Konoe (1891~1945) is from that family. At the library, the family has kept precious old documents such as the diary written by Michinaga Fujiwara (996~1020) who is an ancestor of theirs. Fumimaro Konoe also kept his own important documents there

Dr. Minoru Nomura, who was a former naval officer in the Pacific War, and after the war chief of the military history chamber, Defense Agency of Japan and professor of the National Defense Academy, cited a lot of important documents in his work, *Taiheiyo Senso to Nihon Gunbu* (The Pacific War and the Japanese Military). Those documents were available to him because of his prestigious career and position: For his research purposes, he was allowed to have access to documents on modern and contemporary history at Yomei Bunko. Going through such important records, one single-space typed document of eleven pages by an unknown author, caught his attention. The title was "The Way to End the China Incident both immediately and favorably." At the end of the document, there were numbers and a Chinese character: "14, 7, 19 Ko (written in July 19 Showa 14[1939])." There was only the date and not the writer's name. I will talk about the detail of the document in my keynote speech; I believe that the document is significant, as it argues for the coalition of Japan, the Soviet Union, Germany, and Italy as a means to end the Sino-Japanese War. Nomura concluded with much confidence that, not

Toshio Shiratori (1887-1949) as many had considered, but Yosuke Matsuoka (1880~1946), who became a Foreign Minister in the Second Konoe Cabinet in July of 1940, wrote and submitted the document to Konoe.

3) The Treaty of Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union

In the Diplomatic Documents of the Foreign Ministry of Germany, Andor Hencke, the Minister of the German Embassy in Moscow, had recorded on 24 August 1939 the talks between Stalin and Joachim von Ribbentrop (1893~1946) who had just visited the city to sign the Treaty of Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union. Ribbentrop stated that Germany was ready to mediate between Japan and the Soviet Union, then fighting each other in the Nomonhan Incident. Stalin declined his offer: He had no room for talk with Japan, as he commented that he could not stand Japan's provocation any more.

In the secret protocol as a part of the treaty, Germany and the Soviet Union came to an agreement on three points. Firstly, the Baltic states were to be divided up as territories of the Soviet Union and Germany: The former would rule Finland, Estonia, and Latvia; and the latter, Lithuania. Secondly, Poland would be divided between Germany and the Soviet Union along the Narev, Vistula, and San rivers. Thirdly, Germany clearly stated that it was not going to intervene in any issues concerning Bessarabia, the northern part of Romania.

Until that time, the Kiichiro Hiranuma's Cabinet had been swaying whether Japan should include the UK and France among the targets of the military alliance with Germany and Italy, or should define the Soviet Union as the only target, since the Japanese leaders considered that Germany and the Soviet Union would never be allies. So they were stunned by the two states' concluding of the treaty, and the entire cabinet resigned on 28 August 1939 leaving the notorious statement: "Situation in Europe was intricate and baffling.". At that point, some influential people in Japan suddenly started advocating the Union of Japan, Germany, the Soviet Union, and Italy. Captain Sokichi Takagi, who was also the head of the investigation section of the Ministry of the Navy, drafted a proposal for the Union of the four states on the 24th of August. Toshio Shiratori also became a champion of the 4-Power Coalition, even though he was, as the ambassador to Italy, one of the devoted advocates of the Tripartite Pact against the Soviet Union, the UK and France.

4) The Promise Made by Stahmer

The Second Konoe Cabinet started on the 22nd of July 1940, following the short-term cabinets of Nobuyuki Abe and Mitsumasa Yonai. Konoe appointed Yosuke Matsuoka (1880~1946) as the Foreign Minister. In early September, Heinrich Stahmer, the envoy sent by Ribbentrop visited Japan, and had secret talks with Matsuoka on the 9 and 10 September. There is still a record of the fifteen items from the talks. Among them, the tenth item was the most important one, in which Stahmer stated: "Better to reach agreement between Germany, Italy and Japan first and then immediately approach Soviet Russia. Germany is prepared to act part of an honest broker between Japan and Soviet Russia, and she can see no insurmountable obstacle on the path may be settled without much difficulty. German-Soviet relations are good contrary to what the British propaganda tries to represent, and Russia is carrying out to the satisfaction of Germany all her engagements." The "honest broker" is the expression Chancellor Bismarck had stated at the Berlin meeting in 1878. In the 14th item, Stahmer stated that his words "may be regarded as coming directly from Ribbentrop."

