

Paper Abstracts in English

Change and Continuity: A Study on the Role of the Japanese Cavalry

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Abstract:

The cavalry of the Imperial Japanese Army was integrated with tanks in 1941 to form armor. Why did it become possible to abolish the cavalry, which had played certain roles in the Imperial Japanese Army for about 70 years? I have examined the question from the perspective of combat styles.

The roles of the cavalry included reconnaissance, security, raiding parties, and combat. These roles were solidified during the Meiji period, and they did not change until the cavalry were abolished.

The cavalry referred to themselves as a “mobile combat arm,” and they were characterized by their mobility and independent combat capabilities. However, the reality is that they tended to think of themselves as a “horse-mounted combat arm.”

The Taisho period onward saw the rise of mechanized and armored units, such as aircraft and tanks. Aircraft began to share the role of reconnaissance with cavalry. Aircraft also reduced the importance of cavalry raiding parties. Tanks were initially deployed by the Japanese Army in the role of direct infantry support. Subsequent research and success in actual combat then led to tanks gaining the status of a “mobile combat arm.”

Thus, aircraft, tanks, and similar vehicles reduced the importance of cavalry. However, around 1940, the development of aircraft and tanks was still an ongoing process in terms of operational methods and quantity, and they had not yet made cavalry unnecessary.

Unlike the development of aircraft and tanks, the development of cavalry was limited. The development of battlefield firepower along with the development of science and technology since the mid-19th century had made it difficult for cavalry to perform its characteristic function as a mobile combat arm. In order to reclaim that characteristic function, cavalry needed to increase its firepower and armaments to a degree that would not be transportable by horse — in other words, it needed to mechanize. However, the cavalry did not immediately arrive at mechanization as the

answer. There had been debate for a long time — since the Meiji period — in *Kaikosha Kiji* (Military Club Journal) and *Kihei Kyoiku no Sanko* (Cavalry Education Reference) about what cavalry should be and whether cavalry was even necessary in the first place.

The debate over the nature of cavalry began to take on a new dimension around 1935. Up to that point, the discussion had been based on the position that cavalry was a “horse-mounted combat arm,” but afterward, the discussion shifted to the position that cavalry was a “mobile arm.” This was also a reinterpretation of cavalry tradition. It allowed the cavalry to reimagine their own traditions in a way that was compatible with armor.

The main factors that made the abolition of cavalry possible were the fact that only mechanization could resolve the conflict between cavalry’s own position as a mobile combat arm and the actual environment; the fact that armored unit combat could be interpreted as being essentially the same as cavalry combat; and the fact that these matters were known within the cavalry through journal discussions.

The Roles Played by US Military Assistance Advisory Group in Japan

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Abstract:

The Military Assistance Advisory Group Japan (MAAGJ) was established on June 7, 1954. This organization was a U.S. military advisory body that had been in existence since the Civil Affairs Section Annex (CASA) was established under the General Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ) at the time of the establishment of the National Police Reserve, and it has since undergone reorganization and renaming. It was created to support the development of the Self-Defense Forces, which were to be inaugurated the following month.

There already exists a study focused on MAAGJ and other military advisory bodies: *The Birth of the Self-Defense Forces: Japan's Remilitarization and the United States* (Chuko Shinsho, 2004) by Hiroshi Masuda. However, that work is focused on the period from the National Police Reserve to the establishment of the SDF, and it only discusses the very early activities of MAAGJ. There are many studies on Japan's rearmament from the perspectives of political and diplomatic history and security policy history, but MAAGJ is sparingly mentioned in those studies. As far as I can see, there are no studies that focus on the role that MAAGJ played in Japan's rearmament. Therefore, in this study, I have attempted to clarify the real picture of MAAGJ based on previous research on Japan's rearmament, using primary historical documents from the United States as source material.

In this study, I first review MAAGJ as an organization and clarify its characteristics. During its early years, with anti-American and anti-base sentiment on the rise, MAAGJ was transferred from the Far East Command to the U.S. embassy, and its personnel was reduced. A Maritime Department and Air Force Department were newly established to support the various SDF service branches together with the Ground Department, but since 90% of personnel were from the Ground Department, MAAGJ's main activities consisted of education and training support for the Ground SDF.