5) "G-1000," the Secret Letter from Ott to Matsuoka

To persuade the Navy admirals who were against the Tripartite Pact, Matsuoka urged the German ambassador Eugen Ott to write the secret letter, "G-1000" on 27 September in 1940, namely, the same date for concluding the Pact. It included the statement: "It is needless to say that whether or not a Contracting Party has been attacked within the meaning of Article 3. of the Pact shall be determined upon consultation among the three Contracting Party." The word "consultation" was important to persuade the Japanese navy which was afraid of Japan's being automatically entangled into the World War. The letter also stated: "With regard to the relations between Japan and Soviet Russia, Germany will do everything within its power to promote a friendly understanding and will at any time offer its good offices to this end."

6) Worsening Germany-Soviet Relations

Diplomatic relations between Germany and the Soviet Union were at their best when Ribbentrop visited Moscow on 28 September 1939. On that date, they signed a treaty regulating the borders between two states: The Soviet Union would rule Lithuania; in return, Germany would rule the region surrounding Warsaw and Lublin Province which lay beyond the borders drawn in the secret protocol being a part of the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Soviet Union. Later, on 27 June 1940, the Soviet Union annexed Bessarabia and the northern part of Bukovina from Romania, which

were regions not mentioned in the protocol. As a result, diplomatic relations worsened: Hitler was angered especially by the annexation of Bukovina which had once been a Habsburg domain. The German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano tried to secure oil via the Second Vienna Award which guaranteed Romania its remaining territory on 30 June. This move worsened relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. Hitler stated his decision to start military operations against the Soviet Union in the spring 1941 at a meeting in Berchtesgaden with his generals, including Franz Halder, on 30 July 1940.

7) The Meeting of Molotov, Hitler, and Ribbentrop

Molotov and Hitler could not reach agreement on the deployment of German troops in Finland during the talks on 12 and 13 November 1940. Ribbentrop proposed the draft of coalition treaty between Germany, Italy, Japan and the Soviet Union during the final meeting on the night of 13 November. Molotov promised to consider it in Moscow. Stalin's answer of 25 November stated that they would join the Union, only if Germany accepted the conditions, which it would never had been able to accept, such as its immediate withdraw from Finland. The war against the Soviet Union became inevitable, when Hitler ordered preparations for Operation Barbarossa on 18. December 1941.

8) The Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact

Matsuoka, the Foreign Minister, had been on a trip to Moscow, Berlin, and Rome from the end of March through the middle of April 1941. In Moscow Matsuoka stated to Molotov on 24 March that he was always pursuing Shinpei Goto's idea of friendship between Japan and the Soviet Union. Hitler and Ribbentrop persuaded him not to conclude a treaty with the Soviet Union, while implying though not openly that Germany was about to declare the war against it. Matsuoka ignored their suggestions, however, and signed the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact on 13 April 1941. The outbreak of war between Germany and the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, however, resulted in placing him into hot water; he was ousted from the cabinet through the resignation en masse of the Second Konoe Cabinet on the 16 July.

9) Hitler's policy of pro-Britain and anti-Soviet versus Ribbentrop's policy of pro-Soviet and anti-Britain

As is suggested by Klaus Hildebrand, *Deutsche Aussenpolitik 1933-1945* (1971), there were two simultaneous, differing diplomatic positions among German top leaders: Hitler's pro-UK and anti-Soviet

line and Ribbentrop's pro-Soviet and anti-UK line. The difference confused Japanese diplomatic policy. Ribbentrop was showing his enthusiasm for the pro-Soviet line leading to the Treaty of Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union. This enthusiasm was shown in the tenth item in the record of Matsuoka-Stahmer talks. Stahmer assured to Matsuoka that what he had said was exactly the same as what Ribbentrop had said. Consequently, it may be possible to consider that Ribbentrop was eager to realize the coalition of Japan, the Soviet Union, Germany and Italy. Yet he was powerless in front of Hitler, the dictator who decided on war against the Soviet Union. Eugen Ott's comments were found in the record of the questioning by prosecutors at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. He was ambassador in Japan until November 1942, and brought from Beijing to the Tribunal. From his answers to the questions, it is possible to see how eager Ribbentrop was as to the plan for a Eurasian Continental bloc of Japan, the Soviet Union, Germany and Italy.

Reference

Masaki Miyake, *Stalin, Hitler to Nisso-Doku-I Rengo Koso (Stalin, Hitler, and the Plan for the Coalition of Japan, the Soviet Union, Germany and Italy)*, (Tokyo: Asahi Press, 2007)

Masaki Miyake, "Die Idee eines eurasischen Blocks Tokio-Moskau-Berlin-Rome 1939-1941" in: *Internationale Dilemmata und europäische Visionen. Festschrift zum 80. Geburtstag von Helmut Wagner*, herausgegeben von Martin Sieg und Heiner Timmermann (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2010).

Session 1

Hitler's War Aims

Gerhard Hirschfeld

My paper discusses the obvious as well as the – at times – not so obvious goals of Hitler's war agenda. While the German dictator clearly wished to revise the political results and outcome of the First World War (paying close attention to the German collective memory of the Great War), his far-reaching war aims, particularly his radical intentions for ruling and exploiting Eastern Europe, were as much dictated by megalomaniac, imperialistic designs as by a primitive and brutal racism. His ideologically motivated perception of the Soviet Union led to Hitler's complete underestimation of the military, economic and also political strength of the Russian enemy – a view he was gradually to adjust following Russian military successes over apparently superior German military forces.

Hitler's attitude towards the long desired German "living space" in the east remained, as usual, vague and indecisive. If he had any political or historical inspiration for the role of the "master race" in Eastern Europe, then it was the *Raj*, the British Empire in India. Since the British were able to control 400 million Indians with less than a quarter of a million men, thus ran Hitler's reasoning, it must be possible for the Germans to do the same in Russia. Hitler's first indication of what Germany intended to do with the newly occupied territory in Eastern Europe is kept in the notes of his secretary Martin Bormann (16 July 1941): "Basically, it is a matter of dividing up the giant cake so that we can first rule it, secondly administer it, and thirdly exploit it."

Like in Western Europe, there existed neither a clear political concept of what to do with the eastern territories nor experienced personnel to administer "the giant cake". Hitler's "types of leader for the east" distinguished themselves by demonstrating extreme degrees of brutality and recklessness, but showing little attachment to orderly administration or the rule of law. In essence, Hitler's and Germany's occupying policies boiled down to the exercise of unrestricted, direct domination of all conquered territories and to massive exploitation of all available economic and human resources.

Session 1

The Japanese Perspective on Germany's War

Nobuo Tajima

On December 11, 1941, Germany, Italy, and Japan signed a no-separate-peace agreement in Berlin, promising each other that without full mutual consent they would not draw up cease-fires or make peace with either the United States or Britain. This agreement was intended to link them in a common fate.

However, "peace" in this arrangement tacitly meant victorious peace, or at least peace on equal terms, vis-à-vis the United States and Britain. As the strategic counterattack launched by the Allies led by the United States and Britain proved increasingly successful and the defeat of the Axis loomed more certain, the three countries became suspicious of each other's military capabilities and intentions.

In this report, I would like to outline how Japanese politicians and military leaders assessed the German military and national powers after 1943, and also how they attempted to deal with the situation that developed.

The list below is the content of the report:

Introduction

1. Defeats at Stalingrad and Kursk
2. Defeat in the Mediterranean
3. Defeat of Italy
4. Allied Normandy Landings and the Attempt to Assassinate Hitler
5. September 1944 Plan in Case of Drastic Change in Germany
6. April 1945 Plan in Case of German Surrender

Conclusion

Special Speaker

Culture of War

Martin van Creveld

To many people, "war" and "culture" are an oxymoron. Speaking with Lord Byron, the famous English poet, they see war as the "brain splattering, windpipe-slicing, art". Others, following Clausewitz, understand it as a means to an end, a rational, if very brutal, activity meant to serve the interests of one group of people by killing those who oppose it.