The main focus of that support was to create a sense of ownership on the part of Japan in order to encourage the slow progress of strengthening Japan's military. For this reason, the support plan was essentially formulated on the basis of requests from the Japanese side, and the participation of SDF officers in the planning process as well

as the giving of assignments to those who completed the training were requested in order to increase the sense of participation among trained personnel and to maximize the training results.

However, with the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Japan, changes in the U.S. perception of the situation, and progress in the development of Japan's defense capabilities, the focus of these activities shifted to the expansion of equipment or support for the development of maritime and air defense capabilities. This trend accelerated around the year 1960, when the U.S., which was experiencing a deterioration in its international balance of payments, adopted a policy of offsetting the cost of U.S. forces in Japan with the sale of American-made weapons (a military offset strategy) as a means of remedying the situation. MAAGJ was now expected to be a liaison for equipment-related cooperation, including equipment provision planning, Japan-U.S. negotiations, and support for education and training on the proper operation and maintenance of equipment. Then, in July of 1969, MAAGJ was reorganized as the Mutual Defense Assistance Office (MDAO), concluding 15 years of operation. Although some points remain unclear about MAAGJ's operations at the end of its life, it seems that MAAGJ's role as a liaison for Japan-U.S. equipment-related cooperation continued until that role was taken over by the MDAO, since the U.S., whose international balance of payments had again begun to deteriorate following the start of the Vietnam War in 1965, had begun to demand full-scale military offsets from Japan.

**Establishment Process of Japan Ground Self-Defense Force's
"5 Armies and Military District System"**

HIDA Daisuke

Abstract:

This paper examines the events leading to the creation of Japan Ground Self-Defense Force's (JGSDF) Army and the subsequent establishment process of the 5 Armies and Military District System (hereinafter referred to as the five-Army system).

Since the formation of the five-Army system (Northern, North Eastern, Eastern, Middle, and Western) in January 1960, the Army has remained the largest units in the Ground Self-Defense Force without any change in their number or deployment to date.

The Northern Army, formed in October 1952 at the time of the establishment of the National Safety Force (NSF), was the first Army. It was followed by the formation of the Western Army in December 1955, around the same time as the establishment of the SDF. The following two problems arose at this time.

One was the problem of how to organize the chain of command and how to make the complex and diverse operations of the Defense Agency and the Ground Staff Office more efficient, given the increase in JGSDF units and departments compared to when the National Police Reserve was established. The other was the problem of how to review the role and organization of the Army Headquarters, which had been put in charge of defense administration duties. This was also related to the similar transfer of the duties of the Regional Force, which had also been responsible for defense administration, to higher-level headquarters (Army Headquarters) so that the Regional Force could concentrate on their original role as mobile operations units.

In order to resolve these issues, the Defense Agency and Ground Staff Office began to study the adoption of a Military District system that would position the Army (Army Headquarters) between themselves and the Regional Force, establish a system for enabling orders to be given to units and departments nationwide through those Armies, and clarify the division of defense administration responsibilities. With regard to establishing Armies, the Ground Staff Office probably intended to establish seven or so Armies at first, but because they had to stay within the framework of JGSDF, that number was reduced to five. The Military District system also faced several problems, such as how to determine the powers of the Army Headquarters.

These diverse problems were sorted out and resolved, and the five-Army system came into effect on January 14, 1960. With the introduction of the Military District system, the command system, the role and organization of the Army Headquarters, and the impact of defense administration on the Regional Force were improved, and the command functions for the defense, security, and defense administration of the Army districts were significantly strengthened.

Later, when JGSDF was considering the establishment of a new central headquarters for the Ground Component Command, there was discussion within the Ground Staff Office about the possibility of reducing the number of Armies, but JGSDF kept the Military District system unchanged, and it still has the same number and deployment of Armies as it did when the Military District system was introduced. It could be said that the establishment of the five-Army system was an important turning point for JGSDF in terms of defense security and defense force improvement.