Both views contain a very large element of truth. Still, they are far from being the whole truth. In reality, war is often a source of joy—ecstasy, even. Think of Homer's King Agamemnon, his hands dripping with gore and drunk with the joy of killing, "lustily" calling on the Greeks to follow him; think of such figures as the medieval poet Jean de Bueil, the Confederate commander Robert Lee ("it is good war is so terrible, or else we would love it too much"), German *pour le merite* holder Ernst Juenger, and Winston Churchill. Think of Ariel Sharon who, in front of about a hundred people, once told this author that the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War had been "great fun". Sometimes the same people both decry war and delight in it. For example, the seventeenth century German writer Hans von Grimmelshausen had as much to say about war's horrors as anyone in history, yet he says that, from his own experience and until on is injured, hand-to-hand combat is so much fun that only "a sissy" would shrink from it. In the years after War I British writers Siegfried Sassoon and Wilfred Owen made their names by denouncing the cruelty of war, its stupidity, and its futility. Yet it was the former who, during the Battle of the Somme in 1916, wrote that he had never thought he would find such "perfect peace"; whereas the latter wrote of the "exultation" of "going over the top". Nor is this fascination limited to participants only. As any number of episodes from the Roman gladiatorial shows through the medieval tournament all the way to today's movies and TV prove, war, on top of any political purpose it may serve and has served and continues to serve, is a spectator sport par excellence capable of making countless people go mad with excitement.

Throughout history, this joy and this fascination have given rise, and still are giving rise, to an immense and very sophisticated culture. That culture ranges from the war paint of tribal peoples to the most recent "tiger suits"; from the decoration of ancient Greek shields to the nose art often seen on modern warplanes. It includes military music, military customs, flags, standards, and any number of insignia and symbols; reviews, parades, and ceremonies, of every kind; the enormous body of the law of

war which lays down, or attempts to lie down, who is allowed to do what to whom, for what purpose, under what circumstances, in what ways, and with what weapons; as well as every form of commemoration such as ceremonies, monuments, military history, and the like. Let it be added, in this context, that if history knows one country that has engaged in all of these for centuries on end, then that country is Japan.

Though one would never realize the fact from a look at the curricula of academia, all this culture is no less sophisticated and no less interesting than any other, e.g. that of the Church, the law, sports, etc. Furthermore, far from being simply an irrelevant growth as many "strategists" believe, it is absolutely vital. The reason why it is vital is because dying, not killing, is the essence of war—and dead men have no interests. If men are to fight they must identify with a cause that is better, greater than themselves; the culture of war is the physical embodiment of that cause.

This is the point where what I call The Great Paradox enters the picture. "In reality" a parade is merely a gathering of men who move about in funny ways; an eagle, an image of a nasty bird carried on a pole; the goat acting as the mascot of the regiment, a hairy and not too intelligent quadruped. These and countless other parts of the culture of war are "real" and "unreal" at the same time. Their "unreal" value is far and away greater than their "real one"; furthermore, they are valuable only if they are cherished for their own sake and not as "instruments". A commander who tells his men that "now we shall blow the bugle and raise the flag in order that your morale may improve" will be laughed out of court.

In much of today's world, thinking in this way carries the danger of being accused of "militarism". Yet the danger exists that one may throw out the baby with the bathwater. When a group or nation or state loses its culture of war, the following four things may result:

a. A wild horde: meaning, a mob of barbarians who are subject to no discipline, no tradition, no capacity for coordinated action. History has witnessed countless hordes of this kind; contemporary examples include the militias in Sierra Leone, East Timor, Bosnia, and The Sudan. Such hordes are hated by God and men. They can commit atrocities aplenty, but are unable to wage war and tend to scatter the moment they are confronted not by hapless civilians but by real soldiers. Of them, Clausewitz says that they should be employed in secondary theaters where they can amuse themselves.

b. A soul-less machine: meaning, an organization that is held together by nothing but discipline on the one hand and bureaucracy and political correctness on the other. Again history, beginning already with the ancient Persians during their invasions of Greece in 490-480 BC, knows many examples of such machines. In today's world, perhaps the best known example is the German Bundeswehr. Everybody knows how, down to World War II inclusive, the German military, aided by one of the most highly developed military cultures in history, fought and bled and died. Since then, for

reasons that everybody also knows, it has been forced to surrender that culture. The result is an army without a soul—and one which, should it ever be called to fight a real war, may very well break and run.

c. Men without chests; meaning, men who are unable and unwilling to defend themselves. Historically, perhaps the best example is the Jews. As the Old Testament and the work of Josephus Flavius testify, originally Jewish military culture was as highly developed as any other. However, during the centuries of the Diaspora it was lost, to the point where King David, a great warrior, was presented as a rabbi and his heroes, who had helped him conquer and extend his kingdom, as religious students. It was against this background that they became a nation contemptible in their eyes of their neighbors and their own. Conversely, when modern Zionism was born, everything had to be rebuilt from the beginning.

d. The fourth possible outcome is feminism. On one hand, as every soldier who has ever tried to cut a figure in the eyes of the other sex will readily admit, the support of women is absolutely essential to the maintenance of military culture. On the other hand, women are perfectly capable of wrecking it. There are two ways in which they can do so. First, by looking away from it, despising it, and ridiculing it—that, after all, is precisely the story developed by the ancient Greek dramatist Aristophanes in his celebrated play, *Lysistrata*. The other consists of themselves joining that culture and participating in it. As experience shows, such an attempt, if successful, will cause the prestige of the culture to decline in the eyes of both men *and* women.

War, however, needs a culture—because it is the culture of war that provides those who fight in it and risk their lives in it with their motivation. Granted, many of the manifestations of the culture are extravagant and even ridiculous (though no more so than others such as religion, courts of justice, and sports). Destroy it, and a group, nation or state are certain to lose their ability to defend themselves.

Session 2

German Strategy in the Tripartite Pact during the Second World War

Jost Düllfer

The expansionist plans of Germany, Italy and Japan against a world order of settled or status-quo oriented powers formed a kind of hazard under the conditions of the international system of the 1930ies and 40ies. They would have better chances for this endeavour in a coordinated way, maybe even a common war strategy. This at least was feared by British officials since the early 1930ies.

But, such a comprehensive pact – leaving the Antikomintern Pact of 1936 apart, which Italy joined a year later – would have driven the Status-quo powers closer together, would have alarmed them more than necessary (as Italian foreign minister Ciano himself put it in October 1938).

Thus in the years up to 1940, in Berlin, Rome or Tokyo, there was always a question of balancing the degree of deterrence which might be reached with the amount of provocation and counter-measures, especially of Great Britain, the Soviet Union (up to August 1939), France (up to June 1940) and then increasingly the neutral USA.

During the same time, the pragmatic aspects of each countries' alliance politics fundamentally diverged: Germany clearly broke all obligations towards Japan when concluding the Hitler-Stalin Pact in August 1939 while Japan fought (and lost) war-like battles in China against the Soviet Union. For Hitler at this point, the Soviet Union was seen as a much more effective ally to deter the Western powers than Japan. He erred in that, but at that time, German strategy remained mainly concerned with Europe and could not really affect a global dimension.

This situation changed in the summer of 1940. Germany had defeated France and overrun large parts of Northern and Western Europe, Italy during this period had entered the war, while Japan had occupied Southern Indochina and improved its chance for a maritime expansion to the South. Germany neither succeeded in arranging peace with Great Britain on the basis of German dominance nor a British surrender after *Operation Sea Lion* had proved to be impossible and the air *battle of Britain* could not be won. Thus Germany's leaders followed alternate strategies: the weaker one was developed especially by foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and aimed at a continental bloc from Madrid to Yokohama which would include the Soviet Union. This finally failed after Molotov's visit to Berlin in November 1940.

The stronger alternative was the return to the programmatic line of Adolf Hitler: the attack on the

Soviet Union with the purpose to create a German *living space*. At this time, this war would have an additional strategy purpose, in Hitler's words (31 July, 1940): "If Russia drops out of the picture, America, too, is lost for Britain, because elimination of Russia would tremendously increase Japan's power in the Far East... Russia is the Far Eastern sword of Britain and the United States, pointed at Japan".

This was the situation when the Japanese proposal of a treaty for separate zones of influence gained German (and Italian) interest. The main purpose of the *Tripartite Pact* was to deter the United States from a stronger involvement in the war – be it in Asia-Pacific, be it in Europe by their support of Britain. This aim was hoped to be attained because of a position of relative strength; but the opposite was the result: the US accelerated its engagement in armaments and for Great Britain.

In German strategic options, the continental bloc had failed, but the major idea of an aggressive war against the Soviet Union was not shared with the Asian partner. Thus, in spring 1941 the German war plans for racial war as well as the deterrence of Britain (and indirectly the US) were accelerated, but Japan did was not informed on a political level. Thus it could happen that Foreign Minister Matsuoka on his railway trip from Berlin to Tokyo, in Moscow in April 1941 concluded a non-aggression treaty with his Soviet colleague: compatible and even in the spirit of the *Tripartite Pact*, but completely contrary to German politics in these month.

After amazingly quick German victorious battles, for a very brief period, after the battle of Smolensk, German politics was interested in an immediate Japanese entrance into the war to split up the rest of the defeated Soviet Union. But that failed, primarily because of a grotesque German overrating of its victories and the remaining potential of the Soviet Union.

For the third time in decisive war situations, the pact partners were not informed of central importance; this time it was the Japanese assault on the United States in December 1941. This time, nevertheless, Germany was pleased. Although not under obligation by the Tripartite Pact, it declared war on her part on the United States. This, finally, was a kind of common warfare; the most valid expression for Germany adding the most potent power as an enemy (after Great Britain and now the Soviet war) was the expectation that Japan only had a chance to win the war when the Anglo-Saxon powers would split up their potential between the Atlantic and Pacific War.

But even at the height of Japanese victories, a common strategy was not developed: on 18 January 1942 a military agreement between Japan, Italy and Germany separated the spheres of operation (and thus also: influence) along the 70th longitude on the seas (thus leaving out a discussion of a possible Japanese share of the Soviet Union). There was no common warfare, but only the vague agreement on separate naval warfare against the Anglo-Saxon powers. At the same time, there were Tripartite drafts of

declarations on a free India and free Arabia. Both hinted at the possibility to revolutionize the dependence structures of the two regions from Great Britain (and eventually the US); but both were never decreed because of the lack of military success of the Axis powers.

This was the result of the following event: For a fourth time, the partner was not informed about a major chance, this time Japan did not inform its European partners about the consequences of the defeat at the Midway Islands in Summer 1942 (while on the other hand, Germany had to accept major defeats in the Soviet Union and in Northern Africa at the end of 1942). In this way, the Tripartite Pact could never become the basis of a common world war strategy: the partners proved to be too weak to really fight in such a way.

This said, the question of economic, technological and cultural co-operation is not adequately appreciated so far. The final paper will deal with that in some more detail. It will be shown, that the separate, but cumulated efforts in warfare by the Axis powers, the modus of diversification of the Allied forces, was indeed an important factor for the persistence of the war in Asia/Pacific and in Europe. The simultaneous war fought by the Germans (and Italians) and the Japanese was a major feature to explain the duration of war after 1943; the very late efforts of the Germans to support the Japanese by all means, nevertheless, came too late to produce a major influence.

A last point in the paper will focus on the question, how far racial discrimination on the German side was instrumental in the lack of success. It will be argued that racial categories were central, but could pragmatically be adapted to the war situation and strategy. In Germany there existed indeed at least two lines towards Japan in racial- cultural assessment. One was the belief in the inferiority of any non-white ("Caucasian" in our terms) race, the other one was the idea that Japan in its cultural traditions and military practice had developed something similar to Germany and its racial strength.

Session 2

Ideology, Politics and Armaments in the Italian Strategy of the Tripartite Pact

Nicola Labanca

“Japan will do by himself”, we read in the military daily report of Italian Chief of General Staff in January 1942, after Japan entered second world war. And Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Galeazzo Ciano said “Japan is far away, but Germany is very, very close to us”. Even if Benito Mussolini and Fascist regime developed a bombastic propaganda about the military strength of Tripartite Pact and the friendship among his countries, reality seems much thinner.

Political, cultural and military relations between Fascist Italy and militaristic Japan are not so much studied as they would deserve (international historians put much more attention to the German-Japanese side of the Tripartite Pact). But from what we know, Rome and Tokyo have been linked since several years, even if in complicated and frequently mutually insincere relations. From Italian side, at the military level, between 1940 and 1943 Rome needed military help, strategic raw materials, political support and propaganda. Her place in Tripartite alliance was obviously the junior partner’s one, even if she was not unnecessary for Berlin and Tokyo.

The presentation aims at drawing a review of what we know about wartime relations between Italy and Japan at the military level, with some new insights and research. From the military daily report of Italian Chief of General Staff we understand that direct relations at the higher military level were random and episodic. In the precise days when Japan entered the war, some enthusiasm raised: but as Japan on Fascist side meant USA on the opposite side, feelings changed rapidly. From the Italian side concrete, touchable requests were just a few. Propaganda was more important. Tripartite Pact was perceived by the military as a political reality, as a paper alliance.

Historical assessment of Tripartite Pact divided Italian historians, and the paper will assess the state of art.

In the end, studying Italian side of Tripartite Pact can be a case-study of how much nazi-fascist alliance was different from the anti-fascist one, and why this difference was one of the causes of defeat.

Session 2

Japan and the Tripartite Pact

Kiyoshi Aizawa

It is often said that the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact in September 1940 was the turning point that led to Japan entering into the Pacific War. At that time, one year after World War II broke out following Germany's invasion of Poland, the fierce Battle of Britain was being fought out. Above all, the conclusion of the alliance with Germany definitely meant that Japan had adopted an antagonistic position against the United Kingdom, and the United States. Within such a framework of alliance politics, Japan started taking steps toward war with the US and UK.

The origin of the three powers' alliance backed to the conclusion of Anti-Comintern Pact in November 1937. After that there were several negotiations among Germany, Italy and Japan to strengthen the pact from summer of 1938 to summer of 1939. Originally the Anti-Comintern Pact was "Anti-Soviet" pact, which intended the USSR as a potential enemy. However in the process of strengthening the pact, Germany proposed to place the UK and France on the list of their targets along with the USSR. Japan could not respond to that proposal, because the Japanese government was not able to bring the opinions of Army and Navy into agreement at that point: The Army was supportive of the suggestion because the USSR had always been their theoretical enemy; yet on the other hand, the Navy never accepted the position of their counterpart. Germany, which no longer had time to wait for Japan, finally signed the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the USSR in August of 1939, even though the USSR was the target of the Anti-Comintern Pact. As a result, the Japanese government gave up strengthening the pact.

In this report, I would first of all like to present the focus of the conflict between the Japanese Imperial Army and Navy in the negotiations of strengthening the Anti-Comintern Pact. To do so, I focus on what the issues among Japanese officials were while Japan and Germany were holding meetings for strengthening the Anti-Comintern Pact. Among the issues, I pay particular attention to the ideas of the Navy, which was a major force for opposition to strengthen the Pact. Next, there are a number of questions to answer: What were the ideas of Navy generals about Germany and Italy as alliance partners?; What were their ideas about the USSR as a theoretical enemy in the Pact?; and What were their ideas about France and the UK, especially the latter, as suggested new targets in the discussions on the development of the Pact? The last question is: How did the ideas of the Navy influence their

opposition on the development of the Pact?

That notwithstanding, the Navy supported the Tripartite Pact when Japan actually concluded it in September of 1940. There are a number of questions regarding this. What made Navy officials change their positions? It has been confirmed that the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact was driven by the idea to develop it into the Four Parties Pact including the USSR. Did this process influence the Navy in approving the conclusion of the Pact? What about the Army? The Soviet Union was always their theoretical enemy: What were their ideas on the Four Parties Pact?

As the goal for this paper, along with answering all the above questions, I would like to examine the military and strategic significance of the Tripartite Pact which Japan finally concluded with the intention of involving the Soviet Union in the Pact.

Session 2

The Tripartite Pact and the Soviet Union

Vassili E. Molodiakov

Analyzing relations between the USSR and the Tripartite Pact of Germany, Italy and Japan this author would focus his attention on two points. Was any political or military cooperation or partnership between them possible? Did any possibility of a Eurasian continental bloc of Germany, USSR, Italy and Japan exist?

Historically the Tripartite Pact of 1940 developed from the Anti-Comintern Pact (Agreement) of 1936. The principal author of the Anti-Comintern Pact Joachim von Ribbentrop wanted this agreement to be directed against the Soviet Union as a country and broadly against Communism as ideology, world political force and propaganda tool. His Japanese counterpart Hiroshi Oshima preferred a political pact against the USSR. The Soviet Union saw in this document a union of aggressors preparing a new war.

In 1938-1939 Nazi Germany tried to strengthen the Anti-Comintern Agreement into political and military bloc. Political ideas and actions of Ribbentrop, now Nazi Foreign Minister, became more and more anti-British. He needed possible partners against the Great Britain and France so he began to think not only about Japan but also about... the Soviet Union. During the Nomonhan Incident of 1939 Nazi Germany did not support Japan, but normalized relations with Moscow and concluded with it the Non-Aggression Pact. It was the first step in the direction of a possible Eurasian continental bloc.

At the time, when the Tripartite Pact was concluded (September 26, 1940), relations between the Soviet Union and Germany were one of partnership, but both sides had some doubts about each other. Relations between the Soviet Union and Italy were spoiled by the Soviet-Finnish Winter War but then improved again with German help. Soviet-Japanese relations normalized just after the Nomonhan Incident. So the possibility of political cooperation between the Axis Powers and the Soviet Union existed.

Viacheslav Molotov's official visit to Berlin in November 1940 became the turning point. Hitler proposed him a direct cooperation with the Axis and Ribbentrop even drafted a treaty. Stalin and Molotov agreed to cooperate with some conditions. Soviet proposals were businesslike but Hitler was not disposed to discuss any counter-proposals at all. He did not answer Stalin's plan and decided to attack the USSR.

In spring 1941 Stalin realized that any bloc with Germany was out of question. Because of it, or

even in spite of it, he concluded the Neutrality Pact with Japan. This treaty became the last major event in the history of cooperation between the Tripartite Pact and the Soviet Union. And Japan did not join Germany in the war against the USSR.

We can conclude that political cooperation and partnership between the Axis Powers and the Soviet Union was at least possible. Eurasian continental bloc did not materialize mainly because of Hitler's position.

Concluding Address Speaker

Japanese Alliance Policy in the 20th Century

Ryoichi Tobe

There were ten treaties of alliance which Japan concluded in the 20th century. In chronological order they are the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902), the Russo-Japanese Alliance (or the 4th Russo-Japanese treaty, 1916), the Sino-Japanese mutual defense agreement (1918), the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol (1932), the Tripartite Pact (1940), the Japan-Thailand Alliance (1941), the Japan-Burma Alliance (1943), the Japan-Philippines Alliance (1943), the Sino-Japanese Alliance (1943), and the Japan-US Alliance (1951). Without taking short term alliances during two World Wars into account, I would like to examine following four cases: Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan-Manchukuo Protocol, Tripartite Pact, and Japan-US Alliance.

When examining alliance policies, it is important to focus on three points: (1) the process of making alliance, (2) its maintenance and management, and (3) its termination. Many researchers have paid a lot of attention to the process of making alliances. It can be said that the purposes or motives for an alliance, and the reasons for the successful conclusion of it are very important research questions in disciplines such as diplomatic history and international politics. There are still other important points. Taking into account the power balance between allies as one condition in making an alliance, for example, then the Tripartite Pact was the only case in which all parties were equal in terms of power. The Anglo-Japanese alliance was the alliance which was based on an imbalance of power between the most powerful country in the world and the emerging country in the Far East. The alliance between Japan and Manchukuo was between a protector-power and a dependency. The Japan-US alliance was originally similar to the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol in terms of power: one was an occupying state, and the other was the occupied.

Some of the conditions for a conclusion of alliances and their purposes vary over time. This raises the question: how can we maintain and manage an alliance accompanied by such change? On this question there is a study by Kikujiro Ishii: he insisted the importance of maintaining the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, although he was sarcastic enough to call it “*tokonoma no kazarimono*” (a respected but useless object). Formally the alliance had been valid for twenty years with Japan and the UK renewing it twice. The Japan-US Alliance is still valid, even tho

ugh they have renewed it only once, ten years after its original conclusion. It could be said that the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol and the Tripartite Pact became void without any difficult situations for their maintenance and management. The former alliance was not even recognized for what it actually was.

Few scholars have paid attention to the question of terminating alliances: in other words, why and when alliances are ended? This could also be as important a question as those regarding conclusion and maintenance. It might simply be said that parties abrogate an alliance when it becomes difficult to observe and implement it. Is this the only reason? It was only the Anglo-Japanese Alliance among the four alliances which Japan terminated by means of a clear decision. In the cases of the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol and the Tripartite Pact, Japan's allies virtually disappeared.

In this report, I would like to examine the characteristics of Japanese alliance policies in the 20th century, while taking into account the above three major points.